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OFFICE MEMO interconnectivity->democracy Date: 7/3/95
Democracy and Network Interconnectivity
May 8, 1995
Christopher R. Kedzie, kedzie@xxxxxxxx
Abstract
Coincident revolutions in the 1980s- breakouts of democracy around the =
world and breakthroughs
in the communication and information technologies-have inspired the =
notion that democratic
freedom and electronic network interconnectivity might be positively =
correlated. This study begins
the analytic task to explore the empirical relationship between =
democratization and network
interconnectivity. Despite the inherent limitations of statistical =
analyses, every different analytic
perspective engaged in this study coherently and repeatedly emphasized =
two important
observations. First, interconnectivity consistently emerged as a powerful =
predictor of democracy.
Second, none of the traditional variables which measure and guide foreign =
assistance policies with
respect to promoting democracy seem to cause the desired effect. =
Considered together, these
conclusions have important implications for policy, particularly =
regarding the priority of programs
which support and stimulate international network interconnectivity.
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Coincident Revolutions
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Univariate Correlation
3.2 Multi-variate Dominance
4. Questions of Causality
5. Implications and Conclusions
Footnotes
References
Author Information
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
i met chris at INET 95 last wk.
heard his fascinating lecture.
this paper is attached.
the complete paper, with diagrams, is at
http://inet.nttam.com/HMP/PAPER/134/html/paper.html
glen
----=_Monday, July 3, 1995 1:30 PM
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[Help]Last update at http://inet.nttam.com : Fri May 12 16:10:51 1995
Democracy and Network Interconnectivity
May 8, 1995
Christopher R. Kedzie, kedzie@xxxxxxxx
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--
Abstract
Coincident revolutions in the 1980s- breakouts of democracy around the =
world
and breakthroughs in the communication and information technologies-have
inspired the notion that democratic freedom and electronic network
interconnectivity might be positively correlated. This study begins the
analytic task to explore the empirical relationship between =
democratization
and network interconnectivity. Despite the inherent limitations of
statistical analyses, every different analytic perspective engaged in =
this
study coherently and repeatedly emphasized two important observations.
First, interconnectivity consistently emerged as a powerful predictor of
democracy. Second, none of the traditional variables which measure and =
guide
foreign assistance policies with respect to promoting democracy seem to
cause the desired effect. Considered together, these conclusions have
important implications for policy, particularly regarding the priority of
programs which support and stimulate international network
interconnectivity.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--
Contents
* 1. Introduction
* 2. Coincident Revolutions
* 3. Empirical Analysis
o 3.1 Univariate Correlation
o 3.2 Multi-variate Dominance
* 4. Questions of Causality
* 5. Implications and Conclusions
Footnotes
References
Author Information
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--
1. Introduction
Development, democracy and peace are linked in a scholarly tradition and =
a
conventional wisdom. A dominant strain holds that development leads to
democracy and, in turn, democracy leads to peace. Aristotle is often
credited for being among the earliest to recognize the first link in this
causal chain, that economic well-being and participatory government are
related. In modern times, Martin Lipset has explicitly claimed that the
former is "related causally" to the latter [1]. More recently, Harry =
Rowen
reaffirmed with new data the contention that "the best way to promote
democracy is to foster economic development and education" [2]. Others,
however, have maintained that causality flows in the opposite direction.
Mancur Olson, for instance, argued that only democracies could guarantee =
the
protection of individual rights and contracts which are essential to
investment and economic growth [3]. The most dramatic democratic
developments at the turn of the last decade belie development-first
theories. Even proponents had to concede that "the emergence of =
multi-party
electoral systems in Africa and the ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union in the late 1980's and early 1990's will sharply =
reduce
the relationships [between economic development and democracy] . . .Many
extremely poor countries are now much freer than before"[4]. A third
plausible explanation for characteristically strong statistical =
correlation
could be a third factor which stimulates both democracy and economic =
growth,
for example, access to information. It is well understood that =
information
and communication technologies are critical for market success.
"[T]elecommunication is an engine-probably the engine-for economic and
social development"1 [5]. This paper explores the possibility that
information and communication technologies also contribute significantly =
to
democratization.
2. Coincident Revolutions
For pundits and politicians, coincident revolutions at the end of the
1980's-breakouts of democracy around the globe and breakthroughs in the
communication and information technologies-have inspired the notion that
democratic freedom and electronic interconnectivity might be positively
correlated. Analysts have postulated this relationship. "While =
governments
can and have tried to control such [communications and information]
technologies for their own ends, the liberating effects have ultimately
proved to be the more powerful and, where unfettered, have led to more
competitive and adaptive societies" [6]. Writers have observed it, "Back =
in
'89, Czech students were trying to coordinate the uprising across the
nation, and the technical students, including Martin, were running a =
telecom
angle. . . . The Czech secret police were far too stupid and primitive to
keep up with digital telecommunications, so the student-radical modem
network was relatively secure from bugging and taps. . . . By =
mid-December,
the Civic Forum was in power" [7]. Journalists have recorded it, "the end =
of
the USSR demonstrates the power of information to both liberate and =
destroy
[8]. Politicians have claimed it to their advantage. President Clinton, =
last
year on Russian television, said, "Revolutions [in] information and
communication and technology and production, all these things make =
democracy
more likely" [9]. However, to date, all the evidence has been anecdotal.
Most common in the lore are stories of fax messages rallying =
pro-democracy
demonstrators outside the Chinese "Forbidden City" and the email messages
emanating from the besieged Russian "White House" during the failed =
August
coup.
This inquiry is intended to begin substantive examination, both empirical
and theoretical, into the relationship between new information and
communications technologies and democracy. Visual evidence of this
relationship is provocative. Figure 1 shows Freedom House democracy =
ratings
for all the countries of the world. Darker shading indicate higher levels =
of
democracy.
[Image]
Figure 1-Democracy Rating
Figure 2 is a comparable world projection denoting prevalence of major
worldwide email exchanging computer networks.
[Image]
Figure 2-Interconnectivity Scores
The metric used in the second chart is termed "interconnectivity" [10].
Darker shading indicates greater level of interconnectivity. The =
similarity
of patterns between the two maps inspires more rigorous analyses.
The two variables portrayed are also fundamental to the statistical =
analyses
that follow. Fuller explanations of these measures follow. Generally, the
concept of democracy is open to various interpretations. For this study,
democracy is defined broadly as the combination of representative =
government
and individual freedom. Numerical ratings are adapted from Freedom =
House's
Comparative Survey of Freedom for 1993-1994 [11]. The survey produces two
quantitative measures for each country: "Political Rights," the extent to
which people freely participate in the selection of policy makers and in =
the
formulation of policy and "Civil Liberties," the extent to which people =
are
able to develop and express ideas independent of the state's. Since the
correlation between these two measures is very high, the independent
"Democracy" variable used here is the normalized average. 2 This use of
Freedom House data follows an evolving academic practice for the =
evaluation
of correlates to democracy [2], [4], [12]-[16]. There are difficulties
inherent to quantifying a subjective multi-dimensional democratic quality
across widely varying governments with a single scalar [17], [18]. =
Despite
these problems, a practical consensus for relative rankings prevails =
quite
broadly. Differing attempts to provide numerical ratings show substantial
agreement. This conformity in the ordinal rankings suggests that, =
although
the concept of democracy may be difficult to describe explicitly, it is =
well
understood intuitively (at least by Western analysts). Alex Inkeles
summarized a conference on the topic of measuring democracy with the
following observation:
"[D]emocracy is a distinctive and highly coherent syndrome of
characteristics such that anyone measuring only a few of the
salient characteristics will classify nations in much the same way
as will another analyst who also measured only a few qualities but
uses a different set of characteristics, so long as both have
selected their indicators from the same larger pool of valid
measures. Far from being like the elephant confronting the blind
sages, democracy is more like a ball of wax." [17].
Prevalence of information revolution technologies would seem to be more
easily countable since tangible equipment is essential. Here too, =
however,
quantification difficulties exist. Some are definitional. As the
capabilities of communication technologies increasingly overlap, =
recalling
Ithiel de Sola Pool's "convergence of modes," [19] the question of what =
is
properly included becomes decidedly non-trivial. Computers can send faxes
and radio waves and television cables can transmit email messages.
Electronic mail is the specific capability of interest in this study =
because
it enables people to discourse across the borders in ways that have never
been possible since the evolution of the nation state. Internationally,
email is also the most mature, most widespread, and most commonly used
element of what John Quarterman calls the "Matrix."[20] Quantifying email =
is
difficult. Of the numerous email networks, four are globally dominant:
Internet, BITNET, UUCP and FidoNet. Record keeping has not been regular =
and
accurate on all of these networks. The best available and most =
comprehensive
data is for the numbers of nodes which therefore constitute the basic =
unit
of measure for this variable.
Nodes themselves, however, are not all equivalent, even within the same
network. A node may consist of a single computer and user or an entire
organization with many of both. The Matrix Information Directory Service
(MIDS) tracks and maintains historic data on the size of these networks
aggregated by country [21]. The "Interconnectivity" metric used here is a
combined measure of MIDS data on nodes per capita per country for each =
the
four major computer systems that can exchange electronic mail. Within =
each
network, countries are ranked and scored with a number from 0 to 4. The 0 =
is
assigned to all countries which do not have any nodes of a particular
network. The numbers 1 through 4 are assigned by quartile. The lowest
quartile of countries with one or more nodes for a network receive a =
score
of 1. The highest quartile countries receive a score of 4. The sum of the
four scores determines the level of interconnectivity on a scale from 0 =
to
16.
The combined scores weight each of the four networks equally because the
ability to exchange email is a relatively generic capability. =
Nevertheless,
the equal weightings introduce some theoretic difficulties. Although each =
of
the networks support email, they are not necessarily comparable in other
respects. For instance, the Internet, with specialized services such as =
the
World Wide Web and remote log on, has much more functional capacity than =
the
others. The discrete interconnectivity variable, therefore is neither
uniform nor strictly monotonic. It is arithmetically possible, for =
instance,
that a country with a low interconnectivity score and Internet may =
actually
have more communications capability than a country with a higher score =
but
no Internet. In practice this is not likely to occur and in the analysis
none of the potential degradation of this variable was observed. There =
are
several reasons why this theoretic possibility was not a practical =
problem.
First, email, not necessarily the other services, embodies specific
characteristics that are hypothesized to have dynamic implications for
democratization: the ability to conduct multi-directional discourse3 =
across
borders in a timely and inexpensive manner, unbounded by geographic and
institutional constraints. Second, practical aspects of evolutionary
development in interconnectivity avoid the theoretical problems with
monotonicity. Less capable systems are also less expensive and easier to
implement, so initially they are more prevalent. Improvements on the
micro-level tend to be cumulative via successive upgrades. These often
incorporate switching to or adding on Internet capabilities. In this way, =
a
general progression emerges in the enhancement of interconnectivity that
this scale approximates. Furthermore, to the extent that =
interconnectivity
as a predictor for democracy is measured imprecisely, the effect is =
reduced
statistical significance of the predictor. Thus the conclusions would =
still
be valid from this a fortiori analysis.
3. Empirical Analysis
Figures 1 and 2 suggest a specific conjecture that univariate analyses
support. A strong correlation between democracy and interconnectivity =
does,
indeed, exist.
3.1 Univariate Correlation
The scatterplot and accompanying regression line in Figure 3 display this
relationship graphically and the following correlation matrix in Table 1,
numerically. The correlation matrix includes a set of social indicators
[22]- [24] which are often hypothesized as democracy's causal correlates.
[Image]
Figure 3-Regression and Scatterplot
The question of causality will be addressed in detail later but as the
matrix attests, the correlation coefficient for interconnectivity is not
only large, it is substantially larger than that of any other traditional
predictors of democracy. Even the coefficient on economic development is
smaller by 0.16.
[Image]
Table 1. Correlation Matrix
Economic development, reported here as a per capita GDP (and abreviated
simply as GDP), is quantified terms of purchasing power parity, as is
traditional. Education is commonly paired with economic development as a
predictor of democracy [1], [2], [15]. Direct causality is easy to =
imagine.
An educated public is likely to be both more aware of political events =
and
more capable of intervening to influence them. Indirectly, education
conceivably enhances democracy by contributing to economic growth. The
average number of years of schooling across the entire population is
considered to be the best measure of education for analyses such as these
[2].
Human development and health indicators are also often correlated with
democracy. Most prevalent in the literature are infant mortality rates =
and
life expectancies [13], [16]. causal argument could be posed that as
citizens become more assured of their own well-being they have more
incentive and wherewithal to demand civil rights and political liberties. =
In
the opposite causal direction, an empowered public could be influential =
in
government spending and could impel the provision of better basic =
services.
A democratic government is also inclined to value more highly an =
individual
human life. These two measures are highly correlated, but forward =
causality
seems more plausible in terms of life expectancy. Individuals whose lives
are extended would seem more likely to recognize their increased personal
stake in democracy than babies who would not otherwise have survived
infancy. United Nations Development Program sources provided all the
economic, education and health data which are used in these analyses.
Cultural and ethnic factors may also have certain roles in =
democratization.
"Homogeneous national entities may be more likely to evolve into =
peaceable
democracies than states rent by harsh linguistic and cultural =
antagonisms"
[25]. A variable for the percentage of the population which is comprised =
by
the largest ethnic group in each nation is included to account for these
effects of ethnic homogeneity. These data are published in the CIA World
Fact Book [24]. In a few cases mostly in Northern Europe and Africa these
data were not available. Where applicable, the percentage of largest
religious affiliation substituted for the missing data.
In multi-variate analyses, cultural differences across countries are
potentially more important than the internal mix. Debates continue as to
whether certain cultures or civilizations are favorably disposed or
fundamentally disinclined to embrace democratic principles [26], [27]. In
either case, it is not difficult to believe that cultural aspects =
influence
the characterization of the political regimes and the appreciation of
personal liberties. Binary categorical variables on region are generated =
to
account for these effects. Demarcation between cultures can never be =
exact.
Inexorably, the classification of some countries into any of the regional
categories is susceptible to quibbling. Six regional categories were =
defined
that incorporated elements of geography, history and religion. These six
labeled Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, Middle East, and Western
Europe, map reasonably well onto the eight civilizations identified by =
Sam
Huntington [26]. Western Europe also includes countries that are not on =
the
continent but which have a dominant Western European heritage: United
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Israel is also included in the
Western European category. The Middle East category is predominantly =
Muslim,
includes the Islamic North African states and extends from and extends =
from
Egypt to Pakistan. Africa is defined in fairly obvious geographic terms
including South Africa, minus the northern states grouped into the Middle
East. Asia includes the Confucian countries and the Pacific Islands, plus
India and Japan (both non-Confucian), minus North Korea. Latin America
stretches from Mexico through Argentina including all the Caribbean =
except
Cuba. Cuba and North Korea, plus Albania and the splinter states of
Yugoslavia, in addition to the members of the former Warsaw Pact =
countries
and are all grouped in the Eurasian category. The effects of culture on =
role
of communication in society may be as profound as that on democracy.
Therefore, some of the regression models that follow include interaction
terms which are the products of the regional dummy variables and the
interconnectivity scores.
Population completes this list of independent variables. Presumably, the
size of a country could influence the type and effectiveness of =
governance.
Very small countries may be anomalous. Therefore, only countries whose
populations exceed 1,000,000 (and for whom data is available) are =
included
in this study.4 Above this threshold minimum, country populations span =
more
than three orders of magnitude. Population, therefore, is best included =
here
as an exogenous variable in a log form.
3.2 Multi-variate Dominance
Like the adjacent maps presented earlier, the correlation matrix exhibits =
a
surprisingly powerful correlation between interconnectivity and =
democracy.
Multiple linear regressions provide further convincing evidence that one
cannot dismiss this correlation as spurious. Regression results are shown
below in Table 2. Models I and II show the resulting statistical output =
of
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Model I is an inclusive model
which involves all six predictors.
Immediately apparent is that, again, interconnectivity emerges as the
dominant predictor. More startling, perhaps, is that interconnectivity is
the only statistically significant predictor over which policy may have =
any
influence. The coefficient on population is also significant, but the =
size
of a country's population, largely inaccessible to foreign intervention,
offers scarcely few policy recommendations (except perhaps to shine a
glimmer of hope on the fractious states of Yugoslavia and the former =
Soviet
Union which potentially may have a more democratic future than their =
larger
predecessors.)
None of the other predictors show a statistically significant =
correlation,
including economic development. Thus, the very high statistical =
significance
on interconnectivity is all the more striking. With greater than 99.9%
certainty, one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no =
relationship
between democracy and interconnectivity. Furthermore, the coefficient on
interconnectivity is substantial in practical terms. A single point =
increase
on the interconnectivity scale corresponds to an increase of 5% in the
democracy ratings.
Model II contains a more parsimonious model retaining only those =
predictors
which showed statistical significance or have a substantial theoretic =
causal
basis (GDP). Not surprisingly, outputs are similar. The drop in =
adjusted-R2
is minimal (0.025) for having excluded three predictors, underlining the
relative importance of those variables retained. These few variables =
explain
more than 50% of the variation in democracy for 140 countries. Models III
and IV, with the addition of the regional interaction terms, are =
analogous
to I and II, respectively. These next two models show that the positive
correlation of interconnectivity with democracy is consistent across and
within regional boundaries. In all the regions the coefficient is =
positive.
In half of the regions, the coefficient is substantial and statistically
significant. The correlation is most pronounced in those regions =
undergoing
dramatic political transformation. This fact is important when =
considering
causality. If the correlation were positive only where democracy preceded
the information revolution, one might be able to argue that the latter
strengthened the former but certainly not that the latter caused the =
former.
The evidence, however is that the relationship is weakest in the regions
characterized by established democracies and strongest in regions which =
are
cultivating nascent democracies. In Eurasia, the t-statistic indicates a
level of significance at better than the 0.1% level. In Africa, the
coefficient on the interaction term is the highest and the t-statistic
corresponds to a 1% level of significance. The coefficient is also
substantial for Latin America with a 10% significance level. The =
regression
lines which accompany the six scatterplots in Figure 4 approximate these
multi-variate regression results for visual comparison. Western Europe =
shows
the most paltry correlation. In this region, the high interconnectivity
levels do not vary much and the high democracy ratings move even less.
[Image]
Figure 4-Regional Regressions
[Image]
Table 2-Regression Models
4. Questions of Causality
It is tempting to infer causality from these impressive correlations and
conclude that interconnectivity influences democratization. However, to =
do
so might be premature. Causality could, in fact, flow in the opposite
direction. Democracies rely on an informed public and uninhibited
communication and may therefore seek interconnectivity. One way to test =
this
possibility analytically is via a system of simultaneous equations to be
resolved by two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. Both democracy and
interconnectivity are endogenous in Model V. Instrumental variables for
interconnectivity are determinable from the characteristics of email.
Electronic mail is text based and travels over telephones lines. =
Appropriate
instruments, therefore, are percent literacy and the number of telephone
lines per capita. Exogenous variables in the democracy equation are, as
before, related to economic growth and human development.
The resulting regression coefficients are also listed above on Table 2.
Interconnectivity is shown to be an even better predictor of democracy =
than
before. The magnitude of the coefficient for interconnectivity on =
democracy
is greater than in the OLS models. The level of significance remains =
above
the 0.1% level. Democracy, however, does not prove to have any =
significant
effect on interconnectivity. Thus, the suggestion that democracy leads to
interconnectivity is not supported and the hypothesis that there is no
positive effect cannot be rejected. The coefficient on population is =
still
significant and negative. In this model, GDP is also negatively =
correlated
to democracy and statistically significant. This supports the notion of =
some
scholars that democracy is not costless [28], [29]. All else being equal,
such as interconnectivity and population, greater economic development =
might
be available only at the expense of democratization. Proponents of =
Pinochet
and Lee Kuan Yu models for development have made similar arguments.
The other alternative explanation for the strong correlation between
interconnectivity and democracy is that a third variable may influence =
both
simultaneously. The obvious candidate is economic development which many
contend is an important prerequisite for democratization. The correlation
between interconnectivity and GDP, at 0.84, is also very high, suggesting
that the third variable hypothesis deserves further examination. In
practical terms, the equipment necessary to communicate electronically is
expensive, especially for citizens of the Third World regions which =
Western
democratization policy would be most eager to influence. The same =
economic
resources which can finance participation in the communications =
revolution
could conceivably fuel demands for personal rights and freedoms. Again, a
system of simultaneous equations can help unravel complex reciprocal
effects. Model VI includes all three variables, GDP, democracy and
interconnectivity as endogenous. Each is included in the forcing function
for the other two. The interconnectivity equation utilizes the same two
instrumental variables. The exogenous variables in the democracy equation
are the same as before except that schooling, which has never been a
statistically significant predictor for democracy in this set of models,
switches over to serve as an instrument for economic growth. As noted
earlier, scholars have surmised that education can influence democracy by
increasing personal and national wealth. The 2SLS estimation results, =
shown
in Table 2, are consistent with all those that preceded and do not =
support
the hypothesis of economic development as the confounding third variable.
Strongly to the contrary, the regression coefficients for =
interconnectivity
on democracy and GDP are both substantial and statistically significant,
again above the 0.1% level. Neither democracy nor GDP proves to strongly
influence interconnectivity. GDP again shows a negative correlation with
democracy but at a weaker significance level, 20%.
In each model presented here, without exception, interconnectivity
positively correlates with democracy at the highest levels of =
significance.
In each model, at lower but still high significance, the correlation with
population on democracy is negative. Stories to explain both the country
size and the interconnectivity phenomena may share a common plot. Smaller
size and greater interconnectivity may similarly be conducive to =
democracy
by facilitating coordinated civic action. Although it might by now be on =
its
way towards becoming clich=E9, the often repeated analogy that =
information
revolution technologies are shrinking the world offers appropriate =
insight.
Interestingly, the most populous country which Freedom House labels as
completely "free" became a democracy in 1776 when its population was only =
a
fraction of its current size. At that time and at that size, available
communication technologies, like pamphleteering, were sufficient to gel
public support into popular action.
It is the globe, however, not just countries which are "shrinking" in the
wash of information flows. The worldwide expansion of democracy may have
less to do with the way in which these technologies favor democratic
processes domestically than the way they spread democratic ideals
internationally. In an inward direction from the perspective of the =
citizens
of a prospective democracy, information revolution technologies enable =
them
to learn more about how other societies operate. If they discover that
others living elsewhere are living better thanks to the democratic
governance "over there," they are likely to demand some of that
democratization for themselves. For this reason the Soviets jammed
broadcasts from the West. Several of my Russian associates have expressed
that they felt fortunate to have been born in a communist state until
learned what life was really like in America. In an outward direction,
information revolution technologies empower citizens anywhere to =
broadcast
to the world infractions against their "inalienable rights" by their own
government. Thus world pressure can be brought to bear against repressive
regimes which can no longer hide their misdeeds as successfully as =
before.
That demonstrators in Tian An Men Square displayed signs written in =
English
was not a coincidence. Cross-border communication in the defense of
democracy and human rights is the activity on which citizen diplomacy =
groups
like Amnesty International stake their success. The new technologies =
enhance
these capabilities.
Governments that try to squelch the new information technologies in order =
to
protect their monopoly on power, do so essentially at the peril of =
economic
growth. This is the inference from Model VI and is precisely what leading
analysts have been predicting, "For nations to be economically =
competitive,
they must allow individual citizens access to information networks and
computer technology. In doing so, they cede significant control over
economic, cultural, and eventually political events in their countries"
[30].
5. Implications and Conclusions
Despite the inherent limitations of statistical analysis, every different
analytic perspective of this study coherently and repeatedly emphasizes =
two
important observations. First, interconnectivity consistently emerges as =
a
powerful predictor of democracy. In univariate analysis, the correlation
coefficient for interconnectivity on democracy is larger than that of any
other variable. As a variable in an ordinary least squares multiple =
linear
regression, interconnectivity is the dominant predictor in all models. As =
an
interaction term in conjunction with regional categorical variables, the
correlation of interconnectivity with democracy is everywhere positive, =
and
has both the largest substantive value and greatest statistical =
significance
in regions characterized by dynamic political transformations. As an
endogenous variable in systems of simultaneous equations, =
interconnectivity
always proves to be a significant predictor of democracy and economic
development, but never was the reverse true. These analytic results =
overlay
a background of mounting anecdotal evidence that new information and
communication technologies are facilitating democratic change worldwide.
Second, none of the traditional variables which measure and guide foreign
assistance policies with respect to promoting democracy and peace seem to
produce the desired effect. The only statistically significant policy
variable that appears in any of the models is economic development and =
its
regression coefficient on democracy in those models is negative.
The minimum policy implication, when considering these conclusions =
together,
is that the effects of revolutionary information and communication
technologies on the objectives of foreign aid and national security must =
be
better understood, and the search for appropriate policy instruments is a
critical aspect of further study. At a maximum, the priority of policies
regarding international communication should be at least as high as the
priority for foreign economic development and perhaps as high as that of
some national security programs. References
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--
Footnotes
1 Emphasis in original.
2 Freedom House rates countries on an decreasing basis from 7 to 1 in
both categories, civil liberties and political rights. A ranking of =
"1"
indicates the highest relative accordance with the principles of
democracy, and a ranking of "7," the lowest [11]. The normalized
average used here and elsewhere converts the scale to one which
increases from 0 to 100, such that maximum democracy has the highest
rating. See Rowen [2] or Muller and Seligson [12] for other =
examples.
3 The essence of multi-directional communication is that all people =
who
receive information via a certain information channel can =
participate
equally within the complete and identical context of the discussion.
Another term commonly used to describe multi-directional =
communication
has been "many-to-many." However, this term can be misleading. The
connotation of "many" in one-to-many can be the billion or so people
around the globe who watch soccer's World Cup which would of course =
be
impossibly unwieldy for many-to-many. More importantly, quantifying =
the
number of participants misses the most critical aspect of
multi-directional communication. Independent of the how many people =
are
involved-even if there are only three-email technology creates a
different dynamic and thus can be expected to have differing social =
and
political outcomes.
4 Data were either missing or relative to inconsistent entities for =
many
of the new countries resulting from the recent breakups of
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Therefore excluded from this study =
are
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bosnia-Herzogovina, Croatia, Serbia =
and
Slovenia. Additionally critical missing data precluded the inclusion =
of
Taiwan.
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--
References
[1] Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: =
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[13]
World Bank, World Bank Development Report, The World Bank, =
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[14]
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[27]
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[28]
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[29]
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1993, pp. 155-167.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--
Author Information
Christopher R. Kedzie has earned degrees in Aeronautical Engineering at =
the
U.S Air Force Academy (B.S. 1982) and Massachusetts Institute of =
Technology,
1984 (S.M. 1984), and in Public Policy at Harvard University (M.P.P. =
1992).
He is currently a doctoral fellow at the RAND Graduate School where his
primary research efforts focus on the effects of information revolution
technologies in the arena of international affairs. Before coming to =
RAND,
he was a founder and director of organizations in both Ukraine and
Uzbekistan which exploited information revolution technologies to support
economic and political reform in the republics of the former Soviet =
Union.
Chris Kedzie can be contacted at:
2101 Ocean Avenue, #3
Santa Monica, CA 90405
310-393-0411 x6885
kedzie@xxxxxxxx
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