Introduction

Colonial Rangoon society embraced vast floating populations, constantly entering and leaving the territory of Burma, a province of British India until 1937. This situation made it difficult for the authorities to undertake police activities in the capital city of the province. Dealing with undesirable “outsiders” in Rangoon was an issue related to both the governance of the city and the border control of the province. By the 1910s, the Government of Burma and Rangoon Town Police discovered that expulsion of undesirable “outsiders” was helpful for preventing crime in the city. At first, this policy targeted Chinese riot ringleaders, but, during the 1920s, its scope was dramatically widened and the policy changed qualitatively. This paper deals with the early phase of this process.

From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, overseas Chinese were present in large numbers in the South China Sea region. For the emerging modern states in that region, it was common to utilize the economic resources of the Chinese network as well as to incorporate autonomous local Chinese communities into one unified, ruling state. As previous studies correctly point out, the government of Burma constructed its policy regarding the local Chinese population, especially in Rangoon, by referring to the early experiences of the Straits Settlements. However, the similarity between the two colonies
Discovery of "Outsiders" should not be overemphasized. Despite frequent cross-references, each emerging state developed a different system of governing the Chinese to meet its own needs and conditions. Because of a lack of primary sources, previous studies have not explained concretely how the policy was introduced and practiced in Burma. As a result, the chronology and the characteristics of the process remain obscure. Therefore, this paper aims to clarify these by analyzing previously unexamined documents and to locate the process in the wider context of urban governance in colonial Rangoon.(3)

Ⅰ. Disturbances in Rangoon Chinatown

After the annexation of Upper Burma into British India in 1886, British India, in its northeast of the newly acquired territory, shared a border with Yunnan, part of Qing China. The border issue became a diplomatic concern for the two powers. The policy on Chinese affairs in Burma began as a reaction to this border issue from the British side. In 1891, the special office of the Advisor on Chinese Affairs was created under the government of Burma, and a high-ranking official from the Chinese Consulate Service, W. Warry, assumed the post.(4) However, as the British Consulate in Yunnan came to play a larger role in the border issue, the importance of the Advisor on Chinese Affairs in Burma gradually diminished. Finally, the post was abolished in 1904. Afterward, such a high-ranking office for Chinese affairs was never established in colonial Burma.(5) It was at this point in time that governmental concerns for Rangoon Chinatown emerged almost simultaneously. During the 1900s, the government of Burma’s general concerns for Chinese affairs decreased relatively, but its priority shifted southward from the northeastern borderlands to the port capital of Rangoon.

In terms of demography, the number of Chinese in Burma at the turn of the 20th century was about 60,000, only 0.6 percent of the whole provincial population. These 60,000 Chinese were concentrated in two specific areas. One was the area along the overland trade route in the north where Yunnanese were traditionally active, and the other was the Irrawaddy delta in the south where Cantonese and Fukienese entered after British colonization. In the latter area, about 10,000 Chinese lived in Rangoon when the total population of the city was 234,881. Rangoon at that time was an Indian town. More than half the population was Indian from the eastern coast of the Indian subcontinent. The Chinese were still a minority group even in the cosmopolitan city, but they assembled in Chinatown, which was called Taroktan in Burmese and constituted a culturally distinct ward.(6)

Chinatown was notorious for its criminality and attracted attention from the authority. The Rangoon Town Police (RTP), established in 1899, published criminal case statistics by police station jurisdiction in their annual reports from 1902 to 1906. According to the statistics, roughly a quarter of all criminal cases in Rangoon occurred in Chinatown.(7) The RTP quantified and visualized their concern on Chinese criminality probably in order to persuade the government to take some measures. In December 1904, when the RTP raided a Chinese gambling club and some police officers were attacked and injured by a mob of
local Chinese residents, the authority was alarmed by the lawlessness. (8)

The RTP considered the most serious problem to be the rule of “secret societies” over the residents, and it required reforms to control them, as had been done in the Straits Settlements. After prolonged discussion within the administration under the newly appointed Lieutenant-Governor, Herbert Thirkell White, the government of Burma decided to borrow an expert officer from the Straits Settlements for a year in order to conduct research on this issue. Both the central government of India and the Straits Settlements agreed to this suggestion. (9)

II. Reference to the Straits Settlements

2.1. Peacock Report

As a result, an officer named Walter Peacock came to Rangoon in 1907. The 31-year-old Cambridge graduate had been employed for eight years in the Chinese Protectorate of the Straits Settlements before visiting Burma. He was a specialist in Cantonese, could also understand Fukienese, and had a sound knowledge of the Chinese written language. (10)

Peacock conducted extensive research in Rangoon and other cities in Burma and submitted a report to the local government in 1908. His report listed and classified 139 Chinese associations in the province of Burma. Among them, he focused on three powerful “secret societies”: Yi Hing Society (義興公司), Hoseng Society (和勝公司), and Kienteik Society (建德公司). Each had about 10,000 members and broad influence in the Chinese communities in the delta area. Yi Hing and Hoseng Societies made use of the same ritual in their initiations as the Triad Society (三合會) in China. Kienteik Society was established in Penang and was not related to the Triad Society directly but had a similar organization. All three in Burma were originally branches of the same societies in the Strait Settlements. After the suppression of the parent societies in the Straits Settlements, Rangoon branches began to rule other Burma branches. They were joined by people speaking different dialects of Chinese, but there was a tendency for the Cantonese to join Yi Hing Society and for the Fukienese to join Hoseng or Kienteik Societies. (11)

The serious and direct threat to order was the strife between Hoseng Society and Kienteik Society. The antagonism between these mainly Fukienese societies had intensified since around 1905, and violent disputes were frequent in Rangoon and the surrounding delta areas. In upcountry disturbances, it was often that a gang of ruffians was sent from each headquarters in Rangoon, and when they were arrested, court fees were paid by the society. Regarding Cantonese, though the majority of them belonged to Yi Hing Society, they often also belonged to guild-like associations called “hongs.” Among those “hongs,” Lee Sheng Hong (利城行) and Lo Sheng Hong (魯城行), which had a few thousand members each, had regularly confronted each other since the end of the 19th century. (12) What socioeconomic interests existed behind these conflicts between such similar associations is not clear. At the present stage of research, it can be only inferred that these conflicts occurred within a rather closed ethnic community, either Fukienese or Cantonese, which is a segment of the plural society in the Burma delta.
Hitherto the government of Burma had not interfered with these conflicts and put their solution into the hands of the Chinese themselves. However, as the Hoseng-Kienteik strife began to affect a wider area, the possibility increased that it would threaten the whole colonial society beyond narrow segments. Peacock criticized the previous attitude of the government and proposed reforms based on the Straits Settlements’ experiences since the 1870s.

The principal object of the proposed reforms was to strengthen direct control over Chinese “secret societies.” First, its linchpin was reestablishment of the Advisor on Chinese Affairs. Like the Chinese Protectorate in the Straits Settlements, such a special office led by a high-ranking British officer who could understand Chinese languages was considered necessary for collecting information from the Chinese population directly and scrutinizing it effectively. Second, it was expected that this special office imposed compulsory registration on all Chinese associations. This could give the government power to ban or abolish defiant associations. Third, this power could be exercised under threat of expulsion. Because in cases on Chinese “secret societies” it was difficult to induce reliable witnesses to come forward to give evidence before a court, the government needed executive proceedings for deciding expulsion, which was different from regular judicial proceedings. Targets of expulsion were not only the headmen of defiant associations but also habitual criminals. Fourth, the Chinese Advisory Board would consist of influential Chinese in Rangoon. It was supposed to mediate between the administration and the Chinese residents. Previously, the government of Burma had appointed four influential Chinese as honorary magistrates in Rangoon. Peacock proposed to enlarge this by establishing the Advisory Board and to hold regular meetings under the special office for Chinese affairs.(13)

2.2. Establishment of the Chinese Advisory Board

The government of Burma did not accept all of Peacock’s proposals. The government rejected measures that required new legislation and additional costs on the ground that “in Rangoon the Chinese are a small fraction of the population of the town and not enough to be a menace to the public safety.”(14) In the end, the government of Burma adopted two measures within the existing legal framework: expulsion and the Chinese Advisory Board.

Expulsion policy was introduced in order to resolve the strife between Hoseng and Kienteik. The policy utilized an existing Indian law, the Foreigners Act of 1864. This act gave the central and local governments power to deport non-British-subjects from the territory of British India.(15) Most Chinese in Burma were born in China and were completely foreign “outsiders.” Following Peacock’s report, in October 1908, the government of Burma ordered the Commissioner of the RTP to choose persons who should be deported by the Foreigners Act. After consulting with both Tan Chong Yen (陳昌淵?), the headman of Hoseng, and Tan Soon Chye (陳順在?), the headman of Kienteik, on the basis of Peacock’s investigation, the RTP chose four Chinese who were considered inciters of disturbances and were involved in unlawful activities such as the illicit sale of drugs and gambling.(16) Although their deportation was not immediately executed, as serious disturbances occurred again in 1909, the government of Burma issued expulsion orders for the first time for the three of them on October 17, 1909, after the remaining one had already gone abroad.
Immediately after the first expulsion orders, on October 20, 1909, the government of Burma established the Chinese Advisory Board (CAB), appointing 16 influential Chinese in Rangoon as its members. Because the special office for Chinese affairs was not established, the CAB was put under the Commissioner of the RTP. Members’ terms were usually two years. Of the original 16 members, there were eight Fukienese, seven Cantonese, and one Hakka, and this included both headmen of two antagonistic societies, Hoseng and Kienteik. The CAB was organized to reflect various interests in the Rangoon Chinese communities.(17)

The CAB played an important role in the expulsion policy during the 1910s. While the first selection of deportees was based on Peacock’s investigation, after the establishment of the CAB, the following procedure became normal. First, the CAB would meet and choose people to be deported. Then, the RTP and the local government would almost automatically confirm the choice and issue expulsion orders to deportees.(18) Without its own department for investigating Chinese communities effectively, the government of Burma did not choose deportees by themselves and delegated the power to the CAB. Although the government of Burma referred to the Straits Settlements, where strong direct rule had been established since the 1870s, the system created in Burma was that of indirect rule in nature. This system gave Chinese members of the CAB considerable agency.

III. Practices of Expulsion in the 1910s

3.1. Returners, Absconders, and the Politics of Expulsion

From 1909 to 1921, a total of 34 deportation orders were issued on the basis of CAB proposals.(19) 31 individuals were actually deported, as three orders were later withdrawn.(20) In the first two years, targets of deportation were riot ringleaders in the Hoseng-Kienteik conflicts in the late 1900s. The RTP’s 1910 annual report evaluated the effect of this measure by writing that “the turbulent Hooseng [sic] and Kienteik societies have been made to ‘toe to line’ by the application of the Foreigners Act.”(21) After 1911, deportees were people such as those who did not have a proper livelihood, stayed in gambling houses or brothels, or habitually engaged in blackmailing or violence. The CAB and the authority designated these trouble-prone people as “bad characters” and aimed to maintain order by excluding them preventively. In Chinatown, large-scale disturbances such as those in the 1900s were never reported during the 1910s and 1920s. Expulsion was an effective deterrent.

However, the practice of expulsion was not simply a representation of the government’s will. First, there were probably a considerable number of returners. Among the 31 people who were deported by 1921, at least seven returned to Burma without permission and were arrested and deported again. One even returned again after re-expulsion.(22) These cases were recorded on colonial documents through detection, but it is possible that there were more cases undetected.

Second, the broad discretion of the CAB in choosing deportees seemed to cause a power struggle among the Chinese. Let us take a look at several cases. The first is that of a returned deportee who was a member of the Kienteik Society.(23) In 1910, after being
arrested, he made the following statement:

All the members of the “Kien Teik” Society have to pay Tan Soon Chye Rs. 12 yearly, otherwise they are denounced to the authorities as bad characters.\(^{(24)}\)

Tan Soon Chye was the headman of the Kienteik Society and a member of the CAB. Being denounced to the authorities as bad characters doubtlessly meant being chosen as deportees. This deportee attempted to emphasize the illegitimacy of the CAB’s decision making, but he failed to persuade the authority and was finally deported again. It remains unclear whether his statement was true or not. But power assigned to the CAB probably enhanced its members’ personal authority over their followers.

The next case is that of an absconder.\(^{(25)}\) The man was one of three who were first issued deportation orders on October 17, 1909. He absconded immediately after the issuance of the order, and the authority lost track of him, but one year later he was detected in Henzada. He appealed to the authority that he was not the kind of person who should be deported, and his petition was submitted with guarantee letters from his supporters. Among them, the company Eng Ben Hwet & Co. was included.\(^{(26)}\) Eng Ben Hwet was a trading firm in Rangoon that had branches in Calcutta, Singapore, and Amoy, and its proprietor, Tan Kim Chye (陳金在?), was from one of the most influential Chinese families in Rangoon, and he himself was the vice president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce there.\(^{(27)}\) However, he was not a member of the CAB at that time, though he got the position a few years later.\(^{(28)}\) The result was that the petition was not accepted by the authority and the absconder was deported.

Another case followed a different path.\(^{(29)}\) At a CAB meeting in November 1913, all nine members present unanimously named one Kienteik member to be deported. After the deportation order was issued, the deportee also wrote a petition to the lieutenant-governor for withdrawal of the order. In the petition, he wrote:

Your memorialist believes that the Commissioner of Police, in recommending to Your Honour the application for the Foreigners Act, was influenced by the opinion of some of the members of the Chinese Advisory Committee, who were either wholly misinformed by the personal enemies of your memorialist, or who, in some cases, did not personally entertain any friendly feeling towards your memorialist.\(^{(30)}\)

This time, support came not only from his fellows in Rangoon but also from Tan Soon Chye, the headman of the Kienteik Society and a member of the CAB. In fact, Tan Soon Chye was absent from the meeting of the CAB when the petitioner was named as a deportee, so he objected to this decision and requested the government withdraw the deportation order. This resulted in the withdrawal of the deportation order.

These cases suggest that Chinese seeking help, whether a deportee petitioning the government or a maneuverer attempting to trap rivals, would look to an influential Chinese person with whom they had a personal connection. For the influential Chinese person to fulfill his followers’ expectations, CAB membership seems to have been important. The
CAB itself was not monolithic at all. In deciding who should be deported, politics were at work within the CAB. The CAB, which reflected various interests in the Rangoon Chinese communities, was thus only barely achieving a delicate balance. However, we do not have enough administrative documents to understand the relationships among CAB members. This demonstrates that the colonial authority could not understand the internal affairs of the Chinese communities.

3.2. Deporting Revolutionary Newcomers: the Kuang-hua Case

In addition to expulsion by the usual procedure through the CAB, there was an exceptional case involving the expulsion of political undesirables. That was the *Kuang-hua* (光華日報) case in 1910, in which the government of Burma expelled the publisher and editor of the Chinese revolutionary newspaper in response to a request from Qing China.\(^{(31)}\) While this case developed in the same period in which the expulsion policy of the Foreigners Act commenced in Burma, it also overlapped with the period when revolutionary sentiments arose inside and outside the Chinese continent.

Among Chinese in Burma, sympathy with anti-Manchu revolutionary ideas began to spread beginning in the mid-1900s. In March 1908, the Tongmenghui (Chinese Alliance, 中国同盟会) established its Rangoon branch.\(^{(32)}\) It published *Kuang-hua* in Rangoon as its organ. Of course, the tone of the newspaper was offensive to the imperial court of the Qing Dynasty. At the end of 1908, the Chinese government, through the governor-general of Yunnan and Kueichou (雲貴總督), requested that the British consul-general for Yunnan and Kueichou suppress the newspaper.\(^{(33)}\) Then, the consul-general telegrammed the government of Burma about that. After consulting with the central government of India, the local government of Burma decided not to suppress the newspaper on the ground that the policy of the British government was one of non-intervention in regard to notices in the press. Afterward, the Qing government not only continued to appeal through the British consulates in China but also put direct pressure on the government of Burma through its consulate in Rangoon, newly established in January 1909.\(^{(34)}\)

The government of Burma changed its attitude gradually. In December 1909, Chief Secretary W. F. Rice proposed to Lieutenant-Governor H. T. White that the government should warn the manager of *Kuang-hua* to change its tone, and if he did not he should be deported. Rice continued that “such a warning, in view of recent events, would probably have a good effect.”\(^{(35)}\) The “recent events” mentioned here were the first issuances of expulsion orders two months earlier. However, at this stage, Lieutenant-Governor White was reluctant to give such a warning.

In February 1910, the Chinese consul in Rangoon informed the government of Burma that *Kuang-hua* was established out of funds provided by “the anarchists, who are known in Burma under the guise of ‘Kaik Beng’ or Reformers” and that “the ‘Kaik Beng’ movement is spreading very rapidly in Burma, as the result of less than two years’ active propaganda, and shows a membership of about 1,000.”\(^{(36)}\)

This information likely concerned the government of Burma. After consulting the commissioner of the RTP, Rice confirmed that both two persons in charge of *Kuang-hua*, the publisher Chin Wan Peng and the editor Liu Kok Seng, were foreigners who recently
arrived in Burma about two years previously. Rice proposed to White again to threaten them with expulsion. The reason Rice insisted so was that “these people are like Krishnavarma, who lives in Paris, and publishes a seditious paper about the British Government of India,” and “it is detrimental to the interests of the Province that the Chinese Government should think that we are voluntarily harbouring people of this sort.” By emphasizing analogies between Indian revolutionaries to the British and Chinese revolutionaries to the Qing, Rice attempted to persuade his superior for the sake of the interests of the province of Burma. Despite having discretion to issue an expulsion order, White remained prudent and made Rice ask the opinion of the central government of India. The reply from the central government went beyond warning and claimed that the managers of Kuang-hua should be deported immediately. Only then were the expulsion orders to Chin Wan Peng and Liu Kok Seng issued on March 24, 1910.

Any non-British-subject could be expelled by the Foreigners Act of 1864. Therefore, the potential scope of expulsion was originally very large. As far as I have seen from colonial documents, it was not until 1909 that the power was exercised by the local government of Burma, but once the measure was put into practice, the range of targets was summarily enlarged from riot ringleaders to revolutionaries, from criminals to political offenders. In the case of political offenders, expulsion procedure was quite different from usual procedure in cases of criminals. That was, expulsion was decided directly by the European top officials without consulting the CAB. In the Kuang-hua case, the opinion of Chief Secretary Rice concerning the interests of the province was strongly reflected in the decision.

3.3. Chinese Merchants as Political Threats

The Kuang-hua case turned the local government’s attention to the political activities of Chinese in Burma. Chief Secretary Rice ordered the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the provincial police to investigate the information offered by the Chinese consul in February 1910. The CID reported that the revolutionary movement arose not only in mainland China but also in the Straits Settlements, and its organization had 4,000 members in Burma, of which 2,000 were in Rangoon. This organization seems to have been the Tongmenghui, but the contemporary British authority did not call it so. Taw Sein Ko, Examiner-of-Chinese of Burma, pointed out that this organization was called the “Kei Ming Tang” in Burma. Since then, the British authority in Burma called the organization Kei Ming Tang or Geh Min Dan, which might be phonetic transcription of “革命党,” the Revolutionary Party, but this has not yet been confirmed by Chinese sources.

In these circumstances, Cheng Gun Ann (莊銀安) emerged as a central figure in the Chinese revolutionary movements in Burma. He was broadly known as the person whose opinions most strongly affected the tone of Kuang-hua. Although the government investigated him under consideration of expulsion, finally the expulsion order was not issued to him. This reason was not recorded in the file, but, considering the deportees in the Kuang-hua case were emphasized to be recent arrivals to Burma, it is possible that the government was more unwilling to expel a long-time-Rangoon-based merchant such as Cheng.
Even after the Xinhai Revolution, the Chinese political threat to the local government did not diminish. On June 29, 1912, the General Staff Officer in the Burma Division of the Indian Army sent the Chief Secretary to the government of Burma an extract from a report by an intelligence officer relating to Chinese intrigue in Burma. The report stated that the Chinese had in view the liberation of Burma from British rule. Behind this there was increased tension between the British and China in the Yunnan-Burma border. On the ground of a Chinese “invasion” of the disputed boundary area, Pienma (片馬), which was called Hpimaw in Burma, the British dispatched the military there at the end of 1910 and seized the region by late 1911.

The government of Burma collected the information not only in collaboration with the Indian Army but also through its own CID. After the investigation, it was found that around the same time of the border incident, four Chinese belonging to the Rangoon branch of “Geh Min Dan” went to main cities in Upper Burma to collect subscriptions and to carry out propaganda activities. These four included such prominent Chinese as Ko Ban Pan (高万邦), a member of the CAB, and Teoh Eng Hock (張永福), the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The government attempted to investigate if they had British subjectship in consideration of expulsion, but again the expulsion orders for them were not issued.

By the end of 1913, it was found that the organization locally called “Kei Ming Tang” or “Geh Min Dan” had been reorganized after the Xinhai Revolution as the “Kuo Min Tan” (國民黨) and that in Rangoon it promoted activities supporting Sun Yat-sen under the name of the “Kak Min Society” (覺民書報社). During the same period, the Second Revolution against Yuan Shikai developed in mainland China. In 1914, Yuan’s government of the Republic of China began to request the government of Burma suppress the Kak Min Society. Suggesting that some members of the Kak Min Society in Rangoon participated in rebellions in China, the Chinese government, through its consul in Rangoon, described the society as “a serious menace to the peace and tranquility of Yünnan Province.” The names of three merchants in Rangoon, Teoh Eng Hock, Tan Chow Chaw (陳朝初), and Tan Soo Kim (陳守金), were mentioned by the Chinese consul as leaders of the Kak Min Society. This time, also, the government of Burma only investigated their British subjectship and took no other action.

Thus, during the early 1910s, the turbulent years in China, Yunnan next to Burma grew to be a strong power with a modernized army from its harsh experience of the revolution. Burma was located on the route connecting land-locked Yunnan with the sea. At the node of the Chinese network, Rangoon-based Chinese merchants became increasingly involved in revolutionary movements. These circumstances prevented the Government of Burma from considering Rangoon and the border area separately. The government monitored Chinese with its police apparatus and the help of the army. Though the government of Burma rarely resorted to expulsion measures, the relationships between the government and Chinese elites seemed to change to a certain extent. According to research by the RTP, Teoh Eng Hock was the son-in-law of Tan Seik Kwa, who was a member of the CAB. In April 1914, immediately after the Chinese consul mentioned the three leaders of the Kak Min Society, the commissioner of the RTP reshuffled the CAB and removed the above-mentioned Ko Ban Pan and Tan Seik Kwa on the grounds of advanced age and absence
from meetings, respectively. It was possible that the government attempted to get rid of politically undesirable elements from the CAB.

IV. Exclusion or Inclusion?

4.1. The Discourse of “Peaceful Penetration”

In the late 1910s, another kind of discourse on Chinese threats emerged in the administration. Its early example was the report in 1917 written by Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Nethersole, the deputy commissioner of Tarrawaddy District in Pegu Division. In analyzing the reason for the district’s notoriously high criminality, Nethersole mentioned the existence of the illicit Chinese opium trade. Although this was not considered the main factor in the district’s high criminality, he emphasized that “the Chinese are an unmixed curse to the moral well-being of the people and to the local administration.” At almost the same time, in Irrawaddy Division also, the commissioner sent a letter of inquiry to deputy commissioners about the increased Chinese presence in each district and their involvement in illicit alcohol and opium trade. Now, neither violent disturbances nor revolutionary activities but banal Chinese activities were considered to negatively affect the whole of Burmese society.

In February 1918, during World War I, Reginald Craddock, who had been the home member of the Executive Council in the central government of India, was inaugurated as the new lieutenant-governor of Burma. Paying attention to the Nethersole report, the Craddock government stated that “the dangers of ‘peaceful [Chinese] penetration’ have been made clear,” and “action to protect the indigenous population is necessary and it is desirable that a definite policy should be prescribed.” The Chinese population in Burma, especially in the delta, had increased. As the rice industry developed in the delta, Chinese spread to a wider area and rooted deeper in the society. They could not be closed within segments of the plural society anymore. Under these circumstances, the government decided to strengthen direct control over the Chinese population, and restoration of the Advisor on Chinese Affairs, one of Peacock’s proposals rejected 10 years earlier, was to be reconsidered.

On this attempted policy change, some problems of previous policy were acknowledged. First, the government showed its distrust of the CAB. In the letter to solicit approval of the government of India, the following words of the commissioner of the RTP were cited.

The Chinese Advisory Board has proved useful, but at the same time when presiding at the meetings I always feel very suspicious and doubtful of all proposals and recommendations put forward by the members. The members discuss all matters in Chinese and it is impossible to gain any indication from their impassive faces and restrained gestures.

This kind of suspicion seemed to be deepened by the fact that some members of the CAB
were reportedly involved in revolutionary activities during the 1910s.

Second, the previous expulsion policy was also criticized. The same letter wrote:

The rapidity with which the Chinese population in Burma has been increasing calls for considered action, but the progress of the Province would perhaps be seriously retarded by a policy of exclusion. The better-class Chinese who settle in Burma intermarry with Burmese women, and their offspring in the course of the second or third generation generally became Burmese and make good and respectable citizens. (59)

A “policy of exclusion,” whether deportation or immigration restriction, was discouraged as an obstacle to economic development. Rather, importance was put on inclusion or assimilation into “good and respectable citizens.” While in the discourse of “peaceful penetration” Sinicization of Burmese was regarded as a threat of social deterioration, here Burmaization of Chinese was expected to stabilize the whole society. The direct and nuanced rule by the special office of the Advisor on Chinese Affairs was considered necessary to properly control this process.

The Government of Burma made a long-term plan to train its own Chinese-speaking officers while several times borrowing officers from the Straits Settlements on a five-year-basis. Although the government of India approved the plan, the Straits Settlements rejected it by reason of personnel shortage. This plan was deadlocked by the early 1920s. (60)

4.2. Transforming Expulsion Policy

After the failure to reestablish the special office for Chinese affairs, the expulsion policy of the government of Burma changed in quality during the 1920s. Its scope was widened and the number of deportees increased drastically. While the total number of expulsion cases from 1909 to 1921 was 45, (61) 1922 saw 10 deportees in one year, and after 1925 the number of deportees per year became over 100. (62)

No colonial document exists to explain this policy change process in detail, but it can be inferred that expulsion became widely utilized as a preventive measure. Jails in Rangoon were extremely overcrowded at the time, and the criminal administration began to put much more importance on preventive measures than imprisonment. Most prison inmates were merely petty criminals, such as thieves, beggars, and vagrants. (63) The scope of targets in the expulsion policy appeared to enlarge radically by including this class of the urban poor. The annual report of the RTP for 1925, when the number of deportation first passed one hundred, said that the preventive measures, including these deportations, had “a very wholesome effect in reducing theft.” (64) This change in targets possibly entailed a simplification of procedures. Petty criminals could be deported directly and summarily by the police authority. Though the annual report still mentioned the assistance of the CAB, the role of the CAB seemed to become relatively small.

This expansion of scope also took place in terms of deportees’ legal status of belonging. In the 1920s, targets of expulsion under the Foreigners Act were still mainly Chinese, but sometimes other foreigners such as Japanese were expelled under the Act. (65) Moreover, an idea to expel “outsiders” was amplified to the point of including some British
subjects who could not be targeted by the Foreigners Act. This was realized by local legislation in the 1926 Expulsion of Offenders Act, which enabled expulsion of “non-Burman” criminals from the province of Burma. By this logic, even Indians, who were the dominant majority in Rangoon society, were included in the scope of the expulsion policy. In the process, the category of Chinese perceived as culturally special diminished in meaning in the criminal administration. Instead, rough discrimination between categories of “non-Burman” and “Burman,” “outsiders” and “insiders,” or “foreign races” and “indigenous races” came to the fore.

**Conclusion**

In the early 20th century, in order to deal with high criminality in Rangoon Chinatown, the government of Burma introduced the new policy for governing Chinese by referring to the Straits Settlements. However, the systems created in both colonies were actually quite different.

In the Straits Settlements, since the 1870s, the government had taken measures interfering in Chinese society under the Chinese Protectorate led by Chinese-speaking British high officials. With the determination ready to expel prominent Chinese leaders, the policy of compulsory registration of, and later illegalization of, all Chinese associations was strongly promoted. The CAB there was created in this context as the political institution to substitute for “secret societies” and to incorporate Chinese society into one unifying state ruler. This process constructed a governing system of direct rule based on a nuanced understanding of the culturally peculiar Chinese. However, Chinese in the Straits Settlements, especially in Singapore, attempted to secure their status in the consolidating colonial society by emphasizing their British subjectship at the turn of the 20th century.

In contrast, there was no special office for Chinese affairs in Burma after 1904. Associations were not registered. Targets of expulsion in the 1910s were limited to riot ringleaders and ruffians, and expulsion of influential merchants who had long lived in Burma was only passively considered and rarely executed. The government of Burma created a system of indirect rule that relied heavily on the CAB choosing deportees. This was partly because of the relatively small Chinese population in Rangoon, which was rather an Indian city. In the view of the Burma Province and British India, the presence of Chinese appeared even more trivial. Such a situation made it difficult for the British authority to draft new legislation and financial investment and maintained the low degree of interference.

Through the 1910s, the government of Burma increased a sense of distrust against Chinese elites, but all attempts to create the special office for Chinese affairs had failed by the early 1920s. However, the expulsion policy had transformed into more direct and summary measures to govern the urban poor in the 1920s. The scope of the expulsion policy was widened drastically. The categorization of “outsiders” and “insiders” assumed more importance than either culturally specific category of “Chinese” or British subjectship, though addressing this fully is beyond the scope of this paper. During the 1920s, while the
The colonial state in Burma also consolidated its territorial governance, the politics of belonging was formally performed on the stage of the legislative council in the context of colonial decentralization. Chinese in Burma were to seek their identity in the categorization of “outsiders” and “insiders” imposed by both the colonial state and the nationalism of the majority.

Notes

(1) The Japanese version of this paper was already published in *Kakyo Kajin Kenkyu* [華僑華人研究, *Journal of Chinese Overseas Studies*] 11, 2014, pp.18-37.
(2) There are few previous studies on this topic. The rare exception is Yi Li’s pioneering work. Li, Yi, “Local and Transnational Institutions in the Formation of Chinese Migrant Communities in Colonial Burma,” Ph.D. dissertation, SOAS, University of London, 2011, pp. 85-127.
(3) I conducted archival research in the Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections, British Library, London, UK (the shelf marks started from IOR) and the National Archives Department, Yangon, Myanmar (NAD). In referring to unpublished archival documents, for reasons of space, this paper shows only the file number of the colonial administration, the year, and the shelf marks of the archives in blanket.
(5) After the abolishment of the Advisor on Chinese Affairs, Taw Sein Ko, a local-born “mixed” Chinese, succeeded a part of its duties as the Examiner-in-Chinese, but he hold the post of the Government Archaeologist concurrently, and his salary as the Examiner-in-Chinese (250 Rs.) was much smaller than that of the starting salary of the Advisor on Chinese Affairs (1200 Rs.). On the biography of Taw Sein Ko, see Edwards, Penny, “Relocating the Interlocutor: Taw Sein Ko (1864-1930) and the Itinerancy of Knowledge in British Burma,” *South East Asia Research* 12(3), 2004, pp. 277-335 and Taw, Sein Ko, *Burmese Sketches*, Rangoon: British Burma Press, 1913, pp. 143-145.
(7) For example, in 1902, the number of total criminal cases in all ten jurisdictions of the city was 1,869. Of them, 498 cases (27%) occurred in the jurisdiction of the Latter Street police station, which corresponded with Chinatown. In 1906, the total number of criminal cases increased to 2,652, and 637 cases (24%) occurred in the Chinatown. *Report on the Rangoon Town Police of Burma for the year 1902*, Rangoon: Office of Superintendent, Government Printing, Burma, 1903, p. 3 (hereafter RRTP followed by
the year); *RRTP* for 1906, p. 4.

(8) File No. 10C-52 (1904) (IOR/P/6739).

(9) File Nos. 10C-44 (1905) (IOR/P/7502); 10C-52 (1906) (IOR/P/7502); 10C-45 (1907) (IOR/P/7504).

(10) File No. 10C-45 (1907) (IOR/P/7504).


(13) *Ibid.*, pp. 50-57, 66-68. In 1904, four prominent Chinese, Lim Chin Tsong (林振宗), Tan Po Chaung, Lim Cheng Taik (林清德?), and Lee Ah Lam, were honorary magistrates in Rangoon. File No. 10C-44 (1905) (IOR/P/7502).

(14) Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, October 23, 1909, in File No. 10C-37, Pt. 2 (1909) (IOR/P/8070).


(16) On the circumstances up to the first issuance of the expulsion order, see File Nos. 10C-1, Pt. 2 (1908) (IOR/P/8070); 10C-37, Pt. 2 (IOR/P/8070). Tan Chong Yen (Tan Chong Yan) was born in Singapore in 1855 as a son of Tan Quay, a leading commercial man in the Straits Settlements, and after coming to Rangoon, he developed his own business in cutch and licensed opium trade. Wright, Arnold, ed., *Twentieth Century Impressions of Burma: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources*, London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing Co., 1910, p. 319.

(17) Notification of the Police Department, the Government of Burma, October 20, 1909, in File No. 10C-37, Pt. 2 (1909) (IOR/P/8070).

(18) For example, see the second case found in File No.1M-13 (1910) (IOR/P/8348).

(19) This number is based on comprehensive research of the Police (Confidential) Proceedings of the Government of Burma (IOR/P/7502; IOR/P/7504; IOR/P/7792; IOR/P/8070; IOR/P/8348; IOR/P/8881; IOR/P/9126; IOR/P/9402; IOR/P/CONF/15; IOR/P/CONF/38; IOR/P/CONF/48; IOR/P/CONF/54). This number includes the first three orders in 1909 but excludes some cases of expulsion from Tavoy, re-expulsion cases, and the case of *Kuang-hua* newspaper, mentioned later.

(20) On cases of withdrawal, see File Nos. 1M-28 (1913) (IOR/P/9126); 1M-10, pt. 4
(1916) (IOR/P/CONF/15); 1M-47 (1913) (IOR/P/9402).

(21) RRTP for 1910, p. 3.

(22) These seven re-expulsion cases are found in File Nos. 1M-13, Pt. 2 (1910) (IOR/ P/8348); 1M-13, Pt. 4 (1910) (IOR/P/8348); 1M-20 (1912) (IOR/P/8881); 1M-45 (1913) (IOR/P/9126); 1M-10, Pt. 2 (1916) (IOR/P/CONF/15); 1M-52 (1917) (IOR/P/ CONF/38); 1M-51 (1919) (IOR/P/CONF/48). On the case of return after re-expulsion, see File No. 1M-26 (1914) (IOR/P/9402).

(23) File No. 1M-13, Pt. 2 (1910) (IOR/P/8348).


(25) File No. 1M-13, Pt. 3 (1910) (IOR/P/8348).

(26) Memorial of Tan Tien of Henzada, Trader, October 1, 1910, in File No. 1M-13, Pt. 3 (1910) (IOR/P/8348).

(27) Tan Kim Chye was born in Rangoon in 1869 as the eldest son of Tan Boon Tee (陳文鄭), who had immigrated to Burma from Amoy, and he took over the family business after his father’s death in 1909. Wright, op. cit., p. 313 and Li, op. cit., p. 279.

(28) Tan Kim Chye was appointed in 1912 and 1914 as a member of the CAB. File Nos. 10C-55 (1912) (IOR/P/8881); 1M-20 (1914) (IOR/P/9402).

(29) File No. 1M-47 (1913) (IOR/P/9402).

(30) Memorial from Wee Nga Sang, December 11, 1913, in File No. 1M-47 (1913) (IOR/ P/9402).

(31) On the Kuang-hua case, see File Nos. 1C-61 (1908) (NAD/1/1B/6491); 1C-3 (1909) (NAD/1/1B/6590); 1C-16 (1910) (NAD/1/1B/6762); 1C-16, Pt. B (1910) (NAD/1/1A/3800); 1C-10 (1911) (NAD/1/1A/3854); 1C-40, Pt. 1 (1912) (NAD/1/1B/6968); 1C-40, Pt. 2 (1912) (NAD/1/1B/6969). This incident is often mentioned by previous studies on Chinese politics in Burma during the Xinhai Revolution. For example, see Chén, Rúxìng (陳孺性, Chen, Yi-Sein), Miǎndiàn Huáqiáo Shǐlüè [緬甸華僑史畧, A Brief History of Overseas Chinese in Burma], Nányáng Wénzhāi [南洋文摘, South Seas Digest] 5(2), 1964, p. 49., and Yú, Dìngbāng (余定邦), “Qīngcháo Zhèngfǔ zài Yǎngguāng Shèzhì Lǐngshì de Guòchéng” [清朝政府在仰光设置领事的过 程, The Process that the Qing Government Established the Consul in Rangoon], Zhōngshān Dàxué Xuébào, Shèhuì Kēxué Bǎn [中山大学学报, Social Science Series] 1990(1), 1990, pp. 64-65.


(33) File No. 1C-61 (1908) (NAD/1/1B/6491).

(34) File No. 1C-3 (1909) (NAD/1/1B/6590). On the establishment of the Chinese consulate in Rangoon, see Yú, op. cit., pp. 59-66.

(35) Note by W. F. Rice, December 1, 1909, in File No. 1C-3 (1909) (NAD/1/1B/6590).

(36) Letter from Consul for China at Rangoon to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma, February 23, 1910, in File No. 1C-16 (1910) (NAD/1/1B/6762).

(37) File No. 1C-16 (1910) (NAD/1/1B/6762). By collating with previous studies written in Chinese, Chin Wan Peng was 陳漢平 and Liu Kok Seng was 居正 (居覺生). The latter was a famous revolutionary and politician. See, for example, Chén, op. cit., p. 44.

(38) Note by W. F. Rice, March 4, 1910, in File No. 1C-16 (1910) (NAD/1/1B/6762). The

(39) File No. 1C-16 (1910) (NAD/1/1B/6762). These orders were withdrawn on December 24, 1912 in response to the request from the government of the Republic of China. File No. 1C-40, Pt. 1 (1912) (NAD/1/1B/6968); 1C-40, Pt. 2 (1912) (NAD/1/1B/6969).

(40) The following two paragraphs are also based on File No. 1C-16 (1910) (NAD/1/1B/6762).

(41) Demi-official letter from the Examiner-in-Chinese, Burma, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma, April 12, 1910, in File No. 1C-16 (1910) (NAD/1/1B/6762).


(43) File No. 1C-33 (1912) (NAD/1/1A/3878).


(45) File No. 1C-36 (1913) (NAD/1/1A/3896). Ko Ban Pan (Koh Ban Pan) was born in Amoy in 1852 and, after coming to Rangoon in 1872, carried out his business successfully. Wright, op. cit., p. 316. According to the naturalization records in NAD, both Ko Ban Pan and Teoh Eng Hock acquired British subjectship, in 1892 and in 1901 respectively. File Nos. 2N-2 (1892) (NAD/1/1A/3223); 2N-9 (1901) (NAD/1/1A/3492). However, the government of Burma had not noticed at least until 1914 that Teoh had become a British subject. File No. 1C-3 (1914) (NAD/1/1B/7086). This was likely because his application for naturalization was made under the name “Tiahu Eng Huat.”

(46) This paragraph was based on File Nos. 1C-35 (1913) (NAD/1/1C/9246); 1C-36 (1913) (NAD/1/1A/3896); 1C-3 (1914) (NAD/1/1B/7086).

(47) Letter from the consul for China, Rangoon, to the chief secretary to the government of Burma, March 13, 1914, in File No. 1C-3 (1914) (NAD/1/1B/7086).

(48) Tan Soo Kim (Tan Sew Him) was the managing partner in the mercantile firm of Eng Bee and the rice mill of Eng Ban Whet. After his father, Tan Boon Ban, died in 1906, he partly succeeded the family business. Wright, op. cit., p. 326. He might have been a relative of Tan Kim Chye, mentioned in footnote 27.


(50) Later, during the anti-Yuan Self-Strengthening Movement from 1915 to 1916, the revolutionaries in Yunnan and Tokyo demanded financial support from Chinese in
Burma. The government of Burma caught this information and warned Chinese in the province not to be involved under the threat of expulsion. But the government had no intention of taking measures beyond warning. File Nos. 1C-46 (1915) (NAD/1/1A/4039); 1C-3 (1916) (NAD/1/1B/7282); 1C-3, Pt.2 (1916) (NAD/1/1A/4048).

(51) File No. 1C-3 (1914) (NAD/1/1B/7086). Tan Seik Kwa had become a member of Chinese Advisory Board instead of Tan Po Chaung sometime between 1912 and 1914. File Nos. 10C-55 (1912) (IOR/P/8881); 1M-20 (1914) (IOR/P/9402).

(52) File No. 1M-20 (1914) (IOR/P/9402).


(54) File No. 6M-4 (1918) (NAD/1/15E/4185).

(55) Letter from the chief secretary to the Government of Burma, to the commissioners of divisions, October 11, 1918, in File No. 1M-44 (1918) (IOR/P/CONF/38). It should be noted that this kind of perception did not dominate the whole colonial bureaucracy at that time. See Commissioners’ reaction to inquiry on this issue in File No. 1M-4 (1919) (IOR/P/CONF/48) and the opinion of J. S. Furnivall, then the deputy commissioner of Myaungmya District, in File No. 6M-4 (1918) (NAD/1/15E/4185) and Taw Sein Ko’s dissent to the Nethersole report in Taw, Sein Ko, Burmese Sketches 2, Rangoon: British Burma Press, 1920, pp. 128-130.


(57) File No. 1M-1 (1920) (IOR/P/CONF/54).

(58) Letter from the chief secretary to the Government of Burma, to the secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, June 13, 1919, in File No. 1M-1 (1920) (IOR/P/CONF/54).

(59) Ibid.

(60) File Nos. 1C-26 (1920) (NAD/1/1B/7528); 3335 (1920) (IOR/PJ/6/1679). According to Yi Li, the government of Burma continued to attempt to realize this plan until around 1926 and failed. Li, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

(61) This number includes 31 persons in section 3-1, seven re-expulsion cases, two deportees in the Kuang-hua case, and five mining laborers from Tavoy in the case of File No. 1M-16 (1916) (IOR/P/CONF/15).

(62) RRTP for each year.


(64) RRTP for 1925, p. 14.

(65) For example, see RRTP for 1924, p. 20.
(66) I would like to discuss this development in the expulsion policy during the late 1920s on another occasion.
