[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

BurmaNet News: October 30, 1994 <NA

Subject: BurmaNet News: October 30, 1994 <NARCOTICS>

************************** BurmaNet ************************** 
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
BurmaNet News: Sunday, October 30, 1994


               1    Be assured that I, and my staff, will continue
                    to use our own professional credibility, and
                    that of DEA as the premier narcotics law
                    enforcement agency in the world, to ensure
                    that your anti-narcotics efforts are
                    accurately represented...

               2    I would like to take this opportunity to
                    reiterate my deep appreciation for the
                    vigorous anti-drug trafficking policy you have

          One of the quotes above is by a former US Drug
          Enforcement Administration (DEA) chief in a letter to
          Manuel Noriega, the Panamian dictator and narcotics
          trafficker.  The other is by the former DEA chief in
          Rangoon to Burmese dictator Khin Nyunt, whose country
          produces more than half the world's heroin. Can you tell
          which is which?




     The BurmaNet News is an electronic daily newspaper
     covering Burma.  Articles from newspapers, magazines,
     wire services, newsletters and the Internet are published
     as well as original material.

     The BurmaNet News is e-mailed directly to subscribers and
     is also distributed via the soc.culture.burma,
     soc.culture.thai newsgroups and the seasia-l mailing
     list.  For a free subscription to the BurmaNet News, send
     an e-mail message to:

     Subscriptions and unsubscriptions are handled manually so
     there may be a short delay before requests are fielded. 
     Letters to the editor, comments or contributions of
     articles should be sent to the strider address as well.

     For those without e-mail, BurmaNet can be contacted by
     fax or snailmail:

          By fax: (in Thailand)
               (66) 2 234-6674
               Attention to BurmaNet, care of Burma Issues

          By snailmail: (in the United States)
               BurmaNet, care of Coban Tun
               1267 11th Avenue #3
               San Francisco, CA 94122 USA

October 30, 1994

Agents for "the premier narcotics law enforcement agency in the
world" have had trouble taking orders.  First, there was Greg
Korniloff, given 24 hours to pack his bags and get out of Burma by
then-Ambassador Burton Levin.  Korniloff's crime was refusing to
stop meeting with SLORC military officials after the Ambassador
prohibited contacts in the wake of '88 massacres.  Next was Angelo
Saladino, who took it upon himself to become SLORC's P.R. agency. 
Finally, there was Richard Horn who violated State Department
injunctions on private contacts with representatives from the Wa. 
Now Horn is suing, claiming that the State Department is soft on
drugs.  Meanwhile, the man who was DEA's chief informant in the
late 80s-early 90s accuses the agency of abandoning him after the
SLORC arrested him.  Plainly, all is not well.

In this special narcotics issue, BurmaNet examines Horn's claims
and the issue of heroin trafficking as it affects Burma and to a
lesser extent, neighboring Thailand.  Some of the pieces in this
issue have never been published before, most notably the entire
text of a secret letter to Khin Nyunt from a DEA station chief in

October 29, 1994
Washington, AFP

A former top DEA agent in Burma has sued the US government for
transferring him because his effectiveness in getting Burmese
cooperation to combat drugs ran counter to US efforts to discredit
the junta.

Richard Horn, a Drug Enforcement Administration official said in
his lawsuit that Central Intelligence Agency agents tapped his
telephone and subverted his anti-drug efforts, ultimately expelling
him from the country.

The 23-year DEA veteran, now stationed in New Orleans, Louisiana,
said his successful effort to work with the Burmese government
conflicted with the US policy of discrediting Burma's military

The generals who ran Burma have killed or imprisoned thousands of
dissidents and kept Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for six

Aung San Suu Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner, led the party
that won more than 80 per cent of the vote in 1990 and has received
significant US support for her release and recognition of her

The junta said if the United States lifts an arms embargo against
it, they will hunt down Khun Sa, the opium warlord who controls
vast areas of Burma and has recently declared himself president of
a newly independent state.

Burma produces half the heroin on the world market and about 4.4
million pounds of opium, down from about five million between 1989
and 1993, according to US figures.

Horn's suit states that the junta was making substantial progress
against Burma's heroin trade but the US State Department and the
CIA had a "political and personal agenda to thwart" anti-drug

The suit alleged that both agencies wanted to "deny Burma any
credit for its drug enforcement efforts."

The CIA station chief tapped Horn's home telephone and gave a
transcript of his conversation to Franklin Huddle, the State
Department chief of mission, in order to get ammunition to get Horn
expelled from the country, the suit stated.

The State Department refused to comment on the grounds that the
matter is pending in court.  Horn became the third American drug-
enforcement attache to be expelled from the country at the State
Department's request, according to the suit.

Huddle surreptitiously obtained and delivered a sensitive DEA
document, which he knew was signed by a DEA informant to a Burmese
government official--the equivalent of a death warrant on the
informant, the suit alleged.

Huddle told Horn that his efforts put the State Department in the
uncomfortable position of having to explain the discrepancy in its
policy, the suit alleged.

"Plaintiff was never accused of making any misrepresentation in the
letters, as they were true," the lawsuit said.  "He was criticised
only for having written the letters in the first place."

Source: US State Department, International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report
                                   1988      1991
Opium Cultivations [hectares]:     116,700   161,012
Heroin Production [mt]:            68        180
Heroin Exports [mt]:               66        175.36
Heroin Seizures [mt]:              0.09      0.14
Seizures as % of production:       0.13%     0.08%

Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse

                 700                     _
                  _                     |\|
                 |\|                    |\|
                 |\|               1.9  |\|
         471     |\|                _   |\|
          _      |\|               |\|  |\|
         |\|     |\|               |\|  |\|
         |\|     |\|               |\|  |\|
         |\|     |\|               |\|  |\|

     Individuals reporting         Individuals reporting
     heroin use in the past        heroin use in lifetime
     year (in thousands)           (in millions)

October 30, 1994

The price for one kilo of heroin as it moves from the Wa hills to
the streets of New York.

For one kilo of opium:
          In Pangsang, Burma       US$75

In a refinery in Shan State along the Thai border, the opium will
be converted into heroin.  In the refinery, ten kilos of opium will
reduce first to one kilo of morphine.  The morphine is heated
together with acetic anhydride in order bind morphine with acetic
acid molecules.  One kilo of morphine and one kilo of acetic
anhydride will yield one kilo of heroin.  The price of that kilo
(#4 grade), or 90%-95% pure:

          In Mong Ko (Shan State)    US$2,000
          In Bangkok:               US$10,000
          In New York:             US$200,000

International estimates of opium production in Burma (in tonnes):

1939      1962      87-88     88-89     90-91     92-93     93-94
>40       300-400   1200      2000      1800      2200+     2500

SLORC estimates of opium production in 88-89:  280 tons

Sources: Various, including FEER, AP, The Nation and A. McCoy's,
"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."


Memorandum                              DEA LOGO

Subject:                                Date
Myanmar Narcotics suppression           15 March, 1991

To                                      From
Maj Gen Khin Nyunt                      Angelo M. Saladino
Secretary No. 1                         DEA Country Attache

At a recent meeting, LtC Kyaw Thein pointed out to me that recent
media criticism of SLORC's anti-narcotics program has greatly
distressed Myanmar's leadership.  LtC Kyaw Thein also mentioned
that senior Myanmar officials had concluded that since the past
excellent cooperation with the US Drug Enforcement Administration
had gone unnoticed, perhaps that cooperation should be curtailed. 

I believe that many critics of Myanmar's government for reasons
based on thein own narrow political considerations have
purposedly(sic) ingnored SLORC's current efforts to build a viable
narcotics program.

I would also respectfully point out that the Government of Myanmar
can count DEA among it's staunchest supporters of it's efforts to
eradicate narcotics.  I, and my staff to great lengths to make sure
that the SLORC anti narcotics successes are given the widest
possible dissemination.  We not only advise our own Agency and
Government of the true effort of Myanmar in its war on drugs, but
we also take every opportunity to carry this message to
representatives of third countries and to members of international
organizations.  I have been pleased to note on a number of
occasions that we have been able to completely change the attitude
of foreign officials towards Myanmar by simply telling them the
truth about your efforts to fight narcotics.  Many of these foreign
officials had been mislead, by supposedly impartial outside
observers, to conclude that the SLORC's narcotics suppression
efforts were in reality nothing but a sham.

I would also like to point out that nothing would please your
outside critics and opponents more than for them to see a
deterioration in the excellent relations existing between DEA/SLORC
and the people of Myanmar.  I sincerely hope that the efforts of
critics and nay-sayers will be unrewarded in this regard.

Page 2

Many of the Myanmar anti-narcotics programs are just now beginning
to bear fruit.  As the SLORC successes in these areas continue,
even the most biased critics will be silenced and will lose

In addition, I would like to respectfully offer some ideas for your
consideration that I believe would deprive many of Myanmar's most
vocal critics of some of their most shopworn yet effective, weapons
in the campaign to discredit your narcotics program.

As part of the Border Area Development Plan, Myanmar officials are
conferring with representatives of the Kokang and Wa groups.  Based
upon these discussions and with other available data, Myanmar could
announce a baseline figure for opium production.  This figure
should be very realistic, eg in the area of 1200 to 1400 metric
tons of opium per year.  This figure would not only nearly match
the US Drug Enforcement Administration's estimate, but would also
provide an internationally acceptable basis for measuring the
SLORC's successes in eradication efforts.

Secondly, the other favorite tool continually used by critics to
discredit your efforts is the fact that Myanmar is not a signatory
to the 1988 Vienna Convention Against Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances.  Through direct observation and
discussions with Myanmar government officials, we in DEA know that
Myanmar already complies with the 1988 Convention and, in fact,
does more to combat narcotics than the Convention calls for. 
Myanma's public agreement to ratify the 1988 Convention would again
painfully wound many of Myanmar's most vociferous critics.

These two items: A realistic baseline figure in opium production
and ratification of the 1988 Vienna Convention would silence most
critics and deny them the two primary tools they have used
successfully to discredit Myanmar's anti-drug efforts.

We of DEA believe that Myanmar's anti-drug efforts are sincere,
that your narcotics suppression program is based on economic and
political realities in your country, and that your program will
become progressively more effective, if given the opportunity to
succeed and the support of the international community.  We believe
that any objective observer who studies the SLORC's existing anti
narcotics program must be positively impressed.

Be assured that I, and my staff, will continue to use our own
professional credibility, and that of DEA as the premier narcotics
law enforcement agency in the world, to ensure that your
anti-narcotics efforts are accurately represented to the world at
large, and that we will support your efforts with all the means
available to us.

May 8, 1986

This letter, while not about Burma, is evidence that at least at
one time, the DEA had no small difficulty figuring out the
difference between their allies and their enemies.  At the time
this was written, Noriega was already a major cocaine trafficker. 
Under President Bush, the United States invaded Panama to remove
Noriega from power.  He is now serving time in an American prison
for narcotics trafficking.

DEA LOGO                           U.S. Department of Justice
                                   Drug Enforcement Administration

                         Washington, DC 

General Manuel Antonio Noriega
Commander in Chief
Panama Defense Forces
Panama, Republic of Panama

Dear General Noriega:

In accordance with our conversation on April 23 of this year at the
IDEC Conference in Buenos Aires, I am pleased to send you a copy of
the statement made recently before the United States Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs by Mr. Raymond
J. McKinnon of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my deep
appreciation for the vigorous anti-drug trafficking policy you have
adopted, which is reflected in the numerous expulsions from Panama
of accused traffickers, the large seizures of cocaine and precursor
chemicals that have occurred in Panama and the eradication of
marijuana cultivation in Panamanian territory.

Regarding the question of attacking the profits accumulated by drug
traffickers, I look forward to the day when all governments develop
the means to systematically identify and seize those illegal
profits and drug trafficking starts becoming a self-defeating
enterprise.  While our respective governments currently hold
different views on the question of investigating drug related
finances, I am confident that continued study of the matter will
help us find procedures that will be beneficial to all governments.

It was a pleasure having the opportunity to visit with you
personally in Buenos Aires.


                    /signed/ John C. Lawn

18 November 1993
"US Drug Agency Assailed for Links to Burmese Generals"
by Bertil Lintner in Washington and New York

Undercover drug agents have just bought narcotics from an
unsuspecting street peddler in New York.  Within seconds, a voice
comes over the radio in a car parked nearby.  Other cars come
roaring up the block.  The peddler panics and tries to run away,
but there is nowhere to go.  The streets echo with shouts and
sirens.  An arrest is made and drugs are seized.  The US Drug
Enforcement Administration has scored another success.

At Bangkok's Don Muang airport, a West African national is boarding
a flight to Europe.  He doesn't notice the DEA agent lurking in the
background.  Acting on a tip-off, plainclothes policemen search him
and his luggage, and find two kilograms of heroin hidden in a
secret compartment in his travel bag.  Another DEA victory posted
in the war on drugs.  

Or is it?  In Washington, many policy-makers are now beginning to
question the effectiveness of sting operations like these and to
reassess the DEA's contribution to American's overall
foreign-policy agenda.  It is becoming increasingly difficult to
tell, they say, whether the covert war on drugs is really achieving
anything other than giving the agents involved a quick thrill and
perhaps a sense of satisfaction.

All agree that the DEA's operations do not come cheap.  The agency
spends millions of dollars a year in the US buying drugs from
small-time dealers in the hope of reaching bigger traffickers.  In
Thailand and other drug producing countries, the DEA is said to be
paying up to 80% of the street value of drugs confiscated by local
law enforcement agencies.   

Street seizures and drug burning ceremonies in supplier countries
have become increasingly popular methods of justifying
multi-billion dollar budgets for drug enforcement agencies.  Panama
is a good care.  On May 8, 1986, then DEA chief John Lawn sent a
laudatory message to Manuel Antonio Noriega, then commander of the
country's defence forces.  Lawn wrote that "I would like to take
this opportunity to reiterate my deep appreciation for the vigorous
anti-drug trafficking policy that you have adopted, which is
reflected in the numerous expulsions from Panama of accused
traffickers, the large seizures of cocaine and precursor chemicals
that have occurred in Panama."   

This document was subsequently buried in the US Justice
Department's files in an effort to avoid a major embarrassment. 
But now the same story seems to be repeating itself in Burma.  
Official US policy has been to condemn the ruling military junta in
Rangoon for its direct involvement with major drug trafficking
groups in the Golden Triangle regions, as well as for its gross
violations of human rights.  At the same time, however, the DEA has
been praising the junta for its "vigorous anti-drug policies". 
Predictably, a conflict has arisen between the two government
agencies involved--the DEA and the State Department.  One result of
this feud has been the disciplinary action taken against three
consecutive DEA country officers assigned to Burma. 

The first to go was Gregory Korniloff, who reportedly ignored the
orders of then US Ambassador to Burma Burton Levin to cease regular
meetings with his Burmese military counterparts.  This order was
issued after the US officially condemned the killings of
pro-democracy demonstrators in Burma in September 1988.  Korniloff
was ordered to leave Rangoon in December 1988 after making an
unsuccessful attempt to arrange an unauthorised meeting with
officials of Burma's powerful military intelligence service. 
Korniloff was said to be eager to resume normal ties with the
military leadership in Rangoon, which he claimed had made
significant headway in the war on drugs.  

In February 1989, the US Government removed Burma from a list of
countries eligible to receive US aid earmarked for combatting the
drug trade.  The stated reason was Rangoon's inability to stem the
flow of drugs coming form the Burmese sector of the Golden
Triangle.  US satellite images showed that drug production in Burma
was increasing at an alarming rate, and intelligence reports
suggested high-level official complicity in the trade.   

In July of the same year, however, a new DEA country attache called
Angelo Saladino arrived in Rangoon.  On the assumption that the
Burmese military had no imminent plans to relinquish its hold on
power, the US Embassy and by then relaxed restrictions on contacts
with the junta.  But carrying the policy a bit further, Saladino
saw fit to disagree openly with official US policies by claiming
they hindered the DEA's ability to conduct narcotics suppression
activities in Burma.  

In February 1990 a Burmese Government delegation, led by the
Foreign Ministry's Director General Ohn Gyaw, visited Washington to
lobby for resumption of US anti-narcotics assistance.  The State
Department refused to see the delegation, but the Burmese officials
had better luck with Charles Rangel, Chairman of the Committee on
Narcotics in the House of Representatives, and senior DEA
officials.  The meetings embarrassed the State Department because
the delegation included Brig Gen Tin Hla, the commander of Burma's
22nd Light Infantry Division, a unit which not only had never
participated in any anti-narcotics efforts but also had played a
major role in the 1988 massacres in Rangoon.  

To coincide with Ohn Gyaw's and Tin Hla's visit to the US, Saladino
had encouraged the Rangoon authorities to organize the first public
drug burning in Burma, according to a source close to the DEA. 
Diplomatic representatives were invited to witness the ceremony and
Saladino, together with Burma' powerful intelligence chief, Lieut
Gen Khin Nyunt, attached a great deal of importance to it.  Sources
say that Saladino had, without the US Embassy's knowledge, arranged
with the Burmese Government to use the drug burning ceremony as a
means of publicising the DEA's previously covert presence in Burma. 

What prompted the unofficial alliance between Burma's military
rulers and the DEA is a matter of conjecture.  Analysts speculate
that the former were using the narcotics issue to improve their
abysmal international reputation, while the latter wanted to
justify its presence in Burma as well as, in the words of a source
close to the DEA, to show Washington that "we're doing something." 
When the February 1990 drug burning ceremony failed to attract any
attention from the international press, intelligence chief Khin
Nyunt and the DEA orchestrated a media blitz a few months later. 
A key part of the plan was to keep the US Embassy in Rangoon in the
dark.  While Ambassador Levin--one of the junta's most outspoken
critics--was out of the country, the DEA arranged for four foreign
journalist to visit Rangoon at a time when no press visas were
issued.  While they were all experienced professionals, they were
probably unaware of the covert manoeuvring by the Burmese
intelligence agency and the DEA.

On their arrival in Rangoon, the journalists were met by officials
from Khin Nyunt's secret police who took care of them throughout
their stay.  It did not take long , however, before the US Embassy
staff found out what was happening.  Perhaps inevitably, the
differences which existed between the DEA and the State Department
surfaced in way which embarrassed all concerned.  Television
footage taken by the visiting journalists showed Chris Szymanksi,
the second ranking official at the US Embassy, and Saladino
directly contradicting each other on camera. 

While Saladino assured views the Burmese military was sincere in
its anti-narcotics drive, Szymanski pointed out that drugs were
pouring across Burma's borders in all directions and nothing
substantial was being done to stop the flow.  When Levin returned,
Saladino was reportedly called in and roundly reprimanded for
disobeying the embassy's orders. 

The controversy reached new heights in March 1991, when it was
discovered that Saladino had authored a memorandum addressed to
Khin Nyunt.  The memorandum, a copy of which has been obtained by
the Review, lists in detail the various ways Burma might try to
impress the US Government and UN agencies.  It also provided
specific suggestions on ways to "deprive many of Myanmar's
[Burma's] most vocal critics of some of their shopworn, yet
effective, weapons in the campaign to discredit [Burma's] narcotics
programme."  Finally, Saladino recommended several options to the
junta for silencing "its most vocal critics."

"Be assured," Saladino concluded, "that I, and my staff, will
continue to use our own professional credibility and that of the
DEA as the premier narcotics law enforcement agency in the world,
to ensure that your anti-narcotics efforts are accurately
represented to the world at large, and that we will support your
efforts with all the means available to us." 

It took some time before Washington discovered the memorandum. 
When noises were made, Saladino reportedly flew back to the DEA's
headquarters in the US at his own expense.  He managed to convince
his superiors that he had not, after all, actually sent the
memorandum to Khun Nyunt, State Department sources maintain.  A
compromise solution was reached: Saladino had his tour of duty in
Burma officially curtailed but was allowed to serve out his term
which only had a few more months to run.  

The DEA's participation in official drug burning ceremonies in
Burma are the cause of much of the controversy.  DEA personnel have
argued that "some drugs burnt is better than nothing," while State
Department officers have repeatedly dismissed the ceremonies as
sham public relations exercises which have not affected the flow of
drugs from the Golden Triangle. 

It is by now well known in intelligence circles that the drugs
burned on a number of occasions in northeastern Burma have actually
been bought from the traffickers by the military authorities for
the sole purpose of being publicly destroyed.  The traffickers,
mostly senior cadres of the now defunct Communist Part of Burma
(CPB), are currently accorded official status as local militia
commanders, one result of the 1989 ceasefire agreement between he
government and the former rebel forces.  

Saladino's successor as DEA country attache in Burma, Richard Horn,
arrived in Rangoon in mid-1992.  He lasted about one year before
being recalled to Washington.  Horn's undoing was a series of
unauthorised meetings with officials of the Wa wing of the former
CPB rebel army who and approached several US agencies, including
the DEA, with a drug-eradication proposal.  He is now suing the
Clinton administration for what he claims was an improper transfer.

However, there is an alternative view of Horn's dismissal.  To
improve its image internationally, the Burmese Government invited
several delegations of US politicians and former congressmen to
visit the country.  The DEA, contrary to the State Department's
wishes, played a key background role in ensuring that the visits
took place, according to State Department sources.  One of these
sources complained that the DEA, contrary to the State Department's
wishes, played a background role in ensuring tat the visits took
place, according to State Department sources.  One of these sources
complained that the DEA "Is trying to run its own foreign policy." 
One of the delegations visited Rangoon in March-April this year
and, in an official letter submitted to it, Horn continued the DEA
tradition of praising the Burmese military's anti-narcotics
efforts.  In an even more embarrassing development, several of the
visiting US politicians met some prominent Burmese drug
traffickers, who were introduced to the apparently unsuspecting
Americans as "leaders of the local nationals."  

[Photo with caption: Saladino and another DEA agent inspect a drug

[Photo with caption: A DEA agent with heroin kingpin Lo Hsing-han.]

In August 1993, Congressman Rangel--one of the Burmese Government's
most vocal supporters in the US--and a few other US politicians
were introduced to Lin Mingxian, a former CPB commander turned
government militia commander in the hills north of Kengtung.  Lin
is considered the fastest rising star in the Burmese heroin empire,
and his group is emerging as one of the most powerful drug
trafficking organisations in Burma today.   

While DEA agents in Burma have come in for particularly harsh
criticism, they are not alone.  The reputation of the entire agency
was tarnished in a recent report from the US General Accounting
Office which examined the DEA's operations in Southeast Asia and
especially in Burma.  

Dated December 1992, the report rebuked the DEA for the "poor
performance" of some of its staff in Southeast Asia, whom it said
lacked "the knowledge, skills and abilities recommended for their
positions."  The overall quality of the DEA's intelligence analysts
assigned to Southeast Asia "has declined significantly since the
late 1980s." the report concluded. 


Institute for Asian Democracy
from "Towards Democracy in Burma"

According to the US State Department's 1992 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, illicit drug production in Burma has
doubled since the SLORC took power in late 1988.  The report
estimates 60% of the world supply of opium and heroin originates in
Burma.  Most of that heroin, according to US Senate reports,
ultimately lands in the United States.  Nearly 75% of heroin
reaching North America's biggest cities comes from Burma.  Today,
there are over 200,000 heroin addicts in New York City alone.  Each
day new users are hooked at prices that are ever-cheaper for
increasingly pure heroin.  The National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA) reported a 67% rise in heroin use from 1990 to 1991.  In
1988, when the SLORC took power, an estimated 1.9 million Americans
had ever tried heroin.  With bountiful cheap supplies flooding in
from Burma, NIDA report there were one million more first time
heroin users by 1991, and even this figure is likely an

SLORC policies ensure plentiful heroin for all.  The explosion of
poppy cultivation in Burma's highlands since the generals seized
power is injecting ever more cheap heroin into America's inner
cities.  Poppies harvested in Burmese hill areas are processed to
opium by traditional methods and then refined to high quality
heroin.  Only since the 1988 SLORC takeover have chemicals needed
to refine opium to the purest grades of heroin become available in
Burma's most remote districts.  Local militia groups, formely
opposed to the government and long linked to heroin trade, now do
business freely throughout SLORC-controlled frontier zones.

There is credible evidence linking SLORC to this trade, gathered by
journalists, intelligence agencies and US Senate investigators. 
SLORC intelligence head General Khin Nyunt has publicly visited
formerly rebellious ethnic warlords in heroin-producing areas and
established strong ties with them.  Especially notable are brothers
Pheung Kya-shin and Phueng Kya fu.  They lead the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army, made up of former Communist Party of
Burma fighters, and control Burma's most important opium poppy-
growing region.  A crucial part of their cease fire with the SLORC
in 1989 was a pact to protect, promote and share profits from the
heroin trade.  According to the US State Department, "[T]he
agreement has facilitated the drug trade and limited any potential
enforcement efforts...[T]he GOB [Government of Burma] clearly
condones drug production and trafficking by ethnic groups with
which it has reached an accommodation."  The National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee Report released in July 1992 goes
further.  It states flatly: "Assisted by the Burmese government, [a
former rebel group] expanded its [heroin] operations along the
Chinese border and...along the Thai border in 1991..."

Since 1974, the Burmese government has received over $80 million
from the United States in cash and equipment earmarked for drug
interdiction and eradication efforts--including 11 airplanes and 28
helicopters to spot poppy fields and spray herbicide.  Even this
assistance was reportedly often used against rebels fighting
military rule, rather than for narcotics suppression.  Over the
past two years, US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents
accompanied senior SLORC officers on several well-publicized
missions to destroy alleged heroin refineries.  While the raids
purport to portray SLORC sincerity in combating the drug trade,
most observers dismiss them as utterly unconvincing charades. 
Burma's heroin trade is burgeoning with SLORC complicity.

While most of the heroin flows to its largest and most lucrative
market, the United States, quantities also reach Canada and Europe. 
And Western societies and not the only victims--there is
significant heroin "leakage" along smuggling routes, creating new
generations of users in places that previously saw little heroin. 
Burma itself is now reckoned to have well over 150,000 addicts. 
The capital, Rangoon, and its second city, Mandalay , are today
facing heroin epidemics.

Heroin is widely available in teashops in these cities and is even
distributed on heavily-policed university campuses without
interference.  Observers believe this trafficking involved active
army cooperation.  Students who recently fled Burma say heroin's
new and sadly ironical local name is "freedom from fear."  <Freedom
from Fear> is t also the title of Aung San Suu Kyi's best known
essay, on the courage needed to face dictatorship.

Apparently, the SLORC is promoting heroin addiction among students
to provide an easy escape from oppression's pain and humiliation--
and to divert them from struggle against military rule.  The junta
seems to sense success.  In August 1992, it announced plans to
reopen the country's universities and colleges eight months after
shutting them to quell political dissent--but only after sending
over 2,000 university teachers to "a month's refresher course in
techniques of student management and control."

Slowly, Burma's neighbors are realizing heroin's severe impact
along trafficking routes.  Thailand and Singapore both suffer an
explosion of heroin use.  Addiction is growing sharply in
Bangladesh and northeastern India.  Widespread heroin use is
spreading from Yunnan Province in southern China to population
centres further north.  At the same time, AIDS cases throughout the
region are multiplying geometrically as addicts share needles and
infect sexual partners.  The spiraling social harm--locally,
nationally, regionally, globally--is incalculable.

The SLORC's feigned interest in controlling opium production and
heroin smuggling still wins some Western allies and support from
international agencies.  The United Nations Development Program
assists the SLORC's "Border Development Program."  Moereover, the
generals receive money from the UN International Drug Control
Program--$4.54 million was allocated this year.  These
contributions help build roads into border areas that are critical
to expanding trade in drugs and logging.

Through such apparently well-intended but ultimately misguided
efforts, the international community is helping to finance Burma's
drug production and ecological destruction.  In October 1991, US
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Kenneth Quinn remarked of the UNDP-supported Border
Development Program, "Unfortunatly, the program does not include
significant law enforcement or crop eradication activities...[W]e
are concerned by the prominent role of known narcotics traffickers
in the program.

Finally, the issue of Chinese involvement in the heroin should be
highlighted.  China is now the second most important route for
heroin reaching the United States, according to the US Drug
Enforcement Administration.  The US State Department has put China
on its official "watch list" as a major drug transit country. 
Chinese officials have publicly admitted that large drug shipments
are moving across their territory.  Heroin addiction is rising
sharply there.  Congressional staffers argue that heroin could not
pass through China's heavily guarded militarized southern border
regions without official complicity.  There is also widespread
belief, stated clearly by the US Senate, that China tolerates
heroin smuggling through its territory so the SLORC can earn had
currency to buy Chinese weapons.

26 May,1994

     [Note: Marco Ban and Daniel Aung are elected members of the
     Burmese Parliament which was never allowed to meet.  They were
     also among the approximately 100 elected M.P.s who were
     appointed by SLORC to attend the National Convention.  Both
     men defected from the Convention and escaped from Burma, first
     over the border to Thailand, and then to Manerplaw, which is
     the capital of "the Liberated Zone" of Burma.] 

It is true that some SLORC military officers were directly or
indirectly involved in producing and trafficking narcotics.  We do
not say that the SLORC members like Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt, Tin
Oo, etc, are involved.  But their deputies are.  For instance, in
the Shan State, military personnel openly encouraged opium growing
and enabled its marketing for their own benefit.  We have heard
many time that they helped traffickers by providing them with
security measures to bring their goods out of Burma an d in return
they received an amount of money as a bonus.  It is known that
there are three ways for narcotics to go out of Burma.  The first
way is from various producing areas by air, by train and by car to
Rangoon and then by ship directly to Singapore.  On its return
voyage the ship is fully loaded with goods including firearms.  The
second way is from the producing areas through Mandalay by train or
by car to the Indian border.  And the third way is from the
infamous Golden Triangle to the outside world.

We have man times read news reports on seizing such and such amount
of drugs by military intelligence and police.  Such cases are just
tricks to cover up their big movements. 

Currently, we know that the Wa-controlled area is one of the
heaviest opium producers in Southeast Asia.  The official SLORC
policy is to suppress opium growing.  This, as Wa leaders see, is
a "window dressing" policy only to impress the West.  In recent
years, the SLORC regime invited a number of foreigners to observe
their demotrations of so-called opium burning ceremonies in the Wa
and Kokong areas.  We have learned that opium and opium-based
products they destroyed in front of foreigners were partly bought
but not all seized from traffickers as they said.    

At present, to produce opium-based heroin is far more easier than
some years ago because the necessary chemicals are available from

Now Wa leaders come to realize that their people are in the bondage
of opium.  So they want to free their people from Opium bondage. 
Early in 1993, an organization, known as the United Wa State
Anti-Narcotics and Development Organization (UWADO) was formed for
the purpose of eradicating opium growing in the Wa-controlled area. 
Foreigners who might be interested in this filed were also invited
and some responded.  Therefore, the SLORC proclaimed this
organization illegal and its leader U Saw lu a rebel mastermind. 
In our view the SLORC should support and even give assistance to
such agroup if they really want to eradicate narcotics.  But
anyway, the above-mentioned organization is now trying to carry out
is duties as much as possible  A head office for external relations
is opened at Manerplaw, headquarters of liberated areas of Burma. 

Anyone who is interested in opium-eradication works may make
contacts with either its headquarters in Pangwai, Wa State or its
head office in Manerplaw.  Wa leaders will warmly welcome any kind
of assistance for opium-eradication programs from abroad.  Their
top priorities are: 

     1. Eradication of opium in the Wa State.
     2. Achievement of a Wa Autonomous Region
     3. Rehabilitation and development of the Wa State.
     4. Restoration of real Democracy in Burma.

Finally, we want to urge the world whole-heartedly to please hear
the humble murmur of Burma's forty-three million.

     Yours sincerely,

               Khun Marco Ban      Daniel Aung
               MP-elect            MP-elect
               Pe-kong Township    Mongping Township
               Constituency        Constituency

October 30, 1994

The United Wa State Army fields 25,000-35,000 well armed and
experienced troops and is the second largest military force in
Burma just after the Burmese Army and before Khun Sa's Mong Tai
Army (MTA).  Unlike the MTA, the Wa have signed a cease-fire with
SLORC.  There are however, persistent reports that the Wa are
unhappy with the implementation of the cease-fire and may not be
"in the legal fold" for much longer.  If they do rejoin the war,
the military situation in northern Burma will be drastically

The following document was written by Saw Lu, a Wa who was one of
the DEA's main informants in Burma in the late 80s-early 90s. 
Eventually, the SLORC caught him and he was imprisoned and
subjected to torture, including being hung upside down and given
electric shocks.  According to the information BurmaNet has, Saw Lu
now blames the DEA for doing nothing to help him after his arrest. 
He was released from prison by the SLORC after the Wa threatened to
end the cease-fire but was not allowed to leave Lashio.  When the
Wa then threatened to send 5,000 men down to Lashio to collect him,
the SLORC relented and he is now in the Wa hills.

The Wa are making a proposal in some ways similar to that made by
Khun Sa and other warlords before him.  Khun Sa has offered to sell
his area's entire opium crop to the United States government.  The
Wa proposal differs however in that they are asking for enough
relief and development aid so that they could forego production of
opium.  They reason that aid from the US would be less expensive
and more effective than the current drug suppression efforts.  Thus
far, no American administration since this idea was first floated
(back in Nixon's day) has been receptive.

Over the past five years, opium production in Burma has
approximately doubled, with virtually all of the increased
production coming in areas controlled by groups which, like the Wa
which have signed cease-fires with SLORC.  Because the Wa are now
the largest opium producers in Burma, the State Department imposed
restrictions on contacts with DEA agents.  In particular, DEA
agents were forbidden to meet Wa leaders unless in the presence of
State Department officials.  What got Richard Horn thrown out of
Burma was unauthorized meetings in Bangkok with a senior Wa leader. 
Horn defended himself in part by claiming that the person he met
with was an ethnic Lahu rather than a Wa.  In an extremely narrow
sense, Horn was telling truth.  He was, however, economizing with
the truth insofar as the person he met with is on the Central
Committee of the United Wa State Party.

United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army


The Proposal:
We, the leadership of the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and the
United Wa State Army (UWSA) propose to anyone who might be
interested that we eradicate opium growing and stop the production
of heroin in all the territory controlled by the Wa.  This we are
willing to do.  This we are able to do.  It can be done very
quickly.  I have full authority to speak for the United Wa State
Party and the United Wa State Army which has ample power to carry
out this proposal.

The Plea:
The plea is a necessary part of the proposal.  We need food for our
people while we develop substitute crops.  Our people are already
so poor that to take away opium production without giving them food
would mean starvation.  Beyond that, we need help of every
appropriate kind to make the transition from an opium-based economy
to a new agricultural economy.

The Bondage to Opium

For thirty years the Wa have been trying to eradicate opium
growing, but instead we have become continually more dependent on
it.  Like the heroin addicts that result from the opium we grow,
we, too, are i bondage.  We are searching for help to break that

Currently, Wa area is one of the heaviest producers of opium in
Southeast Asia.  The official policy of the Burmese government is
to suppress opium growing.  This is a "window dressing" policy only
to impress the West.  In the past, the United States has even given
the Burmese aid to carryout that policy.  While, in fact, the
Burmese official encourage opium growing and enable its marketing
for their own benefit.  They take their "cut"--the major "cut."

The Wa people have been pawns int he violent, destructive games of
others.  We have been used as fighters for both the Ne Win Burma
government and in the Burma Community Party's military arm. 
Neither army was under Wa officers.  The Wa fought other people's
wars in return for food and clothes.  Finally, we have come to
realize that we were being used to kill each other off.

Ne Win though the Burma Socialist Program Party indirectly
encouraged the growing of opium while Ba Thein Tin of the Burma
Communist Party urged the Wa people to do so.

When we Wa came to understand that we were being used to kill each
other, we decided to revolt.  In April 1989 we rejected BCP
leadership and sent the leaders to China.  We made a peace
agreement with SLORC in October, 1989, not because of any sympathy
with SLORC but to preserve what we had left of our people and
homes.  We were left war weary--twenty two years war weary--
destitute and opium dependent.  We were also left with an army
large enough to control our own area and to assure a time of peace.

Since 1989 we have become a unified Wa people with Wa leaders.  For
the first time ever we can speak and act as one people.  For the
first time, we can hope to escape opium dependence.  In it is now
possible to stop opium growing in our area.


Now we want to free ourselves from slavery to an opium economy.  It
is in our interest and, we think, in the interest of the rest of
the world to stop opium growing.  This we cannot do by ourselves. 
Like the heroin addict who wants to "kick" his addiction, we need
outside help to be successful.  We have the determination, we need
the support.

First, and most immediately important, we will need food for our
people.  If we ask them to relinquish their present means of
livelihood, we will have to provide subsistence.  Our people are so
poor that they cannot risk any kind of change in agriculture unless
there is assurance that they will not starve.  Also, where they are
pressured by outsiders to grow opium, they cannot risk stopping
without protection which assures their safety.

During twenty-two years of warfare more than 12,000 Wa were killed
leaving thousands of orphans and widows and countless wounded-
disabled.  We struggle to care for these dependent people without
any outside agencies to help and with no internal care structure or

For a transition period we will have to feed our people.  We have
neither the food to give nor the money to buy it.  Food is
necessary to start the process of opium eradication and
rehabilitation of the Wa country.  Relief food is sent all over the
world from generous donor countries to starving peoples, some of
whom are currently turning back relief convoys for political
reasons.  We would not be like Bosnia.  We would welcome and
expedite the distribution of food, but we will not ask our people
to starve first in order to get it.  Food must come along with the
cessation of opium growing, not sometime afterwards.

In contrast to the usual famine relief, temporary food support for
the Wa people would do more than just feed hungry people.  Beyond
that, it would enable the destruction of the opium economy and be
the critical starting place for the recovery of the Wa people and
the development of a whole new economy.

Second, beyond subsistence, we not only want to rehabilitate our
ourea, we want to develop it.  The cultivation of opium substitute
crops is crucial.  Crop substitution has worked in Thailand.  It
can work in the Wa area.  We want the help necessary to make it

We need to diversity our agriculture.  We need improvements in seed
stock and breeding livestock.  We need to learn more productive
agricultural practices.  None of the international aid programs
that have helped other people develop their agriculture have
reached us, first due to war and now due to isolation enforced by
the Burmese.

Third, we sorely need to construct roads and to develop
infrastructure that will support a new economy.  At present there
are no paved roads in Wa area, not even any gravelled roads.  The
roads that exist are hand hews and follow pre-existing foot paths
or are strategic roads designed only to get artillery to the top of
the hill.  There are passable only during the dry season.  There
are no engineered roads designed for vehicular traffic.  Roads and
other improvements reported in the Burmese press were constructed
only in the news media.

Fourth, modern medical care is non-existent.  There are no
hospitals, not even any clinics.  We need medicines.  We need
medical treatment facilities.  We need medical training facilities. 
We need rehabilitation for our disabled and care centers for our
orphans.  We are doing what we can on our own.  We will establish
sixteen care centers for the blind and the disabled.  We have
started to level the ground for the first center.

Fifth, we need schools.  The vast majority of the Wa have no formal
education.  There are only a few informal primary schools taught by
teachers who themselves have been only to primary school.  These
have to be self supporting.  There is no educational system.  Few
children can attend a school even where there is one.  They are
needed to work to get food.  We want schools to train leaders.  We
want to make our people literate.  We also want to preserve,
develop and spread our culture, our traditions and our customs.  We
want to focus and highlight our Wa identity.  We want to give
people what is rightfully theirs but what had been shattered by
constant war.

Sixth, we need help reforest our denuded hillsides and to find what
natural resources are in our area.  We desperately need all kinds
of developmental help--grants, loans, technical advice,
agricultural aid.  We welcome it from any source.


Our political goal is to restore real democracy for all of Burma,
a democracy in which the majority rules, but equally important,
where minority rights are protected even if the minority is a
minority of one person.  We will strive for the equality of all

The democracy is not the sham "democracy" of SLORC.  Their bogus
election was a charge for the purpose of appeasing the West.  It
did not result in the transfer of power to those overwhelmingly
elected.  It did, however, identify the leaders of the political
opposition who were then systematically threatened, jailed, put
under house arrest or hunted down.  Aung San Suu Kyi, U nu and U
Tin Oo are only the most noted examples.  Others less well known
did not fare so well.

We want the restoration of Wa State within Burma.  We are not
separatists, but we want some autonomy for our people.  Under the
British and until 1962 there was a Wa State in the northeastern
corner of Burma.  After Ne Win's 1962 coup, his government redrew
the map.  Wa State just disappeared.  It was swallowed up in Shan
State.  We have historic roots in and an historic claim to the area
east of the Salween River from Ki Kang south to the Thai border. 
We want to administer the area as part of a federal union in Burma.

We are not asking for arms.  We are not asking the United States to
buy our opium crop as Khun Sa does.  We do not want to put on a
show as SLORC does for the West.  We are taking the initiative of
offering to stop opium growing.

The Wa leadership can stop the opium growing and refining at any
time, but our people must eat.

Finally, the top priorities of the United Wa State Party and United
Wa State Army are:
1. Eradication of opium in the Wa State
2. Achievement of the Wa Autonomous Region
3. Rehabilitation and development of Wa State
4. Restoration of real Democracy in Burma.

We want a better life for our people which can only begin by
breaking the bondage to an opium depenent economy.  You want a
better life or your people which means a life without heroin.  It
is to our mutual advantage to work together.  Please, accept our
proposal and respond to our plea.

                    Yours truly,
                     /signed/  Saw Lu

October 30, 1994

Thanat Phaktiphat beat the odds.  He is finally going to America. 
Thanat is not however, the winner of a Green Card lottery and his
prospects for becoming an immigrant success story are slim.  He can
look forward to a long stay though.

Thanat is a Major General attached to Thailand's Supreme Command
and he's being extradited to stand trial on charges of trafficking
Burmese heroin to the United States.  Thanat's case is unique
because he is set to become the first high ranking Thai official
ever to stand trial for heroin trafficking.  This despite the fact
that Thailand has been the largest single smuggling route for
heroin for decades.

Since the late 1950s, Golden Triangle heroin has dominated the
international and American markets, supplying over 50% of demand. 
Of that, the bulk has passed through Thailand and continues to do
so, although other trafficking routes have developed through China,
Vietnam and India.

One way to put the scale and duration of the trafficking in
perspective is this; American rocker Janis Joplin died of a heroin
overdose about a quarter of a century ago.  Nirvana lead-singer
Kurt Cobain overdosed earlier this year.  Based simply on the share
of Burmese heroin on the American market, the odds are probably
better than even that both died using Thai-trafficked Burmese
heroin.  In the quarter of a century between their deaths, the
number of major traffickers extradited from, or prosecuted in
Thailand is exactly, none.  

And Maj. Gen. Thanat unfortunately, is the very model of Thailand's
modern major generals.  He'll be the first to be prosecuted for his
involvement in drug trafficking, but he's no threat to Thailand's
unenviable record of Just Saying No to prosecution.  Thanat is
going to America only because he was foolish enough to conduct his
business in Hong Kong rather than Bangkok.  He was arrested in Hong
Kong by local police working with the much maligned American DEA.

DEA efforts in Southeast Asia have earned brickbats from a number
of quarters, including a blunt report from the U.S. General
Accounting Office ["Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma Are
not Effective" USGAO, 1989)].  The general line of criticism has
been that agents in Rangoon are in bed with SLORC while agents in
Thailand are simply in bed (asleep mostly).  There are signs
however that the agency may wakiing up.  First, and if nothing
else, the Rangoon office has been scandal-free since Richard Horn's
unceremonious ouster.  Thanat's arrest may be further evidence that
the DEA is becoming aggressive.

Bangkok has a new DEA station chief with an impressive record of
arresting American Mafia figures.  Thanat's arrest came not long
after the new station chief's arrival in Asia, although whether
this is mere coincidence is unclear.  If is coincidence, it is one
of a number of them which have plagued drug traffickers in Thailand
this year.

First, there was the public revelation of the indictment of "Thai
Tony." "Thai Tony" is, or rather was, Member of Parliament Thanong
Sirapreechapong.  Thanong was indicted in a California court for
smuggling 40 tons of marijuana to the United States.  Although the
Thai government refuses to extradite, or even investigate "Tony," 
his indictment was enough to embarrass him into a resignation. 
Thanong was only indicted for trafficking marijuana (albeit on an
impressive scale) but there is some indication that the Americans
were more concerned with his involvement in heroin.

After Thanong came further revelations from the files of the
Americans of involvement by Thai officials in narcotics
trafficking.  Next was M.P. Mongkol Suthanamanee from Chiang Rai,
whose district borders Khun Sa's territory in Burma.  Mongkol
tearfully denied the allegations and has refused to step down. 
Mongkol was refused a visa because he is believed to be part of the
drug network headed by fellow northern M.P. Narong Wongwan. 
Narong, was named Prime Minister designate of Thailand in March
1992, but lost the nomination when it was publicly revealed that
the United States had refused him a visa because of his long-
standing involvement in the drug trade.  He too is still serving as
an M.P., and as the fall from grace (but not office) of his protege
Mongkol indicates, he doesn't seem to have given up his other line
of work just yet.

But the biggest scalp the Americans took this summer belonged to
Vatana Asavahame, deputy leader of Chart Thai, the largest
opposition party.  Like Mongkol, Vatana won't be able to visit Gen.
Thanat in his American prison cell, or anywhere else in the U.S.
for that matter, because he can't get a visa.  The Americans
revealed that distinguished Vatana was turned down for a visa
because of a more than twenty year involvement in heroin
trafficking.  As with Narong, Thanong and Mongkok before him, the
Thai authorities see no reason to even investigate Vatana further.

Prasong Soonsiri, Thailand's recently replaced Foreign Minister,
claimed that the U.S. had a list of seventeen current and former
M.P.s who were on a visa blacklist.  American Drug Czar Ron Brown
has publicly denied that such a list exists and there is reason to
believe that the number of M.P.s who won't be visiting the U.S. is
much higher.  One Thai journalist has suggested that all of the
country's M.P.s take the "visa test" of applying to go to the U.S.
and thereby subjecting themselves to public scrutiny.  If they did,
it's doubtful that enough would be approved for that august body to
get a quorum.

DEA involvement in the visa troubles of Thai M.P.s has been denied,
but their hand in something else seems a bit clearer.  On July 16th
of this year, Thai authorities closed the roads leading up to Khun
Sa's territory.  Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army has been locked in a major
fight with SLORC since the beginning of this year.  It was
initially thought that the closure would end quickly but it has
not.  According to a report that BurmaNet has, the entire northern
border has been sealed and is aimed at the Wa as well as Khun Sa. 
And it seems to be the result of cooperation between the American
and Thai authorities, particularly the well-regarded Prime
Minister, Chuan Leekpai.

In response to the border closure, there are indications that
heroin trafficking is rerouting through Yunnan to the north and
also through Mae Sot and Sangklaburi on Thailand's western border. 
If the latter reports prove true, the implications are obvious. 
The territory opposite Mae Sot (Myawaddy) and near the Three
Pagodas Pass/Sangklaburi area is held by the Burmese Army.  The
only way to move significant quantities between the Shan State and
western Thailand would be through SLORC controlled areas and would
constitute further strong circumstantial evidence of involvement by
Burmese officials.

Marco Ban and Daniel Aung, among others, have accused SLORC leaders
of involvement in the heroin trade.  As in Burma, involvement by
high ranking Thai officials in the business is usually done at some
remove.  The case of Vatana Asavahame is a good illustration of how
the system works.  Vatana is closely linked to Kamnan Poh, a well
known Thai gangster.  Kamnan Poh is the person who is directly
involved with with moving the heroin and on more than a few
occasions, with having people eliminated.  Despite the high profile
nature of his crimes, Kamnan Poh remains untouchable.  He does so
because he has the patronage of influential political figures.

Vatana and other politicians linked to Kamnan Poh (most vocally the
so-called Group of 16) may never have seen heroin in their lives. 
What the politicians provide is protection from the legal system,
access to financing, the services of government agencies and
respectability.  In return, gangsters like Kamnan Poh provide large
amounts of cash for the politicians' personal use as well as that
of their political parties.

As the articles in this report show, the issue of narcotics in
Burma is intensely politicized along several, sometimes
intersecting lines.  It has created some odd bedfellows and made
hypocrites of people on both sides.  And the bad news is that the
problem is not going away.  Heroin use in the U.S. is going up, as
is the production of opium in Burma.  The heroin industry remains
deeply entrenched in Burma and Thailand.  It has financed the wars
in Shan State for three generations and it goes a long way to
explaining the systemic political corruption in Thailand.

Should an Aung San Suu Kyi government take power tomorrow, she
would find progress in the "War on Drugs" extremely difficult, at
least over the short term.  It would be years after a democratic
takeover before the central government would have the wherewithal
to destroy the poppy fields.  But until there is something at least
approximating a responsible, democratic government in Rangoon, the
clock doesn't even begin to tick.

And for the last word on Burma's narcotics problem, there is this
testimony by Thomas Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs:

     The United States has a significant interest in ending
     the flow of heroin from Burma, the world's largest
     producer of this narcotic.  We maintain narcotics
     cooperation with Burma under constant review as one
     option to ameliorate the deadly impact of Burmese heroin
     on the United States, but it is unlikely that the heroin
     trade can be curtailed without fundamental political
     change in Burma.  That is why the recent Inter-agency
     Policy Review concluded that a higher level of
     cooperation is not a reasonable prospect at this time and
     that the promoting of democracy in Burma is ultimately
     the best way to achieve our counternarcotics objectives
     as well.

(Testimony to the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee
on Asia and the Pacific.  June 29, 1994.)



 Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt.=US$1 (APPROX), 
                    6 KYAT=US$1 OFFICIAL