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Comprehensive Response (2/2)
>From : Dr U Ne Oo, Adelaide Australia
To : reg.burma-list subscribers
Date : 12 October 1994.
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*************************************************************************
A Comprehensive Response To
Burmese Refugee and Displaced People Problem
********************************************
5 October 1994
Dr U Ne Oo, Adelaide Australia
1. Burma in the Year 1993-94.
==============================
Reflecting Burma's political situation, some analysts describe the
year 1993-94 as the watershed year in Burmese politics [1]. The ruling
military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC), seems
to be adopting a more conciliatory approach towards the detained opposition
leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi [2]. In September 1993, Burmese military
claims to have adopted a republic style constitution, which is
interpreted as the military making a concession to ease tension
with the ethnic oppositions [3]. There is no increase in the level
of human rights abuses in this year, partly because SLORC had
managed to silence the oppositions effectively [4], and reports of
serious violations are rare in comparison to the periods of
August-September 1988 and the aftermath of May 1990 election.
These indications are that Burma may be at the beginning of a
"post-conflict era" in which all parties in the conflict
could resolve their problems in a peaceful environment.
However, the climate of fear continues for the general populace as the
system of repression is still being enforced; therefore
it must continue to judge the military junta as a serious violator
of human rights.
The military continues to show its willingness to hold on to power:
making efforts to hold its dominant position in government in the
event of a transfer of power to any future administrations. To secure
the leading role for the army in the future,
the military imposed guidelines in drafting the constitution [5]
and has also been desperately seeking ways to establish its political
legitimacy.
The Military Government of Myanmar(SLORC) appears to be making efforts
to improve its political stature. The military government declared
the year 1994-95 as ``All-round Development Year'' and is carrying out
various infrastructure and development projects.
It claims to have made measures to bring Burma's civil war to an end;
it is successful in negotiation with some armed ethnic rebel groups to
enter the military cease-fire. A highly publicised anti-narcotics
operation was launched in order to appease the western governments,
particularly the Government of the United States [6].
This is a move that appears to exploit the drug issue as a
legitimate avenue to enter the international stage. Attempts have
been made so as to attract the businesses and investments, in particular,
from the United States [7]. In order to improve its international image,
the military junta reportedly hired public relation personnel from
a private firm to lobby the western governments.
With regards to the human rights situation in the minority
areas, as expected, the general condition seems to be
ameliorated as a result of the military's renewed
initiatives for a cease-fire. However, a resurgence of human rights abuses
that are not necessarily related to the government's counter-insurgency
measures have occurred. The local military administration has become
more systematic in oppressing the villagers: organizing forced labour
and porterage; taking bribe and extorting money; and
confiscating properties. Although these type of abuses, normally,
are considered less serious in comparison to those which occur in
generalized violence, the cumulative effect upon the life and livelihoods
of villagers is found to be severe enough to cause the displacements.
The sincerity of military's initiatives for a cease-fire becomes questionable
as the military authorities refuse to make a political settlements with
the ethnic rebels who are struggling for the establishment of the
Federal Union of Burma. The failure to make political settlement, in fact,
is rather dubious because the military itself claims to be promoting
a republic style constitution.
As the military is preoccupied with keeping a stranglehold on state
power, the government's neglect on the welfare of normal citizens is
beginning to show its effects. The humanitarian situation within the
country continues to deteriorate and the hardships become unbearable to
normal citizens. The economic desperation, which combined with political
repression, has become another cause of displacement for the Burmese
population. Forced relocations, forced labour, extortions and
confiscation of properties in ethnic minority areas have resulted in
the outflows of refugees into neighbouring countries.
A humanitarian oriented approach to Burma's multitude of problems is
therefore necessary. The national reconciliations - minorities and
majority Burman as well as the military and civilian population - should be
given the priority. A unified approach from all fronts (i.e. the political,
human rights and humanitarian) that derives from all legitimate
concerns becomes necessary to tackle Burma's problems.
Therefore a comprehensive response to the Burma's refugee problem
should be made by the United Nations and international community.
All parties in the conflict should be encouraged to enter
negotiation in order to create an environment conducive for refugee's
voluntary return. Measures to improve the human
rights situation must be made in order to eliminate the root causes
that put the refugees to their flights. A voluntary return of refugees,
assisted and monitored by the UNHCR and international community, must
be arranged as a comprehensive response to the refugee problem.
The entire response to Burma's refugees problem must be formulated
within the framework of peace-making and aimed at a longer-term
peace-building in Burma. Outlined in this paper is the strategy to
approach it from all fronts.
2. Human Rights and Refugees [8]
================================
Since the leadership changes in April 1992, the SLORC is seen changing
its behaviour in relation to the serious human rights abuses. Certain
incremental measures have been taken to improve its human rights
records [9]. These measures include the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for the safe
repatriation of Burmese-muslim refugee from Bangladesh, also known as
Rohingyas, and release of some political prisoners [10].
SLORC also claims to have made initiatives to end the civil war with ethnic
minorities who are demanding a greater autonomy. There appears to be
some reduction in the number of serious violations of human rights,
especially those directly related to government counter-insurgency
operations, in the minority areas due to these initiatives for the cease-fire.
However, the climate of fear continues for the Burmese populace and the
minorities in particular, because the system of repression is still being
enforced by the Myanmar military government. It is observed that a
resurgence of widespread abuses, which do not necessarily relate to
the military's counter-insurgency measures, have occurred in minority
areas and are causing the displacement of the civilian population.
The nature of these abuses stem from the lack of an independent judiciary,
the weaknesses in the structure of government departments and the
authorities' inability to control corruption. In particular, the Military
government's implementation of various infrastructure
projects has led to forced labour and enslavement of villagers.
the loosening grip of central control upon the regional
military councils has resulted in a widespread pattern of corruption and
mismanagement [11]. The systematic repression by authorities that
led to the insecurity in the normal life of villagers
is producing the outflow of refugees into neighbouring countries.
2.1 Refugees in Thailand
-------------------------
As a symbol of the Myanmar military government's renewed initiatives for the
cease-fire, the Burmese army has suspended a large scale military
offensive on insurgents in minority areas. There appears to be some
amelioration of the human rights conditions, particularly the abuses
directly related to counter-insurgency measures. However, the forced
relocation scheme continues to play a key role in
the military government's counter-insurgency strategy, particularly in
Karen State [12]. Although large-scale battles with insurgents have not
occurred, there are reports of isolated skirmishes happening throughout
the year [13]. Forced relocations, forced labour and
porterage, confiscation of properties and extortion of money from villagers
are commonly reported. The following is a summary of reported abuses
within Karen and Mon States; and Tennasserim Division - all bordering
Thailand. These abuses are found to be the major root
causes of the flights of refugees into Thailand.
2.1.1 Forced relocations:
--------------------------
The Burmese Army has used the strategy of forced relocation, commonly
known as the ` four-cuts strategy' [14], in its counter-insurgency
operations since mid-1970s. Villages within the strategic area are
ordered to relocate to places near military outposts. The area is then
declared as free-fire zones in which anyone seen is considered rebel
and subjected to being shot on sight.
In 1992, the Burmese military declared a unilateral cease-fire and
suspended the large scale offensive with Karen ethnic rebels. However,
as a government counter-insurgency measure, an intensive forced
relocation campaign in Karen State was carried out instead.
As a result, a large number of villages had to move to places near
military outposts [15]. The villagers are ordered to move at short
notice with little possessions. The houses and food left behind are
destroyed by military and the compensations have never been paid to
the villagers. The restriction on the movement of
villagers has also caused disruption to their normal farming activities.
The humanitarian situation for these villagers in relocated camps were
reported to be egregious.
As of 1994, it appear that the incidences of forced relocations and
the restrictions on the movement of villagers had somewhat eased in
minority areas due to government's renewed cease-fire initiatives.
However, the military continues to relocate of villages without
compensation and exercises the right to shoot on the free-fire zones.
Deteriorating humanitarian situation in these relocated camps, i.e.
malnutrition and the lack of medical care, is causing sickness and
death to the villagers. The Karen Human Rights Group(KHRG) [16]
has reported an incident of the forced relocation, testimony given by a
refugee who fled to the Thai-Burmese border, as [17]:
"They ({\em SLORC}) also force villages to move. They forced
Tha Yet Pin and Shan Ywa villages to move to Mi Kyaun Win, and
Tha Yet Pin Seit had to move to Kyaik Maw Win. At the new places,
the villagers had to clear the bush to build houses for
themselves, and there were landmines close all around. They have
to go very far just to get water, at least 500 meters down the
hill. Now they just have to survive day by day, doing day labour
for money cutting bamboo, cutting sugarcane or cutting wood. About
400 families from my area have already fled. Everyone from small
villages has to flee to big villages, the forest, or the
refugee camps. My village has 50 houses, but when I left there
were already 200 houses there from all the smaller villages
around. Over the last 3 months very many villagers
have been sick. At least 5 or 6 adults have died of the sickness
in my village, and at least 10 children."}
The military enforced the free-fire zones by threatening to shoot and to kill
anyone seen on sight. Consequently, the displaced villagers are having
no means to support themselves in new sights. The nature as well as
extent of hardships and anxieties for the relocated populace inside Burma
are very similar to that of external refugees: threat of
persecution upon return to their normal inhabitant, difficulty to
survive in a new environment, the humiliations and indignity. One displaced
villager told her experience to KHRG as [18]:
"Major Kyaw Shwe ordered us to move. He is a commander from
38 Infantry Battalion. He said we had to move because there
had been fighting in our village, but I'm sure there was no
fighting there, only very far away. They gave us 3 days to
move out of the village and said that after that, if they
see anyone in the village they'll shoot them on sight. ...\ABR
Another villager went back and tried to sleep one night in
the old village, and the soldier captured him, tied him up
and tortured him all night. Now we face the problem of
starvation because we can't work on our farms. We
can't do any thing. We don't have enough clothes. We don't
know how to make a living in the new place, but we can't
dare go back to our old place either.
No one can resist them because everyone is afraid to die. Our
lives now are just work in the morning to eat in the evening,
surviving hand to mouth. Now I need to buy a new sarong but
I can't. We all feel deeply humiliated and small in the new
place, because we see the people from the village with
new clothes while we don't even have a change of clothes.
The village head there feel sorry for us, so whenever the
SLORC orders forced labour he gets his villagers to go
instead of us."
2.1.2 Forced Labour:
---------------------
For decades, the Burmese army have been forcibly conscripting civilians for
porter duty in counter-insurgency operations. The extensive use of forced
labour in large scale infrastructure projects have been reported only
in recent years [19]. Various ambitious development projects are
announced and carried out as public movements [20].
As sources reports, government use of forced-unpaid labour has been
widespread throughout the country in building airports, constructions of
roads and railways [21].
Reports in early April 1994 confirm the large scale use of forced
labour in construction of 110 miles rail route, know as Ye-Tavoy
railway, in Tennasserim Division in southern Burma. The villagers living
in the vicinity of this railway are ordered to clear the route,
build military encampments and make earthen embankments for
construction. Each household in the villages has to work 15 days
a month at the construction sites and fees have never been paid.
The government's practice of using forced and long-term unpaid labour
in its development projects disrupt the livelihood activities of
villagers; and the local people are being forced to abandon their
former inhabitant as life become impossible, one refugee told
the CPPSM [22]:
"We were continuously required to work in the railway
construction and we didn't even have time to do our own
jobs to survive. Again, we had to work very tiredly for
the railway. We couldn't afford to work on for the unpaid
hard job and so decided to flee away."
Local military authorities enforce the order to do unpaid labour
by threatening villagers to punish should they evade the duty.
A refugee told the military authorities punish his family members
as a result of him failing to turn up at work site [23]:
"Then the soldiers came to my house and poked my wife
in the side with a rifle butt. They kicked her hard in
the stomach, and she vomited blood. Then they kicked my
baby son down into the fire, and all the hair on his
head was burnt. They slapped my 7-year old son in the
face and he cried out. They beat them because I had escaped."
Villagers are forced to sleep at the road side without adequate shelters;
the military guarding them day and night. Working condition is inhumane
and medical attention and food for the workers have never been provided
by the authorities: conditions that one has been led to describe
only as the enslavement of the villagers. A refugee told
his experience as [24]:
"They guarded us carefully because they were worried
that someone might escape. Sometimes people tried to escape
and were caught, and the soldiers beat them up severely.
Sometimes they beat them with wood, sometimes they kicked,
sometimes they punched, until the people were bleeding
from the head, and some of them were bleeding seriously. \ABR
No one was killed by beatings, but one or two men died
from sickness and exhaustion. The soldiers never gave
any medical care. \ABR At night we just made a fire and
slept on the ground. We couldn't build a shelter because
we didn't have time, and we were in a different
place every night. We had no mats to sleep on, just the bare ground.
The soldiers were always around the whole night, guarding us closely.
We had to ask permission to go to the toilet. They didn't follow us,
but we didn't dare try to escape because there were other groups of
soldiers nearby."
The local communities has also been coerced to hire equipment from the
railways construction authorities. Both technical management and local
military authorities hired bulldozers and sell the fuel to villagers for
use in the railway construction. The CPPSM reports [25]:
"These 5 bulldozer machines, the fuel and the nails are
likely to be the only materials supported by the central
SLORC government through its local military authorities
for the construction of the railway and the local
encampments along the railway line. Whatever it has been,
it is clear that even this inconsiderable quantity of
material support of the central SLORC has already been
misappropriated by its widely corrupt and unscrupulous
local military authorities and technical management of
the railway construction for their personal benefit."
In other settings [26], the military forcibly conscripted villagers for
use in guarding roads, building military encampments and transporting
military equipments. Little information was given to the villagers
about their assignments and fees have never been paid to the porters.
Such constant harassment by military authorities brought anxiety and
further insecurity to the life of rural populace. A refugee told KHRG [27]:
"There used to be over 100 houses in my village, but
many people have run away and now there are only 10 house
left. The soldiers often ask for 10 or 20 porters
every month. One porter had to go from each house, sometimes
including many women. The SLORC also grabbed people
to be porters whenever they came to ask for money
and we couldn't pay. Sometimes I've been a porter for
1 or 2 days, sometimes for over a month. We had to carry
rice, ammunition, salt, chillies and sugar, and we also
have to carry the soldiers' clothes. I was very afraid
to them all the time."
The military authorities ensure the villagers comply the order to do
slave labour by intimidation, as one Burmese trader testified [28]:
"Once when Tha Mo village refused to go for slave labour
they sent a package to the village head with a message
that said ``You figure out what it means." When the
village head opened it he saw one red chillie, ane
bullet, and one piece of charcoal. At first no one
understood it , but then people guessed that the chillie
is very hot, so it means we have to suffer a hot situation
and a great deal of trouble, the bullet means they will
shoot us and kill us, and the charcoal means they will
burn down our village. After that, the villagers were
very afraid to refuse again."
2.1.3 Informal taxations and Extortions:
-----------------------------------------
Since the military seized state power in 1988, the administrative duties
have been carried out by the local Law and Order Restoration Council (LORC).
As the central authorities loosen its grip on power, the LORC
become increasingly powerful and the local offices become autonomous
centers for administrative affairs. Reported since 1992 are the
incidences of local commanders collecting informal taxes in an
attempt to fill government coffers [29].
Such frequent and unreasonable taxation has also contributed to the hardship
of the local population. These informal taxes were collected usually by local
LORC in the name of `porter fees',`courier fees', `educational fees',
`development fees', etc.. The excessiveness of such collections may
be clear from the fact that the villagers in those areas are normally
living on subsistence incomes. Although the `porter fees' are regularly
demanded from the public, the porters themselves have never been
paid for their work. Local military authorities seize villagers who
cannot pay porter fees or evade porter duty, and demand ransom monies.
One villager told the KHRG [30]:
"Sometimes we had to send 4 or 5 porters at a time
and sometimes 15 porters, depending on what the soldiers
are doing. We tried to hire people to go in our places.
For long-time porters it costs us 1,000 Kyat, for medium-time
porters 500 Kyat, and for short time porters 100 or 200 Kyat.
The soldiers also collect `porter fees' as often as 4 or
5 times a month. I don't know what they use that money for.
Sometimes when they enter the village they also catch
people and take them away, and we have to pay a ransom of
500 or 1,000 Kyat before they release them."
The authorities' imposition of the informal taxes, such as porter fees,
that are excessive in total amount has forced the villagers to resort
to selling their possessions and finally fleeing to the refugee camps
at the border. A refugee described his experience [31]:
"In my village I fed my children by working my field ,
but now I have no farm to work. I had to pay porter fees
so I had to sell my field. My father lived by working
the fields, and my grandmother gave me that field, but I
had to sell it to get the money. I have 3 brothers, and
my grandmother gave us one field each. We all sold our
fields at the same time, last year. We got 30,000 Kyat
altogether. Since then I had to work the fields for other
as a laborer, but only got 10 or 20 Kyat a day and all
that went to porter fees. I couldn't support my family
that way so I came here. After I sold the field I had
nothing anymore."
The military authorities ensures the payments and demands are met by
threatening villagers with punishment and, even, to force the whole village
to move. One villager told his experience [32]:
"Troops from 36 Battalion arrived at our village on
April 30, 1994. They stole 8 pots and one pig, just as
if it were their own. They steal so many things from us -
they've also ordered 1,000 shingles of leaf roofing and 20
cattle carts, and we have to send it all by May 15.
Whenever they come to the village , all the girls have
to hide away because the soldiers always give them
trouble. T--- army camp also demanded 75 tons of logs from us.
The log circumference has to be 2 feet to 4 feet, and
they must be 10 feet long. They said if we don't send
these on time, we will be forced to move
within one week."
2.1.4 Civilians targeted in military operation:
------------------------------------------------
The flagrant disregard of humanitarian laws by Burmese army
has also been a major contributor in the deterioration of the human rights
situation in minority areas. The use of non-combatant civilians in military
operations, such as forced porterage, surveillance support duties, clearing of
mines and, sometimes, civilians being forced to march in front of
military columns are violations of internationally accepted humanitarian laws.
One witness describes the incidence of civilians being forced
to walk in front of soldiers in the minefield [33]:
"The soldiers force all the men to guard the road,
and sometimes the men have to go in front of the
troops on operations just to clear the landmines.
One man from every village or group of houses has to go,
sometimes 200 or 300 men altogether because there
are so many little groups of houses around. They
have to walk in front along with one cart pulled by
a cow. then the soldiers follow behind. No landmines
exploded near my village, but it happens sometimes
in other places. The villager steps on the landmine
and the soldiers just ignore him and leave him there. ...''}
In the event of skirmishes with ethnic rebels, the Burmese army has been
known to attack a nearby minority village. One villager describe an
incident where Burmese soldiers took revenge on villagers after fighting
with rebels [34]:
"One day the two boys were just outside the village
near the forest. The Karen soldiers had attacked
the Burmese and disappeared into the forest, so
the Burmese soldiers came and fired their guns all
around the village, and shot the two boys dead.
Kyaw Bwe and Kyaw Aye didn't know anything, they
didn't even know how to run away. But the SLORC
couldn't catch any Karen soldiers, so instead shot
dead two innocent boys.
After they killed the boys they came into the village,
went directly to the village head and beat him
brutally. They interrogated him,..."}
The military authorities demand compensation from the local population
in the case of army properties being destroyed in operation [35]. The
army threatens to shoot the villagers if they refuse to pay. One
villager told the KHRG [36]:
"There was a truck that exploded about the beginning
of February at Tah Paw, not far from a SLORC camp.
At the time I was on my way home from Thaton town.
The mine destroyed the truck, so the SLORC ordered Tah Paw
village to pay 60,000 Kyat. They didn't want to pay,
because their village only has 50 houses and they can't
afford it or get the money. So the villagers just kept
quiet and hoped that the SLORC wouldn't bother to come
get the money. But instead, the SLORC came into their
village and shot their guns beside and above all the
people to frighten them. Then they started shouting,`` If you
don't pay the money we'll kill all of you in this
village ." All the women, men, old people and children
were afraid so they started collecting money among
themselves. Some of them didn't have any money so they
took the rice they had for the next one or two months, sold
it for money and then gave it. After paying, people
had no food to eat and had to find some way to get
some food. At the same time other villages had
to pay too: Noh Aw Hla had to pay 50,000, Noh La Plaw
50,000, Pwa Ghaw 50,000, Kru See 50,000, Pan Ta Ray
50,000 and Day Law Po 50,000. For just one truck they
asked this much money - they are only coming here to do
business. How can the people not get poor when they do this ?}
2.1.5 Extrajudicial executions:
--------------------------------
To enforce the free-fires zones, the military exercises
the right to shoot and to kill anyone seen in the defined area. One
refugee told [37]:
"Three of my other nephews from Htee See Baw Kee
village were also killed brutally by the SLORC troops.
They had run away into the forest when the
soldiers had come to catch porters, and they were
hiding in the forest for 2 weeks. They didn't even
know the villagers had been driven out. When they
returned to the village without knowing, the soldiers
grabbed them right away, forced them to put on
Karen army uniforms and shot them dead.
\ABR We know for sure that they weren't Karen
soldiers, just innocent civilians. They were my
nephews, and their names were Pa Thu, Thaung Ngwe,
and Htun Thaung. They thought it was safe to go
back to their village, but they were killed."
Extrajudicial executions have taken place, without due process of
examining the case, if persons suspected of rebels are captured.
A fair trial for villagers has not been given to establish
their claims [38]:
2.1.6 Generalized violence:
----------------------------
In December 1993, the Burmese army launched an offensive on the drug
warlord Khun Sa in southern Shan State [39]. The case of forced
porterage by civilians, including prisoners from central Burma,
have been reported [40]. There are also reports of local civilians
in southern Shan State had been rounded up, detained and used for
porterage [41]. Amnesty International has also reported
the forcible returns of displaced villagers who fled into Thailand from
fightings and porterage [42]. The Royal Thai Government have
consistently refused to allow the international NGOs and Red Cross
to assists these displaced villagers and refugees, particularly at
northern Thailand. The total number of refugees and displaced people
in Thailand is approximately 420,000 [43].
2.2 Refugees in India and China
--------------------------------
Student refugees who fled to India since 1988 are reported to be living
at two camps located at Mizorum and Manipur States bordering Burma. Some
moved further to the capital New Delhi and have sought assistance
from UNHCR. Since April 1993, about 100 Arakanese Student activists
in Bangladesh also moved into Mizorum State in India. Although
smaller in their numbers compared to those in Thailand, Burmese displaced
persons can also be found in every border town in India [44].
There are also approximately 12,000 refugees from Kachin State in northern
Burma who had fled to China since 1992. Despite the fact that the
Burmese army reached cease-fire agreement with Kachin Independence
Army in early 1994, there are continuing cases of internally displaced
people in Kachin State [45].
2.3 Humanitarian Concerns
--------------------------
The sad state of decline in the humanitarian situation for the general
Burmese populace also deserves international attention [46]. The continuing
economic despair for the general populace and deterioration in social service
infrastructure due to lack of government's financial support are causing
the hardships and insecurity for all Burmese to increase; recent UNDP
report warned Burma in the state of economic collapse [47].
Many charged the western countries' boycott on aid and government's
increased expenditures on military as the major contributors for such
a state of decline, but the military's desperate push for its political
legitimacy is also found to be a contributing factor.
There has been a continuing embarrassment amongst the ruling military
elite since the United Nations designated Burma the status of Least
Developed Country in 1987 [48]. The military's admission
of such failure is apparent from SLORC announcing 1992-93
as ``The Year of the Economy", 1993-94 as ``The Second Year of Economy"
and 1994-95 ``All-round Development Year" [49]. As already reported
in Sec. 2.1.2, the implementation of various ambitious development
projects have caused forced labour for population. In order to boost
the economy, military government set the production of rice for domestic
consumption and export as a top priority; and launched vigorous campaigns
to encourage the peasantry to adopt multiple-cropping and the cultivation
of summer paddy. A total output of 675milion baskets is predicted for the
year 1993-94 and is said to increase to 900million baskets in 1994-95.
For many years, Burma's rural populace enjoy relative freedom of
government's economic policies [50]. The rural economy is subsistence
in nature and this suits the village lifestyle. However, the military's
recent push for such an increase in productivity without proper
investment in agricultural sector has led to the
forced procurement of rice and other primary products [51].
In November 1993, the student group in Arakan State reported of the
near famine situation for rural populace - which the state of rural
poverty believed to be prevalent throughout Burma [52].
The apparent moral decline of the rural families, which threatened
the social fabric of rural poor, is a direct consequence of the
junta's economic mismanagements.
The reported cases of increase in prostitution inside Burma and the
trafficking of Burmese women and girls into Thailand are much attributed
to this deterioration in rural life [53]. The girls reportedly sold
to Thailand are originated from villages in Burma's inland areas,
such as Sagaing Division, which show the deterioration has
been widespread [54]. Since the military government has made little
or no effort to curtail this trafficking problem, spreading of HIV/AIDS
becomes the immediate threat to rural communities in Burma.
Furthermore, given the facts that an increase in prostitution inside
Burma which combined with the government's effort to expand tourism
for foreign dollars, there has been a concern that Burma will become
another destination for the sex-tour.
The increase of illegal drug use in Shan State and Kachin State also needs
attention. According to reports, the spread of HIV/AIDS amongst intravenous
drug users has been at an alarming situation [55]. The general
situation for women and children, along with the internally displaced
people throughout Burma, have been in a state of overwhelming
humanitarian needs [56,57].
Although human rights abuses are the compelling reasons for
displacement of much of the population that need urgent attentions,
the deteriorating humanitarian situation within Burma should also
be addressed. The international community must therefore be urged
to adopt an approach which tackles both human rights and humanitarian
concerns in Burma.
3. The Root Causes.
====================
The underlying root causes for Burmese refugees and displaced people, as
explained in Sec 2. , are complex in nature and therefore require
a complex response. A widespread abuse of human rights, that perpetrated by
authorities and sanctioned by system of repression, in the
counter-insurgency measures can be seen as the primary root causes.
Deteriorating humanitarian situation and generalized climate of fear for
general populace; the dire poverty and insecurity to the life of civilians
that are generated by political system must also be taken into account.
A comprehensive response from all parties in the conflict, therefore, is
necessary to solve the refugee problem.
One obvious root cause has been the long standing civil war in Burma. The
government's counter-insurgency measures are responsible for the
displacements and deterioration in the humanitarian situation. The use of
civilians for porterage and surveillance duties in the military operation has
also contributed to the hardship of villagers. The military's
enforcement of free fire zones is also given rise to the serious human rights
abuses, such as torture and extrajudicial executions.
There may be some difficulty in seeing the government's activity such as
taxations on populace as a legitimate root cause for the refugees' flights.
However, as it has clearly been demonstrated in Sec 2.1.3 , this government
policy is directly responsible for much of the poverty and insecurity of
the life of local populace; and the practice of enforcing this by means
of threats and intimidations have caused the displacements. These types
of human rights abuses cannot be said as particularly serious enough to
give immediate threat to the security of a person. But the cumulative
effect of such abuses have threatened the livelihoods and caused
hardships and anxieties. Such cases do not normally conform to the
notion of persecution found in 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees. However, these people are clearly in need of protections [58].
The majority of displaced Burmese in Thailand are generated by similar
circumstances. With the viewpoint of Convention, it may be easier to
establish the well founded fear of persecution for student
activists and the ethnic refugees who are likely to
be a close relative or in association with ethnic freedom fighters.
However, people who fled from the hardships and anxieties that
generated mainly by the form of oppressions described in Sec 2.1.3,
or possibly Sec 2.1.2, will find difficult to prove their fear are
being well founded; Rather likely that they be charged as so
called `illegal and economic migrants'. Such arbitrariness to the
definition of refugees had already been pointed out in Asia Watch
report in 1992 [59].
Although the obvious root cause for the refugees' flights, such as
the internal displacements and forced portering, are stemmed from the
Burmese Army's counter insurgency campaign, the cessation of armed
hostility will not, therefore, guarantee a safe return for refugees.
The practice of using forced labour and collecting excessive amount
of taxes from the villagers must also be rectified.
Various NGOs [60] as well as opposition sources [61] have already
expressed that the implementation of cease-fire alone does not provide
enough safety to the return of refugees. It is concluded that the cease-fire
must be implemented as the first priority and the improvement
of human rights and humanitarian situation must also be made for
the safe and voluntary return of refugees.
4. Armed Conflicts in Burma
============================
Concerned with the growing crisis of displaced Burmese in Thailand, the
UNHCR expressed its willingness, on 21 June 1994, to assist and monitor the
returnees in future repatriation. The UNHCR also stated the
voluntary repatriation of Burmese refugees is possible only if all
groups concerned implement a cease-fire and therefore it urged Myanmar
authorities and opposition groups to work towards that end [62].
There has been armed conflicts in Burma since the time Burma
gained independence from British in 1948. The armed struggle in early
period evolved from the ideological differences as well as ethnic
nationality problems [63]. According to the Burmese army,
the multitudes of armed insurrections, in pursuasion of communist ideology
as well as some ethnic groups' movement towards secession, that threatened
security of the nation had been the reason for Burmese military in
seizing the state power in 1962.
There has been a number of attempts by previous military regime to make
cease-fire with the rebels, one in 1963. These attempts failed because
of Burmese military's insistence on total surrender for the rebels
and refusal to make political concessions on ethnic nationality
issues, i.e. to give a greater autonomy. The presense of communist
rebels may also have complicated in formulating a comprehensive political
settlement at that time.
The ethnic nationalities' struggle for varying objectives of freedom
and greater autonomy has, in time, evolved into that of establishing
the federal union of Burma; the National Democratic Front was formed
in May 1976 [64]. Some groups became primarily involved in narcotic trades:
appearing to have been driven by the complex dynamics of underlying
ethnic beliefs, political and economic factors [65].
The Communist Party of Burma army, which is the strongest force against
the Rangoon central government since 1970s, split up into regional resistance
armies after the Wa ethnic faction mutinied against Burman communist
leaders in 1989 [66].
Following the nationwide uprising in 1988, the urban Burman pro-democracy
students fled to rebel controlled areas. In November 1988, the National
Democratic Front formally included Burmese students and formed the
Democratic Alliance of Burma. The ethnic nationalities' struggle for
a greater freedom had reached a new phase in 1991 when the elected
parliamentarians, who claimed to have the mandate to form a parallel
government, fled to rebel held areas and signed an agreement to form
the federal union of Burma [67].
By September 1993, in an attempt to attract the ethnic
freedom fighters to enter a cease-fire, the Burmese military have made a
promise to adopt a federal republic style constitution [68]. This can
be seen as the Burman's concessions on the issue of autonomy for
the minorities.
These facts suggest, for the first time in Burma's post-independent
history, the ethnic nationality issues can be resolved along with the
restoration of a democratic government. With the crisis in Burmese
politics, as the analyst had pointed out [69], the real
opportunities for the cessation of 45 year long civil war as well as
the restoration of a popular government in Burma may have been coming
into a reality.
5. Eliminating Root Causes
===========================
As it is explained in Sec 2. and Sec 3., the armed hostilities between ethnic
nationalities and the Burmese army are seen as a primary root cause for the
occurrences of human rights abuses that consequently cause displacements.
Therefore the priority must be given to implement a nation-wide cease-fire.
For a longer term settlement, the ethnic and political issues must be
resolved through constitutional reform. The ethnic nationalities' demands
for greater autonomy must be realized in the form of Federal Constitution.
Along with elected parliamentarians, the ethnic freedom fighters
should be given appropriate political platform in drafting
the constitution. The UN Committee on Human Rights should offer its help
in drafting of the constitution.
Measures must be made to improve the human rights situation in minority
areas. Efforts should be made to reduce the oppressive
activities by Local military authorities regarding forced labour and
informal taxations. Arrangements must also be made for the displaced
villagers to have the compensations from the Myanmar military government.
The growing humanitarian crisis in Burma must also be tackled. The
immediate attention should be given to contain the spread of HIV/AIDS
throughout Burma, especially in minority areas. The initiatives must be made
to curtail narcotic production and increasing cases of illegal drug uses.
5.1 The United Nations General Assembly:
-----------------------------------------
In this UN General Assembly, the international community should
strengthened the resolution regarding Burmese refugees and displaced
people [70]. In particular, the UNGA should urge
Myanmar government to make measures to rectify the human
rights abuses in minority areas and to eliminate the root causes
of the refugees' flights. The various parties in the conflict must
also be urged to seek an end to civil war and to implement the
nation-wide cease-fire urgently.
In this UN General Assembly, the international community should recommand
the deployment of a civilian peace-keeping mission to Burma. The
mission should be given the mandate to monitor cease-fire and human rights;
and to promote human rights and to improve humanitarian situation.
The UN mission should take the " an expanded peace-keepers' role"
in Myanmar/Burma [71]. A crossed-mandate approach should be made in regards
to monitoring and promoting human rights [72].
The UNGA should particularly encourage Myanmar military authorities and
the elected representatives to form regional working committees, which
similar to {\em Reception Committee} in Arakan State, to carried out the
humanitarian tasks under UN mission.
The UNGA should urge Myanmar authorities to allow UN Agencies and
non-governmental organizations to get free and unhindered
access in delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar
through the regional working committees.
All member states should be urged to refrain from providing the large-scale
development assistance to Myanmar. The humanitarian and small-scale
development assistance should be allowed to be given to Burma.
In this UNGA, the international community should promote an appropriate
legal framework that is necessary for the UN organized repatriation of Burmese refugees and
displaced people. Tripartite agreements should be completed by UNHCR,
Myanmar authorities and Myanmar's neighbouring governments - particularly
the Royal Thai Government. These agreements must observe the {\em
non-refoulment} principle.
5.2 Consolidation of Cease-fire:
---------------------------------
Presently, the Burmese military had signed cease-fire agreements with
11 ethnic rebel groups. Although these cease-fire agreements are
(1) made to counteract the ethnic federal movement, (2) are aimed
at providing a short term solution and (3) are lacking credibility
since the majority of groups entered are now engaged in the illegal
drug trades; nonetheless these agreements are important. By the time
a comprehensive political settlement between the Burmese army and
the Democratic Alliance of Burma has been made, these existing cease-fire
should be brought into line with the settlement.
In this UN General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights should
recommend Myanmar Government and ethnic rebels to enter a cease-fire and
to make the political settlement. Detailed plans of how to implement
a cease-fire and how to maintain and monitor the cease-fire must also
be worked out.
Ethnic freedom fighters have been deceived, in the 1963 Peace Parley
for example, with the promise of a cease-fire by the Burmese army.
They are therefore cautious and fearful about entering into a
cease-fire agreement with Burmese army and request the presense
of international observers. The UN Agencies and major democracies should
offer their presense in the implementation of a cease-fire. Furthermore,
there have been concerns that once the cease-fire is implemented, the
deployment of the Burmese army at strategic positions may
disadvantage the ethnic rebels. These details must carefully be
worked out and planned to implement the nation-wide cease-fire.
It may become possible for armed opposition groups, which have genuine
cause for political freedoms, to enter to the wider settlement.
However, there can be difficulties with private militia. In case of
the existence of such an obstacle in the nation-wide cease-fire,
efforts should be made to contain such insurrection.
Once a nation-wide cease-fire agreement has been implemented, the UN Security
Council should impose an international arms embargo on Burma. This
is particularly necessary for both ethnic rebels and the Burmese army
not to arm themselves to get a greater advantage. In order to
maintain stability, provisions must be made in the cease-fire
agreement so that the armed forces from both sides should not defect
to one another's sides.
5.2 Monitoring Human Rights:
-----------------------------
In order to improve the human rights situation in minority areas, especially
those bordering Thailand, the UN General Assembly should implement the
recommendations of the 50th session of Commission on Human Rights [73].
Since the type of abuses occur because of weaknesses in legislative
and institutional sectors, the effort to improve human rights should
be aimed at building institutions for the long term. To ensure the
participation of elected representatives of May 1990 in institution
building tasks, the implementations of this recommendation must be
made through the regional working committees. In particular, measure
should be made to implement following recommendation:
"(e) The Government of Myanmar should take the necessary
steps to bring the acts of soldiers, including privates
and officers, in line with accepted international human rights
and humanitarian standards so that they will not
commit arbitrary killings, rapes and confiscations of property,
or force persons into acts of labour, portering, relocation
or otherwise treat persons without respect for their dignity
as human beings. When the hiring of local villagers for
porterage and other works may be required for governmental
purposes, it should be obtained on a voluntary basis and
adequate wages should be paid. The nature of work should be
reasonable and in accordance with established international
labour standards. When relocation of villages is considered
necessary for military operations or for development projects,
proper consultation with the villagers should take place and
appropriate compensation should be paid for those
relocations which may be determined necessary for reasons of
the public good;}
Within the context of enforcing this recommendation, the UNCHR should
recommend Myanmar authorities and also UN Agencies:
(a) To promote human rights and to carry out a smooth operation
for the UN Agencies, the `regional working committees' which similar to
{\em Reception Committee} in Arakan State must be formed [74].
(b) A tribunal must be set-up and operate under the supervision of the
United Nations. Various compensation claims: the losses of properties in
having to move to concentration camps, the monies demanded by military for
the loss of army's properties, etc, should be assessed by this tribunal and
the military government of Myanmar give compensation to these people.
Efforts should be made to initiate judicial reforms in Myanmar and UN
Committee on Human Rights to offer its helps.
(c) A special committee consisting of respective government ministries,
the UN agencies, elected local leaders and regional army commander should
be formed to determine the maximum amount of taxes that should be raised
from the people. A guideline must be drawn and urge the Myanmar
authorities to follow it in their taxations. The UN monitoring team should
ensure that the taxation is not excessive. The respective UN agencies, such
as UNDP, should offer their helps to train and restructure a proper
taxation department in Burma.
(d) Myanmar military government must reimburst the monies owed to the
villagers along the Ye-Tavoy railway routes as well as other development
projects for their contributed labour.
(e) Investigations should made into the incidences of extrajudicial
killings occurred within the context of military operations.
Compensation must be given to those family members of those killed in such
incidences.
(f) All UN Agencies and non-governmental organizations must respect
and promote human rights within Burma, regardless of their
formal mandates and humanitarian role.
5.4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees:
---------------------------------------
Presently, in Thailand there are 350,000 displaced people, 72,000 ethnic
refugees and 2500 student refugees. An estimated 12,000 refugees from
Kachin State are in China. Also a smaller number of refugees and displaced
persons in India.
Within Burma, there are estimated 800,000 internally displaced people(idp)
in Karen State, 50,000 idp in Kachin State. In addition to ethnic freedom
fighters, there are un-armed Burmese pro-democracy students within
ethnic rebel controlled areas [75].
For such a mixed population which need similar protection and assistance as
returning refugees, the UNHCR should make an innovative plan for protection.
The UNHCR should broaden its mandate to protect returnees and internally
displaced people. In particular, unarmed student rebels in ethnic rebel
controlled area should be given `person of concern status'.
In order to protect refugees and people who have higher risk of
persecution, such as internally displaced people, the UNHCR should
consider creating special zones, that are similar to security zones
created for returning Kurds refugees in northern Iraq in 1991 [76].
In the process of creating special zones, it must be transparent
by both sides not to build-up their military capacities. This kind of
arrangement will be necessary until the cease-fire is consolidated.
Restrictions may be imposed on students to be confined to their
respective areas until the cease-fire condition is consolidated. Other
detailed arrangements, such as visiting by parents and relatives to those
students must also be allowed.
5.5 Humanitarian Agencies and NGOs:
------------------------------------
The humanitarian agencies and non-government organizations have been
at the fore-front in advocating to increase humanitarian assistance
to Burma. It is reported that the UNICEF and NGOs are now in preparation
to enter Burma [77].
Regarding human rights monitoring missions, the UN Agencies have often
been described as silent witness [78]. There are concerns already
been expressed by NGOs for returning Burmese muslims from Bangladesh.
Once the refugees have returned, the international community need to
be kept informed of the returnees' situations. The NGOs
should fill such an information vacuum, if the UN Agencies'
mandate has limitations.
The UNICEF and NGO's should make a special effort to tackle the
HIV/AIDS problem in Shan State and Kachin State. Special attention should
be given to Burmese women returning from Thailand. The education programs
for the local population as well as the information flow from these areas,
especially Shan State, will be particularly useful to co-ordinate
future drug eradication programs.
5.6 UN Drug Control Programmes:
--------------------------------
The increasing illicit drug production and trafficking in Shan State
also needs attention. In the past, the UNDCP efforts were not yielding
good results, probably because it can not operate in the whole Shan State.
The main problem seems to be the difficulty to work with the local
population directly. Recent human rights field reports suggest that
the confiscation of villagers land has occurred within the context of
UNDCP's income generation programme. Therefore, efforts must be made to
avoid such incidences.
SLORC's attempt to use the drug issue for its political legitimacy has been
a concern to human rights groups and oppositions. The UNDCP should broaden
its focus and consider promoting human rights as suggested in the guideline.
Although the cease-fire situation in Shan State is believed to be fragile,
the UNDCP should work closely with the regional working committees, UNICEF
and NGOs. Through gradual contacts, the UNDCP should promote its
drug eradication programs.
5.7 UN Trusteeship Role in Burma ?
-----------------------------------
There has been increasing weariness in donor countries and the UNHCR, in
particular, to meet growing needs of humanitarian emergencies throughout
the globe. Although the NGOs may do their best efforts in searching for
funds, it is quite impossible to get at the level of needs.
A greater amount of monies will be needed when the reintegration program
has started. Therefore, the UN should consider setting up a
trusteeship for future development projects. At present,
the currency in Myanmar is at a high rate of inflation due to government
over printing of notes. However, if this situation can be brought
under control, the UN should introduce a local financial
institution - i.e. a Bank independent of the Military Government -
for development funds, with the provision of handing-over the assets
to the elected government when the UN mission is completed. This kind
of arrangement will also be beneficial in the training
of civil servants for banking and financial matters.
6. Towards the Reconciliations
===============================
At the time of preparing this paper, it is not known whether SLORC
will set a date to transfer power. One thing certain, however, is that the
building of democratic institutions as well as reconstruction of national
economy may have to be carried out in the immediate future.
Efforts are also needed for reconciliations between the army and
civilian populations as well as the Burman majority and ethnic minorities.
Societies that experienced violent oppressions inevitably have left with
residual tensions. It has often been the case that the fear of
retribution becomes the driving force for oppressors to hold on to
power. It is the very fear that has kept the present Burmese military
junta holding together. Therefore, promises from the
opposition forces that no retribution upon transfer of power to
SLORC is necessary. One may often feel that the perpetrator of
human rights abuses ought to be brought to justice. However, in the
best interests of national reconciliation and in
order to avoid a violent showdown, it seems worthwhile to make
reconciliation. Although we must never forget about the violent past
({\em every effort must be made to prevent the military dictatorship from
resurrecting}), our efforts should better be used in promoting peace
and future prosperity of the nation [79].
There has been a policy dispute between the approach presented in this
document and that of priority given to restoring a popular government.
Although this is an obvious point that the removal of the leadership
of the junta may pave the way to establish democracy, it is not
necessarily the only solution. Of course, there would be far less
reasons to argue this point if SLORC set the date to
transfer power. However, for a country like Burma which has little
experience in democratic government, there are equally important tasks
of building democratic institutions and promoting greater respect
for human rights. In building such institutions, national efforts
with international supports are necessary.
A more fundamental approach is to consider SLORC as the
system of repression and the violator of human rights. Therefore,
the increase in the reduction of SLORC's unlawful activities are equally as
good as removing the junta's leaders. From recent developments,
it is evident that the SLORC leaderships is increasingly disoriented and
also losing their control on the army rank and file.
It is a clear sign that the military dictatorship is
breaking down in Burma. Therefore efforts must be made in order to
create a new democratic political order in Burma. The strengthening
of the democratic institutions and establishing the independent
judiciary are more important and achievable.
The curtailment of SLORC's illegal and unlawful activities can be made
through external supports (and power) along with the national efforts.
The returning refugees, internally displaced people and the
peace-keeping mission that bring international instruments together with
them must be seen as part of the strategy. In this case, the nation
building tasks will be carried through by national efforts with
international supports. Bonuses in this process are peace and
security for normal citizens and regional stability.
It is necessary to balance the efforts to improve human rights with
political realities. For Burma, a country in which all forms of freedom
have been severely suppressed for a long period, the improvements for
human rights must be made in measured steps. At the same time the
confidence building between army, ethnic nationalities and civilian
oppositions should be allowed to take place.
6. Voluntary Repatriation and Confidence Building
==================================================
Since displaced persons are mixed with refugees, the voluntary repatriation
to Burma should be carried out in parallel with confidence building
process in Burma.
As the first step, the UN mission should be mandated to monitor
serious forms of abuses: rape, extrajudiccial killing, torture,
detention without trial; and those described in Sec 2. This step will
create an environment conducive for the return of most of so
called `illegal immigrants' in Thailand. These so called `illegal and
economic immigrants' have lesser risk of politically motivated
arrests and persecutions therefore this first step will enable them to go
home. Since the majority of displaced population in Thailand
are the `illegal and economic immigrants', this step need to
be considered as major operation.
By the time a cease-fire condition is consolidated - probably by
middle of next year - the UN mission's mandate should be broadened
to include freedom of expression and association ( this may not
include freedom to assemble in large crowds ).
This is to facilitate the populace to have free discussions
for drafting constitutions and forming parties. Amnesty to
all rebels, refugees and detained politicians should also be given.
This step will encourage the return of the students who
participated in anti-government movements and ethnic refugees
who are in association with ethnic freedom fighters.
These refugees are expected to repatriate as soon as the political climate
within the country is improved and the process of reconciliation is in
progress. The general amnesty which combined with formation of political
parties has to be a primary deciding factor for those refugees to return.
This step would meet with the consolidation of nation-wide cease-fire
with the army and rebels.
footnotes
---------
[ 1] John BAdgley, "Myanmar in 1993: A watershed year", ASIAN SURVEY,
Vol. XXXIV, NO. 2, February 1994.
[ 2] Bangkok Post, 21 September 1994.
[ 3] The New Light of Myanmar, 16 September 1994.
[ 4] Country Human Rights Reports, US Department of States, February 1994.
[ 5] Janelle M. Diller, "Constitutional Reform in a Repressive State:
The Case of Burma", ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXXIII, No 4.
[ 6] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1994.
[ 7] Economic Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1994.
[ 8] This report mainly focus on the human rights abuses that produce
refugees.
[ 9] see Amnesty International report, "Myanmar: Human rights development
July to December 1993"; ASA 16/03/94.
[10] This concession, again, has been undermined by continuing detentions
and renewed arrests of non-violent political activists in November
1993 and July 1994; see Amnesty document, Urgent Action AI Index:
16/08/94, 16/11/94.
[11] It is a sign of present military junta's lack of moral authority upon
the army rank and file.
[12] Country Human Rights reports, US Department of State; February 1994.
[13] Project Maje, "A Swanp Full of Lilies: Human Rights Violations
Committed by Units/Personals of Burma's Army, 1992-1993, Feb.1994.
[14] The four cut strategy:the military attempts to cut links of
intelligence, food, money and recruit between armed opposition groups
and local civilians.(see Amnesty International report, AI Index ASA:
16/11/92)
[15] ( A - 1) One reliable source stated in 1993 that," The campaign is
spread through Papun Sistrict in the north, through central Thaton
District, to Pa-an District in the south. It is a large region about
200km north to south, forming a large crescent behind SLORC line west
of Manerplaw.
[16] An independent human rights group, which based in Manerplaw, have
reported a series of interview by both refugees at the border and, on
occasions, people from the villages inside Burma. The series of
interview are available on the Internet. The names of the interviewees
have been changed as a protection.
[17] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994: see testimonies of
DAw Mya Thein.
[18] Karen Human Rights Group report: May 26, 1994; testimony by Naw Lar
Htoo.
[19] There had been reports of forced labour in Loikaw-Aungbann railways in
Shan State in 1991-93. Dawn news bulletin, Vol. 4 No. 5.
October-November 1993.
[20] This can be seen as the Burmese Army's atttempt to seek its political
legitimacy: portraying itself as of having the support of masses at
the same time trying to mobilize the public support for its agenda.
[21] ( A - 2) Burma Update, June 24, 1994.
[22] CPPSM, Committee for Publicity of Peoples' Struggle for Monland,
Ye-Tavoy Railway Report, April 1994.
[23] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 13, 1994; testimony by Maung
Aye.
[24] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 13, 1994; testimony by Hla Aye.
[25] CPPSM report, April 1994. See also New Era Journal(in Burmese),
No 27, August 1994.
[26] re: the use of forced labour in counter-insurgeency operations.
[27] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; testimony by Nan
Thein Thein.
[28] Karen Human Rights Group report: March 16, 1994; testimony by Maug
Win.
[29] Burma Action Group UK, "Burma and the United Nations: a roposal for
constructive involvement", November 1992.
[30] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; tesetimony by
Naw Paw Paw Htoo.
[31] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; testimony by
Saw Hla Maung.
[32] Karen Human Rights Group report: May 26, 1994; testimony by
Saw Lah Ghay.
[33] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by
Daw Mya Thein.
[34] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by
Htoo Htoo Mo.
[35] This appear that the army attempting to discourage the similar aggack
by rebels and may also attributed to the practice of army
extorting monies.
[36] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 23, 1994; testimony by Naw Say.
[37] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by H
Htoo Htoo Mo.
[38] ( A - 3) Karen Human Rights Group report: April 23, 1994; testimony by
Naw Eh Wah.
[39] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1994.
[40] ( A - 4) Burmese Relief Centre, July 1994.
[41] Karen Human Rights Groups report: 20 August 1994; testimony by Sai On.
[42] Amnesty International reports: September 1994, 26 May 1994.
[43] ( A - 5) Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993.
[44] Burma Students' League in India estimates, in their December 1993
report, total number as: students 500, war victims 3,000 and
economically-displaced 5,000.
[45] Bangkok Post, 17 September 1994.
[46] ( B - 1) Bangkok Post, 16 September 1994.
[47] Associated Press, 1 June 1994.
[48] Martin Smith, "Insrugency and The Politice of Ethnicity", 1991. The
BSPP government was so embarrassed that they announced that news after
4 months later.
[49] Economic Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1994.
[50] David I Steinberg, "Neither Silver Nor gold: The 40th anniversary of
The Burmese Economy" in Independent Burma at Forty Years,
Ed. J Silverstein, Ithaca, N.Y. 1989.
[51] Human rights groups in their rcent field reports frequently mention
the incidences of forced procurement of rice from villagers(and
refugees). However, this provlem has been so profound in its
underlying complexities and therefore do not nention in Sec 2.1.3.
[52] ( B - 2) All Burma Student Democratic Front(ABSDF) in Arakan have
reported the situation in its 20 November 1993 statement. Clearly
outraged at the sufferings of Arakanese masses, the report itself is
strong in tone, but is the reflection of a deep sadness for rural
population. Students seems to have exaggerated their status of as
military component since there was no such military activity in
Arakan.
[53] Asia Watch/ Women's Rights Project,"A Modern Form of Slavery:
trafficking of Burmese Women and girls into Brothels in Thailand",
December 1993.
[54] ibid. pp45: The report said, "Of the thirty, nineteen had parents or
guardians who were peasant farmers or farm laborers. They came from
villages all over Shan State(Taichelek, Keng Tung and Taunggyi);
Kachin State near the Chinese border; Kayin State; Sagaing division in
central Burma; and even Rangoon, the capital city.
[55] ( B -3) FAr Eastern Economic Review, 21 July 1994.
[56] ( B -4) Jesuit Refugee Service in Asia-Pacific, Issue 31, November
1993.
[57] ( B -5) ICVA mission to Burma report.
[58] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "The State of the Worlds Refugees
1993: the Challenge of Protection", pp 5, "Many of the people in need
of protection are fleeing from armed conflict, generalized violence,
severe disrption of public order or widespread abuses of human rights.
Their claims to international protection are widely acknowledged, even
though they may not always conform to the notion of persecution found
in the 1951 convention relating to the Status of Refugees(see box 2).
The situations from which they flee do not necessarily entil
individually targeted persecution but do provide fertile breeding
grounds for it."
[59] Asia Watch, "Abuses against Burmese Refugees in Thailand", Vol. No 4
Issue No 7, 20 March 1992.
[60] bangkok Post, 30 June 1994.
[61] National Democratic Front, 24 July 1994.
[62] ( C -1) Bangkok Post, 30 June 1994.
[63] ( C -2) Burma Action Group UK, November 1992. Martin Smith, "Burma:
Insurgency and Politics of Ethnicity ", 1991.
[64] A Breif History of National Democratic Front(Burma),(Private
communiations).
[65] The complexity of ethnic armed insrugency issue in Burma has long been
recognised. The evolvement of ideals and actions of the insurgents
are also dictated by the necessity to survive in revolution. These
facts are further complicated by the presense of private militias,
which take advantage of lawlessness in remote areas, formed solely for
production and trafficking of illicit drugs.
[66] Bertil Lintner,"The Politics of the Drug Trade in Burma", Indian
Ocean Centre for Peace Studies occasional paper Mo 33. the University
of Western Australia, May 1993.
[67] ( C -3) Australia Council For Oversea Aid, seminor on Burma, May 27,
1993.
[68] Burma Information Group, October 1993;The New Light Of Myanmar,
16/9/94 stated,"...Others include the creation of a federal union and
a multi-party democracy system with freedom of expression and worship
as well as seven ethnic minority states with equal status, authority
and their own parliaments, judicial systems and administrations in a
power sharing system. Mo part of the territory of the state of region
shall be allowed to secede from the union."
[69] Burma Action Group UK, "Burma and the United Nations: a proposal for
constructive involvement", November 1992.
[70] UNGA draft resolution, UN Document A/C.3/48/L.70, 29 November 1993.
(adopted by consensus in December 6, 1993.)
Noting that the human rights situation in Myanmar has consequently
resulted in flows of refugees to neighbouring countries, thus creating
problem for the country concerned,
Noting the ceasefire that has been reached between the Government of
Myanmar and several groups of ethnic and religious minorities in
Myanmar.
[71] Gareth Evans, "Cooperating for Peace: The global agenda for 1990s and
beyond.", 1993.
[72] This author wrote a suggestion paper,"An Operational Guideline
Proposal for the United Nations Agencies in Myanmar", last April. It
outlines a guideline on how the UN AGencies may promote the human
rights at the same time improving humanitarian situation; and how ti
bypass SLORC in providing humanitarian assistance to the populace. The
paper will be made available at your request.
[73] United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifteith Session, Agenda
item 12, E/CN.4/1994/57, 16 February 1994.
[74] "An Operational Guideline Proposal for United Nations Agencies in
Myanmar", 26 April 1994.
[75] Sources reports 600 such students in Kachin State and 300 in Karenni
State.
[76] UNHCR,"The State of the World's Refugees", 1993; pp-84.
[77] ( D -1) Burma Issues, July 1994.
[78] Amnesty International, "Peace-keeping and Human Rights",
ASA 40/01/94.
[79] Opinions on this point will certainly be varied. It often been charged
to those tends to forgive oppressors as betraying from the course.
Amongst Burmese people, there has been a profound sadness for those
who made sacrifices in 1988 and the period that followed. Eventually,
it is the sadness that compel this author to participate in the
movement.
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