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THE UN ENGAGEMENTS TO BURMA
Received: by pilot.physics.adelaide.edu.au (5.61+IDA+MU/UA-5.23)id AA24740; Fri, 9 Dec 1994 14:58:25 +1030
To : reg.burma-list subscribers, & HRNet
Date: December 10, 1994.
Note: Please do not repost following paper to other public networks.
The author wish to thank, especially activists from HRNet, for
their attention to Burma matters.
There are possiblilty of the international business community's
renewed interests in Burma and a prospect of going into Burma, as the
political tensions eased in there. It still unclear of what kind of
concession will be resulting after this UNGA. However, it will be
important to inform the business community not to obstruct the
process of political transformation in Burma, and especially not to
provide SLORC with a large financial sums. The worst possible thing
the business community could do is to lobby on behalf of SLORC for
international legitimacy - like the Miriam Marshall Associated
International had done in July 1994.
It may be the case that some business community wish to setfoot in
Burma for now as they may need time to study the situation in Burma.
In this case the democratic forces may need to explain the legal
status of SLORC to the private companies, and not to settle in Burma
confidently. We would need to do more works on this.
Following document is a proposed guideline for UN Agencies and
the NGOs operating in Burma. It was written in April 1994 and
submitted to UNHCR and UNDHA for their operation in Arakan State
where the Rohingya refugees were repatriating. It may become relevent
for the whole Burma in near future. Thank you for your attention
to this matter.
With Best Regards, U Ne Oo.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
An Operational Guideline Proposal for the United Nations'
Agencies in Myanmar
{{ by} Dr U Ne Oo, B.Sc., M. Sc.(Rangoon), Ph.D.(Adelaide)}
26 April 1994
This paper is submitted to the offices of UN
High Commissioner for Refugees and UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs}
Table of Contents
----------------- Page No.
I. The Peace Keeping Role for the United Nations ............... 1.
II. The Objectives ..... ....................................... 2.
III. Local Support ............................................. 3.
IV. External Support ........................................... 4.
V. Maintaining Pressure ........................................ 4.
VI. Choice of Project ...........................................6.
VII. Foreign Currency Exchange ................................. 7.
VIII. To avoid the UN of being used as SLORC's propaganda....... 7.
IX. Reception Committee ........................................ 8.
X. Operational Procedure for Reception Committee ............... 8.
XI. Towards Smooth Operations................................... 9.
*************************************************************************
An Operational Guideline Proposal
for the United Nations' Agencies in Myanmar
============================================
Dr U Ne Oo, Adelaide Australia
In October 1993, The Government of Union of Myanmar and UNHCR signed
a Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) for the safe repatriation of
Burma-Rohingya Refugees. The MOU stipulates that the UNHCR will have
un-restricted access to the returnees and the repatriation process will
be carried out in two phases: movement phase and reintegration phase.
In carrying out the latter phase, the UNHCR together with other UN
Agencies will be contacting Myanmar government departments and local
communities. Outlined are the suggestions for a guideline that may be
undertaken by the UN Agencies in contacting the people of Myanmar.
The guideline should be constructed in order to make a smooth
contact and operation for the UN staff-members. A smooth operation of
UN Agencies will help the Burma-Rohingya refugees reintegrated into the
local communities successfully. The operational guideline for UN Agencies
must be set in accordance with the recommendations of Commission
on Human Rights. This will enable the UN Agencies promoting human rights
within Burmese populace; the UN is performing as a catalyst to the
political transformations in Burma and help the reconciliations between
the military and civilian populations.
I. The Peace Keeping role for the United Nations
------------------------------------------------
Since April 1992 leadership changes in the State Law and Order Restoration
Council(SLORC), there are increasing signs of SLORC's willingness to
cooperate in peace building in Myanmar. The seriousness of violent
oppressions in 1988 August/September as well as that of election
crackdowns in 1990-91 in comparison with present day situations
in Myanmar suggests that all parties who are the main contenders for power
are willing to solve their political problems in a peaceful environment.
The political situation in Burma at present can be described as
{\em near post-conflict} [1]. Since the military authorities still
refuse to relinquish state power - partly due to the military's fear
of retributions from the civilian populations, and place the entire
populace under the oppressive measures, there are remaining tensions
between military and civilian population. It is therefore necessary
for the UN and international community to help ease the political
tensions and help reconciliations between the army and civilian populations.
Although SLORC complied with the UN's decision regarding with the
Rohingya refugees, the main causes of political problems for Burma are
still left un-resolved. Nearly half-million refugees have fled to
Thailand to escape the persecution by SLORC. There is no promise of
SLORC transfer of power to the elected civilian government and
no meaningful dialogue has taken place between SLORC and the opposition.
These facts, therefore, suggest that the pressure on SLORC must be
maintained for further concessions. A balanced approach should
be taken in pressuring SLORC for further concessions and providing
aid and assistance to built an orderly society for Burmese people.
A strategy must be planned so that the aid and assistance from the
international community benefits Burmese populace and not SLORC.
To this date, the international community have tried two notably
different approachs regarding Burma's crisis: the policy of
`constructive engagement' and that of `total isolations' [2].
Whilst many branded the `constructive engagement policy' a failure,
some others argued that the `policy of total isolations' isn't
guaranteeing an emergence of a new political order. Suggestions have
been made here that the fusion of two different policies be
applied to Burma.
II. The Objectives
------------------
By means of MOU, the UN and international community will have
the access to the Burma's grass-roots for the first time since 1962.
Although the access, for the time being, is limited to the Arakan
State, the UN will nevertheless have an opportunity to exercise
as `an expanded peace keeper's role' in Burma [1]. Followings is
setting out of the objectives which to be attained by undertaking
the guideline.
Over three decades, Burma has been ruled by highly authoritarian
regimes. The general population has little or no chance to participate
in the decision-making process in country's affair and development
issues in particular. The government departments usually implement
policies which are of little or no relevance to the requirements of
the people. This paper seeks to find ways to break this
authoritarian tradition in Burma.
SLORC is considered as illegitimate, especially, by Human Rights
Organizations, NGOs and the oppositions. The United Nations General
Assembly(UNGA) and the Commission on Human Rights in their resolutions
throughout 1991/92/93/94 reiterate that the only legitimate body
to govern Myanmar is the elected representatives of May 1990 election;
implying that SLORC is illegitimate.
The UNHCR and other UN Agencies faces dilemma whether they will get
involved with SLORC which, according to UNGA, an illegitimate one,
or wait until such time as a new government can be formed.
Since SLORC will not tolerate the UN to make direct contact with
elected representatives, the UN Agencies have difficulties to fulfill
the requirements of Commission on Human Rights and that of UNGA.
This paper find a solution to this problem, enabling the UN agencies
promote human rights at the same time help improving humanitarian
situation in Myanmar.
There are concerns that the possible misuse of aid monies and materials
by the military government. There were numerous incidences that the
military rank-and-file abused aid monies during BSPP era. There are
also fear that aid monies may indirectly be channeled to the use of
armed forces. The unrealistic exchange rate set by Myanmar Government
suggest that the larger proportion of foreign currency intended for the
development projects will fall into Government's coffers. These concerns
are undoubtedly important and therefore the UN agencies should not
overlook these issues. This paper seeks a guarantee to the aid monies
and materials reach the people of Myanmar.
The UN involvement in Burma is considered as an important political
issue for all the contenders for power. The SLORC will seize
the UN presence in Burma as opportunity to further its own propaganda.
This paper finds ways to minimize the UN involvement being used as
a propaganda by SLORC.
Following pro-democracy uprisings throughout Myanmar in 1988,
the division between law enforcement agencies, especially the armed
forces, and civilian population have widened. The people of Arakan are
of no exception. From various facts being gathered suggest, however,
that the both sides, the army and civilians, do not wish to repeat
the violence of 1988. The presence of United Nations Agencies may help
to reconciliate the army and civilians, and ease the political
tension between them. The process of reconciliation and confidence
buildings for the army and civilians can be conducted with
UN initiatives.
The objectives outlined above as well as the expectations of UN as
the savior to Burma may seem extravagant. However, these objectives
can be achieved provided that the cooperations from the local populace
to UN is good. The analysis shown here that there is a special role
for the UN in rebuilding democratic Burma.
III. Local Support
------------------
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN have been involving in in-country
peace buildings and increasingly taking part in the peace keeper's role
in what usually was considered as internal conflicts throughout
the world [1]. In spite of those experiences, it should be stressed
that the role of UN in Burma as peace keeper can be rather unique.
Firstly, the type of conflict in Burma is the one between a military
regime and political movements [ft-1]. Therefore, a non-military
human rights observer mission is considered sufficient to deter
serious human rights abuses [4]. Secondly, unlike any other post-conflict
situations, there has already been a legitimate governing body,
in form of elected representatives, that acceptable to populace is
ready to take over state power. Other factors favoring the success to
the UN mission is the criminal justice system, though subordinate
to military tribunals and not independent, still somewhat intact
in Burma [6]. The important questions have been (1) how much cooperation
from the local population to the UN mission and (2) how can the UN
pose its influence on disputing parties engaging the internal conflicts.
Regarding with the local supports, there is a definite possibility
of enthusiastic cooperations arising from Burmese population once
UN settled in Burma. This is partly due to the general awareness
about UN among the population. Burmese people use to be very proud
about the late UN Secretary-General U Thant - a Burmese national who, he,
is able to serve the UN and international community. Furthermore,
the operations of UNDP and UNICEF in Burma for number of years
have heightened the awareness about UN within the grass-roots
communities. Therefore, the acceptance from local communities
will be positive.
The UN may found a more enthusiastic cooperations from the educated,
especially civil servants and students, since the history of UN
was taught at schools as early as year four. Such awareness is also
possible among military personnels, especially soldiers and
younger officers.
The UN influence over top military leaders has also been reflected
in the recent cooperations. The visit of Ms Sadako Ogata in July 1993
was well received and publicized throughout government media.
The visit by professor Yokota was accepted despite initial refusals and
given a great publicity. Present agreement about Rohingya can be seen as
a result solely due to the SLORC's compliance to the UN. Though the ASEAN
persuasion was valuable in this matter, it is clear that the SLORC's
intention was to ease its tension with the UN [ft-2].
In sum, the local support to the UN mission will be good in Burma.
It is certain that the oppositions as well as military personnel
including top leaders will be taking seriously about the suggestions
and opinions from the UN.
IV. External Support
--------------------
Although the UN is quite certain to have the moral authority on the
leadership of SLORC, it is necessary to make arrangements to ensure
that Myanmar Government complies the UN. Problems are expected to arise
when UN humanitarian and development operations are effectively
marginalizing the present local administration LORC (Law and Order
Restoration Council). In this situation, the LORC and SLORC may
seek ways to intervene the UN operations: hindering the projects with
the excuse of security reasons, or hostility shown towards
those who involved in the projects. On the other hand, the members of
LORC/SLORC at the personal level will not be open-minded about
the success or the popularity of the UN projects (see also IX).
Furthermore, the LORC/SLORC's perceptions of governing a country is
rather limited. Therefore, not only educations but also means of
exerting pressure on Myanmar Government are necessary to attain
better human rights standard and economic well-beings of the general
population.
In particular, the problems will arise when the UN mission try to
improve human rights standards. Whenever the enforcement is made
towards improvements of human rights standards, viz. to revoke
a particular repressive law or to establish independent judiciary,
the frictions with LORC/SLORC should always be expected.
One such measures to ensure the UN authority and influence had
already been suggested [4]: the returnees are considered stateless
and are subjected to the UN protections until the new government
is formed. However, the most essential factor in this regards
will be the attentions and concerted efforts by the international
community towards improvements of human rights and humanitarian
situation in Burma. The social reform induced through refugees
will be rather delicate process but is achievable.
V. Maintaining pressure
-----------------------
A concern shared among Burma pro-democracy groups is the possibility
of SLORC reconsolidating power as the aid resumed. There are reasons
supporting this concern: the old-BSPP style administration with the
support of military power structure is still in placed, the democratic
forces are still unable to rule Burma, and no democratic institutions
are in place. Following are the suggestions for the strategies to prevent
the SLORC(i.e. military) from reconsolidating power.
In order to formulate such strategy, we need to look at the structure
of power as well as the process of maintaining power of the military
regime prior to SLORC. We then determine the type of administration
in Burma at present followed by the suggestions regarding with methods
to prevent the military from power consolidations.
Since 1962, the time General Ne Win took over state power, the military
have been replacing the civilian administrators by ex-military officers.
By mid-1970, the ex-military personnels are well placed within all
government departments. The incompetence and corruptions of those
officers were largely responsible for the political and economic
decays in Burma. The details of how Gen. Ne Win's military dictatorship
had consolidated and maintained state power is given in the
literature [5]. The connection between Gen. Ne Win's military
regime and the BSPP-the political front of the regime- is described as:
``.... [I]n additions to Ne Win's system of punishment and
control, as mentioned above, his system of rewards has also
contributed to the decay of all institutions within the polity.
Positions, ranks, and offices in the military, the state
apparatuses, party bureaucracies, administrative bodies, and
especially those in statal agencies which monopolized all forms
of economic and commercial activities, have been patrimonialized.
Positions and promotions within the military were no longer
tied to merit but became rewards for those loyal to Ne Win.
Additionally, even those military officers who had been purged
or retired were cared for. They were usually given in positions
in the BSPP, or in the various administrative people's councils,
and those demoted from the party positions and administrative
posts were, in turn, given jobs in various state corporations,
boards, ventures and projects, and in cooperatives, people's
stores, and so forth. All functional bodies within the
government-party-administrative super structure of the state
were transformed into the {\em Tatmadaw's} private domain,
serving as a source of rewards and privileges, and, as well,
as a social security safety net for a special class of men,
the military {\em Ahmudan}(i.e., soldiers). Consequently,
these functional bodies no longer functioned the way such
bodies are intended, but became, instead, modern version of
medieval fiefdoms and grants. Furthermore, the monopolization
of all plum posts undermine the morale and efficiency of
the non-military party members and the whole civil service
establishment, and transformed them into do-nothing
errand-boys. '' {pp. 148}}
The consequences of the monopolization of above mentioned `government
super structure'(hereafter referred as BSPP regime) by the military
have been disastrous: the military itself became a corrupt institution.
Furthermore, in the absence of any viable state economic supports,
the BSPP regime relied upon foreign assistance and development aid. Thus,
the BSPP regime's longevity was much attributed to this foreign aid,
as the researcher has concluded:
``.....[A] brief mention must here be made of the contribution
of foreign governments and international donors to the longevity
of Ne Win's {\em Tatmadaw} dictatorship. The actual assistance..
................................................................
................ The figure given does not include the invisible
diversion of funds to the military: for example, the budget
allocated to the Home Ministry for internal security and
narcotic suppression, or the BSPP's expenditures, and indirect
subsidies to the military in salaries and benefits to the military
personnel (active and retired)...........................
................................................................
..... Therefore, in a situation where independent auditing and
institutionalized checks on spending are non-existent,
it would not be unreasonable to conclude that only a tiny
portion of the budget is actually spent for strictly non-military
purposes. '' {pp. 160}
The SLORC as military regime in Burma together with old-BSPP and
ex-military administrators are still in their former positions at present.
Therefore, if development or humanitarian aid go through the central
government (i.e. SLORC), this will simply help the military to consolidate
power.
It is, perhaps, that Burma Army by itself cannot pose a political
threat to the democratization process. However, the wielding of power
by the combination of SLORC as the Army's conservative faction and
the old-BSPP administration must be viewed as the true enemy of
democratization in Burma. Therefore, the old-BSPP administration must
be marginalized from the state's affairs in order to weaken SLORC and
to pave the way for the democratic forces to consolidate power.
In conclusion, the strategy to prevent the military from reconsolidation
are (1) the financial assistance must not go through the central
government(SLORC) and (2) the LORC/SLORC must be marginalized from
the state and administrative affairs.
The first strategy was proved to be successful to some extent.
Although the comprehensive economic sanctions on Burma had not been
carried out, the withdrawal of assistance by major donor countries
seem to have an impact on the military government's `super structure'.
The limited sanctions applied to Burma were still unable to dismantle
this `super structure' completely, nevertheless being able to break
back-bone and cause paralyze. Therefore, the international community should
maintain this pressure and continue to suspend development aid until
an acceptable governing body is formed. The UN should, however, resume
humanitarian and small scale development aid to the areas where the
UN Agencies can oversee the process. The Arakan State is an example.
The process of marginalizing the old-BSPP administrators from the
UN operations can be realized by way of UN Agencies following the
recommendations of Commission on Human Rights. In the following sections,
I outlined the structure and operational procedures of the
{\em Reception Committee} which is to serve that purpose.
VI. Choice of Project
---------------------
Burma is poor by world's standard. However, it must be emphasized
that the social reforms and improvements to the livings of grass-roots
will not occur by simply pouring resources into Burma. Similarly,
it is unlikely that a democratic reform will occur by simply applying
pressure upon SLORC. Present day Burmese people's needs are not only
of resources but also the guidance for democratic reform as well as
effective management for the developments. Therefore, within the
context of improving the humanitarian situation, the UN should provide
aid to Burma in balance with the progress made towards improvement
of human rights situation in Burma. For starters, the small scale
humanitarian projects would be sufficient. When the UN operation
is running smoothly, the projects are to be extended to larger scales.
Following are not comprehensive but the type of project that can be
implemented at present in Burma.
Educational Projects: Because of Burma's long term isolations,
the UN mission must give priority in educating
Burmese people about human rights, democracy and free market economy.
This will also help UN mission to promote the awareness and create
opportunity to explain the UN mission's objectives to the grass-roots.
The educational campaign can be directed towards not only to the
residents of Arakan but people throughout Burma. The participations
by military personnel in the educational campaign should also be
encouraged. Following are some examples:
1. Health educations for medical professions/ general population.
Retraining of medical personnels, HIV/ AIDS educations,..etc.
(see also in ref [3])
2. Human resource trainings for government bureaucracies and
civil administrations. At present, there are a great many
inefficiency in government departments due to the decay suffered
in last 3-decades. An enormous task may have to be carried out
regarding retraining civil servants adaptable to the free
market economy: Taxations, banking etc.
Small-scale Health Assistance: There is acute shortage of medicine
in hospitals throughout Burma (all are
public hospitals). At this stage, the medicines and equipments can be
supplied to the hospitals within Arakan State. UN can also make
initiatives to set up dispensarys in the villages. The doctors
do not usually want to go to villages. But UN can arrange the mobile -
services to these villages.
Emergency Food Supply: There can be shortage in the supplies of staple
food(rice) in northern Arakan because the number
of refugee return has been large for the local populations. The local
farmers cannot keep their own produce for family, but the food-stocks
were said to have been confiscated by LORC and stored in granaries,
and delivered as rations on daily basis [ft-3]. The time refugees
return is the beginning of the rainy season (February- May) and well
over the harvest time. It may therefore needs the emergency rice
supplies for the refugees and local populations.
Small-scale Development Projects: Once the UN settled in the Arakan
State and proper connection with the local
population is made, some small development projects can be carried out.
For example:
1. Assistance for the crop productions, i.e providing fertilizers,
seeds, and other technical assistances.
2. Creating new agricultural land for small land-owners.
3. Building of new roads.
VII. Foreign Currency Exchange
------------------------------
One major problem for the UN operation will be exchanging the
foreign currency for local one. This problem had been addressed
by the NGOs in 1993 and some suggestions were already made to
overcome the difficulties [3]. The Government's exchange rate
is US \$ 1.0 = 5.8 kyats whilst the black-market rate is about
US \$ 1.0 = 100 kyats. This unrealistic exchange rate has been
major concern to all NGOs and pro-democracy groups since most of
the monies intended for the development would fall into the
government's hand. Since the government looks incapable to solve
the exchange rate problem, the situation is unlikely to change in
near future. In order to get around the problem, the UN can do the
following:
1. Try to get a special negotiated rate for the UN operations.
Although the Government do not make relaxations on this rule for
private operators, it is quite possible for the UN operations
to get the privilege as to the Government's obligations.
2. If above is impossible, the UN should choose the projects that
has little to do with local currency.
3. In case of a large amount of local currency is in need, the UN
should consider to open stores and fuel-shops to generate local
currency [ft-4].
VIII. To avoid the UN of being used as SLORC's propaganda
---------------------------------------------------------
The reporting about UN in government's media should be controlled
as follows:
1. The news items relating to UN operation within Burma must be
subjected to UN Agencies' censorship. Reports portraying the
SLORC/LORC officials involving in the UN operations may not be allowed.
Photographs of UN officials with SLORC/LORC members should not be
taken and used in the news media.
2. The visitations and inspections of projects by SLORC members
may be reported without references made to the UN Agencies.
3. The perspectives about the UN operations and projects may be
reported without references made to the SLORC/LORC.
IX. Reception Committee
-----------------------
Presently, the administration operating in Arakan State is the Law and
Order Restoration Council (LORC). The head of LORC is usually a military
commander and the members of LORC are former BSPPs who loyal to the
military regime. The members of LORC are resented by the local populace
since LORC is responsible for enforcing government's oppressive measures
upon the local population.
By means of resolutions of UNGA and the recommendations of Commission on
Human Rights, the SLORC as well as local LORC are illegitimate organizations.
The UN Agencies are therefore required to minimize contact with LORC
in order to respect the UNGA resolutions. Especially the UN Agencies
operations for the improvements of humanitarian situations, the
participation by LORC/SLORC is un-necessary and must be marginalized.
A "Reception Committee" can be formed in order to marginalize the
LORC activities within UN operations and to empower the elected
representatives for coordinating the humanitarian operations. The
"Reception Committee", under supervisions of UN task-force,
should make assessments for humanitarian needs, make decisions and
implement the project. The general structure of Reception Committee
is as follows:
1. The Reception Committee consists of government departments,
local communities and the UN task-force.
2. The government departments includes the armed forces, department of
immigration and manpower, health and educations, and agriculture, etc.
The army commander of that region should be appointed as the head of
governmental organizations [ft-5].
3. The representatives of local communities should include the elected
representatives of May 1990 election, representatives from various
political parties, other NGOs, the village head-men, local teachers
and religious leaders. The elected representative of May 1990 election
should be appointed as the leader of local communities.
4. The LORC and its members are excluded from the "Reception Committee".
X. Operational procedure for the Reception Committee
----------------------------------------------------
Assessment of project: The leader of local communities has the duty to
seek suggestion from the grass-roots of the
specific humanitarian needs: building schools, dispensaries, and
building roads etc. The suggestions and assessments must be approved
by the representatives of the grass-roots communities: for example,
the village head-men, religious leader, local teacher, etc.
These suggestions must be brought before the Reception Committee for the
decision.
Implementation of project: The Reception Committee has the duties
to decide, coordinate and implement the
projects. The UN is to provide material and technical assistance to
the project. The leader and representatives of local communities,
leader of the governmental organization and UN Staff-members are to
oversee the project implementations.
Operation of the project: Operations of humanitarian projects must
be overseen by the leader and local
representatives of the communities, related liaison officers from
respective government departments. The UN is to be informed at every
stage. This is to ensure that the aid monies and materials truely reach
to the grass-roots and benefited.
Note: Supervising the supplies of medicine and equipments to a hospital
may be done as follows: Firstly, the arrival of the materials
must be checked by the local leader and representative of the
community, and the doctor as the liaison officer from the hospital.
The frequent regular checks on the medical supplies as well as
the assurance that the local populations is the beneficiary must
be made by the above three person. The reports are also to be
checked by the UN staff-members. It may seem unnecessarily
bureaucratic, but is necessary in Burma situation. The medical
staffs can be, for example, intimidated and the medical supplies
being confiscated by the local authorities. The local medical-staffs
have to be subservient to the military authorities. On the other
hand, the public servants in Burma tend to engage in low-level
corruption and petty-pillage since the monthly salary can not
meet the ends needs.
Other Educational projects: Human resource training, public health
education, etc. are to be coordinated by the
Reception Committee.
Note: This is an area where the UN can start and move quickly.
The UN can seek help from the NGOs for particular education campaign.
There have already been initiatives from UNICEF(Myanmar) for the
participations of NGOs [3].
Evaluating the project: In order to make assessments about UN operations
and also to create effective communications with
grass-roots, the UN mission should arrange post-box for suggestions. The
members of communities should be encouraged to make suggestions as well as
complaints - especially to monitor misuse of aid materials. The human
rights concerns should also be handled.
XI. Towards smooth operation
----------------------------
Present day Burmese populace suffers almost all forms of human rights
abuses by the government. There exists serious human rights abuses,
such as those described in ref[4], as well as not extremely serious,
but giving great discomforts to the populace. This means the improvements
of human rights has to be made one step at a time. Present case of the
UN operations within the Arakan State, the staff members should
concentrate on the serious human rights abuses: extra-judicial killings,
torture, unlawful arrests and detention without trials. It is expected
that as soon as UN staff members are operating in Arakan State, the
law enforcement agencies, especially MIS and the police force, will
show restraint from committing such serious abuses.
There can be political detainees in Arakan State, including the elected
members of parliaments. This problem has to be resolved first. The UN
staff-members should approach local authorities for the release of
those political detainees. There are absence of elected members
-deceased or exiled- in some constituencies. In this case, the
UN mission should appoint a temporary representative for that constituency.
It however still early to suggest a b(y)-election for those incidences.
There will be incidences of persons been detained without trial.
In this case UN should immediately take notice of the incident,
investigate and try to resolve through mediation within local level.
The UN mission should show the attitude that it is sensitive to the
human rights abuses, but tends to solve problem locally, and will go
higher authorities if necessary.
Such attitude is not to be seen as a compromised role of the UN
on human rights standards. The issues of improvements to judicial
system and revoking the unjust rule of laws must be approached
nationally and one step at a time.
There are emergency situations that can arise. For example, the
students might stage-up a protest to the government as the UN officials
are being presence in the Arakan State. It may be better to
address the student communities not to stage up a protest [ft-6].
Should this occurs, the UN and local representatives must try to
contain this situation and solve through mediations.
There can be incidences of the Rohingya-refugees being bullied by
Rakhine local thugs. (This kind of incidences took place before).
In this case, the UN mission should solve through mediations involving
parties.
[Footnotes]
-----------
[ft-1] There nave been ethnic armed -struggle in Burma since 1947. Recents
developments, however, suggests that this armed-struggle is starting
to evolve into political one.
[ft-2] The SLORC has shown very little interest to join ASEAN.
[ft-3] This was reported last October by student groups in Arakan State.
This move seem to be the Army's attempt to control the rural
population.
[ft-4] This kind of arrangement should be made only as a last resort. Such
dealings can be an opening to abuse by the authorities.
[ft-5] The army commander may as well be the head of LORC. However, the
UN should put it in the structure as the army commander. IN much the
same way as the SLORC is illetitimate whilst the Burma Army is legal
organization.
[ft-6] It may require diligent approach to this.
References
----------
[1] Gareth Evans, "Cooperating for Peace: The global agenda for the
1990s and beyond", September 1993.
[2] Burma Action Group UK, "Burma and United Nations: A proposal for
constructive involvement", November 1992.
[3] Russell Rollason et. al, "ICVA mission to Burma report", May 1993.
[4] Burma Action(SA), February 9, 1993.
[5] Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, "Ne Win's Tatmadaw Dictatorship", M. A. Thesis,
University of British Columbia, April 1990.
[6] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "Summary Injustice: Military
Tribunals in Burma", April 1991.
Appendices
----------
`Letters': December 31, 1993; April 27, 1993.
`Action Letters': October 8, 1992; February 9, 1993.
ENDREPORT/