



(A.2)

## Constructive Engagement: A Critical Evaluation

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### Introduction

“Constructive Engagement is a euphemism for doing business with thugs,” so proclaimed former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan in referring to the US policy towards China. While this may be the view of its outspoken opponents, the proponents of Constructive Engagement defend it with equal fervor as an enlightened approach, and one that is frequently the only realistic option, in dealing with rouge states in the post-Cold War era of globalization. In essence, Constructive Engagement is a policy which advocates the maintenance of an economic and diplomatic relationship with an authoritarian state as opposed to imposing sanctions and embargoes on it. It has been described as “promoting economic and political ties, while at the same time pressing for democracy, open markets and human rights”.<sup>1</sup> Its advocates believe that in encouraging and participating in the opening up of a country to foreign investments, it will also be facilitating the opening up of the country to more information, as well as foreign liberal influences and views promoting a greater awareness of human rights and democratic values.<sup>2</sup> By remaining “engaged” with the rouge state, Constructive Engagement advocates also believe that countries are more likely to be able to exert influence over its government and push it along the path to political and social reform. This paper seeks to evaluate Constructive Engagement critically with a focus on its implementation by ASEAN and the United States vis-à-vis Burma and China respectively.

### The report card on Constructive Engagement in Burma and China

It has been almost a decade since the ASEAN nations commenced their policy of Constructive Engagement with Burma and 6 years since the Clinton administration did the same with China. It is timely now to examine if it has been successful in achieving better treatment of human rights and democratization in these 2 countries.

### Burma

By most accounts, Burma’s human rights record has not improved at all since 1990. The latest reports by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Burma lists a litany of unabated human rights violations including suppression of political activity, torture, non-observance of due process in the judicial system, imprisonment of political opponents, forced relocation, extra-judicial killings and forced labor. Even



on the economic front, the Special Rapporteur reports that it is “in a very weak state, characterized by extreme poverty, lack of food security. . .”<sup>3</sup> Burma has also incurred ILO sanctions for its practice of using minorities and the poor to do forced labor. The junta’s delegation simply responded by announcing in Geneva that it would refuse all future collaboration with the ILO.<sup>4</sup> The only “improvement” to speak of is that the International Red Cross has been permitted to visit select prisons and detention centers.<sup>5</sup> It is clear that Constructive Engagement has not worked at all in bringing about human rights reform in Burma. On the contrary, the regime, as shown by its attitude towards the ILO sanctions, may have grown even bolder in its repression, strengthened perhaps by the knowledge that it can always turn to its ASEAN neighbors for support and assistance.

### **China**

Despite the Clinton administration’s efforts, Constructive Engagement has not seen much success in bringing about change in China either. The White House’s report on the human rights situation in China admits: “Despite the clear expansion of personal freedom for huge numbers of Chinese citizens associated with economic reform over the past several decades, China continues to curtail freedom of speech, expression, assembly, association and religion. China maintains a one-party state that tolerates no organized opposition. Authorities engage in the extrajudicial arrest and detention of political and religious activists and restrict religious and spiritual practices”.<sup>6</sup>

The latest Country Report on Human Rights Practices on China issued by the State Department in fact states that “the Government’s poor human rights record deteriorated markedly throughout the year, as the Government intensified efforts to suppress dissent, particularly organized dissent.”<sup>7</sup> The Report goes on to describe the persecution of religious groups and “particularly serious human rights abuses. . . in minority areas, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other fundamental freedoms intensified.”<sup>8</sup>

In the midst of this gloomy picture, Constructive Engagement supporters take comfort from the fact that China this year signed the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and that the economic well-being of many Chinese citizens continue to improve.<sup>9</sup> It should be noted though that the signing of the Conventions does not mean anything unless it is backed up by action to safeguard the rights enumerated in them. In this regard, the latest reports by the State Department and NGOs<sup>10</sup> do not give reason for optimism. Economically, there can be little doubt that Chinese citizens now have greater opportunities than they did 10 years ago. That may be cited as an improvement on the record. However, the state continues to retain tight control over communications and information, with restrictions on the Internet and censorship of newspapers.<sup>11</sup> The expected information boom that was to accompany economic progress has not yet fully material-



ized. Further, many of the big players in the economy remain state enterprises. Any gains in the economic arena are in any case far outweighed by the “deteriorating” (to paraphrase the State Department’s Report) human rights record. Constructive Engagement must accordingly be judged to have failed to bring about any real tangible improvement in the treatment of human rights.

### **Of disguises and double standards ASEAN-Burma**

The most obvious objective for the ASEAN countries in pursuing Constructive Engagement is economic. Burma is a country rich in natural resources and her population of 50 million provides a potential market for the ASEAN countries’ products and services as well as a source of cheap labor. What was touted was a symbiotic relationship which would not only be good for Burma, but beneficial to the ASEAN members as well. In fact, in economic terms, this was precisely what happened. Singapore and Thailand are now 2 of Burma’s largest trading partners, after China, and with the Asian economies recovering, trade between the other ASEAN members and Burma can be expected to grow to even higher levels. A related consideration was that if ASEAN did not trade with Burma, Chinese business interests would simply take advantage of the situation to establish a monopoly.

A second possible objective of the Constructive Engagement policy is the achievement of political and strategic aims. Burma lies at a strategic location, nestled between China, South East Asia and India. She also has a coastline of some 1,700 miles which China could use to gain access to major waterways. Given her strategic importance, the ASEAN leaders must have been wary that China would cultivate Burma as an ally and try to assume an even greater influence in the region, posing a potential threat to regional stability and security.<sup>12</sup> There was ample reason for the ASEAN leaders to be concerned. Since 1991, the 2 states had been getting ever closer, beginning with the signing of an economic and military cooperation pact in that year. The junta had also bought Chinese arms worth almost US\$ 1 billion.<sup>13</sup> It is reasonable to conclude from the above that in deciding on Constructive Engagement, economic benefits as well as the potential threat of China to regional stability and security are likely to have been equally important considerations to ASEAN, if not more so, than promoting human rights and democracy.

### **US-China**

In adopting Constructive Engagement as the policy instrument of choice, the Clinton administration touted a free market economy and trade liberalization as the means to achieve political reform in China. However, it was not merely benefits to the people of China that the US was interested in. This is plain from the following extract taken from the State Department’s Report: “The United States seeks constructive relations with a strong, stable, open, and prosperous



China that is integrated into the international community and acts as responsible member of that community. The U.S. needs a constructive working relationship with China because:

- The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) plays a major role in the post-Cold War world;
- It is the world's most populous nation (about 1.2 billion people) and the third-largest in land mass (after Russia and Canada);
- It has nuclear weapons, is a growing military power, and plays a key role in regional stability;
- As one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China has veto power over Security Council resolutions dealing with key multi-lateral issues, including international peacekeeping and the resolution of regional conflicts; and
- China is undergoing extraordinary economic growth and promises to be a preeminent economic power early in the next century.”<sup>14</sup>

It is clear that US economic, political and strategic interests stood to gain from engaging China in a friendly relationship as well. In fact, it can be argued that the de-linking of human rights and trade shows clearly the true intentions of the administration. This argument becomes even more compelling when one considers that the US pursues completely divergent and inconsistent approaches in dealing with other less important regimes.

### **Double Standards**

Although in their records of human rights violations, the Burmese military junta and the Chinese Communist Party in power are equally notorious, the US chose to treat the two countries differently. With respect to Burma, “[t]he United States has responded to the regime's continued failure to end its repression and move towards democratic government with strong measures, including: suspension of economic aid and withdrawal of Burma's eligibility for trade and investment programs; an arms embargo; blocking assistance from international financial institutions; downgrading our diplomatic representation to Charge d'affaires; visa restrictions on senior officials and their families; and a ban on new investment by U.S. persons.”<sup>15</sup>

China however has drawn a different response from the US to its notorious human rights record. In place of “strong measures” is Constructive Engagement, a policy that is aimed at more economic and political cooperation and dialogue, not less. This is especially ironic when one considers that with respect to Burma, President Clinton had said that relations between the Burmese government and the US would improve only if there was “a program on democratization and respect for human rights.”<sup>16</sup> Surely, the question is: why not the same for China? China has **no** program for democratization, and the Chinese Communist Party has certainly not given any indication that it has even remotely



considered turning China into a democracy. Further, by the State Department's own reports, China's human rights record remains atrocious. The inconsistency in approaches smacks of hypocrisy and is sufficient to dispel any notion that Constructive Engagement is a policy that is primarily concerned with human rights and democratic reform. In fact, this view is supported by economic data as well as the strategic considerations outlined above. China is clearly much more economically important to the US than Burma. In 1997, the year when the US imposed the latest sanctions on Burma, the US imported US\$12.862 **billion** and exported US\$62.558 **billion** worth of goods to China.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, the US imported US\$114.90 **million** worth of goods and exported US\$19.9 **million** worth of goods to Burma.<sup>18</sup> The contrast could hardly have been more stark. For the year 2000, it was reported that the bilateral trade volume between China and the US was expected to hit US\$73.5 billion, an all-time high figure.<sup>19</sup>

The ASEAN nations are no less guilty of hypocrisy. They participated in imposing sanctions on South Africa. It is hard to imagine how the apartheid regime is more repressive than the military junta now running Burma. They also did not speak of "non-interference" in domestic affairs then. If the ASEAN countries were true believers in Constructive Engagement as the engine of change, they would have applied it to South Africa as well. That they did not speaks volumes.

### **Constructive Engagement as a credible alternative to sanctions**

It is convenient to start off this discussion by quoting the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister : "The choice of whether to use sanctions or constructive engagement has implications beyond the issue of persuading a nonconformist regime to adopt the norms of the majority. First, it affects the welfare of the people in the target country. Constructive engagement allows the majority of the population to carry on their lives without undue hardship. Sanctions, on the other hand, hurt the most vulnerable sectors of society first and hit them the hardest. And as long as the target government can suppress the opposition and maintain its grip on power, sanctions are unlikely to persuade the regime to loosen up.

Second, the choice of policy affects the overall bilateral relations of the countries concerned. Not only do sanctions not work, they also poison the climate and make dialogue more difficult. Where sizable economic stakes are involved, sanctions can hurt both sides deeply, while having none of the effect intended. Tit for tat measures can divert trade to other countries that have no similar compunction to impose sanctions, and may escalate out of proportion into something neither side wants. Engagement, at the very least, keeps the lines of communication open. The interaction and discourse that are a natural part of any relationship allows the exchange of ideas. And ideas that come from friends are more easily accepted than those that come from perceived foes. The choice



between sanctions and constructive engagement also has broader geopolitical ramifications. Where the nonconformist country is a major power or a pivotal player in the regional security equation, its response to the imposition of sanctions can be unpredictable, with disturbing implications for the region. Constructive engagement, meanwhile, allows the countries immediately concerned to maintain a dialogue with the target country and to gradually build confidence, even if only at a rudimentary level.”<sup>20</sup> I shall begin my analysis by examining the above arguments critically. I will then go on to examine the merits of other arguments both for and against Constructive Engagement.

### **Constructive engagement better the lives of the people while sanctions hurt them**

One main argument that opponents of sanctions cite is that sanctions hurt the most vulnerable segments of the population while not having any appreciable adverse effect on the ruling class. Iraq and Cuba are frequently mentioned in this connection. In contrast, it is said that Constructive Engagement, because it brings in trade and commerce, provides jobs and better the lives of the ordinary people.

A related argument which is used by advocates of Constructive Engagement is that foreign companies have a positive impact on the local civil society. Foreign companies offer better working conditions, training and technology transfer, higher wages, health and education benefits. Ernest Bower, president of the US-ASEAN Council argues that American foreign investment in Burma "is an extremely effective means of advancing economic and social development, and should not be abandoned in favor of measures which have no chance of success,".<sup>21</sup>

In China's case, NYU professor Doug Guthrie, writing in *Foreign Policy in Focus*, has this to say: "My research on Chinese factories shows that those which have formal relationships with foreign (particularly Western) firms are significantly more likely to have institutionalized formal organizational rules, they are almost 20 times more likely to have formal grievance filing procedures, they are more likely to have worker representative committee meetings, and formal hiring procedures. They pay significantly higher wages (about 50% higher), they are more likely to adopt China's new Company Law, which binds them to the norms of the international community, and they are more likely to respect international legal institutions.”<sup>22</sup>

Despite views like the above, many remain convinced that sanctions are the only means to achieve political reform in an authoritarian state. They point to South Africa as a case in point. Archbishop Desmond Tutu has asked the world now to again treat Burma as South Africa and impose tough sanctions on her: “International pressure can change the situation in Burma. Tough sanc-



tions, not constructive engagement, finally brought the release of Nelson Mandela and the dawn of a new era in my country. This is the language that must be spoken with tyrants --for, sadly, it is the only language they understand.”<sup>23</sup>

Aung San Su Kyi has also echoed the call for sanctions against Burma. Neither Reverend Tutu nor Aung San Su Kyi dispute that sanctions can hit the general population hard. However, they and many others are convinced that sanctions will ultimately starve the regime of political legitimacy and economic sustenance and force its capitulation. Apart from South Africa however, the verdict on the effectiveness of sanctions is still out. Cuba and Iraq are examples of sanctions having little effect on the regimes there.

### **Constructive engagement benefits the peoples of both countries economically**

It is argued that sanctions, by definition, takes trade away and hurt not only the economy of the target country, but that of the sanctioning country as well. In contrast, Constructive Engagement, which encourages economic exchange and trade, benefits both economies. This argument is not necessarily true because it assumes that engagement opens up the country to a true market economy fueled by the engine of private enterprise. However, in the case of authoritarian states such as Burma, that is often not the case.

In authoritarian or Communist states, the economy is largely state-controlled with limited private enterprise. Most of the major business entities that foreign investors will deal with are likely to be state-owned enterprises or businesses allied to the regime rather than private entrepreneurs, the true engines of commerce in a truly free market economy. This means that real beneficiaries of the business are the government and its cronies. Although it may be argued that there would be a trickle down effect, this is not likely to be substantial as if the country were a true market economy. Indonesia provides a good example in this regard. While the Suharto regime and its cronies got richer and richer from dealing with foreign businesses, the majority of the people did not get to reap the benefits. Unless the market is truly opened up in the authoritarian states and private enterprise is allowed to flourish, the argument that Constructive Engagement and foreign investments bring economic benefits to the people rings hollow. Sanctions may not work too because there would always be other countries that are willing to trade with the rouge regime and circumvent the sanctions. Constructive Engagement advocates therefore argue that trade is the better alternative.

This view has some truth if the sanctioning country imposes the sanctions unilaterally and cannot get the support of the other major trading partners of the rouge country. If the sanctions are multilateral however, like in the case of South Africa, and especially if the rouge state's main trading partners are par-



ticipants, it is arguable that sanctions can work. On the other hand, it is also not true that Constructive Engagement with its emphasis on economic engagement will work better. All that it may ultimately accomplish is to sustain the authoritarian regime without weakening its grip on power, especially if the economic activity in the country is largely controlled by the regime and its cronies.

### **Constructive engagement keeps communication lines open**

If any positive change is to be achieved, advocates of Constructive Engagement argue that a friendly dialogue must be maintained with the regime. Sanctions only provoke the regime unnecessarily and strengthen its resolve to cling on to power at all cost. It is unclear however whether persuasion has in fact worked. There has been only superficial change in the treatment of human right in Burma and China. It appears that even ASEAN is seeing divisions in its ranks over whether Constructive Engagement has worked. Thailand's proposal of "flexible engagement" which called for a tougher stance to be taken with Burma, met with resistance from the other ASEAN members (including Burma) and was dropped.<sup>24</sup> Indonesia can be cited once again as an example where dialogue did not work. Nonetheless, complete isolation is also not to be preferred. Instead, keeping communication lines open while not engaging the regime actively may well make it easier to start a real dialogue when the appropriate time arrives.

### **Economic development leads to political and legal reform**

It has been argued that trade liberalization weakens the power of government and that the institutional infrastructure of a market system is supportive of personal freedom and good government. Free markets, based on private property and consent, encourage individual responsibility, social mobility, and tolerance, which are all associated with human rights and democracy. As Michael Novak writes : "The capitalist preference for law and due process leads naturally enough to the ... basic institutions of democracy: the rule of law, limited government, separated powers, and the protection of the rights of individuals and minorities."<sup>25</sup>

Indonesia however is a case which defies the above theory. A free market for 30 years did nothing to change it from an authoritarian regime into a democracy with respect for human rights and the rule of law. An argument can be made though that Constructive Engagement and the economic development that it brings are more likely to lead to political reform by strengthening the hand of the moderates among the regime. Frequently, it is the moderates and progressives that push for economic liberalization. They are also likely to be more receptive to bringing about political changes which would include a better respect for human rights. If they are successful in bringing development to the



country and better the lives of the citizens as well as the leaders through the door of trade liberalization and a market economy, their influence in the ruling circle is likely to grow rather than diminish. They will then be in a better position to institute systemic political and social reform gradually in the country.

In this regard, I believe that Constructive Engagement is a better alternative to economic sanctions. No threat to the power of a regime can be more naked or direct than sanctions. A threat of sanctions is likely to breed a siege mentality among the leaders which will be fueled even more by the paranoia of the hardliners. There is also a danger that the hardliners will manipulate sanctions to cast the sanctioning country as an enemy of the people and rally the population around the regime. We can see this happening in Cuba and Iraq. States should therefore identify and support or cultivate discretely moderate leaders in the authoritarian regime who are most likely to champion reform if given the opportunity.

### **Constructive engagement strengthens the private sector**

One argument that can be made for Constructive Engagement is that it nurtures the private sector of the authoritarian state, bringing about greater economic freedom and weakening of state control over the economic life of the people. A strong private sector will encourage the fostering of the institutional legal and political framework necessary to protect property, contractual rights and trade. In turn, these will lead to a civil society with greater respect for civil rights. It is also argued that greater private enterprise will lead to the development of a middle class which is more politically aware and willing to participate in the political process.

How true this argument is in reality is difficult to quantify. In China's case, even as the state was liberalizing the economy, its control over political life remains strong, and some would argue, even stronger. For example, the flood of foreign investments and the increasing number of private enterprises have not prevented the CCP from placing restrictions on Internet usage in the country, which belies the prediction of the flood of information that was expected to engulf China.

### **Culture**

One reason that has been cited for ASEAN's adoption of Constructive Engagement with respect to Burma is culture. As one Malaysian foreign ministry official reportedly put it: "We prefer to do things quietly, the ASEAN way, so as to give face to the other side."<sup>26</sup> Cultural differences may influence the tack to take with a particular country. However, it can easily become a convenient excuse for carrying out one's own agenda, as is arguably the case with ASEAN's approach to Burma.



### **Geographic proximity**

Another reason is geographic proximity. It is an unalterable fact of life for the ASEAN countries that Burma is part of the region. "We have to live with the problem" is a common refrain among ASEAN officials.<sup>27</sup> Geographic proximity means that problems in Burma can and do spill over into her neighbor's borders. Good neighborliness however does not mean that one has to stand by and watch as widespread human rights violations occur, especially since one's interests may be affected by the violations, such as in Thailand's case where refugees from Burma have spilled into the country.

### **Sanctions not a credible threat**

Another reason why Constructive Engagement may be favored over sanctions is that isolation is not a credible threat to the repressive regime in Burma. It must be remembered that Burma had lived under self-imposed isolation for more than 30 years under General Ne Win. Isolation is therefore nothing new to the country. If sanctions were imposed, it is not hard to imagine that she would simply retreat into a shell and cut herself off from the rest of the world as she had done before.<sup>28</sup>

### **Doctrine of non-interference**

An important reason why the ASEAN countries went the way of Constructive Engagement is the doctrine of "non-interference" which the regional grouping had subscribed to from its very beginning. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said in 1996 : "Asean has one cardinal rule, and that is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. [The countries of the region] prefer to work quietly on issues of internal matters, and Western countries must realize that this [i.e. ASEAN] is our organization, not theirs."<sup>29</sup>

ASEAN believes that how a government ruled its country and treated its citizens, even if there were effects on the other neighboring countries, were matters which were strictly "domestic" affairs. Also, none of the ASEAN members wanted their own affairs to be publicly scrutinized. By condemning Burma, it would have set an undesirable precedent for open criticism of one another's treatment of domestic matters. Non-interference is certainly no excuse for standing by and watching people die and suffer under an oppressive regime. Non-action, like an actionable omission, is arguably as culpable as active participation in the abuses.

### **Fear of reprisal**

The ASEAN countries also claim that the junta will not give up power easily because it fears retribution by a vengeful civilian administration. One ASEAN official reportedly said: "The Western position sometimes is almost tantamount to telling Slorc to commit suicide. If you give them the choice that



the Western countries are doing -commit suicide or be isolated -of course they'll be isolated."<sup>30</sup> This is a problem that the international community has to deal with together with the people of the country ruled by the regime. Distasteful as it may seem, it may sometimes be better to find a way out for the repressive regime in order to persuade it to give up power rather than to force it to fight to the bitter end at enormous cost to everyone.

### **Constructive engagement legitimizes the illegitimate regime**

One of the main arguments against Constructive Engagement is that it grants an aura of legitimacy to an otherwise illegitimate government. This is certainly the case in Burma where free and fair democratic elections were held and a government elected through that process. The military junta that seized power does not have the mandate of the people of Burma to govern. By engaging with the junta, the countries that do so are recognizing that it possesses the legitimacy to represent the interests of the Burmese people when it has none and perpetuates the myth of its legitimacy.

Gaining friends in the international community also means that the authoritarian regime has others to speak up on its behalf and lend a voice to protect its interests on the world stage. In gaining membership to ASEAN, the military junta in Burma gained the backing of a powerful regional grouping, particularly in its skirmishes with the Western nations. Sanctions may not solve the problem either. As already seen above, isolation may have little effect on a country like Burma. What is required is engagement with specific aims, such as humanitarian assistance, aid and limited economic activity that makes it clear that the regime is being dealt with because it holds the reins of power, not because it has the mandate to govern.

### **Wither constructive engagement?**

The above analysis shows that Constructive Engagement is a seriously flawed approach to take with totalitarian regimes. On the other hand, sanctions are also unlikely in most cases to be effective in bringing about positive changes in a country and better treatment of human rights. What is required is an approach that steers a middle path between the two. With this in mind, I would propose the following. It is evident that isolation is counter-productive. It is necessary to maintain a limited dialogue with the regime. However, it must be made clear to the regime and the world that any dialogue with it is not to be interpreted as legitimizing it. It must be clear that contact is made with it not because it is the legitimate government of the country, but only because it is in power. The kind of indulgence shown to the Burmese regime by ASEAN must be firmly discouraged.

The country that seeks to engage the regime must also make it clear to the regime that it genuinely wishes to help the general population, and that human rights reforms, democracy and the rule of law will be beneficial to the



country. If the engaging country is a Western country, it must be especially careful as too often, well-intentioned Western governments end up lecturing the other country (which is likely to be a poorer, non-Western state) and provoking resentment, instead of trying to persuade and conduct a real dialogue where there is a frank and equal exchange of views. Trade and other economic activity should not be stopped completely as it hurts the people more than the regime. On the other hand, the kind of scramble that developed in the case of China and Burma should not be condoned as well. What is required is a concerted effort by the major trading partners of the rouge state to be selective about the kinds of trade and investments that they encourage.

One way of doing this is to encourage the regime to free up the economy to more private enterprise so that a true market economy develops. At the same time, the foreign companies could be encouraged to do more business with the private sector so that it can be nurtured and the state's economic controls weakened. Either general guidelines or a code of conduct could also be established for companies wishing to do business in the rouge state which encourages fair wages, good working conditions and contribution to the community, e.g. by helping to build schools and hospitals. Local talent should also be nurtured so that a middle class can develop. Participation in certain sectors, such as telecommunications, energy and transportation, is also likely to be more beneficial to the country than being involved in building defense installations.

Historical allies or neighbors of the rouge state can also help by acting as a form of mediator between the regime and those opposing it so that a peaceful transition to democracy and rule of law can take place. The ASEAN countries played such a role in Cambodia and there is no reason to believe why the same cannot be done in Burma.

Humanitarian assistance and development aid should not be stopped, although the granting of aid and its utilization should be more strictly scrutinized to ensure that the regime does not pocket the money. As things stand, it is clear that Constructive Engagement in its present form is unlikely to bring about changes in the near future. Neither are sanctions likely to be successful. If the above suggestions are adopted, I believe that respect for human rights and democracy will be more likely to emerge in the rouge states of the world.

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### ***Endnotes***

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