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World Bank Assistance to Burma
- Subject: World Bank Assistance to Burma
- From: ncgub@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 18 Oct 1995 08:50:00
INFORMATION OFFICE
815 Fifteenth Street, NW, Suite 910, Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 393 7342 (202) 393 4312, Fax: (202) 393 7343
NO RESUMPTION OF WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE TO BURMA;
THE REASONS WHY !
Throughout its seven years of iron-fisted rule, the
military-run State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
has been claiming economic successes and putting up a
pretense that all is well. Yet, today, the SLORC finance
minister and his delegation are touring the globe, knocking
on the doors of international financial institutions to seek
loans and assistance.
When a financial crisis hit Burma in 1988 there was only
around US$12 million in foreign currency reserves left in
SLORC's coffers. The most logical option left was for
SLORC to work with the pro-democracy forces to save the
country. But at this critical juncture an inflow of foreign
investment seeking quick returns from Burma's natural
resources was obtained. SLORC was thus saved from financial
disaster. This enabled SLORC to resort to a violent
suppression of the people and avoid negotiating with the
democratic forces.
A situation not unlike the one in 1988 has arisen again
today. Even though it has succeeded in attracting short-
term, fast money-making investors to Burma, SLORC has
failed to lure long-term investments in the manufacturing
sector. The present pattern of foreign investments in Burma
are all aimed at making quick returns. Major investors lack
the confidence to start labor-intensive and long-term
investment in the manufacturing sector because
infrastructures in the transport, communications and energy
industries are still very poor, the value of kyat against
foreign currencies remains unrealistic, business rules and
regulations are inconsistent, and corruption and nepotism
remain widespread within the military bureaucratic
machinery.
SLORC needs massive loans from the World Bank and the other
institutions if it is to bring on infrastructural
development and devalue the Burmese currency without adverse
consequences. The World Bank suspended loans to Burma in
1988 due to the outcry from the international community that
had witnessed the brutal and bloody suppression of the
democracy movement by the Burmese Army.
SLORC faces an uphill task in trying to build a durable
power base. It expects to achieve that goal through tough
political control and brutal suppression of dissent and by
consolidating a financial base through foreign investment,
international economic and development assistance, and
financial aid.
SLORC has frequently pointed to its "economic reforms" as an
indicator that it is moving toward a free market economy and
that the World Bank should take that as a cue to extend it
loans. The following facts, however, should be taken into
serious consideration if Burma is to become a recipient of
World Bank assistance:
No structural changes have been made in the economy
permitting it to develop into a true market economy.
Budget disparity remains uncorrected, with the bulk of
the budget going to defense expenditures.
Political reforms essential for long-term sustainable
economic development have yet to be undertaken.
Labour practices under SLORC grossly violate
internationally recognized labor conventions.
Restrictions imposed on academic freedom and the
suppression of intellectuals have resulted in the decline
of human resources.
Resuming loans to SLORC under these conditions will be
premature as it will only strengthen the power base of the
Burmese military and will not contribute to long-term
sustainable development that benefits the people.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO DEVELOP A TRUE MARKET ECONOMY
SLORC claims that the country is being developed through a
market-oriented economic policy. The fact, however, is
that the country is only partially opened to foreign
investors to operate mostly in the form of joint ventures
with the State (military). Most state-owned enterprises and
co-operatives that existed under the previous Burma
Socialist Program government remain under the control of
SLORC today.
SLORC's claim of privatization means the transferring of a
few factories to ex-military officers and their relatives.
There has not been any real attempt to privatize key
enterprises, develop private entrepreneurs or to undertake
economic liberalization. The state sector today retains
direct control over the export of 23 important commodities,
including rice, still the country's major earner of foreign
exchange. SLORC intends to revive a military command
economy behind the facade of an "open-door" economic policy.
One glaring example of this is the Myanmar Economic Holdings
Company Limited established by the Defense Ministry. This
enterprise is involved in all major business contracts and
deals.
Another underlying problem associated with investment in
Burma is the repatriation of profit earned in Burmese kyat.
Because of strict controls by the SLORC's Foreign Exchange
Bank, foreign investors are forced to comply with a
bartering system. They are made to buy local products and
export them as a means of channeling their profits out of
Burma. Given the situation, business deals in Burma have
unnecessarily become complicated and risky.
In addition, under the new Private Investment Law, only a
few selected private companies associated with the military
can function and are making profit. Entrepreneurs "without
connection" have to go through corrupt officials at
different levels and bureaucratic red tape before anything
can get done.
BUDGET DISPARITY
SLORC has only concentrated on building up the military and
modernizing its weaponry. In seven years of SLORC rule, the
army has grown from 180,000 in 1988 to 350,000 today.
US$1.4 billion worth of fighter jets, tanks, patrol boats,
anti-aircraft missiles, artillery pieces and other arms and
ammunitions were purchased from China. Naval bases and
radar stations are being constructed on Coco Island and
Zadetgyi Island while M21 and M22 machine-gun factories are
being constructed in upper Burma with China's assistance.
According to a UNICEF report in 1994, SLORC's defense budget
increased from 22% of total expenditure in 1980, to 39% in
1993. In the same period, the health sector budget
increased from 2% to 3% while the budget allocated for
education fell from 2% to 1%.
Furthermore the regime has stated its intention to increase
the size of the armed forces to 500, 000 in the near future,
with continued upgrading of technical equipment. The cost of
this expansion will be enormous relative to the meager
resources of the economy. This is the over-riding reason for
their desperate attempts to obtain World Bank assistance and
the foreign private investment that they will expect as a
consequence.
Many social problems have arisen because of that situation.
The malnutrition rate has soared in the country, with many
cases being detected even in the capital, Rangoon. Yet no
effort has been made until today to correct the problem.
Hospitals only have medical staff and nothing else much.
Due to shortage of medical supplies, patients being
hospitalized are asked to bring in bandages, medicines and
whatever they might need during their treatment.
Children with preventable diseases are dying because of the
lack of effective primary health care programs. Child and
maternal mortality rates are increasing.
In the education sector, the drop-out rate at schools from
primary level up is on the rise. Young children and
students cannot finish their education because they are
compelled to go out and work to supplement the family
income.
The educational standard has declined as experienced
teachers leave the academic life for jobs that would help
them cope with increasing expenses.
Other alarming problems that remain neglected by the SLORC
are drug addiction, AIDS, refugees, war victims and
environmental destruction.
POLITICAL REFORMS
In his report, "An Agenda for Development," the UN
Secretary-General stated that "Democracy and development
are linked in fundamental ways. They are linked because
democracy provides the only long-term basis for managing
competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way
that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict. They
are linked because democracy is inherently attached to the
question of governance, which has an impact on all aspects
of development efforts."
Democracy as good governance needs to be restored if long-
term economic development is to be sustained in Burma, and
the opportunity is available to SLORC if it has the interests
of the country at heart. Democratic forces led by Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi as well as ethnic leaders have offered to work
for national reconciliation and the early restoration of
democracy through political dialogue. International opinion
also supports political dialogue as reflected in
resolutions adopted by consensus at the UN
General Assembly.
SLORC has so far not shown any willingness to comply with
international and internal public opinion. It is bent on
legitimizing the leadership role of the military in the
country's future political life through its sham national
convention.
Without democratic reforms, economic progress will
ultimately achieve nothing more than disembodied growth, a
source of greater inequity and eventually, social unrest.
The widening gap between haves and have-nots under SLORC's
rule is leading to social chaos and total devastation of the
country.
LABOR PRACTICES VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS
A creative and energetic labor force is another vital
requisite for economic development, and hence, conditions
conducive to the emergence of that labor force must be
created. Workers must be able enjoy trade union rights and
labor practices that conform to internationally recognized
labor conventions will have to be developed.
The labor situation in Burma has worsened as SLORC has
resorted to the use of forced labor in the implementation of
infrastructure development projects. The practice directly
violates ILO Convention 29 on forced labor.
At the ILO Conference in July, 1995, the ILO Committee of
Experts urged SLORC to urgently repeal the offensive legal
provisions under the Village Act and Township Act and to
bring them into line with the letter and spirit of
Convention No. 29; to terminate forced labor practices on
the ground, to provide for and exemplary penalties against
those extracting forced labor.
It also called on SLORC to adopt measures to guarantee that
in law and in practice, workers and employers have the right
to join organizations of their own choice and without
previous authorization outside the existing structure, and
that such organizations have the right to join federations
and confederations and to affiliate without impediment. So
far, SLORC has not made any effort to reform labor laws and
practices.
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
The development of human resources is vital if a skilled
labor force is to emerge in Burma. SLORC cares little
about this and often acts against the development of human
resources to protect its political power.
Whenever a political movement led by students arises in
university campuses, the military responds with brute force,
killing, arresting and torturing members of the movement and
closing down universities for an unlimited period.
After the 1988 massacre, thousands of students and
intellectuals ended up in prisons or in exile. Thousands of
students were dismissed from their institutes of learning
while thousands of teaching staff were dismissed from their
jobs for their involvement in the democracy movement. The
1988 incidents alone had seen a great loss of human
resources that is bound to have an impact on the development
of Burma in the future.
When universities were reopened in 1991, teachers and
professors were made to wear military uniforms and to take
refresher courses. SLORC policies and security measures and
surveillance methods to control possible student activities
were taught to the teachers. Universities in Burma today
resemble concentration camps with military informers
watching day to day activities.
Students' unions and educational workers' unions that re-
emerged on the eve of the Democracy Summer of 1988 have been
outlawed since the military coup of 1988.
Since 1988, there has been an exodus of qualified teachers,
and the educational standard in universities has declined
noticeably. The situation has been made worse by the
establishment of new regional colleges and the introduction
of a "long-distance learning system" for higher education
designed to avoid the concentration of students in major
cities.
The departure for foreign countries of other professionals,
such as doctors, engineers and economists is also depleting
human resources. Restrictions on the freedom of academic
expression; freedom of association of professional
organizations; and the lack of research facilities and
seminars, exchange programs, further studies, and free
access to information on advanced technology have also
hindered the emergence of a new generation of intellectuals.
CONCLUSION
Without correcting the underlying socioeconomic and
political problems that hamper greater popular participation
in politics and development, any financial assistance that
goes to SLORC today will go to waste as in the popular
Burmese saying, "Thae dae yay thun" -- Pouring water in the
sand.
The objective of the SLORC regime is emphatically not
economic development. They are not fools. They know that
genuine economic development leading to a vibrant private
sector and a growing middle class will undermine their
monopoly of power which is based only on force. It is quite
unlike the situation in Singapore or even Indonesia where
civil servants and technocrats are able to freely use their
expertise in the service of the country. The Burmese
military lack the self-confidence to share power with any
other groups, such as civil servants or entrepreneurs. The
xenophobic and inward-looking "Burmese Way to Socialism"
represents their true ideology. The talk of market-
orientation and " open door " policies is merely a tactical
ploy necessitated by the disastrous failure of their
original program. It would be a tragedy if the international
institutions and donor community fail to realize this. Their
good intentions will only further pave the road to hell for
the Burmese people.
Oct 13, 1995.