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re ASEAN, Burma, and Denuclearisati



Subject: re ASEAN, Burma, and Denuclearisation of Pacific

I  post this for people who might find the Free Burma policy line of 
Foreign Minister EVANS of  AUSTRALIA and others and their  concern for 
the denuclearisation of the Pacific Asean region, including Burma, now 
under Slorc control,  and in the future of a free peace-loving Burma 
state. 

I hope readers find this issue as interesting as the motive for passing 
it on to those with the objective for the debate towards a free 
non-nuclear ASEAN pacific region. 

I welcome readers to inform me of other sites and groups on the NET who 
are actively pursuing disarmment and nuclear nonproliferation research 
and policies to please inform us here in Paris as we are compiling 
database information for future dissemination. 

No need to remind any of us that the Net?s origin was in the military and 
nuclear, and we hope its future lay in the  demilitarisation and 
non-nuclear. If that?s not dreaming, maybe intelligent use of information 
may make it a little closer to reality. Thank you.

Dawn Star, Paris 


 NEWSLETTERS FROM DFAX <dfax@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
< fhit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
 Subject: Disarmament Diplomacy No.2, 2/96   Pt 4

DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY
Issue No. 2 --  February 1996
 =====================================
 
 *******                PART 4/6               *******
 
 The threshold and undeclared nuclear weapon States
 
 A central threat to the objective of non-proliferation is posed by
 the position of the threshold and undeclared nuclear weapon
 States... their continued refusal to join the NPT regime is of
 grave intrinsic concern not only in terms of proliferation, but
 also in terms of other key aspects of progress towards nuclear
 disarmament, not least reductions by nuclear weapon States and the
 conclusion of major multilateral instruments such as a CTBT.
 
 Accordingly, a major challenge is to close the gap which exists
 between those States - both nuclear and non-nuclear - which have
 supported and continue to support the NPT regime, and those few
 States who do not only remain outside it but whose policies
 directly challenge it. Action to address this situation - to
 achieve the universalisation of NPT obligations - must include
 consideration of the NPT opponents' security concerns, and an
 associated demonstration that possession by them of a nuclear
 weapon capability diminishes, rather than enhances, their
 security. ...
 
 It must be recognised that the universal acceptance of non-
 proliferation obligations through membership of the NPT will be
 essential to all three stockpile reduction processes to which I
 have referred - i.e. by US-Russia, by all five declared nuclear
 powers, and by the threshold/undeclared States. ..."
 

 Press Conference by Foreign Minister Evans and Commission Chair
 Sir Richard Butler
 Transcript of press conference by Senator Gareth Evans and
 Ambassador Richard Butler at the conclusion of the first meeting
 of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,
 Canberra, 25 January 1996
 
 Extracts from remarks by Gareth Evans
 
 "[I want to comment on] the recurring suggestion...that this
 enterprise really is a bit naive, romantic, quixotic in nature,
 and that really we'd be rather better off focusing just on the non-
 proliferation objective: in fact, as someone kindly suggested
 earlier in the week, we ought to re-name the Commission the
 'Canberra Commission to do a Bit More to Curb Proliferation', and
 abandon this romantic aspiration to actually achieve elimination.
 
 Can I just say...that that sort of comment fundamentally and
 comprehensively misses the central point of the whole enterprise.
 And that is that if we are going to get somewhere with the
 proliferation problem...then the present nuclear weapon States
 simply have to get serious, and be seen to be getting serious, on
 the subject of actual elimination. It's just not going to happen
 otherwise."
 
 "The timing of it I think is something that has been in the back
 of my mind for a while, but it was really only in the context of
 the French tests and the international reaction to it, that it
 seemed to us that the international environment was right for a
 major exercise of this kind, with consciousness roused in the way
 that it is. I don't undervalue or underestimate the task of
 maintaining that level of consciousness. Bob McNamara expressed
 himself very disappointed, I think understandably, at the way in
 which the Stimson Report*, just two or three weeks ago in the
 United States, signed by four Four-Star Generals and arguing the
 case for elimination, disappeared without trace in the context of
 current American politics. You have got to keep working away."
 
 Extracts from remarks by Sir Richard Butler
 
 "Question: 'You've said the Commission had agreed that it would
 set out the practical steps that would need to be taken but how
 much agreement is there on what those practical steps should be?'
 
 Sir Richard: 'Substantial agreement. We've got a list that we call
 an 'action plan' which begins at the beginning, which is to
 encourage and facilitate the further development by those who hold
 nuclear weapons of measures through which they will eliminate
 them. And then moves on to an end to testing, a cut-off in the
 manufacture of fissile material for weapons purposes. In other
 words the things you do to prevent those who might want to from
 making new nuclear weapons and then move on to the agreements that
 we will need to ensure that clandestine and criminal activity
 doesn't take place. They're the three legs of the stool, the
 logical ones. Get rid of what already exists, prevent from coming
 into existence what people might plan, and to stop extra-systemic
 or criminal activity. Now these steps together with the means of
 creating them, verifying them and then putting them into a global
 compact...has been agreed to. I have a piece of paper that's
 called 'Steps in Action Plan'. We will need to articulate the
 detail of it. We'll do that in April. But there is complete
 agreement about those and I emphasise again, under the guiding
 principle that the goal of this is zero, I can't emphasise to you
 strongly enough how important that is; not reductions, not down to
 a chosen few to hold an evil few weapons, but zero.'"
 * An Evolving US Nuclear Posture, Second Report of the Steering
 Committee Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, The
 Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 19, December 1995. The report
 concludes: "The prospects for a nuclear-free world may be decades
 over the horizon. But it certainly could be achieved in one or two
 generations. The history of world politics since 1945 shows
 clearly that radical changes are possible in such a timeframe.
 Regardless of the amount of time required, it is virtually certain
 that the world will never be free of nuclear risks without a
 serious political commitment to the objective of progressively
 eliminating weapons of mass destruction from all countries. The
 time to start is now."
 
 The Editor would like to thank the Australian High Commission in
 London for provision of the documentation featured above.
 
 US STATE DEPARTMENT START II FACT SHEET
 State Department Fact Sheet, Treaty on the Further Reduction and
 Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), 1 February 1996
 
 Full text
 
 "What is START II?
 
 The START II treaty is a bilateral treaty negotiated by the United
 States and Russia during 1991 and 1992. It was signed by
 Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on January 3, 1993.
 
 START II builds on the foundation of START I to create an
 equitable and effectively verifiable agreement that reduces the
 number of strategic delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles and
 heavy bombers) and the number of warheads deployed on them.
 Overall strategic forces will be reduced by 5,000 warheads in
 addition to the 9,000 warheads being reduced under START I.
 
 Key Provisions of START II
 
 Because START II builds upon the START I treaty, START I remains
 in effect. START II will remain in force throughout the duration
 of START I, which has a 15-year duration and can be extended for
 successive 5-year periods by agreement among the Parties to the
 treaty.
 
 START II sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear
 weapons that each Party may deploy. The final ceilings will be
 reached in two phases. Phase One is to be completed seven years
 after entry into force of the START I treaty (which was December
 5, 1994). Phase Two is to be completed by 2003. However, Phase Two
 may be completed by the end of 2000 if the United States is able
 to provide financial assistance for the elimination of strategic
 offensive arms in Russia.
 
 By the end of the first phase, each Party must have reduced the
 total number of its deployed strategic warheads to 3,800-4,250.
 This includes warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic
 missiles (ICBMs), warheads on submarine-launched ballistic
 missiles (SLBMs), and the warheads carried on heavy bombers with
 nuclear missions. No more than 1,200 warheads may be on deployed
 ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs); no more than 2,160
 on deployed SLBMs; and no more than 650 may be on deployed heavy
 ICBMs.
 
 By the end of the second and final phase, each Party must have
 reduced the total number of its deployed strategic warheads to
 3,000-3,500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMs, including
 heavy ICBMs. No MIRVed ICBMs will be deployed by the end of the
 second phase. No more than 1,700-1,750 warheads may be on deployed
 SLBMs. There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.
 
 Downloading
 
 START II allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on
 certain existing MIRVed ballistic missiles. This is called
 "downloading." Such downloading will be permitted in a carefully
 structured fashion, which is a slight variation from the rules
 agreed in START I.
 
 * Each side will be able to download two existing types of
 ballistic missiles by up to four warheads each.
 
 * No more than 105 ICBMs of one of those types may be downloaded
 by up to five warheads each. Such an ICBM may only be deployed in
 silos in which it was deployed at the time the two START treaties
 were signed.
 
 Thus, the three-warhead US Minuteman III ICBM, the four-warhead
 Russian SS-17 ICBM, and 105 of the six-warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs
 may be downloaded to a single warhead, to comply with the
 requirement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs.
 
 The Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM and launchers for the SS-24 ICBM
 would be destroyed. SS-24 ICBMs would be eliminated in accordance
 with START procedures.
 
 Missile-System Elimination
 
 In START I, deployed SLBMs and most deployed ICBMs may be removed
 from accountability either by destroying their launchers or, with
 the exception of SS-18 silos, by converting the launcher so that
 it is only capable of launching another type of missile. Moreover,
 154 SS-18 silos must be eliminated through destruction under START
 I.
 
 Under START II, those rules will continue to apply, but with the
 major exception of the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be converted
 to launch a single-warhead ICBM, which Russia has said will be a
 variant of the SS-25. The START II treaty provisions specify
 conversion procedures which are subject to inspection and which
 are virtually irreversible without destroying the silo.
 
 In addition to the elimination or conversion of SS-18 silo
 launchers, all SS-18 ICBMs, whether deployed or non-deployed, must
 be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003. This is a major
 improvement on START I, which did not require the destruction of
 silo-based missiles. Moreover, this provision achieves the long-
 standing US goal of totally eliminating heavy ICBMs.
 
 Heavy Bombers
 
 Under START II, heavy bombers will be attributed as carrying the
 actual number of weapons - whether long-range air-launched cruise
 missiles (ALCMs), short-range missiles, or gravity bomb - for
 which they are equipped. This number is specified in the treaty's
 Memorandum of Attribution and is subject to confirmation by a one-
 time exhibition of the bombers and by on-site inspections.
 
 This attribution formula is another improvement over START I.
 Under START I, the first 150 US heavy bombers equipped to carry
 long-range ALCMs are attributed with 10 warheads; each bomber in
 excess of the 150 would be attributed with the actual number of
 long-range ALCMs it is equipped to carry. For the former Soviet
 Union, the first 150 heavy bombers are attributed with eight
 warheads; each heavy bomber in excess of 150 would be attributed
 with the number of long-range ALCMs it is equipped to carry. For
 both Parties, all heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons
 other than long-range ALCMs are attributed with one warhead each.
 
 Up to 100 heavy bombers that were equipped for nuclear arms other
 than long-range ALCMs may be reoriented to a conventional role and
 exempted from accountability under START II. Such bombers will be
 based separately from heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear
 weapons, they will be used only for non-nuclear missions, and they
 must have observable features that differentiate them from nuclear-
 equipped heavy bombers of the same type. If these heavy bombers
 are returned to a nuclear role, which is permitted, they will
 become accountable under START II and may not be returned to their
 exempted status.
 
 Verification
 
 The comprehensive, intrusive START I verification regime also will
 apply to START II. Additionally, START II has new verification
 measures. These include the following:
 
 * Observation of the conversion of SS-18 silos;
 
 * Observation of SS-18 eliminations;
 
 * Exhibitions of heavy bombers to allow confirmation of capacity;
 and
 
 * Exhibition of reoriented bombers to confirm their observable
 differences.
 
 Moreover, reentry vehicle inspections (RVOSI) will allow
 inspectors visual access to the front ends of ICBMs and SLBMs to
 verify that the numbers of warheads attributed to those systems
 match the number deployed on them."
 
 US DISCLOSURES ON PLUTONIUM EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND STOCKS
 
 See also News Review.
 
 The disclosures were made at a Department of Energy (DoE) press
 conference on 6 February.
 
 Press Release
 Department of Energy Press Release, 'Openness', 6 February 1996
 Extracts
 Policy of openness
 "Openness: An Administration Policy
 
 President Clinton has said that 'an informed citizenry is
 essential to the democratic process and...the more the American
 people know about their government the better they will be
 governed. Openness in Government is essential to
 accountability...'
 
 Acting on this belief, on 17 April, 1995, President Clinton signed
 Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information.
 This Order emphasizes the Administration's commitment to open
 Government while recognizing that the national interest requires
 that certain information must be maintained in confidence...
 
 In recent years dramatic changes have altered, although certainly
 not eliminated, the national security threats that we confront.
 These changes provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our
 commitment to open Government.
 
 Openness in the Department of Energy: A Unique Opportunity and
 Challenge
 
 ... A strong commitment to openness is particularly important at
 the Department of Energy. A tradition of secrecy affects progress
 on key missions, particularly cleanup of nuclear weapon
 facilities, disposition of nuclear weapon materials, and stemming
 nuclear proliferation. ...
 
 ... Executive Order 12958 sets a new direction towards a more open
 Government, but it only applies to one kind of classified
 information, called National Security Information. The Department
 of Energy, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is responsible for
 another kind of classified information called Restricted Data (and
 'Formerly Restricted Data'...). These kinds of information do not
 fall under the scope of Executive Order 12958. They concern
 nuclear weapon-related technology and have long been recognized as
 being so sensitive as to warrant the special protection that are
 provided by classification as Restricted Data and Formerly
 Restricted Data.
 
 As a result, in order to fulfill President Clinton's commitment to
 Government openness, the Department of Energy must not only
 implement the President's Executive Order must also help redirect
 the policies and procedures governing the Government-wide
 classification and declassification programs for Restricted Data
 and Formerly Restricted Data.
 
 The Department of Energy is taking a wide variety of measures to
 deliver on the commitment to a more open Government. ..."
 
 Plutonium disclosures
 
 "'Plutonium: The First 50 Years'
 
 The Department is releasing a formerly classified report,
 'Plutonium: The First 50 Years,' concerning the production,
 acquisition, use, disposition, and inventories of plutonium in the
 United States over the past 50 years. In unprecedented fashion,
 the report announces the following:
 
 * Plutonium produced in the United States.
 
 * Plutonium acquired from foreign countries.
 
 * Transfer of United States-origin plutonium to foreign countries.
 
 * Plutonium expended as a result of various processes.
 
 With respect to plutonium inventories, the Department is
 announcing the Government's total inventory of plutonium, 99.5
 metric tons, which includes the holdings of both the Department of
 Energy and Department of Defense. This newly declassified data is
 incorporated into the report, 'Plutonium: The First 50 Years.' In
 1993, the Department declassified and revealed that the United
 States plutonium inventory was 33.5 metric tons. However, this
 total excluded the quantities at the Pantex Plant in Texas and in
 the Department of Defense stockpile, which is revealed today for
 the first time.
 
 The information publicly released for the first time today is
 directly relevant to the current debate about the proper
 management and ultimate disposition of plutonium. ... In addition,
 the release of information by the United States should encourage
 other nuclear powers, such as Russia, to declassify and publicly
 release similar information.
 
 Declassification provides multi-level transparency which is
 necessary as the basis for developing the mutual trust needed to
 successfully conduct any meaningful, international negotiations.
 Declassification is important to conducting meaningful bilateral
 inspections at current or former nuclear facilities under arms
 control and reduction agreements, such as the Strategic Arms
 Reduction Treaty. It is also essential for the granting of access
 to inspectors as required under the provisions of international
 safeguards and non-proliferation agreements. That access builds
 trust and helps to develop mutual confidence between nations
 thereby reducing the risk of conflict.
 
 The quantities of plutonium and uranium listed in the Fact Sheets
 are based upon the best available records, some of which are very
 old. Re-evaluation of the original records may result in some
 revision of the quantities.
 
 Since the Department has received numerous inquiries from the
 public, a similar report will be written about the production,
 use, disposition, and inventories of highly enriched uranium
 covering the last 50 years and will be released in about 1 year."
 
 Figures
 
 Exports of plutonium
 To Argentina: less than 1 kilogram (kg) between 1969-80
 Australia: 6.4kg, 1960-70
 Austria: less than 1kg, 1960-65
 Belgium: 11.8kg, 1957-91
 Brazil: 1kg, 1963-78
 Canada: 3.5kg, 1957-90
 Columbia: 1kg, 1964
 Czechoslovakia: less than 1kg, 1977-82
 Denmark: 1kg, 1959-63
 Finland: less than 1kg, 1975-79
 France: 41.5kg between 1957-91
 Greece: less than 1kg, 1963
 IAEA: less than 1kg, 1964-94
 India: 1kg, 1968-73
 Iran: 1kg, 1967
 Iraq: less than 1kg, 1975
 Ireland: less than 1kg, 1963
 Israel: less than 1kg, 1960-69
 Italy: 2.3kg, 1960-78
 Japan: 113.5kg, 1962-91
 Mexico: less than 1kg, 1967-73
 Netherlands: less than 1kg, 1960-82
 New Zealand: 1kg, 1961
 Norway: less than 1kg, 1958-66
 Pakistan: 1kg, 1965-72
 Philippines: less than 1kg, 1962
 Portugal: less than 1kg, 1980
 South Africa: less than 1kg, 1965
 South Korea: less than 1kg, 1961-89
 South Vietnam: 1kg, 1962
 Spain: less than 1kg, 1963-67
 Sweden: 9.3kg, 1957-84
 Taiwan: 1kg, 1959-1973
 Thailand: 1kg, 1962
 Turkey: less than 1kg, 1961-66
 United Kingdom: 33.9kg, 1974-88
 Uruguay: 1kg, 1965
 Venezuela: less than 1kg, 1960
 West Germany: 518.1kg, 1961-89
 Source: DoE figures, featured in US sent ton of plutonium to 39
 countries, New York Times, 6 February.
 
 Storage sites and waste deposits
 Argonne West: 4 metric tons (MT) of plutonium; 0.002 MT of waste
 Hanford: 11 MT of plutonium, 1.522 MT of waste
 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory: 0.5 MT of plutonium, 1.106
 MT of waste
 Lawrence Livermore: 0.3 MT of plutonium
 Los Alamos: 2.7 MT of plutonium, 0.61 MT of waste
 Nevada Test Site: 0.016 MT of waste
 Oak Ridge: 0.041 MT of waste
 Pantex (Energy and Defense Departments): 66.1 MT of plutonium
 Rocky Flats: 12.7 MT of plutonium, 0.047 MT of waste
 Savannah River: 2 MT of plutonium, 0.575 MT of waste
 Source: DoE figures, featured in US plutonium inventory is nearly
 100 metric tons, Washington Post, 7 February.
 
 REMARKS BY US ACDA DIRECTOR
 Remarks by John Holum, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency (ACDA), Non-Proliferation Breakfast Meeting, Washington, 15
 February 1996
 
 Prepared remarks
 
 NPT
 
 "...as the NPT has been made permanent, quietly but emphatically,
 the world is also moving to make it universal. Four more countries
 have joined...since May. Those are Chile, Comoros, the United Arab
 Emirates and Vanuatu. And we hope that four more - Andorra,
 Angola, Djibouti and Oman - will join soon. And that would bring
 the total membership...to 185, and leave only five countries
 outside [Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan]. ... Obviously,
 the run-up to the NPT Review and Extension Conference brought in a
 number of additional countries, and that trend has continued
 since. It's a very important but little noticed trend..."
 
 South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ)
 
 "We've explained to ASEAN States that the latest text of the
 Treaty and Protocol still does not meet all of our fundamental
 concerns. We hope those concerns will be adequately addressed
 because we want very much to take part in that Treaty as well. We
 want that because the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zones are
 mutually reinforcing. ..."
 
 Questions and answers
 
 Timetabled programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons
 
 "...my strong belief [is] that the notion of establishing an
 imposed timetable for complete elimination of nuclear weapons...is
 a way to stall, rather than advance, the cause of disarmament.
 This Administration...has made clear our support for the ultimate
 goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. ... If we say we want it all
 at once, we want it established now that it will all be done by a
 certain period, you will gum up and freeze the decision making
 process. The process is working... And...what I find most puzzling
 is the argument that we should stop the step-by-step approach just
 when it in fact has become the stride-by-stride approach. We are
 making enormous progress in arms control and disarmament..."
 
 Russian ratification of START II
 
 "I think ultimately it will be ratified because it is manifestly
 in Russia's interests. It will provide for true equality rather
 than the equality that is basically by formula in START I, where
 the counting rules on bombers favour the United States. It will
 provide for equality at force levels that the Russians can meet
 without starting up new production lines, and without replacing on
 [a] one-to-one basis weapons as they become obsolete, and without
 spending the enormous amounts that they would have to spend in
 order to build up to START I levels in the absence of an
 agreement.
 
 So I think the Treaty is of great value to Russia as well as to
 the United States. And I think that reality will ultimately
 prevail no matter what happens in the [June Presidential]
 elections. I think, however, delay has been costly and it makes it
 more problematic than it would have been had we...acted in a
 timely fashion last year."
 
 The ABM Treaty and the ballistic missile threat
 
 "I think it would be a serious mistake at this stage to withdraw
 from the ABM Treaty or to implicitly jettison the Treaty by
 mandating deployment of a national missile defense. I, therefore,
 am pleased with the new defense authorization bill... And the
 reason I say that...is because the ABM Treaty has enormous
 influence in the context of...ratifying and implementing both
 START I and START II. And...those treaties in combination are in
 fact an enormously effective, 100 per cent effective, national
 missile defense against the most deadly missile that the Russians
 had ever deployed, the SS-18, because every one of those
 missiles...will be completely eliminated without firing a shot and
 with absolute certainty, based on twelve different kinds of
 inspections. So, to jettison the ABM Treaty and thus jeopardize
 the START treaties...seems to me a bad policy, particularly when
 experts tell us that there is not...a ballistic missile threat to
 the United States from the so-called third country threats that
 are being discussed any time in the near-term future.
 
 ... I can't rule out the possibility...that some day this country
 may need a national missile defense... But this is not a subject
 that is being neglected. ...this isn't something where you'd wait
 seven or eight years and then move from a standing start. There is
 a great deal of R&D [Research & Development] and other work
 underway. ..."
 
 Possible sanctions against China
 
 Editor's note: the possibility arises (see News Review) over
 alleged sales to Pakistan of nuclear-weapons related technology.
 
 "I believe that sanctions have a very valuable, constructive
 role... Now, in terms of how they can be applied in specific
 cases, I think it's important for the Executive to have some
 flexibility... I think that, in the case of the Nonproliferation
 Prevention Act, Section 825, that Congress has...been fairly
 flexible, because it also includes a fairly broad waiver
 provision..."
 
 South Asia
 
 "...the situation in South Asia...is a very dangerous one...in
 terms of the time urgency of coming to terms with missile and
 nuclear potential. ... You have in both countries the ability
 within a short period of time to assemble nuclear weapons. You
 have two countries that are in the advanced stages of developing
 missile capabilities. And...what particularly concerns me is the
 juxtaposition [of] countries that are adjacent to each other and
 very close [in] missile and nuclear capabilities.
 
 And I base that [assessment] in part on our own experience. During
 the height of the Cold War...we...had warning times of any nuclear
 exchange of - what? - twenty minutes, [a] half hour, [something]
 in that range... In this case, because of proximity, the warning
 times with missiles would be less than reaction times, and that
 creates a very dangerous circumstance..."
 Source: Federal News Service Transcripts, 15 February 1996.
 
 REMARKS BY US DEFENSE SECRETARY
 Remarks of Defense Secretary William Perry at the Hoover Institute
 Board of Overseers Meeting, Madison Hotel, Washington DC, 31
 January 1996
 
 Extracts from Secretary Perry's address
 
 Dismantlement of nuclear weapons under START
 
 "I...never imagined that the Russian defense minister would help
 me blow up an American nuclear missile silo in Missouri, which we
 did three months ago. I've spent most of my career as a Cold
 Warrior trying to find ways to prevent Russians from blowing up
 nuclear silos. And there the two of us were, each of us putting a
 thumb down on the detonating device and causing this silo to blow
 up, pursuant to the START Treaty.
 
 I never imagined that I would help him and the Ukrainian defense
 minister blow up a missile silo in Ukraine, which we did just two
 weeks ago. We stood in the snow and ice at Programaisk [sic], and
 each of us turned a launch control key. These are the keys that
 were originally used to launch the missiles, and they had them
 rigged up so that s the three of us turned the key, the silo
 detonated.
 
 A year ago...this silo was one of 80 at Programaisk which in
 aggregate contained 700 nuclear warheads, all of them aimed at
 targets in the United States. Five months from now, by this June,
 the last of these warheads will have been removed and the missile
 field will have been turned into a wheat field.
 
 Indeed, over the past year, the Defense Department has not only
 destroyed thousands of American nuclear weapons, but it has helped
 dismantle and destroy thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons as part
 of a cooperative self-reduction program. We spend $400 million a
 year out of the defense budget helping the Russians and Ukrainians
 and Kazakhstanis dismantle and destroy their nuclear weapons
 complex.
 
 When I'm challenged by Congress, which I am, to justify the
 expenditure of defense funds for what some of them consider non-
 defensive purposes, I tell them that these programs are an example
 of defense by other means. That is, we are strengthening our own
 security by helping the Russians reduce their nuclear weaponry.
 These are the benefits of engagement."
 
 Extracts from question-and-answer session
 
 Ballistic missile proliferation and defence
 
 "Question: 'This morning's paper mentions that the Iranians are
 testing a Chinese cruise missile in the Gulf. While I know you're
 conducting efforts on the...supply side of these advanced missile
 technologies, like the Missile Technology Control Regime, do you
 think at some point it would be appropriate for the US to begin
 deployment of ballistic missile defense capabilities?'
 

 Secretary Perry: '... First, a key part of our policy to deal with
 proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is to try
 and make it as difficult as possible for countries like Iran to
 get them. We have been reasonably successful in that, but not
 totally successful.
 
 One of the leakage points is through technology coming into Iran
 from China. And one of the reasons for wanting to engage with
 China is that we can pursue a policy of trying to get them to stop
 that better by engaging with them than by being isolated from
 them. To this point...that policy has had moderate success, but it
 has not been completely successful, as evidenced by this cruise
 missile transfer to...Iran.
 
 So trying to restrict the sale of arms and the transfer of
 technology is something we will continue to pursue, but we cannot
 count on it being successful. And that gets to your second point,
 what do we do in terms of ballistic missile defense?
 
 We are pursuing, in my judgment robustly, vigorously, a so-called
 theater missile defense program in the United States which will
 give us the capability of defending US forces and US allies
 against medium-range ballistic missiles. We are moving
 towards...the production and deployment of this system on a high-
 priority schedule where the first of the new generation of such
 systems will begin their deployment in a few years.
 
 We're also working cooperatively with several of our allies -
 Japan, the United Kingdom, to name two of them - to formulate
 joint programs in ballistic missile defense in which we cooperate,
 we pool resources to arrive at a quicker and more economical
 ballistic missile defense for all countries involved.
 
 And finally, we are in the development phase of a national missile
 defense program, which has very limited objectives. It is to
 protect ourselves against the very small-scale attack that might
 come from a rogue nation getting a hold of some missiles and
 perhaps getting a hold of some nuclear warheads. We don't see that
 last threat as being a likely threat. Nevertheless, we are
 pursuing the development of a system. We will...be three years
 from now in a position to make a deployment decision. That is, if
 three years from now we decide to deploy a system, it will be far
 enough on its development that we can begin on production and
 deployment. It will take another three years to get that system
 deployed and in the field. So we are six years away from the
 deployment of a national missile defense system if we elect to
 make that deployment decision three years from now.
 
 ...the short-range, medium-range ballistic missile threat is upon
 us now, and therefore the very sharp emphasis in our missile
 defense program is on what we call theater missile defense...'"
 Source: Federal News Service Transcripts, 31 January.
 
 *******            END OF PART 4/6               *******
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