COUNTER STATEMENT OF NCGUB, BKK Off

[dbuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Subject: COUNTER STATEMENT OF NCGUB, BKK Office

STATEMENT REGARDING SLORC'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF 3RD FEB, 1995

1. In a press conference held on 3rd Feb, 1995 the SLORC denied
its recent offensive against Manerplaw, claiming it merely 
supported the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO) in
capturing Manerplaw. SLORC denial of its offensive is an absolute
lie. Its statement is an obvious fraud to the people of Burma and
the international community as well.
2. Some members from the KNU have formed the DKBO and DKBA on
21st December, 1994. Before that a group of KNU former members
held a demonstration in the early week of December, 1994
regarding their religious discontentment. Despite the grant of
their demands, those members made contact with the SLORC.
3. According to a radio-telegram, consisting of 23 different
points, which was received by revolutionary groups and Mr. Khin
Zar Min and Mr. Pyi Aye who returned to the KNU from the DKBA it
was quite clear that the SLORC is the main architect of the
conflict in the KNU. 
4. Starting from the last week of December, 1994, the SLORC began
to support DKBA with arms and ammunition, medicines, financies
and rations. SLORC's deputy commander of Brigade 33 communicated
the supplies through a buddhist monastery at Kamamaung.
5. On 2nd Jan, 1995 the SLORC General Maung Hla with 20 other
military officials dropped by army helicopter at the monastery
of Myaing Gyi Ngu monk U Thuzana, and had a closed-door
conspiracy with DKBA leaders including the monks. The deal in the
conspiracy was that if the DKBA members will take part in the
SLORC offensive against the KNU, The DKBA would be recognized as
the real representatives of the karen revolution. 

6. The SLORC used more than 10,000 of its troops from brigades
22, 33, 44, 66 and other regiments under the South-eastern
command and Eastern command. Heavy shelling including 76, 81, and
120mm shell to the headquarters of Manerplaw occurred from the
20th to 27th Jan, 1995. SLORC used Rubber-Light boats which
enabled them to convey about 6- 8 troops at a time to cross the
Salween river.
7. About 1,000  DKBA members took part in the offensive. Its main
object was to guide the SLORC along the principle routes to the
centre of Manerplaw.
8. Following of December 27th, 1994 according to 40 porters who
had escaped from SLORC army in the Manerplaw area, it was said
that most of the soldiers were SLORC troops with only a few
members of the to be seen. It added that the relationship between
them seemed very friendly. 
9. Due to the offensive, it has clear  that the SLORC has no
desire to solve political problems  and national reconciliation
by political means. 
10. In addition, the exodus of refugees to the neighbouring
countries  highlights that the SLORC is creating a threat not
only to Burmese domestic affairs but also to the peace and
stability of the region as well. 
     Hence-forth it is time for governments who believe in the 
constructive engagement policy to review the viability of their
policy with the SLORC. 
11. At the same time it is the time for the United Nations and
the international community, together with multinational
companies to work out effective diplomatic, political and
economic sanctions against the SLORC. Only mmediate actions and
measure can only solve the present crisis.

Headquarters
5th February 1995