Appendix 3: Background information

This appendix provides information on the broader context within which land confiscation occurs in southeast Myanmar. Its purpose is to provide additional information with regards to both the domestic and international legal framework pertaining to land tenure rights, and the conflict and post-conflict situation in southeast Myanmar, to supplement the core analysis of trends of land confiscation and local response detailed in the report ‘With only our voices, what can we do?’.

The appendix is divided into two sections. Section A: Local and international legal context, describes the existing legal framework, both at the national and international level, within which both land confiscation and village agency responses occur. Section B: Land confiscation within the context of peace and conflict in southeast Myanmar, provides an analysis of changes that have taken place since the signing of a preliminary ceasefire in 2012 between the Myanmar government and KNU. Consideration in this section is also given to the central role that land tenure security will play in the tenability of any prospective peace agreement. Taken together, these two sections allow for a more thorough and in-depth understanding of land confiscation, its associated impacts, and the responses to it by local communities in southeast Myanmar.

Section A: Local and international legal context

International rules and norms

International rules and norms surrounding land tenure rights align well with the abuses faced, and demands made, by local villagers in southeast Myanmar. A multitude of legal instruments now exist on the issue of land rights, including: general protections of human rights,1 the right to consultation and compensation,2 norms surrounding corporate responsibility in the context of

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1 See, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), of which Myanmar voted in favour of: UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III); and the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, of which Myanmar is not party to: UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.

2 Issues of consultation and compensation are covered in a number of international documents, most of which constitute international soft law and are non-binding. See, for example: Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), March 2012 (henceforth: Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure); also, Miloon Kothari, Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement, 2007 (henceforth: Basic Principles on Evictions and Displacement).
land confiscated, the rights of displaced persons and refugees, and communal and customary land use protections. As the testimony cited throughout this report can attest to, each of these sets of standards pertain directly to the lived experiences of Karen communities.

Right to life and livelihood

The right to life, liberty and security of person is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and reiterated in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). This right to life is extended to include the right to food security, housing, and medical care. As noted in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement, displacement due to land confiscation severely affects individuals’ livelihoods, a finding corroborated by this report, and is at risk of violating all of these basic human rights. In addition, “Forced evictions intensify inequality, social conflict, segregation and ghettoisation”,


4 The most important document with regards to the rights of refugees and IDPs are the Pinheiro Principles: Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, August 2005 (henceforth: Pinheiro Principles); see also United Nations publication, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.


6 For examples of testimony pertaining to infringements on individuals’ basic human rights, including the right to live and livelihoods, see the Consequences sub-section of each Land Use Types section in the main body of the report; testimony regarding consultation and compensation, see the Occurrences and Actors sub-section of each Land Use Types section; testimony of land confiscation carried out by private corporate actors, see the Occurrences and Actors sub-section of each Land Use Types section, as well as the inset box in the Commercial Agriculture land type section titled, Identifying Trends: A pattern of collusion between state/state-backed actors and private business interests; cases of displacement due to land confiscation, see the Consequences sub-section of each Land Use Types chapter; testimony regarding the infringement of communal and customary land use systems, see sub-section iii. Land Types of the Commercial Agriculture section.

7 UDHR, Article 3; Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), AHRD, 18 November 2012, Principle 41.

8 UDHR, Article 25; also see the Basic Principles on Evictions and Displacement, Principle 13. This extension has also occurred in practice; for case examples, see: Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 51, 55, (S.Ct India 1985), in which the courts found that Bombay slum dwellers could challenge a slum-clearing plan under the constitutionally guaranteed right to life because the plan would destroy their means of livelihood; Yakyke Asa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17th 2005), in which the courts found that government moves to force tribal peoples off of their lands could be challenged as violations of the right to life because such a move threatened the tribal peoples’ means of livelihood; Sesana and Others v Attorney General, Section H.14.4 & D.i.12 (52/2002) [2006] BWHC 1 (Botswana High Court December 13th 2006), in which the cessation of government services to a community constituted a breach of the right to life because it made conditions of life impossible, forcing relocation (the revocation of special game licences, which had allowed citizens dependent upon hunting for livelihood to hunt in a game reserve, also violated the right to life).

9 For examples of testimony pertaining to infringements on individuals basic human rights, including the right to live and livelihoods, see the Consequences sub-section of each Land Use Types chapter.

and invariably affect the poorest, most socially and economically vulnerable and marginalised sectors of society, especially women, children, minorities and indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{11}

**Consultation and compensation**

Consultation with any party potentially affected by a given land seizure is an integral component of a human rights approach to land tenure. This includes comprehensive and holistic impact assessments, which the international instruments mandate for in any large scale projects that have potentially significant environmental or social impacts.\textsuperscript{12} Such an assessment should include: 1) appropriate notice being given to concerned parties; 2) dissemination of relevant information to stakeholders; 3) a substantial time period for public review of the given information; 4) provision of legal and technical assistance to affected parties who are in need of such assistance; and 5) public hearings giving individuals a fair chance to oppose the project.\textsuperscript{13}

When confiscation is, in fact, deemed to be in pursuit of the public good, compensation for the confiscated land must be paid in full. Multiple international legal instruments ensure that compensation is at least equal to the losses individuals suffer,\textsuperscript{14} and that compensation and full resettlement occur immediately after confiscation.\textsuperscript{15}

**Corporate responsibility**

Given the increasing influence and reach of multinational corporations (MNCs), there has been a growing concern over ways in which to hold private business enterprises, as well as states, accountable for human rights abuses. Corporate actors, as this report has shown,\textsuperscript{16} are increasingly involved in cases of land confiscation, either as the sole perpetrator or in collusion with other groups, and therefore need to be held to the same standards regarding consultation and compensation. Accordingly, the *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights*, more commonly referred to as the „Ruggie Principles“, were adopted and agreed upon in 2011. These are applicable to, “all States and to all business enterprises, both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership and structure”\textsuperscript{17} and instruct corporations to ensure full consultations and a rigorous adherence to due diligence throughout every phase of project implementation.\textsuperscript{18} Of particular importance to the situation in southeast Myanmar are specific rules regarding the sensitive issue of operating within a conflict zone, with explicit directions for both governments and private enterprises.\textsuperscript{19}

**Refugees and internally displaced persons**

Land tenure rights pertaining to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) deserve special attention given the large number of both groups with land claims in southeast

\textsuperscript{11} *Basic Principles on Evictions and Displacement*, Principle 7.
\textsuperscript{12} See, for example: “*Basic Principles on Evictions and Displacement*, Principles 32 and 37.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} *Basic Principles on Evictions and Displacement*, Principle 16; *UNDRIP*, Article 28(1,2).
\textsuperscript{15} *Basic Principles on Evictions and Displacement*, Principle 52.
\textsuperscript{16} For testimony of land confiscation carried out by private corporate actors, see the *Occurrences and Actors* sub-section of each *Land Use Type* section; as well as the inset box in the *Agriculture* section titled, *Identifying Trends: A pattern of collusion between state/state-backed actors and private business interests* in the main body of the report.
\textsuperscript{17} *Ruggie Principles*, General Principles.
\textsuperscript{18} *Ruggie Principles*, Principle 17 and 18.
\textsuperscript{19} *Ruggie Principles*, Principle 7.
Myanmar.\textsuperscript{20} Such land is particularly vulnerable to confiscation given the fact that the original occupant is, by definition, absent from the land, often for long periods of time and without any official title to the land.

First and foremost, therefore, states must protect individuals from arbitrarily being displaced, including for reasons related to armed conflict or large scale development projects,\textsuperscript{21} with a special obligation to “protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands.”\textsuperscript{22} In cases such as the ones cited throughout this report\textsuperscript{23} where displacement has already occurred or is unavoidable, refugees and IDPs are guaranteed equitable compensation, with a priority given to full restitution of their original land.\textsuperscript{24} Given their vulnerability, their right to housing and land should be recognised as an essential component of the rule of law and should be explicitly included in any domestic law regarding land tenure and rights.\textsuperscript{25}

Communal and customary land rights

Despite being routinely ignored by both land confiscation perpetrators and lawmakers in Myanmar,\textsuperscript{26} communal and customary land rights are enshrined in both the UNDRIP, which Myanmar voted in favour of in 2007,\textsuperscript{27} and more broadly in the \textit{Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure}. These instruments ensure peoples’ rights to the land, territory and resources that they have traditionally owned, including the right to develop and occupy these lands according to traditional practices, with the state being obligated to accord legal protection to these lands according to traditional land tenure systems.\textsuperscript{28} Free, prior, and informed consent must be obtained for any project affecting the land or resources contained within it, and land disputes should be settled in conjunction with local stakeholders and according to traditional practices.\textsuperscript{29} Under no circumstances should such land be used for military activity.\textsuperscript{30}

Extensive guarantees are also made regarding the ownership and use of communal lands, including: the preservation of systems of collective use and management; extensive consultation when mapping and designating land; respecting the historical importance of such land; and protecting against the unauthorised use of these lands.\textsuperscript{31} The protection of such communal systems of land tenure would go a long way towards ensuring the sustainable, locally driven development of southeast Myanmar.

\textsuperscript{20} As of March 2015, up to 662,400 people remained internally displaced in Myanmar, while figures from July 2014 put the number of refugees at 479,706. For more information, see: “Myanmar,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, accessed on: April 25\textsuperscript{th} 2014.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement}, Principle 6, Article 2(b,c); \textit{Pinheiro Principles}, Principle 5.1.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement}, Principle 9.
\textsuperscript{23} See \textit{Consequences} sub-section of the Natural Resource Extraction and Infrastructure sections in the main body of the report for cases of displacement.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Pinheiro Principles}, Principle 18.1.
\textsuperscript{26} For testimony regarding the infringement of communal and customary land use systems, see sub-section 3. Land Types of the Commercial Agriculture section in the main body of the report.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Burma’s Environment: People, Problems, Policies}, Burma Environmental Working Group (BEWG), 2011, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{28} UNDRIP, Article 26; \textit{Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure}, Principle 3.1; Also see \textit{Burma’s Environment: People, Problems, Policies}, BEWG, 2011, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{29} UNDRIP, Article 32(2), Article 27.
\textsuperscript{30} UNDRIP, Article 30(1).
Domestic law and legal mechanisms

Domestic law in Myanmar consistently falls short of both international standards as well as local villagers expectations regarding land usage rights.

Minimal legal protections

Within the current legal context there are a number of legal protections, at least in theory, available to individuals in southeast Myanmar. The 2008 Constitution mandates that the government “enact necessary laws to protect the rights of the peasants and to [sic] obtain equitable value of agricultural produce.” In addition, the Farmland Law allows for farmer organisations to legally organise while the Foreign Investment Law places restrictions on projects which may have a negative effect on the environment, public health, or cultural rights. Yet such initiatives are riddled with shortcomings. For example, although projects theoretically can be restricted, this decision is left to the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), whose members are not appointed by local communities and whose process does not necessarily even include consultation with people in affected areas. One promising indication is the passing of a new Myanmar Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law, which replaces the current SEZ Law (discussed below) and requires comprehensive compensation for land, crops, and buildings, as well as coverage of full resettlement costs maintaining individuals at their previous standard of living. Continuing to monitor how these new laws are applied is important to securing the land rights of people in Myanmar.

Laws facilitating confiscation

Despite these limited safeguards, new land tenure laws in Myanmar overwhelmingly benefit domestic and foreign firms and wealthy individuals at the expense of local villagers and marginalised communities. The Farmland Law, for example, causes problems for those without formal registration while completely ignoring customary and communal land tenure systems. It allows for the outright seizure of land by the state in pursuit of the „national

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33 Farmland Law, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, March 30th 2012, Chapter 13, Article 113; The Farmland Law also provides for a poorly-defined grievance mechanism for individuals whose farmland has been requisitioned: Farmland Law, Chapter 8, Article 64.
34 The Foreign Investment Law, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, November 2012, Chapter 2, Art 4(a). The law does not refer to „ethnic minorities”, but to „National Races”. This term appears throughout Myanmar’s Constitution without ever being defined. Context reveals that it refers to all identifiable ethnic groups within Myanmar: Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
35 The Foreign Investment Law, Chapter 7, Article 13.
36 Voices from the Ground: Concerns over the Dawei Special Economic Zone and Related Projects, Dawei Development Association (DDA), September 2014, p.70.
37 For in-depth analysis of the body of 2012 laws, see: Legal Review of Recently Enacted Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management Law, Food Security Working Group’s Land Core Group, November 2012; see also Access Denied: Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Transnational Institute (TNI), May 2013.
38 The Farmland Law allows for the expropriation of land: Farmland Law, Chapter 10, Article 98, which mandates that “The Union Government shall requisition […] farmland” for the implementation of government agricultural projects, at the discretion of government committees; it also allows for the reallocation of „farmland: Chapter 8, articles 91-94 establish that “the Central Farm Management Committee shall confiscate [farmland]” that is not being used for its officially approved purpose; and the creation of an unrepresentative Farmland Management Committee: chapter 3 of the Farmland Law details the procedures for allocating requisitioned land, including the role of
interest and ensures that the process for obtaining land use certificates (LUC) is complicated and expensive, with no guarantee that land will not still be seized. The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Law of 2012 exacerbates these issues, allowing for the reclassification of large swaths of land that were previously incorporated in traditional land use systems as "uncultivated" or "fallow", cases of which were documented during the present reporting period. In doing so, the Myanmar government is granted exclusive power to lease this land to private business enterprises for agriculture, livestock farming and aquaculture, mining and/or infrastructure development without the consultation of local communities.

More broadly, the Foreign Investment Law has prioritised foreign direct investment over the protection of local communities' human rights, while the Special Economic Zone Law of 2012 provides numerous incentives to large scale foreign investment, including tax breaks, duty exemptions, long term - up to 75 years - leases, and government sponsored security. All of these laws were rushed through parliament with little or no consultation of the public or consideration of their broader implications, and all fail to recognise communal and customary land rights practices, the special rights afforded to refugees and IDPs and the right to equitable compensation for land that is confiscated.

Overview of domestic logging law

Currently, Myanmar maintains one of the most intact and diverse forest ecosystems in Asia. However, Myanmar's abundant forest reserves are under threat of deforestation and land degradation, caused by over-exploitation of forest resources and unsustainable land management practices. Myanmar's forest cover is dwindling quickly, declining steadily from 58% in 1990 to 47% in 2010, according to Myanmar's official forestry records. In response, Myanmar banned the export of raw unprocessed timber in April of 2014. Although seen as a positive step, there is some scepticism that this will slow down the rate of deforestation, as critics point to the uncontrolled and illegal facet of Myanmar's logging industry and the fact the

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40 Cases such as this were documented by KHRG researchers between December 2012 and January 2015, and can be found in the Land Registration sub-section of the Village Agency section in the main body of the report. This trend has been documented elsewhere in Myanmar; see, for example: Yearning to Be Heard, Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), 2014, pg. 23-24.

41 For testimony regarding the reclassification of land as "uncultivated", see sub-section 3. Land Types of the Commercial Agriculture section in the main body of the report.

42 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law (Myeylut Myeylet nint Meeiyaingmya U P' Day), Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, March 2012, Chapter 2, Articles 3(d)(e), 20: Allowing the allocation of "vacant" lands to foreign investors.

43 The Foreign Investment Law allows for long-term, large-scale projects to be developed without the approval of provincial government; see Access Denied: Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Burma, TNI, May 2013, p. 4.

44 Ibid.


49 “Myanmar’s log export ban to hurt businessmen but help forests,” Reuters, March 20th 2014.
ban still allows for the export of milled timber. For example, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) argues the true scale of the logging industry is much larger than official records allow, suggesting that 72% of all recorded imports of Myanmar timber between 2000 and 2013, were illicit, suggesting wide spread corruption and criminal activity in the sector.

The extraction of forest resources in Myanmar is administered by the Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE), which falls under the control of the Ministry of Forestry (MoF). Competing agendas between the conservation-oriented Forest Department (FD) and the traditional income generating logging department, MTE, ensures conflict within the MoF and asymmetrical political clout for the MTE within the ministry. Current forestry policy is predicated on the 1992 Forest Law, which has provisions supporting conservation and sustainable extraction processes, while also encouraging private sector growth. Both the 1995 Myanmar Forest Policy and 1st 1996 Forest Working Plan are responsible for implementing 1992 Forest Law. A new Forest Law is due in 2015, using the current legal framework for forestry.

Overview of domestic mining law

Myanmar is abundant in natural resources such as oil, gas, gems, metals and minerals. Since 2005, there has been a rapid increase in interest in Myanmar’s natural resource wealth, making natural resources a significant sector of Myanmar’s economy. However, Myanmar’s natural resources tend to be concentrated in border areas, including Kayin State, raising serious concerns about who will benefit from the increasing number of NRE projects being implemented. In fact, Myanmar’s extractive industries are excessively opaque, ranking last out of 58 countries in terms of quality of governance in extractive industries reviewed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute in 2013. In July 2014, Myanmar was accepted as a candidate country for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, although this has been met with scepticism regarding the effectiveness of such measures in assuring actual advancement of reforms, such as press freedom and human rights, in Myanmar. Proper regulation of the

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50 “Better late than never”: Myanmar bans timber exports to save remaining forests,” Mongabay, April 24, 2014.
51 Data Corruption: Exposing the true scale of logging in Myanmar, Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), March 2014.
53 Ibid.
55 For more information see: http://www.resourcegovernance.org/countries/asia-pacific/myanmar/overview.
58 Developing Disparity: Regional investment in Myanmar’s borderlands, TNI, February 2013.
59 The Resource Governance Index (RGI) measures the quality of governance in the oil, gas and mining sectors of the 58 countries that produce 85% of the world’s petroleum, 90% of diamonds and 80% of copper. See The 2013 Resource Governance Index: A measure of transparency and accountability in the oil, gas and mining sector, Revenue Watch Institute, 2013. http://www.resourcegovernance.org/countries/asia-pacific/myanmar/overview
60 For more information see: https://eiti.org/Myanmar
mining industry is increasingly important, as mining operations are shifting from small-scale,\textsuperscript{62} picks and pan type projects, to large-scale\textsuperscript{63} environmentally destructive enterprises.\textsuperscript{64}

Since 1989, Myanmar has sought to increase foreign interest and investment in its mineral resources. In 1994, it enacted the Myanmar Mines Law in order to fulfill domestic mineral requirements, increase exports, and encourage local and foreign investment in mineral resources, while also allowing for environmental conservation where projects may have detrimental effects on the surrounding environment.\textsuperscript{65} The 1996 Mining Rules are meant to implement these laws through the Ministry of Mines. Furthermore, the 1994 laws adopt the right of the state to ownership of all minerals, naturally occurring above or below ground. Although a new updated mining law has been in the draft stage for several years now,\textsuperscript{66} it has not been released yet. However, the Myanmar’s new Investment Law seeks to modernise its investment environment, although it is not without its critics regarding assuring human and environmental rights are protected.\textsuperscript{67}

**Complaint mechanisms and a lack of institutional independence**

Efforts made towards redressing land confiscation complaints have been insufficient and lacking in capacity. Institutions charged with the allotment of land are top-down in nature, with effective control being assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoAI) and only nominal, if any, civilian participation.\textsuperscript{68} Although a number of complaint mechanisms have come into effect, their processes remain opaque and their institutions lack any legal authority,\textsuperscript{69} while villagers have expressed frustration over the inability to seek legal redress through government channels.\textsuperscript{70} The Farmland Investigation Commission, for example, recently released a report documenting the confiscation of over a quarter of a million acres of land by the Tatmadaw, but according to reports, lacks any power to correct this wrongdoing or bring justice to those responsible.\textsuperscript{71}

**Emerging policies and conflicting claims of legitimacy**

\textsuperscript{62} Small-scale mining projects are defined in the 1994 Myanmar Mining Law as, “commercial production of mineral which does not require substantial investment and expenditure or special technical know-how and methods.” Myanmar Mining Laws, 1994.

\textsuperscript{63} Large-scale mining projects are defined in the 1994 Myanmar Mining Law as, “commercial production of mineral which requires substantial investment and expenditure or special technical know-how and methods.” Myanmar Mining Laws, 1994.

\textsuperscript{64} *Burma’s Environment: People, Problems, Policies*, BEWG, June 2011.


\textsuperscript{66} “Myanmar finalizing new mining law,” *The Wall Street Journal*, December 2012; “Myanmar mining bill with parliament may be law by March – ministry official,” *Reuters*, October 2013; and

\textsuperscript{67} “Myanmar kicks off investment law modernization,” *The Nation*, March 2015.

\textsuperscript{68} This includes the Farmland Management Committee, responsible for approving landholder applications and resolving disputes; the State Land Records Department, responsible for maintaining land records and issuing LUCs; the Central Committee for the Management of Vacant Fallow and Virgin Lands, responsible for granting VFV land use rights; and the Land Acquisition Commission. See *Yearning to Be Heard*, HURFOM, 2015, p. 26, 33, 59-60.

\textsuperscript{69} Two such committees are the Rule of Law and Stability Committee, headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Farmland Investigation Commission, tasked specifically with investigating land dispute claims. See “Rule of Law committee receiving complaints,” *Mizzima News*, October 22nd 2012; and Soe Than Lynn, “Reps Ignore Ministry on Land Grab Committee,” *The Myanmar Times*, vol 32 no. 637, July 30\textsuperscript{th}-August 5\textsuperscript{th} 2012 for information regarding the two institutions.

\textsuperscript{70} See sub-sections *Lobbying the Myanmar Government* and *Negotiations* of the Village Agency section in the main body of the report.

\textsuperscript{71} *Yearning to Be Heard*, HURFOM, 2015, p.32; “Rampant Land Confiscation Requires Further Attention and Action from Parliamentary Committee,” Burma Partnership, March 2013.
On October 18th, 2014, the government released a draft of its new National Land Use Policy (NLUP). The draft is characterised by four priorities: 1) harmonising land law, 2) protecting citizens land use rights, 3) social and environmental conservation of resources, and 4) improving land administration. It is worth noting a number of improvements that the land policy could make if implemented properly, including greater environmental protections, equal rights for women, recognition of long term and unregistered land user rights, and possible opportunities for individuals to better protect their land.

Yet the draft policy remains problematic. It maintains the category of vacant, fallow, and virgin lands, while the protections it sets in place regarding customary land tenure systems remain open to potential abuse. It is also vaguely worded and poorly defines its terms of reference, and lacks a strong commitment to international best practices. More importantly, it focuses on economic development and foreign capital investment without any mention of food security or other essential human rights, and does not create special provisions for the rights of refugees and IDPs. Finally, the drafting of the document was done without a fair and legitimate consultation period, with stakeholders being given short notice and a small timeframe within which to submit comments and complaints. A subsequent draft proposal of a new investment law echoes a number of these concerns, as it focuses largely on stimulating foreign investment, concentrates power in the president’s office and includes no mention of human rights protections.

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74 Ibid, Section 10(c); Section 34 (a,b) and 35 call for independent social and environmental impact assessments into proposed projects.

75 Ibid. Section 10(b).

76 Ibid., Section 22(e), 23(a); 34(d) deals specifically with traditional methods such as rotational crop planting; Part VII addresses the land use rights of ethnic nationalities (specific attention should be paid to Sections 68, 70, 73 and 75).

77 Ibid. For example, Section 22(d) states, “all individuals, legally formed organisations and organisations possessing of managing land use right shall have the equal right to know and obtain the complete and correct land information and to carry out land transfer and tenure right in accord with law”; Section 72 could also be utilised, as it temporarily suspends the granting of land titles in areas previously categorised as farmland, forestland, or vacant, fallow, or virgin land.. The NLUP also provides for great transparency; see: Sections 9(a,e), 10(c,h), 15(b), 22(d), 26(d). A number of section outline the particulars regarding the establishment of more inclusive dispute settlement mechanisms; see: Section 9(d); Section 45, 46 and 49 outline the particular features of such an institution; Section 77 mandates the inclusion of ethnic nationalities traditional dispute settlement practices in the new mechanism.

78 Pro-Business or Pro-Poor?, TNI, Making Sense of the Recently Unveiled Draft National Land Use Policy, October 2014, p.11; The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land Policymaking in Myanmar, TNI, February 2015, p. 33-34.

79 As the TNI, Pro-Business or Pro-Poor? Making Sense of the Recently Unveiled Draft National Land Use Policy, October 2014 report points out, the NLUP fails to define any of the terms used throughout the policy, including such essential terms as „stakeholder” or „tenure security,” leaving much of the policy up to the interpretation of the reader; the policy only makes a passing reference to international best practices: NLUP, Section 10(g).

80 Resettlement is mentioned only once: NLUP, Section 42.

81 “Statement of the Ethnic Community Development Forum and the Customary Land Protection Committee Concerning Myanmar’s National Land Use Policy (Draft),” Burma Partnership, Point 1, 5.

82 Investment Law of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Draft), Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2015, Section 3(1); Section 6(1)(a) establishes an investment commission, whose chairman is appointed.
The KNU is also in the process of developing a land policy in an effort to reaffirm the rights of villagers and communities in areas under its control. Aspects of the policy stand in contrast to the governments draft NLUP, as the KNU’s two stated priorities are the legal recognition of customary and communal land use rights and the provision of full compensation to refugees and IDPs, with a priority on restitution of their previously held land. In addition, the document adheres to international legal instruments and prioritises local livelihoods over economic advancement or foreign investment: “Investment, public or private, which ignores the imperatives for peace and social justice, present and future public welfare, social reproduction and which are subsidised by vast ecological debts, cannot be considered sustainable.”

Addressing these conflicting approaches to land tenure rights, and determining a policy acceptable to all parties, will be a crucial task in forging a lasting and durable peace in southeast Myanmar.

Section B - Land confiscation within the context of peace and conflict in southeast Myanmar

Since the 2012 Ceasefire: towards a nationwide ceasefire agreement

In January 2012 a preliminary ceasefire was signed between the KNU and Myanmar government. Following this, in 2013 talks between the government of Myanmar and ethnic armed groups began regarding a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), consisting of 16 major ethnic group representatives (including the KNU), was formed and serves as the negotiation body that has been working with the government towards this goal. Their government counterpart, the Union Peace Working Committee (UPWC), had pushed to have a nationwide ceasefire signed by September 2014 in order to signal progress to the international community and ensure stability leading up to the 2015 election. As of April 2015, a nationwide ceasefire had not been signed and negotiations were ongoing.

Latest developments

The process thus far has been mired in delays, with details of any agreement being kept highly secret by the involved parties. Rifts have occurred between both the Myanmar government and Tatmadaw, as well as within the ethnic NCCT. Since 2012 the KNU itself has been plagued by the president, who also holds the power to revoke any member of the commission’s membership without explanation.

For example, see: KNU Land Policy 2014, KNU, Sections 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 2.1.4.
KNU Land Policy 2014, KNU, Section 3.10.2; such commitments can be found throughout the document. For examples, see: Section 3.10.3, 2.3.6. Explicit mention of international human rights law can be found in Section 1.1.1, 2.3.1.
Ibid.
IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Poor prospects for Myanmar ceasefire agreement raise risks of fighting between army and ethnic insurgents” IHS Jane’s 360, October 13th 2014.
with internal dissent and factional disagreements. Throughout this period there have also been continued skirmishes and fighting in northern Myanmar, further decreasing the legitimacy of the ongoing talks. Signs of progress have occurred, as the NCCT and government negotiators were able to sign declarations of support for a draft NCA in late March 2015. Yet ethnic group leaders have cautioned that this does not mean that such an agreement will be endorsed by groups throughout the country. It also remains to be seen what attention, if any, is given to land rights and land confiscation in the new ceasefire agreement.

Throughout this three-year-period of negotiations, major problems have persisted in ethnic areas and various human rights abuses continue to take place throughout the country. In southeast Myanmar specifically, KHRG has received many reports of increased military presence since the preliminary ceasefire was signed. Given that the KNU and Myanmar government have yet to agree on a military code of conduct in southeast Myanmar, the current situation remains tenuous and worrisome to local communities. These uncertain developments in recent months not only raise doubts regarding the peaceful settlement of conflict but also leave local villagers in an uncertain position, where their livelihoods remain unsecure and their future political environment uncertain.

Looking ahead: New opportunities for assistance and abuse

Ongoing negotiations present an opportunity to ensure the protection of human rights and the establishment of land use laws that would be both consistent with international best practices and supportive to local peoples and their interests. As a part of the preliminary ceasefire, both parties agreed to stop certain common human rights abuses and to work towards settling ongoing land rights issues. Given this new context, opportunities for NGOs, local CBOs and small businesses to support remote communities have been strengthened, allowing for greater, yet still limited, access to fundamental human rights such as education and health care. In addition, small business owners and traders are now able to trade and move more freely in the region. Yet these developments are not without downsides; increased access has meant

90 Ei Ei Toe Lwin “KNU to Meet Amid Split Fears,” Myanmar Times, October 17th 2014.
94 For a detailed report of ongoing militarisation, see “Ongoing Militarisation of Southeastern Burma/Myanmar, Since the January 2012 Ceasefire Agreement between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Burma/Myanmar Government,” KHRG, February 2015.
96 Ashley South, “Prospects for Peace in Myanmar,” Peace Research Institute Oslo, No. 31, 2012, which suggests the establishment of Government of Myanmar-KNU working groups to discuss relationships between KNU “para state structures” related to, inter alia, land registration and government structures.
increased cohabitation, and at times conflict, between Burman and Karen communities.  

Economic liberalisation has also meant an influx of domestic and foreign firms seeking to exploit southeast Myanmar’s natural resources. Finally, the ceasefire has provided rhetorical cover for the Tatmadaw and other state sponsored armed actors, who have taken the opportunity to reinforce bases and expand their presence in areas formerly controlled by ethnic armed groups (EAGs).

Although the nature of human rights infractions in southeast Myanmar may have changed, these new forms of abuse require attention and remedy. Land confiscation has been a primary grievance throughout the conflict period, and will continue to be of importance to the tenability of peace in southeast Myanmar. Ensuring that land tenure rights and land confiscation issues are addressed in an inclusive manner in any future agreement between the Myanmar government and the KNU is therefore crucial to the protection and promotion of human rights in southeast Myanmar.

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101 “Ongoing Militarisation of Southeastern Burma/Myanmar, Since the January 2012 Ceasefire Agreement between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Burma/Myanmar Government,” KHRG, February 17th 2015. See also the Militarisation category in the Land Use Type section in the main body of the report.
“ကျ္ႏုးပးတုိ႔၌ရျာသာ့မ္ာ့ေ်ပာသညးံအသဵတစးခုတညး့်ဖငးံဘာမ္ာ့်ဖစးလာႏုိငးမညးနညး့

်မနီမာ်ပညးအေရြ႕ေတာငးပုိငး့ရြိ႖ေ်မယာသိမး့ဆညး့မႈမ္ာ့ႏြငးံ

ေဒ သခဵတို႕၌တုနး႔်ပနးမႈမ္ာ့ဤေနာကးဆကး

တျဲစာမူသညး

်မနီမာ်ပညးအေရြံေတာငးပိုငး့ရြိ်မယာသိမး့ဆညး့မႈဆိုငးရာ်ဖစးပျာ့မူ

အေၾကာငး့အရာမ္ာ့အာ့:

ပို၊က္ယး်ပနး႔စျာေဖား်ပထာ့ပါသညး၈

်ပညးတျငးသို႔မဟုတးႏိုငးငဵတကာစဵႏႈနး့ႏြငးံအညီ

ပဋိပက၏်ဖစးပျာ့မႈႏြငးံပဋိပက၏်ဖစးပီ့ေနာငးပိုငး့အေ်ခအေနမ္ာ့၇

ေ်မယာအအချငးံအေရ့နြငးံဆကးစပးေသာ

တရာ့ွငးလုပးပိုငးချငးံမ္ာ့၇

်မနးမာ်ပညးအေရြံေတာငးပိုငး့ရြိ

ပဋိပက၏်ဖစးပ္ကးမႈအေနအထာ့မ့္အာ့

စီစစးသဵု့သပးခ္ကးမ္ာ့ႏြငးံ

ေဒသတျငး့ႏြငးံႏိုငးငဵတကာအဆငးံႏြစးခုစလဵု့၌လကးရြိဥပေဒေရ့ရာအေ်ခ

အေနမြာ

ေဖား်ပထာ့သညးံ်ပညးတျငးႏြငးံႏိုငးငဵတကာအဆငးံႏြစးခုစလဵု့၌လကးရြိဥပေဒေရ့ရာမူေဘာငး

်ဖစး်ပီ့

ဒုတိယအခနး့မြာ

်မနးမာႏိုငးငဵအေရြံေ်မာကးဘကး်ခမး့ရြိ

်ငိမး့ခ္မး့ေရ့နြငးံ

ပဋိပက၏

မ္ာ့ဆိုငးရာအ

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ေ်မယာသိမး့ဆညး့်ခငး့

ဿွှဿ

ခုႏြစး

်မနးမာအစို့ရႏြငးံကရငးအမ္ိဳ့သာ့အစညး့အရဵု့

KNU
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တိန့အၾကာ့အပစးအခတးရပးဆဲေရ့မူၾကမး့

လကးမြတးေရ့ထုိ့်ပီ့ေနာကးပိုငး့

ေ်ပာငး့လဲမႈအာ့

စိတး်ဖာေလံလာခ္ကးမ္ာ့်ဖစးပါသညး၈

ဤအခနး့

ေ်မယာႏြငးံ

ေနာကးဆကးတျဲစာမူ

(၀)

ေနာက်ခဵသတငး့အခ္ကးအလကး

ဥပေဒဆုိငးရာ

ရႈေထာငးံ

အ်ပညး်ပညးဆုိငးရာ

စညး့မ္ဥး့စညး့ကမး့မ္ာ့ႏြငးံ

စဵႏႈနး့

မ္ာ့်ဖငးံ

်ငိစျနး့ေနပါသညး၈

ဥပေဒစို့

မ္ာ့်ပာ့ေသာေ်မယာအချငးံအေရ့ဆုိငးရာ
Karen Human Rights Group

The office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has expressed concern about the situation in Karen State, where the Karen National Union (KNU) has engaged in armed conflict with the Myanmar military. The KNU has been designated as a non-state actor by the UN.

The UN Human Rights Council has adopted a resolution (A/HRC/31/41) that calls for the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The resolution emphasizes the importance of corporate accountability and the need for effective mechanisms to address human rights abuses.

The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) were developed by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights and were endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011. The UNGPs aim to provide a framework for businesses to respect human rights and to be held accountable for their actions.

Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) has been monitoring the situation in Karen State and has documented cases of human rights abuses by the KNU.

KHRG has documented cases of human rights abuses by the KNU, including attacks on civilians and infrastructure, as well as restrictions on freedom of movement and expression.

KHRG has also documented cases of human rights abuses by the Myanmar military, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, and extrajudicial killings.

KHRG has called for an end to the violence and for all parties to the conflict to respect international human rights law.

Karen Human Rights Group


原则 41.

在保障人权方面，我们的责任在于保护和促进人权（UDHR）和《亚洲人权保护法》（AHRD）中对人权的定义。108 按照联合国发布的《世界人权宣言》，人权保障应该通过国家的政策和行动来实现。109

UDHR 第 2 条：1948 年，联合国通过了《世界人权宣言》，该宣言于同年 12 月 10 日生效。

108 UDHR 由来：(ASEAN) 亚洲地区国家的共同宣言，该宣言于 1967 年 8 月 7 日生效。《亚洲人权保护法》(AHRD)：第 1 条

109 UDHR 第 1 条：1948 年，联合国通过了《世界人权宣言》，该宣言于同年 12 月 10 日生效。

110 按照联合国发布的《世界人权宣言》，人权保障应该通过国家的政策和行动来实现。

111 亚洲地区国家的共同宣言，该宣言于 1967 年 8 月 7 日生效。《亚洲人权保护法》(AHRD)：第 1 条

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Karen Human Rights Group

စိုက်ချမ်းရာကို အဖွဲ့အစည်း အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် မိမိတို့၏ အကြောင်းအရာများကို အသားပေးချက်ထိုးရန် အမှတ်တွေ့ပါသည်။ အောက်ပါအချက်များကို အသားပေးချက်ထိုးရန် အမှတ်တွေ့ပါသည်။

၁၁၃ အချက်၏ စိုက်ချမ်းရာကို အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် မိမိတို့၏ အကြောင်းအရာများကို အသားပေးချက်ထိုးရန် အမှတ်တွေ့ပါသည်။

၁၀၇ UNDIRP, အရာအတိုင်အကျင်း ၁၁၄ ၏ မြောက်ဖွဲ့စည်းများသည် အပြင်ဘက်အားဖျင်သည် ယောင်းပျံတွေ့ပါက စိုက်ချမ်းရာကို အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် မိမိတို့၏ အကြောင်းအရာများကို အသားပေးချက်ထိုးရန် အမှတ်တွေ့ပါသည်။

၁၁၅ မိမိတို့၏ အကြောင်းအရာများကို အသားပေးချက်ထိုးရန် အမှတ်တွေ့ပါသည်။

၁၁၆ မိမိတို့၏ အကြောင်းအရာများကို အသားပေးချက်ထိုးရန် အမှတ်တွေ့ပါသည်။

၁၁၇ မိမိတို့၏ အကြောင်းအရာများကို အသားပေးချက်ထိုးရန် အမှတ်တွေ့ပါသည်။
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Ruggie (Ruggie Principles) principles and the Ruggie Principles Principle 17 and 18

Principle 5.1

118 Ruggie Principles Principle 17 and 18
119 Ruggie Principles Principle 17 and 18
120 Ruggie Principles Principle 17 and 18
Karen Human Rights Group

သိမး့ပုိကးပုိငးချငးံယငး့တုိ႔၌ပတးွနး့က္ငး၇123။ ်မယာထုိသူတုိ႔၌အချငးံအေရ့မ္ာ့သည်လြညးံက္မနးမာႏုိငးငဵစုေပါငး့ပုိငးေ်မယာအေရ့ၾကီ့ဆဵု့ဒုက၏သညးမ္ာ့ႏြငးံအကာအကျယးေပ့ထာ့ရမညးံပုိငးဆုိငးလာခဲံသည်ံပါသည်၈

Karen Human Rights Group ယငး့တုိ႔၌အထူ့သ်ဖငး့ပါ၍ေစသညံရရြိရမည်ံသဘာွသူလူထု၇်မယာႏြငးံအပိုဒးချဲထိခုိကးေစတနာံသေဘာတူညီမႈအတျကးပုဒးချဲေ်မယာႏြငးံက႑မြဖငးဟယးရုိမူွါဒမ္ာ့၇သဘာွအစုိ့ရဖျဲ႕၌ဖငးဟယးရုိ၀်မယာဖစးေပ၍ေစသညံရရြိရမည်ံသဘာွ်ပါွငးထာ့သငးံပါသည်၈

(Prinheiro Principle) အေရ့ၾေ၀ိ့ဆုိငးလာခဲံသည်။

123 UNDRIP မှ Principle 9
124 UNDRIP မှ Principle 2.1, 21.2, Principle 28
125 UNDRIP မှ Principle 18.1
126 UNDRIP မှ Principle 3.1
127 UNDRIP မှ Principle 2.1, 21.2, Principle 28
128 UNDRIP မှ Principle 18.1
129 UNDRIP မှ Principle 3.1
130 UNDRIP မှ Principle 2.1, 21.2, Principle 28
တိုးတက်သည်အဖြစ်ဖြစ်ပြီး အားလုံးကိုပထမဦးစွာပြု၏။ အဖြစ်ဖြစ်ပြီး အားလုံးများဖွဲ့စည်းထားပြီး အားလုံးကိုပထမဦးစွာပြု၏။ UNDRIP အဖြစ်ဖြစ်ပြီး လုပ်ပေးစုစုစေ့များဖွဲ့စည်းထားပြီး အဖြစ်ဖြစ်ပြီး အားလုံးများဖွဲ့စည်းထားပြီး အားလုံးကိုပထမဦးစွာပြု၏။ Article 8.3 အဖြစ်ဖြစ်ပြီး စုစေ့များဖွဲ့စည်းထားပြီး အဖြစ်ဖြစ်ပြီး အားလုံးများဖွဲ့စည်းထားပြီး အားလုံးကိုပထမဦးစွာပြု၏။
စိတ်ကားပါသည်။
စီ့ပျားလုပ်ငန်းမာ့ဆီသုိသည်များမရှိသည်းသူမျာ့ထံမြောက်စာမျက်နှာခတ်မျာ့အာ့ကိုသတ်မှတ်ချဲ့ကို တျင်းမြောက်အတျင်းမြောက်ထားသည် (SEZ) ကိုဖုန်းအချို့ဖြင့်ပြုလုပ်ရှိသည်။ အချို့ ကို ဖုန်းအဖြစ်သာ့များအာ့လုပ်ကုိငးရန်အတျင်းမြောက်ချင်သည်။ အရင်းအျက်အရင်းရွှေအာ့ရာယး၎င်းပေါ်ကြား၌။ အချို့ ဖုန်းအဖြစ်ပါးပါသည်။ (SEZ) ကိုဖုန်းအချို့ဖြင့်ပြုလုပ်ရှိသည်။ အချို့ ကို ဖုန်းအဖြစ်သာ့များအာ့လုပ်ကုိငးရန်အတျင်းမြောက်ချင်သည်။ အရင်းအျက်အရင်းရွှေအာ့ရာယး၎င်းပေါ်ကြား၌။ အချို့ ဖုန်းအဖြစ်ပါးပါသည်။ (SEZ) ကိုဖုန်းအချို့ဖြင့်ပြုလုပ်ရှိသည်။ အချို့ ကို ဖုန်းအဖြစ်သာ့များအာ့လုပ်ကုိငးရန်အတျင်းမြောက်ချင်သည်။ အရင်းအျက်အရင်းရွှေအာ့ရာယး၎င်းပေါ်ကြား၌။ အချို့ ဖုန်းအဖြစ်ပါးပါသည်။
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172 Rampant Land Confiscation Requires Further Attention and Action from Parliamentary Committee,” 2015.
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180 TNI, Pro-Business or Pro-Poor? Making Sense of the Recently Unveiled Draft National Land Use Policy, October 2014 (Section 10(g))

181 Statement of the Ethnic Community Development Forum and the Customary Land Protection Committee Concerning Myanmar’s National Land Use Policy (Draft), Burma Partnership, Point 1, 5.

182 Statement of the Ethnic Community Development Forum and the Customary Land Protection Committee Concerning Myanmar’s National Land Use Policy (Draft), Burma Partnership, Point 1, 5.

183 TNI, Pro-Business or Pro-Poor? Making Sense of the Recently Unveiled Draft National Land Use Policy, October 2014 (Section 42)
Karen Human Rights Group

စိန့်နောက် အသက်ရောင်ရပ်တည်နေရာများတွင် သိရှိနေသည့် မေးခွန်းများတွင် အခြေခံထားသည်၊ အသင်းပေါင်းစည်းချေရာ ဖော်ပြရန်ပြီး ပြောဆိုထားသည်။ “စိန့်နောက် အသက်ရောင်ရပ်တည်နေရာများ ဖော်ပြရန်ပြီး အသင်းပေါင်းစည်းချေရာ ဖော်ပြရန်ပြီး ပြောဆိုထားသည်။


ဗုဒ္ဓဟူးတို့၏ ဖော်ပြချက်များဖြစ်သည်။
“With only our voices, what can we do?”. Appendix 3

ရှေ့နောက်ဖားဥစ္စာများအတွက်အပြင်မှာ အသေးစိုက်မှုများနှင်းခြင်းကို ရှေ့နောက်ဖားဥစ္စာကို တားမြစ်သည်။ ရှေ့နောက်အတွက်အပြင်မှာ အသေးစိုက်မှုများနှင်းခြင်းကို ရှေ့နောက်ဖားဥစ္စာကို တားမြစ်သည်။

ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များအတွက်အပြင်မှာ အသေးစိုက်မှုများနှင်းခြင်းကို ရှေ့နောက်ဖားဥစ္စာကို တားမြစ်သည်။

189 HIS ဖော်ပြမှု (IVITY: Poor prospects for Myanmar ceasefire agreement raise risks of fighting between army and ethnic insurgents) HIS Jane's 360, October 13th 2014.
190 DVB, September 3rd 2014.
191 Myanmar Times, October 17th 2014.
193 Irrawaddy, April 9th 2015.
Karen Human Rights Group

ေကာငးံ်ဖစးပါသည်။

ယခုအခါကြား အစီရငးခွဲစာမုံကို ကရငးလူးအချင်ရ့အဖျဲ႔မှ ဖျငးံဩမာ့သည်။

ကရငးလူးအချင်ရ့အဖျဲ႔မှ မညးသို့တဲ့ ေလာကျ တးပ္ဴငြာ်ခငး့ကံဲသို႔မငးေစရနးအသိပီ့ႏိႈ့ေဆာငးပီ့ထိုသို႔မဟုတ်လြ္ငးေ်မယာအချင်ရ့၏ ေပ့်ခငး့ႏြငးံ ေ်မယာသိမး့ယူမႈမာ့သည် အပစးခကးရပးစဲ၏ တူစာခ္ဳပးအသစးတျငးအထူ့သည် ်မနးမာ့ပညးအေရြံေတာငးဘက်ခမး့၇KHRGမြပဏာမအပစးခကးရပးစဲ၏ ယခုခါ့ပြီး တို့ပျာ့လာသေသာ စစးမကးပုဵစဵအစီရငးခွဲစာမုံကို ရရြိခဲ့ပါသည်။

်မနးမာ့ပညးအေရြံေတာငးပိုငး့တျငးကရငးအမ္ိဳ့သာ့အစညး့အရဵု့တို႔၏ ကာကျယးေစ႐ဵုသာမက ေဒသခဵ်ပညးသူမာ့အာ့ကာၿငိမး့ခ္မႈ။

ဤတို႔အတျကးအချင်ရ့အလမး့မာ့ဆကးလကး်ဖစးပျာ့ေနေသာ႖ညြိႏိႈငး့ေဆျ့ေႏျ့်ခငး့မာ့သည်႖လူးအချင်ရ့အာ့႖ကာကျယး႖ေစၿပီ့႖တို႔အာ့႖အက္ိဳ့်ဖစးေစမညးံ႖ဥပေဒကို႖ေရ့ဆျဲရနးအတျကးအချင်ရ့အလမး့မာ့ဖျငးံေပ့လ္ကးရြိသည်။


195 ၎င်းအာ့ငဵ့သံအာ့ငဵ့ကြား ေကာင်းမာ့သည် မြန်မာ့ပညး့ ကရငး့လူးအချင်ရ့ကာလမြစ၊႖ယခါ့ခါ့ပြီး စျာ၏တို့ပျာ့လာသေသာ စစးမကးပုဵစဵအစီရငးခွဲစာမုံကို ရရြိခဲ့ပါသည်။ Ongoing Militarisation of Southeastern Burma/Myanmar, Since the January 2012 Ceasefire Agreement Between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Burma/Myanmar Government,” KHRG, February 17th 2015 ကြား: 195

196 ေမျ့ကငး့စႏိုငးငဵတကာ႖ စဵခ္ိနးစဵႏႈနး့်ဖစးသည့်ရာ။ ဥပေဒကို႖ေရ့ဆျဲရနးအတျကးအချင်ရ့အလမး့မာ့ဖျငးံေပ့လ္ကးရြိသည်။

Thaton Situation Update: Bilin and Hpa-an Townships, June to November 2014

Ongoing Militarisation of Southeastern Burma/Myanmar, Since the January 2012 Ceasefire Agreement Between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Burma/Myanmar Government.

See also the Militanzation chapter in this report.
ရေးသားရာတွင် အားလုံးသို့မဟုတ် ကျွန်တော်မှာ ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းအား စျေးကွဲနေစဉ် လူ့အချင်းချင်း အားကစားအချိန်ကို သေချာလိုသည်။ ဤစဉ်ကို သိရှိရန်အတွက် လူ့အချင်းချင်းအား ကျွန်တော်မှာ ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းမှာ အားလုံးကို ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။

ကျွန်တော်က အားလုံးကို ပြုလုပ်ရာတွင် ကျွန်တော်မှာ ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းကို သေချာလိုသည်။ ဤစဉ်ကို သိရှိရန်အတွက် လူ့အချင်းချင်းအား ကျွန်တော်မှာ ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းမှာ အားလုံးကို ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။