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BurmaNet News: December 25 1991
************************** BurmaNet **************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
**************************************************************
BurmaNet News: Christmas Sunday, December 25 1994
Issue #87
**************************************************************
Contents:
BKK POST: KAREN LEADER SAYS SLORC IS BEHIND RELIGIOUS UNREST
NATION: BURMESE SUFFER CASUALTIES
NATION: BURMA STUDENTS PROTEST
NATION: BURMA GOES ALL-OUT TO WELCOME CHINA PREMIER
FEER: MONKS MEDITATION
BKK POST [LETTER]: A CHRISTMAS MESSAGE FOR SLORC BUSINESS
PARTNERS
NATION: BURMESE RICE FOR LAOS
NATION: KHUN SAS OPERATIONS HIT
FEER: ROOMS TO BUILD
FEER: ENTER THE DRAGON
FEER: UNLOCKING YUNNAN
FEER: RIVERS OF DREAMS Chinese Emigrants pour down the Mekong
FEER: CUTTING EDGE
FEER: A PIECE OF THE ACTION Burma-China drug trade thrives...
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BKK POST: KAREN LEADER SAYS SLORC IS BEHIND RELIGIOUS UNREST
Sunday, December, 25 1994
[Photo caption: BO MYA: No problems between Buddhists and
Christians.]
KAREN National Union leader General Saw Bo Mya has blamed the
State Law and Order Restoration Council, the ruling military
junta in Rangoon, for the conflict which erupted in the KNU
among Christian and Karen soldiers early this month.
About 400 Buddhist fighters in the 5,000-strong Christian-led
force the most powerful guerrilla group which has been fighting
the Rangoon government for autonomy within a federal Burma,
seized a hilltop outpost at the confluence of the Salween and
Moei rivers during the first week of December.
The mutiny was said to be the result of deep-rooted differences
between rank-and-file Buddhists and the KNU's mainly Christian
leaders. It has since been settled.
The KNU, however, claims the mutiny was instigated by SLORC
agents who had penetrated the area controlled by the Karen.
Gen Bo Mya said: "SLORC has been fighting us on the military
and political fronts but it has not succeeded in defeating us.
So it is now turning to religion to hit us. This is just not
right." He claims there is no problem between Buddhists and
Christians in Manerplaw where about half a dozen monks live in
a monastery built with the help of the Christians in that area.
The following is an account by Gen Bo Mya of events which led
to the conflict between the Buddhist and Christian factions of
the KNU:
Myiang Gyi Ngu Sayadaw had been building pagodas and
monasteries in our area to which we had no objections.
Our only request was that these activities and propagation of
the Buddhist faith not be conducted at our lines of defence. We
don't mind pagodas being built at our defence perimeters but we
were strictly against him building monasteries which would
allow monks and people to reside in.
However, our requests not to build monasteries at these
strategic areas where we have heavy weapons emplacements were
ignored. Also I told him that we had no objection to them
propagating and practicing Buddhism in the villages, but again
insisted that the monk and his followers abstain from
conducting such activities in the restricted areas.
Constructing monasteries in such areas will draw all kinds of
people to the militarily strategic areas. Gen Bo Mya's main
concern was "it will create easy access for infiltrators to
penetrate the Karen line of defence".
The enemy used this [religious unrest] as a propaganda tool to
accuse the Karen of persecuting the Buddhists and suppressing
the religion.
The monk was alleged to have told his followers to congregate
and reside at the monasteries he had built saying that it was
safe for them to live there, and the military would not take
them away as
porters. The enemy would not bother them at all.
I begged the monk to stop his activities of persuading the
Karen Buddhists (to his view), especially those from the KNU
which are engaged in the revolutionary struggle with the SLORC.
He said they could become vegetarians, but to give up the cause
and go to reside with the monk at the monastery was out of the
question.
The monk has told the KNU Buddhist soldiers that it was
unnecessary for them to fight the enemy: "You people could come
and stay at my monastery [on the hilltop at the confluence of
the Salween and Moei rivers], and won't have to be worried
about being taken as porters by the Burmese army."
He also promised these soldiers and civilians, numbering about
3,000, that he would take care of their board and lodging and
other expenses as required.
Promises like these had led the KNU leaders to become
suspicious of the real motives of the Myiang Gyi Ngu Sayadaw.
Gen Bo Mya said that it was impossible for the monk to support
the 3,000 people. He strongly suspects the SLORC is providing
financial support.
The monk had been able to supply rice, oil, chillies and onions
without any difficulty to his followers.
He then allowed the soldiers to become monks, some of them from
the ranks and files of the KNU administrative level. The
soldiers had entered the monkhood, leaving behind their
families, and their fields unattended.
But what had annoyed the Karen leader most was the soldiers had
failed to inform their superiors of their leaving for the
monkhood.
As we understand, there are certain rules and regulations a
practising Buddhist must abide by. For example, a layman must
first get his wife's consent to enter the monkhood. Also he
must ensure the family is sufficiently provided for, both
financially and materially, during his tenure in the monkhood.
Religion being such a delicate issue had stopped the Karen
leaders from taking disciplinary action against the soldiers.
Gen Bo Mya said that to settle the issue "we invited the senior
monks in the Karen State to attend a religious conference".
The conference was held in Manerplaw about six months ago and
was attended by about 100 monks. Conspicuously absent was the
abbot, Myiang Gyi Ngu Sayadaw. He left the River Junction
Pagoda about November 20 for Kama Maung district inside Burma
where his main monastery is
located.
One of the decisions taken at the conference was "a civil
servant or a soldier must first obtain permission from their
superiors to enter the monkhood".
Also permission must be sought from authorities concerned to
build a pagoda to ensure it is not built on private property
and thus avoid disputes and arguments that could arise
thereafter.
Bo Mya claims he held three discussions with the senior abbot
and pleaded with him to stop what he was doing. He told the
monk: "We all need to be united [KNU forces] also we rely on
you [to maintain unity and peace among the Buddhists and
Christians in the KNU]. Besides you and your followers are
vegetarians who do not believe in violence and killing."
The conflict among Buddhist and Karen had ended and everything
was under control. But he feels "the tension has not been
completely defused". There have been reports that a few
remaining mutineers are still creating trouble at some
outposts.
"They [KNU mutineers] have been approaching some of the
outposts and have threatened the soldiers at gunpoint to either
join them or surrender their weapons and leave."
Most mutineers at the River Junction Pagoda have returned to
their battalions, with the exception of a few stragglers still
roaming the area.
He denies personal and ideological conflicts existed among the
rank and file of the KNU forces. But "there are certain
civilian individuals who are instigating the soldiers and other
villagers with rumours that Christians are persecuting and
killing Buddhists."
Gen Bo Mya vehemently denies these rumours, saying that these
instigators are the ones responsible for the deaths of not only
Christians but also Buddhists.
He accuses so-called Buddhists of killing eight people,
including a Buddhist Karen captain, and also says these people
have threatened certain monks. They have been spreading false
rumours in the interior of the country about the so-called
persecution of Buddhists.
"All this is the work of the enemy [SLORC]."
He claims there is no problem between Buddhists and Christians
in Manerplaw where about half a dozen monks live in a monastery
build with the help of the Christians in that area.
Meanwhile, the Christian leaders of the KNU have issued a
blanket amnesty for the former mutineers. Sources also say the
KNU leaders are most eager to welcome back Myaing Gyi Ngu
Sayadaw to the River Junction Pagoda and continue his work
among his followers.
THE AGREEMENT
Leaders of the KNU, Buddhist monks and Karen Buddhist officers
of the Karen National Liberation Army reached an agreement on
December 15 to defuse the crisis between Buddhists and
Christians which took place at the confluence of the Salween
and Moei rivers.
The five points of the agreement are:
* To form a committee representing the Buddhists.
* The committee will be responsible to arbitrate fairly in any
crisis concerning religious conflicts that may arise in future.
* The KNU and the arbitration committee must take full
responsibility to ensure that no action be taken against
soldiers, Buddhist monks and the Buddhist civilians involved in
the recent conflict, such arrest, execution imprisonment or
other punishment.
* That should any Buddhist soldiers and their commanders commit
any offence, it should be brought to the attention of their
immediate military leaders who would then decide to take action
against the offenders.
* That strict action be taken against those who in any way
obstruct the freedom of worship and the propagation of the
faith.
EIGHT-POINT APPEAL
Following is an eight-point appeal issued on December 16 by a
committee now stationed on the opposite bank of the River
Junction Pagoda.
* That the ceasefire be maintained.
* That the five-point agreement be recognised and observed.
* That the Rambo Sayadaw [U Zawana, chief abbot of Manerplaw
Monastery] be stationed along with the committee on the
opposite bank of the River Junction Pagoda. If the monk is
unavailable, the KNU must take responsibility to settle the
matter.
* That Pado Mahn Sha, Col Johnny and Col Tutu Lay are to be
returned together with the committee to the river confluence.
* That the committee be given a free hand in handling whatever
related issues.
* That the workings of the committee are not exploited.
* That no news based on rumours be issued. If any news are to
be released the committee must first be consulted.
* That when communicating with the committee, both sides should
send team leaders with proper authorisation to act.
***************************************************************
NATION: BURMESE SUFFER CASUALTIES
Sunday, December 25, 1994
Burmese government forces suffered heavy casualties after they
attacked a main base of the ethnic minority Karen rebels. Three
Karen soldiers were wounded when government infantry made an
unsuccessful assault on a guerrilla camp.
***************************************************************
NATION: BURMA STUDENTS PROTEST
Sunday, December 25, 1994
[Photo caption: A group of Burmese students from the Overseas
Students Organization of Burma and the All Burma Basic
Education Students Union gather outside the Burmese Embassy on
Sathorn Road yesterday to protest against Chinese Prime
Minister Li Pengs visit to Burma.
***************************************************************
NATION: BURMA GOES ALL-OUT TO WELCOME CHINA PREMIER
Sunday, December 25, 1994
Kyodo, Yangon [Rangoon]
Elaborate arrangements are being made to welcome Chinese
Premier Li Peng, who arrives in Burma tomorrow for a three-day
goodwill visit.
The lakeside state guest house has been repaired and
refurbished. Roads from the Yangon international airport to
downtown have been lined with Chinese and Burma national flags,
and roadside curbs have been repainted red and white.
A huge decorated pavilion with welcome signs in the Chinese and
Burma languages has also been built at the airport.
Government newspapers yesterday carried portraits of Premier Li
Peng and his wife.
This will be the first visit to Burma by a Chinese prime
minister, and Li Peng will be the fourth foreign premier to
visit the country during the rule of the State Law and Order
Restoration Council.
Laotian Premier Khamtay Siphandone visited Burma in February
1992. Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong visited Burma in
March this year and Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet came
in May.
***************************************************************
FEER: MONKS MEDITATION
December 22, 1994
Rewata Dhamma, a Burmese monk living in Britain who earlier
this year initiated a dialogue between Rangoons military
authorities and detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi,
will return to Burma soon. He intends to stay for more than a
month, leading to speculation that Suu Kyi, who has been under
house arrest since July 1989, may be released in mid-January.
Some Western diplomatic sources say that although the terms of
her detention may be relaxed, she will remain under some form
of surveillance.
***************************************************************
BKK POST [LETTER]: A CHRISTMAS MESSAGE FOR SLORC BUSINESS
PARTNERS
Sunday, December, 25 1994
SIR: SLORC alleges that they held meetings with Aung San Suu
Kyi due to mutual understanding and a desire to act in the best
interests of the country. How can they act in the best
interests of the country when they promptly sent the nation's
leader back into detention after the meetings. This is an act
only uneducated people are capable of. I have always maintained
that Burma is divided because it is led by uneducated leaders.
SLORC held its first meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi on the same
day the United Nations General Assembly convened in New York.
SLORC promptly started a major military offensive against the
Karens and students when their cosmetic campaign failed and the
Third Committee of the United Nations issued its strongest
censure of the military dictators who hijacked Burma. It is now
obvious to the whole world that SLORC is not capable of good
faith negotiations.
In the first week of December SLORC's Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw
met with Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai. It is rumored that the
Thai authorities asked Ohn Gyaw to convey to SLORC the need to
release Aung San Suu Kyi to facilitate a political settlement
in Burma.
Now Thailand has received SLORC's response to their request.
SLORC is now launching a major military offensive against the
Karens and students.
This will result in Thailand reluctantly accommodating many
thousands of Burmese war refugees.
This is probably SLORC's way of thanking the Thai Mafia for
providing a financial life-line when SLORC was on the verge of
financial collapse in 1988.
Economic development can lead to political reform. There are
many examples in Asia. But also one exception. Joint ventures
between affiliates of the Burma Army and foreign investors is
leading Burma towards fascism. No other country in present day
Asia has made extensive use of slave labour.
In recent history, slave labour was used by the Japanese
Imperial Army's Kempeitai and Germanys Gestapo. Both were
fascists states. The hard reality is that SLORC is incapable of
genuine political and economic reforms.
The Christmas message from the Burmese Resistance to the
business partners of SLORC is straight-forward. We give you the
"Bayer Solution" as your Christmas present. The United States
confiscated the manufacturers of Bayer Aspirin when Germany
lost the World War.
The Burmese too will confiscate the many hotels being built by
SLORC's business partners when SLORC is toppled. Confiscation
unlike nationalization does not involve compensation. We will
make the business partners of SLORC pay for the sufferings they
caused tot he forty million hostages in Burma.
Myint Thein
Senior Advisor to the Burmese Resistance
***************************************************************
NATION: BURMESE RICE FOR LAOS
Sunday, December 25, 1994
Kyodo, Rangoon
Burma has presented 500 tonnes of rice and 50 tonnes of salt to
Laos at a ceremony in Wampon Village in eastern Burma, the
state-run New Light of Myanmar reported on Friday.
Burma Social Welfare Minister Brig Gen Thaung Myint handed over
the gift to his Laotian counterpart, Thongl Oun Sisoulth, on
Thursday.
Almost every year Burma presents Laos with gifts of rice,
glutinous rice, salt, seed and farm implements.
***************************************************************
NATION: KHUN SAS OPERATIONS HIT
Sunday, December 25, 1994
Opium war lord Khun Sas drug trafficking organization was
crippled by the arrest of 10 of his leading lieutenants in a
joint Thai-US operation codenamed Operation Tiger Trap. There
are hopes of totally crushing the opium cartel.
***************************************************************
FEER: ROOMS TO BUILD
December 22, 1994
Austral Amalgamated Tin of Malaysia signed a 30-year contract
with the Department of Civil Aviation to build and run a 121-
room hotel near the Rangoon airport. The US$5 million hotel is
due to open in May 1996.
***************************************************************
FEER: ENTER THE DRAGON
December 22, 1994; p.22+
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili, China
Chinese merchants are pushing south as trade with Burma
flourishes. But the nations of Southeast Asia are watching
uneasily as Beijings military influence with its southern
neighbour also expands.
[Photo caption: The Mekong River in Yunnan province.]
[Map: #1 Chinas access routes to the Great Golden Peninsula.
#2 Snooping Posts (Burmese Navel Post - Ramree, Coco, Victoria
Point).]
For the weary traveller, the town of Ruili rises like a mirage
from the rugged mountains on the border between Burma and
China's Yunnan province. After hours of driving through barren,
windswept hills, the town's flashing red and green neon lights,
street-stall karaoke machines, massage parlours and discos -
some blaring heavy-metal rock music-seem almost surreal.
But the economic boom that pays for such indulgences is real
enough. While the Beijing government is trying to rein in
growth elsewhere in China, whirlwind capitalism prevails here
on the frontier.
In the last 10 years, cross-border trade between Yunnan and
Burma has swollen from about US$15 million annually to around
US$800 million. Ruili's markets are full of goods, the
pavements packed with people, many from the Burmese side of the
border, judging from their longyis, or sarongs. The doorways of
dimly lit shacks afford glimpses of scantily clad prostitutes.
A few years ago, China granted Ruili open-city economic status
along with nearby Wanding, where the legendary Burma Road
crosses the frontier. Now, the authorities have gone a step
further: An area south of Ruili straddling the Shweli river has
become a privileged "special economic development zone." A new
concrete bridge spans the river, while on the side nearest
Burma, high-rise buildings and shopping complexes are under
construction. A giant monument was recently erected near the
bridge, showing three figures-their determined faces pointing
south. "Southeast Asia, here we come!" jokes a resident.
But is Southeast Asia ready for China? With the economic boom
on the Sino-Burmese frontier have come expanded Chinese
military ties with Burma and, increasingly, Laos. China denies
it intends to project its influence into Southeast Asia, but
its southward push makes many regional governments uneasy. They
fear China wants to use Burma to try to expand its military and
political reach.
China is seen "not simply [as] a threat to Southeast Asia but a
threat to the region," says a defence analyst in Bangkok. "And
that is perceived as a China that is seeking to extend its
influence beyond its borders. The fear, perhaps, of these
neighbouring states is in concerns that these Chinese policies
may eventually give birth to a Chinese Monroe Doctrine in
Asia."
B.A. Hamzah of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs
concurs: "There is a fear that the Chinese are coming in [to
Southeast Asia] from the other side, via the Indian Ocean. This
will give them access to the Straits of Malacca. If China has
access through that area, it will give Beijing a better basis
for power projection."
Just 10 years ago, Ruili was a supply centre for an earlier
Chinese attempt to extend its influence: an insurgency by the
now disbanded Communist Party of Burma. That insurrection
failed miserably. But, as a Mandalay merchant in the streets of
Ruili sees it: "What the Chinese did not achieve by supporting
the CPB has been accomplished in a subtle, peaceful way."
Recent visitors to Burma report that Chinese traders roam
freely as far south as Mandalay, which is growing rapidly on
account of illegal immigration from China.
The invasion may not be entirely peaceful, however. As one
Singapore-based regional analyst warns: "Many people are
complaining in Burma that those buying land and buildings in
the prime areas in the upper part of the country are Chinese
from the border areas. If the economy is growing without equity
among the races, there is a possibility that a social time bomb
could explode at any time, especially in Mandalay."
In China at least, the expansion of commercial ties has met
with widespread enthusiasm. The Chinese press regularly uses a
new coinage, "the Great Golden Peninsula," to refer to a vast
region stretching from Yunnan to Singapore in the south and
India and Vietnam in the west and east. Commonly cited in such
analyses are three main "routes" along which Chinese commerce
could penetrate the region: one through Burma, the others
through Vietnam and Laos.
For the moment, however, the main avenue for trade is Yunnan. A
sprawling, landlocked province of 38 million people, it has for
years sought foreign markets for its goods, as well as an
outlet to the sea. Despite its relative remoteness from Beijing
and the coast, Yunnan boasts a well-developed industrial base-a
product in part of a Cold War policy of basing industry as far
as possible from the reach of the United States Pacific Fleet.
For the last decade, the economy has grown at close to 10% a
year, and it has a large pool of cheap labour; 120 million
people live within 36 hours' travel of Kunming, the provincial
capital.
Most major investment in the border boom comes from Yunnanese
and Fujianese businessmen, who form the predominant Chinese
community in Burma's urban centres. This seems to reflect the
changing economic balance of Burma's trade ties, which is
shifting in Yunnan's favour. For many years, Burma depended on
Thailand for consumer goods. Now it's Chinese goods that are
lapping at Thailand's borders, Thai businessmen complain.
Trade is one way for China to expand southwards; arming the
Burmese military is another. Ruili's new bridge is referred to
locally as "the gun bridge": This is where most surface
deliveries of Chinese munitions to Burma take place.
In October, more than 500 trucks crossed the bridge. Some,
meant as transports for the Burmese army, were empty; others
carried small arms as well as multiple-rocket launchers. "The
deliveries took place at night," a Ruili resident says. "The
whole area was sealed off as the trucks went across."
It may seem natural that China wants to provide its new markets
with a military umbrella, but Burma's neighbours don't
necessarily see it that way. They have watched with unease the
massive Chinese shipments to Burma's army and air force. But
it's China's role in upgrading the Burmese navy that has caused
the most alarm.
Indonesian military sources, for example, say they consider
that granting China military access to Burmese bases would
present a threat to the Straits of Malacca, a major waterway
for Southeast Asia's sea-borne trade.
In late 1992, Western spy satellites detected a new, 150-foot
antenna used for signals intelligence at a naval base on Coco
Island, a Burmese possession in the Indian Ocean. Suspicion
that this equipment is likely to be operated at least in part
by Chinese technicians has led to fears that Burma will allow
Beijing's intelligence agencies to monitor this sensitive
maritime region.
More recently, intelligence reports indicate that China is
pressing Burma to allow it access not just to Coco Island but
also to two other strategically located listening posts: Ramree
island, south of Sittwe off the coast of Arakan state; and an
island off Tenasserim state. The latter is especially
sensitive: A long, rugged island, it's located off Burma's
southernmost point, Kawthaung or Victoria Point, close to the
northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca.
CHINA'S traditional rival in the region, India, made several
diplomatic representations to Rangoon on the issue this year
and last. In August, Indian coastguards intercepted what
appears to have been a Chinese survey vessel that strayed into
Indian waters near the Andaman islands. The ship, Yan See Han
014, was equipped with modern electronic monitoring gear.
Three mysterious fishing vessels, all carrying Chinese crew,
were also detained at the same time at Port Blair on the
Andamans, but were later released. That incident attracted
media attention in India, but the seizure of the Yan See Han
014 hasn't been reported.
It's also clear that China's interest in staking a presence in
Burma, and thereby the Indian Ocean, is a long-standing one.
"China has traditionally had great concerns about securing its
frontiers," the defence analyst in Bangkok points out. "To my
mind, the collapse of the Soviet Union has allowed the Chinese
to rapidly advance this agenda and created power vacuums among
many of China's neighbours which Beijing is taking advantage
of. The Chinese have keyed the development of their outlying
regions both in terms of economic development and security
concerns to establishing symbiotic relations with adjacent
territories."
Beijing signalled its plans as long as a decade ago in a
little-remarked article in the official Beijing Review.
Published on September 2, 1985, the article, Opening to the
Southwest: An Expert Opinion, was written by former Vice-
Minister of Communications Pan Qi. It outlined the
possibilities for finding an outlet for Chinese trade, through
Burma to the Indian Ocean.
Pan mentioned the railheads of Myitkyina and Lashio in northern
and north-eastern Burma as possible conduits for the export of
Chinese goods. He refrained from mentioning, however, that all
the relevant border areas, at that time, werent under the
control of the Burmese central government, which was fighting
communist and ethnic insurgencies.
But the Chinese were right again. After Rangoon crushed the
1988 uprising in central Burma, it offered ceasefire deals to
rebels in peripheral areas in order to deprive fugitive urban
dissidents of a place to continue their activities. In exchange
for not sharing their weapons with students and other pro-
democracy activists, the rebels are now left alone by the
government.
Hardly surprisingly, the drug trade has flourished as a result
-- northern Burma forms the heart of the Golden Triangle. Other
economic activity has also taken off, principally trade in
gems.
As the burgeoning narcotics trade indicates, Yunnans proximity
to South-east Asia is balanced by its remoteness from Beijings
control. The province has the historical distinction of being
the last stronghold of anti-communist forces well into the
1950s. As a Western intelligence source in Bangkok comments: I
dont think the writ of the Chinese Communist Party runs very
strong in the streets of Kunming.
This may mean Beijing should worry as much about Yunnans
proximity to Southeast Asia as the region does about growing
Chinese influence. For the time being, it seems Yunnan is
suffering more from exposure to its neighbours. Rapid
development along the Burma-Yunnan border has caused
considerable social dislocation on both sides of the frontier.
Prostitution and drug addition are two of the most obvious
problems. Heroin is easily available in Ruili and other border
towns, and young addicts can be seen injecting the drug in
Ruilis narrow back streets.
***************************************************************
FEER: UNLOCKING YUNNAN
December 22, 1994; p.24
by Michael Vatiklotis
The Thais built sturdy brick walls around the northern city of
Chiang Mai more than 150 years ago to keep marauding Burmese
armies out. Today, the walls restored gates beckon Burmese,
Laotians and Chinese as local businessmen look north for trade
and investment.
As recently as the mid-1980s, investors saw Chiang Mai and
other towns in northern Thailand as remote outposts, too close
to the untamed frontiers of Burma and Laos to warrant much
interest. Now, Thai and foreign businesses want to build roads,
bridges and railways across those frontiers to open up a
landlocked area of 93 million people.
If the Thai Government invests in new roads to Burma and Yunan,
Thailand could gain an advantage over Singapore and Hong Kong
in opening markets there, says Narong Suthisamphat, executive
vice-president of Bangkok-based United Foods. At a recent
promotional meeting in northern Thailand, the enthusiasm of
local entrepreneurs extended to inviting participants from as
far north as Mongolia.
But Thailand's dreams of acting as a land bridge to China are
tempered by concerns about the strategic and economic impact of
drawing their giant neighbour closer. Yunnans population of 38
million and its developing industrial base make it potentially
the strongest economic component of the region.
China is bound to want access to this area, but there are
political and military as well as economic implications, says
Pravit Arkarachinores, the head of a newly formed council of
businessmen for northern Thailand.
Some of these developments have found an official agenda in the
so-called Northern Growth Quadrangle, encompassing parts of
Thailand, Burma, Laos and southern China. Backed by the Asian
Development Bank, the concept aims to generate trade and
economic growth in one of the last marginal areas of Southeast
Asia. Infrastructure projects, some funded by the bank, will
link the two driving forces of the effort: Chinas economic
vibrancy and Thailand's commercial sophistication.
Fro businessmen in northern Thailand, the concept offers the
promise of new markets for goods and services, as well as the
opportunity to act as a service centre for the region. And
outwardly, the Thailand's Government supports development in
the area, on the grounds that economic links enhance stability.
Security problems exist where there is a lack of economic
cooperation, Deputy Prime minister Suphachai Phantichaphak
told a recent conference in Chiang Mai.
But there are also indications that Bangkok, which has long
practised a policy of setting up strategic buffer zones, is in
no hurry to make itself too accessible to China. Intelligence
sources point out that two new bridges linking Thailand with
its neighbours -- one leading across the Mekong to Vientiane in
Laos and another, still being built, connecting Mae Sot with
Myawady in Burma -- are sited well away from the Chinese
border. There are no plans so far to bridge the Mekong at
Chiang Khong, which is less than 200 kilometres from the
Chinese border with Laos.
Cultural bridges between northern Thailand and Chinas Yunnan
province already exist. Yunnanese traders have visited Chiang
Mai for centuries, and there is still a vibrant Yunnanese
Muslim community in the city. and for almost three decades
after their 1949 defeat by the Chinese communists, remnants of
the Kuomintangs 93rd Regiment were accommodated in northern
Thailand, where they served as informal border troops until
most moved to Taiwan or settled in mountain villages in the
1980s.
Now Thailand is using cultural diplomacy to expand its official
contacts with Yunnan.
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FEER: RIVERS OF DREAMS Chinese Emigrants pour down the Mekong
December 22, 1994; p.26
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili, China, and Chiang Saen, Thailand
The Mekong River gathers strength in the Chinese province of
Yunnan, then flows south, nourishing Burma, Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia and Vietnam before spilling into the South China Sea.
Regional-development enthusiasts like to portray it as a "river
of peace and cooperation." Recently, however, the life-giving
waterway has gained a more sinister reputation: It has become
the leading conduit out of China for illegal migrants to the
West.
The new wave of illegal immigration isn't just hitting the
West, however. Thousands of Chinese are content to stay in
Burma, capitalising on the border region's economic boom to set
up businesses. Ethnic Chinese have come to dominate commercial
life in the northern Burmese city of Mandalay.
The Chinese who settle in Mandalay are mostly Yunnanese. The
majority of those heading for the West, on the other hand, come
from the Chinese coastal province of Fujian. Snakeheads, the
merchants of migration, currently charge about Rmb 220,000
(US$26,000) for passage overseas, says a well-connected source
in Ruili, on Yunnan's border with Burma.
Until recently, most of the Chinese migrants travelled
southwards from Yunnan on foot through Burma's Shan state to
Tachilek on the Thai border; now, because of fighting in the
area between Burmese government forces and troops loyal to
Golden Triangle warlord Khun Sa, most migrants reach Thailand
by taking a boat down the Mekong.
On the receiving side, at Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong, just
south of the Thai-Lao-Burmese border junction, other agents
help the migrants down to Bangkok, where they await further
transport.
"Now most migrants leave Thailand by air, using mostly cheap
East European airlines," says a source in northern Thailand
close to the immigration rackets. Indeed, intelligence sources
in northern Thailand have tracked some of the Chinese migrants
to Romania and even Italy. In Europe, they are commonly broken
up into smaller groups and smuggled into Puerto Rico or the
United States Virgin Islands. There, they can board domestic
flights to the U.S. mainland.
For Chinese headed no farther than Burma, an immigration racket
also exists. "When a person dies in Mandalay, his death is not
reported to the authorities," explains a source in Yunnan who's
close to the migration trade. "Instead, that person's
relatives send the identity card to a broker in Ruili or any
other border town in Yunnan."
In Yunnan, the identification papers are sold to anyone able to
pay Kyat 50,000, or US$500 at the blackmarket rate. The Chinese
buyer's photo is substituted on the card, and he can then move
to Mandalay as a Burmese citizen.
Ethnic Chinese pervade commercial life in Mandalay-including
the trade in precious stones, jade and narcotics. Their
partners are often ethnic Chinese from the Kokang district of
northeastern Burma, who are bona fide Burmese citizens but who
speak the same Chinese dialect as the Yunnanese immigrants.
The new wave of Chinese immigration has reignited traditional
anti-Chinese sentiment among many Burmese, as reflected in
regular cartoons and short stories on the subject in local
Mandalay publications. But local authorities seem confident the
situation won't get out of hand.
"Yes, there are many Chinese in Mandalay today," says a recent
visitor to the city. "But it's still manageable. It's not like
the Han influx to, for instance, Lhasa in Tibet."
But it may become that way, if illegal immigration continues
apace.
***************************************************************
FEER: CUTTING EDGE
December 22, 1994; p.26
by Bertil Lintner
[Photo caption: Timber trucks on the Burma Road.]
Every day, a seemingly endless stream of heavily laden timber
trucks groans its way up the sharp switchbacks of the Burma
Road. This legendary highway has become the main route for
timber leaving northern Burma for Yunnan in China.
But it's not only the volume of timber being exported to China
that's remarkable. The logs are scored with various
abbreviations such as KDA, UWSA and SSA; these are the marks of
former rebel groups in northern Burma that have agreed on
ceasefires with the government in Rangoon. Spared the threat of
attack, the groups now have a free hand to sell timber to
China.
"The rebels have become timber companies," jokes a resident in
Wanding, where the Burma Road crosses the international
frontier. "They've still got their guns, but their struggle for
independence, autonomy or whatever is over."
Most of the timber heading for China comes from the high
mountain passes of Kambaiti, Panwa and Hpimaw along the Chinese
border in Kachin state. This area is controlled by a remnant of
the now defunct Communist Party of Burma, and the deforestation
there is said to be the worst in the country's northern areas.
"This used to be the most densely forested part of the north.
But in three-to-four years' time, there won't be a tree left
there," says a local resident.
Following the most recent ceasefire agreement-with the Kachin
Independence Army in February-locals expect massive
deforestation in other parts of Kachin. This may, however,
cause more concern in Rangoon as the area under Kachin control
includes crucial watersheds feeding the headwaters of the
Irrawaddy river, which waters the central Burmese plains.
"If those areas are deforested, the effects would be felt all
over the country. There would be a endless circle of drought
and floods," says a forestry expert in Bangkok.
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FEER: A PIECE OF THE ACTION Burma-China drug trade thrives with
official complicity
December 22, 1994
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili and Kunming, Yunnan
Kill them! Kill them! thousands of people shouted in unison
from the stands of the central sports stadium in Kunming, where
they gathered to witness the trial of a group of drug
traffickers and other criminals.
Hands tied behind their backs, the prisoners carried signboards
identifying them and their crimes. Their names were scored with
red ink, indicating that they had already become non-persons.
After the trial, the 17 convicts were paraded through the
streets of Kunming, capital of southern Chinas Yunnan
province. Then they were executed one by one, each with a
single bullet in the nape of the neck.
Public shows of official force arent rare in Yunnan, which is
facing a worsening drug problem. But the mass trial, held in
October, was exceptional because the defendants included police
officials, a man with links to Burmese communist leaders, and
two people from Fujian province who may have ties to organised
crime.
As such, the trial for the first time indicated a willingness
by the Chinese authorities to grapple with official complicity
in the drug trade. Yunnan borders the Burmese and Laotian areas
of the Golden Triangle, the worlds most infamous opium-growing
area.
The most notorious of the convicts was Yang Muxian, an ethnic-
Chinese from Kokang, a district in northeastern Burma whose
population is predominantly Yunnanese. Yang had been arrested
on May 9 and charged with smuggling hundreds of kilograms of
heroin into Yunnan.
But he was no ordinary smuggler. His elder brothers, Yang
Muleng and Yang Muang, command a unit of the Communist Part of
Burma's former insurgent army. The force has been recognised by
Rangoon as a local militia since the communist insurgents
agreed to a ceasefire four years ago.
Two high-ranking Yunnan police officers as well as a man and
woman from Chinas coastal province of Fujian were also among
those executed, say witnesses to the trial and other local
sources. The group of convicts was diverse, but no more diverse
than the mix of players in the drugs drama of the Golden
Triangle.
It works like this. The Kokang militia turns locally grown raw
opium into heroin in a string of refineries. But the rustic
Yunnanese on the Burmese frontier dont have the means to
distribute the heroin to addicts in East Asia, Australia,
Europe and North America. This is done by international ethnic-
Chinese gangs, the so-called Triads or secret societies, which
have always been strong among the Fujianese. Their syndicates
are present in Chinatowns throughout the world.
Foreign anti-narcotics agents stress that it would be
impossible for this traffic to operate without the cooperation
of local government officials on both sides of the frontier.
They note that the militia status that Rangoon afforded the
Kokang force five years ago gives it virtual immunity from
prosecution on the Burmese side.
The militia has used that freedom to pump up heroin output.
Opium production in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle
increased to an estimated 2,500 tonnes in 1993-94 from 1,200
tonnes in 1988. Another record harvest is expected for this
years growing season.
While some of the most blatantly obvious heroin laboratories
have been shut, the Kokang militia has set up a new refining
complex in Mong Hom-Mong Ya, a secluded valley west of the
Salween River. The heroin that Chinese authorities seized from
Yang came from these refineries, sources say.
The two police officers executed in Kunming came from Zhenkang,
a Chinese town across the border from Kokang thats on the main
smuggling route from the Golden Triangle into Yunnan.
Underlining the magnitude of official complicity, 150-200 local
border officials -- police, customs and security personnel --
were also detained in the wake of Yangs arrest, say sources in
both Kokang and Kunming.
China officially counts 250,000 drug addicts, with Yunnan
having the highest rate of addiction. The U.S. State
Departments narcotics bureau estimates the real figure is two
to three times bigger. But local authorities appear unable --
or perhaps unwilling -- to confront the drug problem. The army
is mostly doing business these days, and the local police are
just too corrupt, says a well-connected source.
In a sign that Beijing may not trust local authorities, it has
assigned the Peoples Armed Police to deal with the drug
problems in Yunnan. Set up in the early 1980s, the PAP has been
described as the new strike force of Chinas powerful internal-
security apparatus.
In the forces most spectacular action, thousands of heavily
armed PAP men, supported by armour, moved in late 1992 against
drug traffickers who had taken over the Yunnanese town of
Pingyuan, near the Vietnamese border. When the town was
recaptured after two months of heavy fighting, the police found
that drug barons were living in luxury villas with dancing
girls and karaoke bars. The haul after the operation: 854
people arrested, 981 kilograms of drugs seized and 353 assorted
weapons confiscated.
The PAP often doesnt even inform local officials before
conducting its anti-drug sweeps. But while its tactics may be
effective, analysts point out that riding roughshod over the
local authorities -- many of whom belong to ethnic minorities -
- is liable to cause resentment. Nonetheless, with corruption
rampant and organised crime increasingly powerful in the
provinces, Beijing may have no choice but to use the centrally
controlled force.
A Western Sinologist, though, warns against counting on the PAP
to cure the plague of provincial crime. He points out that
Public Security Minister Tao Siju -- whos also the PAPs
political commissar -- made headlines in 1992 when he said some
Hong Kong-based Triads are patriotic and good people who
are welcome to do business in China.
***************************************************************
NEWS SOURCES REGULARLY COVERED/ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET:
AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS
AFP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
AW: ASIAWEEK
AWSJ: ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt.=US$1 (APPROX),
BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
BI: BURMA ISSUES
BKK POST: BANGKOK POST (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
BRC-CM: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-CHIANG MAI
BRC-J: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-JAPAN
CPPSM: C'TEE FOR PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND
FEER: FAR EAST ECONOMIC REVIEW
IRRAWADDY: NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY BURMA INFORMATION GROUP
JIR: JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
KHRG: KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP
Kt. BURMESE KYAT; 150 KYAT=US$1 BLACK MARKET
100 KYAT=US$1 SEMI-OFFICIAL
6 KYAT=US$1 OFFICIAL
MOA: MIRROR OF ARAKAN
NATION: THE NATION (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
NLM: NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR (DAILY STATE-RUN NEWSPAPER, RANGOON)
S.C.B.:SOC.CULTURE.BURMA NEWSGROUP
S.C.T.:SOC.CULTURE.THAI NEWSGROUP
SEASIA-L: S.E.ASIA BITNET MAILING LIST
SLORC: STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COMMITTEE
USG: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
XNA: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
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