Identity Politics And Ethnicity:  
Chin Christian Churches and Cross Planting

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Abstract

This paper looks into the policies Christian denominations in present-day Myanmar. Of the major Christian denominations Anglican, Baptist, Catholic, Methodist and Protestant, many are multiethnic, whereas some are strongly embedded in the identities of groups like Chin, Kachin, and Karen. Christianity was introduced and consolidated by the colonial rule as the British permitted and indirectly supported activities of both American and European Christian missionaries. Christian mission schools and the British army ultimately opened the road to social mobility for some Christianised minorities. With the recent political transformations, Myanmar is increasingly open for Christian missionaries and lobbyists. This paper looks particularly into the recent cross planting campaigns of the evangelical groups in the Chin State and contrasts these interventions with the stated purposes of the established churches to “decolonise” Christianity in Myanmar.

Keywords: Chin, evangelical churches, cross planting, primordialism
Introductory Reflections on “Burma Studies”

Benedict Anderson (1983) suggested that ethnic groups and nations are “imagined communities”. This irritated many people who felt that their identities were questioned and ridiculed as imaginary. Partha Chatterjee (1993) criticized Anderson pointing out that different groups represented ‘different imaginings of nationhood’. What Anderson meant with the concept of imagined community was rather that a community of anonymity reading the same vernacular press imagines possessing identical and shared socio-economic interests regardless of their caste, status or class background.

Eric Hobsbawn (1990) regarded the new European nation-states as “unhistorical nations” and showed how the so-called mother tongues that the ethno-linguistic nationalists in Europe were pushing as essentialist identity markers of ethno-national identities were actually not their mother tongues at all but rather an “invented tradition” based on nostalgic folklorism. In Asia, we have witnessed immigrants like an Irish lady Mrs. Annie Besant was fighting against British colonialism in India, South Asians like H.N. Goshal, Abdul Razak and M. A. Rashid fighting against British colonialism in Burma and Chinese-born elites formulating the pillars of Thai identity or “Thainess” in early Siam. (Harrison and Jackson 2010)

Paul Brass (1991) emphasises the role of elite competition in the construction of ethnic identities. Ethnic communities are created and transformed by elites in a process that invariably involves competition and conflict for political power and economic benefits. The elite chooses the language and the religious tradition to promote internal solidarity and external differentiation from other groups. The elite may then manipulate the selected symbols of the chosen identity to unite the group. According to Brass, ethnic self-consciousness, ethnically based demands, and ethnic conflict can occur only if there is some conflict either between indigenous and external elites or between indigenous elites themselves. (Brass 1991)

The post-colonial school has questioned the validity of essentialist identities and regards them not only imagined and culturally constructed but as hybrids. Homi Bhabha (1994) regards the colonial identities as hybridities and questions the colonial narratives of cultural imperialism and thus challenges essentialist claims for inherent authenticity or purity of cultures.
Recent discourses on ethnicity allege strong fluidity in identities, as also James C. Scott (2009) has shown in his book on the uplands of “Zomia”, pliable ethnic identities as a strategy in the art of not being governed. Edmund Leach (1954) suggested a flexibility and interchangeability of Kachin and Shan identities in his field work from the 1940s. The categories of Kachin and Karen were initially created by missionaries translating the Bible into a language in the region and the identities were further codified and militarized by British military recruiters who were looking for the “martial races” to join various ethnic “Riffles” within the British colonial army. The ethno-Christian identities of Kachin and Karen groups were constructed upon myths about the holy book, the white man and supreme god. (Gravers 2007)

The ethno-Christian identities are supported and promoted by internal and external “sacred” networks of evangelical churches, organisations, media and websites. (Horstmann 2011)

According to the government, Myanmar officially has 135 ethnic groups, the number based on the dubious British censuses taken by the petty colonial officials in their fiefs between 1891 and 1931. As a consequence of this categorization of peoples of colonial Burma, over 30 ethnic insurgent groups and nearly 80 different ethnic organisations could be listed in 1991 in Martin Smith’s classic work on ethnic insurgencies. (Smith 1991)

Charles Hirschmann (1986) has criticised the arbitrariness and irrationality of the censuses taken by the British in neighbouring Malaya. These fixed identities imagined by the British distorted the indigenous poly-centered, polyglot multi-cultural society. Malay scholars like A. B. Shamsul (2004) question the validity of the colonial knowledge collected by the colonial officials throughout those years of British rule. This type of basic source criticism appears to be still missing in the field of Burma Studies.

On the contrary, the anachronism of primordial narratives and parochial micro-nationalisms seems to prevail within the Burma Studies. The non-academic narratives about the Myanmar ethnic groups tend to be donor-based and pushed forward by probably well-meaning foreign and domestic organisation without any references to anthropological theories on ethnicity. This paper looks particularly into the issue on “religious freedom” in the context of the ethnic Chin and the socio-religiously constructed identity of the Chin.
Chin Christian Identity Construction

The ethnic Chins of Myanmar are predominantly Christian belonging to several different denominations. Their conversion into Christianity is relatively recent compared with some other ethnic minorities of Myanmar, among whom the proselytizing was started already in the early 1800s by missionaries like the American Baptist Adoniram Judson (1788-1850) predominantly among the Karen and Ola Hanson (1864-1927) among the Kachins in the turn of the last century creating the unifying “Kachin” identity which was consolidated by the invented print language. The Chins were more resistant to the new faith and the new identity was adopted only gradually in the 20th century. (Salai 2004: 17)

The term “Chin” encompasses a number of subgroups from diverse religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and geographical backgrounds.

Present Chin State borders with Mizoram, Nagaland and Manipur in India and shares their diversity of ethno-cultural groups. Mizoram, according to Lian Sakhong (2003), is part of the imagined Chinram, all-encompassing ‘homeland’ of the Chin, broken up be the British. (Sakhong 2003: xvii) In Mizoram, particularly, there are obviously numbers of Chin refugees from Myanmar, as the border has been rather porous. According to some estimates, there are 100,000 Chin refugees in India, mostly in Mizoram. The neighbouring states in Myanmar are Arakan and Sagaing Division. There are Chins residing both in northern Arakan and in Kalaymyo in Sagaing Region.

According to a classic study on the “Chin” by Vumson the Zo people are called Chin or Kuki by “foreigners”, whereas Zo is the indigenous name.3

Major C.M. Enriquez was one of the first Westerners trying to tackle and standardize the ethnic complexities of the “Chin Hills” in his “Races of Burma” (1933). Enriquez divided the Chins into three major groups based on the British division of the “Chin Hills” i.e. Northern, Centre and Southern administrative areas. Hence he recognized the regional “Chins of Tiddim”, “Chins of Falam” and “Chins of Haka”. According to the Census of India from 1931, there were 348,994 Chin living in “Chin Hills Proper”. (Enriquez 1933: 83)

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1 Estimates of the numbers of Chins in Myanmar vary between 500,000 and 700,000. There are Chins also in the neighbouring states of Mizoram in India and overseas.
3 Vumson (1986) Zo History. With introduction to Zo culture, economy, religion and their status as an ethnic minority in India, Burma and Bangladesh. Mizoram, India.
The “Chins of Tiddim” (Tedim) were, according to Enriquez, divided into clans “much more abruptly than is the case with Kachins”. His observations were guided by his sole purpose to recruit men for the British troops. He concludes that the Haka (Hakha) Chins are “good fighting men” whereas the others were “unfit to military service”. Indeed, a “platoon of Hakas (Hakha) was raised for the Military Police in 1914.” (Enriquez 1933:83-86)

Ultimately there were 868 Chin soldiers in the British Burma Army at the end of the war. (Furnivall 1948:184) Chin continued to serve in the army after the independence in 1948 and Chin troops were responsible for keeping Rangoon out of ethnic Karen and other insurgent hands, during the battle of Insein in 1949. (Lehman 1967: 98)

Linguistically, the Chin languages belong to the Tibeto-Burmese languages as most languages of Myanmar, and was divided by British linguists in 1904 into four different dialects; Northern, Central – which includes Lushai (Mizo), Old Kuki group includes Chakma spoken in present Bangladesh and Southern group including Chin Bok. (Sakhong 2003:17) Various Chin languages like Hakha Chin and Tedim Chin are not mutually comprehensible.

The “Hills” were the last frontiers occupied by the British as late as in 1898. Lowlands of Chittagong, Arakan and Burma had already been occupied in 1824 and the Central and Northern parts of present-day Myanmar were annexed to the British India after 1886 through various separate treaties and agreements. The highlanders had traditionally kept themselves apart from the lowlanders but their rulers often had a mutually beneficial relationship in terms of trade and exchange of tributes. Politically and administratively the highlanders were never under the lowland kingdoms. The British administration hence introduced a new situation where the highlanders were lumped – even if in administratively separate enclaves – with the British India and later British Burma.

The British colonial officials set to produce “knowledge” about the people they were to rule. The colonial officials tirelessly collected, labeled, and categorised races, tribes and languages, to assist them in drafting rules and regulations to divide and rule in order to administer the unruly hills. The British introduced an indirect rule to the Hills thus empowering the traditional chiefs and village headmen to become landowners and tax-

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4 Enriquez’ numbers correspond the Census of India 1931.
collectors. Consequently the local indigenous elites were turned into “agents of the British government”. (Sakhong 2003: 104-105)

The Chins had not easily surrendered to the British rule but openly rebelled as late as in 1917-19 in a rebellion known as Anglo-Chin War. (Sakhong 2003: 105)

The first missionaries who attempted to enter the Chin areas were Roman Catholic priests in 1864. They were escorted out of the area that time but returned in 1884 to Kalaymyo in the present Sagaing Region, where they encountered some ethnic Chins. American Baptist missionaries Arthur and Laura Carson succeeded in 1899 to found a mission station in Hakha. According to Lian Sakhong, the couple was “invited” by the British colonial officers. (Sakhong 2003:119)

They were followed by some other American missionaries. The first Chin converts in 1904 were two couples from Tedim.

Christianity gradually spread among the Chins but was also challenged by indigenous cults. In the 1930s, an indigenous cult or religious movement led by Pau Cin Hau (1859 - 1948) had more adherents than Christianity. The movement is interpreted by a Chin scholar Pum Khan Pau (2012) both as an indigenous response to the Christian mission as it defended the Chin traditions and a forerunner to Christianity. In 1931, there were 35.700 adherents to Pau Cin Hau and 10.000 Christian converts. (Pau 2012:10) The Chins were more resistant to the new faith and the new identity was adopted only gradually in the 20th century. (Salai 2004: 17)

F.K. Lehman pointed out that in 1967, “roughly 70 percent of the Chins are non-Christian; most are animists, but some, especially on the Arakan side are at least nominally Buddhists. Only about 22 percent are Baptist, real or nominal, and a few percent more are Protestants or of other denominations or Roman Catholics.” (Lehman 1967: 97) This clearly reveals an exceptionally fast pace of conversion into Christianity among the Chin during the last forty years. Lehman points out that already in the 1960s the “Chin nationalistic political leadership” was predominantly Christian, and Christianity had become an important symbol of Chin political identity. (Lehman 1967: 96-97)
After the foreign missionaries were expelled by the military government in 1966, the Burmese converts continued the work. According to Chin Khua Khai (2002), a Burmese Pentecostalist, Myo Chit continued the work of proselytizing in the already existing Assemblies of God. According to Chin, the Pentecostal church had become visible among the Chin particularly under pastor Hau Lian Kham and his “open-air crusade” starting in 1973. (Chin 2002: 57-59)

According to Chin Khua Khai, the reason why the Pentecostal movement and the Assemblies of God Church appeal particularly to the former nominally animistic peoples like Kachins and Chins is its preoccupancy with healing, miracles, evil spirits, singing, witnessing and speaking in tongues and other supernatural manifestations (Chin 2002: 55-61).

According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, in 2011, there were 309,571 Christians in Falam District, and 1,289 Buddhists. In Mindat District there were 155,781 Christians and 58,910 Buddhists. There were 1,053 churches in Falam and 905 churches in Mindat. According to the Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO), 87 percent of the people in Chin State are Christian. In the poorer South, 72 percent of the people are Christian; 27 percent are Buddhist, rest are Animists, Hindus, or Muslims. (CHRO 2012: 44)

**Constructing Giant Christian Crosses as Identity Markers**

The campaign to convert all Chins into Christianity was started late in the 1970s: “In the late 1970s, the Zomi Baptist Convention (ZBC) launched an indigenous missionary program “Chin for Christ in One Century” (CCOC) aimed at making the entire Chin people become Christian by the end of the twentieth century. Under the program, the ZBC recruited volunteer missionaries and evangelists from various parts of Chin State to carry out its mission in certain parts of Chin State, especially the northern part, and other adjoining areas in habited by many non-Christian Chins. By the end of the program in late 1990s, the CCOC converted a large proportion of non-Christians despite several restrictions and persecution.” (Salai 2004:18)

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5 The Zomi Baptist Convention (ZBC) has its head office in Falam.
6 CHRO 2012:120.
7 The name Zomi is often used by the Chins in Myanmar and overseas.
8 The CCOC movements bears clear similarities to the “church planting movements” carried out worldwide by US based Southern Baptists. See Garrison (1999)
The same developments are presented somewhat more detailed in a later report by the Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO): “Pu Lain Uk, the leader of the Chin Federal Movement, and two of his fellow law students who were also imprisoned for their roles in the movement, Reverend Dr. Sang Awr and Reverend Hniar Kio, went to play a leading role in the 1983-1998 *Chins for Christ in One Century* (CCOC) movement.” (CHRO 2012:21) According to Lian Sakhong (2003), the campaign had started in 1964 as “Chin Hills for Christ” and was an indigenous missionary endeavour. (Sakhong 2003:xviii) This may refer to a much earlier campaign with less reported consequences.

According to the CHRO (2012) report, “CCOC was an evangelical mission under the Evangelism and Mission Program of the Zomi (Chin) Baptist Convention, formed of the representatives of about 30 Chin Baptist Associations. The purpose of CCOC was to bring Christianity to all Chin people, especially in the Southern area of Chin State, before one hundred years of the arrival of the Gospel in Chin State (i.e. before 1999)”. This program was launched in 1983. (CHRO 2012:21)

The campaign attempted yet again link Chin ethnic identity to Christianity by the Chin nationalists underlining that the CCOC movement “also promoted Chin cultural homogeneity, and by extension, Chin national identity.” (CHRO 2012: 21-22)

Under the CCOC, hundreds of Chin volunteers were enlisted as “ambassadors”. As lay Christians, they were given training to enable them to proselytize and support newly-converted Christians. “The volunteers were primarily sent to he southern townships of Mindat, Matupi, Kanpetlet and Paletwa, but also to northern townships of Chin State, and other parts of Burma with sizeable Chin populations”. (CHRO 2012:22) “Ambassadors” were also sent outside the Chin State to Tamu township in Homalin district in Sagaing Region; Gangaw township in Magway Region; and Ann township in Arakan State. (CHRO 2012 fn 114: 22) With this the Chin Baptists were outreaching into areas outside the Chin State to the neighbouring Arakan and Sagaing, both predominantly Buddhist.

The activists attempted to convert also the Chins who did not live within the boundaries of Chin State. The CCOC arrived in Arakan State in 1993 to set up giant crosses in the Ann and Myebon townships. The resistance against this campaign started two years later when
“Buddhist monks from the Hill Region Buddhist Mission” and from the army started to destroy the property of the missionaries, evict them, and impose travel restrictions on missionaries. (CHRO 2012: 66)

During the time of CCOC, Chin communities erected large wooden crosses on hilltops near the villages and towns to “symbolize their faith in Christianity”. With this construction of giant crosses, the Chins, according to the Chin nationalists, also wished to show that their “homeland was Christian”. One of the pastors participating in the campaign complained that the Buddhist monks had been the “main trouble makers”. (CHRO 2012: 22)

CHRO reports that thirteen crosses – many of them large structure over 20 feet tall – have been destroyed. “Most of the crosses were on hilltops overlooking towns, on land considered to be sacred according to the Chin tradition. The Chin activists innocently claimed that, “the planting of crosses on sacred sites is a very important manifestation of their religious beliefs,” suggesting that the Chin Christians have divine monopoly on mountain tops. (CHRO 2012: 54)\(^9\)

The CHRO manufactured consent in the media landscape and Narinajara\(^10\) an Arakanese news agency reported, based on the information by CHRO, that a 23 feet high concrete cross in Mindat township had been pulled down 24 June 2010. Irrawaddy magazine published a similar article with the headline “Christian Chin ‘Coerced to Buddhism by State’” without questioning the purpose of the campaign.\(^11\)

Crosses were burnt as a part of the counter-campaign. The Chin organisations interpret the events as “discrimination of the dual basis of their ethnicity and religion”. (CHRO 2012: xiii)

The Chin nationalists regarded the CCOC movement as a success despite the resistance by the local Buddhist communities and authorities. CHRO boasts that as a result of the

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\(^9\) Crosses were destroyed or pulled down in Tonzang, Matupi, Hakha, Thantlang and Falam townships in the 1990s and early 2000s according to Salai (2004:51-54). Crosses were later on again destroyed in Matupi, Kanpetlet and Paletwa. (CHRO 2012 fn 240: 54) It seems that more crosses have been destroyed in the South recent years. The Paletwa cross was destroyed by “local Buddhists” in 2007. (ibid)


campaign “200 churches were planted and at least 20,000 people were converted”. (CHRO 2012 fn 116: 22)

It is worth noting that the campaign was started during the harsh military dictatorship of General Ne Win that lasted from 1962 to 1988. His authoritarianism was inherited by the military junta ruling from 1988 to 2010. Hence it is hardly surprising that the military-ruled authoritarian state violently countered the aggressive cross planting campaign. The CHRO brings forward a government pamphlet allegedly from 1992, which encourages the Buddhist monks and other opponents to openly attack and criticize Christians and “the sermons which are broadcasted from Manila, Philippines”\textsuperscript{12}. (Salai 2004: 24; CHRO 2012: 23)

The entire CCOC cross planting campaign was initiated and directed by the evangelical churches in the Philippines. The campaign appears to go against the official church paradigm prompting an “indigenisation” of the Chin Christian church. There has been close links to the Philippines among several Myanmar Christian communities and, nowadays, there still is an active Chin community called Philippine Chin Christian Fellowship in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{13}

According to the \textit{Chinland Guardian}, the Chin religious leaders are planning new “campaigns” to reach out to all the Chins. The \textit{Chinland Guardian} reports how the leaders of the Global Chin Christian Fellowship (GCCF) call for support and collaboration on mission works among the “unreached” Chins as part of its long-term goals.\textsuperscript{14}

In the \textit{Chinland Guardian} interview, Rev. Dr. Hla Aung, Executive Secretary, and Pastor Salai Cung Cin, Executive Director of GCCF, met with Chin churches and communities across Europe, Australia and New Zealand to work jointly on mission projects. "We have outreach and home missions. The first one aims to work among the unreached such as Asho Chins living in regions outside of Chin State while the latter would focus on, for instance, students studying at different universities in the country," said Rev. Dr. Hla Aung.\textsuperscript{15}

The Executive Secretary announced that GCCF would work to reach out to fellow Chins in Chittagong Hill Tracts in Muslim Bangladesh, southern parts of Chin State, and Buddhist

\textsuperscript{12} Italics mine.
\textsuperscript{13} 2012 Philippine Chin Christian Fellowship had with 74 members in 2012. (Website accessed 10 November 2012)
\textsuperscript{14} GCCF to Focus on Mission on “unreached” Chins. 5 November 2012, \url{www.chinlandguardian.com}
\textsuperscript{15} GCCF to Focus on Mission on “unreached” Chins. 5 November 2012, \url{www.chinlandguardian.com}
regions of Myanmar. GCCF’s mission includes building up networks and cooperation among Chin Christians living in Bangladesh, India and Myanmar for strengthening fellowship and unity.

According to Chum Awi (1999), the idea for the cross planting campaign came allegedly from Kachin State, where there had been similar campaigns, and where some Chin priests had been involved in. The CCOC campaign was purely a Baptist campaign, dominated by the overseas evangelical Baptists. The campaign resulted in new Baptist associations in those areas that were targeted, and hence by 1999, there were 25 associations listed within the Zomi Baptist Convention. (Chum Awi 1999: np)

The Centenary marked the 100 years of the arrival of the missionary couple Arthur and Laura Carsons (1899), and after the successful operation CCOC, the next target will be to intensify proselytizing to the Asho Chins16 and to the Arakan Chins. (Chum Awi 1999: np)17

The struggle between the Buddhist community and the Christian evangelists has resulted in human right violations as Rachel Fleming from the CHRO reports18: CHRO has documented 15 separate incidents of monasteries and pagodas being built with forced labour extracted from Chin Christians between 1992 and 2009. Most of these incidents took place in towns in the early-mid 1990s. Later incidents primarily involved forced labour to build either pagodas or monasteries inside or very close to Myanmar Army camps in rural areas. There is a clear pattern in which soldiers, local authorities and monks work together to extract the forced labour. In at least one location, a pagoda was built using forced labour on the very site where a Christian cross had been destroyed by soldiers. In the towns, high school students were frequently ordered to provide the labour, severely disrupting their right to education. (Fleming 2012:13-18)

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16 Asho Chin is one of the many subgroups of Chins, predominantly animists residing in Southern Chin State.
17 Online article by Reverend Chum Awi “Centenary Essay; In search of the lost souls of the Chins”. Unpublished letter posted online 12 March 1999. (Retrieved 10 November 2012)
The heavy-handed overseas campaign to convert all Chin sub-groups into Christianity in fact aggravated the human rights situation among the Chin people. Similar aggressive Christianisation policies have been carried out in Indonesia resulting into religious violence.\textsuperscript{19} The fanatic cross planting, however, continues in the Chin State and as recently as in January 2015, a 54 feet high cross had been removed by the government. (Irrawaddy 29 January 2015) Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) expediently interpreted the case as a case of religious persecution.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Conclusionary Reflections}

Essentialisation of Christianity into a fetishisation of the Christian cross as the symbol of an ethno-religious identity is promoted by the fundamentalist evangelical Christian groups based in the Philippines but targeting Myanmar and other regions in Asia.

The provocative campaigns of church planting and cross planting in the Chin State, with slogans on cross in every village have only constituted a prelude to human rights violations, which the Christian propaganda organisations then report as supposedly unprovoked attacks on local Christian groups.

The activities of these evangelical overseas groups aggravate the situation in the already volatile atmosphere of religious tensions. The more established Anglican, Baptist, Catholic, Methodist and Protestant churches in Myanmar are for their part actively promoting inter-faith dialogue and a de-colonization of Christianity.

The leading educational institute Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT) has a strong Chin representation. Since 2006, the rector of the university has been Reverend Dr. Samuel Ngun Ling, a Chin from the Theology Department. Many of the younger professors are also Chins such as Reverend Dr. Cung Lian Hup from the Historical and Mission Department. Both theologians represent a modern “pluralist” and “multiculturalist” approaches to Christianity. Ngun Ling recognises the importance of mission in Christianity but points out that without dialogue, mission has “often taken the form of militancy and cultural imperialism”. (Ngun Ling 2007:8)


Ngun Ling promotes the contemporary discourse of trying to “decolonise” Christianity in Myanmar. He continues on this theme in another article discussing the perceptions of Christianity among the non-Christian population of Myanmar again calling for “decolonizing Christianity”. (Ngun Ling 2010: 19)

Remote-control church planting and cross planting campaigns in the Chin State in recent years are a prime examples a “cultural imperialism” and constitute a total opposite to the attempts of decolonising Christianity in Myanmar.

Paradoxically, the Burma Studies with essentialist approaches to ethnicity and identity politics in Myanmar, risks remaining on its infant primordialist stages uncritically promoting anachronistic race-narratives and parochial micronationalisms.

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