Burma and the US Congress, its a st

[cd@xxxxxxxxxx]

Subject: Burma and the US Congress, its a story about drugs! 

check it out, dawn star, paris

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html
gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0F-1%3A23308%3ABurma
State Dept International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
March 1996 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 
MARCH 1996 
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BURMA 
 
I. Summary 
 
Burma remains the world's largest producer of opium and heroin.  

Burma lacks both the resources and commitment to undertake effective drug 
control and is likely to remain one of the world's major sources of 
drugs for many years to come. 

 In 1995 opium cultivation and production rebounded after a slight 
decline due to poor weather in 1994.  Opium poppy cultivation covered 
154,000 hectares and yielded 2,340 metric tons 
of opium gum -- enough opium to produce 230 tons of heroin and satisfy  
the U.S. heroin market many times over. 

 There were few signs of improvement in the government's counternarcotics 
performance during 1995.  In early 1996 a two year offensive against the 
Mong Tai Army  (MTA, also know as the Shan United Army) of Khun Sa ended 
with the Burmese Army occupation of the MTA headquarters.  The Burmese, 
however, have shown no willingness to use the opportunity brought about 
by their cease-fire with the MTA to bring Khun Sa to justice or to take 
effective action to suppress the heroin trade in the Shan state. 
 
The drug trade in the Shan State continues virtually unchecked.  Burmese 
authorities lack the resources, the ability or the will to take action 
against ethnic drug trafficking groups with whom they have negotiated 
cease-fires.  Groups known to be involved in the heroin trade, such as 
the United Wa State Army and the Kokang militia, remain heavily armed 
and enjoy complete autonomy in their base areas.  Although the Burmese 
Government claims that these groups have committed themselves to drug 
control as part of their cease-fire agreements, the Burmese Government 
has been either unwilling or unable to get these groups to reduce heroin 
trafficking or opium cultivation. 
 
Money laundering in Burma is also a growing problem and the laundering 
of drug profits is thought by some analysts to have a wide-spread impact 
on the Burmese economy.  An underdeveloped banking system and lack of 
enforcement against money laundering have created a business and 
investment environment conducive to the use of drug-related proceeds in 
legitimate commerce.  
II. Status of Country 
Burma continues to provide the bulk of the world's opium supply and is 
the source of over 60 percent of the heroin seized on US streets.  The 
ethnic areas of Burma's Shan State, such as the Kokang and Wa 
territories, produce most of Burma's opium.  The State Law and Order 
Restoration Council's (SLORC) cease-fire agreements with these drug-
trafficking armies have prevented the implementation of any meaningful 
drug enforcement operations in areas under the control of ethnic armies. 
 
As a result, these regions have become drug trafficking havens where 
heroin is produced and trafficked without any risk.  Leaders of these 
drug-trafficking armies have benefited immensely from their good 
relationships with the Rangoon regime; their businesses--legitimate and 
illegitimate--have prospered.  The top traffickers of these ethnic 
groups are:  U Sai Lin AKA Lin Ming-shing of the Eastern Shan State Army 
(ESSA); Yang Mao-liang, Peng Chia-sheng, and  Liu Go-shi of the Myanmar 
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang Chinese); Pao Yu-chiang, 
Li Tzu-ju, and Wei Hsueh-kang of the United Wa State Army (UWSA); and U 
Mahtu Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA).  The SLORC has given these 
ethnic traffickers significant political legitimacy and now refers to 
them as "leaders of national races."  Several major traffickers now 
participate in the government's national constitutional convention in 
the guise of ethnic leaders. 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1995 
Burmese counternarcotics efforts remained woefully inadequate in 1995, a 
situation that has not changed fundamentally since 1989.  The SLORC 
steadfastly maintains that only peaceful economic development will bring 
about a reduction in drug production and trafficking.  Many of the major 
drug trafficking insurgent groups have been at peace with the SLORC 
since 1989 and the surrender of the Mong Tai Army in early 1996 brought 
an end to the last major insurgency by an army involved in drug 
trafficking.  During the past six years there has been no progress in 
reducing opium cultivation or in stopping the heroin-trafficking 
activities of ethnic armies now considered part of the "legal fold."  
The SLORC's development program seems more intent on expanding and 
strengthening its political position in the border areas than in 
countering the narcotics trade. 
The Burmese Government continues to look to United Nations International 
Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) assistance to bolster its own development programs in ethnic Wa, 
Kokang, and Shan areas of the Shan State.  Nevertheless, Burmese 
Government  cooperation in implementing UNDCP projects declined in 1995. 
 
The government also appeared intent on exerting greater control over UN 
programs operating in the ethnic border areas.  In the case of UNDCP, 
the GOB has sought a say in UNDCP personnel assignments and has 
restricted access by UNDCP personnel to project areas and leaders of 
ethnic militias.  The government has largely barred NGO involvement in 
aid projects in these ethnic drug areas. 
Policy Initiatives.  The SLORC did not announce any new drug-control 
policy initiatives during 1995.  However, the Government continued to 
implement its "northern border development program" which in part aims 
to reduce and ultimately eliminate opium cultivation in the ethnic 
border areas.  This program was started in 1990 and refined in the 
September 1994 unveiling of an eleven-year "Master Plan for the 
Development of Border Areas and National Races."  While large sums of 
Burmese money reportedly have been allocated for development work in the 
opium-producing areas of the Shan state, none of this aid has been 
closely tied to reductions in poppy cultivation.  In 1995, the UWSA 
announced a unilateral plan to establish five "opium poppy-free zones" 
in its area of control in order to bring about a gradual reduction of 
opium cultivation.  Though there is skepticism about the drug-
trafficking group's sincerity, the UNDCP hopes to test this purported 
UWSA drug-control commitment through a planned five-year crop 
substitution project due to start in mid-1996 in the Wa region. 
  
Accomplishments.  The government appeared to take fewer steps to counter 
Burma's drug trade in 1995 than in other recent years.  A counter-
insurgency campaign seen in the late dry season of February-April 1995 
against Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) ended in a brokered peace in 
January 1996.  Although the details of the peace arrangement are not yet 
clear, it seems the MTA will be allowed to operate as an ethnic militia 
in the same manner that the UWSA and MNDAA continue to operate in other 
parts of the Shan state.  It is unknown what, if any, impact the end of 
the fight against Khun Sa will have on the heroin trade. 
 
The Burmese effort to seize drugs and arrest traffickers remains 
disappointing: less than 100 kilograms of heroin and less than 1.1 
metric tons of opium gum were seized by Burmese authorities in 1995.  
This represents more than an 80 percent and 53 percent decline, 
respectively, from 1994 seizures.  Seizures of acetic anhydride 
increased by 6 percent to 1,261 gallons.  In one particularly large 
seizure, Burmese military intelligence and police on May 24 seized 721.5 
gallons of acetic anhydride entering Burma from China's Yunnan province 
and bound for the MTA. 
 
Burmese police, who account for the bulk of Burma's drug seizures, 
appear to be targeting low-level drug violators -- seldom seizing more 
than one kilogram of heroin at a time -- while avoiding major 
traffickers who are responsible for much larger heroin shipments. 
 
The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances law brought the 
Burmese legal code into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention.  As 
such, the 1993 law contains useful legal tools for addressing money 
laundering, the seizure of drug-related assets, and the prosecution of 
drug conspiracy cases.  However, these provisions remain largely unused 
by Burmese police and judicial officials.  Burmese authorities have been 
slow to implement the law, and have targeted few, if any, major 
traffickers.  There have been few cases involving money laundering or 
seizure of major assets acquired through drug crime.  The Burmese 
Government, however, continues to express its desire to give its 
personnel better training and to make better use of its drug laws.  In 
November 1995, a UNDCP contractor visited Rangoon to conduct a legal 
workshop for Burmese enforcement and judicial personnel. 
 
Law Enforcement.  The Burmese Government's coordinated drug enforcement 
effort is led by the office of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse 
Control (CCDAC), which includes the police, customs, military 
intelligence, and the army.  CCDAC now has 17 drug enforcement task 
forces around the country, most located in major cities and along key 
transit routes near Burma's borders with China, India and Thailand.  
Though CCDAC and its task forces are responsible for the bulk of 
narcotics seizures and arrests, the agency continues to suffer from a 
lack of adequate resources.  The UNDCP has provided various CCDAC units 
with modest equipment and some training.  DEA has also provided basic 
drug enforcement training to CCDAC personnel.  However, the SLORC's very 
small budget allocations for narcotics enforcement do not give the 
agency the resources needed to make a credible effort to combat Burma's 
massive drug cultivation and trafficking problem. 
  
Corruption.  The SLORC's business relationships with some of Burma's top 
narco-trafficking minority groups raise suspicion in the minds of some 
observers that senior Burmese officials are profiting from narcotics 
revenues.  There is, however, no evidence that the Government, on an 
institutional level or as a matter of policy, is involved in the drug 
trade.  But there are persistent reports that lower level officials, 
particularly in the border regions, are involved in taking bribes in 
return for ignoring drug smuggling.  The lack of a vigorous enforcement 
effort against money laundering leaves Burma vulnerable to the growing 
influence of traffickers who will use drug proceeds in legitimate 
business ventures, thereby gaining influence over  investment and 
commercial activities. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  Burma is a party to the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN 
Drug Conventions.  However, the Rangoon regime maintains its 
reservations on two of the Convention's articles -- one on extradition 
of Burmese citizens to third countries and one on the use of the 
International Court of Justice to resolve disputes relating to the 
Convention (articles 6 and 32, respectively).  The United States does 
not have a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with Burma.  The 
Burmese Government has disputed the continuing applicability of the US-
UK Extradition Treaty, which was accepted by the provisional Burmese 
Government in 1947. 
 
Cultivation and Production.  Burmese opium production doubled with the 
opium crop harvested in early 1989 -- the first crop harvested after the 
SLORC's seizure of power.  Since then Burma's output of opium has 
remained at high levels -- near 2,300 metric tons per year.  This is by 
far the largest amount of opium produced in the world.  The 1994 crop 
saw a 21 percent decline in production due to poor weather during the 
crop's growing season.  In 1995, however, the crop rebounded, rising 18 
percent to 2,340 metric tons.  The bulk of Burma's opium cultivation 
traditionally has been in the mountainous regions of the Shan plateau, 
which extends the length of the Shan state, from the Chinese border to 
the Thai border.  Since 1989, however, cultivation has been expanding 
into areas under at least nominal Burmese Government control on the west 
bank of the Salween river.  New cultivation has also been noted in the 
Chin state, along Burma's border with India. 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Heroin is produced in large, relatively static 
refineries well ensconced in ethnic enclaves protected by drug 
trafficking armies in the Shan state.  These labs, run by the ESSA, 
MNDAA (Kokang), KDA, UWSA, and MTA, are out-of-bounds to Burmese law 
enforcement and paramilitary efforts, under the terms of the SLORC's 
cease-fire agreements with these drug militias.  A growing amount of 
methamphetamine is reportedly produced in labs co-located with heroin 
refineries along the China and Thailand borders.  Heroin produced by 
Burma's ethnic groups is trafficked largely through the porous Chinese 
and Thai borders, and to a lesser extent the Indian border.  Though the 
use of trafficking routes through China to move heroin to the 
international market continues at a high level, Thailand remains the 
primary route for Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia. 
  
Traffickers continued a trend noted last year of moving a growing amount 
of heroin through central Burma, often from Lashio, through Mandalay to 
Rangoon or other seaports such as Moulmein, for seaborne export to 
Singapore or Malaysia.  Though some Burmese customs personnel in August 
participated in a two-week U.S. Customs training course to help better 
identify seaborne and airborne drug shipments, Burmese customs 
registered no seizures of narcotics for all of 1995.  Trafficking routes 
leading through Kachin and Chin states and Sagaing division in northern 
Burma to India continue to be used to a limited extent, but largely to 
supply regional addict populations in India and Bangladesh.  Acetic 
anhydride, an essential chemical in the production of heroin, is 
imported primarily from China and India and to a lesser extent from 
Thailand. 
 
US Policy Initiatives.  Direct USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has 
remained suspended since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally 
suppressed the popular pro-democracy movement.  Joint initiatives such 
as an aerial eradication program, which had been effective in containing 
the expansion of Burmese opium cultivation ended in 1988.  Currently, 
the USG engages the Burmese Government on a very limited level.  DEA 
shares drug-related information with the GOB and conducts joint drug 
enforcement investigations with Burmese police and military personnel.  
Various US agencies have twice joined Burmese counterparts in conducting 
annual opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of the Shan state. 
 
Results from the surveys give both Governments a more accurate 
understanding of the scope and magnitude of Burma's opium crop, which in 
recent years has been the single largest component of the world's 
illicit crop. 
 
The U.S. Government continues to urge the SLORC to take serious steps to 
curb Burma's runaway opium production and heroin trafficking.  
Specifically, the Rangoon regime has been encouraged to: 
 
--utilize more fully the money laundering and drug conspiracy tools of 
Burma's new 1993 drug law in targeting major traffickers; 
 
--target and destroy or confiscate heroin refineries in areas accessible 
to Burmese security personnel; 
 
--implement the counternarcotics components of its cease-fire agreements 
with ethnic groups in drug producing areas, specifically pushing the 
ethnic traffickers to reduce opium poppy cultivation; 
 
--cooperate more fully with UNDCP and international NGOs in implementing 
crop substitution and counternarcotics-related health projects. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation.  USG counternarcotics cooperation with the 
Burmese regime will remain at a restricted level until there is progress 
in the areas of human rights and political reform.  DEA's liaison with 
Burmese police and military -- conducted through DEA's three-man office 
in Rangoon -- will continue at its limited level.  In 1995, DEA 
conducted one two-week training course on basic drug enforcement 
techniques, and US Customs conducted a similar course on identifying and 
seizing drug shipments. 
  
The Road Ahead.  The USG recognizes that no Burmese Government is 
capable of effectively dealing with the country's huge drug trade alone. 
 
Large-scale international aid, including developmental assistance and 
law enforcement aid, will be needed to curb drug production and 
trafficking.  The SLORC will need to demonstrate a real commitment to 
drug control before any meaningful progress in counternarcotics is 
possible. 


[Editor?s Note:  EXCELL file; see Charts and Graphs Directory]