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************************** BurmaNet **************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
**************************************************************

BurmaNet News: Thursday, September 15, 1994

QUOTES OF THE DAY:

          "If any other countries want these people, please please take
          them."

                                   Wimol Wongwanich, Thai Army chief
                                   referring to the Mon refugees.


          "If you don't like the way we treat our minorities, take them
          yourselves."

                                   Adolf Hitler referring to the Jews.

*************************************************************
Contents:

1: FEER: STRINGS ATTACHED; US CONDITIONS ON MILITARY AID RANKLE THAIS
2: NATION: WIMOL WARNS ETHNIC MON ON GAS PIPELINE SABOTAGE THREAT
3: BURMANET: WHOSE RICE, WHO PAYS?
4: BURMANET: ICE ON THE ROADS IN THAILAND
5: BRC-CM: BROKEN PROMISES (THE WA PEOPLE OF THE SHAN STATES)
6: BURMANET: ARTICLE 19 PRINTS REPORT ON BURMA'S ENVIRONMENT AND CENSORSHIP
7: KHRG: SLORC ORDERS TO KAREN VILLAGES:  SET 94-D

*************************************************************
FEER: STRINGS ATTACHED; US CONDITIONS ON MILITARY AID RANKLE THAIS
September 15, 1994
by Adam Schwarz in Bangkok

The message mattered more than the money.  By quietly attaching conditions =
to
military training assistance to Thailand, the United States Congress struck
the two rawest nerves of the kingdom's foreign policy; Cambodia and Burma.

The move raised nationalist hackles across Thailand, where accusations of
supporting the Khmer Rouge faction in Cambodia or of coddling the military
regime in Rangoon are deeply resented.  "The people are not happy with this
kind of pressure from Washington," says chayachoke Chulasiriwongs, a
professor of international relations at Chulalongkorn University.  "If the
Americans want to stop their aid, let them stop."

On August 23, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed into law the 1995 Foreign
Operations Act, which carried two small provisions that may affect Thailand
in the future.

The first, which does not specifically mention Thailand, mandates stopping
assistance to any country "cooperating tactically or stragegically with the
Khmer Rouge in their military operations."  The second, which concerns aid
given to the Thai military under the International Military Education
Training (Imet) programme, requirest he U.S. Department of State to prepare
a report by February 1 "on the extent of Thai military support for the Khme=
r
Rouge and the efforts of the Thai Government to impede support for Burmese
democracy advocates, exiles and refugees."

The money involved is relatively insignificant, but Congress' implied warni=
ng
is harder to ignore.  In the current fiscal year, the U.S. has allocated
US$875,000 to bring about 100 Thai soldiers under the Imet programme.  Whil=
e
the Act does not set out a timetable for the possible cutoff of aid, the
threat of possible sanctions has injected another irritant into the U.S.-Th=
ai
bilateral relationship.

In the past year, ties between the two countries have been buffeted by U.S.
pressure on labour and intellectual-property rights, investment access and
allegations of drug trafficking lodged against several Thai parliamentarian=
s.

One U.S. official, speaking anonymously, dismissed the flap over Imet "as a
very minor hiccough in a fundamentally strong relationship."  But on the Th=
ai
side some are taking the matter more seriously.  In the wake of the Imet
decision, Army Commander-in-Chief Wimol Wangwanich questioned Washington's
commitment to friendly ties with Thailand.  "It is not proper to link the
Imet funds with irrelevant issues such as Thailand not agreeing with he
United States on all issues," he said.

Opposition members of parliament considered retaliating by cutting off
Thailand's financial contribution to the Joint US Military Advisory Group
(JUSMAG).  The agency, which coordinated military cooperation between the t=
wo
nations during the Vietnam War, today supervis
************************** BurmaNet **************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
**************************************************************

BurmaNet News: Thursday, September 15, 1994

QUOTES OF THE DAY:

          "If any other countries want these people, please please take
          them."=20

                                   Wimol Wongwanich, Thai Army chief
                                   referring to the Mon refugees.


          "If you don't like the way we treat our minorities, take them
          yourselves."

                                   Adolf Hitler referring to the Jews.

*************************************************************
Contents:

1: FEER: STRINGS ATTACHED; US CONDITIONS ON MILITARY AID RANKLE THAIS
2: NATION: WIMOL WARNS ETHNIC MON ON GAS PIPELINE SABOTAGE THREAT
3: BURMANET: WHOSE RICE, WHO PAYS?
4: BURMANET: ICE ON THE ROADS IN THAILAND
5: BRC-CM: BROKEN PROMISES (THE WA PEOPLE OF THE SHAN STATES)
6: BURMANET: ARTICLE 19 PRINTS REPORT ON BURMA'S ENVIRONMENT AND CENSORSHIP
7: KHRG: SLORC ORDERS TO KAREN VILLAGES:  SET 94-D

*************************************************************
FEER: STRINGS ATTACHED; US CONDITIONS ON MILITARY AID RANKLE THAIS
September 15, 1994
by Adam Schwarz in Bangkok

The message mattered more than the money.  By quietly attaching conditions =
to
military training assistance to Thailand, the United States Congress struck
the two rawest nerves of the kingdom's foreign policy; Cambodia and Burma.

The move raised nationalist hackles across Thailand, where accusations of
supporting the Khmer Rouge faction in Cambodia or of coddling the military
regime in Rangoon are deeply resented.  "The people are not happy with this
kind of pressure from Washington," says chayachoke Chulasiriwongs, a
professor of international relations at Chulalongkorn University.  "If the
Americans want to stop their aid, let them stop."

On August 23, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed into law the 1995 Foreign
Operations Act, which carried two small provisions that may affect Thailand
in the future.

The first, which does not specifically mention Thailand, mandates stopping
assistance to any country "cooperating tactically or stragegically with the
Khmer Rouge in their military operations."  The second, which concerns aid
given to the Thai military under the International Military Education
Training (Imet) programme, requirest he U.S. Department of State to prepare
a report by February 1 "on the extent of Thai military support for the Khme=
r
Rouge and the efforts of the Thai Government to impede support for Burmese
democracy advocates, exiles and refugees."

The money involved is relatively insignificant, but Congress' implied warni=
ng
is harder to ignore.  In the current fiscal year, the U.S. has allocated
US$875,000 to bring about 100 Thai soldiers under the Imet programme.  Whil=
e
the Act does not set out a timetable for the possible cutoff of aid, the
threat of possible sanctions has injected another irritant into the U.S.-Th=
ai
bilateral relationship.

In the past year, ties between the two countries have been buffeted by U.S.
pressure on labour and intellectual-property rights, investment access and
allegations of drug trafficking lodged against several Thai parliamentarian=
s.

One U.S. official, speaking anonymously, dismissed the flap over Imet "as a
very minor hiccough in a fundamentally strong relationship."  But on the Th=
ai
side some are taking the matter more seriously.  In the wake of the Imet
decision, Army Commander-in-Chief Wimol Wangwanich questioned Washington's
commitment to friendly ties with Thailand.  "It is not proper to link the
Imet funds with irrelevant issues such as Thailand not agreeing with he
United States on all issues," he said.

Opposition members of parliament considered retaliating by cutting off
Thailand's financial contribution to the Joint US Military Advisory Group
(JUSMAG).  The agency, which coordinated military cooperation between the t=
wo
nations during the Vietnam War, today supervises joint military exercises
such as Cobra Gold.  It also administers the Imet programme and advises the
Thai military on weapons acquisitions.

To the relief of U.S. defence-industry executives, the budget committee of
the Thai parliament decided on September 2 that Jusmag funding would
continue, at least for another year.  "We sell a lot of weapons to the
Thais," notes one U.S. official.

The budget committee took its lead from Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, who
adopted a low-key response to the U.S. move.  He dismissed the conditions
placed on Thailand's Imet funds as "not a big issue" and said they resulted
simply from "communications problems" between the two sides.

But analysts warn that the communications problems, if that is what they ar=
e,
may be difficult to resolve.  Although the Thai Government denies any
official knowledge of aid passing to the Khmer Rouge, some critics contend
that low-level military officers still maintain contacts--economic and
otherwise--with the outlawed faction.  An article published earlier this ye=
ar
by the former U.S. ambassador to Thailand, Morton Abromowitz, repeated this
allegation, much to the chagrin of the Chuan administration.

The situation in Burma may prove even more problematic for U.S.-Thai
relations.  The two sides differ on how to treat the military regime in
Rangoon and on how to get the regime to end the house arrest of Aung San Su=
u
Kyi, the leader of Burma's pro-democracy movement.

Recent events on the Burma border could further strain bilateral ties,
especially in light of the Imet language on the plight of Burma's exiles an=
d
refugees.  In Late July, Burmese troops attacked a Mon village near the Tha=
i
border and set fire to about 50 houses, according to refugees and aid
workers.  About 6,000 Mon fled their camp at Halockhani and settled at "new
Halockhani," just inside the Thai border.  Fearful of further attacks by
Burmese forces, the Mon refugees are resisting efforts by the Thai military
to force them back to the old camp. The military has erected a virtual
blockade around the new refugee settlement; a fact-finding team of U.S.
embassy diplomats and congressional staffers was denied entrance to the cam=
p
in late August.

Since August 31, soldiers from Thailand's 9th Light Infantry Division, base=
d
in Kanchanaburi, have blocked the Mon refugees from reaching their rice
supplies at the old Halockhani camp.  Information trickling out of the new
camp suggests that no more rice will be distributed until all refugees retu=
rn
to Burma.  "I'd call it a forced repatriation" says a Western diplomat in
Bangkok.  But most embassies will probably look the other way because no
overt force is being used."

Human rights activists and aid workers say the move to block food supplies =
is
part of a broader strategy by the Thai military to pressure the Mon and oth=
er
Burmese minorities into signing ceasefires with the Burmese military.


*************************************************************
NATION: WIMOL WARNS ETHNIC MON ON GAS PIPELINE SABOTAGE THREAT
September 15

The Thai military will take action agains t the ethnic Mon if they sabotage
gas pipblines between Burma and THailand following this country's decision =
to
buy natural gas from Burma last week, army chief Wimol Wongwanich said
yesterrday.

"We are not afraid of any threats.  If the sabotage took place in our
territory, a confrontation is unavoidable.," Gen Wimol said.

Last Friday, the Petrolieum Authority of Thailnd (PTT) signed a Memorandum =
of
Understanding with the Bumrese government to purchase natural gas at a cost
of US$2.52 per million BTUs, to be reaides to US$3 per million BTUs in 1996
when the gas comes on line.

THe Burmese gas deal has generated considerable controversy, rasing questio=
ns
about its ethical, economica and political viability due to human rights
abuses by the Burmese State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).

Wimol said Thailand had taken good care of the thousands of Mon refugees wh=
o
took shelter at a Thai border checkpoint after a July 21 raid by Burmese
troops on their camp at Halockhani.

Thailand repatriated them to Burma last week, after it was considered safe
for their return, he said.

The Army chief added that international human rights organizations should n=
ot
criticize Thailand for sending the mon refugees back to Burma because
Thailand is a poor country incapable of caring for the Mon indefinitely.

"If any other countries want these people, please please take them.  Thaila=
nd
can't afford to look after them.," Wimol said.

The repatriation coincided with the release of a report containing a scathi=
ng
attack by the human rights group Amensty International, on Thailand's
treatment of asylum-seekers, particularly those from Burma.

Thai authorities kept the refugees cut off from the outside world from Augu=
st
10 and from their own supply of rice from August 31.

The refugees have lived off rice soup and vegetables since earlyh this mont=
h.

Authorities have promised to reopem access to the rice supplies once the
refugees have returned to Halockhani.

*************************************************************
BURMANET: WHOSE RICE, WHO PAYS?
September 15

Thai Army Commander, Gen. Wimol Wongwanich is quoted in today's issue of Th=
e
Nation as saying that the Thailand has taken good care of the the Mon
refugees thus far but as Thailand is a poor country, she cannot afford to g=
o
on caring for the Mons indefinetely.  Gen. Wimol seems to be misinformed as
to who is paying the bills for the refugees from Burma.

There are at present, in the neighborhood of 75,000-77,000 refugees from
Burma in 29 camps in Thailand and three others just over the Thai/Burma
border [exactly where these camps are is a sensitive issue, in part because
border demarcation is purposely obscured by the Thai government].  Halockha=
ni
is one of the camps just inside Burma and houses about 6,000 Mon refugees. =
=20

Food is purchased for the refugees by a non-governmental organization calle=
d
the Burmese Border Consortium, which is made up of several church groups.
The current annual budget for BBC is about US$3.4 million, of which 97% is
spent on food aid.  This amounts to about 95% of all food and relief suppli=
es
to the refugee camps along the border.  Another 4% of the refugees food and
relief supplies are paid for by COERR, the charity arm of the Thai Catholic
Church.  Medicines Sans Frontieres (Belgium) also provides primary medical
care.

Among the major funding agencies at present are Dutch Interchurch Aid, the
Dutch government, Church World Service, the Australian Council of Churches,
the Anglican Church of Canada, Christian Aid, Norwegian Church Aid, the
Jesuit Refugee Service, Refugee International, ZOA Refugee Care
(Netherlands), World Vision, Catholic Relief Services and the International
Rescue Committee.

What the money buys is mostly rice, fish paste and salt.  The rice amounts =
to
16kg/per adult/per month and 8kg/per child/per month.  This is in line with
survival rations for emergency relief programs.  Some supplementary feeding
is also provided to pregnant and lactating women, underweight children and
tuburculosis patients.

Thai Ministry of Interior regulations prohibit the refugees from working or
cultivating the land, although limited "kitchen-gardens" are allowed adjace=
nt
to the refugees houses.  In the main, the refugees do not appear to be
competing in the Thai job market, either by camp-based industry (virtually
non-existent) or leaving the camps to find work (rare).

BBC is spending something on the order of $50/per refugee/per year.=20
Virtually all of the money is raised from church and charitible
organizations.  The Thai government probably does incur incremental costs f=
or
security.  However, the government will need to station police and troops
along the border for security regardless of whether there are any refugees
there, so it would be disingenious to assign these costs to "caring for
refugees."

On balance, there seems to be little evidence for Gen Wimol's claim that
refugees from Burma are costing the Thai government anything but political
embarrassment, and as that is related to attempts to forcibly deport the
refugees, is largely self-inflicted.  If there is any effect on the Thai
economy, it is probably beneficial. The $3.4 million dollars is spent mostl=
y
in Thai rice shops in Mae Sot and Sangklaburi.

It is worth noting that today's issue of The Nation also carried a report
that Gen Wimol defended the planned purchase of 180 tanks from the United
States.  Thailand will purchase the tanks and related equipment at a cost o=
f
$127 million dollars.  Said Gen Wimol of the purchase, "Although the tanks
have been used, they're of good quality.  Our country is poor and therefore
cannot help but buy cheap weaponry."

[The source of the statistics cited above are from year-end public reports
made by the Burmese Border Consortium.  BurmaNet makes no claim that the BB=
C
would agree with or support the conclusions drawn here from those public
reports.  Standard disclaimer in effect: I don't speak for them and they
don't speak for me.]

*************************************************************
BURMANET: ICE ON THE ROADS IN THAILAND
September 15

BurmaNet has credible reports that the drug "Ice" is now being manufactured
in Wa-held territory along the Thai/Burma border near Chiang Rai.  Ice is a
more powerful variation on a theme of methamphetamine; speed.  The drug is =
a
crystalline form of methamphetamine which can be smoked or ingested and is
analogous to "crack," which is the crystalline form of cocaine.

The target-market seems to be Thai truck drivers, who are already notorious
for their substance abuse.  Surveys in Thailand indicate that a large
majority of truckers already use amphetamines and these statistics are born=
e
out by the extremely high accident rates.  According to Bertil Lintner, a
writer who specializes on Burma and drug-issues, Ice is spreading rapidly
across Northern Thailand and can be purchased easily in many local gas
stations.

The people reportedly responsible for manufacturing the drug are the Wei
brothers, who are ethnic-Chinese but are powerful in the Wa Southern Comman=
d.=20
The financiers for the project are rumored to be Hong Kong-Chinese.  The
reason for its manufacture in Wa-controlled areas seems to be the proximity
to Thailand's expanding highway system and a pre-existing narcotics industr=
y,
complete with financing, trained chemists, as well as security and
distribution mechanisms.


*************************************************************
BRC-CM: BROKEN PROMISES
[Note: The Burmese Relief Centre-Chiang Mai is a small non-profit
organization providing aid to refugees, mostly along the the Thai/Burma
border including Shan, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Palaung, Lisu and Lahu peoples.=
=20
This report is from the July 94 edition of their biannual newsletter].

+++++++++++++++++++++

Although the Wa people are no longer losing thousands of lives by fighting
the Burmese Army, and the former guerrillas are now able to travel to
Mandalay and Rangoon, they are far from happy with their cease-fire
arrangement with Rangoon.

The Wa hills are situated in north-easter Shan State, and border China's
Yunnan province.  It was in this isolated area that the Communist Party of
Burma (CPB) decided to set up their north-eastern command in the late
sixties.

The CPB's predominantly Burma leadership promised development and improved
living standards for the impoverished Wa people.  In return, the Wa provide=
d
the bulk of CPB forces.

Yet over the next twenty years, the Wa saw no improvements to their lives.=
=20
Instead, thousands of Wa people died in human wave attacks against Burmese
troops in the name of communism.

By 1989 the Wa leaders could no longer endure the high death toll and
continuing impoverishment of their people.  They organised a mutiny, and on
the 17th of April, with very little fighting, the Wa rank-and-file expelled
the Burman CPB leaders across the river to China.

The Wa were then able to set up their own leadership, which was no longer
under direct communist control.  However they remained completely dependent
on China for access to food and medicines.

As they were unable to continue funding a was against the Burmese military
regime, the newly-formed United Wa State Party (UWSP) made a reluctant
decision to implement a cease-fire with Rangoon.

Unlike the rest of Shan State, the rugged mountainous Wa area has few natur=
al
resources.  It is difficult to grow food as the soil is very alkaline and t=
he
weather conditions are harsh.

For over a hundred years the only real means for survival in these hills ha=
s
been to grow opium as a cash crop.

In the early seventies the Communists tried to implement a crop substitutio=
n
program by introducing wheat.  But when a rat plague wiped out most of the
wheat, the villagers went back to growing the more hardy opium poppy.

The Wa have stated that following the CPB mutiny in 1989, their aim has bee=
n
to cut down he opium yield annually by introducing crop replacement
initiatives.  The Wa Army Chief Commander, Pao Yo Chang, says: "We know tha=
t
to grow opium and sell it is bad for other countries, and bad for our peopl=
e
too.  But we have to do it for our own survival.  Without development of
other industries, it is impossible to eradicate opium here."


As an encouragement to enter the cease-fire agreement, the Wa were promised
development and relief assistance by the Burmese military.  This included
hospitals, schools, roads and rice.

Today, over five years later, the Wa are still waiting for these promises t=
o
be fulfilled.

While the SLORC did indeed build a hospital, it was in Pangsang, where ther=
e
were two Wa hospitals already running.  This hospital has been unable to
operate due to a lack of medical supplies and staff.

Similarly, the Burmese regime did eventually build some schools, but as no
teachers have been provided, the schools remain unused. =20

The SLORC has been sending some rice as promised, but a recent incident
involving this aid has destroyed what little trust the Wa had in the regime=