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NCGUB Position on Humanitarian Assi



Subject: NCGUB Position on Humanitarian Assistanc

Errors-To:owner-burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx
FROM:NBH03114@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Burmese Relief Center--Japan
DATE:May 18, 1995
TIME: 9:33PM  JST
Subject: NCGUB Statement on Humanitarian Assistance to
Burma

NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF BURMA
WASHINGTON, D.C, INFORMATION OFFICE
816 Fifteenth Street NW.  Suite  609, Washington DC 20005
Tel: 202 - 393 7342, Fax: 202 - 393 7343

POSITION ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO
BURMA

UN AGENCIES - UN agencies have specific mandates
and do not take into account factors outside the scope of
their mandate.  As stated by Mr Herbert A. Behrstoek,
Chief of UNDP's East Asia Division, on 4 May 1996, the
UNDP's focus is development.  The UNDP does not take
into account political considerations.  As long as its
projects in Burma are "developmental" and can fulfil some
"grassroots" needs, the UNDP is not concerned about
whether or not its projects are directly or indirectly
supporting an illegitimate regime.  Likewise, UNICEF is
committed to children and its 1996-2000 programme
(US$53 million) in Burma is specifically designed to
support the State Law and Order Restoration Council's
National Programme of Action for the Survival,
Protection and Development of Myanmar's Children in the
1990s.   Most of the implementing agencies are also the
various SLORC line ministries. 

This narrow focus often leads to unacceptable results.  For
example, in its program, UNICEF is promoting capacity-building for two so-call
ed national NGOs -- the Myanmar
Maternal and Child Welfare Association and the Myanmar Red
Cross.  It is well-known that these two organizations are semi-official agenci
es of the regime.  Therefore, UNICEF is
indirectly contributing to building up the capacity of the
military dictatorship.  In the UNDP program, village health
workers, rural health centres, and township hospitals are
targeted to enhance their capacity.  While the intention is
commendable, all village health workers, rural health centres,
and township hospitals in Burma come under the Ministry of
Health.  Therefore, the UNDP program is also indirectly
contributing to building up the capacity of the regime.

Other areas of concern include educational material for remote
villages in the Chin and Arakan States.  Unless the textbooks
and school material are written in the language of the ethnic
people in those areas, the UNDP could be accused of promoting
SLORC's ethnic assimilation program.  This is a serious
concern In the ethnic states.  The employment by UNDP of
nationals who have previously served in other countries as
international United Nations Volunteers, raises other questions. 
After 1962 to until recently, Burmese citizens were not allowed
to travel overseas.  Only a privileged few - state scholars, civil
servants, military personnel, and people with military
connections - could do so.  The UNV from Burma are,
therefore, from a select population.  Their relationship to
SLORC, and their ability to communicate with villagers, etc,
could be questioned.  The claim that UN agencies and NGOs
have full and open access to civil society also raises questions. 
How valid is this claim?  It seems to contradict reports received
from credible sources.

Given the present condition under which UN agencies operate,
and given that no assistance to the people of Burma can be
delivered without indirectly supporting the military dictatorship,
the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma
cannot support the programs of UN agencies in Burma.

The humanitarian crisis in Burma today is a direct outcome of
33 years of military misrule.  The UNDP acknowledges that
"though Myanmar is blessed with abundant natural resources, it
remains an LDC with serious pockets of human deprivation"
and that the UNDP's efforts "are just scratching the surface," It
is, therefore, the contention of the NCGUB that the problems in
Burma cannot begin to be addressed without first addressing the
root problem which is political.  This can best be illustrated by
the fact that while UN agencies are talking about the "silent
emergency" in Burma, SLORC Chairman Senior General Than
Shwe, oblivious to the humanitarian crisis in Burma, made the
following speech on Independence Day on 4 January 1995.

"During the period of more than six years of the State Law and
Order Restoration Council, firm foundations have been
established and all round development has been achieved in the
nation's political, economic, social, education and health
spheres..."  

If SLORC does not acknowledge that Burma is facing a serious
humanitarian crisis, how can the UN agencies ever hope to
alleviate the situation?  Will their best efforts not be thwarted
by SLORC's political agenda?

FUTURE - Should the United Nations in the future appoint a
Special Envoy to coordinate an overall UN program
(humanitarian, refugee, development, narcotics, and political),
the NCGUB is willing to review and revise its position
regarding UN agencies in Burma.

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS - As previously
mentioned, given current conditions in Burma, UN agencies
and NGOs cannot avoid relying on  SLORC and its line
ministries.  Decision-making by these organizations depends to
a large extent on how closely tied each individual organization
is to the military and SLORC.  The closer the ties, the easier it
is to implement programs.  However, the organization may have
to sacrifice its independence in order to achieve goals.  It is,
therefore, recommended that NGOs contemplating working in
Burma consult the Guidelines set by the Burma Briefing, UK,
Burma Peace Foundation, and the Australian NGO Forum. 
The Burma Border Consortium in Thailand and the Burma
Donors Secretariat should also be contacted.  In general, NGOs
that can implement projects directly with well-informed and
trained foreign staff are preferable to NGOs that need national
NGOs as implementing partners or have only national staff. 
The rationale for this preference is that national staff can be
subject to more pressure from SLORC and truly independent
national NGOs do not exist in Burma.

An alternative to working in Burma, which the NCGUB would
like to recommend is working cross-border with the most needy
in cease-fire zones, in the liberated areas and on the borders of
neighbouring countries.

May 14, 1995