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Washington Post Letter



Received: by superior (4.1/Sun-Client)
	id AA27506; Wed, 12 Apr 95 11:59:06 EDT


A letter in the _Washington_Post_, April 12, 1995.

  |  Heroin in Burma: Strike the Source
  |  
  |  I read with concern Lally Weymouth's "Smack Land; It's time to
  |  attack the drug lords in Burma" [op-ed, March 24]. Mrs.
  |  Weymouth's conclusion that the United States should take direct
  |  or covert military action against the Shan Army and Khun Sa is
  |  misdirected. It ignores the fact that the military in Burma is
  |  the main cause for the increase in opium production. 
  |  
  |  Prior to the military takeover in 1962, opium production in
  |  Burma was insignificant. As resistance to the military
  |  increased, the military encouraged "home guard" units to be
  |  formed. Unable to pay the home guards, the military gave them
  |  permission to trade in opium. 
  |  
  |  Kuhn Sa was at one time a home guard commander fighting the
  |  nationalist Shan State Army on behalf of the Burmese military.
  |  As his drug profits soared, he gave up being a home guard.
  |  Similarly in 1989, when the United Wa State Army (UWSA) broke
  |  away from the Burmese Communist Party, the Burmese military
  |  struck a deal with them. In return for UWSA's promise not to
  |  join the Burmese democracy movement, the military gave the UWSA
  |  "unrestricted trading privileges." No wonder opium production
  |  in Burma has more than doubled since 1988. 
  |  
  |  The increase is not because the United States ended its
  |  counter-narcotics aid program. It is because the State Law and
  |  Order Restoration Council (SLORC) is using opium production as
  |  a tool to remain in power. Launching a military action against
  |  Khun Sa or the UWSA will not solve the problem as long as the
  |  military remains in power in Rangoon. Giving SLORC
  |  counter-narcotics aid is also not the answer. From 1978 to
  |  1988, the U.S. government provided the Burmese military with
  |  $81 million in counter-narcotics assistance. During the same
  |  time period, opium production in Burma doubled. 
  |  
  |  The military used the aid and helicopters and airplanes
  |  provided to suppress the ethnic resistance and allowed more
  |  home guard units to be formed to maintain control. In turn, the
  |  home guards trafficked in opium to finance their operations. 
  |  
  |  To reduce the available heroin in the United States requires,
  |  as Mrs. Weymouth suggested, taking action against the source --
  |  namely the military junta in Rangoon. An effective first step
  |  would be to impose economic and investment sanctions against
  |  the regime. Until SLORC is replaced by a legitimate democratic
  |  Burmese government led by 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate Daw Aung
  |  San Suu Kyi, the heroin problem cannot be resolved.
  |
  |
  |  BO HLA TINT
  |  Washington
  |  
  |  The writer is foreign minister of the National Coalition
  |  Government (in exile) of the Union of Burma. 
  |