Two articles from Burma Issues

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>From BURMA ISSUES, September 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS

FORCED LABOR IN KYAUK KYI TOWNSHIP 

Part II - Military - run Rice Plantations

The August edition of Burma Issues carried the first article
in a series detailing forced labor practices in Pegu Division's
Kyauk Kyi Township in eastern Burma.  The military -
administered project was the damming of the Kyauk Ke Kyi
Stream in order to provide hydropower and irrigation to
lowland military installations.  Although neither small - scale
hydropower and irrigation schemes are necessarily
detrimental to local economics, this article will elaborate on
the context in which these 'development programs occur
and the devastating effects they have on rural communities.

In 1994, severe flooding destroyed a large portion of the
rice paddies under cultivation in Kyauk Kyi township.  It is
estimated that rice production in Kyauk Kyi and
neighboring Shwegyin townships was below 40% the usual
yield.  After the floodwaters receded, local villagers
attempted to salvage the growing season by planting beans
in the recovered fields.  However, as part of the Burma
army's strategy to keep tight control over the area, then -
Southern Region Commander General Soe Myint ordered
the local Tactical Command to increase rice production to
supply troops in the area.  As a result the villagers were
ordered to destroy their own bean fields to make way for
the military's dry - season rice plantations.

On February 7, 1995, villagers commenced work on three
tracts of dry - season rice (which requires irrigation but not
the flooded - paddy technique common throughout lowland
Burma).  The project was managed by Infantry Battalion 60
and Light Infantry Battalion 351, which were responsible
for both seizing the land for use in the plantations and
controlling the villagers' forced labor.  The system is a
familiar human rights abuse scenario in Burma: daily,
approximately 500 villagers were required to work,
providing their own food. medicine, tools and draught
animals. "Substitute fees" for those unable to work were
100 kyats per day, but considering that even in stable
economic times a typical daily income is 50 kyats, the
burden of failing to report for duty was very high.  There
was never any evidence uncovered that the substitute fees
were used in any administrative capacity, and certainly
could not have been used to pay labourers, since none were
ever paid.  For poorer households struggling to survive, the
only recourse was to avoid both the substitution fees and
the loss of male labourer to bring in daily income by sending
women and children to the fields to work.

Even after the preparation and planting were complete,
forced labor was used to guard the fields from wandering
buffaloes and cows (the owner of a cow or buffalo
convicted of trampling the military rice fields would be fined
500 kyats) The villagers felt that when the time came for the
rice to be harvested (at the end of the 1995 dry season, in
May - June), they would once again be called to work
without compensation or regard for their own survival or
welfare.

Deprived of rice stocks by natural disaster, then deprived of
a cash bean crop by local authorities, throughout the 1994 -
1995 dry season lowland communities in Kyauk Kyi
township suffered the added burden of forced labor on a
military - run rice plantation.  The project consumed their
time, stole their land, and further entrenched the destructive
presence of the Burma army in their community.

As forced labor continued in lowland areas throughout the
1995 dry season, in the neighboring highlands a massive
increase in military activity against the Karen National
Liberation Army saw Burma army troops enter villages
which had been removed from direct military conflict since
the beginning of the Four Cuts strategy in the area twenty
years ago.  Entire villages and their rice stores were burned
and the people fled into the mountainous jungles.  By the
middle of the rainy season, unconfirmed reports began
filtering into Thailand that the cumulative effect of the 1994
flooding, the seizure of communal labor and lowland
growing areas, and increased abuse of social, cultural, and
economic rights associated with increased military activity
was a severe food shortage in several districts surrounding
Kyauk Kyi.  

The resulting malnutrition has worsened people's health,
and dysentery, diarrhoea and malaria are widespread.  There
have even been suggestions that some people have either
died from starvation or have taken their own lives facing an
absolute food shortage.

When an individual project using forced labor cannot be
held responsible for the totality of suffering in Kyauk Kyi, it
does lend insight into the scope of military control in the
area, and -- viewed in conjunction with the hydropower
project reported on last month -- indicates that the military
is cementing its presence in the economic and political life
of rural Burma to ensure future control of the local
populace.

SLORC ADMINISTRATION

Structure of the SLORC Administration

The word "Slorc" has become common English for anyone
watching Burma, even from a distance.  Standing for "State
Law and Order Restoration Council", the Slorc is a military
machine which controls virtually every aspect of life in most
of Burma today.  While the military elite makes up only a
tiny fraction of the entire population (some people estimate
they are less than .1%), it rules everything from the
economy, to the education system, to the clothing styles
singers in Karaoke bars can wear.

How do they do it?  Through a tight organization which
winds its way from the highest leadership all the way down
to the smallest village.  Loyalty is not based on a common
ideology or a common vision.  It is gained and hold through
special benefits and promotions.  Any crack in the chain
brings inconveniences and possible loss of benefits to those
below. Therefore pressure and fear also play a significant
role in keeping the system intact.

Following is a brief outline of how this structure is set up.
lst class:
State Law and Order Restoration Council [Slorc] - consists
of a small number of high ranking military senior officers

2nd class:
State Government - consists of military senior officers,
Slorc members and a few civilians trusted by the Slorc
 a) At State and Division levels, Zone Commanders and/or
Divisional Commanders are the Slorc
Chairmen. Divisional police chiefs or State police chiefs,
Divisional or State administration officers are members of
Division or State-level Slorc.  
* Vice-chairmen, secretaries and assistant secretaries at
such levels are senior military officers above the rank of
colonel.

 b) At District-level, the Slorc chairmen are military officers
from Major up to the rank of Colonel.  District police
officers and district administration office officers are the
members of district - level Slorc.
*  Vice - chairmen, secretaries and assistant secretaries are
the military officers from the rank of Captain up to Major.

c) At township - level, township administration chiefs are
the chairmen of that level of Slorc.  Township police
officers and township administration officers are the
members at that level.
* Vice-chairmen, secretaries and assistant secretaries of
township level Slorc are township senior police officers and
/ or administration senior officers.

d)  At the levels of the village or town - quarter, the officers
from the township - level Slorc let the people elect their
own chairmen and secretaries, usually from a handpicked
group nominated by the township - level Slorc officers.  

The various levels have a specific nomenclature:

Na Wa Ta -- State Law and Order Restoration Council
[Slorc]

Ta Wa Ta -- Division - level Slorc authorities

Pa Wa Ta -- State - level Slorc authorities

Ka Wa Ta -- District - level Slorc authorities

Ma Wa Ta -- Township - level Slorc authorities

Ya Wa Ta -- Town - quarter or village - level Slorc
authorities

When village or town- quarter- level Slorc chairmen fail to
fulfill the objectives of the township - level Slorc authorities,
the latter have full authority to dismiss the Ya Wa Ta
chairman and appoint a new one.

Source: The Rape of the Rural Poor, Mergui - Tavoy
District,  July 1995



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