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COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO REFUGEE A (r)
Subject: Re: COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO REFUGEE AND DISP. PEOPLE PROBLEM(5/10/94)
/* Written 5 Nov 6:00am 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ---------------" Comprehensive Response (reposted) "-------------- */
Part 2 of 2.
A Comprehensive Response to
Burma's Refugee and Displaced people problems
4. Armed Conflicts in Burma
============================
Concerned with the growing crisis of displaced Burmese in Thailand,
the UNHCR expressed its willingness, on 21 June 1994, to assist and
monitor the returnees in future repatriation. The UNHCR also
stated the voluntary repatriation of Burmese refugees is possible
only if all groups concerned implement a cease-fire and therefore
it urged Myanmar authorities and opposition groups to work towards
that end [62].
There has been armed conflicts in Burma since the time Burma gained
independence from British in 1948. The armed struggle in early period
evolved from the ideological differences as well as ethnic
nationality problems [63]. According to the Burmese army, the
multitudes of armed insurrections, in pursuasion of communist
ideology as well as some ethnic groups' movement towards secession,
that threatened security of the nation had been the reason for
Burmese military in seizing the state power in 1962.
There has been a number of attempts by previous military regime to
make cease-fire with the rebels, one in 1963. These attempts
failed because of Burmese military's insistence on total surrender
for the rebels and refusal to make political concessions on ethnic
nationality issues, i.e. to give a greater autonomy. The presense
of communist rebels may also have complicated in formulating a
comprehensive political settlement at that time.
The ethnic nationalities' struggle for varying objectives of
freedom and greater autonomy has, in time, evolved into that of
establishing the federal union of Burma; the National Democratic
Front was formed in May 1976 [64]. Some groups became primarily
involved in narcotic trades: appearing to have been driven by the
complex dynamics of underlying ethnic beliefs, political and
economic factors [65]. The Communist Party of Burma army, which is
the strongest force against the Rangoon central government since
1970s, split up into regional resistance armies after the Wa ethnic
faction mutinied against Burman communist leaders in 1989 [66].
Following the nationwide uprising in 1988, the urban Burman
pro-democracy students fled to rebel controlled areas. In November
1988, the National Democratic Front formally included Burmese
students and formed the Democratic Alliance of Burma. The ethnic
nationalities' struggle for a greater freedom had reached a new
phase in 1991 when the elected parliamentarians, who claimed to
have the mandate to form a parallel government, fled to rebel held
areas and signed an agreement to form the federal union of Burma [67].
By September 1993, in an attempt to attract the ethnic freedom
fighters to enter a cease-fire, the Burmese military have made a
promise to adopt a federal republic style constitution [68]. This
can be seen as the Burman's concessions on the issue of autonomy
for the minorities.
These facts suggest, for the first time in Burma's post-independent
history, the ethnic nationality issues can be resolved along with
the restoration of a democratic government. With the crisis in
Burmese politics, as the analyst had pointed out [69], the real
opportunities for the cessation of 45 year long civil war as well as
the restoration of a popular government in Burma may have been
coming into a reality.
5. Eliminating Root Causes
===========================
As it is explained in Sec 2. and Sec 3., the armed hostilities
between ethnic nationalities and the Burmese army are seen as a
primary root cause for the occurrences of human rights abuses that
consequently cause displacements. Therefore the priority must be
given to implement a nation-wide cease-fire.
For a longer term settlement, the ethnic and political issues must be
resolved through constitutional reform. The ethnic nationalities'
demands for greater autonomy must be realized in the form of
Federal Constitution. Along with elected parliamentarians, the
ethnic freedom fighters should be given appropriate political
platform in drafting the constitution. The UN Committee on Human
Rights should offer its help in drafting of the constitution.
Measures must be made to improve the human rights situation in
minority areas. Efforts should be made to reduce the oppressive
activities by Local military authorities regarding forced labour and
informal taxations. Arrangements must also be made for the displaced
villagers to have the compensations from the Myanmar military
government.
The growing humanitarian crisis in Burma must also be tackled. The
immediate attention should be given to contain the spread of
HIV/AIDS throughout Burma, especially in minority areas. The
initiatives must be made to curtail narcotic production and
increasing cases of illegal drug uses.
5.1 The United Nations General Assembly:
-----------------------------------------
In this UN General Assembly, the international community should
strengthened the resolution regarding Burmese refugees and displaced
people [70]. In particular, the UNGA should urge Myanmar government
to make measures to rectify the human rights abuses in minority
areas and to eliminate the root causes of the refugees' flights.
The various parties in the conflict must also be urged to seek an
end to civil war and to implement the nation-wide cease-fire
urgently.
In this UN General Assembly, the international community should
recommand the deployment of a civilian peace-keeping mission to
Burma. The mission should be given the mandate to monitor
cease-fire and human rights; and to promote human rights and to
improve humanitarian situation. The UN mission should take the "
an expanded peace-keepers' role" in Myanmar/Burma [71]. A
crossed-mandate approach should be made in regards to monitoring
and promoting human rights [72].
The UNGA should particularly encourage Myanmar military authorities
and the elected representatives to form regional working
committees, which similar to {\em Reception Committee} in Arakan
State, to carried out the humanitarian tasks under UN mission.
The UNGA should urge Myanmar authorities to allow UN Agencies and
non-governmental organizations to get free and unhindered access in
delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar through
the regional working committees.
All member states should be urged to refrain from providing the
large-scale development assistance to Myanmar. The humanitarian and
small-scale development assistance should be allowed to be given to
Burma.
In this UNGA, the international community should promote an
appropriate legal framework that is necessary for the UN organized
repatriation of Burmese refugees and displaced people. Tripartite
agreements should be completed by UNHCR, Myanmar authorities and
Myanmar's neighbouring governments - particularly the Royal Thai
Government. These agreements must observe the {\em non-refoulment}
principle.
5.2 Consolidation of Cease-fire:
---------------------------------
Presently, the Burmese military had signed cease-fire agreements
with 11 ethnic rebel groups. Although these cease-fire agreements
are (1) made to counteract the ethnic federal movement, (2) are
aimed at providing a short term solution and (3) are lacking
credibility since the majority of groups entered are now engaged in
the illegal drug trades; nonetheless these agreements are
important. By the time a comprehensive political settlement between
the Burmese army and the Democratic Alliance of Burma has been
made, these existing cease-fire should be brought into line with
the settlement.
In this UN General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights should
recommend Myanmar Government and ethnic rebels to enter a
cease-fire and to make the political settlement. Detailed plans of
how to implement a cease-fire and how to maintain and monitor the
cease-fire must also be worked out.
Ethnic freedom fighters have been deceived,in the 1963 Peace Parley
for example, with the promise of a cease-fire by the Burmese army.
They are therefore cautious and fearful about entering into a
cease-fire agreement with Burmese army and request the presense
of international observers. The UN Agencies and major democracies
should offer their presense in the implementation of a cease-fire.
Furthermore, there have been concerns that once the cease-fire is
implemented, the deployment of the Burmese army at strategic
positions may disadvantage the ethnic rebels. These details must
carefully be worked out and planned to implement the nation-wide
cease-fire.
It may become possible for armed opposition groups, which have
genuine cause for political freedoms, to enter to the wider
settlement. However, there can be difficulties with private
militia. In case of the existence of such an obstacle in the
nation-wide cease-fire, efforts should be made to contain such
insurrection.
Once a nation-wide cease-fire agreement has been implemented, the
UN Security Council should impose an international arms embargo on
Burma. This is particularly necessary for both ethnic rebels and
the Burmese army not to arm themselves to get a greater advantage.
In order to maintain stability, provisions must be made in the
cease-fire agreement so that the armed forces from both sides
should not defect to one another's sides.
5.2 Monitoring Human Rights:
-----------------------------
In order to improve the human rights situation in minority areas,
especially those bordering Thailand, the UN General Assembly should
implement the recommendations of the 50th session of Commission on
Human Rights [73]. Since the type of abuses occur because of
weaknesses in legislative and institutional sectors, the effort to
improve human rights should be aimed at building institutions for
the long term. To ensure the participation of elected
representatives of May 1990 in institution building tasks, the
implementations of this recommendation must be made through the
regional working committees. In particular, measure should be made
to implement following recommendation:
"(e) The Government of Myanmar should take the necessary
steps to bring the acts of soldiers, including privates and
officers, in line with accepted international human rights
and humanitarian standards so that they will not commit
arbitrary killings, rapes and confiscations of property, or
force persons into acts of labour, portering, relocation or
otherwise treat persons without respect for their dignity
as human beings. When the hiring of local villagers for
porterage and other works may be required for governmental
purposes, it should be obtained on a voluntary basis and
adequate wages should be paid. The nature of work should be
reasonable and in accordance with established international
labour standards. When relocation of villages is considered
necessary for military operations or for development projects,
proper consultation with the villagers should take place and
appropriate compensation should be paid for those relocations
which may be determined necessary for reasons of the public
good;}
Within the context of enforcing this recommendation, the UNCHR
should recommend Myanmar authorities and also UN Agencies:
(a) To promote human rights and to carry out a smooth operation for
the UN Agencies, the `regional working committees' which similar to
{\em Reception Committee} in Arakan State must be formed [74].
(b) A tribunal must be set-up and operate under the supervision of
the United Nations. Various compensation claims: the losses of
properties in having to move to concentration camps, the monies
demanded by military for the loss of army's properties, etc, should
be assessed by this tribunal and the military government of Myanmar
give compensation to these people. Efforts should be made to
initiate judicial reforms in Myanmar and UN Committee on Human
Rights to offer its helps.
(c) A special committee consisting of respective government
ministries, the UN agencies, elected local leaders and regional
army commander should be formed to determine the maximum amount of
taxes that should be raised from the people. A guideline must be
drawn and urge the Myanmar authorities to follow it in their
taxations. The UN monitoring team should ensure that the taxation
is not excessive. The respective UN agencies, such as UNDP, should
offer their helps to train and restructure a proper taxation
department in Burma.
(d) Myanmar military government must reimburst the monies owed to
the villagers along the Ye-Tavoy railway routes as well as other
development projects for their contributed labour.
(e) Investigations should made into the incidences of extrajudicial
killings occurred within the context of military operations.
Compensation must be given to those family members of those killed
in such incidences.
(f) All UN Agencies and non-governmental organizations must respect
and promote human rights within Burma, regardless of their formal
mandates and humanitarian role.
5.4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees:
---------------------------------------
Presently, in Thailand there are 350,000 displaced people, 72,000
ethnic refugees and 2500 student refugees. An estimated 12,000
refugees from Kachin State are in China. Also a smaller number of
refugees and displaced persons in India.
Within Burma, there are estimated 800,000 internally displaced
people(idp) in Karen State, 50,000 idp in Kachin State. In addition
to ethnic freedom fighters, there are un-armed Burmese
pro-democracy students within ethnic rebel controlled areas [75].
For such a mixed population which need similar protection and
assistance as returning refugees, the UNHCR should make an
innovative plan for protection. The UNHCR should broaden its
mandate to protect returnees and internally displaced people. In
particular, unarmed student rebels in ethnic rebel controlled area
should be given `person of concern status'.
In order to protect refugees and people who have higher risk of
persecution, such as internally displaced people, the UNHCR should
consider creating special zones, that are similar to security
zones created for returning Kurds refugees in northern Iraq in 1991
[76]. In the process of creating special zones, it must be
transparent by both sides not to build-up their military
capacities. This kind of arrangement will be necessary until the
cease-fire is consolidated. Restrictions may be imposed on
students to be confined to their respective areas until the
cease-fire condition is consolidated. Other detailed arrangements,
such as visiting by parents and relatives to those students must
also be allowed.
5.5 Humanitarian Agencies and NGOs:
------------------------------------
The humanitarian agencies and non-government organizations have been
at the fore-front in advocating to increase humanitarian assistance
to Burma. It is reported that the UNICEF and NGOs are now in
preparation to enter Burma [77].
Regarding human rights monitoring missions, the UN Agencies have
often been described as silent witness [78]. There are concerns
already been expressed by NGOs for returning Burmese muslims from
Bangladesh. Once the refugees have returned, the international
community need to be kept informed of the returnees' situations.
The NGOs should fill such an information vacuum, ifthe UN Agencies'
mandate has limitations.
The UNICEF and NGO's should make a special effort to tackle the
HIV/AIDS problem in Shan State and Kachin State. Special attention
should be given to Burmese women returning from Thailand. The
education programs for the local population as well as the
information flow from these areas, especially Shan State, will be
particularly useful to co-ordinate future drug eradication programs.
5.6 UN Drug Control Programmes:
--------------------------------
The increasing illicit drug production and trafficking in Shan State
also needs attention. In the past, the UNDCP efforts were not
yielding good results, probably because it can not operate in the
whole Shan State. The main problem seems to be the difficulty to
work with the local population directly. Recent human rights field
reports suggest that the confiscation of villagers land has
occurred within the context of UNDCP's income generation
programme. Therefore, efforts must be made to avoid such incidences.
SLORC's attempt to use the drug issue for its political legitimacy
has been a concern to human rights groups and oppositions. The
UNDCP should broaden its focus and consider promoting human rights
as suggested in the guideline.
Although the cease-fire situation in Shan State is believed to be
fragile, the UNDCP should work closely with the regional working
committees, UNICEF and NGOs. Through gradual contacts, the UNDCP
should promote its drug eradication programs.
5.7 UN Trusteeship Role in Burma ?
-----------------------------------
There has been increasing weariness in donor countries and the
UNHCR, in particular, to meet growing needs of humanitarian
emergencies throughout the globe. Although the NGOs may do their
best efforts in searching for funds, it is quite impossible to get
at the level of needs. A greater amount of monies will be needed
when the reintegration program has started. Therefore, the UN
should consider setting up a trusteeship for future development
projects. At present, the currency in Myanmar is at a high rate of
inflation due to government over printing of notes. However, if
this situation can be brought under control, the UN should
introduce a local financial institution - i.e. a Bank independent
of the Military Government - for development funds, with the
provision of handing-over the assets to the elected government when
the UN mission is completed. This kind of arrangement will also be
beneficial in the training of civil servants for banking and
financial matters.
6. Towards the Reconciliations
===============================
At the time of preparing this paper, it is not known whether SLORC
will set a date to transfer power. One thing certain, however, is
that the building of democratic institutions as well as
reconstruction of national economy may have to be carried out in
the immediate future. Efforts are also needed for reconciliations
between the army and civilian populations as well as the Burman
majority and ethnic minorities.
Societies that experienced violent oppressions inevitably have left
with residual tensions. It has often been the case that the fear of
retribution becomes the driving force for oppressors to hold on to
power. It is the very fear that has kept the present Burmese
military junta holding together. Therefore, promises from the
opposition forces that no retribution upon transfer of power to
SLORC is necessary. One may often feel that the perpetrator of
human rights abuses ought to be brought to justice. However, in the
best interests of national reconciliation and in order to avoid a
violent showdown, it seems worthwhile to make reconciliation.
Although we must never forget about the violent past ({\em every
effort must be made to prevent the military dictatorship from
resurrecting}), our efforts should better be used in promoting
peace and future prosperity of the nation [79].
There has been a policy dispute between the approach presented in
this document and that of priority given to restoring a popular
government. Although this is an obvious point that the removal of
the leadership of the junta may pave the way to establish
democracy, it is not necessarily the only solution. Of course,
there would be far less reasons to argue this point if SLORC set
the date to transfer power. However, for a country like Burma which
has little experience in democratic government, there are equally
important tasks of building democratic institutions and promoting
greater respect for human rights. In building such institutions,
national efforts with international supports are necessary.
A more fundamental approach is to consider SLORC as the system of
repression and the violator of human rights. Therefore, the increase
in the reduction of SLORC's unlawful activities are equally as good
as removing the junta's leaders. From recent developments, it is
evident that the SLORC leaderships is increasingly disoriented and
also losing their control on the army rank and file. It is a clear
sign that the military dictatorship is breaking down in Burma.
Therefore efforts must be made in order to create a new democratic
political order in Burma. The strengthening of the democratic
institutions and establishing the independent judiciary are more
important and achievable.
The curtailment of SLORC's illegal and unlawful activities can be
made through external supports (and power) along with the national
efforts. The returning refugees, internally displaced people and
the peace-keeping mission that bring international instruments
together with them must be seen as part of the strategy. In this
case, the nation building tasks will be carried through by national
efforts with international supports. Bonuses in this process are
peace and security for normal citizens and regional stability.
It is necessary to balance the efforts to improve human rights with
political realities. For Burma, a country in which all forms of
freedom have been severely suppressed for a long period, the
improvements for human rights must be made in measured steps. At
the same time the confidence building between army, ethnic
nationalities and civilian oppositions should be allowed to take
place.
6. Voluntary Repatriation and Confidence Building
==================================================
Since displaced persons are mixed with refugees, the voluntary
repatriation to Burma should be carried out in parallel with
confidence building process in Burma.
As the first step, the UN mission should be mandated to monitor
serious forms of abuses: rape, extrajudiccial killing, torture,
detention without trial; and those described in Sec 2. This step
will create an environment conducive for the return of most of so
called `illegal immigrants' in Thailand. These so called `illegal
and economic immigrants' have lesser risk of politically motivated
arrests and persecutions therefore this first step will enable them
to go home. Since the majority of displaced population in Thailand
are the `illegal and economic immigrants', this step need to be
considered as major operation.
By the time a cease-fire condition is consolidated - probably by
middle of next year - the UN mission's mandate should be broadened
to include freedom of expression and association ( this may not
include freedom to assemble in large crowds). This is to facilitate
the populace to have free discussions for drafting constitutions
and forming parties. Amnesty to all rebels, refugees and detained
politicians should also be given.
This step will encourage the return of the students who
participated in anti-government movements and ethnic refugees who
are in association with ethnic freedom fighters. These refugees are
expected to repatriate as soon as the political climate within the
country is improved and the process of reconciliation is in progress.
The general amnesty which combined with formation of political
parties has to be a primary deciding factor for those refugees to
return. This step would meet with the consolidation of nation-wide
cease-fire with the army and rebels.
footnotes
---------
[ 1] John BAdgley, "Myanmar in 1993: A watershed year", ASIAN SURVEY,
Vol. XXXIV, NO. 2, February 1994.
[ 2] Bangkok Post, 21 September 1994.
[ 3] The New Light of Myanmar, 16 September 1994.
[ 4] Country Human Rights Reports, US Department of States,
February 1994.
[ 5] Janelle M. Diller, "Constitutional Reform in a Repressive State:
The Case of Burma", ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXXIII, No 4.
[ 6] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1994.
[ 7] Economic Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1994.
[ 8] This report mainly focus on the human rights abuses that produce
refugees.
[ 9] see Amnesty International report, "Myanmar: Human rights development
July to December 1993"; ASA 16/03/94.
[10] This concession, again, has been undermined by continuing detentions
and renewed arrests of non-violent political activists in November
1993 and July 1994; see Amnesty document, Urgent Action AI Index:
16/08/94, 16/11/94.
[11] It is a sign of present military junta's lack of moral authority upon
the army rank and file.
[12] Country Human Rights reports, US Department of State; February 1994.
[13] Project Maje, "A Swanp Full of Lilies: Human Rights Violations
Committed by Units/Personals of Burma's Army, 1992-1993, Feb.1994.
[14] The four cut strategy:the military attempts to cut links of
intelligence, food, money and recruit between armed opposition groups
and local civilians.(see Amnesty International report, AI Index ASA:
16/11/92)
[15] ( A - 1) One reliable source stated in 1993 that," The campaign is
spread through Papun Sistrict in the north, through central Thaton
District, to Pa-an District in the south. It is a large region about
200km north to south, forming a large crescent behind SLORC line west
of Manerplaw.
[16] An independent human rights group, which based in Manerplaw, have
reported a series of interview by both refugees at the border and, on
occasions, people from the villages inside Burma. The series of
interview are available on the Internet. The names of the interviewees
have been changed as a protection.
[17] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994: see testimonies of
DAw Mya Thein.
[18] Karen Human Rights Group report: May 26, 1994; testimony by Naw Lar
Htoo.
[19] There had been reports of forced labour in Loikaw-Aungbann railways in
Shan State in 1991-93. Dawn news bulletin, Vol. 4 No. 5.
October-November 1993.
[20] This can be seen as the Burmese Army's atttempt to seek its political
legitimacy: portraying itself as of having the support of masses at
the same time trying to mobilize the public support for its agenda.
[21] ( A - 2) Burma Update, June 24, 1994.
[22] CPPSM, Committee for Publicity of Peoples' Struggle for Monland,
Ye-Tavoy Railway Report, April 1994.
[23] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 13, 1994; testimony by Maung
Aye.
[24] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 13, 1994; testimony by Hla Aye.
[25] CPPSM report, April 1994. See also New Era Journal(in Burmese),
No 27, August 1994.
[26] re: the use of forced labour in counter-insurgeency operations.
[27] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; testimony by Nan
Thein Thein.
[28] Karen Human Rights Group report: March 16, 1994; testimony by Maug
Win.
[29] Burma Action Group UK, "Burma and the United Nations: a roposal for
constructive involvement", November 1992.
[30] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; tesetimony by
Naw Paw Paw Htoo.
[31] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; testimony by
Saw Hla Maung.
[32] Karen Human Rights Group report: May 26, 1994; testimony by
Saw Lah Ghay.
[33] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by
Daw Mya Thein.
[34] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by
Htoo Htoo Mo.
[35] This appear that the army attempting to discourage the similar aggack
by rebels and may also attributed to the practice of army
extorting monies.
[36] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 23, 1994; testimony by Naw Say.
[37] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by H
Htoo Htoo Mo.
[38] ( A - 3) Karen Human Rights Group report: April 23, 1994; testimony by
Naw Eh Wah.
[39] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1994.
[40] ( A - 4) Burmese Relief Centre, July 1994.
[41] Karen Human Rights Groups report: 20 August 1994; testimony by Sai On.
[42] Amnesty International reports: September 1994, 26 May 1994.
[43] ( A - 5) Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993.
[44] Burma Students' League in India estimates, in their December 1993
report, total number as: students 500, war victims 3,000 and
economically-displaced 5,000.
[45] Bangkok Post, 17 September 1994.
[46] ( B - 1) Bangkok Post, 16 September 1994.
[47] Associated Press, 1 June 1994.
[48] Martin Smith, "Insrugency and The Politice of Ethnicity", 1991. The
BSPP government was so embarrassed that they announced that news after
4 months later.
[49] Economic Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1994.
[50] David I Steinberg, "Neither Silver Nor gold: The 40th anniversary of
The Burmese Economy" in Independent Burma at Forty Years,
Ed. J Silverstein, Ithaca, N.Y. 1989.
[51] Human rights groups in their rcent field reports frequently mention
the incidences of forced procurement of rice from villagers(and
refugees). However, this provlem has been so profound in its
underlying complexities and therefore do not nention in Sec 2.1.3.
[52] ( B - 2) All Burma Student Democratic Front(ABSDF) in Arakan have
reported the situation in its 20 November 1993 statement. Clearly
outraged at the sufferings of Arakanese masses, the report itself is
strong in tone, but is the reflection of a deep sadness for rural
population. Students seems to have exaggerated their status of as
military component since there was no such military activity in
Arakan.
[53] Asia Watch/ Women's Rights Project,"A Modern Form of Slavery:
trafficking of Burmese Women and girls into Brothels in Thailand",
December 1993.
[54] ibid. pp45: The report said, "Of the thirty, nineteen had parents or
guardians who were peasant farmers or farm laborers. They came from
villages all over Shan State(Taichelek, Keng Tung and Taunggyi);
Kachin State near the Chinese border; Kayin State; Sagaing division in
central Burma; and even Rangoon, the capital city.
[55] ( B -3) FAr Eastern Economic Review, 21 July 1994.
[56] ( B -4) Jesuit Refugee Service in Asia-Pacific, Issue 31, November
1993.
[57] ( B -5) ICVA mission to Burma report.
[58] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "The State of the Worlds Refugees
1993: the Challenge of Protection", pp 5, "Many of the people in need
of protection are fleeing from armed conflict, generalized violence,
severe disrption of public order or widespread abuses of human rights.
Their claims to international protection are widely acknowledged, even
though they may not always conform to the notion of persecution found
in the 1951 convention relating to the Status of Refugees(see box 2).
The situations from which they flee do not necessarily entil
individually targeted persecution but do provide fertile breeding
grounds for it."
[59] Asia Watch, "Abuses against Burmese Refugees in Thailand", Vol. No 4
Issue No 7, 20 March 1992.
[60] bangkok Post, 30 June 1994.
[61] National Democratic Front, 24 July 1994.
[62] ( C -1) Bangkok Post, 30 June 1994.
[63] ( C -2) Burma Action Group UK, November 1992. Martin Smith, "Burma:
Insurgency and Politics of Ethnicity ", 1991.
[64] A Breif History of National Democratic Front(Burma),(Private
communiations).
[65] The complexity of ethnic armed insrugency issue in Burma has long been
recognised. The evolvement of ideals and actions of the insurgents
are also dictated by the necessity to survive in revolution. These
facts are further complicated by the presense of private militias,
which take advantage of lawlessness in remote areas, formed solely for
production and trafficking of illicit drugs.
[66] Bertil Lintner,"The Politics of the Drug Trade in Burma", Indian
Ocean Centre for Peace Studies occasional paper Mo 33. the University
of Western Australia, May 1993.
[67] ( C -3) Australia Council For Oversea Aid, seminor on Burma, May 27,
1993.
[68] Burma Information Group, October 1993;The New Light Of Myanmar,
16/9/94 stated,"...Others include the creation of a federal union and
a multi-party democracy system with freedom of expression and worship
as well as seven ethnic minority states with equal status, authority
and their own parliaments, judicial systems and administrations in a
power sharing system. Mo part of the territory of the state of region
shall be allowed to secede from the union."
[69] Burma Action Group UK, "Burma and the United Nations: a proposal for
constructive involvement", November 1992.
[70] UNGA draft resolution, UN Document A/C.3/48/L.70, 29 November 1993.
(adopted by consensus in December 6, 1993.)
Noting that the human rights situation in Myanmar has consequently
resulted in flows of refugees to neighbouring countries, thus creating
problem for the country concerned,
Noting the ceasefire that has been reached between the Government of
Myanmar and several groups of ethnic and religious minorities in
Myanmar.
[71] Gareth Evans, "Cooperating for Peace: The global agenda for 1990s and
beyond.", 1993.
[72] This author wrote a suggestion paper,"An Operational Guideline
Proposal for the United Nations Agencies in Myanmar", last April. It
outlines a guideline on how the UN AGencies may promote the human
rights at the same time improving humanitarian situation; and how ti
bypass SLORC in providing humanitarian assistance to the populace. The
paper will be made available at your request.
[73] United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifteith Session, Agenda
item 12, E/CN.4/1994/57, 16 February 1994.
[74] "An Operational Guideline Proposal for United Nations Agencies in
Myanmar", 26 April 1994.
[75] Sources reports 600 such students in Kachin State and 300 in Karenni
State.
[76] UNHCR,"The State of the World's Refugees", 1993; pp-84.
[77] ( D -1) Burma Issues, July 1994.
[78] Amnesty International, "Peace-keeping and Human Rights",
ASA 40/01/94.
[79] Opinions on this point will certainly be varied. It often been charged
to those tends to forgive oppressors as betraying from the course.
Amongst Burmese people, there has been a profound sadness for those
who made sacrifices in 1988 and the period that followed. Eventually,
it is the sadness that compel this author to participate in the
movement.
Part 2 of 6.
/* Endreport */