[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

Human Rights and Asia -- Part II



--=====================_813700458==_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"



--=====================_813700458==_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

TAKING MAHATHIR MOHAMMED SERIOUSLY:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPAN IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION --  Part II

(Unpublished Presentation at Miyazaki International College,
Miyazaki, Japan, September 29, 1995)

by John J. Tobin

   (continued)
In this international environment, many former reigning
ideologies: liberalism, communism, socialism, social democracy
have been drawn into question: one result has been the
emergence of broad support for fundamentalist religious
movements, and the susceptibility of masses of the people to
demagogic appeals in the name of ethnicity or communal
memberships.  In the United States, the appeal of
comunitarianism and the rejection of rights discourse gain
sway.  With the collapse of the Communist countries, most
states now accept the market as the organizing principle of
society.  The terms of the debate over human rights have thus
changed, but not completely.

The 1995 Human Rights Watch World Report refers to a
"wholesale retreat" from the implementation of human rights by
the major powers, noting that "governments shrank from the
year's most urgent challenge -- preventing genocide in Rwanda. 
And they allowed a growing mercantilism (the pursuit of trade
and investment" J.T.) to dominate their foreign policy and
undermine the vigorous protection of human rights. 
Increasingly, the duty to ensure respect for the most basic
human rights gave way to a vision that equated economic self -
interest with the common good." This view is epitomized by a
recent comment of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, that
promoting trade is a human rights policy, and that the public
stigmatization of abusive regimes that for two decades has been
indispensable to the defense of human rights is a mere "feel
good" policy that accomplishes nothing.

As the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights approached,
several Asian governments stepped up their promotion of an
Asian concept of human rights, maintaining that Asians sought
economic development before political liberty, valued
communal obligations over individual rights, and supported
national rather than universal human rights standards.  Asian
NGOs forcefully rejected this. Let's examine some of the
arguments now current in the debate. 

An especially significant argument in the Asian context, and
one which the Japanese have already encountered, is a critique
of the universality of human rights standards based on the
distinctiveness of Asian cultures.  This is the "we - are - all - a -
little - different" argument, a type of weak cultural relativism
holding that cultures are distinctive, though not
incommensurable and that western human rights may undergo
some change when implemented in Asian societies.

Cultural relativism provides an important anti - imperial check
on the manipulation of human rights and to a large extent
provides space for cultural differences.  (It may not be adequate
when addressing some pre - capitalist cultures whose
cosmologies differ radically from those of modern societies,
especially as regards the relationship of the individual to the
land and other aspects of the natural environment.)   But the
weakness at the heart of the cultural argument is the ambiguity
of its core concept, "culture."  Determining whether a practice is
"culture" (therefore worthy of respect) or "politics", (open to
critique) is difficult, since the two domains are inseparably
linked.  Moreover, ethnography has exploded the view of
cultures as static, showing them to be dynamic, riddled with
conflict, syncretistic, and saturated with power.  Since cultures
are incessantly remade out of the symbols, power relations and
material conditions of the present, "culture" cannot provide a
secure basis for justifying social practices.

Moreover, as Thomas McCarthy has put it, "Globalization of
culture that has accompanied the growth of economic, political,
and technological interdependence, the vast migration of
populations (migrant labors, tourism, immigration) ever -
denser networks of international telecommunications, have
increasingly placed all cultures in the situation of a global
modernity.  Radical cultural relativism is now factually as well
as conceptually a red herring.  The totally isolated and wholly
alien cultural units that classical anthropology hoped to salvage
have little to do with the realities of interdependence and change
in non - Western societies or with the increasingly hybrid,
syncretistic and asynchronous cultures that are characteristic of
them."

Yash Ohai has also observed that cultures are attributes of
communities, not usually of states.  There is thus the large
question whether one can sensibly speak of the "culture" of a
nation - state.  Practices seeking justification in a putative
"national culture" must be handled with caution.  And as it is
precisely the role of human rights to protect individuals'
freedom to participate in groups from the impositions of the
powerful modern state, to attribute a "'culture" to the state --
and therefore to underpin the right of the state to defend "its"
culture -- is to negate an essential purpose of human rights.

Now it may be objected that it is precisely this notion of the
individual's relation to the state which is at issue; that human
rights defined as the shielding of the individual from the state
(or the market) is itself a cultural product (Marx made a
similar, historical relativist argument in his famous "On the
Jewish Question").  In this account, the purported Asian
concept of the individual entails an entirely different notion of
the state, of the relationship of ruler to ruled, of rights.  I think
this is far from a proven propositions and the burden of proof
remains on the proponents to show that the state system in Asia
is fundamentally different from that of the West.  This kind of
argument seems to fly in the face of the widespread use of
colonial - style repressive legislation against critics, and the use
of a range of others Western repressive mechanisms, such as the
police, death squads, etc.

McCarthy's argument about hybrid cultures also argues against
such a position and is reinforced by the western institutional
structure of modern states, no matter what part of the world they
are in.  Arguments relying an Asian forms of capitalism which
are putatively cultural, such as Lee Kuan Yew's "family -
based" capitalism, are not persuasive.

Finally, Asia's rich cultural and historical diversity of "Asia"
(itself arguably a Western concept) argues against a single,
culturally "Asian" meaning of human rights.

This takes us to another, closely related argument deployed by
proponents of an Asian concept of human rights, what I call the
"Occi - genetic fallacy," a historical, rather than cultural
relativism.  The historical origin of human rights in the West
makes them unsuited to Asia.  It is of course true that human
rights appeared first in the West, initially a defense of the
nobility and the bourgeoisie against arbitrary state power, later
a defense of workers against the ravages of the market.  To the
extent that Asian societies employ states and markets which
pose "Western" threats to individuals, "Western" human rights
are essential, holding back the oppressive hand of the state from
individuals and communities, fostering the flourishing of
culture and giving some shelter from the profit - seeking global
market,  no respecter of local culture.  It is in this very
particular sense that Western human rights are universal.

Another argument is a kind of refurbished anti - imperialism:
the argument is that the Western media are controlled by an
elite, and are closely aligned ideologically with Western
governments.  Human rights criticism is used as an ideological
weapon to stigmatize and weaken the legitimacy of third world
governments, in order to maintain the dominance of the major
powers.  This criticism it is argued, is quite selective The
argument has, with considerable justification, been applied to
the AFL - CIO labor federation's support of labor rights in
Indonesia and Malaysia. The AFL - CIO has become notorious
in recent years for its fanning of national chauvinism.  

There is more than a grain of truth to this argument; if we
examine the US press reaction to the Gulf War, and the Panama
invasion we do not see a great deal of deep critical comment. 
Similarly it is difficult to find good critical commentary on US
human rights foreign policy in the US press -- the recent
Bamaca case in Guatemala, which showed US involvement in
or at least knowledge of, human rights abuses by a government
it was assisting, or the US financial support for the head of a
violent Haitian paramilitary organization are covered in the
press, but invariably treated as unfortunate exceptions or lapses
which should be corrected, rather than systematic policies. 
While criticism is valid, the fallacy in the anti - imperialist
argument is that it dismisses wholesale any criticism voiced by
the Western press against third world countries.  This argument
becomes a form of Stalinism; no criticism can be recognized as
valid because it may weaken the government being criticized.

But this argument has increasing resonance in the current world
situation, where many countries feel that they have lost their
sovereignty to the IMF and World Bank, who can dictate policy
as a condition of financial assistance and access to capital.  It
has additional resonance as part of what Salman Rushdie has
referred to as "the Empire writes back", or what Thomas
McCarthy calls "ethnography in reverse" practiced by members
of cultures earlier studied by Western anthropologists. 
Themselves trained as sociocultural interpreters, they turn their
gazes toward the societies that represented them and, drawing
on the "weapons of critique" that are part of their colonial
legacy, offer trenchant analyses of the cultural relations of
production behind those representations.  Eduard Said's
writings are good examples of this trend.

The "politicization through double standards or selectivity"
argument was first used by US conservatives against the Carter
administration's human rights policy in the late 1970s: Jeanne
Kirkpatrick's article "Dictatorships and Double Standards" is
the locus classicus, arguing that the US singled out friendly
authoritarian regimes (like Argentina) for criticism, while going
easy an totalitarian regimes like the USSR.  Asian leaders have
pointed out that the US' criticism of Algeria, which halted an
election, installed a military dominated government, and
declared a state of emergency in order to prevent an Islamist
party from capturing a majority in parliament, was minimal,
while a strong campaign of criticism was waged against China,
Malaysia and Indonesia.

There is another sort of Western selectivity criticized by Asians:
giving priority to civil and political rights over economic and
social rights.  This argument is similar to that used by the
USSR during the cold war.  Chandra Muzaffar, a human rights
activist in Malaysia, has made this point forcefully in his
writings, and it is a valid criticism.  Muzaffar's criticism is in
line with the official position of the United Nations, as
expressed in numerous declarations and resolutions, that all
human rights are interdependent and indivisible

As is well known, the Reagan administration's attempt to banish
human rights from the foreign policy agenda failed, and was
replaced by a redefinition of human rights in which human
rights were defined to exclude economic and social rights.  
With the exception of some concern with conditions of work,
the US government has virtually ignored economic and social
human rights.  The annual Country Reports on HR practices
put out by the State Department, is strongly biased in this way.
Among the major NGOs in the West, one looks in vain for
organizations which devote significant efforts to investigating
and reporting on economic and social rights.

There are very few.  This has begun to change recently,
especially in the area of women's rights.  More human rights
attention still goes to a single lawyer arbitrarily detained than to
dozens of people felled by starvation or inadequate medical
care.  And if these matters are covered, they are handled as if
they were somehow natural disasters, not human rights
violations. This tendency has been reinforced by some of the
third world governments; development NGOs, working on
economic matters, have traditionally been reluctant to use the
rhetoric of human rights, since the result might be their
exclusion from the country and an inability to do their work.

Yet another argument is the "full belly thesis": observance of
human rights depends on stages of economic and social
development, with civil and political rights coming last.  China
set out one variant in a 1991 white paper on human rights,
arguing that survival rights -- to foods shelter, and health -- take
priority over freedom of expression and other civil and political
rights, since the latter are meaningless if one is starving. 
Violation of these rights is justified as triage, a necessary setting
of priorities by states with limited resources.  This assumption,
that a trade - off is in fact necessary, is highly questionable. 

The full belly argument has the virtue of countering developed
countries' scant attention to economic and social human rights. 
But it wrongly assumes that "development" -- industrialization
and the emergence of a large middle class -- will result from this
approach, and will be followed by full civil and political rights. 
Latin America and Africa are littered with the failures of states
which have taken this road.  The reasons for such failures are
complex, but "postponement" of civil and political rights
maintains imbalances of power and facilitates grotesque
"development" skewed in favor of the rich and powerful, in this
process, corrupts unaccountable governments, assist in the
looting of natural resources and the destruction of the
environment, and are complicit in denying the very rights they
claim to prefer.  A variant of this argument is the "white man's
burden" -- these poor, benighted souls are as yet incapable of
democratic, civilized governance, and must first economically
progress, in the process being schooled by their betters.

Another argument, the "authoritarian success story,"  invokes
national security.  China and others have argued that the denial
of civil and political rights is not simply a matter of tough
choices, but necessary to maintain the political stability required
for development, and necessary for an eventual transition to full
human rights protection.  The examples of Singapore, South
Korea and Taiwan, usually trotted out as proof of this
proposition, are not persuasive.  Singapore is anomalous, a city
- state based on its colonial history as a regional entrepot, and
moved from an import - substitution to an export - oriented
strategy at an appropriate time, much earlier than most other
former colonial states.  The others benefitted from being
showcases / bulwarks of capitalism during the cold war.  It is
far from proven that authoritarianism was required for, or
contributed to, their economic development.  The invocation of
the Philippines as a cautionary tale of too much democracy
conveniently ignores the pernicious legacy of Marcos - era
crony capitalism and the limited nature of Philippine
democracy.  References to the United States as an example of
the dangers of too many rights are dead wrong --the cause of the
United States social decay is the systematic denial of rights --
both economic and civil --not permissiveness.

Asian leaders justify draconian detention laws, the most
egregious examples of which are Singapore's Internal Security
Act (ISA) of 1968, and the Emergency (Public order and
Prevention of crime) Ordinance of 1969).  Both allow arrest
without warrant, and both permit detention without trial.  The
ISA also grants the minister of Home Affairs broad discretion to
order up to two years' detention without charges, renewable
without limit, if it is determined that a person poses a threat to
national security.  There is no judicial review of the detention,
inviting arbitrariness.  

Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provides for national security threats:
suspension of some rights is permitted in times of public
emergency which threaten the life of the nation, if such
measures are strictly required by the situations

In their zeal to defend Singapore's policies, defenders criticize
"those who make propositions not sustained by human rights
law," such as that a person should never be detained without
trial,  noting that "human rights do not absolutely prohibit
detention and critics are wrong to overstate their case."  

The issue which these defenders ought to address is, why does
Singapore reject Article 4 - style restrictions on government
power?  Singaporean "culture"? Stage of social and economic
development?  Struggle with neo - colonial domination?  Or is
it simply a matter of arbitrary power masquerading as national
security?  Perhaps they fear the wrath of the Singaporean
government if they speak forthrightly.

A fourth argument cites national self - determination, according
to which Asia needs its own concept of human rights for defense
against criticism by "outsiders" and for the construction of its
own future.  Given the disproportionate power of Western
governments and NGOS, the defensive tone is understandable,
though it could be argued that there are no longer "outsiders"
when it comes to publicizing and criticizing human rights
violations.

The danger is that a concept designed to deflect criticism
usually ends in quashing internal dissenters and suppressing
inconvenient facts.  Self - determination requires open and
participatory societies, in which all can contribute to the debate.
Despite the disproportionate influence and bias of Western
human rights NGOs, the information they provide should be
available for discussion by the citizens of Asian countries.

Some argument invoke the danger of ethnic conflict to justify
limits on freedom of speech and expressions.  Article 20 of the
ICCPR prohibit "advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence,"  so Singapore and other states are quite free to
prohibit such speech, taking into account their own history and
circumstances.  Moreover, Singapore has not been criticized for
such censorship, but for the abusive application of the Official
Secrets Act against journalists,, criminal defamation actions
against journalists and academics for criticizing Singaporean
politicians, and curbs on the circulation of newspapers and
magazines.

Many of the arguments I have discussed have a strong
conservative, antidemocratic cast; I believe they represent a
larger malaise, a fear by political elites that sooner or later the
masses may assert themselves in an organized fashion, in a
situation in which the international system is incapable, as
currently constituted of providing for the human rights of the
majority. It is our task, in Japan and elsewhere, to reject
arguments which are material and spiritual dead - ends.  We
must devise strategies based on a conception of human
creativity, not incompetence.  Ultimately human rights in any
country can only be protected by the people of that country.
Strategies should be aimed at fostering such capacity in all
societies.


    - - - - - - - - - - --

--=====================_813700458==_--