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ABSDF Declaration 18-12-94



ABSDF: EMERGENCY DECLARATION
December 17, 1994
 
 
EMERGENCY DECLARATION OF ABSDF
 
1.0  Tactics of a Regime
 
1.1  The State Law and Order Restoration Council officially announced on
28 April 1992 itFs unilateral suspension of military offensives in Karen
State for the sake of tnational reconciliation and unityv.
 
1.2  Since 9 January 1993 the unelected military regime has been
convening a national convention to draft a new constitution with the
majority of the delegates being hand-picked by the junta.
 
1.3  SLORC has intensified its military, economic and political pressure
for ceasefire negotiations with all armed ethnic groups.
 
1.4  In September and October 1994, junta leaders met briefly with Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi.
 
2.0  Observations of a Regime
 
2.1  SLORC seems to have changed its tone in order to solve the major
political issues -- namely, the long-awaited and overdue restoration of
democracy, the respect for human rights and guarantees for the equal
rights of ethnic minorities -- by genuine political means.
 
2.2  SLORC has been waging a systematic attempt at prolonging the
military dictatorial rule it inherited from Ne Win six years ago, by a facade
of compromise and political reform.
 
3.0  Reality of a Regime
 
3.1  On Law and Order.  Until now, true access to multi-party democracy,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and
individual fundamental democratic rights has been unquestionably denied
by SLORC to all citizens of Burma.
 
3.2  On Human Rights.  During the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Bangkok at the end of July 1994, SLORC
Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw stated that tFor us, we donFt think we have
any human rights problems [in Burma]v while unprovoked SLORC
military troops attacked and decimated a village of 6,000 innocent civilian
refugees of Halockhani Camp along the Thai-Burma border, forcing them
to flee before burning their homes and possessions.
 
3.3  On Constitution.  SLORC's tnational conventionv lacks free
discussion, debate, or ideas, international observers noticed when invited to
the proceedings -- which was even supported by comments of the various
delegates. Daniel Aung, an elected MP for the Lahu National Development
Party and Presidium member of the tnational conventionv addressed the
constitutional seminar held in Manerplaw in October 1994 and expressed
his real views for the first time since he served on the national convention.
 
3.4  On Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.  Although SLORC has met with Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi right before the UN General Assembly convened, the
Nobel Laureate has not been released. Nor has there been any official
announcement on how solutions to long-standing political problems raised
by her and others will be sought. Her calls for a pan-opposition dialogue
with SLORC remain unanswered.
 
3.5  On Ceasefire Agreements.  Day-to-day dissatisfaction is heard from
ethnic groups that have signed ceasefire agreements with SLORC.
Promises of political compromise, economic development and even basic
rice supplies from the military regime have never been met. The situation
of the people is worsening in these areas, as in the rest of Burma,
increasing overall discontent and misery.
 
3.6  On Unity.  The significant evidence of this real situation of the people
was uncovered when the powerful Peace Democratic Front was recently
formed. The United Wa State Party, which signed the very first ceasefire
agreement with SLORC in 1989, took the leading role in PDF.
 
3.7  On Power.  Even under such a situation SLORC can no longer conceal
its insincere aims, following the resumption of major military offensives in
Karen State. The junta has broken its vow in front of the world to halt any
military offensive for the sake of internal peace, and shown its true colours
to all, which SLORC has never been able to wash away despite all the
propaganda, all the promises; all the lies. The military regime has seen a
chance to capitalise on the temporary difficulties of the various groups,
even as it has capitalised on the difficulties of the people, natural resources
and suffering of the country.
 
4.0  Religious Events in KNU-Controlled Area
 
4.1  We, as part of the democratic forces and armed ethnic groups, have
openly and strongly stated our belief of the right to freedom of religion and
belief as a part of democratic rights.
 
4.2  But religious customs and traditions have been particularly difficult to
practice for decades, especially under the successive military regimes in
Burma. The persecution of SLORC in its bid to dominate and prolong that
domination has authorised the dismantling mosques, burned down
churches and even disrobed and imprisoned monks. In Karen State, for
example, SLORC troops have conscripted Christians as porters, sparing
Buddhists, thereby causing tensions between  religious communities.
Religious persecution remains one of the military regime's favourite divide
and rule tactics to destroy the community, and to divide its citizens.
 
4.3  Religious differences and mutual tolerance can be difficult in any
country; but mistrust and misunderstanding in an unfree society are easy to
manipulate and exacerbate by a ruling power which has monopolized all
media and isolated various peoples.
 
4.4  We need mutual understanding, tolerance and open-mindedness when
dealing with people who follow other customs and traditions than our own.
We must learn to respect these practices, even as we would respect the
different ideas from one another on politics, etc. And we firmly believe that
people in Burma share this respect for mutual tolerance and understanding.
 
4.5  However, a situation between Buddhist and Christian Karens
developed recently which was more due to misunderstanding and lack of
communication than serious or permanent discord. After mediation and
discussion by the concerned organisation and the DAB, the situation was
defused and the two parties came to a truce for the dispute which had
arisen.
 
4.6  It was at this time that SLORC attempted to capitalise on and exploit
for military purposes the religious situation of the Karens, one of the
staunchest anti-ceasefire groups. Apparently, persons in the employ of the
military regime have been agitating religious tensions. When the true facts
were revealed, all sides came to the conclusion they had been manipulated
by SLORC and worked together.
 
4.7  But by this time, Karen forces had already begun repositioning
themselves around Manerplaw, which inadvertently weakened the ABSDF
frontline and leaving the Student Army the lone defenders of the Dawn
Gwin area for a short time -- in which the SLORC seized hold of.
 
5.0  Military and Propaganda Attack
 
5.1  SLORC took hilltop positions and fired artillery shells into
Manerplaw, Headquarters of the KNU and Thu Mue Hta, at the confluence
of the Salween and Moei Rivers, the place where religious
misunderstanding started.
 
5.2  On 9 December SLORC troops occupied Mae Nyaw Khei outpost
located on a local hilltop. The military regime distributed false and
exaggerated information, as is the junta's practice to hoodwink the public
and their own troops, that the KNU was "at war with itself" between
Christian and Buddhist factions.
 
5.3  Further playing on this misinformation, SLORC troops made rumours
to local Buddhists living in nearby villages and towns in the KNU-
controlled area about the nearby situation; meanwhile, at the very same
time, SLORC troops launched a major offensive in KNU territory in order
to over-run Manerplaw in the general confusion.
 
6.0  Defence of Dawn Gwin
 
6.1  Dawn Gwin is the Central Headquarters of ABSDF, located in Karen-
controlled area 30 km east of Papun and 60 km north of Manerplaw. A
bastion of democracy that threatens the SLORC regime with its very ideas,
not to mention its political means. No less than two dozen groups of the
democratic opposition, ethnic minorities and special interests are located in
the entire Dawn Gwin-Manerplaw area.
 
6.2  While Dawn Gwin had been experiencing a slight problems with
communications due to the temporary confusion within the KNU, SLORC
took advantage of these circumstances and started launching an offensive
against the ABSDF Student Army on 8 December. Student Army fearlessly
defend SLORC troops.
 
6.3  On 13 and 14 December fighting took place between the Student Army
and SLORC troops near Lae Toe, located between Papun and Dawn Gwin.
On the latter date, unable to hold any territorial victory, SLORC troops
razed the regimental headquarters and kitchen buildings of ABSDFFs
216th Regiment and nearby offices of NLD Central Command on a plain
in the region.
 
6.4  The Student Army cut off the SLORC armyFs reinforcements from the
rear, forcing the aggressors to be faced with a shortage of food supplies. As
SLORC troops could no longer occupy these camps for any longer than just
that night, they retreated the following day from the area. These
developments are likely to prompt SLORC to obtain necessities such as
food from Thailand.
 
6.5  Major clashes have been intensifying between the Student Army and
SLORC troops between the area located east of Papun and west of Dawn
Gwin.  Examining the experiences of past events along the border area,
ABSDF now believes that SLORC will reorganise and reinforce its troops
in order to launch a full-scale attack on Dawn Gwin in order to occupy the
ABSDF Central Headquarters, and further threatening Manerplaw, the
KNU and all democratic opposition forces located there, in an effort to
crush the Spirit of 8888 and those who stand up against the brutality and
illegitimacy of SLORCFs enforced rule.
 
7.0  Position of ABSDF
 
7.1  The All Burma StudentsF Democratic Front does not believe that
SLORC has been honest in its attempts to implement national
reconciliation and unity throughout Burma. Nor is it apparent that the
military regime desires to restore internal peace and authentic democracy
for all peoples.
 
7.2  Current events concretely reveal the cunning tactics of SLORC in
dealing with the citizens of the country, and the international community.
It is unfortunate that, time and time again, the junta has been given the
good-will and benefit of doubt from the world, and time and time again has
seen such unscrupulous incidents too numerous to individually and in their
entirety name here, such as the unfounded attack on innocent refugees and
the constant breaking of promises that SLORC is working for tnational
reconciliation and unityv through unmet ceasefire agreements.
 
7.3  SLORCFs calls for peace were to distract the view from their real
situation; unsolved problems at home with the economy and political
rights. Using the aforementioned tactics the military regime employs,
solutions will not be forthcoming, because their real aim is to prolong the
military dictatorship by any and all means  -- including the destruction of
all peoples, democratic opposition, political freedom, human rights and
natural resources.
 
7.4  This was shown in the SLORC pressures on Mons to sign an unfair
ceasefire agreement and the attack on Halockhani. Now the true
programme of the junta is known in Karen State; lopsided negotiating table
versus lasting military pressure. This method doesnFt solve conflicts, it
creates and continues them and thus under SLORC there can be no
headway made in the questions that plague Burma's unique situation.
 
7.5  In light of these facts, ABSDF declares that, no matter what barriers
exist or have existed these years, our members whole-heartedly pledge that
the Front will continuously fight for the sunset of the military dictatorial
regime in any ways possible. We promise to do our best to eliminate the
dark influence of the State Law and Order Restoration Council on our
homeland and peoples, and to work towards a universal realisation of the
shining goals set out in the Spirit of 8888.
 
Central Committee
ABSDF
Central Headquarters, Dawn Gwin
17 December 1994
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