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BurmaNet News: December 25 1991




************************** BurmaNet ************************** 
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
************************************************************** 
BurmaNet News:  Christmas Sunday, December 25 1994
Issue #87

************************************************************** 
Contents:

BKK POST: KAREN LEADER SAYS SLORC IS BEHIND RELIGIOUS UNREST
NATION: BURMESE SUFFER CASUALTIES
NATION: BURMA STUDENTS PROTEST
NATION: BURMA GOES ALL-OUT TO WELCOME CHINA PREMIER
FEER: MONKS MEDITATION
BKK POST [LETTER]: A CHRISTMAS MESSAGE FOR SLORC BUSINESS 
PARTNERS
NATION: BURMESE RICE FOR LAOS
NATION: KHUN SAS OPERATIONS HIT
FEER: ROOMS TO BUILD
FEER: ENTER THE DRAGON
FEER: UNLOCKING YUNNAN
FEER: RIVERS OF DREAMS Chinese Emigrants pour down the Mekong
FEER: CUTTING EDGE  
FEER: A PIECE OF THE ACTION Burma-China drug trade thrives...

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BKK POST: KAREN LEADER SAYS SLORC IS BEHIND RELIGIOUS UNREST
Sunday, December, 25 1994

[Photo caption: BO MYA: No problems between Buddhists and 
Christians.]
 
KAREN National Union leader General Saw Bo Mya has blamed the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council, the ruling military 
junta in Rangoon, for the conflict which erupted in the KNU 
among Christian and Karen soldiers early this month. 

About 400 Buddhist fighters in the 5,000-strong Christian-led 
force the most powerful guerrilla group which has been fighting 
the Rangoon government for autonomy within a federal Burma, 
seized a hilltop outpost at the confluence of the Salween and 
Moei rivers during the first week of December.  

The mutiny was said to be the result of deep-rooted differences 
between rank-and-file Buddhists and the KNU's mainly Christian 
leaders. It has since been settled.  

The KNU, however, claims the mutiny was instigated by SLORC 
agents who had penetrated the area controlled by the Karen.  

Gen Bo Mya said: "SLORC has been fighting us on the military 
and political fronts but it has not succeeded in defeating us. 
So it is now turning to religion to hit us. This is just not 
right." He claims there is no problem between Buddhists and 
Christians in Manerplaw where about half a dozen monks live in 
a monastery built with the help of the Christians in that area.  

The following is an account by Gen Bo Mya of events which led 
to the conflict between the Buddhist and Christian factions of 
the KNU:  

Myiang Gyi Ngu Sayadaw had been building pagodas and 
monasteries in our area to which we had no objections.  

Our only request was that these activities and propagation of 
the Buddhist faith not be conducted at our lines of defence. We 
don't mind pagodas being built at our defence perimeters but we 
were strictly against him building monasteries which would 
allow monks and people to reside in.  

However, our requests not to build monasteries at these 
strategic areas where we have heavy weapons emplacements were 
ignored. Also I told him that we had no objection to them 
propagating and practicing Buddhism in the villages, but again 
insisted that the monk and his followers abstain from 
conducting such activities in the restricted areas.  

Constructing monasteries in such areas will draw all kinds of 
people to the militarily strategic areas. Gen Bo Mya's main 
concern was "it will create easy access for infiltrators to 
penetrate the Karen line of defence".  

The enemy used this [religious unrest] as a propaganda tool to 
accuse the Karen of persecuting the Buddhists and suppressing 
the religion.  

The monk was alleged to have told his followers to congregate 
and reside at the monasteries he had built saying that it was 
safe for them to live there, and the military would not take 
them away as 
porters. The enemy would not bother them at all.  

I begged the monk to stop his activities of persuading the 
Karen Buddhists (to his view), especially those from the KNU 
which are engaged in the revolutionary struggle with the SLORC.  

He said they could become vegetarians, but to give up the cause 
and go to reside with the monk at the monastery was out of the 
question.  

The monk has told the KNU Buddhist soldiers that it was 
unnecessary for them to fight the enemy: "You people could come 
and stay at my monastery [on the hilltop at the confluence of 
the Salween and Moei rivers], and won't have to be worried 
about being taken as porters by the Burmese army."  

He also promised these soldiers and civilians, numbering about 
3,000, that he would take care of their board and lodging and 
other expenses as required.  

Promises like these had led the KNU leaders to become 
suspicious of the real motives of the Myiang Gyi Ngu Sayadaw. 
Gen Bo Mya said that it was impossible for the monk to support 
the 3,000 people. He strongly suspects the SLORC is providing 
financial support.  

The monk had been able to supply rice, oil, chillies and onions 
without any difficulty to his followers.  

He then allowed the soldiers to become monks, some of them from 
the ranks and files of the KNU administrative level. The 
soldiers had entered the monkhood, leaving behind their 
families, and their fields unattended.  

But what had annoyed the Karen leader most was the soldiers had 
failed to inform their superiors of their leaving for the 
monkhood.  

As we understand, there are certain rules and regulations a 
practising Buddhist must abide by. For example, a layman must 
first get his wife's consent to enter the monkhood. Also he 
must ensure the family is sufficiently provided for, both 
financially and materially, during his tenure in the monkhood.  

Religion being such a delicate issue had stopped the Karen 
leaders from taking disciplinary action against the soldiers.  

Gen Bo Mya said that to settle the issue "we invited the senior 
monks in the Karen State to attend a religious conference".  

The conference was held in Manerplaw about six months ago and 
was attended by about 100 monks. Conspicuously absent was the 
abbot, Myiang Gyi Ngu Sayadaw. He left the River Junction 
Pagoda about November 20 for Kama Maung district inside Burma 
where his main monastery is 
located.  

One of the decisions taken at the conference was "a civil 
servant or a soldier must first obtain permission from their 
superiors to enter the monkhood".  

Also permission must be sought from authorities concerned to 
build a pagoda to ensure it is not built on private property 
and thus avoid disputes and arguments that could arise 
thereafter.  

Bo Mya claims he held three discussions with the senior abbot 
and pleaded with him to stop what he was doing. He told the 
monk: "We all need to be united [KNU forces] also we rely on 
you [to maintain unity and peace among the Buddhists and 
Christians in the KNU]. Besides you and your followers are 
vegetarians who do not believe in violence and killing."  

The conflict among Buddhist and Karen had ended and everything 
was under control. But he feels "the tension has not been 
completely defused". There have been reports that a few 
remaining mutineers are still creating trouble at some 
outposts.  

"They [KNU mutineers] have been approaching some of the 
outposts and have threatened the soldiers at gunpoint to either 
join them or surrender their weapons and leave."  

Most mutineers at the River Junction Pagoda have returned to 
their battalions, with the exception of a few stragglers still 
roaming the area.  

He denies personal and ideological conflicts existed among the 
rank and file of the KNU forces. But "there are certain 
civilian individuals who are instigating the soldiers and other 
villagers with rumours that Christians are persecuting and 
killing Buddhists."   

Gen Bo Mya vehemently denies these rumours, saying that these 
instigators are the ones responsible for the deaths of not only 
Christians but also Buddhists.  

He accuses so-called Buddhists of killing eight people, 
including a Buddhist Karen captain, and also says these people 
have threatened certain monks. They have been spreading false 
rumours in the interior of the country about the so-called 
persecution of Buddhists.  

"All this is the work of the enemy [SLORC]."  

He claims there is no problem between Buddhists and Christians 
in Manerplaw where about half a dozen monks live in a monastery 
build with the help of the Christians in that area.  

Meanwhile, the Christian leaders of the KNU have issued a 
blanket amnesty for the former mutineers. Sources also say the 
KNU leaders are most eager to welcome back Myaing Gyi Ngu 
Sayadaw to the River Junction Pagoda and continue his work 
among his followers.

THE AGREEMENT 

Leaders of the KNU, Buddhist monks and Karen Buddhist officers 
of the Karen National Liberation Army reached an agreement on 
December 15 to defuse the crisis between Buddhists and 
Christians which took place at the confluence of the Salween 
and Moei rivers.  

The five points of the agreement are:

* To form a committee representing the Buddhists.  
* The committee will be responsible to arbitrate fairly in any 
crisis concerning religious conflicts that may arise in future.  
* The KNU and the arbitration committee must take full 
responsibility to ensure that no action be taken against 
soldiers, Buddhist monks and the Buddhist civilians involved in 
the recent conflict, such arrest, execution imprisonment or 
other punishment.
* That should any Buddhist soldiers and their commanders commit 
any offence, it should be brought to the attention of their 
immediate military leaders who would then decide to take action 
against the offenders.  
* That strict action be taken against those who in any way 
obstruct the freedom of worship and the propagation of the 
faith.  

EIGHT-POINT APPEAL

Following is an eight-point appeal issued on December 16 by a 
committee now stationed on the opposite bank of the River 
Junction Pagoda.  

* That the ceasefire be maintained.  
* That the five-point agreement be recognised and observed.  
* That the Rambo Sayadaw [U Zawana, chief abbot of Manerplaw 
Monastery] be stationed along with the committee on the 
opposite bank of the River Junction Pagoda. If the monk is 
unavailable, the KNU must take responsibility to settle the 
matter.  
* That Pado Mahn Sha, Col Johnny and Col Tutu Lay are to be 
returned together with the committee to the river confluence.  
* That the committee be given a free hand in handling whatever 
related issues.  
* That the workings of the committee are not exploited.  
* That no news based on rumours be issued. If any news are to 
be released the committee must first be consulted.  
* That when communicating with the committee, both sides should 
send team leaders with proper authorisation to act. 

***************************************************************
NATION: BURMESE SUFFER CASUALTIES
Sunday, December 25, 1994

Burmese government forces suffered heavy casualties after they 
attacked a main base of the ethnic minority Karen rebels. Three 
Karen soldiers were wounded when government infantry made an 
unsuccessful assault on a guerrilla camp.

***************************************************************
NATION: BURMA STUDENTS PROTEST
Sunday, December 25, 1994

[Photo caption: A group of Burmese students from the Overseas 
Students Organization of Burma and the All Burma Basic 
Education Students Union gather outside the Burmese Embassy on 
Sathorn Road yesterday to protest against Chinese Prime 
Minister Li Pengs visit to Burma.

***************************************************************
NATION: BURMA GOES ALL-OUT TO WELCOME CHINA PREMIER
Sunday, December 25, 1994
Kyodo, Yangon [Rangoon]

Elaborate arrangements are being made to welcome Chinese 
Premier Li Peng, who arrives in Burma tomorrow for a three-day 
goodwill visit.

The lakeside state guest house has been repaired and 
refurbished. Roads from the Yangon international airport to 
downtown have been lined with Chinese and Burma national flags, 
and roadside curbs have been repainted red and white.

A huge decorated pavilion with welcome signs in the Chinese and 
Burma languages has also been built at the airport.

Government newspapers yesterday carried portraits of Premier Li 
Peng and his wife.

This will be the first visit to Burma by a Chinese prime 
minister, and Li Peng will be the fourth foreign premier to 
visit the country during the rule of the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council.

Laotian Premier Khamtay Siphandone visited Burma in February 
1992. Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong visited Burma in 
March this year and Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet came 
in May.

***************************************************************
FEER: MONKS MEDITATION
December 22, 1994

Rewata Dhamma, a Burmese monk living in Britain who earlier 
this year initiated a dialogue between Rangoons military 
authorities and detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, 
will return to Burma soon. He intends to stay for more than a 
month, leading to speculation that Suu Kyi, who has been under 
house arrest since July 1989, may be released in mid-January. 
Some Western diplomatic sources say that although the terms of 
her detention may be relaxed, she will remain under some form 
of surveillance.

***************************************************************
BKK POST [LETTER]: A CHRISTMAS MESSAGE FOR SLORC BUSINESS 
PARTNERS
Sunday, December, 25 1994

SIR: SLORC alleges that they held meetings with Aung San Suu 
Kyi due to mutual understanding and a desire to act in the best 
interests of the country. How can they act in the best 
interests of the country when they promptly sent the nation's 
leader back into detention after the meetings. This is an act 
only uneducated people are capable of. I have always maintained 
that Burma is divided because it is led by uneducated leaders.

SLORC held its first meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi on the same 
day the United Nations General Assembly convened in New York. 
SLORC promptly started a major military offensive against the 
Karens and students when their cosmetic campaign failed and the 
Third Committee of the United Nations issued its strongest 
censure of the military dictators who hijacked Burma. It is now 
obvious to the whole world that SLORC is not capable of good 
faith negotiations. 

In the first week of December SLORC's Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw 
met with Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai. It is rumored that the 
Thai authorities asked Ohn Gyaw to convey to SLORC the need to 
release Aung San Suu Kyi to facilitate a political settlement 
in Burma.  

Now Thailand has received SLORC's response to their request. 
SLORC is now launching a major military offensive against the 
Karens and students.  

This will result in Thailand reluctantly accommodating many 
thousands of Burmese war refugees.  

This is probably SLORC's way of thanking the Thai Mafia for 
providing a financial life-line when SLORC was on the verge of 
financial collapse in 1988.  

Economic development can lead to political reform. There are 
many examples in Asia. But also one exception. Joint ventures 
between affiliates of the Burma Army and foreign investors is 
leading Burma towards fascism. No other country in present day 
Asia has made extensive use of slave labour. 

In recent history, slave labour was used by the Japanese 
Imperial Army's Kempeitai and Germanys Gestapo. Both were 
fascists states. The hard reality is that SLORC is incapable of 
genuine political and economic reforms.  

The Christmas message from the Burmese Resistance to the 
business partners of SLORC is straight-forward. We give you the 
"Bayer Solution" as your Christmas present. The United States 
confiscated the manufacturers of Bayer Aspirin when Germany 
lost the World War.  

The Burmese too will confiscate the many hotels being built by 
SLORC's business partners when SLORC is toppled. Confiscation 
unlike nationalization does not involve compensation. We will 
make the business partners of SLORC pay for the sufferings they 
caused tot he forty million hostages in Burma.

Myint Thein
Senior Advisor to the Burmese Resistance 

***************************************************************
NATION: BURMESE RICE FOR LAOS
Sunday, December 25, 1994
Kyodo, Rangoon 

Burma has presented 500 tonnes of rice and 50 tonnes of salt to 
Laos at a ceremony in Wampon Village in eastern Burma, the 
state-run New Light of Myanmar reported on Friday.

Burma Social Welfare Minister Brig Gen Thaung Myint handed over 
the gift to his Laotian counterpart, Thongl Oun Sisoulth, on 
Thursday.

Almost every year Burma presents Laos with gifts of rice, 
glutinous rice, salt, seed and farm implements.

***************************************************************
NATION: KHUN SAS OPERATIONS HIT
Sunday, December 25, 1994

Opium war lord Khun Sas drug trafficking organization was 
crippled by the arrest of 10 of his leading lieutenants in a 
joint Thai-US operation codenamed Operation Tiger Trap. There 
are hopes of totally crushing the opium cartel.

***************************************************************
FEER: ROOMS TO BUILD
December 22, 1994

Austral Amalgamated Tin of Malaysia signed a 30-year contract 
with the Department of Civil Aviation to build and run a 121-
room hotel near the Rangoon airport. The US$5 million hotel is 
due to open in May 1996.

***************************************************************
FEER: ENTER THE DRAGON
December 22, 1994; p.22+
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili, China 

Chinese merchants are pushing south as trade with Burma 
flourishes. But the nations of Southeast Asia are watching 
uneasily as Beijings military influence with its southern 
neighbour also expands.

[Photo caption: The Mekong River in Yunnan province.]

[Map: #1 Chinas access routes to the Great Golden Peninsula. 
#2 Snooping Posts (Burmese Navel Post - Ramree, Coco, Victoria 
Point).]

For the weary traveller, the town of Ruili rises like a mirage 
from the rugged mountains on the border between Burma and 
China's Yunnan province. After hours of driving through barren, 
windswept hills, the town's flashing red and green neon lights, 
street-stall karaoke machines, massage parlours and discos - 
some blaring heavy-metal rock music-seem almost surreal.

But the economic boom that pays for such indulgences is real 
enough. While the Beijing government is trying to rein in 
growth elsewhere in China, whirlwind capitalism prevails here 
on the frontier.  

In the last 10 years, cross-border trade between Yunnan and 
Burma has swollen from about US$15 million annually to around 
US$800 million. Ruili's markets are full of goods, the 
pavements packed with people, many from the Burmese side of the 
border, judging from their longyis, or sarongs. The doorways of 
dimly lit shacks afford glimpses of scantily clad prostitutes.  

A few years ago, China granted Ruili open-city economic status 
along with nearby Wanding, where the legendary Burma Road 
crosses the frontier. Now, the authorities have gone a step 
further: An area south of Ruili straddling the Shweli river has 
become a privileged "special economic development zone." A new 
concrete bridge spans the river, while on the side nearest 
Burma, high-rise buildings and shopping complexes are under 
construction. A giant monument was recently erected near the 
bridge, showing three figures-their determined faces pointing 
south. "Southeast Asia, here we come!" jokes a resident.  

But is Southeast Asia ready for China? With the economic boom 
on the Sino-Burmese frontier have come expanded Chinese 
military ties with Burma and, increasingly, Laos. China denies 
it intends to project its influence into Southeast Asia, but 
its southward push makes many regional governments uneasy. They 
fear China wants to use Burma to try to expand its military and 
political reach.  

China is seen "not simply [as] a threat to Southeast Asia but a 
threat to the region," says a defence analyst in Bangkok. "And 
that is perceived as a China that is seeking to extend its 
influence beyond its borders. The fear, perhaps, of these 
neighbouring states is in concerns that these Chinese policies 
may eventually give birth to a Chinese Monroe Doctrine in 
Asia."  

B.A. Hamzah of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs 
concurs: "There is a fear that the Chinese are coming in [to 
Southeast Asia] from the other side, via the Indian Ocean. This 
will give them access to the Straits of Malacca. If China has 
access through that area, it will give Beijing a better basis 
for power projection."  

Just 10 years ago, Ruili was a supply centre for an earlier 
Chinese attempt to extend its influence: an insurgency by the 
now disbanded Communist Party of Burma. That insurrection 
failed miserably. But, as a Mandalay merchant in the streets of 
Ruili sees it: "What the Chinese did not achieve by supporting 
the CPB has been accomplished in a subtle, peaceful way." 
Recent visitors to Burma report that Chinese traders roam 
freely as far south as Mandalay, which is growing rapidly on 
account of illegal immigration from China.  

The invasion may not be entirely peaceful, however. As one 
Singapore-based regional analyst warns: "Many people are 
complaining in Burma that those buying land and buildings in 
the prime areas in the upper part of the country are Chinese 
from the border areas. If the economy is growing without equity 
among the races, there is a possibility that a social time bomb 
could explode at any time, especially in Mandalay."  

In China at least, the expansion of commercial ties has met 
with widespread enthusiasm. The Chinese press regularly uses a 
new coinage, "the Great Golden Peninsula," to refer to a vast 
region stretching from Yunnan to Singapore in the south and 
India and Vietnam in the west and east. Commonly cited in such 
analyses are three main "routes" along which Chinese commerce 
could penetrate the region: one through Burma, the others 
through Vietnam and Laos.  

For the moment, however, the main avenue for trade is Yunnan. A 
sprawling, landlocked province of 38 million people, it has for 
years sought foreign markets for its goods, as well as an 
outlet to the sea. Despite its relative remoteness from Beijing 
and the coast, Yunnan boasts a well-developed industrial base-a 
product in part of a Cold War policy of basing industry as far 
as possible from the reach of the United States Pacific Fleet. 
For the last decade, the economy has grown at close to 10% a 
year, and it has a large pool of cheap labour; 120 million 
people live within 36 hours' travel of Kunming, the provincial 
capital.  

Most major investment in the border boom comes from Yunnanese 
and Fujianese businessmen, who form the predominant Chinese 
community in Burma's urban centres. This seems to reflect the 
changing economic balance of Burma's trade ties, which is 
shifting in Yunnan's favour. For many years, Burma depended on 
Thailand for consumer goods. Now it's Chinese goods that are 
lapping at Thailand's borders, Thai businessmen complain.  

Trade is one way for China to expand southwards; arming the 
Burmese military is another. Ruili's new bridge is referred to 
locally as "the gun bridge": This is where most surface 
deliveries of Chinese munitions to Burma take place.  

In October, more than 500 trucks crossed the bridge. Some, 
meant as transports for the Burmese army, were empty; others 
carried small arms as well as multiple-rocket launchers. "The 
deliveries took place at night," a Ruili resident says. "The 
whole area was sealed off as the trucks went across."  

It may seem natural that China wants to provide its new markets 
with a military umbrella, but Burma's neighbours don't 
necessarily see it that way. They have watched with unease the 
massive Chinese shipments to Burma's army and air force. But 
it's China's role in upgrading the Burmese navy that has caused 
the most alarm. 

Indonesian military sources, for example, say they consider 
that granting China military access to Burmese bases would 
present a threat to the Straits of Malacca, a major waterway 
for Southeast Asia's sea-borne trade.  

In late 1992, Western spy satellites detected a new, 150-foot 
antenna used for signals intelligence at a naval base on Coco 
Island, a Burmese possession in the Indian Ocean. Suspicion 
that this equipment is likely to be operated at least in part 
by Chinese technicians has led to fears that Burma will allow 
Beijing's intelligence agencies to monitor this sensitive 
maritime region.  

More recently, intelligence reports indicate that China is 
pressing Burma to allow it access not just to Coco Island but 
also to two other strategically located listening posts: Ramree 
island, south of Sittwe off the coast of Arakan state; and an 
island off Tenasserim state. The latter is especially 
sensitive: A long, rugged island, it's located off Burma's 
southernmost point, Kawthaung or Victoria Point, close to the 
northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca.  

CHINA'S traditional rival in the region, India, made several 
diplomatic representations to Rangoon on the issue this year 
and last. In August, Indian coastguards intercepted what 
appears to have been a Chinese survey vessel that strayed into 
Indian waters near the Andaman islands. The ship, Yan See Han 
014, was equipped with modern electronic monitoring gear.  

Three mysterious fishing vessels, all carrying Chinese crew, 
were also detained at the same time at Port Blair on the 
Andamans, but were later released. That incident attracted 
media attention in India, but the seizure of the Yan See Han 
014 hasn't been reported.  

It's also clear that China's interest in staking a presence in 
Burma, and thereby the Indian Ocean, is a long-standing one. 
"China has traditionally had great concerns about securing its 
frontiers," the defence analyst in Bangkok points out. "To my 
mind, the collapse of the Soviet Union has allowed the Chinese 
to rapidly advance this agenda and created power vacuums among 
many of China's neighbours which Beijing is taking advantage 
of. The Chinese have keyed the development of their outlying 
regions both in terms of economic development and security 
concerns to establishing symbiotic relations with adjacent 
territories." 

Beijing signalled its plans as long as a decade ago in a 
little-remarked article in the official Beijing Review. 
Published on September 2, 1985, the article, Opening to the 
Southwest: An Expert Opinion, was written by former Vice-
Minister of Communications Pan Qi. It outlined the 
possibilities for finding an outlet for Chinese trade, through 
Burma to the Indian Ocean. 

Pan mentioned the railheads of Myitkyina and Lashio in northern 
and north-eastern Burma as possible conduits for the export of 
Chinese goods. He refrained from mentioning, however, that all 
the relevant border areas, at that time, werent under the 
control of the Burmese central government, which was fighting 
communist and ethnic insurgencies.

But the Chinese were right again. After Rangoon crushed the 
1988 uprising in central Burma, it offered ceasefire deals to 
rebels in peripheral areas in order to deprive fugitive urban 
dissidents of a place to continue their activities. In exchange 
for not sharing their weapons with students and other pro-
democracy activists, the rebels are now left alone by the 
government.

Hardly surprisingly, the drug trade has flourished as a result 
-- northern Burma forms the heart of the Golden Triangle. Other 
economic activity has also taken off, principally trade in 
gems.

As the burgeoning narcotics trade indicates, Yunnans proximity 
to South-east Asia is balanced by its remoteness from Beijings 
control. The province has the historical distinction of being 
the last stronghold of anti-communist forces well into the 
1950s. As a Western intelligence source in Bangkok comments: I 
dont think the writ of the Chinese Communist Party runs very 
strong in the streets of Kunming.

This may mean Beijing should worry as much about Yunnans 
proximity to Southeast Asia as the region does about growing 
Chinese influence. For the time being, it seems Yunnan is 
suffering more from exposure to its neighbours. Rapid 
development along the Burma-Yunnan border has caused 
considerable social dislocation on both sides of the frontier. 
Prostitution and drug addition are two of the most obvious 
problems. Heroin is easily available in Ruili and other border 
towns, and young addicts can be seen injecting the drug in 
Ruilis narrow back streets.

***************************************************************
FEER: UNLOCKING YUNNAN
December 22, 1994; p.24
by Michael Vatiklotis

The Thais built sturdy brick walls around the northern city of 
Chiang Mai more than 150 years ago to keep marauding Burmese 
armies out. Today, the walls restored gates beckon Burmese, 
Laotians and Chinese as local businessmen look north for trade 
and investment.

As recently as the mid-1980s, investors saw Chiang Mai and 
other towns in northern Thailand as remote outposts, too close 
to the untamed frontiers of Burma and Laos to warrant much 
interest. Now, Thai and foreign businesses want to build roads, 
bridges and railways across those frontiers to open up a 
landlocked area of 93 million people.

If the Thai Government invests in new roads to Burma and Yunan, 
Thailand could gain an advantage over Singapore and Hong Kong 
in opening markets there, says Narong Suthisamphat, executive 
vice-president of Bangkok-based United Foods. At a recent 
promotional meeting in northern Thailand, the enthusiasm of 
local entrepreneurs extended to inviting participants from as 
far north as Mongolia.

But Thailand's dreams of acting as a land bridge to China are 
tempered by concerns about the strategic and economic impact of 
drawing their giant neighbour closer. Yunnans population of 38 
million and its developing industrial base make it potentially 
the strongest economic component of the region.

China is bound to want access to this area, but there are 
political and military as well as economic implications, says 
Pravit Arkarachinores, the head of a newly formed council of 
businessmen for northern Thailand.

Some of these developments have found an official agenda in the 
so-called Northern Growth Quadrangle, encompassing parts of 
Thailand, Burma, Laos and southern China. Backed by the Asian 
Development Bank, the concept aims to generate trade and 
economic growth in one of the last marginal areas of Southeast 
Asia. Infrastructure projects, some funded by the bank, will 
link the two driving forces of the effort: Chinas economic 
vibrancy and Thailand's commercial sophistication.

Fro businessmen in northern Thailand, the concept offers the 
promise of new markets for goods and services, as well as the 
opportunity to act as a service centre for the region. And 
outwardly, the Thailand's Government supports development in 
the area, on the grounds that economic links enhance stability. 
Security problems exist where there is a lack of economic 
cooperation, Deputy Prime minister Suphachai Phantichaphak 
told a recent conference in Chiang Mai.

But there are also indications that Bangkok, which has long 
practised a policy of setting up strategic buffer zones, is in 
no hurry to make itself too accessible to China. Intelligence 
sources point out that two new bridges linking Thailand with 
its neighbours -- one leading across the Mekong to Vientiane in 
Laos and another, still being built, connecting Mae Sot with 
Myawady in Burma -- are sited well away from the Chinese 
border. There are no plans so far to bridge the Mekong at 
Chiang Khong, which is less than 200 kilometres from the 
Chinese border with Laos.

Cultural bridges between northern Thailand and Chinas Yunnan 
province already exist. Yunnanese traders have visited Chiang 
Mai for centuries, and there is still a vibrant Yunnanese 
Muslim community in the city. and for almost three decades 
after their 1949 defeat by the Chinese communists, remnants of 
the Kuomintangs 93rd Regiment were accommodated in northern 
Thailand, where they served as informal border troops until 
most moved to Taiwan or settled in mountain villages in the 
1980s.

Now Thailand is using cultural diplomacy to expand its official 
contacts with Yunnan.

***************************************************************
FEER: RIVERS OF DREAMS Chinese Emigrants pour down the Mekong
December 22, 1994; p.26
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili, China, and Chiang Saen, Thailand

The Mekong River gathers strength in the Chinese province of 
Yunnan, then flows south, nourishing Burma, Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam before spilling into the South China Sea. 
Regional-development enthusiasts like to portray it as a "river 
of peace and cooperation." Recently, however, the life-giving 
waterway has gained a more sinister reputation: It has become 
the leading conduit out of China for illegal migrants to the 
West.  

The new wave of illegal immigration isn't just hitting the 
West, however. Thousands of Chinese are content to stay in 
Burma, capitalising on the border region's economic boom to set 
up businesses. Ethnic Chinese have come to dominate commercial 
life in the northern Burmese city of Mandalay.  

The Chinese who settle in Mandalay are mostly Yunnanese. The 
majority of those heading for the West, on the other hand, come 
from the Chinese coastal province of Fujian. Snakeheads, the 
merchants of migration, currently charge about Rmb 220,000 
(US$26,000) for passage overseas, says a well-connected source 
in Ruili, on Yunnan's border with Burma.  

Until recently, most of the Chinese migrants travelled 
southwards from Yunnan on foot through Burma's Shan state to 
Tachilek on the Thai border; now, because of fighting in the 
area between Burmese government forces and troops loyal to 
Golden Triangle warlord Khun Sa, most migrants reach Thailand 
by taking a boat down the Mekong.  

On the receiving side, at Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong, just 
south of the Thai-Lao-Burmese border junction, other agents 
help the migrants down to Bangkok, where they await further 
transport.  

"Now most migrants leave Thailand by air, using mostly cheap 
East European airlines," says a source in northern Thailand 
close to the immigration rackets. Indeed, intelligence sources 
in northern Thailand have tracked some of the Chinese migrants 
to Romania and even Italy. In Europe, they are commonly broken 
up into smaller groups and smuggled into Puerto Rico or the 
United States Virgin Islands. There, they can board domestic 
flights to the U.S. mainland.  

For Chinese headed no farther than Burma, an immigration racket 
also exists. "When a person dies in Mandalay, his death is not 
reported to the authorities," explains a source in Yunnan who's 
close  to the migration trade. "Instead, that person's 
relatives send the identity card to a broker in Ruili or any 
other border town in Yunnan."  

In Yunnan, the identification papers are sold to anyone able to 
pay Kyat 50,000, or US$500 at the blackmarket rate. The Chinese 
buyer's photo is substituted on the card, and he can then move 
to Mandalay as a Burmese citizen.  

Ethnic Chinese pervade commercial life in Mandalay-including 
the trade in precious stones, jade and narcotics. Their 
partners are often ethnic Chinese from the Kokang district of 
northeastern Burma, who are bona fide Burmese citizens but who 
speak the same Chinese dialect as the Yunnanese immigrants.  

The new wave of Chinese immigration has reignited traditional 
anti-Chinese sentiment among many Burmese, as reflected in 
regular cartoons and short stories on the subject in local 
Mandalay publications. But local authorities seem confident the 
situation won't get out of hand.  

"Yes, there are many Chinese in Mandalay today," says a recent 
visitor to the city. "But it's still manageable. It's not like 
the Han influx to, for instance, Lhasa in Tibet."  

But it may become that way, if illegal immigration continues 
apace. 

***************************************************************
FEER: CUTTING EDGE  
December 22, 1994; p.26
by Bertil Lintner

[Photo caption: Timber trucks on the Burma Road.]

Every day, a seemingly endless stream of heavily laden timber 
trucks groans its way up the sharp switchbacks of the Burma 
Road. This legendary highway has become the main route for 
timber leaving northern Burma for Yunnan in China.  

But it's not only the volume of timber being exported to China 
that's remarkable. The logs are scored with various 
abbreviations such as KDA, UWSA and SSA; these are the marks of 
former rebel groups in northern Burma that have agreed on 
ceasefires with the government in Rangoon. Spared the threat of 
attack, the groups now have a free hand to sell timber to 
China.  

"The rebels have become timber companies," jokes a resident in 
Wanding, where the Burma Road crosses the international 
frontier. "They've still got their guns, but their struggle for 
independence, autonomy or whatever is over."  

Most of the timber heading for China comes from the high 
mountain passes of Kambaiti, Panwa and Hpimaw along the Chinese 
border in Kachin state. This area is controlled by a remnant of 
the now defunct Communist Party of Burma, and the deforestation 
there is said to be the worst in the country's northern areas. 
"This used to be the most densely forested part of the north. 
But in three-to-four years' time, there won't be a tree left 
there," says a local resident.  

Following the most recent ceasefire agreement-with the Kachin 
Independence Army in February-locals expect massive 
deforestation in other parts of Kachin. This may, however, 
cause more concern in Rangoon as the area under Kachin control 
includes crucial watersheds feeding the headwaters of the 
Irrawaddy river, which waters the central Burmese plains.  

"If those areas are deforested, the effects would be felt all 
over the country. There would be a endless circle of drought 
and floods," says a forestry expert in  Bangkok.

***************************************************************
FEER: A PIECE OF THE ACTION Burma-China drug trade thrives with 
official complicity
December 22, 1994
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili and Kunming, Yunnan

Kill them! Kill them! thousands of people shouted in unison 
from the stands of the central sports stadium in Kunming, where 
they gathered to witness the trial of a group of drug 
traffickers and other criminals.

Hands tied behind their backs, the prisoners carried signboards 
identifying them and their crimes. Their names were scored with 
red ink, indicating that they had already become non-persons. 
After the trial, the 17 convicts were paraded through the 
streets of Kunming, capital of southern Chinas Yunnan 
province. Then they were executed one by one, each with a 
single bullet in the nape of the neck.

Public shows of official force arent rare in Yunnan, which is 
facing a worsening drug problem. But the mass trial, held in 
October, was exceptional because the defendants included police 
officials, a man with links to Burmese communist leaders, and 
two people from Fujian province who may have ties to organised 
crime.

As such, the trial for the first time indicated a willingness 
by the Chinese authorities to grapple with official complicity 
in the drug trade. Yunnan borders the Burmese and Laotian areas 
of the Golden Triangle, the worlds most infamous opium-growing 
area.

The most notorious of the convicts was Yang Muxian, an ethnic-
Chinese from Kokang, a district in northeastern Burma whose 
population is predominantly Yunnanese. Yang had been arrested 
on May 9 and charged with smuggling hundreds of kilograms of 
heroin into Yunnan.

But he was no ordinary smuggler. His elder brothers, Yang 
Muleng and Yang Muang, command a unit of the Communist Part of 
Burma's former insurgent army. The force has been recognised by 
Rangoon as a local militia since the communist insurgents 
agreed to a ceasefire four years ago.

Two high-ranking Yunnan police officers as well as a man and 
woman from Chinas coastal province of Fujian were also among 
those executed, say witnesses to the trial and other local 
sources. The group of convicts was diverse, but no more diverse 
than the mix of players in the drugs drama of the Golden 
Triangle.

It works like this. The Kokang militia turns locally grown raw 
opium into heroin in a string of refineries. But the rustic 
Yunnanese on the Burmese frontier dont have the means to 
distribute the heroin to addicts in East Asia, Australia, 
Europe and North America. This is done by international ethnic-
Chinese gangs, the so-called Triads or secret societies, which 
have always been strong among the Fujianese. Their syndicates 
are present in Chinatowns throughout the world.

Foreign anti-narcotics agents stress that it would be 
impossible for this traffic to operate without the cooperation 
of local government officials on both sides of the frontier. 
They note that the militia status that Rangoon afforded the 
Kokang force five years ago gives it virtual immunity from 
prosecution on the Burmese side.

The militia has used that freedom to pump up heroin output. 
Opium production in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle 
increased to an estimated 2,500 tonnes in 1993-94 from 1,200 
tonnes in 1988. Another record harvest is expected for this 
years growing season.

While some of the most blatantly obvious heroin laboratories 
have been shut, the Kokang militia has set up a new refining 
complex in Mong Hom-Mong Ya, a secluded valley west of the 
Salween River. The heroin that Chinese authorities seized from 
Yang came from these refineries, sources say.

The two police officers executed in Kunming came from Zhenkang, 
a Chinese town across the border from Kokang thats on the main 
smuggling route from the Golden Triangle into Yunnan. 
Underlining the magnitude of official complicity, 150-200 local 
border officials -- police, customs and security personnel -- 
were also detained in the wake of Yangs arrest, say sources in 
both Kokang and Kunming.

China officially counts 250,000 drug addicts, with Yunnan 
having the highest rate of addiction. The U.S. State 
Departments narcotics bureau estimates the real figure is two 
to three times bigger. But local authorities appear unable -- 
or perhaps unwilling -- to confront the drug problem. The army 
is mostly doing business these days, and the local police are 
just too corrupt, says a well-connected source.

In a sign that Beijing may not trust local authorities, it has 
assigned the Peoples Armed Police to deal with the drug 
problems in Yunnan. Set up in the early 1980s, the PAP has been 
described as the new strike force of Chinas powerful internal-
security apparatus.

In the forces most spectacular action, thousands of heavily 
armed PAP men, supported by armour, moved in late 1992 against 
drug traffickers who had taken over the Yunnanese town of 
Pingyuan, near the Vietnamese border. When the town was 
recaptured after two months of heavy fighting, the police found 
that drug barons were living in luxury villas with dancing 
girls and karaoke bars. The haul after the operation: 854 
people arrested, 981 kilograms of drugs seized and 353 assorted 
weapons confiscated.

The PAP often doesnt even inform local officials before 
conducting its anti-drug sweeps. But while its tactics may be 
effective, analysts point out that riding roughshod over the 
local authorities -- many of whom belong to ethnic minorities -
- is liable to cause resentment. Nonetheless, with corruption 
rampant and organised crime increasingly powerful in the 
provinces, Beijing may have no choice but to use the centrally 
controlled force.

A Western Sinologist, though, warns against counting on the PAP 
to cure the plague of provincial crime. He points out that 
Public Security Minister Tao Siju -- whos also the PAPs 
political commissar -- made headlines in 1992 when he said some 
Hong Kong-based Triads are patriotic and good people who 
are welcome to do business in China.

***************************************************************
NEWS SOURCES REGULARLY COVERED/ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET:
  AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS
 AFP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
 AW: ASIAWEEK
 AWSJ: ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
 Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt.=US$1 (APPROX), 
 BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
 BI: BURMA ISSUES
 BKK POST: BANGKOK POST (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
 BRC-CM: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-CHIANG MAI
 BRC-J: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-JAPAN
 CPPSM: C'TEE FOR PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND 
 FEER: FAR EAST ECONOMIC REVIEW
 IRRAWADDY: NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY BURMA INFORMATION GROUP
 JIR: JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
 KHRG: KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP
 Kt. BURMESE KYAT; 150 KYAT=US$1 BLACK MARKET
                   100 KYAT=US$1 SEMI-OFFICIAL
                   6 KYAT=US$1 OFFICIAL
 MOA: MIRROR OF ARAKAN
 NATION: THE NATION (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
 NLM: NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR (DAILY STATE-RUN NEWSPAPER, RANGOON)
 S.C.B.:SOC.CULTURE.BURMA NEWSGROUP 
 S.C.T.:SOC.CULTURE.THAI NEWSGROUP
 SEASIA-L: S.E.ASIA BITNET MAILING LIST
 SLORC: STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COMMITTEE
 USG: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
 XNA: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
**************************************************************