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BurmaNet News March 10, 1996



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The BurmaNet News: March 10, 1996
Issue #358

HEADLINES:
==========
THE HINDU:  SUU KYI CAUTIONS INVESTORS
S.H.A.N. : SHAN STATE - AFTER THE DEAL OF THE DECADE
FBC: HARVARD UNDERGRAD COUNCIL PASSED BURMA RESOLUTION
NATION: CONFUSION SURROUNDS KHUN SA'S NEW LIFE IN BURMA
INDEPENDENT REPORT: SITUATION IN MAE SOT AND CAMPS
BUREAU FOR INTL NARCOTICS CONTROL: REPORT ON BURMA
ANNOUNCEMENT: BURMA & US CONGRESS INFO. NETWORK
ANNOUNCEMENT: US REPORTS ON DRUGS & HUMAN RIGHTS
ANNOUNCEMENT: MASSACHUSETTS BURMA ROUNDTABLE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE HINDU:  SUU KYI CAUTIONS INVESTORS
March 6, 1996

Yangon, March 5: The Nobel laureate and pro-democracy leader, Ms. Aung 
San Suu Kyi, today cautioned foreign investors that Myanmar did not have 
the kind of infrastructure to sustain economic development.

"They are working not only against the interests of the people of Burma,
but against their own long-term or medium-term interests. Even if they are 
looking at it only from the point of view of economic benefits, they must 
rethink  their strategy," she said in an interview here.

Dealing with the ASEAN ( Association of South East Asian Nations ) 
approach and investments in this country, Ms. Suu Kyi said  "I think they 
have this rather mistaken view that Burma has the potential to be another 
Singapore or Malaysia. They have only to look at the education system in 
Burma(to know) that there is no such thing."

Ms. Suu Kyi argued that more people had concluded that economic success 
was related to education. "If they see the education system or standard here, 
they will see that Burma is not about to become another Asian Tiger. There is 
just not the right kind of educational foundation for sustained development."

Ms. Suu Kyi urged them to study the conditions "below the surface" and
"not look at just the attractions" held out to them.  "There was no effort 
either to get the structures required for a sustained economic development in 
place."

Burmese economists, she noted, came to the conclusion that the economy had
either peaked already or was in recession.  "If it has peaked within four years, 
there is nothing much to write home about."

Though she was conscious that the ASEAN did not make democracy a 
prerequisite for admission of any member-state, Ms. Suu Kyi said "they 
will find that unless there are political changes in Burma, there can not be 
any sustained economic development they would like to see to make Burma 
the kindcof member they want it to be."

Democracy struggle will continue : Asked about her struggle for the restor-
ation of democracy, she said "It goes on. The National League for Democracy 
has been reorganised and revitalised. We want to work with the people and that 
is what we are doing."

Ms. Suu Kyi urged that the National Convention, drafting the so-called 
Constitution, does not opinion of the people, nor will it allow the will of
the people to be reflected in it.=94

The pro-democracy leader, speaking 10 months after she had been 
released from six-years incarceration here, made it clear that any constitution
that the present National Convention drafted would be "only a piece of paper."
 She asked "What is a Constitution if it does not enjoy the support of  the
people and has not been approved by them?"

Ms. Suu Kyi kept the old name Burma and did not recognise the new name, 
Myanmar, given by the military junta. She continues to receive visitors, 
delegates, students and academic at home. Week-nd meetings also continue, 
when she speaks to a few hundred people (sic: 2500-3000 people) from her 
gate in the University Avenue residence.

A semi-permanent "pandal" or hall is coming up within the premises for  
fortnightly lectures her party is organising for its cadre and youth. These
lectures cover literature, culture, history and even politics -  "to  broaden 
their outlook and vision.

Asked if she was not planning to travel across the country to meet and 
speak to more people, the Nobel Laureate said,  "We will be doing it, but 
there is no time-frame. People find it too costly to travel to Rangoon.  So 
we must reach out to them in the remote areas."

Did she fear being put under house arrest again?  "No. They (junta) do 
not work very logically. If they arrest me again, it will be good for democracy. 
More people will realise that there is no progress on the political front, only
some excuses."

Some of her supporters think that if Ms. Suu Kyi starts moving around and 
mobilising more people, she could be detained on the charge of trying to 
"incite"people - an allegation made against her at some stage during these 
past 10 months.

Ms. Suu Kyi thinks that by criticising her and her movement for democracy,
 the junta was only reminding the people of  their sufferings.

What about the dialogue she had asked for with the military leadership? No
movement again. But Ms. Suu Kyi said her party would soon come out with 
a  clear statement on this question, just as it took a decision on the National
Convention - from which the League pulled out last year.

On the developments in the Shan State - the Golden Triangle of the drug 
trade - she said it was "no more than a deal" with the druglord, Khun Sa, 
though no detail or its purpose was known. "He is only a drug-lord and no 
ethnic leader. So what is the deal. It only further erodes the credibility of this 
regime. Some people are saying laundered drug money is now being invested 
in booming construction activity in the bigger towns."

Despite the lack of progress on the road to democracy, Ms. Suu Kyi remains
calm, patient, hopeful and firmly committed to non-violence. The struggle 
will go on.

*************************************************

S.H.A.N. : SHAN STATE - AFTER THE DEAL OF THE DECADE
7 March 1996
<100706.1311@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

The military situation in Shan State seems, according to the SLORC's  news media
, to be fully under its control. But a S.H.A.N. team traveled to various
Thai/Shan border areas, talked and interviewed with concerned peoples in the
Shan resistance movements and filed a report which suggest the situation
otherwise.

According to the report, the west of Salween stretching from the southern part
of  Shan State  Mawkmai, to Muse to the North, is controlled by various Shan
resistance armies. Apart from that a chunk of area bordering Lao in the east and
Thailand in the south is also occupied by  ex-MTA troops led by Lern Kham.

The areas of influence and operation could be categorized as follows : 

1. Former MTA groups and their areas of influence and operation :

        Name                                  Leadership
area                           strength

1.1   SSNA                                  Karn Yord,Yi Kaw           Mongnai
to Hsipaw          ca. 5-6000
       ( Shan State National Army)
      
1.2  Committee for Peace              Lern Kham,Kham Pha     Mong Yawng,Pan Laio
ca. 15-2500
       ( East Salween )
Keng Larp to Tachilek

1.3  Yord Serk                             Yord Serk                     SSNA
area                       ca.  1000

1.4  BDE 273                              Khorh Ngern,Loi Khiao
Mongnai,mawkmai,            ca. 500-1000
                                                                                 
Namsang

1.5  BDE 8                                 Khun Aung Htun             Mong Nong,
Lai Kha          ca. 500

II.   MTA                                    Khun Sa                        Ho
Mong, Mong Mai           ca. 5000
      ( Mong Tai Army ) 

III. SSA                                     Sai Nong,Kai Hpa,          Hsipaw
to Muse ,Namkham  ca. 5000
     ( Shan State Army )               Pang Hpa

IV. PDF  ( Peace And Democratic Front )

4.1 UWSA                                 Chao Ngi Lai ,                Wa State
ca. 10-15000
     ( United Wa State Army )        Pao Yu Chang 

4.2 NDAA                                  Sai Lin, Sang Lu
Kengtung,Mong Yang           ca. 35-4000

4.3 MNDA                                 Yang Mu Lian                Ko Kang
ca. 15-2000

4.4 PSLA                                   ---------------
Nam Hsam                           ca. 7-800

The fusion of the SSA and SSNA, which was said to be renamed as SSNA has been
revoked. Instead it was agreed upon to go on using SSA for the combined forces.
Furthermore, the SSPP ( Shan State Progressive Party ) is renamed SSPC ( Shan
State Peacekeeping Council ) . It was learned that this decision was made not to
provoke the SLORC in particular.

Further reports indicated that the surrendering MTA troops were being loaded
into trucks and tranported to big towns such as Taunggyi, Lashio and Kengtung
where they were let free without any help or assistance, whatsoever. Many of
them find their way to SSNA, where most of them were well received. Thus,
boosting the strength of the SSNA further.

Meanwhile, the SLORC has been pressuring all the ceasefire groups to lay down
their arms as the MTA did. Recently, the indication to take a harder stand was
further strengthen by blocking the UWSA convoy coming down from the north to 
its southern base near Doi Lang, where years of armed clashes has been going on
between UWSA and MTA for the control of the strategic base. The fighting eased
down only after the MTA handed over the Doi Lang base to the Burmese forces in
late December last year. Since then, the SLORC has been asking the UWSA to
return to its base in Wa State, which was  flating refused.

Given such a hostile atmosphere between the ceasefire groups and the SLORC in
general, a Shan spokeman for newly formed Shan State Peacekeeping Council 
( SSPC), Who refused to be named said : " Our days of entering the open conflict 
with SLORC again might be just around the corner ".

Relaible sources also indicate that the Shans are sending selected troops to be
trained in urban guerrilla tactics somewhere within KNU area.

**********************************************

FBC: HARVARD UNDERGRAD COUNCIL PASSED BURMA RESOLUTION
March 8, 1996
>From Marco Simons (msimons@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)

Resolution 14S-17:  Free Burma Act (Simons), passed on March 3, 1996

Whereas Burma has been under military rule since 1962, and is currently
under a bloody regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), which has massacred thousands of civilians, arrested a Nobel
Peace Laureate, tortured many arrested activists, accelerated the
destruction of the Burmese environment, subjected thousands of civilians
to forced labor, sanctioned rape and murder by the armed forces, and
refused to recognize the government which was elected democratically in
1990;

Whereas members of the Parliament which was elected in 1990, as well as
Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition
National League for Democracy, have called upon the West not to invest
in Burma, and the exiled Prime Minister, Sein Win, has said that
investment "helps only the Burmese military, not the Burmese people";

Whereas under Burmese law all foreign corporations hiring more than five
employees must hire only from a government-supplied list, and Amnesty
International and others have reported that forced labor is used on foreign-
backed projects;

Whereas the United States House passed a resolution calling on the
U.S.A. to pressure the SLORC to move toward democracy and improve 
human rights, and the House and Senate are both considering bills to impose
sanctions on Burma;

Whereas cities such as Berkeley (CA), Madison (WI), and Santa Monica
(CA), have already passed selective purchasing laws against Burma, and
similar laws are pending in Cambridge and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts;

Whereas many corporations have already pulled out of Burma due to human
rights and other concerns, and Levi-Strauss stated after its pullout that
"it is not possible to do business in [Burma] without directly supporting
the military government and its pervasive violations of human rights";

Whereas Harvard University currently invests in corporations which invest
in Burma and purchases goods and services from such corporations;

Be it resolved that the Undergraduate Council shall not, wherever
possible, knowingly purchase goods or services from corporations which
invest in Burma, also known as Myanmar, and that the most recent report
from the Investor Responsibility Research Center shall serve as the
source of information on which corporations invest in Burma;

Be it further resolved that the Undergraduate Council calls on the
governing boards of Harvard University and all departments therein to
adopt policies prohibiting the purchase of goods and services from
corporations which invest in Burma;

Be it further resolved that the Undergraduate Council calls on the
governing boards of Harvard University, and specifically the Advisory
and Corporate Committees on Shareholder Responsibility, to adopt
policies of voting in favor of resolutions which promote human rights
and democracy in Burma and call on corporations to withdraw from Burma.

*************************************************

NATION: CONFUSION SURROUNDS KHUN SA'S NEW LIFE IN BURMA
March 7, 1996
Kyodo, Reuter

CONFLICTING reports have emerged about the life of drug 
warlord Khun Sa after his surrender to the Slorc.

One news agency says he is under detention while another 
states he is doing legal business as a free man.

Kyodo reported yesterday that Khun Sa, who surrendered to 
Slorc in January, is being held in a military security camp 
in Rangoon.

But Reuter said that the drug king, who is believed to be 
living a life of luxury in an exclusive lakefront villa in 
Rangoon, had started a wide range of legal businesses to 
help launder his drug money.

Quoting an unnamed senior military officer, Kyodo said Khun 
Sa, 61, had been brought to Rangoon and "will be dealt with 
according to Burmese laws.

Extradition to the US is out of the question".

The US government indicted Khun Sa for drug offenses in 
December 1989 and recently asked the Slorc to hand him over 
to face trial in the US.

Before giving himself up, Khun Sa also arranged the 
surrender of more than 13,000 members of his Mong Tai Army 
(MAT), spread over various parts of Shan state.

"It was an unconditional surrender by Khun Sa. Foreign news 
reports of Khun Sa laying down 10 conditions are nonsense," 
the unnamed officer said.

"In fact, before accepting the surrender, it was the Slorc 
which set the condition that the MAT must surrender all 
weapons and give up the drug business entirely," he said.

"Only after receiving those assurances did Slorc order its 
troops to accept the surrender."

Reuters reported that a source close to Khun Sa had revealed 
that his boss had begun setting up legal businesses that 
include jade and ruby factories in Rangoon, a Chinese goods 
import business and trading offices in various Burmese 
towns.

"Six Taiwanese experts in ruby and jade design and gem 
cutters from his former headquarters in Ho Mong went to 
Rangoon to work in the jewellery factories, and 10 women 
workers were also sent there," a source from the MAT said.

Another MAT source claimed Khun Sa's men were planning to 
buy land in Tachilek, on the Burma-Thai border, to build up 
an import-export trading centre.

"Colonel Ho Phing, a former MAT commander, and eight of Khun 
Sa's trusted men are in Tachilek to look after the business 
there," the MAT officer said.

A Thai intelligence source said Khun Sa had withdrawn about 
Bt600 million from various Thai financial institutions 
recently to invest in Burma.

"Khun Sa has transferred hundreds of million of baht from 
Thailand to Burma. That makes the Slorc very happy because 
they never care about dirty money and where it comes from," 
the sources said.

Apart from the jewellery business, Khun Sa is also said to 
have established a trading centre in the Golden Triangle 
region on the bank of the Mekong river opposite Thailand's 
Chiang Saen district where he plans to import goods from 
southern China to sell in Burma's border towns.

Khun Sa had deployed more than 500 of his armed guerrillas 
to another area where he built a heroin factory on the bank 
of the Mekong river opposite Laos, narcotics sources said.

"The heroin and Chinese goods will then come down the Mekong 
river on the same ship and we believe that Chiang Saen will 
soon be the major route for heroin and the centre for money 
laundering," a Thai narcotics police officer said. (TN)

(EDITOR'S NOTE: VOA also ran a story on the discrepancies in reports 
about Khun Sa's whereabouts.  The New York Times: BURMESE HARBOR 
DRUG LORD - March 5, 1996 wrote the following:  

[Khun Sa] is living in a  lakeside villa in the most exclusive neighborhood 
of Yangon, Myanmar's capital, a  diplomat said today.

The diplomat said that [he] had been living in Yangon for several weeks after 
his surrender to Government forces in January.

A member of Mr. Khun Sa's old guerrilla force, the Mong Tai Army, which has
also surrendered to Government troops, confirmed the report that Mr. Khun Sa
was living in the exclusive Yangon neighborhood.

******************************************************

INDEPENDENT REPORT: SITUATION IN MAE SOT AND SURROUNDING
REFUGEE CAMPS
March 9, 1996

Mae Sot, TAK, February 12-22 1996

The face of Mae Sot is changing rapidly. New constructions, gold and gem 
shops are dotted across town. Many more luxury cars can be seen as the 
economy improves.

Guest houses are full of backpackers, wanting to get a feel for rural 
Thailand and to trek through Karen villages. They are oblivious to the 
boarder problems with KNU, SLORC and DKBA except that some areas are not 
recommended to tour. Mae Oo Suu caves was a popular tourist destination, 
local Thai-Karen kids would offer tours for 5 or 10 baht, but it is now 
believed to shelter some DKBA troops and receives no more visitors.

Several western NGO staff are keeping a low profile after specificly 
being named over DKBA radio. KNU radio intercepters reported that DKBA 
are planning to step up attacks this dry season and said that they will also 
be targeting any NGO staff helping refugees.

Thai television for the first time openly blamed SLORC for the DKBA 
attacks and claimed that SLORC frequently accompanied DKBA soldiers when 
attacking camps and villagers on the Thai side of the border.

Bak Law refugee camp has now expanded to well over 10,000 residents. 
[Editor's Note: the camp population is now over 25,000.] The 
main entrance to the camp is heavily guarded with Thai military 
personal. Shelters and trenches have been build in case the DKBA attack. 
These shelters are only for the military personnel.

The refugees live in fear of DKBA attacks, one man said "When I sleep, I
do it with one ear open. A leaf may fall from the tree, but I must look
for the DKBA to protect my family."  
A 12 year old boy said "If you go over there at night", pointing towards
the Moi River, "Bang, bang, you die." I asked him who, he replied, "DKBA." 

Water and sanitation is a major problem in the new areas. The dry season
only just at the start, but many of the wells are almost dry. There are
not enough toilets for all the new refugees. Baw Naw camp has an abundance
of water, but now the same people have to walk long distances to find
water. 

The Thai military photographed all the refugees again this year. Each
refugee must pay 30 baht for the photo to be taken. This procedure has 
been carried out several times in the past and each time the reason was for 
security ID cards, however no-one has ever seen the results.  

The army instructed the refugees to build a fence around the camp. 
Each family had to provide 8 lengths of bamboo cut for the job. The fence 
had to be installed in 3 days because the Thai General planned to visit 
the camp. The fence is about 5-6 feet high, there are several gates 
installed along the road. The army says it will be easier guard against 
the DKBA. However, little thought has been given for refugees escaping DKBA 
attacks.

[Editor's Note: 8 refugees were arrested for cutting bamboo in the surrounding
forest for the fence.  They were not provided with any materials for constructing
the fence and so had no choice but to go out and cut bamboo.  At this point, they 
are still in jail in Mae Sot.]

Many troops were moved in for the visit of the general. On the morning of
the visit between 9 and 10am, 12 troop trucks arrived. The refugees had
been forced to clean up the camp for the general's visit. Groups of heavily
armed soldiers roamed the camp. On the road to Mae Sot, police waited at
every bus stop. A convoy of around 30 cars headed up the Mae Sariang road
about 1pm and helicopters flew ahead to check the road.

Immigration Police on the 21st arrested more than 50 people travelling 
into Mae Sot. On one Song Taw three children of no more that 13 years 
were arrested and put in a waiting truck. Thai children are not 
issued with ID papers until they are 15 years old and are free to 
travel. However these police from Bangkok did not listen to the pleas of 
the children. 

The arrests were later thought to be a money collecting exercise as 
those who could pay 3000 baht where released on the Thai side to return 
to the camps.

One boy, who was almost arrested but was traveling with a western man, said,
"I was very scared, I could not speak Thai because I was so afraid. I am
Thai-Karen and my home is in Mae Sot, but they would not believe me." 

The situation is far worse that after the fall of Manaplaw last year. And 
with the continuing threats from DKBA and repatriation from the Thais it 
is not going to improve.

[Editor's Note: The Thai military is discussing repatriation of the Karen
refugees but no timeframe has been set.]

ATIAH..... 
Burma Support Group, Sydney 

*********************************************************

BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AFFAIRS : INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 
MARCH 1996 
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC - BURMA 
March 8, 1996
from cd@xxxxxxxxxx
 
I. Summary 
 
Burma remains the world's largest producer of opium and heroin.  

Burma lacks both the resources and commitment to undertake effective drug 
control and is likely to remain one of the world's major sources of 
drugs for many years to come. 

 In 1995 opium cultivation and production rebounded after a slight 
decline due to poor weather in 1994.  Opium poppy cultivation covered 
154,000 hectares and yielded 2,340 metric tons 
of opium gum -- enough opium to produce 230 tons of heroin and satisfy  
the U.S. heroin market many times over. 

 There were few signs of improvement in the government's counternarcotics 
performance during 1995.  In early 1996 a two year offensive against the 
Mong Tai Army  (MTA, also know as the Shan United Army) of Khun Sa ended 
with the Burmese Army occupation of the MTA headquarters.  The Burmese, 
however, have shown no willingness to use the opportunity brought about 
by their cease-fire with the MTA to bring Khun Sa to justice or to take 
effective action to suppress the heroin trade in the Shan state. 
 
The drug trade in the Shan State continues virtually unchecked.  Burmese 
authorities lack the resources, the ability or the will to take action 
against ethnic drug trafficking groups with whom they have negotiated 
cease-fires.  Groups known to be involved in the heroin trade, such as 
the United Wa State Army and the Kokang militia, remain heavily armed 
and enjoy complete autonomy in their base areas.  Although the Burmese 
Government claims that these groups have committed themselves to drug 
control as part of their cease-fire agreements, the Burmese Government 
has been either unwilling or unable to get these groups to reduce heroin 
trafficking or opium cultivation. 
 
Money laundering in Burma is also a growing problem and the laundering 
of drug profits is thought by some analysts to have a wide-spread impact 
on the Burmese economy.  An underdeveloped banking system and lack of 
enforcement against money laundering have created a business and 
investment environment conducive to the use of drug-related proceeds in 
legitimate commerce.  

II. Status of Country 
Burma continues to provide the bulk of the world's opium supply and is 
the source of over 60 percent of the heroin seized on US streets.  The 
ethnic areas of Burma's Shan State, such as the Kokang and Wa 
territories, produce most of Burma's opium.  The State Law and Order 
Restoration Council's (SLORC) cease-fire agreements with these drug-
trafficking armies have prevented the implementation of any meaningful 
drug enforcement operations in areas under the control of ethnic armies. 
 
As a result, these regions have become drug trafficking havens where 
heroin is produced and trafficked without any risk.  Leaders of these 
drug-trafficking armies have benefited immensely from their good 
relationships with the Rangoon regime; their businesses--legitimate and 
illegitimate--have prospered.  The top traffickers of these ethnic 
groups are:  U Sai Lin AKA Lin Ming-shing of the Eastern Shan State Army 
(ESSA); Yang Mao-liang, Peng Chia-sheng, and  Liu Go-shi of the Myanmar 
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang Chinese); Pao Yu-chiang, 
Li Tzu-ju, and Wei Hsueh-kang of the United Wa State Army (UWSA); and U 
Mahtu Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA).  The SLORC has given these 
ethnic traffickers significant political legitimacy and now refers to 
them as "leaders of national races."  Several major traffickers now 
participate in the government's national constitutional convention in 
the guise of ethnic leaders. 

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1995 
Burmese counternarcotics efforts remained woefully inadequate in 1995, a 
situation that has not changed fundamentally since 1989.  The SLORC 
steadfastly maintains that only peaceful economic development will bring 
about a reduction in drug production and trafficking.  Many of the major 
drug trafficking insurgent groups have been at peace with the SLORC 
since 1989 and the surrender of the Mong Tai Army in early 1996 brought 
an end to the last major insurgency by an army involved in drug 
trafficking.  During the past six years there has been no progress in 
reducing opium cultivation or in stopping the heroin-trafficking 
activities of ethnic armies now considered part of the "legal fold."  
The SLORC's development program seems more intent on expanding and 
strengthening its political position in the border areas than in 
countering the narcotics trade. 

The Burmese Government continues to look to United Nations International 
Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) assistance to bolster its own development programs in ethnic Wa, 
Kokang, and Shan areas of the Shan State.  Nevertheless, Burmese 
Government  cooperation in implementing UNDCP projects declined in 1995. 
 
The government also appeared intent on exerting greater control over UN 
programs operating in the ethnic border areas.  In the case of UNDCP, 
the GOB has sought a say in UNDCP personnel assignments and has 
restricted access by UNDCP personnel to project areas and leaders of 
ethnic militias.  The government has largely barred NGO involvement in 
aid projects in these ethnic drug areas. 
Policy Initiatives.  The SLORC did not announce any new drug-control 
policy initiatives during 1995.  However, the Government continued to 
implement its "northern border development program" which in part aims 
to reduce and ultimately eliminate opium cultivation in the ethnic 
border areas.  This program was started in 1990 and refined in the 
September 1994 unveiling of an eleven-year "Master Plan for the 
Development of Border Areas and National Races."  While large sums of 
Burmese money reportedly have been allocated for development work in the 
opium-producing areas of the Shan state, none of this aid has been 
closely tied to reductions in poppy cultivation.  In 1995, the UWSA 
announced a unilateral plan to establish five "opium poppy-free zones" 
in its area of control in order to bring about a gradual reduction of 
opium cultivation.  Though there is skepticism about the drug-
trafficking group's sincerity, the UNDCP hopes to test this purported 
UWSA drug-control commitment through a planned five-year crop 
substitution project due to start in mid-1996 in the Wa region. 
  
Accomplishments.  The government appeared to take fewer steps to counter 
Burma's drug trade in 1995 than in other recent years.  A counter-
insurgency campaign seen in the late dry season of February-April 1995 
against Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) ended in a brokered peace in 
January 1996.  Although the details of the peace arrangement are not yet 
clear, it seems the MTA will be allowed to operate as an ethnic militia 
in the same manner that the UWSA and MNDAA continue to operate in other 
parts of the Shan state.  It is unknown what, if any, impact the end of 
the fight against Khun Sa will have on the heroin trade. 
 
The Burmese effort to seize drugs and arrest traffickers remains 
disappointing: less than 100 kilograms of heroin and less than 1.1 
metric tons of opium gum were seized by Burmese authorities in 1995.  
This represents more than an 80 percent and 53 percent decline, 
respectively, from 1994 seizures.  Seizures of acetic anhydride 
increased by 6 percent to 1,261 gallons.  In one particularly large 
seizure, Burmese military intelligence and police on May 24 seized 721.5 
gallons of acetic anhydride entering Burma from China's Yunnan province 
and bound for the MTA. 
 
Burmese police, who account for the bulk of Burma's drug seizures, 
appear to be targeting low-level drug violators -- seldom seizing more 
than one kilogram of heroin at a time -- while avoiding major 
traffickers who are responsible for much larger heroin shipments. 
 
The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances law brought the 
Burmese legal code into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention.  As 
such, the 1993 law contains useful legal tools for addressing money 
laundering, the seizure of drug-related assets, and the prosecution of 
drug conspiracy cases.  However, these provisions remain largely unused 
by Burmese police and judicial officials.  Burmese authorities have been 
slow to implement the law, and have targeted few, if any, major 
traffickers.  There have been few cases involving money laundering or 
seizure of major assets acquired through drug crime.  The Burmese 
Government, however, continues to express its desire to give its 
personnel better training and to make better use of its drug laws.  In 
November 1995, a UNDCP contractor visited Rangoon to conduct a legal 
workshop for Burmese enforcement and judicial personnel. 
 
Law Enforcement.  The Burmese Government's coordinated drug enforcement 
effort is led by the office of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse 
Control (CCDAC), which includes the police, customs, military 
intelligence, and the army.  CCDAC now has 17 drug enforcement task 
forces around the country, most located in major cities and along key 
transit routes near Burma's borders with China, India and Thailand.  
Though CCDAC and its task forces are responsible for the bulk of 
narcotics seizures and arrests, the agency continues to suffer from a 
lack of adequate resources.  The UNDCP has provided various CCDAC units 
with modest equipment and some training.  DEA has also provided basic 
drug enforcement training to CCDAC personnel.  However, the SLORC's very 
small budget allocations for narcotics enforcement do not give the 
agency the resources needed to make a credible effort to combat Burma's 
massive drug cultivation and trafficking problem. 
  
Corruption.  The SLORC's business relationships with some of Burma's top 
narco-trafficking minority groups raise suspicion in the minds of some 
observers that senior Burmese officials are profiting from narcotics 
revenues.  There is, however, no evidence that the Government, on an 
institutional level or as a matter of policy, is involved in the drug 
trade.  But there are persistent reports that lower level officials, 
particularly in the border regions, are involved in taking bribes in 
return for ignoring drug smuggling.  The lack of a vigorous enforcement 
effort against money laundering leaves Burma vulnerable to the growing 
influence of traffickers who will use drug proceeds in legitimate 
business ventures, thereby gaining influence over  investment and 
commercial activities. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  Burma is a party to the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN 
Drug Conventions.  However, the Rangoon regime maintains its 
reservations on two of the Convention's articles -- one on extradition 
of Burmese citizens to third countries and one on the use of the 
International Court of Justice to resolve disputes relating to the 
Convention (articles 6 and 32, respectively).  The United States does 
not have a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with Burma.  The 
Burmese Government has disputed the continuing applicability of the US-
UK Extradition Treaty, which was accepted by the provisional Burmese 
Government in 1947. 
 
Cultivation and Production.  Burmese opium production doubled with the 
opium crop harvested in early 1989 -- the first crop harvested after the 
SLORC's seizure of power.  Since then Burma's output of opium has 
remained at high levels -- near 2,300 metric tons per year.  This is by 
far the largest amount of opium produced in the world.  The 1994 crop 
saw a 21 percent decline in production due to poor weather during the 
crop's growing season.  In 1995, however, the crop rebounded, rising 18 
percent to 2,340 metric tons.  The bulk of Burma's opium cultivation 
traditionally has been in the mountainous regions of the Shan plateau, 
which extends the length of the Shan state, from the Chinese border to 
the Thai border.  Since 1989, however, cultivation has been expanding 
into areas under at least nominal Burmese Government control on the west 
bank of the Salween river.  New cultivation has also been noted in the 
Chin state, along Burma's border with India. 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Heroin is produced in large, relatively static 
refineries well ensconced in ethnic enclaves protected by drug 
trafficking armies in the Shan state.  These labs, run by the ESSA, 
MNDAA (Kokang), KDA, UWSA, and MTA, are out-of-bounds to Burmese law 
enforcement and paramilitary efforts, under the terms of the SLORC's 
cease-fire agreements with these drug militias.  A growing amount of 
methamphetamine is reportedly produced in labs co-located with heroin 
refineries along the China and Thailand borders.  Heroin produced by 
Burma's ethnic groups is trafficked largely through the porous Chinese 
and Thai borders, and to a lesser extent the Indian border.  Though the 
use of trafficking routes through China to move heroin to the 
international market continues at a high level, Thailand remains the 
primary route for Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia. 
  
Traffickers continued a trend noted last year of moving a growing amount 
of heroin through central Burma, often from Lashio, through Mandalay to 
Rangoon or other seaports such as Moulmein, for seaborne export to 
Singapore or Malaysia.  Though some Burmese customs personnel in August 
participated in a two-week U.S. Customs training course to help better 
identify seaborne and airborne drug shipments, Burmese customs 
registered no seizures of narcotics for all of 1995.  Trafficking routes 
leading through Kachin and Chin states and Sagaing division in northern 
Burma to India continue to be used to a limited extent, but largely to 
supply regional addict populations in India and Bangladesh.  Acetic 
anhydride, an essential chemical in the production of heroin, is 
imported primarily from China and India and to a lesser extent from 
Thailand. 
 
US Policy Initiatives.  Direct USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has 
remained suspended since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally 
suppressed the popular pro-democracy movement.  Joint initiatives such 
as an aerial eradication program, which had been effective in containing 
the expansion of Burmese opium cultivation ended in 1988.  Currently, 
the USG engages the Burmese Government on a very limited level.  DEA 
shares drug-related information with the GOB and conducts joint drug 
enforcement investigations with Burmese police and military personnel.  
Various US agencies have twice joined Burmese counterparts in conducting 
annual opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of the Shan state. 
 
Results from the surveys give both Governments a more accurate 
understanding of the scope and magnitude of Burma's opium crop, which in 
recent years has been the single largest component of the world's 
illicit crop. 
 
The U.S. Government continues to urge the SLORC to take serious steps to 
curb Burma's runaway opium production and heroin trafficking.  
Specifically, the Rangoon regime has been encouraged to: 
 
--utilize more fully the money laundering and drug conspiracy tools of 
Burma's new 1993 drug law in targeting major traffickers; 
 
--target and destroy or confiscate heroin refineries in areas accessible 
to Burmese security personnel; 
 
--implement the counternarcotics components of its cease-fire agreements 
with ethnic groups in drug producing areas, specifically pushing the 
ethnic traffickers to reduce opium poppy cultivation; 
 
--cooperate more fully with UNDCP and international NGOs in implementing 
crop substitution and counternarcotics-related health projects. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation.  USG counternarcotics cooperation with the 
Burmese regime will remain at a restricted level until there is progress 
in the areas of human rights and political reform.  DEA's liaison with 
Burmese police and military -- conducted through DEA's three-man office 
in Rangoon -- will continue at its limited level.  In 1995, DEA 
conducted one two-week training course on basic drug enforcement 
techniques, and US Customs conducted a similar course on identifying and 
seizing drug shipments. 
  
The Road Ahead.  The USG recognizes that no Burmese Government is 
capable of effectively dealing with the country's huge drug trade alone. 
 
Large-scale international aid, including developmental assistance and 
law enforcement aid, will be needed to curb drug production and 
trafficking.  The SLORC will need to demonstrate a real commitment to 
drug control before any meaningful progress in counternarcotics is 
possible. 

************************************************************

ANNOUNCEMENT: BURMA & US CONGRESS INFO. NETWORK ON THE WEB
March 8, 1996
>From FreeBurma@xxxxxxx

Dear Friends of Burma,
The Burma & U.S. Congress Information Network is launched on the web. Its URL
is: http://www.clark.net/pub/burmad/burmaus. It consists of full text of the
past legislations, congressional records, testimonies, members mailing and
email addresses and fax. numbers. The updated news on the Hill and the
current status of the sanction bill would also be included in the near
future.  Please check this out and have anything you want.
In peace.

Regards,
Zaw Zaw (Free Burma)

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ANNOUNCEMENT: US REPORTS ON DRUGS & HUMAN RIGHTS
March 7, 1996

The U.S. Department of State's 1996 "International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report" released by the White House last week      and

The U.S. Government's Annual Report on Human Rights Practices, released at
the State Department's daily press briefing on March 6

are both available on the Department of State's WWW Home Page at the URL

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html

These reports will be of great use in lobbying your Congressional
representatives as well as city council members.

**********************************************

ANNOUNCEMENT: MASSACHUSETTS BURMA ROUNDTABLE
March 8, 1996
simon_billenness@xxxxxxxxxxxx

*  March Burma Roundtable  .  .  .  .  .  Different Day!

The next Roundtable will take place on Thursday, March 14. The meeting will
start at 7pm at the office of Franklin Research & Development at 711
Atlantic Avenue 4th floor, just across the street from South Station and
opposite the Greyhound Bus terminal.  

Our speaker will be Professor Susan Darlington of Hampshire College.
Professor Darlington recently returned from spending six months on the
Thailand-Burma border. She will speak about her experiences and the current
situation on the border.

*  It's Make or Break for the Massachusetts Burma Bill ! ! !

The Massachusetts Burma selective purchasing bill (H2833) could come up for
its Second Reading vote of the full Massachusetts Senate as early as the
week of March 11.  (The bill was reported out of the Steering and Policy
Committee last week.)

This will be a major test of support for H2833.  If we win the vote
convincingly, the bill will move forward quickly.  If we lose the vote,
H2833 is dead.

It is vital that every Massachusetts Burma Roundtable participant contact
their state Senator immediately to register their support for H2833 before
it comes to a vote!

Call Your State Senator Again......And Do It Today!

Call and ask your state Senator to vote in favor of H2833 when it comes up
for its Second Reading in the Senate.

(If don't know who your state Senator is, contact CPPAX at (617) 426-3040 or
the State House switchboard at (617) 727-2121.)

If you have a few more minutes, follow the action plan in the enclosed March
8 Action Alert.  Ask your friends and family to do the same.

Simon Billenness, Franklin Research & Development, 711 Atlantic Avenue,
Boston, MA 02111
423 6655		simon_billenness@ cybercom.net

********************

ACTION ALERT: MARCH 8, 1996

THE BILL'S NEXT HURDLES

If the bill passes its Second Reading, it will be referred to the Committee
on Bills in the Third Reading. If the Committee on Bills in the Third
Reading reports H2833 out favorably, the bill will come to the full Senate
one last time for a vote on its Third (and final) Reading. If the bill
passes the Senate on its Third Reading in the same form as it passed the
lower House, it will go to Governor Weld.

ACTION PLAN

There are plenty of opportunities for Unocal and its lobbyists to delay and
kill the bill. But lobbyists can be defeated with grassroots action.  Here
are steps to take before the bill hits the Senate floor on March 11.

Step 1.      
Write or call your state Senator again in support of H2833. (If don't know
who your state Senator is, contact CPPAX at the number below or the State
House switchboard at (617) 727-2121.)

Step 2.      
Each week, ask one or two friends, family and/or co-workers to write their
state Senator.

Step 3.      
Help out the CPPAX phone bank. CPPAX needs volunteers to call on its 3,000
members to write their state Senators. Contact Julia Carpenter at CPPAX or
Simon Billenness at Franklin Research.

WITH YOUR HELP WE CAN DEFEAT THE CORPORATIONS AND THEIR LOBBYISTS!

Julia Carpenter
Citizens for Participation in Political Action (CPPAX), 25 West Street,
Boston, MA 02111
426 3040		cppax@xxxxxxx

Simon Billenness
Franklin Research & Development, 711 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, MA 02111
423 6655 x 225	simon_billenness@xxxxxxxxxxxx

PLEASE DISTRIBUTE THIS NOTICE TO YOUR FRIENDS AND FAMILY!

******************

SEND A LETTER TO YOUR STATE SENATOR...

Senator ________
Massachusetts Senate
State House, MA 02133-1053

Dear Senator __________:

I am writing to ask your support for H2833, Representative Byron Rushing's
bill that would bar state purchasing managers from buying goods or services
from companies doing business with the Burmese military junta. Specifically,
I am requesting that you vote in favor of the bill when it comes to the
Senate floor for its Second Reading on or after the week of March 11.

(Include a personal paragraph here. If possible, mention your personal and
family history in Massachusetts and in your State Senator's district.
Explain your interest in human rights and Burma.)

There are signs that the ruling military junta in Burma is cracking down on
the democracy movement.  Human Rights Watch/Asia has reported that members
of the National League for Democracy, the party headed by Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, are now required to obtain government permission
to travel within Burma, attend meetings or distribute political literature.
The junta has recently referred to Aung San Suu Kyi and her party as
"subversive elements" that should be "annihilated."

Aung San Suu Kyi has asked that companies not invest in Burma at this time
as a way of putting pressure on the military junta.  However, it was
recently reported that military leaders felt no need to even meet with
representatives of the democracy movement because the junta sees investment
in Burma as a vote of confidence in the military regime.  Passage of H2833
would send a clear signal to the Burmese military junta and the corporations
with which it does business that Massachusetts supports the Burmese
democracy movement just as it supported the campaign against apartheid in
South Africa.

I hope that you support H2833 at this critical time.  Please write back and
tell me if you intend to vote in favor of  the bill on its Second Reading.

You can obtain the name of your state senator by calling the State House at
(617) 727-2121 or by calling CPPAX (address below). Please put any or all of
this letter in your own words - the more personalized the letter the better.

Please send a copy of your letter (and, especially, any reply!) to Citizens
for Participation in Political Action (CPPAX), 25 West Street, Boston, MA
02111.  If you have any questions, contact Julia Carpenter at CPPAX at (617)
426 3040 or cppax@xxxxxxxx

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