BPF: The Hunting of the SLORC

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BPF: THE HUNTING OF THE SLORC---POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGIES 
BPF: UPDATE TO THE HUNTING OF THE SLORC 

David Arnott, Burma Peace Foundation

June 1993, updated in March 1994






The distinction between "political" and "military" is by no means
clear in a state so profoundly militarized as Burma, where
Clausewitz' dictum is reversed, and politics is simply war
carried out by other means.

The Chinese sage Sun Tsu says in The Art of War that "The supreme
art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting". In its
conduct of the civil war SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration
Council, the martial law administration ruling Burma), is
currently using Low Intensity Conflict strategies, which avoid
major military confrontation, but are designed to force a
"political" (read "politico-military") settlement on the ethnic
opposition and divide them from the political opposition.  These
strategies are closely tied to SLORC's attempts to acquire
constitutional "legitimacy" by means of a National Convention,
and are aided by the pressure which Burma's neighbors are
putting on the non-burman ethnic groups to sign a cease-fire. 
But no lasting solution to the country's problems will be
achieved until the three main actors -- the military, the
political opposition and the ethnic opposition -- meet on a basis
of equality and with a strong political will to achieve national
reconciliation and the restoration of democracy. The politico-
military devices described in this paper must therefore be seen
as measures by SLORC to retain power, reverse international
criticism, especially at the UN General Assembly and the
Commission on Human Rights, and attract foreign investment and
development assistance.


The search for legitimacy: The legal status of the military
junta ruling Burma, the State Law and Order Restoration Council,
is that of a martial law administration, which in international
law is permitted to govern only during a state of emergency. 
SLORC is therefore a completely illegal regime since by its own
admission, the "law and order", dis-turbed by the 1988 democracy
movement,  have been restored.  Its only legitimate course would
be to step down and hand over to the victors of the 1990
elections.  But it is set on clinging to power, and in common
with most dictatorships which rule by brute force, especially
those operating within a hierarchical culture, is anxious for
some form of legitimation beyond that of the bullet. This
ambition was not significantly furthered by SLORC's suppression
of the monkhood, the body which traditionally legitimizes
Buddhist rulers, nor by the election results of 1990 when the
people overwhelmingly voted for the opposition. Lacking anything
more substantial,  SLORC seeks "recognition" by association:
monks, ethnic nationals in traditional dress, visiting
businessmen and statesmen, UN officials and even ordinary
tourists, are all liable to be paraded across the state-run print
and broadcast media alongside SLORC officials in order to "prove"
that SLORC has won acceptance from these various communities. To
judge from The New Light of Myanmar (the revamped Working
People's Daily), the official -- and only -- newspaper, one would
assume that the SLORC leadership does little else but make
offerings to senior monks, receive visiting dignitaries, and
inspect construction sites.  It claims legitimation from every
contract signed and even from its membership of the United
Nations, though it is states rather than governments which the UN
recognizes.  

But SLORC's main source of "legitimation" is the civil war, which
like the previous administration it has maintained as a
justification for continued military rule -- the argument is that
without the army in control, the different ethnic nationalities
would secede from the Union and split the nation.  SLORC has
therefore avoided a peace settlement with the ethnic opposition
as a whole up to this time, though it has approached most of the
groups individually, and made deals with some of them. This may
soon change, however, since SLORC is busy constructing an
alternative source of legitimation in the form of a New
Constitution which would stretch a thin skin of civilian
administration over the real power -- which of course would
remain firmly in the hands of the military. (One problem is that
without the civil war it might be more difficult to justify the
50% or so of the national budget thought to go on military
expenditure.)  The device by which it is seeking to bring this
off is the so-called "National Convention", which is charged with
drafting the basic elements of the constitution. One of the
stated objectives of the Convention is to guarantee the
"participation of the Tatmadaw (the Burmese military) in the
leading role of national politics of the state in future." The
members of the National Convention have been hand-picked by
SLORC.  Even so, their activities are rigidly controlled, with
strict rules as to what subjects can be discussed and how, and
severe penalties for infringements.  Some participants are
representatives elected in 1990, but these comprise a small
percentage of the total Convention, which is an unrepresentative
body with no mandate whatsoever  from the people. In spite of
their being hand-picked, however, many members  of the
Convention, at no little risk to themselves, have walked out,
largely on account of the requirement, quoted above, that the
military should retain its political dominance.


Changing civil war strategy: In parallel with the National
Convention, SLORC is pursuing a politico-military strategy to end
the civil war, which cannot be won by traditional military means
alone. Even if such fixed bases as Manerplaw were taken, the
ethnic minority armies could use classical guerrilla tactics
indefinitely. And so long as the civil war continues, mineral and
other kinds of extract-ion by US, Thai, Chinese, Japanese and
Korean companies among others, will be hindered; dams and
pipelines cannot be built, and the foreign exchange SLORC needs
to prop up the collapsing economy will not be forthcoming.  Over
the past couple of years, therefore, SLORC has been developing
some alternative strategies inspired by Sun Tsu and  Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC).  

In Karen, Kachin, Mon and Karenni areas, there have been a number
of minor skirmishes over the past year between the Tatmadaw and 
troops of the ethnic opposition, but most Tatmadaw activity has
concentrated on terrorizing and controlling the minority civilian
populations.  The army comes into villages and shoots a couple of
people if any of its men have been attacked by Karen, Karenni or
Mon soldiers. It has relocated villages to sites grouped around
military camps and established free-fire zones in the areas not
in the immediate vicinity of the camps. 

This "strategic hamleting" serves several purposes: it provides
hostages against military attack, a pool of "voluntary" labor for
the army in various road-building and other construction
projects, as well as for forced portering; it separates the
villagers from the ethnic minority fighters, thereby reducing
their flow of intelligence, recruits and material support; and a
belt of such "hamlets" and the intervening free-fire zones may
eventually form a cordon sanitaire to control movement between
the non-burman areas and the interior, thus allowing the
formation of Bantustans.  Along with this demographic
engineering, there has been a large build-up by the Burmese army
over the past two and a half years which has led some observers
to predict a major military offensive. 

In my view, however,  the increased number of troops is not
intended for purely military purposes. Along with control of the
civilian population, it is part of a LIC strategy to apply
politico-military pressure on the non-burman ethnic nationalities
to come to a cease-fire on SLORC's terms. When combined with
"persuasion" from the neighbors to sign a cease-fire (China and
Thailand can apply a stranglehold on the Kachin and Karen
respectively since these groups depend on cross-border
communications and supplies), such pressure would appear almost
irresistible. Sun Tsu, quoted above, tells his students that
if they can achieve an overwhelming superiority in position,
weaponry and men, and at the same time offer a way out so that
the enemy does not have to fight,  the stronger party may be able
to dictate terms without a battle.   

SLORC could accompany coercion by induce-ments, and offer
"generous" terms ("an offer they could not refuse") to the non-
burman nationalities -- retention of arms, continued control of
their territories, access to international development assistance
etc.  SLORC would no doubt prefer to deal with each group
separately or, failing that, with the four main combattant
groups, the Kachin, the Karen, the Karenni and the Mon.  If the
groups hold out, SLORC might agree to a settlement and a nation-
wide cease-fire with the National Democratic Front (NDF).  The
Tatmadaw would hardly be enthusiastic about negotiating with the 
broader Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) since this would
counter its general strategy of dividing the alliance between the
ethnic and political opposition.  

This alliance presents SLORC with its greatest threat, since it
combines political legitimacy with military force.  In fact, as
the price of a settlement the ethnic minorities might have to
expel their allies in the political opposition from their
territories, abandon the long-term struggle for democracy;
surrender control over natural resources in their territories to
companies holding concessions from SLORC; and perhaps accept a
reduction in the area of their territories. Of course, if any
of the minorities do not agree to a cease-fire on SLORC's terms,
an actual military offensive is not excluded.    


Uncertain: There is no guarantee, of course, that SLORC will
succeed in these undertakings. Although some of its working
groups are still meeting, the National Convention has been
postponed several times, after very few plenary meetings, on
account of the resistance, even among the hand-picked
participants, to the requirement that the military remain at the
centre of political life.  Even if a constitution is railroaded
through the National Convention, it would take a few years to
consolidate, and if the 82-year old Ne Win dies before this
happens, there is a high probability that the army would split
into two or more warring factions in a struggle for State
power.  Some observers think that certain regional commanders
are already building up their private armies and fiefdoms in
preparation for a breakdown of central power in the post-Ne Win
era.


Short-term:  One scenario is that SLORC might succeed in
concluding a "political" settlement of the civil war, imposing a
constitution, and persuading its neighbors and the international
community that the process has been legal and political enough. 
In this case countries, agencies and corporations with myopic
optimism or short-term interests might agree to renew bilateral
and multilateral development assistance.  Corporate investment
from Japan and other industrial countries would no doubt be
renewed, and provide a temporary alleviation of Burma's economic
sickness.  (A nationwide cease-fire with the promise of a
"political" settlement would certainly smooth SLORC's passage at
this year's General Assembly, where there will be many voices
calling for sanctions and an arms embargo.)

Without real political and economic change, resumption of ODA
(Official Development Assistance) and increased foreign
investment would mean that an unrepresentative, authoritarian and
unstable military regime could remain in power, buy better
weapons, continue to starve and abuse its people, sell off its
natural resources, destroy its economy, bully its neighbors, and
destabilise the region. In addition, a settlement forced on the
ethnic nationality armies would be unlikely to last long. Already
the Wa and some of the other groups  SLORC made deals with in
1989 are expressing dissatisfaction about the arrangements and
rattling their weapons. And no ethnic group or alliance
believes that SLORC can be trusted to honor a peace treaty beyond
the period of military, political or economic expediency.  The
question of the duration of a peace settlement is of particular
interest to investors, who require long-term guarantees of
stability -- for instance it would take up to 15 years to
construct the proposed dams on the Moei and Salween rivers, 
pipelines are notoriously exposed to attack, and it would be
politically embarrassing for companies to have their personnel
and equipment protected by the Burmese army against the local
people. Perhaps SLORC calculates that by the time the "political
settlement" breaks down, enough money will have been brought into
the country by governments, corporations and multilateral
agencies to justify the exercise.  


A centralized military state:  Burma is a military state, as it
has been for more than 30 years, with an all-pervasive Military
Intelligence.  A new constitution, if SLORC succeeds in imposing
it, will make no essential difference to this reality. Politics,
for the Burmese military, is simply war carried out by other
means, to reverse Clausewitz' dictum. The development of the more
sophisticated politico-military strategies described in this
paper does not indicate any lessening of SLORC's commitment to
the growing militarization of what is already the most
militarized state in the region. There is no reduction in the
rate of increase in military expenditure and recruitment, for
instance. The Burmese army has shown its willingness to bully its
neighbors Thailand and Bangladesh, with periodic incursions onto
their territories which have resulted in the death of a number of
their nationals. If the Burmese army reaches its projected target
strength of 500,000 men under arms by the end of the decade, it
will be the largest (apart from its friend China, and India)  and
most battle-hardened fighting force in the region, though not yet
the best armed.   


China, Thailand and Constructive Engagement:  Ninety-five percent
of Burma's trade is with China and Thailand, and China is SLORC's
main arms supplier. These countries, if they chose to do so,
could pressure SLORC into entering into negotiations with the
real leaders of the political and ethnic opposition for
restoration of democracy and national reconciliation.  Instead,
they are using their influence to encourage a settlement of the
civil war on SLORC's terms, in isolation from the restoration of
democracy, thereby supporting continued military rule. China's
motives for this approach are not difficult to identify: the
present leaders would hardly welcome a democratic Burma with
leaders sympathetic to the Chinese democracy movement and to the
aspirations for self-determination of the Tibetan and other
peoples within the international borders of the PRC (Burma shares
a border with Tibet). They might also suspect that a democratic
Burma would turn more to India than to China.  Thailand's motives
are more complex, but one could mention the close links between
the Thai and Burmese military which are manifested on commercial
as well as political levels, as well as Thailand's desire to
counter Chinese influence in Burma. 

As far as the ASEAN policy of Constructive Engagement is
concerned, this description of a long-term policy by the Burmese
military to retain power tends to undermine the view that
economic assistance and an increase in trade will alone lead to
significant change, and broadly supports the arguments for
additional forms of international action, for instance UN-
facilitated negotiations between the three main actors,
reinforced if necessary by selective sanctions, perhaps including
an arms embargo on SLORC. ASEAN member Singapore, which acts as a
channel for arms to SLORC, would no doubt resist an arms embargo.
This may also be the case with other ASEAN members and India, if
they see Singapore's role, though bilateral, as reducing SLORC's
dependence on China. 

This analysis suggests that the policy of Constructive Engagement
has not dissuaded SLORC from retaining centralized military
control over political and economic life in Burma. In fact the
injections of foreign cash into Burma have enabled SLORC to keep
the economy afloat without the radical decentralization and
demilitarization of the economy needed for long-term improvement.
The devices of the National Convention and the forced politico-
military settlement of the civil war are simply means to give a
constitutional and political gloss to continued military
dominance. There is no indication that the military intends to
reduce its control over the economy, which will thus remain
centralized, oriented towards military expend-iture, highly
dirigiste and incompetently managed .  

The basic articles of faith of Constructive En-gagement are that
quiet and friendly though firm advice by Burma's neighbors is
better than confrontation, and that economic de-velopment will
lead to political liberalization and greater respect for human
rights. On the former point I would say that both are needed. On
the latter, there is no evidence that the economic development of
countries like South Africa, whose racist ideologies and
discriminatory citizenship laws are somewhat similar to Burma's,
has led to political liberalization or an improvement in the
human rights situation.  In fact, as South African  Nobel Peace
Laureate Desmond Tutu has frequently said in relation to Burma,
the kind of international sanctions which have been most
effective in forcing political change in his country might also
bring about change in Burma.  

The choice for ASEAN countries and others, including India and
China, who wish to extend their influence in Burma through trade
and investment, is one of long- or short-term interest:  Do they
want a country in the region which is politically and
economically centralized and militarized and in addition,
economically incompetent?  Burma is a country of 43 million which
is increasing the size of its army to half a million, has shown a
willingness to bully its neighbors and which after Ne Win's death
might enter a period of classical civil war compared with which
the conflict in Cambodia, with a population of 7 million, may
seem a minor event in terms of refugees and the destabilization
of the region. Is a short-term policy worth the risk? 

If so, ASEAN and Burma's neighbors should continue their present
course, congratulate themselves on symbolic and superficial
changes, enjoy the short-term benefits of cheap fish and teak,
and block international efforts to pressure SLORC into more
radical political and economic changes.

If on the other hand they are willing to join a serious
international effort to encourage real political and economic
change in Burma, an effort which must also contain a dimension of
dialogue with SLORC or its successor regimes, their experience,
contacts and 
leverage, especially that of China and Thailand, will be
invaluable.


Implications of this analysis for the political and ethnic
opposition:  If this analysis is even partially correct, it would
support the opposi-tion tactic of opposing the National
Convention internally and in international forums, and stressing
its unrepresentative and illegal nature. It would also suggest
that a close alliance between the political and ethnic opposition
is feared by SLORC, and should therefore be developed and
reinforced.


                                CONCLUSIONS

SLORC is an illegal regime using an illegal process to acquire
"legitimacy" through cos-metic constitutional changes. Its aim is
to preserve the political and economic dominance of the military.
It is also seeking through a barely-disguised policy of military
coercion to force a "political" settlement of the civil war. If
it were to succeed in these attempts, the resulting arrangements
would be  highly volatile and could easily destabilise the
region.

There is also no sign that the ASEAN policy of "Constructive
Engagement" has done more than encourage SLORC to develop such
strategies. The economy is still under centralized and
incompetent military control; the Kyat is still overvalued by a
factor of about twenty; consumer prices have risen sharply since
1988, including that of rice, which has more than tripled;
domestic production is stagnant; foreign investment is highly
risky;  and meanwhile, the people starve and Burma's  ethnic
and religious minorities are subject to unspeakable, racially-
motivated atrocities.

Medium- and long-term stability in Burma require the
establishment of genuine demo-cracy, respect for the ethnic
nationalities' demands for national equality and the right to
self-determination, and the demilitarization and decentralization
of the economy.  One necessary step would be the negotiation 
of a credible timetable for the transition of power to the
representatives chosen by the people in 1990.  Such negotiations
would involve U Tin U, U Kyi Maung and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.  The
process leading towards long-term stability would also require
unforced negotiations with the alliances of the ethnic
nationalities. 

The main actors are therefore the Tatmadaw, the political
opposition and the alliances of the non-burman ethnic
nationalities. Three-way talks between these groups on a basis of
equality are an essential part of any meaningful process of
national reconciliation and democratization, and would provide a
good medium-term goal for  international diplomacy.  


                              RECOMMENDATIONS

The international community and  countries in the region should:

1)  Recognize that the process of imposing a constitution to
"legitimise" continued military dominance, in opposition to the 
people's choice of civilian representatives in 1990, is 
illegal, destabilising and a mockery of demo-cracy and popular
participation;

2)  Recognize that a forced end to the civil war, whether
described as "political" or military, is unstable in the medium
and long term. SLORC does not have the political or economic
capacity to maintain a forced settlement other than by military
means;

3)  Cease encouraging SLORC to adopt such coercive and short-term
measures, which isolate the civil war from the restoration of
democracy;

4)  Recognize that "Constructive Engagement" alone is making no
impact on the deep structural problems of Burma's economic and
political life, which can only be solved through genuine
democratization, decentralization and demilitarization of
government and economy. Attempts should be made to coordinate the
strategies of Constructive Engagement with the sanctions and
other measures which industrialized countries are contemplating.

At its forthcoming session the General Assembly should: 

5) Make an explicit condemnation of the Nat-ional Convention, on
the grounds that this is an illegal body with no mandate from the
people, designed to provide a "constitutional" fig-leaf for the
perpetuation of naked military rule;   

6)  Recommend to individual member states and to the Security
Council that they impose selective sanctions, perhaps including a
prohibition on investment in Burma and a ban on trade in arms and
timber. The lifting of sanctions should be made conditional on
the    initiation of, and progress in,negotiations between the
three main actors in Burma: the military, the ethnic
nationalities and the political opposition. The negotiations
should be on the basis of equality between these parties, who
should demonstrate a strong political will to achieve national
reconciliation and to draw up a credible timetable for a
restoration of democracy and the fulfillment of the will of the
people expressed in the elections of 1990; 
 
7) Call on the Secretary-General, in collabor-ation with
countries in the region, to use his good offices to facilitate
such negotiations.       

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BPF: UPDATE TO THE HUNTING OF THE SLORC 
(March 1994) 

The preceding text was written between April and May 1993. Events
in Burma  since then have led some people to believe that SLORC
has yielded to its public relations advisers and international
pressure and is making genuine moves towards national
reconciliation and the restoration of democracy. However,
although a number of small gestures have been made such as more
visitors for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the release of a number of
political prisoners, SLORC logic remains essentially military,
with all policy decisions subordinated to questions of control of
people and territory, and survival of the ruling group. The
National Convention has been kept on track, despite frequent
suspensions of the plenary for resisting elements in SLORC's
proposed constitution.

As regards the civil war, the Kachin Independence Organisation
signed a formal cease-fire with SLORC on the 24 February. Thai
pressure on the Karen and Mon to agree cease-fires with SLORC has
been reinforced by such measures as the Thai authorities' seizing
consignments of medical supplies intended for the Karen (with
implications for other supplies including ammunition), the
announcement of a prohibition on NGO cross-border assistance, the
closing of part of the Thai-Burmese border, and the expulsion of
the senior Karen diplomat from Thailand.  

An element not adequately dealt with in The Hunting of the SLORC
is the destabilising role of forced labour, enforced recruitment
and economic sabotage in combination with forced relocations and 
the general terror tactics of the "People's Army".  Forced labour
is not only a terror tactic, but also does severe damage to the
economic life of a village by depriving it of agricultural and
other workers. One stage in the Burma army's recruitment drives
is the destabilisation of the village economy by forced labour
and eviction from land to make way for military installations and
farms. A point comes where joining the army is the only way of
surviving. The families of the recruits receive important
economic and other privileges. The consistent pattern of economic
sabotage seen in reports on the activities of the Burma army --
burning of fields, killing of animals, stealing of foodstuffs and
other items, destruction of houses etc, compounds the damage,
which in combination with forced relocations and terrorisation
results in the destabilisation and collapse of village
communities, abandonment of villages, increased internal
displacement and mass exoduses to neighbouring countries.

The view expressed in The Hunting of the SLORC that SLORC would
be prepared to offer autonomy and retention of arms to the ethnic
nationalities has had to be modified. Fragments of information
emerging from the preliminary talks with some of the ethnic
groups suggest a much harder line than anticipated, which would
require virtual surrender on the part of the armies of the ethnic
groups. It appears that SLORC is seeking localised cessations of
hostilities round the proliferating military "development"
enclaves implanted in the territories of the ethnic groups rather
than the nation-wide cease-fires which the ethnic groups want.
SLORC's intention is presumably the progressive occupation and
partitioning of the non-burman areas by means of this counter-
insurgency/development strategy. Presumably also, this will be
accompanied by forced relocations, forced labour and economic
sabotage unless the Burmese military has changed its working
methods. This will lead to the further abandonment of villages,
increased levels of internal displacement and mass exoduses into
Thailand on a scale hitherto unknown on this particular border. 
However, until SLORC has sufficient troops to occupy the whole of
the non-burman territories, this process is likely to be gradual,
and not necessarily consistent. Several scenarios or stages come
to mind:

1) Politics but no arms: the non-burman peoples preserve their
identity and still participate in national politics. Local
autonomy and participation in future national elections is the
picture presented by Xuwicha Hiranyapruek, the Thai businessman
who as advisor to the Thai National Security Council (NSC) and
intimate of SLORC has been shuttling between the various parties
peddling cease-fire deals. However, a SLORC spokesman has said
that to take part in national politics the minority organisations
would have to disarm.

2) Arms but no politics: the non-burman ethnic nationalities
preserve their identity and weapons but refrain from
participating in national politics. A policy of separate
development. And the tungsten, copper, nickel etc? 

3) Assimilation: the non-burman groups merge their cultural and
political identity into a greater Burmese identity. This scenario
is supported by reports of the continuation of the policy of
cultural and genetic burmanisation (minority languages are
discouraged and soldiers are encouraged to marry girls from the
ethnic group which predominates in any given non-burman area). 

4) Selective military occupation: important areas (towns, rich
agricultural land, development projects of various kinds, actual
or potential mines, hydro-electric and other energy projects,
strategic areas for defence or communications etc) are occupied
by the military and their families and subjected to further
burmanisation, while the non-burman populations are driven onto
marginal land and called on to provide labour, brides, and
recruits for the army. The "Liberated Areas" are penetrated by
various kinds of military enclaves centered around development
projects and other locations of strategic, economic or
communications significance, for which localised "cease-fires"
are negotiated. Such enclaves, needless to say, also act as
fortresses for military purposes, and when linked up, can act to
partition the general area. In addition to these enclaves, one
may expect the implantation of settlers from burman and other
non-local ethnic groups  in areas abandoned by the indigenous
populations as a result of SLORC's Low Intensity Conflict
strategy. Such settlement has been reported (not confirmed) from
Arakan, where land and houses abandoned by the fleeing (Muslim)
Rohingyas are reported to have been occupied by (Buddhist)
Rakhine settlers.

5) Total military occupation: total military occupation of all
the minority areas would be a simple development of scenario 4.
(Mao's Go strategy?) SLORC troops might not mass on the Thai
border, but there would be little to prevent them if it suited
their purpose. One would certainly expect a very large number of
refugees to seek asylum in Thailand under these circumstances. 

Some of these scenarios could occur simultaneously and/or
sequentially. For example, 2 and 3 could apply respectively to
the ethnic heartlands and the mixed areas, and then lead into
scenarios 4 and 5. 

It is fascinating to speculate on how SLORC sees NGOs and UN
Agencies contributing to these undertakings; -- presumably they
will supply the "carrots" while SLORC applies the stick.

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