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BurmaNet News: September 22, 1994
- Subject: BurmaNet News: September 22, 1994
- From: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 22 Sep 1994 11:03:00
************************** BurmaNet **************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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BurmaNet News: Thursday, September 22, 1994
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Contents:
1: NCGUB: STATEMENT REGARDING DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI'S MEETING WITH THE SLORC
2: BURMANET: THE SPY WHO WAS LEFT OUT IN THE COLD?
3: KHRG: COMMENTARY
4: BURMANET: TRANSCRIPT OF GARETH EVANS ON MEETING SLORC F.M. OHN GYAW
4: BURMANET: SOUTHEAST ASIAN LANGUAGES MAILING LIST
5: BURMANET: SUMMER BURMESE LANGUAGE STUDY
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NCGUB: STATEMENT REGARDING DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI'S MEETING WITH THE SLORC
September 20, 1994
Since its very inception, the National Coalition Government
has firmly and unwaveringly stood by the conviction that
political and economic crises in Burma can only be overcome
by a comprehensive national political settlement involving
all parties concerned. It is in this light that the
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma welcomes
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's talks with the leaders of the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) yesterday.
For the sake of the whole nation and its people, the
National Coalition Government hopes that the SLORC came to
the negotiating table sincerely wanting to resolve national
problems. At the same time, we cannot help but continue to
feel deeply concerned about the political dissidents who
continue to languish in prison today and about the massive
use of forced labour especially in ethnic minorities areas.
Socioeconomic and political problems are rife in Burma today
and any party that genuinely wishes to correct these should
act immediately to achieve national reconciliation and
peace. It goes without saying that all phenomena that run
counter to the process of national reconciliation and peace
should also be stopped at all cost. The national convention
that was convened to enshrine principles favoring military
domination in the country is one such obstacle in the way of
true reconciliation. If the SLORC leaders are sincere they
should take immediate steps to abandon the national
convention, announce the unconditional release of all
political prisoners and stop all violation of human rights
in the country. It will be difficult for the National
Coalition Government to welcome the talks with great
enthusiasm without these positive steps being taken.
The National Coalition Government hopes that this meeting
would develop into a serious and substantial political
dialogue. For the talks to have greater meaning and impact,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should have free access to the media
and the right to communicate and consult with anyone she
deems necessary. This will ensure that the talks are fair
and objective and will gain the respect of others.
Again, it is time to give serious and greater consideration
to the interests of the entire people rather than to the
interests of a class, a party or an organization.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA
---------------------------------------------------
Information Office, 815, 15th Street NW, Suite 609
Washington DC 20005
Tel: 202-393 7342 Fax: 202 - 393 7343
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BURMANET: THE SPY WHO GOT LEFT OUT IN THE COLD?
September 22, 1994
BurmaNet has a number of reports that point to some kind of shift in the
personnel responsible for security issues along the Thai/Burma border.
Thus far, the shift seems to affect personnel and not the policies being
implemented.
Until recently, responsibility for the border area has appeared to rest
with Gen Charoen Kullavanich and the National Security Council (NSC), which
he chairs. In meetings with ethnic rebel groups, Gen Charoen was often
represented by his voluble aide, a civilian businessman named Xuwicha
Hiranyaprueck.
The reports BurmaNet has received indicate that Gen Charoen's NSC has had
"their freedom of action curtailed" by the Prime Minister's office. What
this means is unclear, even assuming it to be true. Charoen, according to
one report, has lost a degree of power. However, there is no indication
that his position is in jeapordy. At most, it probably means that he has
less freedom to speak and act independently on border issues.
The Prime Minister's office was reportedly unhappy with the publicity
stemming from the NSC's handling of border-related issues. The forced
deportation of Mon refugees at Halockanie, which resulted in headlines that
the Thais were "starving refugees out" may have contributed to this.
Another possible source of embarrassment was a series of articles in the
Thai-language newspaper Naeo Na, which alledged that Gen Charoen's
businessman friend was a SLORC spy.
At the end of August, Gen Charoen took a large NSC delegation to Rangoon
for meetings with SLORC officials. After his return, an interagency
meeting of NSC, Army and Police officials responsible for the Burmese
border was held in Chiang Mai on September 5th. One official present at
the meeting was asked why Xuwicha was not attending even though he was
reportedly in nearby Chiang Rai. According to the Thai official, Xuwicha
was not allowed to attend the meeting because he was not a government
official. If this report is accurate, it represents a sharp change in
practice given that Xuwicha has regularly commandeered army helicopters for
trips to the border and has been seen giving orders to field-grade Army
officers. Being frozen out of the meeting in Chiang Mai may portend
trouble for Xuwicha, but it remains to be seen whether the NSC has decided
to dump him.
His main role with the NSC has been to cajole and pressure the ethnic
groups to negotiate cease-fires with the SLORC. On August 22nd, he
travelled the border to press Mon leaders for a resumption in talks [see
BurmaNet News, August 27-28 "XUWICHA FLIES TO PAYAW CAMP; PRESSURES MONS
LEADERS"]. Eight days later, instead of negotiating, the NMSP announced
they were pulling out of cease-fire talks altogether and the next day, were
quoted in The Nation as threatening to blow up the natural-gas pipeline set
for construction through Mon territory.
BurmaNet has also learned that NMSP leader Nai Shwe Kyin, who was in Pay
Yaw at the time of Xuwicha's visit, refused to meet him. The NSC
representative reportedly threatened to have Nai Shwe Kyin brought out to
meet him if he didn't come voluntarily by September 1st. To date, no
meeting has occured.
Xuwicha also demanded that two sets of radio equipment, given to the Mons
by him in earlier, happier days, be returned. He was also demanded the
return of weapons lost by SLORC troops when they attacked Halockanie
Refugee Camp some weeks earlier. The Mons apparently have rejected these
demands as well.
Another reversal Xuwicha has met recently is the refusal of the Karenni
ethnic group to negotiate with SLORC, despite being pressured by him to do
so. He also seems to have dropped off the rolodex of American officials
stationed in Bangkok, where he had earlier been a frequent and welcome
visitor.
Xuwicha began his career as a liason for the Thai army with the right-wing
opposition in Laos in the early 70s. His father, who was a "kicker" with
Air America, and was involved in a similar line of work. [Air America was
an American Central Intelligence Agency funded operation which delivered
weapons to the Lao resistance during the 60s and early 70s. A kicker was
the person in the aircraft who kicked packages out of the door]. Xuwicha,
born in 1951, made his first trip to Burma aboard one of his father's
flights to deliver weapons to Koumintang forces in the Shan State in 1959.
One report maintains that Xuwicha also provided information for the Central
Intelligence Agency, which was cooperating with Thailand during those years
to oppose the Communist government in Vientiane. Although Xuwicha has not
worked with the Americans for quite a few years, his Vietnam War-era
connections seem to explain why some American officials continue to view
him as "one of ours."
After his work in Laos, Xuwicha pursued business interests and went on to
be active in various capacities along the Thai/Cambodia border, and has
businesses in Thailand, Cambodia and Laos.
The reports in Naeo Na, which were published in late-July, cite allegations
made by a defector from Burma's secret police, the Directorate of Defense
Services Intelligence (DDSI). The gist of the allegations is that a Thai,
code-named Victor, was providing information and services to the Burmese in
exchange for compensation. Xuwicha was known to the ethnic group leaders
as Victor. The ex-DDSI agent is now reported to be in the United States.
*************************************************************
KHRG: COMMENTARY
The Karen Human Rights Group
September 5, 1994
KHRG #94-C5
First of all, a correction to avoid any confusion: the new refugee
camp on the Karen side of the border which we had previously referred
to as Klay Muh Hta (see "Refugees at Klay Muh Hta", 24/6/94) is
more properly called Klay Muh Kloh, and we will refer to it as
such in the future. Klay Muh Hta is on the Moei River, whereas
the camp is 15 minutes' walk inland from there. Sorry for any
confusion caused. As for the situation there, this has been the
heaviest rainy season in years, and several people in the area
have died in the floods. There have been few new arrivals at
the camp because of the rains, but everyone is expecting a new
onslaught of arrivals the minute rainy season ends, especially
now that word has spread in Hlaing Bwe Township that there is
a safe place you can go to escape SLORC. There will probably
be many more new arrivals than the camp can handle, and refugee
officials aren't sure what they will do.
Worst of all, it is extremely questionable just how 'safe' the camp
really is with SLORC troops only a few hours' walk away at most, while
Thai authorities are still refusing to allow any new refugees to cross
the border.
To ensure this, the Thai government has now told the agencies
who supply rice to the Karen refugee camps that they will no longer
be allowed to ship rice directly to the camps; a new central distribution
centre is to be set up in Tak for all supplies to go to all camps,
and it will be monitored and controlled by the Thai government.
If this goes ahead, it will give the Thai government exactly
the power it needs to restrict or entirely cut off supplies to
all the refugees at once, effectively using starvation to drive
the refugees 'voluntarily' back across the border.
The issues of refugee safety and Thai forced repatriation have
been blatantly brought out into the spotlight by the current situation
of Mon refugees at Halockhani (see "SLORC's Attack on Halockhani
Refugee Camp", 30/8/94). As one recent foreign visitor to Manerplaw
said in amazement, "In what other country in the world would you
hear of the Army attacking a refugee camp??" The disgust that
every thinking person should feel at the SLORC Army's attack on
the refugees at Halockhani goes beyond the power of words to express.
It is more than a crime, it is more than an atrocity - it is
a travesty against every human principle, and as such it affects
every single one of us. Now is our time to respond and stop the
SLORC from ever being able to do such a thing again in the future.
To make things worse, the situation at Halockhani has also made
it clear that there is no limit to how low the Thai authorities
will sink in order to support the SLORC. Almost as soon as the
attack was over and the refugees had fled to the Thai side of
the border again, the Thai Border Patrol Police and the Royal
Thai Army were trying to drive them right back into the hands
of another SLORC Infantry Battalion. The refugees are still refusing
to go and the situation is still a standoff, with the Thais cooking
up new schemes every week to intimidate or trick the refugees
back across - like cutting off all food and medical supplies,
as they've done so far, inventing 'assurances' that the refugees
won't be attacked again which have supposedly been given to them
by SLORC commanders (the same 'assurances' which they said were
given when the refugees were first being forced to Halockhani,
by the commanders who later attacked them), or suddenly announcing
that the border wasn't where they'd said it was after all...
Meanwhile, the four to six thousand refugees have been clustered
around the Border Patrol Police post for 1« months now, suffering
and sick because the Thais won't let them set up a proper camp
with proper water supply. Why is the Thai government so desperate
to have no refugees from Burma in Thailand? The land they are
on is not populated by Thais, and it is foreign organizations,
not Thailand, that provide all the food and clothing. The only
feasible answer seems to be that it is all for the sake of Thai
business interests with SLORC. It is indeed strange that Thailand's
international image, once so protectively guarded by the Thai
government, doesn't seem to matter to them any more. The Thai
government seems content to continue obeying every order of a
few self-interested individuals on its own National Security Council,
letting them dictate every aspect of regional foreign policy while
Thailand slowly sinks to the status of an international human
rights pariah. It is now important for people and governments
around the world to let the Thais know just where their precious
'image' is going if they don't start acting like a responsible
member of the international community.
Up on the Shan State border the Thais have also been forcibly
repatriating hundreds of refugees at a time, but this has been
given almost no attention internationally. The main reason seems
to be that these unlucky people just happen to live in an area
where SLORC has been on the offensive against Khun Sa's Mong Tai
Army (MTA) since December 1993. While there has been a great
deal of discussion about the military aspects of the offensive,
who's winning, whether it's right or wrong, and whether it's about
drug eradication, control of territory, or Shan nationalism, one
thing has hardly been discussed at all - what about the civilians
who live there?
It is very easy to categorize every villager who lives in an area
controlled by Khun Sa as a heroin trafficker, but this
is quite simply wrong. Of course, some of them grow opium -
but wouldn't you, if you had six children to feed and
had to grow everything by manual labour, only to have SLORC troops
coming around every month to take three-quarters of your crop,
demanding half the money you've got, and forcing you to work a
week every month at their army camp for nothing? Opium is relatively
easy to grow and is currently the only cash crop for which there's
a reliable market in southern Shan State, so innocent people grow
it in Khun Sa's area, in the Wa area, in SLORC areas, everywhere
in the hills. If anything, by destroying villages, displacing
people, and extending SLORC control (and the resulting looting
and extortion) in Shan State, this offensive will only have the
effect of increasing the farmers' dependence on growing opium
in the long term. When it comes to taxing it, processing and
exporting it, of course Khun Sa is involved, but so are the SLORC
and its ceasefire partners, and according to most evidence they
produce a lot more of it than Khun Sa does. If the SLORC wanted
to eradicate drugs, they could have attacked Khun Sa long ago,
but they didn't - they only attacked when Khun Sa started talking
loudly, sincerely or not, about Shan State independence.
The result has been a major SLORC military offensive in which
they have used all their usual tactics - rounding up thousands
of porters in towns and villages (even some Thai businessmen grabbed
in the Tachilek market who later had to buy their freedom), massacres
of villagers in fighting areas, burning down villages and driving
people out, rape, extortion, looting, the list goes on, as always.
Thousands of Shan, Palaung, Lahu, Lisu, Akha, and other refugees
have fled their homes into Thailand. The Thai response, thanks
largely to the absence of international attention, has been much
quicker and more ruthlessly efficient than at Halockhani. Entire
areas of the border in Fang District have been made off limits
to all outsiders while the Thais blockade the border against all
new refugees and repatriate those already there.
In other areas, such as around Mae Sai where it would be difficult to
keep outsiders away, the moment groups of refugees cross the border they
are rounded up by Thai authorities and spirited away to Buddhist
monasteries, where they are kept incommunicado until they are handed
over to SLORC authorities within 1 to 3 days. In at least some cases,
the SLORC has reportedly been waiting for them, loaded them on
trucks and carried them off to a 'holding centre' for slave porters
in a barbed-wire enclosure at Loi Hsa Htoong army camp. After
one such forced repatriation in May, Amnesty International released
an Urgent Action notice encouraging international protests; as
a result, a refugee official from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok
went to Mae Sai, interviewed only the Thai military commander
responsible, then returned to Bangkok and declaimed the Amnesty
International report as being false, claiming that the refugees
had suddenly changed their minds and had happily gone back to
tend their fields. Some of the refugees involved, however, subsequently
slipped back into Thailand and told volunteer workers a very different
story.
While embassies and others continue to play their political games
with Shan State, at the beginning of August we went to see what
the villagers had to say (see "SLORC in Southern Shan State",
20/8/94). The fighting had just stopped on July 18, though neither
side had declared a stop. The MTA's reason seems to be heavy
casualties, while the SLORC, also suffering from heavy casualties,
may have decided that they are at a disadvantage fighting MTA
guerrillas in the heavy rains. Regardless, it appears that heavy
fighting will probably resume as soon as rainy season is over,
possibly in October. Unfortunately, when we got to the border
the Thais had already clamped down on security: we couldn't even
get near the border in Fang District near the Mong Kyot fighting,
nor could any of the refugees there get to us.
Around Mae Sai, while we were actually there an entire village of Akha
people came across the border in a group of one or two hundred after
SLORC troops had burned down their village and driven them out
(even though there was no fighting). However, they were quickly
rounded up, held under guard at Wat Tam Pa Zome monastery, then
handed over to SLORC authorities at Tachilek the next afternoon
by order of Kamron Booncherd (in the report, we have mistakenly
spelled his name 'Kamluen Moonchut'), Governor of Chiang Rai province.
We couldn't even get close to them, nor could Shan refugee officials.
So while our interviews provided some firsthand evidence on the
offensive, what most people wanted to talk about was SLORC oppression
and cultural genocide in Shan State. Along with forced labour,
land confiscation is a major problem: the SLORC is confiscating
farmland everywhere, then using it to set up huge army camps or
military farms on which the displaced farmers are forced to do
all the labour without food or payment. All produce goes to the
Army.
Around Kengtung, one farmer reported that the villagers
are being forced to clearcut the forest for miles so the Army
can set up cash-crop butter bean plantations. Worst of all, these
are the kind of projects which SLORC is presenting to the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) as "community income generation" under the Border
Areas Development Programme. The slave labourers are portrayed
as happy villagers working for their own benefit. The UNDP is
very secretive about its specific operations in Shan State, so
it is difficult to estimate the extent of their involvement with
such projects. Slave labour on a "community hydro project" which
is only sending its power to army offices and selected civilians
was also described by a civilian and a prisoner who were forced
to work on it - both knowing that they would never receive its
electricity. The UNDP has also promoted the idea of funding SLORC's
local hydro schemes in Shan State. One man who'd worked on the
Mong Kwan project put it best when he said, "If we could prosper
under SLORC, then we must be very prosperous right now because
we've been under them for 30 years already. But we're still miserable."
When it comes to Border Area Development projects, one of the
most notorious has been the Loikaw-Aung Ban railway line between
Kayah and Shan States, built by hundreds of thousands of Pa'O,
Karenni, and other enslaved villagers from 1991 to 1993. Now
all the villagers along the line are being forced to guard it
(see "Human Rights in Northern Karenni State", 10/4/94). A man
from Loikaw recently arrived in the Karen area with an update.
In June 1994 the BBC Burmese service reported a derailment at
Naw Woh village 6 miles from Pekhon in Karenni State in which
20 people were killed and more wounded, and he says there have
been at least 2 other derailments which have gone unreported.
The reason: during the construction, entire villages were assigned
segments of the embankment to finish before certain deadlines,
and they could only go home when that assignment was finished.
So whenever there were no soldiers around, they filled the embankment
with branches, scrub, sticks, and other refuse, all hidden by
thin layers of dirt so the work would be done faster and they
could go back to their farms. Now as a result the tracks are
sinking, the rains are washing away the embankments and the trains
are derailing left and right. After one derailment in May just
outside Loikaw, when the authorities saw how poorly the embankment
had been built they rounded up all the area villagers to punish
them severely - but at the last moment a benevolent official of
the railway department saved them by pleading with the military
officer, telling him the accident was caused by heavy rain and
slippery tracks. "People who live around Loikaw know how the
embankment was built, so they don't travel by train", our informant
says. "Only the Burmese and people from other areas ride the
trains." Is this to be the future of all the SLORC's "development
projects"?
Given the UN Agencies' consistent "carrot and carrot" approach
to dealing with SLORC, it is difficult to say whether the talks
between SLORC and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, which are
supposedly around the corner, are likely to yield much. If the
UN continues refusing to meet any representatives of the political
or ethnic opposition, how could the talks be balanced?
It sounds something like Hitler and Mussolini sitting alone negotiating
a peace settlement to end the Second World War. After all, when
the UN was asked to send a representative to Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi's first visit in February it sent well-known SLORC apologist
Jehan Raheem, the UNDP's resident representative in Rangoon, who
spent his few speeches during the interview subtly disagreeing
with Aung San Suu Kyi on most points. Perhaps she should be included
in the SLORC - Boutros-Ghali talks, although it should be recognized
that even she cannot speak on behalf of the Democratic Alliance
of Burma (DAB) to end the civil war. The U.S. and others should
certainly continue their pressure on SLORC to talk sincerely with
her, but they should also be pressing SLORC to talk to the DAB
if their goal is peace in Burma.
As Aung San Suu Kyi herself told Congressman Richardson, "I would
rather put it [dialogue] as between SLORC and the NLD, or the
democratic forces, because I'm not in favour of promoting any
kind of personality cult or personality politics. This is
something we've got to avoid from the beginning ... We want
to see a democracy which is based on solid principles, not
on any personalities ... I would like people to think of
the democracy movement as a whole, not just as me. Just
releasing me tomorrow is not going to do any good if the
attitude of SLORC does not change." (Source: Burma Debate magazine,
July/August 1994). Putting all the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi
is dangerous, because the SLORC can easily manipulate this - as
Khin Nyunt already did, defusing a lot of Western pressure at
the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conference
just by saying he might meet with her sometime.
Furthermore, for all that she is and she represents, she is still only
one person. If she is released or if anything happens to her, will
the world stop caring about human rights in Burma? Remember the
one, but don't forget the forty million. The DAB is ready and
willing to talk. The SLORC is not.
'If you misbehave, the same thing will happen to you.'
'What?'
'The forest will swallow you.'
'Then I will become a tree', I said.
'Then they will cut you down because of a road.'
'Then I will turn into the road.'
'Cars will ride on you, cows will shit on you, people will
perform
sacrifices on your face.'
'And I will cry at night. And then people will remember the
forest.'
- Ben Okri, The Famished Road
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BURMANET: TRANSCRIPT OF GARRETH EVAN'S COMMENTS FOLLOWING MEETING WITH
BURMESE FOREIGN MINISTER, U OHN GYAW, BANGKOK, JULY 24 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Evans: I said to the Australian press before I came here that I
wanted to take the opportunity of this week to have a systematic, detailed
round of discussions, not only with the Foreign Minister of Myanmar but
also all the other Foreign Ministers who are here, to get their
judgements about what kind of progerss is being made in the country, what
kind of progress is possible under the existing policy approach. The
policy approach of the ASEANs being one of constructive engagement, the
policy approach of our friends in the United States and Eurape being one
of rather more arms length distance and constant criticism, the approach
of Australia being one of extreme concern about the continuing human
rights situation in Myanmar but accompanied by a desire to find ways of
moving the situation productively forward. So Australia is thinking very
carefully about what the best way of moving the situation forward might
be, how we might best contribute to securing that and I want to have many
more discussions this week before I make up my mind.
But let me say one other thing about what I have said to my counterpart in
the last few minutes. I have made it absolutely clear on this occasion, as
I have on many previous occasions, that we regard the continued detention
of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as absolutely indefensible, that we regard it as
not only in breach of universal human rights principles but also utterly
unheapful in terms of Myanmar's own membership of the international
community and in terms of its way forward politically, economically and in
terms of its regional role. It's not only of course the detantion of Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi that's in issue here, its the failure of the
constitutional convention process to make any significant change in the
direction of democretic accountability systems, it's on the continued
detention of many political prosoners, its the continued existence on the
statute books of many laws of political censorship of one kind or another
that are repressive and do inhibit any kind of free dialogue or free
political process and it's a matter of still some very considerable
uncertainty in terms of the situation in the border areas as to whether or
not that set of problems is being resolved in the most productive way,
although there has been some evidence over the last couple of years of
advances in that respect. So what I'm trying to say is that we have many
continuing difficulties with the situation in Myanmar and all of those were
made abundently and straight forwardly and very explicitly clear to my
counterpart on this occasion as they have been on previous ones.
Q: What was the Minister's reaction?
A: The Minister's reaction, as it has been on previous occasions, is to
endevor to argue that significant forward progress has been made over the
last two or three years and there is some evidence of course for that with
the dialogue that's been going on with the minority areas, with the release
of anumber of political prisoners, with the Richardson meeting with Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and, of course, in the last couple of days with the
signalling of a commencement of a dialogue process with the United
Nations. I acknowledge those advences but I;ve already referred to, the
continued detention of Daw San Suu Kyi and everything that means in terms
of a resistance of legitimate human rights and democratic process.
Q: You said this morning tahat you would like to include Aung San Suu Kyi
in a meeting between UN and SLORC. Did you say that to him?
Q: I didn't quite put it in those terms. I said I wanted to see a dialogue
process commence with the UN which had some meat and had some substance,
and I certainly want to see a dalogue process commenced between Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and the administration, not just one meeting to tald about the
weather, but a process which is at least the beginning of a serious
discussion about the evolution of a more democratic political system within
the country, bearing in mind Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's stature - not certainly
as the elected leader of the government, she was only elected as the leader
of the largest political party to be elected to a constituent assembly -
but bearing in mind her degree of obvious public support within the
country, her obvious standing internationally, she is a systematically abut
the whole future evolution of the country. Now whether that her and the
administration is really less important than that some serious dialogue
take place.
Q: did he give any indication to you , Senator, that there might be serious
dialogue between the SLORC and Aung San Suu Kyi?
A: The only indication I was given is that the commitment that was made for
there to be a meeting between Daw Aung SAn Suu Kyi and senior SLORC
personnel, presumably Khin Nyunt, will be honoured. That will take place.
But what flows out of that, whether it's a serious process of dialogue in
the sense that I've just described it, of course remains to be seen. There
was a clear commitment to commence a process of dialogue with the United
Nations, the details of that are still te be bedded down in the period
immediately ahead. But that is a heartening and welcoming development and I
don't want to sound churlish about acknowledging just that.
Q: Does he give you any guarantee that by the end of the year when the UN
Secretary-General reports to the General Assembly, the report will contain
positive development inside Burma?
A: No there was no guarantees of that kind given, we can only watch and
hope that that will occur.
Q: Is Australian going to change it's policy of trade with Burma?
A: Our policy at the moment is neither to encourage or discourage trade and
investment with Burma. That is Under consideration as indeed are all
present aspects of our policy but I would't anticipate any rapid change in
this respect. What I'm about, what Australia is about, is just working out
what the best possible way is of moving the game forward more productively
to create a better environment in that country, one that's more conducive
to regional stability and one that does better honour basic human rights
standards. NOw, whether that's better done by standing back as we were
about two or three years ago in arguing for sanctions, whether it's better
done in some other ways is a matter about which I still have an open mind
and, as I began by saying, that what I want to spend a lot of this week
talking to my collegues about. I haven't got anything further I can
usefully add this stage.
End/
TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE BY SENATOR EVANS, BANGKOK, 24 JULY 1994.
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Q: You are meeting the Burmese Foreign Minister this afternoon, what were
you hoping to talk to him about?
A: Obviously we'll be talking about the total situation in Burma/Myanmar,
our hopes for the imminent release of Aung San Suu Kyi, continued detention
of whom we continue to regard, along with the rest of the world, as
indefendible. We hope that the Burmese government will embark upon a
serious dialogue process. Its good news that they seem to have agreed to do
that with the United Nations but that has to be followed through with the
NLD and with DAw Aung San Suu Kyi in particular herself if anyone was to
have any confidence that the country is genuinely on the path back to some
kind of credible democratic processes. I'll be making all those points.
Q: Has Australia settled its review of its policy towards Burma?
A: No, we're still considering what the appropriate corse of action should
be and I certainly won't be rushing to judgment about that. Part of the
utility of this week is to have an opportunity to tald not only with my
counterpart from the country itself but also a number of coubtries
represented here to get their judgment as to how the situation is running
and what most usefully can be done to help advance it.
Q: Are your discussions with U Ohn Gyaw the beginning of constructive
engagement between Australia and Myanmar?
A: I'd prefer not to use that terminoligy, it has been a little discredited
in the context of our previous usages. The notion, however, of making some
kind of better progerss through dialogue, through communication, rather
than through brick walls is one that has some merits. I , ofcourse, have
spoken to U Ohn Gyaw on a number of previous occasions at the UN New York
and elsewhere so I'm not breaking any new ground in that respect. Australia
does maintain a diplomatic presence in the country, we have all along, so
we have always taken the view that there is some virtue in dialogue, in
developing a working relationship with the country. But there are of
course a number of limitations in that relationship at the moment in terms
of aid, in terms of non encouragement of trade, the absence of senior level
visits and so on, and it's a matter of judgment as to how much longer that
should be maintained.
Q: Does this review lead towards the ASEAN approach or is it leading the
other way?
A: I'm not in the business of anticipating in anything I've said to you. I
am going to spend this week constructively entaged in discussions with my
foreign ministerial colleagues from the region and elsewhere and that will
be a useful source of additional input in the review process.
Q: So Australia is not at odds with the United States with Burma?
A: I wouldn't use that terminoligy. Therer has been over the last several
years something of a difference in perspective between ourselves and North
America and Eurape in the sense that we, up to about two or three years
ago, were strenously advocating both military and economic sanctions and
basically with a policy of maximum , overt pressure and minimum dialogue.
Over the last two or three years we've taken the view that that was
proving rather unproductive and it would be better to focus on trying to
encourage the ASEAN countries in particular, who are much closer to
Burma/Myanmar than anybody else, to see what progress could be made in that
context, and I made that clear on this occasion two or three years ago. The
ASEANs have made the judgment that sufficient progress has been made over
those last three years to justify at least the country being herer as a
guest of the AMM, not a guest that's been immune to some degree of
criticism while it's been here , I understand, in terms of it being made
clear to them that they could do a lot more to bvring themselves into line
with regional and worldwide expectations. So, it's a matter of Australia
having put some weight behind that particular policy approach and now it
being a matter or really looking at where we've got to in the light of that
sort of approach over the last two or three years and see where we go next.
Bur I din't thind it's profitable to tald in terms of stark policy
differences between ourselves, the US or anybody else. We're all trying, in
our own way, to get some movement on the ground in the country and it's a
matter of judgment as to the best way of getting that.
Q: Last night Mr Michael Harris was on his way out after having meet Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi. He was terribly distressed, the feeling was that the
prospects aren't good for her release - do you think they are?
A: Well, the July 20 date, the anniversary, has come and gone. There had
been some hope that it might be the occasion for a major softening of
SLORC's position and it hasn't happened so far. The reference to the
dialogue process commencing in the United Nations is slightly encouraging
as is the reference by Khin Nyunt to establishing some form of direct
dialogue and, again, the possibility of that occurring in the context of
Congressman Richardson's further visit, all of these are straws in the
wind. But nont of thet's good enough and that is the view that's shared not
just by the US, by Eurape, by ourselves but is pretty universal.
Q: Are you satisfied with the present level of ..... in Burma?
A: No, in short the steps that have been taken to release political
prosoners to commence something in the nature of the discussion of
constitutional process is to anticipate the possibility of some dialogue on
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and, of course, to get some movement of a
coustructive kind on the border areas. They are all straws in the wind and
they are all useful developments as far as they go. But as I made clear on
many occasions I don't think they go far enough and I don't think anyone in
the world believes they go far enough, including the ASEAN countries
themselves.
Q: do you think encouraging investment in Burma will have a good impact on
democratisation?
A: Australia's current position is to neither encourage or discourage trade
and investment, and again it's a matter for judgment about which opinions
at this stage differ, as to whether the process of advancement there is
further assisted by opening up the economy with significant new investment
and forengn presence, or whether that would rather be encouragement for
maintenances of the status quo. Now opinions are divided on that and that's
one of the issues which I want to tald through with a number of my
colleagues here to try and get a better sence on how to respond on that
front.
Q: The Startlys will become a major talking point during the ASEAN Forum,
fo you thind it could become a major security issue?
A: We all know the South China Sea has the potential to flare up simply
because of the competingterritorial claims and the extent to which
countries have established a military presence there. But I don't want to
exaggerate and overstate that. I thind everyone wants to approach it in a
measured and diplomatic fashion. I'm sure it will be the subjuct of
discussion over the next couple of days both in the Regional Forum context
and in the more familiar ASEAN PME context. I am sure that there will be
quite widespread sympathy for the notion of preventive diplimacy developing
as a major arm of ARF's activity in future with South China Sea being a
very clear-cut example of the kind of area in which such activity can be
helpful in building upon, in that respect, the already helpful work of the
Indonesians with their workshops. So I don't think we should talk up the
Spartlys as a major problem area but we should certainly acknowledge it as
one of the reason why it is important to have this kind of security
dialogue and the accompanying strategies flowing from it.
Q: Indonesia has intimidated first Manila and now Bangkok over East Timor
conferences. Is that a step backward for human rights in the region?
A: That's your terminoligy and don't let me be taken as emvracing it. I
simply say here, as I said in the Philippines, that it is disappointing
that conferences of this kind have not been able, for whatever reason, to
take place. I don't think dialogue on these issues, including participation
of a whole variety of people, including East Timorese, does any harm and
may in fact do some good in the sense of exposing the issues and
encouraging, in this instance the indonesians, down the path of a more
substantial process of reconciliation than has been managed so far. The
point has been made over and over again by Australia and by many other that
if progress is to made in East Timor, it can only occur in the context of a
very significant downgrading of the military presence there, it can only
occur in the context of senditive economic development occurring and full
respect being given to the indigenous culture including, of course, the
Catholic culture which is a distinctive feature of East Timor, together
perhaps with some degree of political autonomy as well. That's what's
needed if the heat is to go out of that particular issue and human rights
are genuinely to be enjoyed by the East Timorese people. And if conferences
like this help to make that point clear then I would suggest there is no
harm done in them taking place. Equally, Australia's position is perfectly
clear on self-determination question. We accept the principle of self
determination but don't regard it this instance, as in many other around
the world, as necessarily requiring sovereignty, independent statehood. We
of course recognise indonesian sovereignty.
End/
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BURMANET: SOUTHEAST ASIAN LANGUAGES MAILING LIST
[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.thai ]
[ Author was Gwyn Williams ]
[ Posted on 19 Sep 1994 08:45:35 -0500 ]
SOUTHEAST ASIAN LANGUAGES MAILING LIST
(SEALANG-L)
Southeast Asian Languages Mailing List (SEALANG-L) is an unmoderated
mailing list and central electronic archive. It is maintained on
listserver@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx at NECTEC (The National Electronics
and Computer Technology Center), Ministry of Science, Technology and
Environment, Bangkok, Thailand.
The purpose of SEALANG-L is to provide an international scholarly
forum and central archive for the discussion, documentation, and
dissemination of information on the languages spoken in Southeast Asia.
The languages spoken in this region belong to five major language
families: Austronesian (AN); Mon-Khmer (Austro-Asiatic; AA, including
Munda); Tai-Kadai (TK); Tibeto-Burman (TB; a branch of Sino-Tibetan ST);
and Hmong-Mien (HM; also known as Miao-Yao). These are the core
languages which form the Southeast Asian linguistic area.
In addition to the core languages of Southeast Asia proper, SEALANG-L
extends to all languages of the Sino-Tibetan language family, as well
as all languages of the Austronesian language family, spoken in
Vietnam and Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia,
Java, and the Micronesian, Melanesian, Polynesian, and Madagascar
regions. Recently introduced European languages, such as English, are
included in the discussion.
The scope of discussion includes formal features of these languages,
as well as issues related to theory, research, history, relationship,
sociolinguistic situation, language planning, and teaching.
SEALANG-L Archive
All postings to SEALANG-L are automatically archived. In addition,
participants are invited to contribute files to the SEALANG-L Archive.
Possible contributions include online bibliographic files, dictionaries,
texts, scholarly papers, reports, and software.
Anyone, whether or not a subscribed member, can view and retrieve
contributions to the mailing list in the SEALANG-L Archive which are
accessible through NECTEC's FTP and gopher.
1) TO SUBSCRIBE
Mail to: listserver@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In the body of the message, type:
subscribe SEALANG-L yourfirstname yoursurname
Ex: subscribe SEALANG-L John Doe
2) TO JOIN IN THE SEALANG-L DISCUSSION
Address your message to: sealang-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Internet)
Or simply select the Reply option while reading a SEALANG-L message.
Any submission to the mailing list is immediately and automatically
distributed to all subscribed members and a copy archived.
LIST OWNERS
-----------
Mr. Gwyn Williams <gwyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Mr. Trin Tantsetthi <trin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Further information will be posted upon subscription.
*************************************************************
BURMANET: SUMMER BURMESE LANGUAGE STUDY
+++++++++
>From COMPTONC@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 1994 09:23:37 +0700
Reply to: sealang-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx
I hope this message is useful to all of you. At least some of your
students and friends may be interested!
SEASSI 1995
The Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute (SEASSI) intensive language
program will be held at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin,
USA, June 12 to August 11, 1995. Subject to minimum enrollment,
first-year,
second-year, and third-year levels of Burmese, Hmong, Indonesian, Javanese,
Khmer, Lao, Tagalog, Thai, and Vietnamese will be offered. Tuition will be
$1700. Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships, along with
full and partial tuition waivers will be available to qualified applicants.
The FLAS application deadline is Febraury 1, and the deadline for other
support is April 1; the course application deadline is May 1, 1995. For
applications and further information, contact SEASSI, Center for Southeast
Asian Studies, 4115 Helen C. White Hall, 600 N. Park Street, Madison, WI
53706; phone 608-263-1755; fax 608-263-7125; internet:
seasian@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
(PLEASE NOTE: For those unfamiliar with SEASSI, classes meet four and
one-half hours a day, five days a week for nine weeks. Applicants should
expect to participate fully during this intensive language program.
Carol J. Compton, SEASSI Language Director)
*************************************************************
ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET:
AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS
AFP: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
AWSJ: ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
BI: BURMA ISSUES
BIG: BURMA INFORMATION GROUP
BKK POST: THE BANGKOK POST
CPPSM: COMMITTEE FOR THE PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND
DA: DEPTHNEWS ASIA
FEER: FAR EAST ECONOMIC REVIEW
NATION: THE NATION (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
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