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Subject: REPORT ON  COMMUNICATIONS (24/6/94, 10/8/94)

/* Written Sat 3 Feb 6:00am 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx(DR U NE OO) in igc:reg.burma */
/* -----------" Report on Communications (24/6 & 10/8, 1994) "------------- */

Dr U Ne Oo
48/2 Ayliffes Road
St Marys SA 5042
Adelaide, Australia

June 24, 1994.

Mr Lee Brown
Director of the National Drug Control Policy
C/O The US Department of State
Washington, DC 20520 USA.

Dear Mr Brown,

I  am a Burmese national presently residing in Australia. Formerly, I was a
teacher at the Rangoon Arts and Science University, and left Burma in  1988
for  further  study in Australia. I took asylum from Australia as a refugee
after Burmese  Government's  cancellation  of  my  passport  in  1992;  and
subsequently  engaged in the movement for democracy in Burma. Enclosed with
this letter are some of my work  relationg  with  democracy  movements  for

Firstly, please allows me of taking the liberty of writing to you regarding
with your initiatives at the US Congress about anti-narcotics operations in
Burma.  I particularly agree with you that Burma's narcotics problem should
be addressed in relation with its human  rights  concerns.  I  believe  the
problem could be resolved if we approach with patience and diligence on the
issue  of  reducing  narcotics  production  and  not  to lend legitimacy to
Burma's military regime (SLORC).

There have been  considerable  concerns  amongst  pro-democracy  groups  if
US-DEA were to resume Aid directly to SLORC. The main concerns are (1) this
will  give  internal  as well as international credibility to SLORC and (2)
Aid monies might be used for Burma Army (see also  enclosed  paper  to  the
UN).  Apart  from  this,  all  pro-democracy  groups  certainly  share  the
international community's concern on narcotics problem in Burma.

In my opinion, the narcotics problem should be divided into two stages: the
production and trafficking. Given that SLORC's own political insecurity and
lack of credible law enforcement agencies with the absence  of  independent
judiciary,  it  seem impossible to [take] counter [measures on] trafficking
problem. There have  been  credible  reports  of  Burmese  Army's  official
complicity  in  production  and trafficking of narcotics. Burma has a large
enough intelligence apparatus, such as Military Intelligence Service (MIS),
in order to counter drug trafficking but the MIS  have  been  too  busy  in
cracking-down  political opponents. Even if the MIS have enough evidence of
trafficking by army officers,  SLORC  regime  cannot  discipline  to  those
officers  for obvious reasons. The political instability as well as lack of
observant of rule of law by officials are the main obstacle to counter drug
trafficking in Burma. I believe a more efficient and practical approach  to
the  narcotics problem is the one that oriented in reducing production than
to crack-down trafficking.

Such an approach based on the principle of  reducing  production  had  been
carried  out  by  UNDCP in Burma through SLORC: The Border Area Development
Programme (BAD). The BAD fails because  the  international  monitoring  and
evaluation  processes  were  inadequate,  I  believe.  On  the otherhand, a
well-planned participation of the grass-roots to  this  programme  seem  to
have  been  neglected at the policy level. The method of resources given to
SLORC and  get  them  to  administer  the  programme  give  some  political
legitimacy  to  SLORC, which becoming a concern to human rights groups; and
also makes impossible to determine whether SLORC were doing good job.  This
method, therefore, need to be rectified.

I think the most feasible approach may be a modified version of Border Area
Development  Programme,  with  more  international  monitoring  instruments
placed. Those monitoring procedures that described in  the  enclosed  paper
may have some relevance to this. Followings are some steps that may require
to implement this.

(1)  First stage: maintain existing cease-fire between WAs rebels and SLORC
by deploying the ICRC and NGOs within the area (i.e. Shan State).  I  would
like  to  suggest  this  step  could  be  taken  together  with nation-wide
cease-fire by other ethnic groups. We hope this to be implemented after the
next UNGA in September (1994).

(2) Second stage: NGOs to increase contact with drug producing  grass-roots
(mostly hill-farming communities). It would take some time for NGOs to know
local  people.  A  trust  between NGOs and grass-roots should be created by
involving in the humanitarian activities. It is a  necessary  step  because
these  hill-farming  communities,  traditionally,  tend not to have contact
with government authorities.

(3) Third stage: eradicate poppy fields by manpower. This task can be  done
by  mobilizing urban population and Burmese students of lower-land areas as
volunteers. This kind of public movement once a year  at  poppy  harvesting
time is quite possible.

(4)  Fourth  stage: NGOs to provide education for substitution of crops and
relief to the grass-roots. This is important in order that the  grass-roots
are not turning into rebellion after their cash-crops were destroyed.

I  think  these  steps will bring about the medium and, possibly, long term
drug eradication programme. However, there can be  a  lot  of  unknown  and
uncertain  factors can exists in this process. Firstly, about the nature of
WAs' rebellion. It is not clear, at  least  to  me,  what  has  been  their
aspirations  for  rebellion.  Prior  to  1989,  the WAs are under communist
party's consolidations. Soon after China  opened  trades  with  Burma,  the
Moist-Burman leaders left and, consequently, WAs took to the form of ehtnic
rebellion.  It  has  also been reported that some personnel within WAs army
are originally of China's  intelligence  supporting  groups.  It  is  quite
possible that China still have some security interests in this. But, if DEA
can negotiate with China, this problem might be resolved.

Another  factor  unknown  is  whether there are political aspiration of WAs
rebels and, if there is any, how that might  have  to  reconcile  with  the
policy  of  DAB  and  that  of  Burmese Army. /* --------- */ These are the
concerns that may be affecting to such solutions to narcotics problem.

In any case, it seems that a comprehensive and nation-wide cease-fire  with
all  ehtnic groups will be first important step that have a common interest
in not only for Burma's political solution but also for narcotics  problem.
We  are  presently working towards nation-wide cease-fire to be implemented
possible after UNGA in September-94.  I wish  to  urge  US-DEA,  The  State
Department and the Congress to support in this endevour for peace in Burma.

Furthermore,  I whish to appeal the US-DEA to take some patience and not to
make favour to SLORC by pouring resources into military's  hand.   Pressure
must  be  mounted upon SLORC that it is Burma's international obligation to
eradicate narcotics. The time would come when the  international  community
is able to make contact with grass-roots for meaningful initiatives in this
regards. I believe the strategy outlined would serve for long term benefits
at a relatively low risks.

With  this,  hoping  that  I have made some useful inputs to the DEA policy
towards Burma. Please feel free to  contact  me  in  case  of  a  need  for
clarifications and further planning.

Yours sincerely,
Sd. U Ne Oo

(1) Mr Tim Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, US Department of State

(2)  Mr  John  Shattuck,  Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, US Department of State.

(3) Senator The Hon. Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  Canberra,
Australia for information.


August 10,1994.

Jan Eliasson
The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations, New York 10017
New York, U.S.A.

Dear Sir,

Please  find  enclosed  materials regarding with the cease-fire negotiation
proposed for the Military Government of Myanmar(SLORC) and  the  Democratic
Alliance   of   Burma(DAB)   -   the   umbrella   organization  of  elected
parliamentarians  in  exile,  ethnic  rebels  and  Burmese  students.  This
initiative has been one of the continuing efforts by expatriate Burmese and
NGOs  to  implement  a  notionwide  cease-fire  and  to  create a conducive
environment for repatriation of the refugees.

Burmese refugees and  displaced  persons  have  been  scattered  throughout
neighbouring  countries:  Thailand, India and China. There are also Burmese
illegal workers in Malaysia, who might  as  well  be  considered  displaced
persons.   I   wihs  the  Under-Secretary  and  UNHCR  approach  respective
governments to address displaced Burmese problem and  make  initiative  for
organized  repatriations for these Burmese. In particular, I wish the UN to
make  tripartite  agreements  with  those  countries  for  repatriations of
displaced  Burmese.  This  will  set-up   a   legal   framework   for   the
implementation of the UN organized repatriation programme.

I  also  wish the Under-Secretary and UNHCR to approach Military Government
of Myanmar to implement cease-fire. Teh Military Government of Myanmar must
be supervised to sign  cease-fire  agreement  with  any  ethnic  rebel  and
political  organizations  which  were  willing  to  resolve their political
differences by peaceful means. The  continuing  armed  hostilities  at  the
ethnic minorities areas are responsible for the occurrence of serious human
rights  abuses. Therefore, it is urgent to implement cease-fire in order to
create a safe return for the refugees.

There has already been a cease-fire  agreement  in  place  between  Burmese
military and Kachin Independent Organization (K.I.O) in northern Burma. The
K.I.O.  appear  to  have  tendency  to  resolve  the  conflict  by peaceful
political means.

There have also been cease-fire agreements by Burmese military with WA  and
KOKANG  rebels  in  Shan  State.  The  SLORC cease-fires with WA and KOKANG
appear to be more fragile as some neighboring influence upon  those  rebels
being suspected. Furthermore, osme elements within Wa and Kokang Armies are
reported to be engaging in opium-production and drug-trafficking.

It will be more difficult to implement the cease-fire agreement between DAB
and  SLORC  because of the SLORC's reluctance to make political settlements
with the opposition democratic forces. Recent response from SLORC seems  to
be  favorable  nonetheless  UN  should  be more forceful of the approach if

There are also Karenni ethnic rebels outside of DAB and will need to  enter
the  cease-fire. There are few different factions in Darenni ethnic rebels.
Some have already signed cease-fire with SLORC. Some factions are still  on
the  negotiation  with  SLORC.  Some elements of Karenni rebels believed to
have an inclination towards secession, which could become an  obstacle  for
the  nationwide political settlement. Nonetheless, any group, regardless of
their political inclinations, should be  encouraged  to  enter  cease-fire,
provided  that  the  group  has  genuine will to settle their difference by
political means.

There have been armed hostility  between  the  drug  warlord  Khun  Sa  and
Burmese Army since December 1993. It appear that the Military Government of
Myanmar  staged  the  offensive  on Khun Sa in the hope that US and western
countries will support the operation.  The  Government  of  United  States,
however,  announced  its drug policy on Burma last July that dashed SLORC's
hope for  western  support.  As  Khun  Sa  has  been  well  known  for  its
drug-trafficking  and  opium-producing  records,  he  should be barred from
entering cease-fire agreement. However, if the Mong  Tai  Army  (Khun  Sa's
private  army)  can  find  an  alternative leader who doesn't have criminal
record, it should be allowed to enter  the  cease-fire  provided  that  the
political settlement be made in a peaceful way.

Finally,  I  wish  to  thank  you for your attention on this matter. I also
thank the UN and UNHCR for their efforts made on Burmese refugees.

Yours sincerely
Sd. U Ne Oo

1. Ms Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Case  Postale  2500,
CH-1211 Geneva 2 Depot, Switzerland.

2.  Senator  Gareth  Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Parliament House,
Canberra A.C.T. 2600, for information.

/* Endreport */