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Article by Harn Yarngwe
Sunday Perspective:
Slorc's cease-fire talks -- an analysis and recommendations
>From January 13-25, HARN YAWNGHWE travelled to Bangkok, Chiang Mai
and Manerplaw. The trip was made at the request of the Oslo Group,
Prime Minister Dr. Sein Win of the National Coalition Government
of the Union of Burma and Chairman U Win Khet of the National
League for Democracy -- Liberated Area. The following is his
assessment.
IN the past, at least five different departments of the Thai
Government have been responsible for policy towards Burma: the
Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the Foreign Ministry (FM) the
Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the National Security Council
(NSC) and the military.
Coordination among the various departments has always been
problematic because of the vested interests of powerful
individuals within the establishment.
It was generally accepted that the PMO and FM were more
sympathetic to the Burmese democracy movement than the MOI, NSC or
the military.
The visit of the Nobel Peace laureates to the Thai-Burmese border
in 1993, which was a tremendous international success,
unfortunately changed the power structure in Thailand.
The FM was blamed for allowing Thailand to be used by the Burmese
democracy movement.
The State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) in Rangoon
also embarked upon a campaign to undermine the influence of the FM
by ignoring initiatives proposed by the FM. The Thai Foreign
Minister himself visited Rangoon in September 1993 to improve his
standing but returned empty handed.
In contrast, visits to Rangoon by the military and NSC achieved
great success.
The MOI also lost its influence as General Chavalit, the Interior
Minister, became more and more pre-occupied with his own political
survival.
This has left the field open for the NSC to push its own Burma
policy forward as the national policy.
Although the PMO and the military deny that Thailand has changed
its policy towards Burma and the Burmese democracy movement, the
NSC's policy is definitely the de facto policy in force today and
accounts for the hardening of the Thai position toward the Burmese
democracy movement within the last six months.
There are indications that a special joint-operations task force
will be set up to implement NSC policy. This will prevent the MOI
from directly influencing Burma policy on the ground.
Thai National Security Policy: According to the NSC, the three
most pressing problems faced by Burma today are:
a) National reconciliation between the Burman and other ethnic
groups,
b) Democratization, and
c) The illegal drug trade -- opium production.
The NSC concedes that, in the long run, a democratic system of
government is required to sustain national reconciliation in
Burma. However, it maintains that democratization and the illegal
drug trade are Burma's internal problems and do not concern
Thailand.
For the time being, the NSC is only concerned with national
reconciliation in Burma because it poses a possible threat to
Thailand's security. It postulates that, if the fighting in Burma
continues, the situation could deteriorate as in Bosnia and result
in a massive influx of refugees into Thailand.
The NSC is, therefore, determined to stop the fighting and
strengthen Slorc's position so that it can remain in control and
prevent Burma from breaking up.
To achieve its goal, the NSC is prepared to use whatever means it
has at its disposal to encourage the Karennis, Karens and Mons
along Thailand's border to negotiate cease-fires with Slorc.
It would also like to see all Burmese dissidents -- students and
others -- leave Thai soil. The NSC would like to send all Burmese
students to the `safe' camp or back across the border into the
jungles. The NSC has proposed to Slorc that it announce an amnesty
and take back dissidents. The NSC would be prepared to expel
foreigners and NGOs that oppose its policy or attack the Thai
Government.
In the NSC's view, if all Burmese dissidents are returned to Burma
and cease-fires are negotiated between Slorc and the ethnic
groups, Thailand's security will be assured.
Ideally, the NSC would like all parties involved in the Burmese
conflict to talk and negotiate a settlement, but in its view, this
is an internal Burmese matter. The NSC, however, would ensure that
Slorc makes some concessions to the ethnic groups.
Slorc's Cease-fire Offer: Based on previous Slorc settlements with
ex-Communist Party of Burma (CPB) forces and the Kokang, Wa, Shan,
Pa-O, Palaung and Kachin ethnic groups, it is expected that Slorc
will first negotiate separate cease-fires with the Mon, Karenni
and Karen.
The negotiation period could be very short as was the case with
the ex-CPB, Kokang and Wa groups -- or extended, as was the case
with the Kachin.
There is a definite possibility that the various negotiations will
be concluded before the Asean meeting in Bangkok in July 1994. At
the very least, some `significant' announcement will be made
before then.
It is expected that Slorc will grant some measure of local
autonomy to the various ethnic groups.
According to Thai sources, Slorc will adopt the `Yunan' or China
model where, for example, the Karen National Union (KNU) would be
allowed to contest local elections in the Karen State and become a
state government with limited powers. However, the KNU will have
limited input into national politics, which will continue to be
controlled by the military.
This means that a federal system of government is not negotiable
and the ethnic peoples will be relegated to the status of
second-class citizens. Ethnic states will also be further divided
along ethnic lines into sub-regions with local autonomy to further
weaken their political influence on national politics.
The consensus of the various groups along the border is that Slorc
will use the National Convention and the cease-fire talks to
demonstrate to the international community that it is making
progress in democratizing the political process in Burma.
This claim will be made sometime before the Asean meeting. Once it
is accepted by Asean and its dialogue partners, Slorc will appeal
to the international community for aid to develop the country in
order to maintain the peace.
Slorc is already using the Kachin cease-fire talks to encourage
foreign NGOs to come and help develop the border regions.
Recently, the Kachin Baptist Convention was allowed to invite a
number of foreigners to visit the Shan and Kachin States.
There is also the strong possibility that Slorc will move against
Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) to demonstrate that it is not
involved in the drug trade. Slorc has already moved up troops to
block the MTA into an area between the Salween river and the Thai
border.
The US Drug Enforcement Administration is reported to have warned
the Thai Government not to allow Khun Sa to retreat into Thailand.
Once Khun Sa is sacrificed, the US DEA and the UN will be
hard-pressed not to step up their drug eradication aid programmes
to Slorc.
Whether or not Slorc succeeds in removing Khun Sa, it has nothing
to lose by launching operations against him. Khun Sa is a product
of the Burmese military's strategy to undermine the Shan
nationalist movement and the military has long benefited
financially from Khun Sa.
However, his recent nationalist tendencies have become problematic
to Slorc. And although Khun Sa is known internationally as the
"Drug King", the drug trade in Burma is now controlled by other
Slorc allies -- the ex-CPB, Kokang and Wa forces. Khun Sa has,
therefore, become expendable.
Once foreign aid to Burma is restored, Slorc will consolidate its
position and try to weaken the democracy movement. When this
threat diminishes, it will withdraw some of the concessions
granted to the ethnic groups (the right to bear arms, etc.)
A government elected under the guidelines drawn up by the National
Convention could also be set up to win international approval and
to negotiate difficult issues with the ethnic groups.
At an appropriate time, the military could `legally' seize power
and once again `save' the country form disintegrating. General Ne
Win seized power from an elected government in 1962, claiming that
the proposal to amend the 1947 constitution to a federal
constitution was leading to national disintegration.
Observations: The current Thai policy to cooperate closely with
Slorc is a very dangerous one because it leaves Thailand with no
other options should it prove unsuccessful. While it may be
possible to argue that the current policy is good for Thai
security at the moment, it is dangerous to allow short-term
security considerations to override a nation's long-term foreign
policy options.
The Thai Government may feel it can distance itself from the NSC
should the policy prove unsuccessful or claim the credit if it
succeeds. The NSC may feel it can adopt the same tactic since the
current policy is being implemented by a Thai businessman who is a
personal advisor of the chairman of the NSC.
A similar arrangement was used by the NSC chairman and his advisor
in Cambodia for the Khmer Rouge. However, neither the NSC nor the
Thai Government will be able to deny responsibility for the
current policy if it fails, as was demonstrated in Cambodia.
While the NSC policy is based on security reasons, personal
motivations cannot be ruled out altogether. Both the NSC chairman
and his advisor resent US and other western influence in the Third
World. Like Slorc they subscribe to the view that Asians should
resolve Asian problems.
In the advisor's opinion, Thailand initiated the Cambodia solution
and invited the UN to help resolve the problem, but instead of
resolving it the Asian way, the UN agenda was hijacked by western
nations and Thailand became the culprit. Therefore, he does not
want the UN to become involved in yet another neighbouring
country.
The advisor has also had a business and personal relationship with
the Burmese military since the 1960s. He was the agent for the
US$1 million Thai fishing trawler that was blown up in January
1991 by dissident Burmese students.
The Thai NSC's analysis of the situation in Burma is seriously
flawed. Based on its familiarity with the poorly-organised Burmese
democracy movement on the border, the NSC has underestimated the
strength of the movement within Burma. It assumes Aung San Suu Kyi
has no real support and she is only being used by western nations
to advance their own agenda.
The NSC views the Burmese military as a potent political force
with 350,000 disciplined members plus their immediate circle of
beneficiaries.
Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, with its 2
million members, and the fact that it won 80 per cent of the
contested seats in the 1990 elections is conveniently ignored.
Based on this mistaken premise, the NSC has concluded that only
the Burmese Army has the capability and organisation to `save'
Burma.
The NSC further assumes that Burma is about to disintegrate
because the Burmese Army's control is not strong enough.
The reverse is true.
Burma is about to disintegrate because the Army has progressively
tightened its control on the Burmese population since independence
in 1948. The Army is the largest it has ever been, and the threat
of disintegration has never been greater. Strengthening the
military's control in Burma will accelerate the process of
disintegration.
The NSC assumes that ethnic conflict in Burma results from racial
hatred. Although various ethnic groups are involved and most
resistance groups are organised along ethnic lines, the basic
issue in Burma is not a racial one.
Apart from isolated incidents, the ethnic armies do not
systematically massacre other ethnic populations. In general, they
attack Burmese Army units and government installations, and the
Burmese Army itself is multi-ethnic.
The Burmese Army, however, does commit atrocities against specific
ethnic and religious populations. Racial hatred and mutual
distrust do exist, but have existed from the very beginning, in
1946.
Burma's ethnic leadership has campaigned for equal political
rights. Only when their rights were repeatedly denied and they
were suppressed by force of arms, did the ethnic groups resort to
armed struggle.
Even secessionist movements are fueled, not by a desire to be
ethnically pure, but by a desire to be able to control their own
destiny.
Cease-fires with a token freedom to engage in trade without real
political concessions at the national level will, therefore, not
solve Burma's problems.
The NSC is assuming that the Burmese population is poor and is
suffering primarily because of the fighting. It is claiming, if
the fighting is stopped, Burma's people will enjoy new economic
benefits and suffer less.
The Burmese population has resorted to armed struggle because 31
years of military rule has impoverished the land and reduced the
people to beasts of burden at the mercy of the military.
Stopping the fighting while ignoring the root cause of the
suffering and poverty will only aggravate the situation and
prolong the suffering.
The NSC is assuming that, given a strong Slorc, cease-fires, and
increased investments, Burma's economy will begin to develop
enough to satisfy everyone, and both political and ethnic issues
will be forgotten.
In order for a nation to be able to absorb investments and
develop, its economy and infrastructures must be functioning.
Unlike other developing nations, all infrastructures that propel
Burmese society and the economy have been destroyed by the
military in over 30 years of unchallenged rule.
Only a facade used to impress uninitiated foreigners remains. Even
the military, which was once the only functioning institution, has
deteriorated into a gang of petty warlords.
Increased investments will not rebuild the economy. The increased
cash flow will only benefit the power elite and serve to further
alienate the impoverished population. To have economic
development, the military's stranglehold on power has to be
broken.
Analysis: Given the fact that, since 1948 the Burmese military has
always opted for a military solution to Burma's political
problems, the fact that it is now offering to negotiate a
cease-fire with the various ethnic groups, is something to
consider.
Cease-fires are, of course, nothing new. Cease-fires have been
negotiated and broken numerous times in the past as political
negotiations failed.
What makes this cease-fire different is the fact that the ethnic
groups are being allowed to retain their arms and territory while
they negotiate for some form of recognition.
In the past, the military had always insisted the ethnic armies
had to surrender first before any negotiations could be broached.
This condition no longer seems to apply.
Considering the fact that the Burmese Army is numerically the
strongest it has ever been in its entire history, and it now has
the most modern weapons it has ever possessed, this change in
tactic is significant.
Why is Slorc not pursuing the military solution that it has always
adopted? The clue to this may be contained in the speeches made by
Slorc Secretary Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt inviting the ethnic
groups to cease-fire talks. He repeatedly asserted that the
invitations are not being extended " ... because Slorc is facing
difficulties in political, military, and economic spheres."
In spite of its increased repression of the civilian population,
Slorc has not been able to suppress dissent. Sporadic outbursts of
violence in different parts of the country attest to the tenuous
control Slorc has.
The recent knifing of a student by pickpockets in Rangoon gave
Slorc nightmares about a student uprising, prompting it to fire
senior police officials to appease dissatisfied students. An
automobile accident in Mandalay also became a cause for rioting.
Slorc may have turned Burma into a nation of 40 million hostages,
but, in turn, it has become a besieged invader in its own country.
In spite of having relocated millions of villagers to ensure its
safety, Slorc is safe only in the cities and behind the barbed
wire of its fortified military garrisons.
Slorc is also aware that its National Convention has fooled no one
domestically nor internationally. The unanimous resolution passed
by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 1993 made it clear that
the international community would not accept Slorc's continued
manipulation of the political process.
Compounding Slorc's problems is Burma's economy. In spite of rosy
forecasts and reports of growing foreign investments, Slorc has
not been able to attract enough investment to make up for the
losses in foreign aid. Burma's foreign debt has mushroomed to
US$47.5 billion while foreign exchange reserves grew to US$137
million in 1993, from a low of US$10 million in 1988. The foreign
investment Slorc has been able to attract has crated its own
problems. The cities are experiencing a mini-boom but the people
in the country are worse off than they were five years ago when
Slorc took over. Even the army units are having to resort to
living off the land.
To make matters worse, most of the small foreign businesses
investing in Burma are owned by overseas Chinese from Thailand,
Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Taiwan and elsewhere.
This visible Chinese presence, coupled with the massive influx of
traders across the border from China, is causing even Burmese
within the military to question Slorc economic policies.
There are indications that the military is also becoming
increasingly restive as General Ne Win grows older and his health
deteriorates (he is 84.)
All these factors lead to the conclusion that Slorc is not in as
strong of a position as it would like the world to believe. It is
important to realize that Slorc is not entering into negotiations
with the ethnic groups from a position of strength.
It is also important to know that Slorc is negotiating in order to
find a solution to the problems it is facing in order to ensure
its survival. Slorc is not yet looking seriously for a solution to
Burma's problems.
Slorc will negotiate with the ethnic groups but concede only
enough to ensure its own survival. Remaining in power is Slorc's
bottom line.
Another important conclusion to be drawn from Slorc's change in
tactics is the fact that Slorc is vulnerable to international
pressure. If Slorc had been able to gain international recognition
and foreign aid, it would not have bowed to pressure from Japan,
China and Thailand to negotiate with the ethnic groups.
Proposed Strategy: Given the conclusion that Slorc is vulnerable
to external pressure and that it will negotiate with the ethnic
groups only to ensure its survival, the following strategy is
proposed.
>From the way Slorc is conducting the cease-five negotiations and
from the above analysis, it is clear that Slorc wants to divide
the Burmese democracy movement into those fighting for ethnic
rights and those fighting for democracy.
Slorc knows that it cannot hope to continue to survive if the
various groups work together as a single movement fighting for
their basic rights and putting aside ethnic differences.
In conducting separate negotiations, Slorc is hoping to exploit
the divergent views and interests of the various groups and
completely separate the two issues of ethnic rights and democracy.
It is further hoping to weaken the position of the ethnic groups
by exploiting the differences that exist between the various
ethnic groups.
Any strategy that is adopted, therefore, must seek to preserve and
strengthen the unity that already exists between the ethnic and
other groups within the democracy movement. Communication is
vital.
It is also clear the Slorc's negotiation strategy is to concede as
little as possible while extracting maximum political mileage
internationally. Slorc is willing to grant limited autonomy to the
ethnic groups if this will ensure its survival and its ability to
retain control of the national political process. In other words,
if Slorc's strategy succeeds, democracy in Burma will be
postponed.
The negotiating strategy of the democracy movement, especially the
ethnic groups, must underline the fact that the basic rights they
desire include the right to determine the national political
system.
In other words, local autonomy without a say in national politics
is unacceptable. As full citizens, the ethnic people must have the
same basic human and political rights as their fellow-citizens,
Cease-fire negotiations must lead to negotiations on Burma's
political future, and all citizens, regardless of their ethnic
backgrounds, must be allowed to participate in the process.
Another obvious aim of Slorc cease-fire negotiations is to gain a
measure of international acceptance and with it a loosening of
economic purse strings.
While the people of Burma need assistance, the premature granting
of aid will inhibit the process of political negotiations
necessary if the problem in Burma is to be resolved.
Aid should be withheld until separate ceasefire negotiations
become a full-fledged political dialogue between the military and
the ethnic and other groups in the democracy movement.
Unlike in other countries, the government in Burma does not
provide for the people. They survive is spite of the government.
Aid to the government does not mean aid to the people. To ensure
aid reaches to the people, it must be delivered directly to the
people or the government has to be changed.
Economic aid, whether private or public, must not be resumed
prematurely. Cease-fire negotiations do not necessarily guarantee
that political talks will follow. Aid should resume only with
political change.
Possible Dangers: The main danger in this cease-fire negotiation
process is the Slorc might succeed in dividing the democracy
movement. The incident between the Karens and students reported by
the British Broadcasting Corporation is a case in point.
Fortunately, the issue was resolved quickly and peacefully by the
National Council of the Union of Burma.
The second danger is the Slorc might refuse to move from
individual cease-fire negotiations to a broader-based dialogue
with all parties involved in the conflict in Burma.
The third danger is that donor nations and well-intentioned NGOs
might prematurely resume aid to Slorc before it commits itself to
political dialogue and agrees to negotiate with both the ethnic
and other groups in the democracy movement.
The greatest danger, of course, is the Slorc may be able to
achieve all three of the above.
Recommendations: 1. Although the various ethnic groups have to
negotiate separately with Slorc, communications between the groups
must be maintained and enhanced to ensure that Slorc cannot play
one group off against the other.
2. Pro-democracy groups, especially those in the Democratic
Alliance of Burma and the NCUB, should refrain from publicly
criticizing member organizations in their negotiations. Support
and understanding for each other's position should be encouraged.
Dialogue is essential.
3. The ethnic groups should insist on wider participation in
political negotiations to resolve Burma's problems and not just
negotiate cease-fires.
4. A clear message should be sent to the international community
to continue their efforts to bring about change in Burma, in spite
of the cease-fire negotiations. The process needs to be extended
beyond the cease-fire negotiations Slorc is hoping to conclude.
5. Given that the ethnic groups will not be able to travel
overseas this year to lobby for their cause internationally, the
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma must represent
ethnic interests by lobbying both as the NCGUB and the NCUB. The
main focus will be the United Nations, Asean and Japan, and the
main request will be for the holding of tripartite talks between
the military in Burma, the democracy movement and the ethnic
groups.
6. All concerned should help to maintain unity among the ethnic
and other groups within the democracy movement. Visits and
expressions of concern would be useful, as well as material
assistance.
7. The status of students and other democracy groups in ethnic
areas during negotiations with Slorc need to be clarified. Their
freedom of movement and ability to function should be guaranteed.
8. Bangkok-based embassies should be encouraged to visit the
border areas to assess the situation on the ground and show
concern for the democracy movement as a whole.
9. Thailand should be asked to review its policy. It should be
commended for its desire to bring about national reconciliation in
Burma. But in the interest of its own future relations with Burma,
it should be encouraged to help bring about real change rather
than merely supporting Slorc's agenda.
10. Thailand should be encouraged to continue being tolerant
towards members of the Burmese democracy movement. Many of the
students in exile will, in the future, become leaders of Burma.
Their safety and freedom of movement are prime concerns. The
freedom of elected representatives to travel is another key issue.
11. Japan and Asean nations should be requested to assist Thailand
in persuading Slorc to have a dialogue with leaders of the
democracy movement as well as with the ethnic leaders in order to
find a long-term solution. Cease-fires alone are not sufficient.
12. The United Nations should be requested to implement the 1993
UNGA resolution by bringing about tripartite negotiations (the
military, ethnic groups and others in the democracy movement.)
13. The UN, Japan and Asean should be requested to refrain from
premature aid to Slorc. If any aid is to be given, cross-border
aid directly to the suffering population should be considered.
14. NGOs should be educated and requested to refrain from rushing
to Burma until real change takes place. They can start by working
across the border if they really wish to alleviate the suffering.
15. The US government should be encouraged to complete their Burma
policy review as quickly as possible and to decisively implement a
policy which will facilitate all of the above.