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Acknowledgments

Burma News International (BNI) is pleased to present the second book of an annual series covering Myanmar's complex peace process. The data compiled in this book is a culmination of media monitoring conducted over the past year by BNI’s Myanmar Peace Monitor project. Other important sources of information include interviews, primary documents and contributions by key actors involved.

The organisation would like to thank the members of its Myanmar Peace Monitoring Team, Mr. Sai Leik, Ms. Donna Ong, Mr. Naylinn Htike and Mr. Aung Kyaw Htun for research and writing, Mr. Khin Maung Shwe and Mr. Khuensai Jaiyen for their expert insights and proofreading of this book, and Ms. Thu Htike San, Ms. Ngao Hseng and Mr. Nay Myo Aung for logistical support. We would like to thank all editors of BNI member organisations for sharing information. The team’s research of the peace process was greatly aided by many of whom cannot be named here. The generous time and effort that many key players of the peace process have provided for this book has greatly encouraged our efforts to improve understanding and awareness about Myanmar’s peace process.

This publication would not have been possible without the generous financial support from Open Society Foundations (OSF). BNI would also like to take this opportunity to express its profound gratitude to its donors for their continued support towards the organisation's work for peace and democracy in Myanmar.

Notes to the reader:

The political sensitivity and scale of the peace negotiations and conflict have again posed a major challenge in collecting complete and accurate data for this book. While we have received the generous support of insider sources for our data, this remains far from gaining a complete picture of the myriad components of Myanmar’s peace process. We have also tried to the best of our ability to provide overview statistics that give a sense of the scale and impact of developments occurring over the past year. However, these numbers are based on media reports that are usually unable to cover all events, and statistics quoted in the news and different official sources more often than not do not match up. Therefore most of the information and data recorded in this book are estimates at best. Diagrams, graphs and maps aim primarily to provide a framework in which to understand the many aspects of peace and conflict.

Due to unforeseen delays, the book was unable to publish by February as originally planned but the authors have tried to provide major changes up until the end of March 2014.
### Acronyms

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<td>AAPP</td>
<td>Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma)</td>
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<td>ABSDF</td>
<td>All Burma Students’ Democratic Front</td>
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<td>ALP/ALA</td>
<td>RSLP Arakan Liberation Party/Rakhine State Liberation Party</td>
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<td>Border Guard Force</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<td>Chin National Front</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
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<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (Formerly DKBA-5)</td>
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<td>EAOs</td>
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<td>ENC</td>
<td>Ethnic Nationalities Council</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>Nationalities Brotherhood Federation</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement</td>
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<td>NCCT</td>
<td>Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team</td>
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<td>NDA-K</td>
<td>New Democratic Army - Kachin</td>
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* iv | Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process*
Official and Former Anglicised Names

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Executive Summary

Myanmar’s peace process in 2013 experienced twists and turns as conflict persists alongside developments in peace talks. The commitment to peace from both sides and willingness to make compromises by softening demands, has ensured negotiations have not only stayed on track but made a major breakthrough with the near completion of a single text nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). After two years of peace talks that began under the newly reformed government, the negotiation strategy of both sides have matured. Instead of making outright demands, the two sides agree to begin talks on common points before moving towards more sensitive issues of political and military affairs.

The historic Laiza conference that brought together all major non-state armed groups (NSAG) to discuss a government draft of a NCA in early November, marked a major turning point in strengthening and streamlining the ethnic armed groups’ negotiation position. The Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) was created as a negotiation team to handle all negotiations for the NCA with the government team. Instead of the government’s initial plan to negotiate a ceasefire with individual groups, the focus has now turned to signing one “single text” ceasefire among all groups. To resolve resistance on the part of several groups to sign a ceasefire first before completing political talks, the ethnic side has compromised by accepting a government draft that includes the agenda for political talks within the NCA. This helps to guarantee a continuation of negotiations for the much-desired goal of ethnic self-determination after signing. The positive response made at the second ethnic conference at Law Khee Lar (20-25 January 2014), creation of a joint Government-NSAG ceasefire drafting committee and frequent meetings with the government side, signals that the two sides are moving closer to signing a NCA. Nevertheless the need for many more rounds of negotiations has perpetually pushed the government’s proposed signing date back indefinitely.

The terms to reintegrate NSAGs and assist conflict affected communities, signed at the state and union level peace agreement beginning late 2011, have already started making important headway which supports the overall movement for peace e.g. legalisation of NSAGs, trust building, ethnic rights and resettlement. Assistance from the international community has played a crucial supporting role in producing these “peace dividends” but must guard against ignoring the core political issues that continue to drive the conflict. The marked improvement of everyday life for post conflict communities is a clear sign of the progress made in this respect. However without solving political issues of self-determination, many remain sceptical about the government’s sincerity and fear a return to conflict.

Despite the major developments on the peace negotiation front, the persistently high level of conflict in Kachin and Shan states are a cause for worry. NSAG reports that the Myanmar military has not changed its aggressive policies to wipe them out, has only fueled the ethnic side’s distrust of both the government and peace process as a whole. Communal violence that began in the Western state of Rakhine in 2012, spread throughout the country and caused a rapid rise in religious radicalism as demonstrated by the growing popularity of the protective Buddhist 969 movement. The ongoing violence related to ethnic and communal conflict has not only created new IDPs and prevented returns of existing ones, but threatens to slow or even reverse the positive reforms made in the country as a whole. The growing...
The rate of opium production and trade is another contradicting outcome of the peace process that exposes yet to be identified holes in the peace efforts. Much more still needs to be done to understand and address the root political causes that drive these conflicts. With the increasing integration into the international community and as the ASEAN chair in 2014, Myanmar is more enthusiastic than ever to make up for damage done by decades-long conflict to catch up with global standards.
Myanmar Peace Monitor is a project run by the Burma News International that works to support communication and understanding in the current efforts for peace and reconciliation in Myanmar. It aims to centralize information, track and make sense of the many events and stakeholders involved in the complex and multifaceted peace process.

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<td>The Irish Daily Mirror</td>
<td>The Irish Daily Mirror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Daily Record</td>
<td>The Irish Daily Record</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entering into the third year of transition in Myanmar, changes continue to move rapidly under the new civil military government led by former military general Thein Sein. Upon taking office, President Thein Sein announced his government would transform the political, economic and social sectors. An important component of the political reform agenda has been engaging in peace talks with various ethnic armed groups, which have fought the central Myanmar government for equality, self-determination and a genuine federal union since the country gained independence in 1948. Following several peace meetings with ethnic armed groups since 2011, the Myanmar government has signed ceasefire agreements with 14 out of 17 major armed groups.

This book is a part of BNI’s ongoing Myanmar Peace Monitoring program (http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org) and a continuation of last year’s Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2013. This 2014 book covers major developments of the previous year, and includes significant events up until the third month of this year to assist all players to map out the complicated components, actors and issues of the peace process. By making sense of the confusing relationships, it hopes to further improve understanding and communication between all sides, as well as assist key players to make informed decisions in the year ahead. It is our hope that mapping out the overall peace process will also assist experts, civil society groups and the media in improving monitoring and analysis.

2013 was another eventful year of conflict and peace talks, persistent distrust but advances in peace agreements. While the year began on a bad note with the heavy military offensives against the KIA’s headquarters, military buildup against the UWSA and continued campaigns against SSPP and RCSS bases in the first half of the year, the second half closed on a positive note with the creation of the single text NCA.

The impressive achievements in ethnic unity and cooperation with the government over the single text NCA however was not without its ups and downs in the ethnic peace plan. Over the course of the year, a split among NSAGs occurred over the Working Group for a Reference Guide 2014 | 1
Ethnic Coordination's (WGEC) political framework proposal in April, which put ceasefire before political talks. The UNFC, led by combatant groups KIA and TNLA, opposed the arrangement and pursued a more aggressive strategy that was reminiscent of previous years, namely re-proposing the complete rewrite of a federal constitution and demanding a Federal Union Army. Nevertheless, the KNU and RCSS defended the WGEC’s proposal and successfully convinced the government side to draft up a Single Text NCA. The first government’s draft was a key catalyst for NSAGs to convene the historical Laiza conference that brought together 18 armed groups. In a surprise show of unity, the conference concluded with an agreement to cooperate with the government on the NCA on condition that it guarantees political talks. A NCCT (National Ceasefire Coordination Team) was formed to represent NSAGs in negotiations with the government over the terms in the NCA.

The first part of the book provides an overview of the major events of last year, highlighting the positive developments and persistent problems. On the positive front, trust building and communication between the two sides have improved dramatically this year, peace brokers are no longer necessary to mediate between NSAGs and government, and meetings have increased in frequency. As a result of ceasefires, reports from the ground show a marked improvement in civilian life in conflict-affected areas. Human rights abuses have reduced significantly and people enjoy greater freedom to move and conduct business.

On the negative front, the level of conflict has not improved with the KIA and TNLA seeing an increase in battles during 2013. Ceasefire violations continue, with especially intense fighting between the Myanmar and the RCSS and SSPP in Shan state. The spread of communal violence is especially worrying and threatens another kind of war in Myanmar which will be much harder to tackle in the long run than the ethnic civil war. Increasing Buddhist radicalism with the rise of the 969 movement across the country, is being met with growing militancy of Muslims in Myanmar. There was a rise in occurrences of communal conflict as well as terrorism inside the country and regionally. Links with al-Qaida warrants serious attention, especially with regard to growing radicalism of religion internationally. The spillover of religious tension was seen this year in India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and most of all in Indonesia. The result of these has led to increasing numbers of IDPs and human suffering. The rising level of drug production also contradicts the developments in the peace process. The many disparate grievances that have yet to be addressed or identified also explains the string of bomb blasts and notably violent protests over land confiscation.

The second part is an in-depth explanation of the new peace process plan following the formation of the NCCT and single text document. It includes a timeline of events, background of important players, explanation of the negotiation process, issues discussed and to be included in the NCA. In addition, it outlines what the new political roadmap will look like following the signing of the NCA. This new plan replaces the previous union level and state level agreements, and the government no longer aims to sign any more agreements with individual groups. It has welcomed the unified ceasefire and both sides believe in the benefits of negotiating one document for all.

The third part covers the ongoing efforts related to the peace process, most of which have already started under the post-2011 ceasefires and union level peace agreements. These include a wide array of issues such as support for peace dialogue from legalising and reintegrating NSAGs and conflict-affected communities, codes of conduct, self-determination issues that aim to resolve grievances that drive the conflict e.g. ethnic rights, economic development and improving living standards in ethnic areas. This section also includes a summary of efforts that have been taken to address communal conflict. In addition, the role of CBOs in implementing peace terms and representing the voice of the people at the...
The fourth section is devoted to understanding the role and activities of the International Community in helping the country progress positively towards peace. Foreign aid and assistance have been vital in expediting ceasefire implementation, trust building and policymaking. Foreign presence at peace meetings is also regarded as important in making the agreements more binding. Like the rest of the peace process, international aid is equally complicated by the politics resulting from the competing agendas of different donor countries. This explains why, despite the formation of a Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG) to coordinate international aid, there is still a lack of transparency and cooperation. It has also come under harsh criticism for serving economic or political benefits of foreign governments instead of local interests. The Norway-led peace initiative (MPSI), which was the first immediate response to assist the peace process, is expected to end in April this coming year. Though it has initiated several important programs, it has especially come under fire by CBOs for favoring development over political settlement and pressuring NSAGs to sign ceasefires before completing their goals to ensure ethnic rights and self-determination. Foreign actors play a difficult role balancing their engagement with the government and opposing ethnic sides, and have been cautioned to better understand the politics behind the conflict.

The conclusion of the book lists some determining factors that will lead to the success or hindrances of the peace process. The final section is a compilation of profiles of the different NSAGs, UNFC, government peace team, as well as important documents for the reader’s reference.

Despite the major challenges that continue to plague the country, there is a general sense of optimism on both sides about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Both the Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups have reiterated their commitment to peace. The leaders also recognise the benefits of peace over conflict, and fully understand their responsibility in meeting the overwhelming demand of their people for long-term peace.
I. Overview

Status of NSAG groups

Following President Thein Sein’s order on 18 August 2011 to resume peace dialogue with major non-state armed groups (NSAG) in the country, the government’s peace team has made rapid progress in engaging them to cooperate towards a long term political solution. Over the course of two years, the government’s three phase peace plan - State level (ceasefire agreement), Union level (political dialogue) and Nationwide ceasefire - has been the prevailing scheme, with 14 out of 17 major NSAGs signing a ceasefire and 11 of these making headway in political dialogue at the Union level agreement.

Despite ongoing heavy fighting with non-ceasefire groups, the government has maintained consistent talks with the KIA (along with AA) and met with the TNLA for the first time this year. The inability to secure a ceasefire with these two groups and ongoing clashes has therefore led to a significant shift in the government’s original peace plan of engaging armed groups individually, to signing one nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). The proposal to sign one NCA was first proposed by the WGEC and accepted by the government on 15 June. However, problems regarding the decision to sign a ceasefire first before political talks caused a split in the ethnic side between the UNFC and WGEC (supported by the KNU and RCSS). It was only until the Laiza conference in November that the ethnic side were unified in their decision to work on a single document ceasefire agreement to be signed with the government, on the condition that political talks were guaranteed in a framework.

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Agreement level - 2011</th>
<th>Agreement level - 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UWSA/P</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSS/SSA</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPP/SSA</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNLO</td>
<td>State Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSDF</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPC</td>
<td>State Level</td>
<td>State Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP/A</td>
<td>State Level</td>
<td>State Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCN-K</td>
<td>State Level</td>
<td>State Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instead it has called for all AA-Kachin, AA-Karen and other Rakhine groups to negotiate under the single banner of ALP/A.
Though the government-NSAG negotiations have now shifted to working on a single document to streamline negotiations, the conditions signed in previous union and state level ceasefires will remain in effect and be incorporated into the single NCA. Furthermore, the developments in some of these agreements, such as code of conduct, resettlement, amnesty, recognition of ethnic rights, socio-economic development etc., are all important in contributing to long term efforts for peace and national reconciliation.

In 2013, the Kuki National Organisation - Burma (KNO-B) (split from the previous united front with Indian Kukis, known as the Kuki National Organisation) emerged as a new distinct NSAG in Myanmar that has attempted to initiate a ceasefire with the government, but has yet to be acknowledged. Although they have had no clashes with the Myanmar army since their reformation, they continue to pose a potential threat to national stability if left out of the national peace process.

Positive developments

Progress in Trust-building and commitment to peaceful dialogue

A major development over the course of 2013 is a marked improvement in the trust between the government and armed groups. According to an MPC official, there was reason to be optimistic as both sides are willing and eager to make the peace process succeed. In particular there is no longer a need for third parties to help broker talks, as NSAGs, including combatant ones, have now established direct communication with the government.

There are several possible reasons for this:

1. Commitment of leaders to engage in peaceful dialogue and realisation of the benefits of peace over conflict. e.g. RCSS leader Yawd Serk expressed on several occasions his commitment to peace despite heavy fighting with government troops in the first half of the year. 10 May, RCSS spokesman Lao Hseng reiterated the group's commitment to the ceasefire despite the government's violation, until such time as the government revokes it.

2. Positive reforms occurring in the country as a whole under the Thein Sein government, demonstrating hope and willingness of the government to make political reforms that respect ethnic rights and demands.

3. Goodwill gestures by Aung Min and the government peace team, as well as delivering on promises made in peace agreements, which contributes towards building trust with some NSAG leaders. The government's willingness to accommodate demands of NSAGs helps improve rapport between the two sides. This is furthered by moves to bring NSAGs back into the legal fold - namely the release of political prisoners, passports to NSAG leaders and granting of tax free/preferential tax rates vehicle licenses.

4. Overwhelming show of support from the public for successful peace talks between the government and NSAGs to end the conflict e.g. rally in Myitkyina during peace talks and the march to Laiza.

5. Financial support from foreign and domestic donors to fund goodwill trips and meetings, e.g. Nippon Foundation's sponsorship and hosting of three UNFC leaders to Yangon from 23-26 November.

Frequency of meetings

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Goodwill meetings. According to an official at the MPC, there were a total of 250 formal and informal meetings between the government and NSAGs. However, the media only recorded a total of 74 meetings in 2013 compared to 56 in 2012.

New peace agreements

ABSDF reached ceasefire and union level agreements

First meetings

TNLA - 2

UNFC - 1 formal and 2 informal

NCCT - 1 formal and 2 informal

Total crisis meetings KNU, UWSA, SSPP, DKBA

Other notable outcomes KIO Technical Advisory Team

The significance of peace talks was especially apparent in successful attempts to resolve intense fighting in Kachin state and Shan state. After a heavy military offensive by the government against the KIA’s headquarters in Laiza, talks facilitated by the Chinese government in February saw an improvement in relations that culminated in 6 meetings total in 2013, and resulted in a preliminary ceasefire that included a commitment to peace talks, a joint-monitoring committee and the setting up of a technical advisory team office in Myitkyina (in lieu of a liaison office).

UNFC also appears to be softening its stance as it has agreed to start nationwide peace talks on common points instead of differences (e.g. dropping demands for a new Federal constitution, foreign mediators or to hold peace meetings abroad). Mediators like the Dawei Princess company and Peace Creation Group (PCG) are no longer needed to broker meetings. Nevertheless, domestic and foreign witnesses are still present at a few meetings to give more legitimacy to the agreements and hence make them more binding.

Improvements on the ground

Since the signing of union and state level ceasefire agreements, locals in affected areas have reportedly seen a consistent decline in military activities and human rights abuses. Surveys and interviews by MPSI, TBC, media and local groups have also found they enjoy more freedom to travel, do business without fear for their security or the need to pay taxes to different militia groups. The benefits on the border economy is also reflected in the significant increase in border trade — local media reported Myanmar’s border trade increased 26% to US$1.881 billion in the first five months (April-August) of the fiscal year 2013-14, compared to the previous year.

The Irrawaddy Magazine article also found that conditions in Chin state have improved drastically since the CNF negotiated 3 ceasefire agreements with the government in January 2012.

Roads are being improved and the requirement for tourists to hold special permits before traveling in the state was dropped in early 2013. Foreign investors are also said to be coming to the state looking for business opportunities. Nevertheless, despite these positive changes, there remains a general scepticism among the ethnic population about the sincerity of the government’s peace talks. The deep-rooted trauma as a result of decades of abuse by the military has made many highly distrustful of the government and fearful that clashes would recur.

1 Based on meetings reported in the media

2 “Myanmar’s border trade hits over 1.8 bln USD in five months” Xinhua 8 Sept. 2013. Web.

Persistent problems

Ongoing clashes

While the situation has improved for civilians, combatant and ceasefire NSAG commanders, on the other hand, find the conditions in the field remain unchanged. Due to enduring aggressive attitudes of the military and ceasefire violations, they believe that the peace process is not going well. Over the course of 2013, armed clashes persisted against the KIA, TNLA, RCSS and SSPP in Kachin and Shan state. While the situation in Kayah, Kayin and Mon state in the southeast is gradually improving, occasional tension and skirmishes still occur. Only Western Myanmar has seen no fighting since the signing of ceasefire agreements in 2011.

Figure 1: Clashes in 2012

Figure 2: Clashes in 2013

Note: Actual number of clashes between ethnic armed forces and Myanmar military forces may be much higher than the number of clashes reported in the media. Myanmar Peace Monitor has collected the following data reported in both domestic and international media, and noted official figures from NSAGs when available.
Figure 3: Clashes, peace talks, agreement and communal violence in 2013

Table 2: Clashes per month for intense fighting groups (Reported only*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAOs</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total this year and last year per group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KIO</th>
<th>TNLA</th>
<th>SSPP</th>
<th>RCSS</th>
<th>KNU</th>
<th>DKBA</th>
<th>NMSP</th>
<th>KNPP</th>
<th>UWSA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>130*</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>120*</td>
<td>71*</td>
<td>86*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process
Figure 4: Conflict situation map of northern Shan state

- Gas and Pipe Line
- Planned Dam Projects
- KIA's operational area
- RCSS's operational area
- TNLA's operational area
- SSPP's operational area
- Shweli Dam

Table 3: Clash comparison between non-ceasefire groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Group</th>
<th>2012 Clashes</th>
<th>2013 Locations</th>
<th>Casualties (reported)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>+ AA (cooperating with KIA)</td>
<td>&lt;2400 (since June 2011)</td>
<td>98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Near Laiza, Bhamo, Hpa-kant, Pangwa, Chipwe, Kutkai, Panghsai, Kyukote, Namkham, Moenyin, Mongkoe, Mongsi, Mongkai, Manton, Muse, Machanbaw, Puta-O, Mabain, Mansi</td>
<td>68 killed and more than 21 seriously injured, including civilians (IDPs &gt; 3,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td>80+</td>
<td>Kutkai, Nam Kham, Namhsan, Kyaukme, Manton, Mong Ngao, 64 killed and 92 wounded including civilians (IDPs - over 100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>132 Killed and 113 wounded (IDPs &gt;3100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ceasefire violations: clashes in ceasefire areas

Despite efforts to maintain ceasefire agreements since 2011, clashes continue to occur. The SSPP (SSA-N) and RCSS (SSA-S) have experienced the most clashes among the ceasefire groups, with over 100 each. While most are minor skirmishes, these two Shan armies have also seen heavier fighting including the loss of military bases and attacks on liaison officers.

### Table 4: Clash comparison between ceasefire groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Group</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCSS/SSA</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>27*</td>
<td>A Homein, Leikhar, Maukmai, Mongton, Tasan, Kunhing, Mongpan, Mongkai, Namkhan, Hopon, Namhsan, Kyaukme, Mongyaung, Loilem district</td>
<td>22 killed and 20 injured including civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPP/SSA</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>25*</td>
<td>A Homein, Lashio, Tangyan, Nawngkio, Namtu, Kehsi, Monghsu, Kyaukme, Mongyai</td>
<td>21 killed and 20 wounded including civilians (IDPs - over 2,800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hlaingbwe (Maethawaw), Phaam (Myaingyingu), A Paung, Kawtkarike</td>
<td>2 killed and 2 wounded including civilians (IDPs - over 1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Papun, Hlaingbwe</td>
<td>2 killed and 2 injured including civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Myeik, Thaninthari</td>
<td>3 NMSP killed and 4 injury, 20 houses destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>----</td>
<td><strong>53 killed / 48 injured / 3820 IDPs</strong></td>
<td><strong>53 killed / 48 injured / 3820 IDPs</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The beginning of 2013 started off on a dire note with intense fighting between government troops and ethnic NSAGs, lasting for much of the first half of the year. Heavy fighting was not only restricted to non-ceasefire areas in Kachin and Northern Shan state, but also directed against the RCSS and SSPP. There were rumours that the government attempted to cut off contacts between the UWSA and its allies. While the NSAGs believe that the government army is violating ceasefire agreements to achieve its military agenda to wipe out NSAGs, the government justified its actions by saying it needs to protect national projects, and stop illegal activities of NSAGs. Nevertheless, the commitment of all sides to communicate has proven effective in sustaining peace talks, and brought about positive developments towards the latest nationwide ceasefire effort.

The assault mission on KIO's headquarters of Laiza that began in November the previous year, continued to drag on for much of the first month of 2013 until the eventual fall of Hka Ya Bhum post, the last major stronghold protecting their headquarters in Laiza on 26 Jan. 2013. The attacks included the use of airstrikes, in which 2 bombs fell on the Chinese side of the border on 31 Dec. 2012 and again on 15 Jan. 2013. Complaints from the Chinese government brought a halt to the Myanmar army's weeklong airstrikes. The military initially denied it had launched an offensive or airstrikes, saying on 1 January that helicopters and jets were supplying government units, but later admitted on 4 January it had used airstrikes.

The failure of Parliament's lower house motion calling for a halt to fighting in Kachin State, and President Thein Sein's unilateral ceasefire order for the Lajayang area on 18 January, raised concern among the ethnic NSAGs and international community about the power of government to control the military. More severely, it cast doubt on the validity of the entire peace process and ceasefires between the government and NSAGs.

The intensity of the entire Lajayang operation is reflected in the high cost of human life, as a government statement on 18 January said there had been more than a thousand "battles" between the rebels and government troops since 10 December.

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3. "Fresh tensions with Shan army have implications for Wa." [Shan News Network. 15 February 2013.]
The government also said the military had suffered many casualties, but did not give a number. A military officer, however, quoted an official tally of 218 troops killed and 764 wounded from 15 Nov. 2012 to mid January 2013.

The following month, the government army also increased their activities in Shan state in what many ethnic military experts and officers believed was a continuation of the military’s “territorial clearance” and “territorial control” operations.

Tensions and attacks were renewed between its forces and the SSPP in February when the Myanmar Army tried to remove 4 SSPP mountain bases in northern Shan State, which are said to be strategically important positions for attacking the UWSA. This suspicion was supported by the government’s 2011­2012 operations that occupied the Kokang (MNDAA) region to the north of the Wa region and former bases of the RCSS and SSPP to the West of the Salween. This was further fuelled by the entry of troops into the NDAA area (another ally of the UWSA) without prior notice, and reports that the Myanmar army was reinforcing and building up troops against the UWSA, SSPP and RCSS during the campaign that lasted from February until May. Although Lt-Gen Yawd Serk opined that the attacks appeared more like a blockade than an offensive against the UWSA,

the severity of the military operations is exemplified by the 5 June event when 2 SSPP liaison officers in Namtu township were shot by the Myanmar Army - 1 killed and the other captured. Moreover, clashes took place in Loilan, Tangyan township on 18-22 February, an area chosen the previous October by the two sides for the resettlement of 350 households from the SSPP 36th Brigade.

Increasing tension between UWSA and government troops is also supported by a Jane’s Intelligence report on 29 April that China had delivered several Mi 17 ‘Hip’ helicopters armed with TY 90 air-to-air missiles to the Wa in late February and early March (the UWSA has denied allegations). Tensions are said to have resulted when the Myanmar Army ordered UWSA to withdraw their brigade 171 from the southern region to their former stronghold, Panghsang in the northern region with the deadline of 7 June. On 2 June, although an emergency meeting was held at UWSA southern command, no reports mentioned if a decision on its withdrawal was made.

Fuller, Thomas and Edward Wong, “Myanmar Announces a Cease-Fire in Assault Against Kachin Rebels”, NY Times January 18, 2013

“Fresh tensions with Shan army have implications for Wa”, S.H.A.N, 15 Feb. 2013.

troops withdrawal had been made. The tension was further fuelled after the Wa called for a separate state of their own in March and refused to allow Naypyitaw’s administrative personnel into Wa-controlled territories, following reports that the UWSA was launching a rubber plantation-cum-new town project in Mong Khid, Mongton township in May. This was followed in June by the killing of a Tachileik resident by a Wa gunman believed to be a follower of Xi Guoneng, an official in the Wa’s Hong Pang Company (newly renamed Thawda Win). According to Thai and Shan sources, thousands of Myanmar Army and UWSA troops were reportedly encircling one another around a strategic mountain in Monghsat township, opposite Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, in early July.

Nevertheless, an outbreak of conflict was avoided after the two sides met on 12 July and signed a 5-point agreement. The RCSS however appears to be the ceasefire group which has engaged in the most intense fighting with the Myanmar army in 2013. Heavy fighting occurred in May between the RCSS and Myanmar army in Namkham Township following the disappearance of 4 citizens—whom the RCSS believe were intelligence agents in early April. The 4 were reported to have been selling historical photos and detained by RCSS, one of whom was killed. The RCSS refusal to return them led to the Myanmar Army’s raid on RCSS’s Terng Kha (also known as Nawng Matar) camp in the afternoon of 2 May and destruction of the camp in the morning of 3 May. They then attacked and occupied a RCSS base on the Sino-Myanmar border also in Namkham township on 9 May. On 13 May, the government newspaper New Light of Myanmar reported that RCSS soldiers opened fire at a compound of Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) near the China pipeline, killing 2 and wounding 3—although RCSS Lt-Col Yawd Murng denied allegations.

The government side justified their seizure of the RCSS outpost in Namkham in a Military-owned Myawady newspaper on 12 May, saying the group had “extended beyond” areas agreed and were building illegal settlements and confiscating farmlands. RCSS alternatively accused the Myanmar army of underhanded tactics. RCSS spokesman Maj Lao Hseng informed Aung Min that the incidents in May by the Myanmar army incited racism and violated the ceasefire agreement, which provoked the group to fight back. In addition, RCSS Shan Task Force 701 commander also reported that Myanmar army troops in mid-May were disguising themselves in RCSS uniforms to commit crimes against humanity in the villages in Namkham Township.

These attacks and provocative military movements in NSAG areas were seen as a clear indication that the government did not want to wait for a political settlement in order to accomplish its military objectives.
There were also several moments of tension and minor clashes between government-backed Kayin BGF and DKBA as well as KNU in the southeastern part of the country. One other clash occurred when the Myanmar army attacked a NMSP base on 16 July; 3 were killed in the incident. Tensions rose again in October when the Myanmar army tried to force the NMSP off two bases in Mon state.

### Reasons for clashes and ceasefire violations

The reasons for clashes between NSAGs and the government can be categorised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Clashes</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Competing control over strategic and national interest points (highways, hydropower dams, oil and gas pipeline) | e.g. 15 October: Myanmar Army attacked the KIA at Nam Hawm in Mabein township, after the latter refused to evacuate a roadway. 
2 May: DKBA were issued an ultimatum by the Myanmar Army to leave the area slated for the Hatgyi dam project by 12:00 on 4 May or face renewed clashes. 
5 April: Myanmar Army ordered the SSPP to move away from the Nawng Pha dam area and moved tanks and artillery around SSPP bases on the west bank of the Salween, near the construction. |
| 2. Government's attempt to clamp down on illegal economic activities vs. Government's attempt to wipe out ethnic NSAGs | Government: The Myanmar army enters NSAG area to clamp down on illegal activities, especially smuggling of timber to China, or attacks NSAGs when they go beyond their area. 
\[1^\text{st} May, \text{clash with RCSS in Kengtawng after the Myanmar Army came "to inspect gold mining and logging operations".} \]
| 2. Government's attempt to clamp down on illegal economic activities vs. Government's attempt to wipe out ethnic NSAGs | Government: The Myanmar army enters NSAG area to clamp down on illegal activities, especially smuggling of timber to China, or attacks NSAGs when they go beyond their area. 
\[1^\text{st} May, \text{clash with RCSS in Kengtawng after the Myanmar Army came "to inspect gold mining and logging operations".} \]
| Government: The Myanmar army enters NSAG area to clamp down on illegal activities, especially smuggling of timber to China, or attacks NSAGs when they go beyond their area. 
\[1^\text{st} May, \text{clash with RCSS in Kengtawng after the Myanmar Army came "to inspect gold mining and logging operations".} \]
| 3. NSAGs campaign to eradicate and destroy poppy plantations run by the PMF | e.g. TNLA has clashed frequently with the Pangsay PMF in Namkham township during poppy eradication campaigns. |

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Distrust and suspicion about each others movements e.g., 5 Jan. Myanmar army believed the RCSS was preparing to obstruct the building of a road from Ta Hwe Kha to Homong.

Failure to adhere to agreements over control areas e.g. RCSS accused the Myanmar army of blocking access to areas agreed in the ceasefire, most importantly to Homong and Monghta where it is supposed to build its headquarters.

6-29 Aug. KNU commanders held conferences in Hlaing Bwe regarding the government’s refusal to withdraw from 90 out of 300 outposts in KNU territory, but decided to uphold the ceasefire nevertheless.

One NSAG leader reported that contrary to terms in the ceasefire agreement, his group’s members have not been allowed free access to other towns. Moreover, the Myanmar Army has entered their control area and built a military camp.

Ineffective Liaison officers Government: Problem of ineffective communication in NSAG liaison officers caused by language problems, low capacity of liaison officers and delays caused by excessive bureaucracy.

NSAG: e.g., RCSS leader accused the government side of not using liaison officers.

The military has also warned NSAGs that it will take action if they violate any of the following six points:

1. Not to kill civilians
2. Not to collect taxes
3. Not to recruit new members
4. Not to intervene the government’s administration
5. Not to attack PMFs
6. Not to build new military camp

KIA’s forced recruitment of Red Shan and rising racial tension in Kachin state

Since the ceasefire breakdown between the KIA and the Myanmar government, the KIA resumed its force recruitment of non-Kachins in the state to join their armed struggle, the majority of whom are Red Shan that make up around 40% of the state’s population, as well as Gurkhas (Nepalese) and Indians. The rising Kachin nationalism as a result of the intense fighting and its imposition on non-Kachins has especially caused increasing anti-Kachin sentiment among Red Shan. On 20 Dec. 2013, Red Shan demonstrated against the KIA’s human rights violations against those who refuse to join their army and pay tax. More recently, Red Shan have also threatened to retaliate against the KIA’s abuse of their people by taking revenge on Kachin civilians. This has raised concerns that this could explode into a major communal conflict between Red Shan and Kachins that is similar to Rakhine and Rohingya in Rakhine state.

"Burma army obstructing the truce agreement as RCSS/SSA planning to setup its headquarters in Monghta and Homong" S.H.A.N 20 Mar. 2013. Web.
Communal violence

Figure 5: Communal Violence in 2012

Figure 6: Communal Violence in 2013
At the beginning of 2014, there were no areas under states of emergency, but a curfew was enforced in seven townships (which undergoes review every three months):

- Buthidaung, Kyaukpyu, Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, Pauktaw, Sittwe, Thandwe.

Communal violence in 2013 worsened in Myanmar and saw a rapid rise in radicalism of both Islam and Buddhism. Conflict between Muslim and Buddhist communists was not confined to Buddhist Rakhine and "Rohingya" Muslims in Rakhine state, but spread across the country to over 12 townships. The growing religious tension, especially internal islamophobia and the involvement of international terrorism networks, will present a much harder peace challenge than the current nationwide ceasefire with ethnic armed groups.

According to our data, there were 21 occurrences of communal violence in over 12 townships across the country in 2013. These resulted in about 130,000 IDPs, 100 deaths and dozens injured from both communities. Numerous houses and buildings were burned down, and in Meiktila alone more than 1,500 houses were destroyed costing an estimated US$7 million to rebuild.
Table 7: Number of dead, wounded and IDPs affected by communal violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Clashes</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Religious buildings damaged</th>
<th>Houses damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Government &amp;</td>
<td>Sittwe Township, Rakhine</td>
<td>5 killed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>State.</td>
<td>22 wounded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddha</td>
<td>&amp; Muslim</td>
<td>communities</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>communities</td>
<td>Pauk Taw, Kyaung Kone,</td>
<td>98 killed</td>
<td>15720</td>
<td>1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thandwe (3 occurrences),</td>
<td>56 wounded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Htangone village-Kanbalu,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyaukgyi, Lashio, Hpakant,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oakphoe, Kyopinkaut,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Meikhtila, Maungtaw</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>103 killed</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>78 wounded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15720 +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The riots that occurred across the country in 2013 differ slightly from the Rakhine state violence of 2012 in which both sides attacked each other, in that attacks were directed mostly against Muslim minority communities. The first and most severe outbreak of anti-Muslim riots in 2013 occurred in Meiktila on 20 March, which was sparked by a dispute between a Muslim gold shop owner and his Buddhist customers. The incident contributed to the rising popularity and influence of the protective religious 969 movement, as well as triggering a string of riots across the country. The 969 movement and its leader Wirathu have been accused of fanning anti-Muslim sentiment by promoting a "buy Buddhist" campaign and legislation that discourages interfaith marriage. The leader has even been accused of being "The face of Buddhist terror", as declared controversially on the cover of Time Magazine's 20 June issue (currently banned in Myanmar). The 969 movement however claims that it is pro-peace and only supports the protection of the Buddhist religion. Nevertheless, the visibility of the 969 symbols in areas that experienced communal violence, for example on destroyed mosque walls, is evidence that it is being used by perpetrators of anti-Muslim attacks whether it intends to or not.

Both the Rohingya-Rakhine issue and 969 movement remain a highly sensitive topic in Myanmar - notably, media groups have received death threats for reporting on the Rohingya issue and the UN human rights envoy Tomas Ojea Quintana was attacked by a 200-strong Buddhist crowd during his visit to Meiktila in mid-August. As a result of the sensitivity, the government has been slow in addressing the religious problem.

2013 saw a string of terrorist attacks and attempts related to religious radicalism. On 22 July, a bomb exploded meters away from U Wirathu as he delivered a mass sermon in Mandalay; 5 in the audience were slightly wounded. Three Rakhine men were arrested for an attempt to bomb mosques on 13 November in Yangon. In early 2014, 3 Myanmar-born operatives of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were arrested in Bangladesh on 19 January. Police interrogation revealed they were "planning to launch their activities in Myanmar's T3 Figures are calculated from rough estimates numbers reported in the media immediately after the clashes. IDP figures: Meiktila 13000, Thandwe 500, Lashio 1400, Okkan 500, Kanbalu 320."
troubled Rakhine state with their expertise to prepare high-powered explosives. A laptop containing bomb making information has been seized from their possession.

At the beginning of 2014, tensions remained high with reports that 48 Rohingya villagers were killed in retaliation following the disappearance of a police officer in Maungdaw Township, Rakhine state on 13 January.

International repercussions of religious violence: People from Indonesian Muslim hardline groups hold a banner and placards during a protest near the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta on May 3, 2013. (Photo: Reuters), A radical Muslim website distributed 28 photos purportedly showing Rohingya insurgents in Rakhine State. (Photo: www.arrahmah.com)

Figure 8: Spillover effects: International terrorism

Jakarta, Indonesia
17 January 2014: Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said that Myanmar’s ongoing Buddhist-Muslim violence has ramifications outside of the country.

2 May 2013: A man behind a foiled Myanmar embassy bombing plot arrested

3 May 2013: Indonesian Islamic terrorist leader Abu Bakar Bashir warns of launching jihad against the Myanmar government.

31 December 2013: 6 suspected terrorists killed in a police raid near Jakarta, suspected to be connected to the alleged May plot against the Myanmar Embassy and Buddhist temples.

14 August 2013: A small bomb exploded outside a Buddhist temple packed with devotees; officials said the attack appears to have been meant to avenge the deaths of Muslims in Myanmar.

Bodh Gaya, India
7 July 2013: A series of 10 bombs exploded at the Buddhist holy site, wounding 5 people, including 2 Buddhist monks. 3 more bombs found and defused.

Bangladesh
16 August 2013: Images published in an Urdu-language internet forum suggest the Taliban has recruited Rohingya Muslims and is training them in Myanmar. The force is said to be led by Abu Sufiya and Abu Arif, and claims to have destroyed 2 Myanmar vehicles killing 17 soldiers, and to have beheaded 3 Buddhists, including a priest, who were responsible for slaying Muslims. The Times of India also reported that at the Indo-Bangladesh home secretary-level talks in late July, the Indian side alerted Bangladesh to the recent emergence of terror training camps for Rohingya Muslims in its Chittagong Hill Tracts bordering Myanmar during the first half of the year.

According to Indian intelligence reports, terror training sessions were being held by Pakistani LeT and Jaish commanders, with help from local outfits like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh that are linked to NGOs like Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). However the validity of these claims remain disputed.

Malaysia
5 June 2013: Malaysian police reported that there had been 4 killings suspected to be linked to religious tensions between Muslims and Buddhists. About 1,000 Myanmar nationals in Malaysia have been detained since 30 May following multiple clashes. As a result, on 13 June, Malaysia announced it would work with Myanmar to repatriate thousands of their nationals.

North Sumatra, Indonesia
Early April 2013: a clash broke out between 11 Buddhist fishermen and more than 100 Rohingya asylum seekers, leaving 8 Buddhists dead and 15 Rohingyas injured.
IDP

Rakhine and Meikhtila IDP
Kachin IDP figures 2011-2013
South-East IDP figures over many years

OCHA November 2013 report: total 649,000 IDPs in Myanmar and need US$ 160 million for them.

Table 8: IDPs inside Myanmar and UNHCR recognised refugees abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Refugees/IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kachin state</td>
<td>123,000 (Myanmar Govt. 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100,000 (OCHA, Nov. 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>107,000 (KIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120,000 (KWAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Shan state</td>
<td>5,000 (PWO, Dec 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Myanmar (Thai-Burma border)</td>
<td>IDPs: 13,426 (TBC, Dec. 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiktila</td>
<td>5,000 (OCHA, Nov. 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakhine state</td>
<td>130,000 (Myanmar Border Affairs Ministry, Jan. 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>143,000 (OCHA, Nov. 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>30,000 UNHCR registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimated 200,000 unregistered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>8000 UNHCR registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimated 100,000 unregistered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>95,380 UNHCR registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>119,694 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: IDPs inside Myanmar and refugees in Thailand
OCHA: IDP in Kachin and Northern Shan State - Left and in Rakhine - Right (November 2013)

Ongoing armed clashes and communal violence have continued to create new IDPs and prevented the return of those displaced from previous years.

Rakhine state: OCHA reported there are 179,000 in need of humanitarian assistance, 143,000 internally displaced, 103,000 in temporary shelters. The Border Affairs Ministry however reported there are 130,000 IDPs and have so far provided basic shelter for 117,144 refugees, 110,000 Muslim and 6,000 Buddhist Rakhine. Over 19,000 Muslim and 1,000 Rakhine IDP’s are still in need of shelter.

In the last year, the anti-UN/INGO sentiment in Rakhine state has become increasingly prevalent and more openly expressed. Threats to humanitarian staff and aid operations are resulting in an extremely difficult environment for ongoing response activities to assist vulnerable and displaced people.

Two violent incidents occurred on 2 November near Sin Tat Maw camp for IDPs in Pauk Taw Township, Rakhine State, which resulted in 4 people killed and at least 3 seriously injured. These incidents were followed by a local community protest at Sittwe hospital as false rumours spread that NGOs provided assistance only to Muslims in the wake of the violence. Many Rakhine Muslims are still taking the risky boat ride with hopes of settling in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Reports suggest that 24,000 people left on boats from Myanmar and Bangladesh in the first 8 months of 2013, and UNHCR sources said more than 1,500 people boarded boats in northern Rakhine State over the first week of November. From interviews done with people who have made the journey, they seem to be driven by serious protection concerns stemming from violence, ethnic conflict, instability, discrimination, and a lack of citizenship rights. Furthermore, continued restriction of movement on IDPs and surrounding communities are preventing them from resuming livelihood activities or from accessing markets.

Meiktila: 5,400 IDPs remain in 5 camps in Meiktila town and Yin Daw in Mandalay State (from the original 8,441 in 7 camps in April 2013).

A resettlement committee composed of the regional Government, local authorities, private donors and IDP representatives has been formed and has submitted a proposal to the Chief Minister of Mandalay. The resettlement

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20 Ibid.
21 OCHA Myanmar: Meikhtila inter-communal violence Situation Report No. 4 (as of 9 April 2013), Reliefweb.int.

22 | Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process
The plan is now approved and implementation has started, with construction beginning in January 2014 and projected to finish in April 2014.

Kachin and Northern Shan State: Numbers continue to steadily increase with the ongoing violence. According to KIO spokesman La Nan, over 100,000 IDPs are living in the camps under control of KIO area while there are more than 7,000 IDPs living in 21 government controlled camps in Waingmaw and Myitkyina areas.

Meanwhile Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT) claims there are over 120,000 IDPs in Kachin state. There are 67 IDP camps in the KIO area with over 78,000 IDPs living in those camps. Currently, there are about 170 battalions of government troops stationed and patrolling in Kachin state. Some IDPs who do not go to the IDP camps also seek refuge in churches. According to government figures, there are nearly 43,000 displaced people living in 106 camps under state control, and more than 80,000 living in KIA-controlled camps.

Access for the UN and international organisations to the IDPs in the areas beyond Government control has improved but remains limited. Local NGOs have been providing relief assistance for IDPs in these areas.

Over 5,000 in total have been staying in 10 IDP camps in northern Shan state — mainly from clashes between the TNLA, KIA and SSPP. These IDP camps were established in 2013 — 4 camps in Manton township, 2 camps each in Kutkai and Nam Kham townships and 1 camp in Tangyang township in northern Shan state. Poe Ngeal of Palaung Women’s Organisation (PWO) said in September there are at least 2,000 IDPs from Palaung communities living in 5 basic camps in northern Shan state near Kachin state — an increase from 1190+ in 3 camps last year.

The UNHCR has 415,373 recognised but not necessarily verified refugees from Myanmar, 77,240 of which reside in UNHCR administered camps on the Thai side of the border and 95,380 registered in Malaysia (28,000 are Muslim-ethnic Rohingyas). The estimated number of registered and unregistered refugees in India is 8000 and 100,000, while in Bangladesh numbers were 30,000 and 200,000. Plans to repatriate them have been ongoing since reforms in 2011, but surveys have found that conditions are not yet conducive. According to TBC’s updated 2013 population figures for the refugee camps on the Thai-Myanmar border, the net population decreased 9,044 or 7.1% in 2013. The total population living in the 9 camps was 119,156 at the end of December 2013, compared to 128,200 at the end of 2012. TBC’s data shows that of the 4,389 people who did leave the camps to return to Myanmar, 70% of all departures include just 1 or 2 people from a household, while the rest of the household remains in the camps.

23 Phone Interview with KWAT representative, 15 Jan 2014
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opium Poppy cultivation (Hectares)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos PDR</td>
<td>6,800 ha</td>
<td>3,900 ha</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>51,000 ha</td>
<td>57,800 ha</td>
<td>+13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>209 ha</td>
<td>265 ha</td>
<td>+27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weighted average dry opium yield</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos PDR</td>
<td>6.0 kg/ha</td>
<td>6.0 kg/ha</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>13.5 kg/ha</td>
<td>15.0 kg/ha</td>
<td>+11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>15.6 kg/ha</td>
<td>15.6 kg/ha</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opium poppy production</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos PDR</td>
<td>41 tons</td>
<td>23 tons</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>690 tons</td>
<td>870 tons</td>
<td>+26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3 tons</td>
<td>4 tons</td>
<td>+33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opium poppy eradication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos PDR</td>
<td>707 ha</td>
<td>397 ha</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>23,718 ha</td>
<td>12,288 ha</td>
<td>-52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>205 ha</td>
<td>264 ha</td>
<td>-29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average price of opium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos PDR</td>
<td>1,800 US$/kg</td>
<td>1,840 US$/kg</td>
<td>+2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>520 US$/kg</td>
<td>498 US$/kg</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2,734 US$/kg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential value of opium production</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos PDR</td>
<td>US$ 72 million</td>
<td>US$ 42 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>US$ 359 million</td>
<td>US$ 433 million</td>
<td>+21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>US$ 11 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the UNODC’s 2013 report, opium cultivation increased 13% (from 51,000 to 57,800 hectares) and opium production increased 26% in 2013 to an estimated 870 tonnes, despite eradication efforts. Surveys of farmers in Golden Triangle poppy-growing villages show that money from poppy cultivation is essential for villagers suffering from food insecurity and poverty.

The reluctance of the government to push the drug eradication process is cited as a major factor for increasing drug production. Specifically, the RCSS issued a statement on 23 December that claimed the tripartite agreement with the government and UNODC signed in October 2012 to eradicate opium production was only a piece of paper. The group blamed the government for having no genuine desire to implement a drug ban as they had made no official contact with RCSS officers employed in Taunggyi Township for over a year. The RCSS claims it approached the Myanmar official Pol-Col Win Tun about the launch date of the needs assessment, and was told that he would need to ask the UNODC for approval. At the same time, the UNODC has claimed it cannot offer financial or technical support for the assessment without approval from Myanmar authorities.

One anonymous researcher explained that the government was unwilling to tackle the drug problem because it does not want to disrupt its BGF and PMF schemes, whereby militia groups are self-sustained through their longstanding income source from drugs. His study found that the “drug trade has become embedded in the Myanmar Army’s dual strategy of extending its territorial reach and using local militias more or less subservient to the Army, A Reference Guide 2014 | 25
The lack of cooperation from the government side to uphold its promise is seen by the ethnic side as yet another sign of their insincerity and poor commitment to the peace process as a whole. The drug trade is therefore detrimental to the peace process as it increases instability, armed clashes between BGF and NSAGs and distrust amongst groups. This in turn leads to stronger government surveillance and restrictions in NSAG active areas, as well as preventing implementation of peace agreement terms.

Terrorism

Various unresolved issues and grievances have fuelled acts of terror in the country over the years, and continued to be a constant threat in 2013. Media reports show that at least 22 bombs were found or exploded. The motive for these acts are not always clear, but have generally been connected to the ethnic struggle, religious tension and most recently in October, attempts to scare off foreign competitors in Myanmar.

The high profile series of bombs across the country in October was suspected to have been connected to a group of Kayin businessmen that allegedly attempted to scare off foreign investors from their resource-rich Kayin State. The 8 people arrested in connection to the bombs were from a group of mining businessmen. One of the suspects, Nay Toe, who manages a mining project in Kayin State was said to have been offered a permit for a gold mine by a group of Kayin businessmen if he successfully planted bombs at hotels and restaurants. Another suspect, Saw Myint Lwin, reportedly served in the past with the KNU’s armed wing KNLA, raising suspicion that the KNU was in someway involved. However the KNLA’s commander-in-chief denied involvement in the bomb plots and agreed to help the government investigate the bomb blasts and search for more suspects. KNU met with the government side twice for the case, the first on 17 October when Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung travelled to Naypyitaw to meet with Soe Thane, Aung Min, Immigration minister Khin Yi and Border Affairs minister Thet Naing Win; the second on 18 December in Taunggoo when KNU’s CEC member Saw Roger Khin met with police and border affairs ministry officials to search for a suspected bomber.

Throughout the year, there were also occasional reports that the police had arrested suspects for possessing bombs e.g. 13 November, 2 Rakhine men in Yangon were arrested for possessing bomb-making materials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09/01/2013</td>
<td>Kyarkwingyi Village, Mohnyin Township, Kachin State</td>
<td>1 killed, 4 injured in a train derailment following an explosion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/01/2013</td>
<td>Bhamo Township, Kachin State</td>
<td>Bomb blast on the Bhamo-Momauk road near the Bhamo Technological University injured 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/05/2013</td>
<td>Muse, Shan State</td>
<td>Bomb explosion killed 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/06/2013</td>
<td>Loi Lin Kan village, Nam Kham township</td>
<td>Police from Anti-Narcotics Task Force were attacked with a bomb by unknown assailants (alleged to be the Pan Say Kyaw Myint PMF) while searching for illegal drugs. 1 policeman was killed and 2 policemen were injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/07/2013</td>
<td>Mandalay</td>
<td>Bomb blast during U Wirathu's Mass Sermon wounded five people in the audience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/10/2013</td>
<td>Bago</td>
<td>Bomb discovered on a Nyaunglebin-Phyu passenger bus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/10/2013</td>
<td>Taungoo township, Bago</td>
<td>Bomb blast at a guesthouse killed two and injured one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/10/2013</td>
<td>Saw Bwa Gyi Gone, Insein, Yangon</td>
<td>Bomb explosion at a bus stop, no casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/10/2013</td>
<td>Thaketa township, Yangon</td>
<td>Homemade bomb attached to the underside of a truck exploded when two youths tried to remove a clock attached to the device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/10/2013</td>
<td>Yangon</td>
<td>Explosive device found at restaurant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/10/2013</td>
<td>Mandalay</td>
<td>Explosive device found at restaurant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/10/2013</td>
<td>Traders Hotel, Yangon</td>
<td>Small bomb in a hotel room injured 1 American tourist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/10/2013</td>
<td>Sagaing</td>
<td>Small devices exploded at a hotel and pagoda before dawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/10/2013</td>
<td>Namkham, Shan state</td>
<td>Bomb explosion on a street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/10/2013</td>
<td>Namkham, Shan state</td>
<td>2 bombs killed 1 and wounded 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/10/2013</td>
<td>Namkham, Shan state</td>
<td>Bomb explosion in Loilin village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/11/2013</td>
<td>Tamu township, Sagaing</td>
<td>2 bomb explosions broke the windows and doors of 2 houses -- police accuse Kuki militia in state owned newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/12/2013</td>
<td>Kong Long township, northern Shan state</td>
<td>Bomb planted on a truck killed 3/4 and wounded 2. Eye witness account claims the victims included driver, 1 traffic police officer and 2 road construction workers for the Asia World company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/12/2013</td>
<td>Myoma ward, Taunggyi, Shan state</td>
<td>A bomb exploded in a house owned by a Muslim resident who was slightly injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/12/2013</td>
<td>Taunggyi, Shan state</td>
<td>3 pipe bombs uncovered in a gutter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/12/2013</td>
<td>Taunggyi, Shan state</td>
<td>Pipe bomb discovered outside Nyein Chan Youth Training Centre and Muslim Orphanage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/12/2013</td>
<td>Mong See village, Kutkai township Shan state</td>
<td>1 killed, 1 critically injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Violence Related to Protests Against Land Confiscation and Development Projects

Since reforms and political liberation under the new Thein Sein government, the country has seen a major increase in protests and violence over land rights and negative impacts of development projects. Civilians are taking advantage of new political freedoms to voice their concerns. Repressed grievances, primarily over land confiscation by the previous military regime and damages caused by large-scale development projects, are now being aired. On several occasions this has resulted in violence, arrests and deaths.

At the beginning of 2014, 2 townships were under curfew due to violence related to development projects and land confiscation:

- Sagaing Division: Salingyi township, Monywa District (Letpadaung Copper Mine) Curfew: July 2012
- Yangon Division: Dala township Curfew: August 10, 2013

Several activist groups have warned that ceasefires are fueling mining and economic projects in fragile conflict areas. On 3 October, Molo Women Mining Watch and Karenni Civil Society Network issued a joint statement explaining that mining projects in Kayah state have increased from 3 before the March 2012 ceasefire, to 16 in just over a year. This they claim is causing increasing grievances among the local population due to loss of farmland, rivers, livelihoods and environmental destruction.

Table 11: Land confiscation and protests 2013

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>Maubin township, Ayeyarwady</td>
<td>27 police and 19 farmers injured and 1 police dies in conflict over land sold by township government to businessmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Letpadaung, Salingyi township, Sagaing</td>
<td>A clash broke out after security forces moved in to stop farmers from ploughing fields in their bid to reclaim the land. Police shot and beat protesters, injuring 10, including at least 1 who suffered gunshot wounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Sinbaungwe township, Magway</td>
<td>6 farmers arrested for protesting against confiscation of their farmland by the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June</td>
<td>Hpakant, Kachin</td>
<td>More than 200 individual miners were arrested by the police and army forces in mining areas in Hpakant for illegally exploiting mines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June</td>
<td>Pwain Chaung and Oat taung pyin village, Kyauk Taw township, Rakhine</td>
<td>20 farmers have been sued by the military for protest ploughing land confiscated by the military since 2010. More than 130 acres have been grabbed without compensation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>Nyaung Pin Thar village, Phyu township, Bago</td>
<td>52 farmers arrested and sued by Myat Aimdreal company for protest ploughing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June</td>
<td>Shwe Nathar village, Mingladone township, Yangon</td>
<td>More than 50 protest Zaykabar Company, owned by PM Khin Shwe, because of land confiscation. 800 acres had been grabbed for an industrial zone project in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>and July</td>
<td>Irrawaddy region wide Over 500 farmers are sued for ploughing their confiscated land marked for economic projects as a form of protest in 13 townships in the delta region. More than 20 have been jailed and fined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July</td>
<td>East Dagon township, Yangon</td>
<td>More than 300 farmers demonstrated outside the offices of 4 companies in East Dagon township about confiscation of more than 1770 acres of land in 2008.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 July Pauk Myaing Village
Inntaingthar village, Lewei township, Naypyitaw
General Soe Shein and Major Hlaing Myo Win threatened villagers with guns in a dispute over land confiscation.

11 August Zeegone village, Letpadaung, Salingyi township, Sagaing
At least 4 villagers were arrested for protesting copper mines.

12 August Monywa township, Sagaing
More than 10 protesters including well known activist Naw Ohn Hla were arrested for protesting against the copper mine in Monywa township.

13 August Mindama flowers park, Mayangone township, Yangon.
6 officials injured, 5 civilians seriously injured in an organized attack against municipal forces in a land dispute over an area planned for the construction of a Central Business district with Japanese investment.

14 August Myo Ma football grounds Hpa-an, Kayin State
Pha Am local citizens protest shopping mall and hotel construction plans by Mya Htay Kywe Lin Company in the city's trademark football grounds.

15-18 Sep Weigyi village, Pobbathiri township, Naypyitaw
More than 5 police and 5 villagers were badly injured in clashes when police raided the house of an NLD village leader who had organized a protest against land confiscation by the Ministry of Information in 2006. Villagers are sued for attacking the police.

16 Nov Htantapin township, Taungoo district, Bago
1 farmer shot by police forces over a land dispute.

17 Nov Nattalin township, Bago
3 land rights activists jailed 6 months ago, go on hunger strike in jail.

18 Nov Dawei, Tanintharyi
Farmers in Dawei stage a protest to demand the return of confiscated land by the military, legalisation of land ownership, a halt to projects on their land.

19-29 Nov China Embassy, Yangon
Protesters marched to the Chinese embassy to mark the first anniversary of Letpadaung violence. 2 Activists arrested.

20-26 Nov-9 Dec Michaungkan, Thingangyuan township, Yangon
200 villagers staged a sit in protest against land confiscation dating back to 1990. 2 organisers arrested and at least 8 were injured, including elderly women during clashes with Ministry of Defence staff.

21 Dec Moe Ti Moe Mi gold mines in Yemethin township, Mandalay
9 protestors have been badly injured and hospitalized during clashes with police. More than 92 workers protest the company's broken promises. 4 have been sentenced to jail and 22 have been sued.

22 Dec Minglataungnyunt and Thaketa township, Yangon
Residents protest YCDC over football grounds confiscation for municipal housing.

23 Dec Shan State
Landowners petition the return of 6700 acres of confiscated land in Shan state by PNO, Mat Kyan PMFs, military, companies.

24 Dec Ngaputaw township and Mawlamyaing Kune township, Ayeyarwady
More than 30 farmers have been arrested and sentenced to jail for protest ploughing.

25 Dec Hainzar police station area, Thar Si township, Meikhtila
3 activists near Yamethin region have been jailed for organizing a protest plough on confiscated land.

26-31 Dec Mawlamyaine, Kyune township, Ayeyarwady
5 farmers sentenced to jail for protest ploughing in June over land confiscated by police forces.
Figure 12: Land confiscation and protests, 2013
A Reference Guide 2014
IL 2014 New Peace Plan

Government Policy Control & Peace Talks

Conflict & Peace Talks

Ethnic Policy

Implementation

Ceasefire

DDR, Liasison Office, Economic Code of conduct

UPCC

NDSC

Ministers

CBOs, INGO and implementation local partner

UPWC

State/Regional level peace committee

Myanmar Peace Center

Opposing Peace Plans

Government Ethnic plan

Enter the legal fold:

1. Disarm (give up arms or transform into BGF/PMF)
2. Set up political party to contest elections
3. Set up businesses

Political talks (reform constitution to ensure ethnic self determination)

Union accord

Approval by parliament

2012 - 3 phase peace plan

1. State level: ceasefire
2. To ceasefire from both sides
3. To deploy troops only in agreed territories
4. Prohibit carrying arms outside the designated territories
5. Open liaison offices in areas agreed by both sides (no arms allowed)
6. In order for the negotiation process to proceed to Union Level negotiation, each group will have to form an official delegation team and negotiate the place and time for Union-level negotiations.

2012 - 6 point plan (UNFC)

1. To host a meeting with civil society and all ethnic armed groups
2. A meeting between all ethnic armed groups and government representatives monitored by the international community
3. Referendums in each ethnic state to ratify agreements reached
4. A meeting with all ethnic people to talk about peace
5. Tripartite dialogue between the government, democracy activists and ethnic people
6. Implementation of agreements reached within a set timeframe

32 Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process
2. Union level: confidence building, political dialogue, implement regional development projects in education, health and communication

1. To remain forever in the Union
To accept the Three National Causes: non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national sovereignty and perpetuation of national sovereignty
To cooperate in economic and development tasks
To cooperate in the elimination of narcotic drugs
To set up political parties and enter elections
To accept the 2008 Constitution and to make necessary amendments via Parliament by majority consent
To fully enter the legal fold for permanent peace and live, move, work in accord with the Constitution

8. To coordinate existence of only a single armed force in accord with the Constitution

3. Create political parties to contest in elections and enter parliament

2013 (as of December)
President Thein Sein, in his message to the Laiza conference, proposed a 3 phase process (modelled on the WGEC framework):

1. Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (between armed groups and the government)
Framework for political dialogue negotiations (which will also include political parties and civil society organizations)
Political Dialogue (government, armed organizations, political parties and civil society organizations)

* UWSA and NDAA
* NSCN-K

WGEC (April)
Ceasefire S framework S political dialogue S national accord
*RCSS + KNU

NCCT (November)
Framework S ceasefire S political dialogue S national accord
*All UNFC members (including KNU) + ABSDF

-- NCCT has now agreed to sign a ceasefire before political framework on the condition that the government will guarantee the topics of federal union and army in the political dialogue phase.

Nationwide Ceasefire
The creation of the single text nationwide ceasefire has now overtaken the previous individual ceasefire agreements that were signed between armed groups and the government. All new peace talks will be based on the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA).

What is the nationwide ceasefire?
The term "nationwide ceasefire" has been used in two different ways in the last year. Since the restart of conflict in Kachin state in 2011, NSAGs have called on the government to declare a nationwide ceasefire. It was used loosely to mean a halt to all attacks in the country, and the government had announced a unilateral nationwide ceasefire several times in early January without much success.

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The second usage of the term was for the "nationwide ceasefire agreement". It was developed by the Working Group on Ethnic Coordination (WGEC) tasked with writing up a political framework for the ethnic side. It referred to a signed agreement between the government and ethnic armed groups with terms that explain the conditions and framework in which the two sides will stop fighting and begin political talks. The proposal was presented to the government in April, and approved by the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), the country's executive committee. The government then called all major NSAGs to sign a nationwide ceasefire agreement on 15 June with the aim to complete the peace process before the general election in 2015. The adoption of the NCA has also meant that the government's original 8-point peace guideline may have been shelved.

The difference between the new Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and previous State level ceasefire/ Union level peace agreements with individual groups is that it provides a more comprehensive approach to the ethnic problem that lays out a plan for cementing ceasefires and using political dialogue to ensure a durable peace. It is also generally understood that a nationwide ceasefire is a precondition for substantive political talks to begin. These political guarantees also address the impasse in peace talks between the government and combatant groups KIA and TNLA.

Ambiguities and differences in interpretation of the term "nationwide ceasefire" contribute to the split between those that believe political talks should precede ceasefire and vice versa. For most, a ceasefire is understood as a complete stop to clashes, without which a true ceasefire is not possible. The KIO for example said that they were not willing to sign a ceasefire when they were still being attacked by the government army, while the KNU and RCSS see it as a commitment to peace and accept the ceasefire will take time to perfect. They argue that political talks would take too long and stopping the conflict should be given priority. This is echoed by the government side in MPC associate director Aung Naing Oo's article, "the NCA is a process of normalising the relationship among their descendants among all ethnic groups. One could see the nationwide ceasefire as the beginning of national reconciliation".

KNU CEC member Mahn Nyein Maung echoed this sentiment when he told DVB in an interview "reaching a ceasefire doesn't mean the peace process is completed... But rather it is a mechanism to facilitate political dialogue that, in turn, builds further understanding."

Most NSAGs, especially the non-ceasefire groups like KIA and TNLA, are cautious about signing before ensuring that political talks are guaranteed to address the sensitive issue of ethnic self-determination. This caused a split between the WGEC and UNFC, where the latter accused the former of forcing a rushed ceasefire without proper measures for peace and political talks to complete their struggle for a genuine federal union.

The KNU and RCSS independently advocated the WGEC political framework to the UPWC, which led to the government's drafting of the "Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Between Ethnic Armed Organisations and Republic of the Union of Myanmar". The inclusion of the political talks agenda and guarantees convinced the UNFC members to consider the possibility of ceasefire before political talks. The KIO then organised an unprecedented ethnic conference at their headquarters in Laiza from 30 October - 2 November where 16 out of 17 major organisations (excluding the RCSS) signed an agreement to work together on what is now known as the single text document of the NCA. This included the 11 UNFC members, plus AA, ALP, DKBA, KPC and MNDAA. The NCCT was formed on the last day as a temporary team to handle all negotiations with the government's UPWC on developing the NCA.

28 "President's 8 point peace guideline quietly shelved"
29 Aung Naing Oo. "The nationwide ceasefire: Myanmar's road to peace"
30 "KNU is ready to sign nationwide ceasefire, says CEC member"
34 | Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process
The major breakthrough in ethnic unity and proposal for a federal union army at the Laiza conference was said to have shocked the military representatives.

Participants reported the military responded with a hardline second NCA draft presented immediately following the Laiza conference at the Myitkyina meeting between the two sides, in contrast to earlier NCA draft with softer terms. Notably, it demanded the ethnic side to “totally abandon the armed struggle” and that only previous ceasefire agreements that do not “overstep existing laws” would be ratified.

A think-tank Pyidaungsu Institute of Peace and Dialogue (PI) was created with funds from the EBO to write up an ethnic response to the government’s NCA. The PI combined four documents into one “Single Text Document”: these are the WGEC proposal in April, MPC proposal in October, NCCT proposal November and Army proposal in November. It was presented to the NCCT on 9 December who then passed it to the UPWC for further discussion at a meeting on 15 December.

Pyidaungsu Institute for Peace and Dialogue (PI)

Formed: August 2013, to be officially launched in February 2014

Website: http://www.pyidaungsuinstitute.org/

Headed by Khuensai Jaiyen in Chiang Mai, Thailand. PI is an ethnic policy research centre (different from the UNFC’s think tank it plans to start) run by 14 staff members in charge of producing the “Single Text Document” for the NCCT side. PI is funded by the Euro-Burma Office (EBO) and not affiliated to any organisation.

The government's deadline for the nationwide ceasefire has been postponed several times—originally they had hoped for July, October, November and at the beginning of 2014 the ethnic side delayed meetings scheduled for January with the UPWC to February.

The delays can also be a result of the many steps involved in the decision-making process of the NCA draft. The NCA draft is negotiated between the government's UPWC and NSAG's NCCT; however, both sides need to report back and receive the approval from higher authorities. On the government side, the UPWC reports to the President, who reports to the NDSC that decides whether to accept or deny terms in the ceasefire draft. On the ethnic side, the NCCT needs the approval of all member groups who report to the leadership of their organisations. The drafting workflow will continue to go through several rounds until the two sides finalise a draft with terms that satisfy all parties.

Figure 14: NCA Decision-making Process

The government side has also welcomed the unified front and its strategy now is to only negotiate using the single text document, although the terms of the previous peace agreements will remain in effect. The new framework has now been streamlined as seen in the diagram above. The negotiation strategy has also changed to start from common points before moving onto more difficult issues.

Following the 9-10 March 2014 meeting between the two sides, they agreed on five points which includes the formation of a Joint Nationwide Ceasefire Drafting Work Group. This will include 9 members from the government side (3 from administration, 3 from the army and 3 from parliament), 9 from the ethnic NCCT and 5 from Non-NCCT groups (ABSDF, NDAA, NSCN-K, RCSS and UWSA).

Naypyitaw has closed the list of armed groups to be invited to sign the NCA at 16, according to the government's chief negotiator U Aung Min. Among these are the 14 that have signed state level ceasefire agreements and 2 combatant groups KIA and TNLA. The other groups are considered either “too small” or “owe their existence to bigger organizations”, according to a source close to the government. However all NSAGs will be invited to join the political dialogue even if they do not sign the NCA.

The two powerful NSAGs, UWSA and NDAA did not participate in the meeting given their differences in demands. They have had almost no clashes since the first ceasefire in 1989 and already enjoy more autonomy within their own special region. According to an interview with a UWSA official, the group supports the NCA but did not join the ethnic conferences as they were not given sufficient time to review the NCA draft before the meeting. In addition, few UWSA leaders are able to understand the Myanmar language, making communication and processing of documents much slower than other groups.

Nevertheless, both the UWSA and NDAA are expected to participate at the next round of talks planned to be held in Mongla territory.

During a visit to the special region in early October, Thein Zaw also urged UWSA leaders to attend the nationwide ceasefire signing ceremony.

Another major group that has not signed the Laiza agreement is the RCSS. However the group’s spokesman Sai La reportedly said that there is no problem concerning the nationwide ceasefire since the framework is congruent with their own programme and intention, but they needed time to consult Shan political parties and community-based organizations of the Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU) about the ethnic conference agreement.
Post-ceasefire

NCA — Framework — Dialogue

Panglong Union Conference

Joint Political Peace Process Preparations for Monitoring Dialogue

Ceasefire (Code of conduct)

Implementation

Panglong Union Conference

Union Accord (Political settlement)

Similar to the WGEC’s framework, the current single text document plans to follow a framework that creates committees and taskforces responsible for implementing peace and steering the national dialogue (Appendix 4: WGEC framework).

Panglong Union Conference which includes government, ethnic and opposition representatives, will be the central body of the peace and dialogue process. It is in charge of adopting the final agreement (“Union Accord”) for political settlements with NSAGs and expected to be signed outside of parliament. The political dialogue and peace process is expected to last many years beyond the 2015 elections. Insider sources on the government and ethnic side said in January 2014 that there was a general consensus that 80-90% of the NCA is complete, and expect it to be signed in March or April.

Shifts in the government’s peace plan - tensions between parliament, army and UPWC

The introduction of the NCA and role of parliament in signing the national accord, initiated a shift in power between different government bodies over who controls the peace process on the government’s side. Ten days after the President called for NSAGs to sign a nationwide ceasefire agreement, Speaker of the Lower House Thura Shwe Mann sent a parliamentary order to President Thein Sein on 25 June, calling for the direct involvement of the parliament in the peace process, raising concerns about the handling of the peace negotiations, and for the president to hold an executive National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) meeting.

Shwe Mann raised concerns about the need for MPs to have a greater understanding of the peace process and warned that the concessions granted to the NSAGs by Aung Min’s executive powers as a Presidential Office minister, had not all been in line with the law - specifically in reference to the “cars for peace” scandal. In addition, Aung Min and his technical team at the MPC, have come under increasing scrutiny due to a lack of transparency over the organisation’s work and the foreign funds it receives. However insider sources say that the MPC itself does not know how much budget it has, and after running for over a year still does not have a website to publicise its work.

On 21 July, a parliamentary peace-making group that included Aung San Suu Kyi and Shwe Mann, held a joint meeting with Aung Min and other regime officials at the MPC to discuss the status of ongoing peace talks between the regime and ethnic armed groups. Aung Min clarified the work and structure of the MPC and development of peace process in the country. MPC Special Adviser Tin Maung Than explained organizational set-up and function of the centre and Special Adviser Hla Maung Shwe explained the centre’s participation in the peace-making activities. Chairperson of Lower House Rule of Law and Tranquility Committee Aung San Suu Kyi touched upon the ongoing peace process. After the meeting, Vice-Chairman of UPWC Committee Aung Min and Chairman of Lower House National Races Affairs and...
The Internal Peacemaking Committee headed by Thein Zaw answered questions from the media.

The National Democratic究竟 Command Council (NDSC) held a meeting at least once per week during parliament session concerning the peace process. It also now takes a more prominent role in the peace process as a decision maker in the nationwide ceasefire drafting process. On 1 July, NDSC made a decision to use public funds rather than depending on international aid. Though President Thein Sein allocated a special budget of one million kyats in 2013 (diverted from its originally earmarked purpose of funding the construction of housing for parliamentarians in Naypyitaw), the peace process until now has been largely funded by international donors such as Japan, EU, Norway and other members of the Peace Donor Support Group. The decision by the NDSC and criticisms that the government previously did not have a specific budget for the peace process, resulted in the President's office's request to parliament in January 2014 for 7 billion kyats (US$7.1 million) of the state budget for Myanmar's peace process and national reconciliation efforts. It is set for the fiscal year beginning on 1 April 2014 and funds will fall under the broader "national planning" budget to be used for the ongoing peace process.

In the months of September and October, Shwe Mann toured the country from Chin state, Kachin state, Shan state and Tanintharyi division, as well as meeting with Rakhine representatives in Yangon to discuss issues related to the peace process. Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing met with KNU chairman Mutu Say Poe at the end of September in another attempt to broaden interactions between the government and ethnic side outside of Aung Min and the MPC. In addition on 18 October, Ethnic Affairs ministers announced that they would begin formally participating in the national peace process through the government's peace-making committee and make recommendations for the framework for the second Panglong conference.

Critics say that the push to increase parliament's role in the peace process was in fact a power struggle between Lower House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann and President Thein Sein, especially as Shwe Mann has made known his intention of running for president in 2015. The increasing role of parliament and NDSC is therefore seen as an effort to sideline both Aung Min and President Thein Sein. According to news sources, Aung Min attempted to resign several times from his position but was refused by President Thein Sein. According to military analysts, the army has closely watched the activities of MPC due to a possible political struggle between factions within the government. However despite these speculations, in early 2014 Aung Min and the MPC are still in charge of negotiations with the NCCT for the finalisation of the NCA.
Current nationwide ceasefire terms and difficult issues

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 5: Open liaison office</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 5: Liaison Offices opening</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 6: Humanitarian assistances</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 6: Humanitarian assistances</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 7: Human rights protection</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 7: Human Rights protection</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 8: Establishing a joint ceasefire monitoring committee</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 8: Peace and Political Dialogue Committee</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 9: Holding political dialogue</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 9: Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 10: Rights to sign on following ratification</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 10: Joint Peace Building Advisory Committee</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 11: Approve in parliament (parliamentary approval)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 11: Principles for trust building among stakeholders</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 12: Miscellaneous</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 12: Promise to hold political dialogue</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 13: Effective date of the agreement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 13: Rights for following signatory</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 14: Signature on the agreement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 14: Parliament Approval/acord</strong></td>
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**Second round:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government UPWC - 3rd draft (29 Dec.) 13 pages</th>
<th>Ethnic NCCT - 2nd draft (25 Jan.) 29 pages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1: Basic principles</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 1: Basic Principles</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2: Aims and Objectives</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 2: Aims and Objectives</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 3: Military matters</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 3: Political roadmap</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 4: Code of Conduct</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 5: Nationwide Ceasefire Monitoring Committee</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 6: Trustbuilding</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 6: Trustbuilding and Waiver of Law on Unlawful Associations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 7: The Day the agreement takes effect</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 7: The Day the agreement takes effect</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 8: Ratification by the Union Assembly</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 11: Signing of the agreement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 11: Signing of the agreement</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

|-----------------------------------|------------------------|

40 “To Hopeland and Back VII: From battlefield to the negotiating table”

In the 10 March 5-Point agreement, the two sides also agreed on the seven sections to be included in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement draft:

- **Preamble**
- **Section 1- Background (or Basic Principles)**
- **Section 2 - Aims and Goals**
- **Section 3 - Ceasefire Matters**
- **Section 4 - Ways and Means for a Lasting Ceasefire**
- **Section 5 - Political Dialogue Guarantees**
- **Section 6 - Ongoing Work**
- **Section 7 - General Matters**

Issues to settle before the ceasefire:

Both parties agreed to draft the “Political framework” (section 5.1.b) within 60 days after signing of nationwide ceasefire. Government representatives proposed section “the programs/plan for period between nationwide ceasefire and national accord signing” must be discussed under the political dialogue section but NSAGs responded that this section is crucial. Finally, both parties agreed to hold a technical teams meeting to seek a solution before the main meeting begins.

Outstanding issues mostly revolve around questions of terminology, for example of the term Panglong spirit, genuine federal union, as well as the hammering out of details such as how to organise the joint monitoring committee.

In addition NCCT is proposing to use the term “Revolutionary” to clearly define NSAGs that struggle for ethnic self-determination versus the many other armed groups in the country such as PMFs.

Table 12: Sensitive issues in negotiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Ethnic NCCT side</th>
<th>Government side</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal army</td>
<td>Affirmative action quota system (set quota for ethnic nationality cadets/promotion)</td>
<td>Ethnic nationality soldiers already serving in the army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal constitution</td>
<td>Real power for state level government, no military seats, state level ownership of resources and revenues.</td>
<td>Creation of state and union level government already a federal system, Amendments must be based on the state and region system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self determination</td>
<td>Power to make its own decisions without consulting others</td>
<td>Fear a breakaway of ethnic areas from the union, rejects the usage of “fully self-determination states” because the current Myanmar constitution is composed of regions and states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide ceasefire</td>
<td>Ensure framework and guarantees for future political dialogue</td>
<td>Prioritise nationwide ceasefire to stop fighting before political talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarm</td>
<td>Understood as surrender</td>
<td>Understood as reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amending the constitution</td>
<td>National accord outside the parliament</td>
<td>Via election and changes through parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41 Nay Tun Naing “A move from Laiza in the north to Law Khee Lar in the south - is it possible to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement before 2015” Eleven 26 Jan 2014. Web.
As KNU CEC member Mahn Nyein Maung noted, the hundreds of ceasefire violations since 2011 are a warning that there should be a clear understanding and agreement about demarcation before a nationwide ceasefire is signed.

However as many NSAG active areas overlap, deciding which areas belong to whom will pose a major challenge for the NCA.

### Nationwide Ceasefire Timeline

1. **30-31 March**
   - Meeting of top leaders of major armed movements in Chiang Mai has adopted the draft framework for political dialogue with Naypyitaw, according to a copy of the resolutions received by SHAN. The proposed framework includes specific subjects such as:
     - Core principles
     - Roadmap (agreed by the Ethnic Conference in Chiang Mai, 14-16 September 2012),
     - Composition of the participants at the new Panglong or Union Conference,
     - Structure of the convening group

2. **3 April**
   - WGEC framework and roadmap completed titled "Comprehensive union peace and ceasefire agreement" - starting from a nationwide ceasefire agreement requiring all parties to sign again. First proposal for the national ceasefire as an agreement.

3. **30 April to 2 May**
   - Preparation meeting in Chiang Mai for next round of political talks with government regarding the WGEC political framework draft. 40 representatives attended.

4. **Early June**
   - UNFC withdrew from the WGEC.

5. **1-3 June**
   - WGEC members agreed to disband the group upon completing its mission to draft up the political framework.

6. **11 June**
   - Media reports that UNFC Technical Team is ready to discuss the Political Framework with UPWC, although both parties have not confirmed the agenda yet. The meeting was said to have been held in Chiang Mai.

7. **15 June**
   - RCSS and KNU met with thee MPC representatives and presented the WGEC political framework

8. **17 July**
   - KNU - RCSS Joint Statement - support negotiations without the need of mediators

9. **20 June**
   - After being shrouded in secrecy for months, it was disclosed at a recent meeting in Chiang Mai that the draft framework for the planned nationwide political dialogue had been presented to the MPC.

10. **7 Oct. 2013**
    - DVB


12. **Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process**
Late June The Myanmar government announced in late June that it would hold a major conference this month to sign a nationwide ceasefire with all major armed ethnic groups.

29-31 July UNFC proposed another roadmap (undisclosed, written by Liam Sakhong) at a multi-ethnic conference in Chiang Mai (minus KNU and RCSS) - ENC 6 points - includes writing a new Constitution based on genuine federal principles to be drafted by a team led by UNFC and UNA, and forming a Federal Union Defence Forces.

2 Aug. UNFC statement - announced it would push for a full rewrite of the constitution that includes the formation of a Bama/Myanmar state and federal union army.

11 Aug. A Myanmar Peace Canter official cautioned armed ethnic groups "not to be too radical", after UNFC called for a rewrite of the constitution, saying "if one group is too extreme, it will be hard to move discussions forward."

31 Aug. RCSS and KNU met Vice President Dr. Sai Mauk Kham in Naypyitaw

8 Sept. UNFC and UPWC second official meeting discussed Govt's 8-point roadmap and UNFC's 6-point roadmaps and framework. Govt announced a nationwide ceasefire agreement will be implemented on the third week of October.

11-12 Sept. An ethnic delegation led by Saw Htoo Htoo Lay, Saw Ta Doh Moo from the KNU, Sai La, Sai Ngeun from RCSS, Lian Sakhong from the Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies, and Harn Yawnghwe from the EBO met with the government's peace making technical team led by Hla Maung Shwe. The meeting was the first major step towards solidifying the peace process and creating a substantial nationwide ceasefire agreement based on the framework created by the WGEC.

KNU, RCSS and MPC technical team discussed about what points should be in nationwide ceasefire agreement.

14 Sept. UNFC emergency meeting in Chiang Mai to discuss the government's nationwide ceasefire offer concluded it was still not acceptable as fighting continued in Kachin state and there was no durable agreement in place for political talks.

7-9 Oct. The emergency council of the UNFC released its demands for a nationwide ceasefire deal at a meeting held in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

11 Oct. The alternative constitutional draft could come out at the end of next month (November), says Hkun Okker, leader of the UNFC constitution drafting team.

25 Oct. Government's 1st draft delivered to KIO

26 Oct. 'Joint Statement KNU and RCSS' reiterates support and advocacy for the NCA.

30 Oct. - 2 Nov. Laiza ethnic conference forming NCCT; opportunity for all ethnic NSAGs to find a common ground on the NCA proposal.


24 4-5 Nov. Laiza 11 point common position, handed over to UPWC's Aung Min (appendix) and the government presented the "Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Between Ethnic Armed Organisations and Republic of the Union of Myanmar" (UPWC version 2nd Draft).

25 7 Dec. PI completed the "Single text document" in response to the "nationwide ceasefire agreement between ethnic armed organisations and Republic of Union of Myanmar". It combines 4 documents:
- WGEC proposal in April
- MPC proposal in Oct
- NCCT Nov
- Army Nov

26 9 Dec. PI handed the Single text document draft over to NCCT

27 15 Dec. NCCT delivered "single text document" of the NCA to the MPC

28 29 Dec. Both UPWC and NCCT discussed the single text document in Chiang Mai. NCCT ceasefire version draft 1

29 10 Jan. 2014 NCCT and UPWC held an informal meeting

30 16 Jan. NCCT meeting


32 29 Jan. NCCT's latest NCA draft presented to government team in Chiang Mai.

33 9-10 Mar NCCT and UPWC met in the MPC and signed on a 5-Point agreement which included forming a Joint Nationwide Ceasefire Draft Work Committee and the 7 sections of the NCA. (Originally scheduled 24 Jan, then 20 Feb in Hpa-an).

34 19 Mar Informal NCCT meeting to select 9 members for the Joint Nationwide ceasefire Drafting Work Group.

For the updated NSAG map and ceasefire terms chart see next pages. >>
Figure 16: Active area of NSAGs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Appendix 1: NSAG active area in Myanmar 2013 - page 1
<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>District</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Location</th>
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Appendix 1: NSAG active area in Myanmar 2013 - page 2
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Updated Ceasefire Terms in February 2011 - Page 2
### III. Ongoing efforts for reintegration and long term peace

Terms mentioned in state and union level peace agreements have made important developments towards peace dialogue between NSAGs and the government, reintegration of NSAGs into the legal fold, as well as ethnic rights and self-determination.

#### Peace dialogue support

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*Reopened

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NSCN-K 1. Khamti
2. Maukmai
3. Hsihseng
4. Thaton

RCSS / SSA
1. Taunggyi
2. Kengtung
3. Tachilek
4. Mong Hsat
5. Kholam
6. Muse
7. Mong Pan

SSPP / SSA-N
1. Lashio
2. Taunggyi
3. Kholam
4. Muse

UWSA Yangon, Mandalay, Taunggyi, Kengtung, Tangyang and Lashio
Reopened
* Unable to open due to opposition from CNF and Chin locals
** All NMSP Liaison offices first opened in 1995 after a ceasefire with SLORC were closed in April 2010 after the group refused to transform into a BGF, but reopened after a new ceasefire agreement on 25 Feb 2012.
Figure 17: Liaison Offices

A Reference Guide 2014
Pan-ethnic cooperation

Over the years the different NSAGs have maintained good contact and cooperation for their struggle for self-determination.

UNFC

The UNFC is a coalition of 12 major ethnic groups that has taken the lead in demanding ethnic political rights as the largest ethnic nationalities front. It holds regular meetings to discuss issues such as solving the ongoing conflict in Kachin state, situation of war refugees (8 Jan.) and how to work with the Nippon Foundation (9 May). It also holds conferences and other capacity building workshops to include non-member groups like the UWSA, DKBA and RCSS e.g. Peace and Reconciliation seminar (Chiang Mai, 29-31 Jul) and Security Sector Reform seminar with international experts (2 Dec).

UNFC also maintains ties with the ethnic parties coalition Nationalities Brotherhood Federation (NBF) and other democratic opposition representatives. For example, a 5-member UNFC delegation led by Vice Chairmen David Tharckabaw and Abel Tweed and Secretary General Nai Hong Sa, visited Yangon (23-26 Nov) to meet Aung San Suu Kyi. 88 Student leader Mya Aye also visited the UNFC in Chiang Mai (18 Jul).

Cross NSAG cooperation

The KIA's ongoing conflict continues to concern and rally the solidarity of other NSAGs. KIO accepted an offer by the UWSA to host peace talks with the government's UPWC (29 Jan), while the NMSP's Executive Committee held an emergency meeting and called for an immediate countrywide ceasefire and political dialogue with ethnic groups (4 Jan). The 88 Generation Students Group leaders held a meeting with a high-ranking official from the KIA in Laiza, Kachin state, to discuss the KIA's peace and conflict situation (6 Jan).

KNU and RCSS

KNU and RCSS forged close ties this year in their shared support and advocacy of the WGEC's Political Framework, and met several times to discuss the ongoing peace process (e.g. 15-17 Jul). KNU and RCSS and SNLD attended a dinner hosted by the MPC (15 Jun) after presenting the framework to the government side.

Karen Armed Groups Solidarity Committee

Due to ongoing clashes between Kayin ceasefire groups and Kayin BGF, all Kayin armed groups met several times to ensure peace and unity and created a Kayin Armed groups solidarity committee in May to handle clashes. e.g. Col. Kyaw Thet and Col. Saw San Aung from DKBA and Col. Tiger from KPC met in Kawkareik township, Kayin state to discuss a range of issues for the next round of peace talks, e.g. land confiscation, road construction in their control area, recent clashes with government forces and BGF (11 May).

Karen Armed Groups Solidarity Committee: formed by six Kayin armed groups (28 May) to solve problems and ease tensions that occur among each other. Representatives reportedly meet for quarterly meetings.
Chairperson Gen. Saw Johnny KNU
Vice-chairman, Maj. Gen. Saw Yin Nu KPC
Secretary Col. Paw Doh KNU
Joint secretary Brig. Gen. Saw Kyaw Thet DKBA

Members
Saw Kyaw Moo Hae KNU
Saw Yawshu KPC
Saw Moo Shay and Saw Than Aung DKBA
Saw Chit Thu, Dr. Saw Htay Myint and Saw Kyar Inn BGF
Saw Steven, Saw Nay Win and Saw Eh Mwee BGF (KPF)
Saw Myint Than and Saw Kyaw Myint BGF (Phayar Gone peace)

KNU, DKBA and KPC held a meeting in Myawaddy, Kayin State to discuss the establishment of a single united Karen National Army (23 Jul).

Kayah:
Kayah ceasefire group and border guard forces KNPP, KNPLF, KNDP, KNSO, KNPDP met to discuss unity in the future (17 Sept).

NSAG Cooperation with ethnic parties for future elections
In order to ensure a smooth transition to a unity government, the NSAGs have kept in contact with ethnic political parties. They have stated that they do not have plans to set up political parties to contest in elections until signing the NCA and settling political problems of self-determination. They have nevertheless kept in close contact with ethnic political parties regarding constitutional and legal amendments to the ethnic cause. National conferences have also been important in coordinating with not just parties, but also community based organisations and leaders to work together for a united cause.

Senior political parties’ leaders and members of the United Nationalities Federal Council pose for a photo in Chiang Mai, Thailand on 22 November.

For example on 22 November, Nippon Foundation and MPC organised a meeting between the UNFC and ethnic political parties in Chiang Mai. Party representatives included:
1. Khin Maung Swe (NDF),
2. Than Than Nu (Democratic Party Myanmar),
3. Myo Nyunt (Democracy and Peace party),
4. Sai Aik Pao (SNDP),
5. Zaw Aye Maung (Rakhine minister in Yangon),
6. Saw Tun Aung Myint (Kayin minister in Yangon),
7. Noe Htan Khat (Chin minister in Sagaing),
8. U Zoe Zam (CNP),
9. Sai Nyunt Lwin (SNLD),
10. Nay Myo Wai (Peace and Diversity Party),
An alliance of 15 ethnic parties, the National Brotherhood Federation, merged and officially registered as one party, the Federated Union Party to compete against the dominant NLD and USDP (11 Jun). It was started by the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, Chin National Party, Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, All Mon Region Democracy Party and Phalon-Swaw Democratic Party after the 2010 election, and now has a core group of 7 parties, with 6 parties as observers. The alliance is active in promoting the ethnic cause such as hosting a workshop on political dialogue in Naypyitaw with 2 outside participants, Dr Johannes Siebert and Harn Yawnghwe (13-14 Jul). They had also dismissed the government’s recently published official list of “recognized ethnic groups” in the country as an attempt at divide and rule, and making it harder for them to exercise their rights (4 Apr).

New ethnic parties:

Former ex-chairman of KIO Dr. Tuja was granted permission from the Union election commission to register his Kachin State Democracy Party on 30 October. He had been rejected twice on the grounds he was a former leader of the KIO in 2009 during a bid to compete in the 2010 elections, and again in 2012 for the by-elections. The All Ethnic Democracy Party (Kayah) was also registered by the Election Commission on 27 June.

“Trust Building for Peace: Shan State and Kayah State” was held in Lashio on 20-22 March to discuss prospects to ending armed conflict with the government. It was organised by SNLD and funded by MPSI. It included representatives from 21 political parties and armed groups, and Aung Min attended as an observer.

Shan-Kayah-Mon trust building for peace forum on 21-23 September attended by a total of 331 individuals including representatives of 21 parties, 15 armed groups and 3 civic groups. 31 observers attended, including members of the government. They issued a 5-point statement calling for: Nationwide ceasefire, Abolition of laws that do not meet democratic standards, including the Unlawful Associations Act, Genuine federal union, Convention representing all national races based on Panglong spirit and Amendment to the constitution. This was preceded by a meeting of ethnic politicians and representatives of various ethnic armed groups on 23 August in Taunggyi.

Rakhine groups held a conference in Chiang Mai 11-14 January where they reached a 6-point accord and formed a joint committee to work for building national unity. Rakhine leaders formed a working committee to organise the Rakhine Conference to be held in April 2014 (6 Dec). In addition the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) and Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) announced they would merge into a single party and apply to register as the Rakhine National Party (RNP) (17 Aug).

Kayin: A KNU delegation led by its chairman General Mutu Say Poe met with Kayin political parties in Hpa-an to discuss plans for amendments to Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution (2 Sept). Kayin community leaders met with top government officials in Hpa-an, Kayin State at the Karen Unity Meeting, to discuss unity among the various political, armed, religious and community organizations. 400 Kayin representatives, Aung Min and Zaw Min attended the meeting (29 Mar). The KUPC (Karen Unity and Peace Committee), a civil society peace team for the KNU is also active in promoting Kayin unity as seen at a meeting in Yangon on Nov 20-21 where they agreed to 1. continue holding public meetings 2. meet and discuss with Kayin MPs 3. meet and discuss with religious leaders 4. to report the decision to KNU, Government, and other Kayin armed groups.

Shan: Shan political parties and armed groups, representing all ethnic nationalities from the state, attended a regional assembly in a bid to promote ethnic unity and federalism in Myanmar (9 Jan). RCSS, SSPP, SNLD, SNDP, Euro-Burma Office met in Yangon to discuss ways
to solve the challenges in Myanmar and agree that Federalism is important (12 Jun). RCSS leader Yawd Serk also met Aung San Suu Kyi and discussed 1) the current peace process and developments in the country; 2) a federal union state for the future of Myanmar; 3) drug issues (15 June). A Pan-Shan State conference on 15-17 October (initiated by SNLD chairperson Hkun Htun Oo in response to the President’s request) resulted in the founding of the Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU) - a meeting point for all groups and individuals working for Shan State to work for peace in the country.

Member groups include RCSS, SSPP, SNLD, SNDP and Shan CBO/CSOs. Two offices are to be set up in Chiang Mai and Taunggyi, and Board of Chairpersons (made up of top leaders from each of the member group), a secretarial (provisionally headed by RCSS personnel with one representative from each member group) and five affairs departments: 1) Peacebuilding, 2) Research and Development, 3) Parliamentary Affairs, 4) Foreign Relations and 5) Constitutional Affairs.

Mon: The Mon National Conference (MNC) was announced on 19 August after an organising committee (19 Aug) was formed, led by Mon political parties including the New Mon State Party (NMSP), Mon Democracy Party (MDP) and All Mon Region Democracy Party (AMDP). It was held on 29-30 September in Mawlamyine City hall with Mon civil societies, political parties and NMSP to support peace, self-determination, equality, all inclusiveness and development of Mon people — it was also attended by Aung Min and State government ministers. The Mon national assembly was set to take place again in the capital city of Mawlamyine in December, but was postponed indefinitely due to “unresolved internal matters.”


Commitment to resolving conflict through peace talks

Despite persistent clashes and ongoing tension, NSAGs and the government have remained committed to maintaining peace talks to resolve the conflict, as exemplified by the meetings below:

KIA: Naypyitaw signed a 7-point agreement with the KIO that includes reduction of fighting, avoiding further clashes and opening of a liaison office in Myitkyina on 30 May. The KIO successfully reopened their liaison office in Myitkyina in accordance with the 7-point agreement, officially titled the Technical Advisory Team Office on 23 July.

DKBA: DKBA representative Maj. Maung Lay visited Naypyitaw on 6 May to hold talks with Aung Min over contested areas. They agreed to visit the area on a date yet to be fixed. DKBA asked for a joint-monitoring team to control conflict on 24 June.

KNU: The government and KNU representatives met on 28 October to discuss troop repositioning. KNU met twice with the government to assist investigations into the October bombings. It formed the “Bomb Plots Emergency Investigation Commission” with CEC members to publicise developments of the investigation.


Kayin armed groups: formed a joint "Karen Armed Groups Solidarity Committee" of all armed groups in Kayin state on 28 May to resolve fighting amongst each other. They have cooperated on certain cases such as demining and arresting drug traffickers.

UWSA representatives met with government side to calm the tensions on 3 July, resulting in a 5-point agreement on 12 July signed by UWSA's external affairs in charge Zhao Guo-ann and UPWC vice chairman Thein Zaw.

RCSS wrote a letter to Aung Min to clarify the ambiguous terms of agreement related to military active zones that have caused misunderstanding and clashes between the Myanmar army and RCSS (17 Mar).

Relationship building and Goodwill gestures
1. Meeting with state-level government: e.g. KNPP secretary Shwe Myo Thant hosted a dinner for State chief minister Khin Maung Oo at his residence on 10 April on the event of the group's 55th Anniversary Tagundaing (Kay-Hto-Bo) festival, urging cooperation to overcome difficulties in peace process.

2. Attending national day. e.g. Aung Min and Lt Gen Aung Than Htut (Peace Team) attended the first Kayah National Day (138th anniversary) Ceremony held inside the country (21 Jun). Aung Min and Deputy Minister of Border Affairs Gen. Maung Maung Ohn also attended the Kayin New Year celebrations in Myawaddy, hosted at a Kayin BGF headquarters and attended by the KNU, DKBA, KPC and Kayin BGFs (1 Jan. 2014).

3. Military relations
Several NSAG groups have direct and regular contact with the Myanmar army in their regions. For example, the KNU, DKBA, KPC, BGF 1022 representatives attend weekly meetings with government and military officials. Ministry of Border Affairs Lt Gen Thet Naing Win met with Kayin armed groups for the first time in Myawaddy (9 Sept). The CNF’s Headquarters, Camp Victoria, was visited by the army personnel of Kalaymyo, Sagaing region on 16 June and discussed security of both sides. Some NSAGs are said to have good communication with regional military commands like the KNU, while others do not like the RCSS. The reason for this is unclear but some suggest it may be a result of personalities.

4. Car licenses for peace
On 12 February the government granted car licenses to NSAGs in response to a demand they made during union level peace talks to register their unlicensed cars. It is part of a broader scheme to bring these groups back into the legal fold by assisting them to conduct daily activities, in this case to facilitate their travel and transportation. In addition, the profits made from selling these licenses supports the livelihood of their members legally and is important in discouraging them from the common practice of extorting illegal tax and engaging in the drug trade. The car licenses were presented in a gesture of goodwill by Aung Min to NSAG leaders on the eve of the 66th anniversary of Union Day celebration held in Naypyitaw - which they attended at the special invitation of the Myanmar government.
The invitation of President Thein Sein. In addition, it is known that one third of the total car licenses would be tax free, and two thirds will be 40% tax free e.g. KNU can import or register 40 new cars tax-free while the remaining 80 cars are 40% tax-free.

According to insider sources, the breakdown of a total of 870 car licenses for the 14 ceasefire groups is listed above. However, Hla Maung Shwe, an MPC special adviser, maintains that permission had been granted to register 800 cars in total, 270 of which were completely tax-free. In addition the Road Transport Department has put aside a total of 3,000 number plates for the peace process. Many of these have been given to defunct or groups that have transformed into PMFs and BGFs.

Cars for peace controversy

Car licenses in the peace process has attracted much attention and controversy, especially after a media sensation over the importing of luxury cars using “peace car licenses” to avoid paying taxes. NSAGs, such as the KNU, have admitted selling their excess permits to commercial car importers as a source of income and investment for their organisations. Luxury car permits can be sold for as much at US$ 100,000.

Many critics see car licenses and “peace gifts” as a form of bribery. However the government has insisted on the sincere need to legalise NSAGs’ vehicles, and reiterated they were not permits to import cars. NSAG leaders too have defended their decision to accept and sell the licenses due to the financial difficulties facing the survival of their organisations and the need to fund their political activities. The legal problems related to this programme raised questions over the executive powers of Aung Min and his team. This was one of the concerns cited by Parliamentary speaker of the Lower House Shwe Mann, in his order to the President to increase the role of parliament in the peace process and balance the power of the UPWC.
5. Passports for NSAG leaders

Another important effort to legalise NSAGs is the issuing of passports to its leaders. KIO Deputy Commander in Chief Maj. Gen. Gun Maw, from KNPP including Vice Chairman Khu Oo Reh and Secretary-2 Shwe Myo Thant, CNF joint secretary Dr. Sui Khar, representatives from RCSS and NMSP have so far received passports from the government.

6. Releasing Political prisoners and legalisation

The government has kept its promise to free political prisoners and on 1 August, President Thein Sein announced that there would be no political prisoners after 2013. On 30 December, President Thein Sein granted a pardon to those convicted of, or charged with, a variety of political offences such as unlawful association (17-1), high treason, contempt of government and violations of the peaceful assembly law.

In 2013, a total of 354 political prisoners were released, of which at least 158 are from NSAGs including ABSDF, RCSS, SSPP, DKBA, KNU and KIA. According to the Former Political Prisoners Group spokesman Thet Oo “Most of these people were accused of having contact with ethnic armed groups such as the KIA or SSA. We can say that the government is releasing these people coinciding with the peace talks in Kachin State to show that they are working compassionately for peace”.

Table 14:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of Released</th>
<th>ID Card Programme Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>23 April 93 prisoners, 69 political prisoners among them, including 40 Shan rebel soldiers from Shan State National Army (SSNA) disbanded in 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17 May 23 prisoners, 21 political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>23 July 73 prisoners, 69 political, including 29 Shan rebels and 26 Kachins from at least 6 prisons across the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 October</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8 October 56 prisoners, all political and most were affiliated to the ABSDF, KIA and RCSS. Same day as the KIO Government meeting. According to Aung Min, 18 were ethnic Kachin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 November</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>15 November 69 prisoners, 66 political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 December</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11 December 44 prisoners, 41 political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ID cards

Providing National Registration (Identity) cards to conflict affected populations is an important step in integrating them back into the national system. ID cards are crucial for anything from applying to school, voting and travelling around the country.

Under the MPSI’s Identity Card Programme, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has developed a model of setting up a temporary “one-stop shop” which covers, free of charge, all the steps involved in issuing the Citizen Scrutiny Cards on the same day. Starting from June 2012, approximately 60,000 people have received national identity cards in Kayah and Kayin States. The national census scheduled to take place from 30 March to 10 April 2014 will be very important in helping to register many citizens, especially in conflict areas previously inaccessible to the government. The government, together with the United Nations Population fund (UNPF) has campaigned hard to earn the trust and cooperation of NSAGs. For example on 4 October, Thein Zaw (UPWC vice-chairman) and Lt-Gen Thein Htay (deputy

47 “Trying to get the NCA draft next month” (Burmese version), RFA, 18 Nov. 2013. Web.
Minister of Border Affairs visited UWSA headquarters Pang Sang to discuss the census and national ID card issue with UWSA leaders including Vice-chairman Xiao Minliang. On 31 December, Immigration Minister Khin Yi and UNPF representative visited Chiang Mai to explain the national census. The government and UNPF nevertheless continue to face difficulties overcoming scepticism regarding how the census will measure ethnicity.

Resettlement
Since the signing of ceasefires with major NSAGs in Myanmar’s southeast, the UNHCR and host countries have been working with the Myanmar government to repatriate refugees. While there have been a few who have started to return, a UNHCR survey in September has found that most refugees in Thailand prefer not to return, and NGOs and activists argue against sending refugees back to Myanmar without securing their livelihoods.

The resettlement of refugees has been included in union level agreements between the NSAGs and Government. This year, the KNPP and Government agreed to resettle Kayah refugees by building about 50 model camps near Maelayu river, Shadaw township during peace talks on 20 June. However armed troops and landmines are threatening plans to resettle refugees from the Thai-Myanmar border.

According to a peace agreement between the government and RCSS, 600 plots of 1000 acre land in Mong Hta sub-township, Mine Tone are measured for RCSS family housing. However refugees at Loi Taileng camp expressed concern about returning home due to ongoing clashes. For new IDPs, the government has also been working to calculate losses and compensate damages caused by clashes e.g. on 15 May, Shan MP Sai Kyaw Ohn was working with township authorities, political parties and administrative organizations to calculate the damages incurred during 9 May clashes in Namhsam. The information will then be submitted to the Shan State Government responsible for allocating the compensation.

Kachin
In Kachin state, the first batch of refugees under government administration returned home to San Kin village in Tarlaw Gyi village tract on 2 December. The World Food Program (WFP) provided food ration for one month to each family who returns to their village, while northern military command headquarters provided one bag of rice and 30,000 Kyat to each family.

In early March, the Myanmar government said it plans to offer agricultural loans to Kachin villagers who have been displaced by the ongoing conflict in northern Myanmar to re-establish their livelihoods.

Demining
According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (LCM), Myanmar has the third highest number of deaths caused by landmines. According to LCM, landmines exist in 50 townships in Myanmar, posing a major problem to resettlement efforts. Yeshua Moser, a representative from the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) also said that Myanmar is the third most frequent employer of active landmines in the world. No estimate exists of the extent of contamination, but the Monitor identified Suspected 'Kachin IDP’s return home despite ongoing peace talks', Eleven, 12 Apr. 2013. Web.
Hazard Areas in the following regions and townships:

- Kayah state: all seven townships;
- Kayin state: all seven townships;
- Kachin state: Chipwi, Mansi, Mogaung, Momauk, Myitkyina, Tsawlaw, and Waingmaw;
- Mon state: Bilin, Kyaikto, Mawlamyine, Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye;
- Pegu region: Kyaukkyi, Shwekyin, Tantabin, and Taungoo;
- Rakhine state: Maungdaw;
- Shan state: Hopong, Hsihseng, Langkho, Loilen, Mawkmai, Mongpan, Mongton, Monghpyak, Namhsan Tachileik, Namtu, Nanhkan, Yaksawk and Ywangan;
- Tanintharyi region: Bokpyin, Dawei, Tanintharyi, Thayetchaung, and Yebyu; and
- Chin state.

Demining has therefore been included in several peace agreements, and NSAGs are working with each other and the government. One of the objectives of the Karen armed groups solidarity committee in July also includes demining. Several campaigns are already underway, for example joint missions by Kayin armed groups with the Myanmar army since June 2013 and in Kayah state by KNPP, KNPLF and KNLP. Efforts have also been made to provide training and workshops. However the demining campaigns face great difficulty as armed organizations do not have landmine laying maps.

The KNU’s three step demining program includes: educating locals and putting up warning signs, technical and non-technical surveys and removing mines. KNU and KNPP however claim that the government has not been following the peace agreement by failing to make the demining process clear. The KNPP are still waiting for clearance from the government as they were told by Aung Min that demining can only begin after the demining law is passed and approved by the president. Pilot projects with KNPP and the government are planned in Shar Taw Tsp near Thai-Myanmar border.

Norwegian People's Aid is the only humanitarian mine action actor in Myanmar with a MoU to conduct non-technical survey and clearance (signed on 26 Sept. 2012 for the clearance of landmines in Kayah State, Kayin and Mon states, as well as Tanintharyi and Bago regions). They have been involved in conducting non-technical surveys in mine affected areas and were requested by the government of Myanmar to assist in establishing and building capacity of a national mine action centre - Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC) in cooperation with the MPC. On 31 May, NPA signed an agreement with the European Commission for € 3.5 million over the next 18 months to support the establishment and initial operations of the national Mine Action Centre (requested by the Myanmar government) and to conduct non-technical survey (mapping) and clearance of landmine contaminated areas in Myanmar.

NSAG businesses

Granting business concessions to NSAGs plays an important part in the peace process in allowing them to financially sustain their organisations legally and contribute to the economic growth of their respective areas. The issue however remains a highly controversial topic as experience from the 1990s has shown that this has often led to corruption of NSAG leaders, and many see it as a government ploy to bribe them away from their original political fight for ethnic rights. The precedence of business over politics in the 1990s ceasefires is often blamed for the breakdown of ceasefires after the 2010 elections, and especially the resumption of conflict in Kachin state. NSAGs are now very cautious about pushing for political settlements.
Table 15: NSAG companies and business deals resulting from post-2011 peace agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSAG Registered Company Details</th>
<th>Concession to build a 15 mile road from Htantalan Granted permission to cut 1000 tons of teak and 1000 tons of hardwood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CNF Khonumhtung (2012) Construction, logging, communication, trading, tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKBA Unregistered Rubber plantation, sandalwood plantation, mining and teak wood logging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayin BGFs Unregistered (running business as a BGF) agribusiness, mining, trading, manufacturing, tourism (According to BGF leader Col. Saw Chit Thu, more than 50 percent of net benefits have been used in local development, healthcare and education for members' family)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIO Buga(1994) Distribution of electricity to Myitkyina, Mining (jade), trading, agribusiness (all activities except electricity distribution have stopped after the ceasefire broke down in 2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU 1. MOE KO SAN Travel &amp; Tours Co. Ltd, Trading Company Ltd. (run by Brigade 7) 2. Saung Seesar Co.Ltd (run by Brigade 6 - Mawlamyine) 3. Unregistered businesses Logging, mining, agribusiness, tourism, transportation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPC Unregistered Rubber plantation, transportation and border trade Demanded exploration and trade licenses for timber and mineral extraction and tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA Shwe Lin Star Tourism (1989) Mining, agribusiness, logging, trading, tourism, hotel, casino Granted 1000 tons of timber (out of 10,000 tons it had requested). It is also permitted to construct hydropower plants and operate mineral mines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNLO Pending registration Permitted to conduct logging, mining and minerals, trading, cement, construction, as well as run hotels and warehouses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSS Shan Taungdan Cherry (2012) Permitted mining, road construction, logging, agriculture, power distribution, tourism, trading, transportation and agribusiness Proposed to establish industrial zone in southern Shan state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPP Unregistered SSPP leaders are known to have ruby mine and trading concessions following the 1989 ceasefire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NSAGs have also opened economic offices to liaise with the government for business activities. In 2013, KNU Brigade 6 opened a new economic office in Mawlamyine (22 Nov) and CNF in Paletwa (19 Oct). The results of these companies have been mixed, with some performing well and others like the RCSS facing restrictions from the military to start business projects agreed in peace agreements.

Drug eradication

Myanmar remains the world's second largest producer of opium, the raw ingredient for heroin, after Afghanistan, accounting for 10% of global production, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Despite efforts by the government, NSAGs and the support of foreign bodies, UNODC has reported a year on year rise in Myanmar's drug production. Analysts believe that the drug issue strongly related to the political problems facing Myanmar, as drug money is needed to fund wars, and it is political issues that are the root drivers of the conflict.

Government efforts:

The Myanmar authorities reported they had destroyed 12,774 hectares of poppy plantations in the 2013-14 poppy cultivation season, accounting for 20% of the total of 507,800 hectares cultivated across the country.

On 26 June, Myanmar and Thai authorities incinerated $400 million-worth of narcotics to mark World Drug Day and Lieutenant Colonel Tin Aung from Myanmar police force’s drug control team said drug seizures had increased this year. The government also punished 5,740 offenders in connection with 4,006 drug-related cases.

However due to persistently high production, Home Affairs Minister Lt-Gen Ko Ko announced on 12 May that Myanmar will form a number of police units to fight drugs as the figures of households growing opium along the border area of the country has exceeded 30,000.

International assistance

Over the last two decades, Myanmar has received a large amount of foreign aid and assistance for drug eradication and crop substitution. Aid is channelled through the UNODC office or unilaterally. This year, Germany donated US$ 5 million for crop substitution in 40 villages in Loi Lem and Panglaung township in southern Shan state on 3 Dec. 2013. A significant drug eradication project that is part of the tripartite agreement between the RCSS, Government and UNODC signed in Tachileik on 27-28 Oct. 2012, is a new multimillion dollar peace initiative in Myanmar's eastern Shan State slated for 2014-2017. The initiative was presented by Jason Eligh, country manager for the UNODC in Myanmar, July 2013. It is based on cooperation on alternative development projects for opium farmers and aims to improve the state's infrastructure, health, education and crop substitution. It involves the Myanmar government and its military, RCSS and UNODC, would allow survey staff into Shan State, and aims to develop trust between all sides.

The program has experienced a severe delay due to what the RCSS claims is a lack of response from the government side. According to RCSS’s analysis report on drug-eradication, the group is ready to cooperate with Myanmar army and police but are not able to start without the approval of government authorities. RCSS has a 3-point approach to implementing drug eradication: treating drug addicts, assisting poppy farmers with crop substitution, raising drug-awareness among civilians. Over a year since it was signed, the RCSS reported on 23 December, that its Anti-Narcotics Division had met several times with the UNODC to kickstart the needs assessment, but received contradictory messages from the UNODC and Government that the other had to give authorisation in order to begin. Moreover, it claimed that the government’s Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control had not included them.
in several anti-drug activities. The report concluded that "the agreement is on paper only and the government has no intention of cooperating on drug eradication." Moreover, this experience severely affected trust building in the peace process.

NSAG efforts

In contrast to the stalled cooperation efforts by the RCSS with the government, combatant groups KIA and TNLA have been active in conducting anti-opium production campaigns unilaterally, even without a ceasefire with the government.

TNLA has identified drugs as the root cause of high levels of crime, social problems, poor education standards and a weak economy. As a result, they have placed great importance on their anti-drug campaign policy. Since its formation in 2011, the group has been active in eradicating plantations and arresting drug dealers in Mogok and Momeik areas in Kyaukme townships. At the beginning of 2014, TNLA claimed it had destroyed about 100 out of 300 acres of reported poppy plantation in the area which are cultivated by local Chinese, Kachin, Shan and Ta’ang farmers.

The KIO has also started a drug eradication program in Kachin state and established a "Drug Eradication Committee" on 1 Oct. 2011. The program cooperates with Kachin youth, parents, elders and social organizations. For example, KIO held a conference for drug eradication in its headquarters of Laiza on 24-25 May with the attendance of about 150 youth leaders from 30 different organizations in both Kachin state and northern Shan state. According to Brig. Gen. Zau Bok Hteng, deputy in charge of KIO’s drug-eradication committee, KIO has a comprehensive drug eradication program that includes tackling drug abuse, trafficking, poppy growing and producing.

The drug eradication activities of the TNLA and KIO cast further doubt over the government’s sincerity in tackling the drug issue. TNLA chief-of-staff Col Tar Ho Palin told Myanma Freedom Daily that his group had destroyed almost double the amount of opium poppy plantations than the government did in 2013, and was "100 percent certain that the abundance of drugs in Shan State is because local authorities are involved in the trade." Moreover, the two groups have frequently clashed with local PMFs and BGFs during drug eradication operations, for example, clashes between the TNLA and Pansay militia. This suggests the prominent role of these government militia forces in Myanmar’s drug trade and also supports suspicions that the government is involved in the drug trade.

The Myanmar government tacitly supports the drug trade to enable paramilitary forces (PMFs) to suppress ethnic resistance movements with minimum financial strain.

The high profile capture and execution of PMF leader Naw Kham in China raises serious questions about the Myanmar government's BGF/PMF scheme in dealing with ethnic armed groups. Naw Kham's Hawngleuk Militia, known to be a major drug trafficking gang involved in murder, kidnapping and banditry, was made up of former members of Khun Sa's Mongtai army. He was finally charged and executed by the Chinese government in March 2013 for killing 13 Chinese sailors on the Mekong River in 2011. (Photo: XInhua)

Aside from the need of drugs to financially support their BGF/PMF scheme, the reason for the government's reluctance to start the project is unclear. Another possibility for the government's slow response is perhaps negligence, or corruption of authorities at all levels who have strong interests or benefit from the endemic drug trade in ethnic areas. Notably, TNLA said publicly in December 2013 that local militias are backed by the government and their leaders, like the Pansay militia leader U Kyaw Myint aka Li Yongquang and Kutkai militia leader Ti Khun Myat, are now members of the state parliament. Many critics also believe that the drug trade is a military strategy to sustain the existence of NSAGs as a way to keep its army busy and hence maintain the importance or relevance of military power in the country.

Another conspiracy theory is that the government encourages drug use among ethnic youth to prevent them from joining resistance movements.

BGF/PMF

Under the SPDC regime, ethnic armed groups were expected to reintegrate into the legal fold by transforming into a border guard force (BGF) or people's militia force (PMF) under control of the Myanmar army. BGFs and PMFs have assisted the Myanmar army in different ways including collecting information about the activities of non-ceasefire armed groups and cooperating in military operations.

Analysts believe that the Myanmar army uses BGFs and PMFs to gain control of ethnic areas. Over the last year, NSAGs continued to clash with BGFs.
and PMF who were their former comrades and allies.

Table 16: Clashes between NSAGs and PMFs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>EAO/BGF/PMF Clash Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 22 Jan.</td>
<td>KNU BGF1014 Papun township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 8 Feb.</td>
<td>KIA, SSPP, TNLA Pansay PMF Namkham Township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 9 Feb.</td>
<td>TNLA Lonkan militia Kutkai Township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 26-29 Apr.</td>
<td>DKBA Kayin BGFs Myine Gyi Ngu area, Hlaing Bwe township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 2 May</td>
<td>SSPP Lahu PMF and Myanmar troops Tangyang township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 9 May</td>
<td>RCSS Task force 701Pansay PMF and Namkham Myoma militia cooperated with MOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 28 May</td>
<td>TNLA Pansay PMF and Myanmar troops Kutkai township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 25-27 July</td>
<td>TNLA Pansay PMF and Myanmar troops Kutkai township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 16 Aug</td>
<td>KNU brigade 5 BGF1014 Papun township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 17-19 Aug</td>
<td>KIA Kachin BGFs and Myanmar troops Chiphwe township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 26 Aug</td>
<td>KIA Kachin BGFs and Myanmar troops Chiphwe township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 28 Aug</td>
<td>KIA Kachin BGFs and Myanmar troops Machanbaw township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 31 Aug</td>
<td>KIA Kachin BGFs and Myanmar troops Puta-O Township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 11 Sept</td>
<td>TNLA Pansay PMF and Myanmar troops Kutkai township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 11 Oct</td>
<td>TNLA Pansay PMF and Myanmar troops Kutkai township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 26 Oct</td>
<td>RCSS Homong PMF and Myanmar troops Homong area, southern Shan state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 23 Nov</td>
<td>SSPP, TNLA Pansay PMF and Myanmar troops Namkham Township</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSAGs were ordered to transform into a BGF/PMF in 2009 ahead of the general election in 2010, but since the reform and new peace plan under the new Thein Sein government, it is no longer the main DDR framework or requirement for NSAGs. Nevertheless, the Myanmar army did create one Shanni militia force (Red Shan) based in Kachin state in May 2012 when Shanni soldiers, forcibly recruited by the KIA, surrendered to the Myanmar government. The Myanmar northern military command trained and equipped 200 Shanni PMF in May 2012 and about 300 Shanni PMF in Jan 2013.

On 13 February, the government media reported that a 10-member splinter group of Mon Peace Defence (already defunct) had also returned to the government's legal fold. The scheme has for the most part drawn criticism as BGFs and PMFs have become notorious for their involvement in the drug trade. While analysts believe that the government turns a blind eye to these illegal activities, Myanmar authorities have on occasion raided drug refineries run by PMF, e.g. 20 November 2013, authorities raided a refinery operated by Mong Zi PMF led by U Aung Khaing and his deputy Ah Liang aka Ah Ying aka Ya Pafa. There have also been some positive cases of BGF/PMF groups that are successfully conducting legal businesses and becoming elected MPs for their regions.

Self-determination

The struggle for self-determination and ethnic rights is the underlying cause of decades long conflict in Myanmar. Solving this political problem can therefore theoretically bring an end to the conflict.
to the ethnic struggle. The demands made during the state and union level agreements since 2011 have started making important headway in raising the government’s awareness of ethnic demands and rights. While there is still a long way to go in guaranteeing full self-determination legally and structurally, political concessions and improvements in ethnic rights and equality will be important developments in this direction towards the end goal of the peace process.

Constitutional reform

The 2010 constitution that instituted the current civil-military democratic government is regarded as a major improvement over the past. While the state and regional government structure takes a federal form, the excessive power reserved for the army and the central government are far from the self-determination that the ethnic NSAGs are demanding to ensure equality for their people. Notably, ethnic groups’ ability to make decisions over their own affairs and—most importantly—natural resource revenues, previously denied to them, are a huge source of grievances that continue to drive the ethnic struggle.

Constitutional reform has received a great deal of interest in recent years. Last year a 2008 Constitution Joint Review committee was created by parliament on 25 July to investigate the issue. The 109 members of parliament reviewed public submissions on proposals to amend the constitution and submitted its report to the parliament on 31 January 2014. Union Parliament approved the formation of a new committee to implement the findings of the review committee’s report on 3 February 2014. In addition, an ethnic protection bill is being proposed by MP Ti Khun Myat to promote self-determination and language and literature.

National Census 2014

The United Nations agreed on 30 April 2012 to assist the Myanmar government in conducting its first census in 31 years. It will be conducted on 29 March 2014 and the data collected will greatly influence social policies, including ethnic nationalities policy; as the UN Population fund factsheet explains “The information collected will give planners, both inside and outside of government, an accurate picture of how many people are living in the country at every administrative level and their living conditions as well as access to basic services. This will tell planners what resources people need such as education, healthcare, housing and transport.”

According to some like David Scott Mathieson, a senior researcher in the Asia division of Human Rights Watch, the census would have a very positive effect on the ethnic areas and could serve to support claims for ethnic rights in education, language and culture that in some areas is repressed by the state and military.

In addition, there is hope the census would also support the case for granting citizenship rights to stateless people—especially for Rohingya. Other groups like the Red Shan in Kachin state are hopeful that the census will provide them an opportunity to gain their own self administration zone, if results show they make up over 50% of populations in two contiguous townships.

Others, especially ethnic NSAG leaders, are sceptical about the government’s true agenda and fear statistics about ethnic nationalities may be manipulated down as has been done in the past. It is widely believed that the government lists 135 ethnic groups to weaken their...
political power, since an ethnic race, which has a population of more than 57,000 in a region, can have a related ethnic affairs minister to represent them in the regional Hluttaws (regional parliaments). In addition, ethnic profiling has become a highly political issue as smaller groups fear they will lose their official status if their people choose larger group instead of subgroup identities (e.g. Palaung versus Shan), and larger groups fear their numbers will shrink if people choose to identify as a subgroup. The International Crisis Group also issued a conflict alert titled “A Risky Census” on 12 Feb. 2014 claiming it risks inflaming tensions during a sensitive peace process. In addition its 41 questions are “overly complicated and fraught with danger” and warns against the political ramifications that will result from it.

Political consultation

As NSAGs are technically illegal organizations in Myanmar, they have made agreements with the government during union level peace talks, to be permitted to meet with locals inside the country for suggestions on how best to proceed with the peace process.

Table 17: NSAG and public consultation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSAG</th>
<th>Public consultation details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>CNF meet chin people in Yangon 19 Oct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU</td>
<td>KNU Battalion 201 explains KNU road maps and new political landscape to the 10 village groups of Maw Khee in Myawaddy township 24 Sept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public consultations by the Karen Unity and Peace Committee on the peace process conducted in Kawkaraik, Kayin state 11 Dec. and Thanbhyu Sayat Township, Mon State 9 Nov.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIO</td>
<td>Gen. Gun Maw met Kachin people in Yangon to explain the current peace process and political issues and met the media (18-20 Nov). The KIO also held a meeting with Kachin civilians in Myitkyina (29 May).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>KNPP held a public consultation meeting in Loikaw township where leaders explained the nationwide ceasefire and Laiza meeting (11 Nov). 50 people from more than 10 CSOs attended the meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>DKBA and 29 groups held a conference in DKBA control area on 15-17 June. They agreed 8 points sent to President Thein Sein and MPC. 17 representatives and 5 coordinators were selected to a working committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSS</td>
<td>Prior to peace talks with the Myanmar government, RCSS held a political consultation with Shan political parties, Shan civic groups and individuals on 1-2 June in Chiang Mai. Lt-Gen. Yawdserk also met civilians in Tachileik town on 23 June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFC</td>
<td>UNFC sent teams across Myanmar to meet with local civil society groups to prepare for potential political talks with the government (15 Jan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National day

The government has relaxed its attitude towards ethnic holidays and national celebrations, which under the SLORC and SPDC military regimes were banned. Events are now celebrated openly across ethnic states, both in government and rebel-controlled areas. In addition to the state days, which are now recognised public holidays, several groups have also requested a national day. 

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Chin Chin State government held Chin National Day celebrations in Hakha with the CNF on 20 Feb. A motion was passed on 6 Feb. to allocate a budget of 13 million kyat (US $15,000) for various activities to mark the occasion, including cultural and sporting events. Chin National Day marks the Chin ethnic group’s struggle for self-determination and was recognized as a holiday by the Myanmar government in December 2012.

Kachin 66 Kachin Anniversary Day held in Myitkyina, organised by the State Government (10 Jan, 2014)


Karen New year ceremony held in Myawaddy township, attended by U Aung Min, U Khin Yi, Karen State govt and MPC. (1 Jan, 2014).

65th anniversary of Karen revolutionary day held in KNU controlled area, included the participation of other Karen armed groups and Arakan Army (31 Jan, 2014).

Kayah 62nd anniversary of Kayah state day held in capital, Loikaw for a week organized by state government (15 Jan, 2014)

Mon Mon National Day celebrated across the country for the second year, it was attended by the Mon State minister Kyin Phay (26 Feb).

Rakhine 39th anniversary Rakhine State Day in Yangon, Sittwe and Ayeyarwady region (15 Dec). A committee has been set up to establish a Rakhine National Day. However, some in Rakhine State have criticized it on the grounds that the committee was formed by the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) office and most committee members are from Sittwe, the state’s capital (20 Mar).

Shan Ethnic Shan groups in Myanmar were allowed to openly celebrate Shan State National Day for the first time in two decades (7 Feb).

Ethnic language

In response to several peace agreements and the hard campaigning of NSAG groups, the government announced that textbooks in several ethnic languages had been distributed on 25 January 2014.

No. 1 Basic Education Department has distributed primary school textbooks in:
1. Kayin (Sgaw, Pwo and West Pwo)
2. Mon
3. Rakhine
4. Jingpaw (Kachin)
5. Lisu (Kachin)
6. Rawang (Kachin)
7. Lachid (Kachin)
8. Kayah
9. Kayan
10. Tedim Chin
11. Hakha Chin
12. Falam Chin
13. Pa-O
14. Tai lone Shan
15. Shanni
16. Danu

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17. Palaung
18. Intha

Border and Economic Development of ethnic areas

With the peace process negotiations in progress, there are opportunities for ethnic areas to develop and participate in national economic growth. Development policy in ethnic areas is a major concern, especially after years of conflict and discrimination. The Border and Economic Development ministry, headed by the military, is tasked with overseeing development in ethnic areas. However, the policies published on their website were created under the previous SPDC regime and do not reflect the current political situation of the country. Current changes in ethnic development policy appear to be influenced more by demands made in peace talks with NSAGs and national economic policies.

The issue of development is broad and wide ranging, but below are some key issues and examples related to development for the peace process:

1. NSAG economic policies and cooperation with the government to identify and deliver development needs. For example, KNU economic and land policy
2. Increasing state budget for infrastructure projects. For instance, a one billion kyat (US$1 million) budget was approved for development in Chin state at an emergency meeting of the regional parliament in Hakha. A three billion kyat project to build a road link to the Thai Kayah Border Trade BP 13 started since July as a result of the ceasefire. There are also reports that the Border affairs ministry has completed roads, houses and small and medium bridges in Kayin state. An air route has just started operating between Mae Sot, Thailand, and Mawlamyine.
3. MPC held several meetings on rural development which included civil society and INGOs (17 Aug. and 21 Dec).
4. Social development: For example, sport schools in Mawlamyine and Taunggyi
5. Electricity: Several townships are being connected to the national electricity grid; this year these include Kalay and Kyauk Phyu Townships. During the 2013-2014 budget year, the government plans to provide electricity to 47 villages in Kayah state (14 villages in Loikaw township, 20 villages in Demawsoe township, 13 villages in Phrusoe township) where currently only 108 out of 511 villages have access to electricity.
6. Health: Several reports covered activities by the KNU health department this year that include cooperation with the government health director for Kayin State to fight malaria, and better coordinating of healthcare services in Kayin State. The KNLA also announced that they had set up the Big Tiger Foundation with a start-up amount of 100,000 Thai Baht (USD 3100), to provide medical care and basic supplies to poor patients. Multiple offices of the Foundation were inaugurated in hospitals and clinics in Kawkareik Township, Kayin State on 31 August.
7. Education: Kayin State Government announced that during 2013-2014 budget year, 95 schools will be built in Kayin state in replacement of old schools. Kayin Education Department and the Kayin Teachers Working Group from KNU areas held a summer camp for teacher training in a government controlled area (19 Apr.). CNF installed 90 computers and internet in all 30 high schools in Chin state.

Border trade also plays an important role in development plans for ethnic areas, offering a way for ethnic groups to engage with market economies and generate income.

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Myanmar's border trade reached US$1.88 billion in the first five months of the 2013-14 fiscal year, a rise of $391 million over the same period the previous year.

Myanmar's exports to China, Thailand, Bangladesh and India hit $1.17 billion from April to August, compared to $710 million in imports. For trade with China, the town of Muse was Myanmar's largest border trade point, while Myawaddy was the biggest trade point with Thailand.

In another sign of increasing development and liberalisation of border crossings, Kayin Chief minister Zaw Min announced that foreign tourists will soon be permitted to enter Myanmar through border trade centers in Kayin State, bordering Thailand on 19 May. The vibrant trade directly boost the local economy of ethnic areas, for example a meeting of Kayin and Mon businessmen with Thai counterparts in Mae Sot on 29 October.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border Trade Points</th>
<th>Shan-Chinese border</th>
<th>Shan-Thai border</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muse</td>
<td>1. Muse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Chin Shwe Haw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned: Mongla</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Tachileik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned: Pong Pakheng</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachin-Chinese border</td>
<td>1. Loi Je</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Kan Paitee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayin-Thai border</td>
<td>1. Myawaddy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Three Pagoda Pass</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned: Mae Sae</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanintharyi-Thai border</td>
<td>1. Kaw Thoung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Myeik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Nabulae/Htee Khee*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Maw Taung*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakhine - Bangladesh border</td>
<td>1. Sittwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Maung Daw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagaing - Indian border</td>
<td>1. Tamu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned: Pan Saung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin-Indian border</td>
<td>1. Rih</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned: Falam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*new border trade point opened in 2013

Development projects are also meant to boost the economy of ethnic areas, but are frequently criticised for their adverse effects on local populations and the environment. While business interests are quick to take advantage of the ceasefires to enter previously inaccessible areas, several CBOs have campaigned to stop all major projects before genuine peace and stability are achieved. They warn that the adverse effects on citizens will only increase grievances that threaten the already fragile peace and vulnerable conditions of a transitioning society. From the government perspective and some NSAGs, the benefits of large-scale developments for the country as a whole outweigh the costs. Below are some development projects related to the peace process that made news in 2013.

1. Tasang hydropower dam in Shan State: work has reportedly resumed and had been relocated to a site on the Salween River near Mongton town. The group said 123 villages would be forcibly relocated to make way for the US $12-billion project, which is being funded by Chinese and Thai investors (20 Mar).
7,000-megawatt dam began in 2010, but was suspended due to the ongoing ethnic conflict in the area.

2. Myitsone Dam in Kachin state remains stalled since 30 September 2011 due to intense opposition and environment assessments of the damage it would cause. In 2013, the Chinese government as the main investor in the project continued to lobby the Myanmar side to resume construction.


4. Shwe gas pipeline opened: Pipeline to China is ready for gas transport at the end of May 2013.

5. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, jointly implemented by Myanmar and India, is expected to be completed by mid-2014. The project is an Indian government initiative to provide India with trade and transport links to its northeastern states, which are otherwise inaccessible overland via India’s rugged mountainous region.

6. SIZ: A new industrial zone has been created in Hpa-an, Kayin state (2011), which in April 2013 was reported to have three private factories and a list of foreign and domestic companies lined up to rent spaces; these include food and beverages, garment factories, purified drinking water factories and mineral refinery plants. RCSS has demanded an SIZ in their area as part of its union level peace agreement with the government, but no developments have been reported.

7. SEZ: The development of a 288-acre Special Economic Zone in Muse, Shan State facing the Chinese border was announced on 15 June 2013. It is designed to facilitate the growing transport and infrastructure demands e.g. construction of cargo yards and a traffic detour designed to combat congestion caused by an increasing number of cargo vehicles. The Dawei Project (that crosses KNU Brigade 4 area) industrial zone, which was set to include an $8 billion deep-sea port, a refinery, gas and coal power plants and steel mills, is currently stalled due to a lack of investment. Myanmar and Thailand are looking to Japan to revive the project.

Efforts to solve religious conflict:

Legal punishment

Col. Htein Lin, minister of Rakhine state border affairs and security ministry, said in July that 1189 people were arrested and sent to court with 295 criminal cases that occurred during the two waves of communal violence in the Rakhine state in 2012. 507 people have already been sentenced. More than 6000 police and military personnel have been deployed from July 2012 to 2013.

In the wave of religious violence in 2013, at least 68 people were arrested, of which 30 have been sentenced to jail.
Rakhine state:  
7 May 2013: At least 10 Rakhine found guilty of involvement in sectarian violence against Muslims in Kyauk Taw township, sentenced 9 months to 3 years imprisonment by Sittwe court. 
6 October 2013: 60 Rakhine people are detained in jail. 
21 November 2013: 3 Rakhine men arrested for plotting to bomb mosques. 

Lashio: 
12 June 2013: Ne Win, a Muslim man who set a woman on fire in Lashio triggering a series of riots, sentenced to 26 years in prison. 

Meiktila: 
8 July 2013: 2 Buddhists jailed for Meiktila murders were sentenced to 7 years in prison for murders during the religious violence in March. 
21 May 2013: 7 Muslim men have been sentenced from two years to life in prison for the death of a Buddhist monk. However on 28 May, Thein Than Oo, one of the defence lawyers, said that the families of the defendants were launching an appeal against the verdict. 

Okkan 
19 June 2013: two Muslim women found guilty of sparking religious violence and insulting religion sentenced to two years of hard labour; 30 people arrested. 

Others: 
30 November: The Myanmar government announced in the New Light of Myanmar that a police file has been opened to take action against protesters for carrying a banner assaulting religion during a demonstration on 15 November against the OIC delegation. 
72 Buddhist monks reportedly carried signs that equated Islam to animal ideology. 

Institutional 
• Investigation Commission on communal strife in Rakhine State: Formed by the government on 17 August 2012 to systematically uncover the root causes of communal violence in Rakhine State. It is made up of 27 political, community and religious leaders, law experts and business people. The much-delayed government inquiry into 2012’s sectarian violence in Rakhine State finally submitted its report on 22 April and a press conference was held on 29 April. 

• 10-member State of Emergency management central committee was formed by President Thein Sein on 30 March to control the ongoing violence. The committee will expose and detain those who instigate violence, and seek ways to prevent recurrence of racial and religious conflicts, and enable rapid response in times of conflict and better coordination between security forces. The Government has also established seven subcommittees on rule of law, security and law enforcement, immigration and review of citizenship, temporary resettlement and reconstruction, social and economic development and strategic planning.

Disbanding Nasaka Force: 
President Thein Sein announced the Nasaka force that guards the border with Bangladesh was disbanded on 12 July. It was established in 1992 and notorious for corruption. 

• Two-child limit on Rohingya families: In May, the Rakhine state government adopted a suggestion from the Rakhine investigation commission to set a two-child limit on Rohingya families. The regulation enforced in Maungdaw district (bordering Bangladesh) is aimed to control communal violence and is also part of a directive "Action to be taken against protesters who use banner assaulting faith", New Light of Myanmar, 1 Dec. 2013, p9.
that enforces a ban on polygamy.

• Disassociating 969 principles and emblems from Buddhism:

  The State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (SSMNC), a government-appointed body of high-ranking monks that oversees and regulates the Buddhist clergy in Myanmar, issued a directive dated 14 August, stating that it is illegal to form monk networks organized around the principles of the 969 movement, and bars linking the 969 emblem to the Buddhist religion.

Proposed solutions:

• Proposed law to restrict Buddhist Muslim intermarriage:

  18 July, Wirathu claimed nearly 2.5 million have signed a petition in support of proposed law restricting intermarriage in Myanmar between Buddhists and Muslims.

• Disusing the term “Rohingya” as a conflict control measure, suggested by Muslim and Rakhine leaders at a meeting hosted by the the Rakhine conflict inquiry commission (2 Dec).

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• Section 144 of the Myanmar Penal Code for preventing further communal violence was discussed by local community leaders and government officials in Rakhine state on 6 April.

• UN resolution to grant the Rohingya full access to citizenship and amend the 1982 citizenship law has been issued a number of times. The latest call on 19 November however was rejected by the Myanmar government.

Assisting IDPs resulting from communal conflict:

The Myanmar government is primarily responsible for the care of IDPs from communal clashes. According to a Mizzima report, the Rakhine State government says its budget for supporting the residents of camps holding about 130,000 will be exhausted by February 2014.

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The government spends 20 million kyats a week on the camps and seeks foreign donations when there is a shortage.

In April, the government formed the Rakhine State Peace and Stability Implementation Central Committee, another ministerial-level body to implement the President’s resettlement plan in Rakhine state. It includes Immigration Minister Khin Yi based in Sittwe, the Rakhine capital and has three months to complete its work. Khin Yi visited Sittwe together with the US and Australian ambassadors and representatives of UN agencies. They also visited relief camps in Pauktaw, Myebon and Sittwe townships. Hundreds of Muslim IDPs from 2012’s communal conflict were moved from Aung Mingalar quarter in Sittwe township to a camp for internally displaced people (25 Aug). Over 600 ethnic Rakhine IDPs were accommodated in Sittwe (19 July).

In Meiktila, free housing complex for refugees in Meikhtila Township was set to start construction at the end of July 2014 for over 5000 refugees. One complex will include 1,600 rooms and the government will give land (30’ by 40’) to 93 households in Meikhtila (2 Dec). Another apartment with 700 rooms and 200 houses will be donated by a construction company (27 Dec).

Consultation and inter-faith Meetings

• 1 December: An interfaith meeting held in Yangon was hosted by Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, secretary of Rakhine Crisis Investigation Committee (RCIC), and Daw Yin Yin New, member of RCIC, and included Mr. Derek Mitchell, the American ambassador to Myanmar, Mr. Vijay Nambiar, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on...
Myanmar, representatives from Rakhine political parties, Kaman representatives, elders from Sittwe city and Islamic religious leaders.

• 10 September: 969 monk U Wirathu and Muslim representative Diamond Shwe Kyi meet in Yangon to discuss interfaith friendship, unity and peace.

• 1 October: Academic conference on security, peace and co-existence jointly organized by Institute for Global Engagement and Sitagu World Buddhist Academy (Yangon)

International aid to solve communal conflict

The Rakhine state and racial riots across the country have attracted large support and sympathy from foreign countries. Myanmar has been criticised for not doing enough and failing to tackle religious violence in the country. Frequent high level visits throughout 2013 were made to Rakhine state e.g. during Vice President Dr Sai Mauk Kham’s field trip to Rakhine State on 7 and 8 July 2013, he was accompanied by a delegation of 18 Ambassadors (from Indonesia, Bangladesh, Israel, Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Italy, Brunei, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Saudi, Malaysia, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Pakistan, Egypt) and UN officials. Other visits include one on 19 December when UK, USA, Canada representatives visited Rakhine and Muslim refugees camps in Rakhine state.

Table 19: International humanitarian assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian Foreign Affairs minister Bob Carr announced $3.2 million humanitarian aid for Myanmar’s Rakhine state, lifting Australia’s total aid contribution to the Rakhine state to $9 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>350 teachers will be trained in peace education under a Belgian funded UNESCO peace education project in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships in Rakhine state, as a means of fostering mutual respect for cultural diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Since September, EU has been funding an 18-month-long police training project for 4,000 police on community policing and crowd management best practices, and to promote police accountability by engaging civil society and parliament. Though this was requested to tackle the violence clashes that occurred during the Letpadaung copper mine protest, it is also aimed at tackling communal conflict. Several analysts have also suggested the importance of improving riot-control training and equipment for police to make them more effective and trusted in controlling violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>India contributed USD 1 million for construction of 10 schools in four townships in Rakhine State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Nippon Foundation donated $6 million to build 20 primary schools in Rakhine state. It also provided 65 tons of rice (1,300 50-kg bags) as relief supplies to Meiktila IDPs on 30 March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand Foreign minister visited Rakhine state Refugee Camp to assess aid requirements in the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The UK pledged £4.4 million (US$6.7 million) humanitarian aid package for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Rakhine State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>US Ambassador to Myanmar Derek Mitchell met with five Rakhine leaders in Yangon to discuss the state’s ongoing humanitarian crisis and an embassy statement said the US would provide US $4.2 million in emergency aid for victims of the Rakhine violence. In March, the US announced it would provide US $100,000 in aid to help residents displaced by violence in Meiktila. The aid will include hygiene kits, blankets, utensils, plastic sheeting, emergency water and sanitation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 20: Aid from Islamic nations

Kuwait
A delegation of Kuwaiti parliamentarians made an official three-day visit to Myanmar on 29 May. In early March, the Khalifa Bin Zayed Humanitarian Foundation (KZHF) distributed another 2,600 tonnes of food aid to Myanmar Muslims, completing its third and last phase of the urgent aid totalling 5,200 tonnes of relief items among 850,000 beneficiaries.

Malaysia
Malaysia urged Myanmar to take action to address communal violence in the country (1 Jul). Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah urged Myanmar to bring the perpetrators to justice in a fair and transparent manner. He also sought the agreement of Myanmar to allow the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation contact group to visit the country and be given the fullest cooperation in fulfilling its mandate.

Indonesia
January 2013, the Indonesian government planned to pledge $1 million in humanitarian aid to Rakhine state. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa visited Rakhine on 7 January. In June Indonesia announced US$1 million in aid to build three elementary school buildings in Rakhine state.

OIC
14-16 November, OIC delegation to Myanmar led by its Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu and comprised of foreign ministers from the OIC member states of Djibouti, Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. OIC has continuously called on Naypyitaw to end anti-Muslim campaigns and intends to raise the issue in the Security Council and the Human Rights Council to find a solution to religious violence against Muslims in Myanmar. OIC secretary general urged the EU to take immediate steps to help Muslim Rohingyas in Myanmar during a recent meeting with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso on 25 June and Kristalina Georgieva, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation Human Rights Aid and Crisis Responses. Ihsanoglu stressed the need to pressure the government to allow international humanitarian access to the Rohingya population in Rakhine state.

OIC Secretary General Statement: Rohingya are an indigenous people of Myanmar (10 Dec).

Qatar
Qatari Red Crescent (QRC) announced the construction of 60 residential compounds totalling 480 units to accommodate 480 families (approximately 3000 persons) in Rakhine state. These were expected to be handed to the beneficiaries during the first week of March 2013.
IV. Role of CBO (international and domestic)

Domestic civic groups make direct and indirect contributions to the current Myanmar peace process, from conducting peace campaigns to peace facilitating between government and ethnic armed organizations.

Below are a number of key CBOs involved directly in the peace process:

Peace Creation Group (PCG) was formed by Kachin businessmen in 2012 to assist ceasefire negotiations between the government and KIO. Good relations with both sides has allowed them to play an important role initially as a broker and now as a facilitator for peace talks. They have been instrumental in communicating between the two sides and managing the logistical arrangements for KIO representatives. In particular, they were involved in forming the KIO’s technical advisory team (23 Jul) responsible for undertaking necessary measures for the peace process. One of the PCG members (U Yup Zau Hkawng) travelled to Japan with UNFC leaders on 13 November, on a trip organized by the Nippon Foundation. They were also important in advising the KIO to release all Shan new recruits on 20 December after Shan CBOs and local Shan protested the KIO in Myitkyina for forcibly recruiting Shan civilians against their will. On 9 July PCG organized a meeting with civic groups and local leaders for advice on forming a technical team for peace process.

Euro Burma Office (EBO) has been a key figure in brokering peace talks between ethnic militia groups and the government. It aims to coordinate ongoing ceasefire negotiations and develop a common peace plan. Their activities are wide ranging from finding funds for NSAG political activities, capacity building to channelling start up funds for opening liaison offices. The organisation and its director Harn Yawnghwe are particularly influential in steering the direction of the peace process. It was previously responsible for convening a meeting of all ethnic groups involved in negotiations with the government and hosted monthly “Ethnic Coordination” meetings before the Working Group on Ethnic Coordination (WGEC) was formed in June 2012. The latter was responsible for drawing up the political framework that initiated the idea of a nationwide ceasefire agreement. The new think tank Pyidaungsu institute for peace and dialogue (PI) which it funds, is now another key player as the responsible body for drafting and advising the single text document for the NCCT.

Working Group for Ethnic Coordination (WGEC) was created in June 2012, tasked with writing up the framework for political dialogue. It was conceived by ethnic NSAGs but included representatives from CBOs (2 representatives each from youth, women and issue-based CBOs).
WGEC MEMBERS

Resource Persons CSO Ethnic States Representatives

1. U Khuensai Jaiyen (SHAN)
2. Daw Saw Mya Raza Lin (ALP)
3. Daw Shelley Seng (KWAT)
4. Lt. Gen. Tu Tu Lay (KNU)
5. Col. Khun Okkar (PNLO)
6. Dr. Shwe Khar (CNF)
7. Ko Shwe (KESAN)
8. Saw Lamon (Shan)
9. Ko Sai Sai (Burma Rivers Network)
10. Col. Perng Fa (SSPP)

youth org. reps

1. Daw Moon Nay Li (KWAT, WLB)
2. Sin Wah (KIA)
3. Naw Zipporah Poh Rasein
4. Salai Leng Hmon (ENC)
5. Kya Yi Shay (NY Forum)
6. Khu Oo Reh (KNPP)

issue based org. reps

1. Daw Zaw Mya (KIA)
2. Naw Seng (SYCB)
3. Nai Hong Sar (NMSP)

The International Peace Support Group (IPSG)

is made up of INGOs involved in capacity building initiatives to support the ethnic NSAGs negotiate a just and equitable peace. It is an informal network of 20 members that holds a coordination meeting once a month in Bangkok. These include the International Crisis Group (ICG), Centre for Humanitarian dialogue (the HD Centre), Euro-Burma Office (EBO), Fairness International, The Border Consortium (TBC), Geneva Call, Transnational Institute (TNI), Nippon Foundation, Open Society Foundations, World Bank, and Shalom. It has a small secretariat that includes EBO's Harn Yawnghwe.

Karen Unity and Peace Committee (KUPC) aims to assist the KNU in implementing and facilitating peace negotiations, as well as ensuring an active role for civil society groups, media and public participation in the peace process. It was formed by Kayin armed groups, Kayin politicians, Kayin Civic groups and Kayin Culture and Religious Groups on 8 April 2012. The KUPC held a second meeting on 20-21 Nov. 2013 in Yangon where participants agreed on 4 points to achieve peace through unity among all Kayin armed organizations including Kayin BGFs, Kayin politicians in parliament and Kayin people.

Mon State peace monitoring committee was formed on 7 June 2013 at a workshop for peace process monitoring in Mawlamyine city. The monitoring committee has 15 staff members from six groups covering 1. Political parties and MPs 2. Civic groups 3. Youth group 4. Ethnic cultural groups 5. Individuals that attended the workshop.

Others:

CBOs have been an important voice for the people, to communicate their needs to governments and NSAGs through reports, campaigns and trust building activities. They have also participated in joint-taskforces with the government (e.g. the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Multi-stakeholder group) and assisted in drawing up policies related to social, economic and environmental affairs.
V. Role of international actors

International assistance and funding for Myanmar’s peace process has been instrumental in implementation of the peace process, humanitarian aid, and brokering and mediating peace talks. International attention on Myanmar’s reforms has attracted a flurry of high level foreign visits, including the visit of former heads of states who expressed their support for the peace process: former US President Bill Clinton, former UK prime minister Tony Blair and a group of “Elders” - former US President Jimmy Carter, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. As the Myanmar government did not allocate state budget for its peace programme (except an emergency fund of 1 million kyat in 2013), foreign aid was key in enabling quick action to start and move peace negotiations with NSAGs.

However, foreign aid is also complicated by the politics of conflicting national interests which might explain why foreign actors in the peace process have not always been fully transparent about their activities, finances or assistance plans. Moreover, foreign aid has also come under criticism for putting development before political settlement which ethnic NSAGs feel works in favour of the government against their interests. In an interview with the *Irrawaddy*, KNLA’s vice commander-in-chief Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh explains his concern that the government will exploit development projects and NGOs as tools to strengthen its presence and control in ethnic communities, citing the case of Tamil rebels and the Sri Lankan government.

MPSI’s consultant Ashley South too warned that foreign donors are content to channel aid through government-controlled structures without fully understanding the political complexities of the country.

In June 2013, Speaker of the Lower House Shwe Mann raised the issue of overdependence on foreign funds for the peace process. This led to an NDSC decision to use public funds and later a President’s office request to parliament in January 2014 for 7 billion kyats (US$7.1 million) for the fiscal year beginning in April.

Most foreign aid so far has been towards humanitarian assistance and support for peace dialogue and implementation. In 2013, there was a notable increase in efforts to engage Myanmar’s military and provide training or exchange on security sector reform. Foreign military high level visits with Myanmar included China, Japan, India, Malaysia, Singapore, UK and Russia. The US also expressed a desire for further military engagement as part of its assistance for political reforms but faced strong resistance from state senators. According to OCHA’s *Humanitarian Bulletin: Myanmar* for October-November 2013, the top humanitarian donors in Myanmar are as follows:

Foreign observers
Due to ongoing distrust between the NSAG and the government, the NSAG side has been insistent on the presence of foreign observers at peace meetings. KIA's Maj. Gen. Gun Maw said on 29 May that a ceasefire agreement could be signed only if international observers from the UK and US are present at the talks. The Chinese special envoy and UN special envoy so far have been the only witnesses at the KIO's talks with the government. Japan's special envoy Sasakawa was present at UNFC peace talks, and American diplomat Erin Websterman was present at KNPP union-level peace talks in Loikaw 19 June.

Neighbouring Countries
China, as a close and powerful neighbour, continues to play a pivotal role in Myanmar's peace process. Spillover effects of the ongoing conflict and cross border crime show how the peace process has a direct impact on its own national security, and that China's stake in Myanmar is not only confined to the large economic interests it has in the country.

Three bombs that fell on the Chinese side of the border during the government offensive against the KIA at the beginning of the year, led the country to deploy its troops on its border with Myanmar, and arrange a meeting on 19 January with President U Thein Sein and Special Envoy of the Chinese Government/ Deputy Foreign Minister Fu Ying and military delegation in Yangon. On 20 January, senior officers of China's People's Liberation Army also held a first Strategic Security Consultation with Myanmar's armed forces to make joint efforts to maintain peace and stability in their border regions.

China appointed its first special envoy on Asian affairs (prioritising Myanmar) and former vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yingfan on 11 March to continue a constructive role in the peace process. His appointment was made on the same day as the first meeting of renewed talks following the government's offensive against KIA headquarters in Laiza. It is said that renewed talks were made possible only after the Chinese government's initiative, and the meeting was hosted on its soil in Ruili. China also appointed a veteran diplomat Yang Houlan as ambassador to Myanmar in March which observers believe reflects China's hopes to strengthen bilateral relations. China continues to maintain close ties with powerful NSAGs on its border, especially the UWSA and NDAA. Special envoy and ambassador also met with opposition leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and 88 generation, while the United Nationalities Alliance and NLD were invited to visit China.
According to some analysts, China intervened in the Kachin negotiations in 2013 due to fear of the “internationalization” of the Kachin issue and the potential US role along the Chinese border.

At the 11 March peace talk in Ruili, the Chinese Special Envoy directly opposed inclusion of the article on inviting international third parties in the final statement. The intervention is said to have angered the KIA and the government who refused to host any further meetings in China and did not invite the Chinese special envoy but the UN Special Envoy to attend the May talks in Myitkyina without informing China. The Chinese embassy dispatched its political counsellor instead and some Chinese officials acknowledged that China overplayed its hand in the March talks but insisted it was worthwhile so as to “deter the internationalization of the Kachin issue.” As a compromise, China stepped back to accept UN participation in the Kachin dialogue.

The high profile execution of a Myanmar PMF leader Naw Kham and three accomplices in Kunming, Yunnan province on 2 March for murdering 13 Chinese sailors on the Mekong River in 2011, is another example of how Myanmar’s rampant drug trade and ethnic conflict is directly related to China’s national security. Although the broadcasting of the execution was condemned by many in the international community as unethical, an article in the Global Times clearly explains how it was an act by the government to show how it protects its citizens overseas, “marks a step forward in China’s national security” and “has significance in terms of the relationship between the nation and its people.”

Bangladesh has seen severe spillover of insecurity from Myanmar’s ongoing conflict with growing threats of terrorism, religious tension and drug production and trade. This year it created a cabinet ministership in September to endorse a national strategy for dealing with 300,000 to 500,000 illegal Myanmar citizens in the country. Agencies in India fear the Bangladesh-Myanmar border may emerge as a new theatre of jihad in the not-too-distant future.

Other notable events include the creation of A Joint Working Group for Border Trade on 22 June and the first visit of a Myanmar naval warship to Bangladesh’s Chittagong port on 7 June.

79 Yun, Sen. "China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict", Stimson Center Issue Brief No.2, January 2014
India maintained strong military ties with Myanmar this year with Indian Defence minister A K Antony's visit on 22-23 January, joint naval exercises in March, an Indian Military delegation in July, and foreign minister Salman Khurshid's and Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne's visit in November-December, to bolster bilateral defence cooperation. These include training for better border management to “capacity-building” of the Myanmarese armed forces. India has also provided aid for the development of ethnic border areas and has tried to cooperate with the Myanmar government to tackle Indian northeast insurgents based on their side of the border.

Thailand takes a low profile in Myanmar's peace process with its main role as a hosting country for peace talks where many NSAGs and the ethnic alliance UNFC are based. Key issues between the two countries include drug trade, cross border economic partnerships, and large refugee and migrant worker populations in Thailand. This year also saw the first “Thai-Myanmar High Level Committee” chaired by Thai and Myanmar military chiefs.

ASEAN has been supportive of Myanmar's peace process through experience sharing such as a seminar in February on the Philippines’s security reform and peace process held in Yangon. C-in-C Vice-Senior General Min Aung Hlaing also met Singapore’s Minister of Defence in January and Malaysian C-in-C in July.

Other Countries

Japan has played a prominent role in Myanmar's peace process through the Nippon Foundation and as the main foreign supporter of the UNFC. Its Chairman Yohei Sasakawa was officially named Japan's special representative to help achieve ethnic reconciliation in Myanmar on 19 February 2013. The role is an upgrade from his earlier appointment in June 2012, to be Japan's “Goodwill Ambassador for Welfare of the National Races in Myanmar.” While previously his role was primarily humanitarian in nature, his new position requires him to perform special duties as a national civil servant in assisting ceasefire and peace negotiations between the Myanmar government, ethnic minorities, and the governments of other countries.

UNFC meeting with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in Tokyo on April 2, 2013
31 March-7 April 2013 United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)'s 23 member delegation led by Chairman Lt-Gen N'Ban La travelled to Japan to meet Japan’s PM, deputy PM and FM. Japan reaffirmed the important role of ethnic people in Myanmar's future and discussed
using Nippon Foundation to help Myanmar with the political dialogue, alleviating poverty and improving the people’s living standards.

Nippon Foundation signed a formal MoU with the UNFC in 2012 for the distribution of US$3 million worth of humanitarian aid. The application of funds is administered by The Greater Mekong Sub-region Agriculture and Education Development Centre (GMSAED) under Thai-Japan Education Development Foundation (TJEDF) and The Foundation. In March the Japanese government granted more than US $12 million in deals signed with non-governmental organizations in Japan and the government-affiliated Myanmar Peace Centre ($1.2 Million).

On 6 January 2014 Japan announced plans to spend US $96 million in the next five years to improve living standards and promote peace in Myanmar’s war-torn ethnic areas.

Aside from humanitarian work, Nippon Foundation also works closely with both the MPC and UNFC to host political dialogue meetings, e.g. NCCT and MPC meetings on the NCA, UNFC and ethnic political parties meeting in Chiang Mai, 22 November (co-organised by the MPC), 5-member delegation of the UNFC, including 3 leaders to Yangon from 23 to 26 November, at the invitation of Union Minister Aung Min.

Nippon Foundation has also been an observer at several peace meetings e.g. between the UNFC and UPWC on 20 February.

Table 21: Breakdown of Projects from FY2012 (1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
<th>Launched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide emergency food and medical support to internally displaced people</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Implement medical services for residents of remote areas (mobile clinic)</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Distribute prosthetic limbs for residents of isolated areas</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>January 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Establish a prosthetist/orthotists training centre</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>January 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Distribute traditional medicine boxes</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Support a medical clinic on the Thailand-Myanmar border</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Support fundraising activities of the medical clinic on the Thailand-Myanmar border</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>November 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Offer training on cultivation of medicinal plants</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>January 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Donate used welfare vehicles</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>Vehicles arrived in Yangon in September 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support for the disabled

10. Offer leadership training and establish self-help groups for the disabled | 73,300 | Ongoing |
11. Prepare for the holding of an international arts festival for the disabled | 30,000 | Ongoing |

Support for the disabled

12. Offer leadership training and establish self-help groups for the disabled | 73,300 | Ongoing |
13. Prepare for the holding of an international arts festival for the disabled | 30,000 | Ongoing |

12 Assist the Institute on Disability and Public Policy 100,000 2013
13 Establish an international network to provide secondary education for the disabled in the ASEAN region
14 Support tertiary education for the visually impaired 100,000 2013
15 Build an educational centre for children with disabilities 1,800,000 2013

Education
16 Assist school construction to provide regional development and agricultural instruction (Shan state) 700,000 Ongoing
17 Construct schools and put in place facilities for health and sanitation education (Rakhine state) 5,000,000 Ongoing
18 Regional development through school construction and (Ayeyarwady state) Planning 2013
19 Hold an international workshop to educate female leaders 25,000 Preparation stage

Training for public officials
20 Train public officials 156,000 Ongoing
21 Invite Myanmar members of Parliament to visit Japan to study its political system 116,000 Ongoing
22 Support the chairing of the ASEAN Summit 250,000 Ongoing
23 Offer training of state government officials 1,500,000 2013

Other
24 Dispatch skilled volunteers Planning Preparation stage
25 5th ASEAN Traditional Medicine Conference 200,000 September 2013

Table 22: Total Amount of Rice and Medicine Delivered (As of 31 October 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>(A) Budget (US$)</th>
<th>(B) Amount delivered (US$)</th>
<th>(B)/(A) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>2,676,037</td>
<td>1,245,302</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine for clinics</td>
<td>633,829</td>
<td>134,423</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,309,866</td>
<td>1,379,725</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Region</th>
<th>NSAGs Area</th>
<th>Rice Budget (kg)</th>
<th>Medicine Amount Delivered to Date (kg)</th>
<th>Medicine Budget Units</th>
<th>Medicine Amount Delivered (units)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shan State</td>
<td>1 SSPP/SSA</td>
<td>478,625</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 RCSS/SSA</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>303,120</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 PNLO</td>
<td>98,915</td>
<td>69,990</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 LDU</td>
<td>47,089</td>
<td>8,190</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 PSLF/TNLA</td>
<td>336,352</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 WNO</td>
<td>109,873</td>
<td>19,125</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayah State</td>
<td>7 KNPP</td>
<td>344,656</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayin State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanintharyi Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 KNU</td>
<td>1,106,185</td>
<td>936,920</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 DKBA</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 KNLA PC</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 NMSP</td>
<td>338,915</td>
<td>252,810</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 KPDF (KNDF)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bago Region</td>
<td>13 KNLA Kon-phe</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakhine State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 ALP</td>
<td>103,898</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 ANC</td>
<td>239,407</td>
<td>75,225</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin State</td>
<td>16 CNF</td>
<td>209,312</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagaing Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 NSCN-K</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachin State</td>
<td>18 KIO</td>
<td>2,116,109</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6,174,337</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,557,380</strong></td>
<td><strong>423</strong></td>
<td><strong>88</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to aid efforts, Japan too boosted military relations when the Japanese Ambassador, accompanied by Japanese Military Attache to Myanmar met Myanmar's C-in-C on 14 August.

President Thein Sein visited Japan, 15 December.

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87日本—緬甸高峰會，日本外務省，2013年12月15日。
The Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG) was set up in June 2012 by the Government of Norway at the request of President U Thein Sein in order to provide a common platform for dialogue between the donor community and the Government of Myanmar, and to better coordinate the international community's support of peace in general and the provision of aid in conflict-affected areas. The grouping is very loose and is not a pooled fund, but rather a mechanism for donors to communicate and coordinate their aid. Different donors are free to fund or assist projects independently, and in accordance to their own national agendas.

The Government of Myanmar asked that the Group be initially composed of Norway, Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank. The US, Japan and Switzerland were invited to join the PDSG in May 2013.

### Table 24: MPSI projects in Myanmar, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Kyauk Kyi pilot</td>
<td>Kroeng Batoi Pilot</td>
<td>Dawei and Palaw Pilot</td>
<td>Mon Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Ker der village tract, eastern Bago region</td>
<td>Kroeng Batoi area, Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region</td>
<td>Two small locations south of Myitta and east of Palaw in Tanintharyi Region</td>
<td>Thaton, Mawlamyaine and Dawei Districts in Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>AusAid, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Committee of Internally Displaced Karen People, with NPA support</td>
<td>KBPPWG (consortium of Mon CBOs) with NPA and ILO support</td>
<td>Taninthayi Karen Peace Support Initiative (consortium of key stakeholders in Taninthayi including CIDKP, KDN, the Catholic Church and the Baptist Church with NPA support)</td>
<td>Mon National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>85,675</td>
<td>266,260</td>
<td>136,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detail</td>
<td>Provides assistance to internally displaced communities in an area previously inaccessible from inside Myanmar due to conflict.</td>
<td>Support the rehabilitation of infrastructure and services in the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector, plus civic mobilization and women's empowerment trainings.</td>
<td>Helps 1153 conflict-affected individuals rebuild and rehabilitate their lives, peace and conflict sensitivity training</td>
<td>Protects and promotes Mon language and culture through raising public awareness of need for Mon Education policy and informing development of Mon education policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 18: MPSI projects in Myanmar

6. Trust Building for Peace Conference Shan and Kayah State

Mr

82 Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process
**Project**

**New Mon State**

**Party**

**Consultations Process**

- Trust building for Peace Conference - Kayah and Shan States
- Karen Consultations Process
- Karenni National Progressive Party Consultations
- Chin Consultations & IT for Chin Schools

**Area**

- Mon populated areas in Mon State and adjacent parts of Karen State and Tanintharyi Region
- Lashio city, Shan State
- KNU districts in Bago Region, Kayin State, Mon State and Taninthayi Region
- Kayah (Karenni) State
- Chin State
- Chin communities in other areas.

**Project Begin**

- Jun 2012 - Jul 2013
- Dec 2012 - May 2013
- Feb 2013 - Nov 2012 - Jan 2013
- Apr 2013 - Mar 2014

**Donor**

- Ministry for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands & Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and British Embassy
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Partner**

- NMSP, with NPA support
- Working committee for Peace, Shan and Kayah state, with Norway Peace Aid
- KNPP, with NPA support
- Chin National Front

**Amount**

- 190,925
- 71,000
- 13,329
- 43,405
- 831,630

**Detail**

- Promotes greater mutual understanding and cooperation regarding the peace process amongst NMSP, Mon communities, civil society organizations and political parties through a series of consultations.
- Enabled leaders and members of ethnic nationalities, political parties and ceasefire armed groups in Shan State and Kayah State to come together, share opinions and build mutual trust and understanding.
- Facilitates consultations among KNU, CIDKP and representatives from the townships within the KNU districts about the changes occurring from before the ceasefire until now.
- Opens a dialogue between KNPP and the general public about the current political situation and initial ceasefire agreement and to establish an implementation system for community-based ceasefire and local human rights monitoring.
- Implements two specific clauses in the ceasefire agreement between CNF and government.
  - 1. Facilitates a series of consultations between CNF and Chin communities and a Chin national conference ($179,000)
  - 2. Provides Internet connections and computer centres to 30 Chin High Schools in collaboration with the Chin state government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Chin State          | Ceasefire Liaison Offices Stage 1 | ALP Capacity Support | Identity Card Programme  
Ethnic Peace Resource Programme Stage 1  
All ceasefire areas of Rakhine, India, the Philippines, Kayin, Kayah, Mon and southern Shan States, and Tanintharyi and eastern Bago Regions  
All ethnic communities  
Project Begin  
Feb 2013 Sep 2012 - on-going  
Jul 2012 Apr 2013 - Sep 2013  
Donor Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AusAid, SDC and EuropeAid  
Partner Fafo Research Foundation  
Euro-Burma Office  
Norwegian Refugee Council in conjunction with the ministry of immigration and population  
Amount 525,000 30,000 1,992,000 236,000  
Detail Supports scoping and discussions on a peace and development survey that involve cooperation between the CNF and the Chin State Government  
Preliminary field trip conducted by Fafo Research Foundation  
Supports NSAGs to establish liaison offices and includes an initial training of liaison officers in responsibilities and approaches  
Implemented by Euro-Burma Office  
Strengthens the capacity of Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) to engage in the peace process  
Issuing of Citizenship Scrutiny Cards to remote and conflict-affected communities, who currently lack ID cards in areas determined by agreement between government, NSAGs and communities. ID cards issued by the ministry of immigration  
Develops a web-based resource platform and a series of workshops and seminars for ethnic leaders and in communities around 11 liaison offices in Karen, Mon, Kayah, Chin, Rakhine, Shan and Kachin with expansion to cover others in stage 2.
Project: Chin Development Agency Karen Districts

Information-sharing and planning for community development

Shan Media Training

Area:
- Ten villages in Shadaw township, Kayah state
- KNU districts in Bago region, Kayin state, Mon state and Taninthayi region
- All townships in Shan state

Project Begin:
- Sep 2013 - Jun 2014
- Feb 2013 - Jun 2013

Donor:
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Partner:
- Karen Rural Social Development Committee for internally displaced Karen people
- RCSS Peace Committee

Amount:
- 79,000
- 13,329
- 37,339

Details:
- Supports returning IDPs in a remote and difficult to access area to recover traditional land and livelihoods, and to empower local people.
- Approved at the local and state level and by the KNPP.
- Facilitates consultations among KNU, CIDKP and representatives from the townships within the KNU districts on community development needs and opportunities under the ceasefire.
- Facilitates a series of basic trainings on media reporting standards for people of the various townships in Shan state.

Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), established in January 2012 to act as the PDSG's secretariat, is also part of the Norwegian-led international initiative to support the ceasefires in Myanmar by facilitating and coordinating humanitarian, development and peace building assistance. In parallel with the continued political efforts, it provides communities in ceasefire areas with the needed assistance in order to recover from conflict and build momentum for peace on the ground - otherwise known as "Peace dividends". Between 2012-2013 the MPSI has initiated 17 projects for war affected populations worth US$2 million and all are owned and run by their respective communities. MPSI maintains good relations with both the MPC and NSAGs, and ensures an agreement from both sides before beginning projects in ethnic areas.

MPSI was conceived as a short term initiative with part time staff during the early stages of the peace process until more systematic support was put in place. After running for two years, the MPSI will be phased out in April 2014 according to MPSI consultant Ashley South. Its work will be taken over by the PDSG members themselves and run by local stakeholders. The rapid implementation of the MPSI brought heavy criticisms, especially from Thai-based civil society groups. Many criticised it for being very close to the government affiliated MPC and focused only on government demands. The implementation of development projects and humanitarian aid prior to reaching political settlement led many to believe the MPSI was trying to "buy peace".

Australia has been active in improving diplomatic ties with Myanmar, in which assistance for peace and improving governance are included in its aid program. In 2012/13 Expenditure

was $64.2 million and 2013/14 Proposed Expenditure was $78.8 million. This includes Humanitarian assistance to Rakhine, Shan and Kachin state, recovery efforts for IDP in Kayin state, demining and peace and reconciliation efforts. This year also saw several high level visits between the two countries, with the Governor-General of Commonwealth of Australia Quentin Bryce to Naypyitaw in November and foreign minister Bob Carr in July.

European Union

The European Union has provided assistance to Myanmar's transition since the country began reforms in 2011 through support to civil society, the Myanmar Peace Centre (primary donor for running costs) and to the reform of the police service. For 2012-2013 budget, the EU provided €10 Million for police skill upgrade, €16 million Peacebuilding and €20 million Humanitarian aid. In addition to these direct activities related to peace, overall efforts for economic development, improving governance, legal structures etc. are all important in supporting the effectiveness of peace process and implementation. EU and Union Election Commission also gave voter education in Taunggyi, Shan State in November.

To seek closer cooperation with Myanmar, for the common benefit for the two states and for the region, The Union of Myanmar and the European Union signed a Partnership Framework Agreement in July 2011. A Partnership Framework Agreement is an agreement between the Union of Myanmar and the European Union on the general basis of their cooperation. A Partnership Framework Agreement sets the framework for the development and implementation of cooperation programmes and projects under funding instruments. It sets out the overall guidance and principles for the cooperation. The Agreement is envisaged to last for five years.

To implement the Partnership Framework Agreement, the European Union initiated the EU-Myanmar Task Force - a new form of European diplomacy to enhance the EU's engagement with countries in transition through the mobilization of all EU assets and working with both public and private sectors. The first EU-Myanmar Task Force took place between 13-15 November in Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar.

It was comprised of several high-level events; providing a forum for debate on the progress made and challenges faced by Myanmar, the economic opportunities, as well as on the EU's contribution. The Task Force brings together leading political, development and economic figures from both sides as well as civil society groups and NGOs to discuss Myanmar's ongoing social, political and economic transition, including facilitating and delivering comprehensive EU support at all levels.

Norway

Norway has played a leading role in the peace process as the initiator of the PDSG and its secretariat MPSI. It maintains close ties with the government as demonstrated by several high level visits in 2013. President U Thein Sein visited Oslo (February), Norwegian ministers visited Myanmar (April) and Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Torgeir Larsen visited Myanmar (May).

Switzerland

Switzerland announced it planned to donate 35 million Swiss francs yearly for 5 years development and general peace support by 2017 (4 Sept). Swiss Agency (SCD) discussed healthcare support of 10 to 30 million USD in Tanintharyi, Kayin and Mon for the upcoming budget year (24 Jun). Swiss Upper House Speaker Fillippo Lombardi also met with Myanmar's Vice President Nyan Tun in Naypyitaw to discuss possible Swiss investments in Myanmar in early May.

USA

USA's role in the peace process has been relatively quiet. Though it has a "United States-Burma Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity" program and a US special representative for Burma W. Patrick Murphy, its activities are largely unknown. The US ambassador however was reported to have met several NSAG and opposition representatives regarding peace related issues e.g. visiting 88 generation office (10 Jan. 2014), KIA's Gun Maw (19 Nov), 89 Council of the European Union. Press Release: 3286th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 16 December 2013, p12.

90 The Voice Weekly, issued on 6 Nov.
91 EU-Myanmar Taskforce website: http://www.myanmar-eutaskforce.com/
Kayin and Mon leaders in their states (24 Jan. 2013). He also made several trips to Rakhine state and areas affected by communal violence. The USA's main activities related to the peace process include supporting activities/organisations that promote general democratic and humanitarian assistance. Last year the US also sought to support military engagement with Myanmar as a way of encouraging further political reforms.

93 In January, Myanmar's armed forces participated for the first time as an observer of a United States-led military exercise in Thailand known as "Cobra Gold", and in September reports revealed the Obama administration's desire to restart U.S. defence training, which was met with resistance by lawmakers.

94 UK President Thein Sein visited the UK in mid-July 2013 where Prime Minister Cameron offered military training to Myanmar and official assistance for the peace process. It has also offered expert assistance with regard to the Rohingya Muslims and trainings in international best practices. A UPWC delegation led by Aung Min also visited the UK in April on a trip to meet Foreign Secretary William Hague and others. British house speaker visited Myanmar in August and Foreign Affairs Minister Wanna Maung Lwin also travelled to the UK to meet his counterpart in February.

The UK, like many other countries, developed closer ties with the Myanmar military in 2013. The Chief of the British armed forces Gen. Sir David Richards visited Myanmar in early June; it announced it would appoint a permanent defence attache at its mission later in the year, and provided an 11-day training course to the Myanmar military focusing on security sector reform in January 2014 (which was criticised by rights groups).

In July 2013, Development Secretary Justine Greening said the Department for International Development has committed a further £29.15 million in UK Aid to Myanmar as part of a support to ongoing reforms (£10m for the 2014 Census, £13.5m for victims of conflict and humanitarian programme in Kachin, £0.75m to support Burma's implementation of the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), £4.9m for the Burma Business Innovation Facility).

UN The UN has several different bodies involved in the peace process. Its special envoy Vijay Nambiar has played an important role as a witness at negotiations with the KIO and an interlocutor between NSAG leaders, the vice president, Commander in Chief and other political and community leaders. OCHA has been providing humanitarian aid in conflict areas, but became embroiled in religious tensions in Rakhine state after being accused of favouring Muslims IDPs. The UN Human rights envoy was also attacked by angry mobs during his visit to Meiktila for the same reasons. UNODC is working with the government and NSAGs to tackle drug production in the country but has yet to see positive results.
VI. Factors Determining Peace Process Developments

How the peace process will develop over the coming year will depend on a variety of factors, some of which are identified below. These will answer the crucial questions of how to end armed clashes, how to settle the political demands of both sides, and how to sustain positive developments in the peace process.

1. Making agreements binding
   The biggest concern for NSAGs is how the nationwide ceasefire will be binding and properly implemented. To date ceasefire violations continue and groups like the RCSS have complained that some of their agreements with the government are merely a piece of paper. Ensuring that peace agreements are binding will depend largely on how solid the mechanisms are in the ceasefire agreement to ensure all sides keep to their promises.

2. Involvement of the military
   The inability of a Presidential order for a unilateral ceasefire to stop military offensives in Laiza in early 2013 raised concerns not only about the power of government to control the military, but the relevance of peace agreements without military involvement. Moreover, NSAGs have consistently complained that military actions contradict and refuse to uphold terms signed in the ceasefire. What role the military plays in each stage of the peace process will also determine the success of the ceasefire agreement to end fighting.

3. Code of conduct
   An important reason for ongoing ceasefire violations and clashes despite peace agreements is the unclear territorial demarcations especially in areas where multiple armed groups overlap. Deciding how to allocate active and control areas will pose a major challenge in writing the code of conduct.

4. Resolving persistent distrust
   Rumours persist that the Myanmar military's true intention is to wipe out ethnic NSAGs to gain control of all frontier territories (e.g. 2 May 2013 Defence analyst Aung Kyaw Zaw claims to have obtained a leaked military document that proves this). Due to the reportedly unchanged aggressive attitude of the military against NSAGs and ceasefire violations, many continue to believe the government's political talks are merely a front or disguise. Meanwhile the government argues NSAGs provoke attacks due to ongoing illegal activities that require action by security forces.

5. Involvement of parliament
   The monopolisation of the Peace process by Aung Min and MPC has raised questions about how he will implement or grant the political demands and settlement without the power to change laws. In the last year, the role of parliament in the peace process has been given more attention, but it is not clear exactly how and in what way it will be involved.

6. Resolving political issues
   Many grievances that drive conflict have yet to be fully identified and addressed.

7. Communal conflict - high levels of tension
   Religious tension still runs high in Myanmar and many have criticised the government for not doing enough to tackle the problem. Increasing threats of terrorism and insecurity may threaten or delay the positive reforms and developments of the peace process.

8. Internal politics within government and among NSAGs
   Rumours of power politics behind who controls the peace process may also lead to unexpected shifts or changes in the people currently leading the negotiations. For example, Aung Min's four attempts to resign from his position as chief negotiator is seen by some to be signs of tension behind the scenes. On the NSAG side there are also conflicts between soft-line and hard-line camps.
Ongoing reforms

The successful implementation of ceasefire terms and creating the new political settlement that comes out of the peace talks, is also highly dependent on the effectiveness of government. Overall national reforms to address rule of law, transparency, corruption, military professionalism will therefore influence developments in the peace process. Political, constitutional, military, economic and social reforms will also change the background in which negotiations and decisions are made.

National census

Results of the national census will likely have a large impact on ethnic nationality policy; these may lead to more disputes or help to address ethnic grievances.
VII. Profiles

NSAGs, NCCT and Myanmar peace stakeholders

[Page content not visible]
Arakan Army

SUMMARY

Founded: 2008
Headquarters: HQ (temporary) in KIA controlled areas
Operational Area: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) controlled area
Estimated Strength: 1,200+
Leader: Brig. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing (commander-in-chief)
Col. Dr. Nyo Twan Awng (second-in-command)
CEC member: Lt. Col. Kyaw Han (AA representative in NCCT)

The Arakan Army (AA) was founded to protect the Rakhine people, and to establish peace, justice, freedom and development. The AA has fought alongside the KIA since the conflict with the government army resumed on June 9, 2011. More than half their troops have been trained by the KIA.

1. Self-determination for the multi-ethnic Rakhine population.
2. Safeguard national identity and cultural heritage.
3. Promote national dignity and Rakhine interests.

Peace Process

Official ceasefire

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<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>AA rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ethnic cooperation</td>
<td>1 UNFC -</td>
<td>NCCT Member</td>
<td>Laiza ethnic conference 1 Attendee Signed agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Law khee lar ethnic conference 2 Attendee Signed agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Military allies</td>
<td>KIA</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Meetings with other groups</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>National conferences</td>
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<td>Plan to attend Rakhine National Conference</td>
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</table>

| | Partnerships | | | |
| | Observers at meetings | | | |

| | Liaison officers | | | |
| | | | | |
All Burma Students' Democratic Front
http://absdf8888.org/profile/

SUMMARY
Founded: 1 Nov. 1988
Headquarters: KNU controlled area
Operational Area: KIA and KNU controlled areas
Estimated strength: 600+ (about 200 in Kachin state)

CEC members: U Than Khe (Chairperson)
U Myo Win (Vice-Chairperson)
U Sonny Mahindra (General Secretary)

The ABSDF is a student army that was formed after the 1988 uprisings. Their objective is to fight for democracy and human rights in Myanmar alongside other democratic and ethnic nationality forces.

They have 7 camps along the Myanmar-Thailand border, 3 camps along the Myanmar-India border and 3 camps on the Myanmar-China border. The ABSDF also has foreign branches in the US and Australia.

Aims of peace talks:
1. Peace and national reconciliation
2. Establishing all inclusive participation in political talks
3. Establishing the constitution which grants Democracy, Human Rights, Equality and Self administration in Democratic Transition

Aims of studies (observation) trip:
1. To study the political transition led by president Thein Sein
2. To collect opinions for future politics of ABSDF
3. To meet former ABSDF members and family members

The government has requested the ABSDF to set up a political party.

Peace Process

New Ceasefire: 5 Aug. 2013
14th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government

Post-Ceasefire Clashes: unknown

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### Official delegations

**Location**

1. Myawaddy
2. Muse
3. Loikaw

Proposed: Kalay, Payathonsu and Myeik

### Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>ABSDF rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17/01/2012</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Thailand</td>
<td>Vice-chairman Myo Win</td>
<td>U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>ABSDF presented a 'peace talk' paper that defined their position. They accepted the government's peace offer as a constructive first step and are ready to talk if they are allocated equal rights. The government sent a formal letter offering to engage in peace talks with the ABSDF on Jan. 10, 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/02/2012</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Thailand</td>
<td>Vice-chairman Myo Win</td>
<td>Major Saw Khin Soe (representing Aung Thaung)</td>
<td>No agreement was made, but both sides agreed to meet again for further negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/11/2012</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>Chairman Than Khe, General secretary Myo Win and 4 others</td>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>Both parties agreed on two points: (1) allow an ABSDF delegation to safely conduct a series of studies on the conditions in Myanmar (2) to continue political dialogue with the government. Hla Maung Shwe, Nyo Ohn Myint were present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 18-24/12/2012 | Naypyidaw and MPC Yangon | Chairman Than Khe, Secretary Sonny Mahindra and 7 others | U Aung Min and MPC members | An ABSDF delegation organized a study trip to better understand the government's development and implementation of the 94 | Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process
During the trip, they consulted 88 Generation Student Group leaders, SNLD leader Khun Htun Oo and other ethnic political party leaders. The ABSDF delegation also met with their respective families.

ABSDF reaffirmed the importance of peace and implementation; both sides discussed the continuation of peace talks. Representatives from Northern region did not turn up as they were not provided gov't assistance or security.

ABSDF- 24 from CEC, 5 from northern and 5 from India.

12 point Union Level agreement

Informal meeting

Discussed terms signed at union level talks.
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<th>Ethnic cooperation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 UNFC -</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 NCCT Observer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Laiza ethnic conference 1 Observer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Law khee lar ethnic conference 2 Observer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Meetings with other groups</td>
<td>12/2012 NLD, SNLD, UNA, 88 generation student group</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Meeting with foreign actors</td>
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<td>8 National conferences</td>
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<td>9 Partnerships</td>
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<td>10 Observers at meetings</td>
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</tbody>
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**Developments**

| 1 Panglong agreement and spirit |  |
| 2 Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire |  |
| 3 Code of Conduct: control area |  |
| 4 Monitoring: crisis mediating body |  |
| 5 Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body |  |
| 6 Military relations |  |
| 7 Observers |  |
| 8 Public consultation | V ABSDF delegations met with parents of fallen students in the battles, delivered honorable certificates to the parents of fallen students. |  |
| 9 To have rights to engage with news agencies freely and independently. |  |
9 Legalisation
  To hold continued discussions on the removal of ABSDF members from the blacklist and the cancellation of the charged members in accordance with the law.

10 Release political prisoners
  To carry out continued discussions and scrutinizing to release remaining political prisoners scrutinizing committee for the release of all political prisoners.

11 Human Rights
12 Ethnic Rights
13 National day Resettlement
14 ID card
15 Resettlement plans
16 Demining

17 Economic
  Rights to liaise with local and foreign based NGOs and CBOs in line with the existing laws.

18 NSAG company
19 SEZ/SIZ
20 Development projects
21 Development: Tourism
22 Development: Internet
23 Car licenses
  20 cars for tax free and 40 car licenses with preferential tax rates

24 Social Media
25 Ethnic language in primary school
26 others

27 Drug eradication

28 Environment
  EIA

A= Term sign in peace agreements; D= Demand; ^= started; V = Achieved; X = Failing
Statements

10 Aug 2013 - UPWC and ABSDF signed 12 points Union Level peace agreement (Eng)
10 Aug 2013 - UPWC and ABSDF signed 12 points Union Level peace agreement (Bur)
05 Aug 2013 - 4 points agreement ABSDF and UPWC
30 Jul 2013 - ABSDF's statement on peace talks
07 Jan 2013 - War conflict in Kachin state
07 Jan 2013 - Requesting Buddhist monk
03 Jan 2013 - Press conference in Yangon

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Arakan Liberation Party

Armed wing: Arakan Liberation Army (ALA)

Government name: Rakhine State Liberation Party (RSLP)

http://arakanalp.com/

UNFC member (under ANC)

NCCT member (under ANC)

SUMMARY


Headquarters: HQ in Indian border

Operational Area: Northern Rakhine and Karen states

Estimated strength: 60-100, (2000 party members)

Leader: U Khine Ray Khine (Chairperson)

U Khine Soe Naing Aung (Vice-chairperson)

U Khine Thu Kha (Secretary)

The Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) is advocating freedom and ethnic rights for Rakhine people in Myanmar. Its headquarters based on the Indian border near Rakhine State. The ALP's armed wing, the Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), have fought against the Myanmar army near the Indo-Myanmar and Thai-Myanmar border.

ALP/ALA has 4 military camps: battalion no. 9 (Bangladesh border), Danyawaddy battalion and Arakan Ranger (India border), Yamarwaddy battalion (Karen state).

ALP Branch: Maesot (Thailand), Dhaka (Bangladesh), New Delhi and Guwahati (India), Malaysia branch and USA branch.
CEC members: U Khine Ray Khine
U Khine Soe Naing Aung
U Khine Thu Kha
U Khine Tun Lin
Daw Saw Mra Raza Lin

Military Affairs:
C-in-C: Khine Ray Khine
Lt. Col. Khine Soe Naing
Maj. Khine Myo Win
Maj. Khine Bone Myint Zaw (Yamarwaddy battalion commander)

* Daw Saw Mra Raza Lin is a NCCT member

Peace Process
New ceasefire 5 April 2012
11th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government

Stage 1: State level peace talks
Clash#: None

Official delegation team

Liaison offices
1. Quoted from Dr. Han Min Htun, 2010
2. Aung San Suu Kyi, 2010
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meetings Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-5/04/2012</td>
<td>Sittwe, Rakhine</td>
<td>ALP rep: U Khaing Soe Naing Aung, and ALP Joint Secretary Khine Thukha, Rakhine State Minister of Security and Border Affairs, Colonel Htein Lin. Discussed state level ceasefire agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/06/2012</td>
<td>Sittwe, Rakhine</td>
<td>Khine Thu Kha Rakhine state government officials discussed peace efforts, communal violence and opening a liaison office in Rakhine state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/09/2013</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>ALP U Aung Min, U Khin Yi MPC-13 representatives held an informal meeting. MPC technical team also attended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/11/2013</td>
<td>MPC, Yangon</td>
<td>ALP/ABSDF U Aung Min held an informal meeting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic cooperation:
- 1 UNFC Member
- 2 NCCT Member
- 3 Laiza ethnic conference attendee signed agreement
- 4 Law khee lar ethnic conference attendee signed agreement
- 5 Military allies
- 6 Meetings with other groups
- 7 Meeting with foreign actors

National conferences
- 8 National conferences planned to be held

Partnerships
- 9 Partnerships

Observers at meetings
- 10 Observers at meetings

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<td>Code of Conduct: control area</td>
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<td>Monitoring: crisis mediating body</td>
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<td>Ethnic Rights</td>
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<td>National day</td>
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<td>Resettlement</td>
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<td>ID card</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>Drugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- A = Term sign in peace agreements
- D = Demand
- ^= Started
- V = Achieved

Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process
SUMMARY
Founded: 2010
Headquarters: HQ in DKBA-controlled area
Operational Area: Karen state
Estimated strength: 30
Leader: Maj. Moe Hein aka Khine Zan Wai

The Arakan Army (AA) was founded to protect the Rakhine people, establish peace, justice, freedom and promote development. In the past, the AA worked alongside the DKBA. As an observer, AA representatives attended the second conference of EAOs held in Law Khee Ler in Karen state on Jan 20-25, 2014.

Aims:
1. To gain self-determination for multi-ethnic Rakhine
2. To safeguard national identity and cultural heritage
3. To promote national dignity and related interests

Peace Process
Non-ceasefire

Official delegation team
None

Liaison offices
None

Contact: aa.arakanarmy@gmail.com
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Arakan-Army/318576794899066

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Ethnic cooperation

- UNFC
- NCCT
- Laiza ethnic conference
- Law khee lar ethnic conference
- Military allies
- Meetings with other groups
- Meetings with foreign actors
- National conferences
- Partnerships
- Observers at meetings

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Chin National Front

**SUMMARY**

**Founded:** 20 March 1988
**Headquarters:** Thantlang, Chin State (Camp Victoria)
**Operational Area:** Thantlang Township, Tlangpi village tract, Dawn village tract and Zang Tlang village tract
**Estimated strength:** 200+
**Leader:** Pu Zing Cung

The CNF was formed to achieve self-determination of ethnic people in Myanmar. They are based along the Indo-Myanmar border and other locations inside Chin state. At least 70 CNA soldiers were killed during fighting with the Myanmar military between 1988 and 2012. After 2003, fighting with government troops stopped. The CNF (like most of the ethnic armed groups) oppose the 2008 Constitution.

**CEC Members:** Joint General Secretary Dr. Sui Khar (Shwe Khar)

The Supreme Council that guides the CNF central committee was established in December 2011 and formed with 1 representative from each of the 9 townships, 1 representative each from Kuki, Lushine and Asho Chin tribes, CNF members, 3 patrons, 1 intellectual, 1 woman representative, 1 general secretary, and 3 joint general secretaries.

**Supreme Council:**
1. Dr. Zalay Htan (chairman 2012)
2. Pu Liang Oak (chairman 2013)
3. Pu Salai Kapkho Liang (chairman 2014)

**CNF Chairman of the fourth-term Conference Pu Zing Cung**
Peace Process


New assistance scheme to help achieve peace and genuine

Stage 2: Union level peace talks (7 May 2012)

# Post-Ceasefire Clashes: None

Official delegation team

Chin Peace and Tranquility

Committee 24-31 August 2012

Twenty committee members were selected from the Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, Supreme Council members and CNA leaders.

Leaders: Supreme Council Chairman Pu Za Hlei Thang and Secretary General Pu Zing Cung

Liaison offices

1. Teddim (25/09/2012)
2. Thantlang (29/06/2012)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>CNF Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19/11/2011</td>
<td>Mae Sai, Thailand</td>
<td>Dr. Sui Khar and Pu Zing Cung</td>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>Preliminary discussions, informal ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/01/2012</td>
<td>Hakha, Chin state</td>
<td>Joint Gen-Sec Dr. Sui Khar, 10-member delegation</td>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>State level: 9-point ceasefire agreement signed. Members of the govt delegation included: Forestry Minister Win Tun, State level peace and stability committee members and Chin state Security and Border Affairs Minister Colonel Zaw Min Oo, Strategic Command Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ko Ko Gyi and 5 state govt cabinet members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05/2012</td>
<td>Hakha, Chin state</td>
<td>Dr Sui Khar Aung Min</td>
<td>Union level: 15-point peace agreement signed. These included travel restrictions lifted for CNF members in Myanmar and travel visas allowed for resettled Chin. Other participants included: MPSI Consultant Ashley South, Executive Director of Chin Human Rights Organization Salai Bawi Lian Mang.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15-point peace agreement signed. Other participants included: MPSI Consultant Ashley South, Executive Director of Chin Human Rights Organization Salai Bawi Lian Mang.

Secretary Pu Zing Cung and Sec-Gen Dr. Sui Khar and other leaders

2nd Union level meeting: 28-point agreement signed. An agreement to form an independent commission on human rights abuses in Chin state was decided. Govt participants included: U Tin Maung Than, U Hla Maung Shwe, U Kyaw Soe Hlaing, Dr. Min Zaw Oo, Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, U Thihan Myo Ngunt, U Aung Naing Oo, U Ne Myo Naing, Colonel Chit Ko Ko and U Tin Aung Moe.

International observers included: Kristine Gould (PACRIM Research Associates); USA, Mr. Yohei Sasakawa, (chairman of Nippon Foundation), Mr. Yiji Mori (Nippon Foundation), Ms. Suzuka Yoshida (Nippon Foundation); Japan, Charles Petrie (MPSI), Mai Chin Chin (Shalom Foundation; Yangon, Salai Bawi Lian Mang, (Executive Director of Chin Human Rights Organization); Indo-Myanmar border

4 07/12/2012 MPC, Yangon

Vice President Sai Mauk Kham

UPWC Chairman Sai Mauk Kham expected to get nationwide ceasefire in October. (1) commitment of ceasefire (2) framework from both sides negotiation for political dialogue (3) all inclusiveness in Conference (4) midterm working process negotiations is proposed by KNU- RCSS. informal meeting.

5 31/08/2013 Naypyitaw RCSS + KNU+ CNF (Gen. Mu Tuu Say Phoe, Maj. Htoo Htoo Lay, Maj. Sai La and Maj. Sai Mein from RCSS)

UPWC Chairman Sai Mauk Kham
Ethnic cooperation

1. UNFC Member
2. NCCT Member
3. Laiza ethnic conference Attendee Signed agreement
4. Law Khee Lar ethnic conference Attendee Signed agreement
5. Military allies
6. Meetings with other groups
   UNA, Chin civic groups
7. Meetings with foreign actors
8. National conferences
   Chin National Congress
9. Partnerships
10. Observers at meetings

Developments

1. Panglong agreement and spirit
2. Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
3. Code of Conduct: control area
   CNF/CNA will be temporarily based out around 5 village tracts in 2 townships: Tlangpi, Dawn and Zang Tlang village tracts in Thantlang Township, and Zampi and Bukphir village tracts in Tedim Township. Other possible bases include: Kung Pin, Ra O, Shweletwa, and Ra Kan village tracts in Paletwa Township; Para and Pathiantlang, Belhar, Vanzang, Lungding, Lulpilung in village tracts in Tedim Township; Dampi, Tui Dial village tracts in Thantlang Township.
4. CNF opened Camp Victoria in Thantlang Township (January, 2013 as their new headquarters.

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1. Monitoring:
   - Crisis mediating body
   - Arbitrate any physical violence resulting from accidental nature between the CNF and Myanmar army. To be formed under the leadership of the Chin state Security and Border Affairs minister and will also involve both the CNF liaison officer and CNA leaders responsible for the areas where such incident occurs. This can also include the in-charge/commander of the CNF/CNA, commander of the Myanmar army, police force, chairman of the Chin Peace Monitoring Body or any such duly authorized individual.

2. Monitoring:
   - Ceasefire monitoring body
   - “Ceasefire Monitoring Body” consisting primarily of the Chin Peace and Tranquility Committee but also with active participation from other legal experts.

3. Military relations
   - V agreed to allow the presence of only the Myanmar army and the CNF within Chin state.
   - CNF must obtain permission from the government before conducting military exercises.
   - A CNA refresher training course covering public relations was held on the Indo-Myanmar border on October 24, 2017.

4. Observers
   - Political consultation
   - CNF granted permission to hold public consultations regarding the peace process (20/11/2012: preliminary meeting for an upcoming CNF’s public consultation took place in Matupi, Chin state).

5. Legalisation
   - Under existing laws the CNF/CNA are still considered unlawful organizations by the Union government, both parties have agreed this will be amended at a later date once full confidence has been firmly established.
   - CNF/CNA members immune from criminal prosecution for being part of the organisation (effective after the signing of this agreement).
   - UPWC will remove the names of all individuals who have been blacklisted for being affiliated or members of CNF/CNA (effective after the signing of this agreement).

6. Official registration allowed for community-based organizations.

7. Release political prisoners
   - Both parties agreed that the UPWC team will submit a list of any individual(s) who have been arrested and imprisoned on account of CNF/CNA activities to the president’s office for immediate amnesty (effective after the signing of agreement).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Human Rights A</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ethnic Rights A</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>National day A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ID card A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Resettlement plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Demining A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>NSAG A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>SEZ/SIZ A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20 Development initiatives

Both parties will cooperate on development projects and allow for INGOs and social economic organisations (both inside and outside the country) to support development initiatives that will improve the quality of life for Chin state residents. CNF will establish committees or organizations to carry out new development initiatives in cooperation with domestic/international social economic organisations and INGOs.

An additional one billion kyat (US$1 million) budget was approved for development in Chin state at an emergency meeting of the regional parliament in Hakha, targeted at improving transportation links and government buildings across the state, as well as development projects.

17 November, he pledged to provide 100 million kyat ($100,000) for development to every township in Chin state.

21 Development: Tourism

Restrictions lifted for international tourists to travel in the state.

Chin State is likely to see a new phase of development in eco-tourism as three new places are to be transformed into visitor attractions, plans to establish tourist sites at Rih Lake, Bawipa and Zinghmuh mountains in Chin State announced (15/08/2013).

22 Development: Internet

The development of information technology and computer skills. Basic services such as water, electricity, food, security, health and education to be made available to everyone.

CNF installed 90 computers and internet in all 30 high schools in Chin state.

23 Car licenses

20 cars for tax free and 40 car licenses with preferential tax rates.

Social

24 Media

The establishment of a community radio broadcast program for promoting Chin media and culture in each of the various dialects as well as the establishment of media e.g newspapers, journals, magazines, newsletters, radio, internet and television programs.

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25. Ethnic language in primary school

26. Others: Both parties will cooperate in the development of out of state guest houses for travelling Chins (Naypyidaw, Yangon, Mandalay, Pakokku, Kalay, Sittwe, Seih Town) open schools to promote Chin culture and music.

27. Drugs: Both parties agreed to cooperate in the eradication of poppy cultivation and other illegal drug businesses, this includes smuggling operations in northern Chin state. Drug production is increasing despite the agreement.

28. Environment: Environmental impact assessments shall be conducted on all in state development projects by an independent committee of experts. Both parties agreed that the extraction of natural resources in Chin State will adhere to the points stipulated in the ceasefire agreement.

A = Term sign in peace agreements; D = Demand; ^= started; V = Achieved; X = Failing
Democratic Karen Benevolent Army

headed by Gen. Saw Lah Pwe aka. Na Kham Mwe (Commander-in-chief)
Brig. Gen. Moo Shay (Deputy commander-in-chief)

led by Gen. Saw Lah Pwe, the DKBA Brigade 5 is a breakaway faction of the original Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (now a BGF) and renamed itself the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. During the 2010 elections, Brigade 5 attacked government troops and security forces in Myawaddy, Karen state.

DKBA has Klo Htoo Baw and Klo Htoo Wah strategic commands.

CEC member: Col. Saw Kyaw Dah
Col. Saw Lont Lon
Col. Saw San Aung
Maj. Saw Tun Tun

SUMMARY
Founded: 8 Nov. 2010
Headquarters: Sonesee Myaing, Myawaddy township, Karen State
Operational Area: Three Pagodas Pass, Myine Gyi Ngu, Hlaing Bwe and Kyar-In-Seik-Gyi, Kawkareik townships, Manerplaw (former KNU headquarters)
Estimated strength: 1,500+
Leader: Gen. Saw Lah Pwe aka. Na Kham Mwe (Commander-in-chief)
Brig. Gen. Moo Shay (Deputy commander-in-chief)

IfiAWfl&dftXffJWft
NCCT member

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Peace Process

New Ceasefire: 3 Nov. 2011
3rd resistance group to sign ceasefire with government
Stage 2: Union level peace talks (11 Dec. 2011)
Post-ceasefire Clashes: 1 (2012); 4 (2013)

Official delegation teams
None

Liaison offices
1. Hpa-an city (Opened in Nov 2011)
2. Myawaddy (Opened in Nov 2011), Kyar-In-Seik-Gyi, Kyaikdon, Three Pagoda Pass, Myain Gyinngu (pending)

Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>DKBA rep.</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>26/10/2011</td>
<td>Mottama, Thaton District, Mon state</td>
<td>Brigadier General Moo Shay Thein Zaw</td>
<td></td>
<td>Preliminary meeting Maung Maung, commander of the Southeast Regional Military Command and chief ministers of Karen and Mon states were also present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>03/11/2011</td>
<td>Hpa-an, Karen state</td>
<td>Brigadier General Moo Shay Col Aung Lwin</td>
<td></td>
<td>State level 5 point ceasefire agreement signed, both sides represented by 4 member delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11/12/2011</td>
<td>Hpa-an, Karen state</td>
<td>Saw Lah Pwe, 6 member delegation</td>
<td>Aung Thaung, 7 member delegation</td>
<td>Union level peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22/01/2013</td>
<td>Myawaddy, Karen state</td>
<td>Saw Lah Pwe, 8 member delegation</td>
<td>Aung Min, Gen Maung Maung Ohn + 9 others</td>
<td>Agreement on 3 points: demarcation of control areas, open liaison offices, provide assistance to DKBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>04/05/2013</td>
<td>Kayin State government office in Hpa-an, Kayin State</td>
<td>Maj. Maung Lay</td>
<td>Aung Lwin</td>
<td>Discussed recent fighting between the DKBA and local BGF, however the issue was not resolved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maj. Maung Lay Aung Min discussed fighting in Myaing Gyi Ngu and ways to avoid conflict in the future. Aung Min to follow up on the matter. DKBA reconfirmed its commitment to the ceasefire agreement and suggested a liaison group be formed to mediate between the DKBA and other ceasefire groups.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic cooperation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 UNFC - 2 NCCT Member</td>
<td>3 Laiza ethnic conference</td>
<td>4 Law Khee Lar ethnic conference 2 Observer Signed agreement 5 Military allies 6 Meetings with other groups 7 Meetings with foreign actors 8 National conferences 9 Partnerships Member Karen Armed Groups Solidarity Committee (KNU, DKBA, KPC, Karen BGFs) 10 Observers at meetings 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Developments
Dialogue
1 Panglong agreement and spirit
2 Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
3 Code of Conduct: control area
4 Monitoring: crisis mediating body
5 Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body
6 Military relations
7 Observers

Political
8 Public consultation
9 Legalisation
10 Release political prisoners
11 Human Rights
12 Ethnic Rights
13 National day

Resettlement
14 ID card
15 Resettlement plans
Temporary settlement of Kalo Htoo Baw armed group at the environs of Sonesee-myaing
Settlement of members of Kalo Htoo Baw group and their families

16 Demining

Economic
17 NSAG company
18 SEZ/SIZ
19 Development projects
20 Development initiatives
Cooperate with the government in regional development, and improvement of socio-economic status in Sukali region under existing laws, based temporarily in Sonesee Myaing region

21 Development: Tourism
22 Development: Internet
23 Car licenses
V 20 cars for tax free and 40 car licenses with preferential tax rates
Drugs

Drug eradication A declared Myawaddy district as a drug-free zone on May 20, 2012. DKBA captured 2 drug dealers in Myawaddy for the first time on Feb 2, 2014.

Environment

EIA

A= Term sign in peace agreements; D= Demand; ^= started; V = Achieved

Statements

Jan 4, 2013 - DKBA statement condemning government offensives in Kachin and northern Shan states, and threatening to cancel its ceasefire agreement.
Kachin Independence Organisation

SUMMARY

Founded: 5 Feb. 1961

Headquarters: Laiza, Kachin state

Operational Area: 5 brigades across Kachin state and Northern Shan state

Estimated strength: 7,000 to 10,000 (excluding the KIO's MHH and MKM civilian militia forces)

Leader: Lanyaw Zawng Hra (Chairman and President), Lt. Gen. N'Ban La (Vice-President), Lt. Gen. Gauri Zau Seng (Vice-Chairman), Lt. Gen. Gam Shawng (Chief of Staff), Maj. Gen. Gun Maw (Vice Chief of Staff), Brig. Gen. Dr. La Ja (General Secretary), U La Nan (Joint General Secretary)

The KIO's armed wing the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is the second largest ethnic armed group in Myanmar. The KIO claims to have 10,000 troops with another 10,000 reservists in the civilian population ready to fight. The KIO generates large revenues from its rich natural resources, which has enabled them to create a powerful army and develop trade centers in several cities along the Sino-Myanmar border, e.g. Laiza, Mai Ja Yang.

A 17-year ceasefire, which for many years was the only written agreement that the government had with any armed group, ended less than 3 months after the nominally civilian government took power. The contributing factor was the KIO's refusal to join the government's BGF scheme. Construction of the Myitsone dam - that would flood large tracts of land in KIO-controlled territories - was also a major source of tension. Although the Myanmar state media started referring to the KIO as an illegal organization from 2009-2010, the ceasefire did not breakdown until government troops attacked the KIO's Sang Gang outpost on June 9, 2011.

CEC members:

- Chairman of KIO and President of Kachin Independence Council (KIC): Lanyaw Zawng Hra
- Vice-President 1: Lt. Gen. N'Ban La
- Vice-Chairman 1: Lt. Gen. Gauri Zau Seng
- Vice-Chairman 2: Lt. Gen. Gam Shawng
- Chief of Staff: Maj. Gen. Gun Maw
- General Secretary: Brig. Gen. Dr. La Ja
- Joint General Secretary: U La Nan
Peace Process
Preliminary Peace Talks
non-ceasefire
• clashes since 9 June 2011 - 2012: 2,400 clashes (KIO) 1095 clashes (government)
• 2013: >1,000 (estimate)
Previous ceasefire: 24 Feb. 1994

Official delegation team

Liaison offices
Previously, 22 liaison offices in Kachin and Shan states under the 1994 ceasefire.
All liaison offices were ordered to close in November 2010.
KIO Justice and Negotiation center
Located: Prang Ngawn village, Loijay area, Kachin State, Myanmar.
The Peace-talk Creation Group is made up of Kachin businessmen. They have been instrumental in assisting peace talks between the KIO and government by mediating between the two sides to schedule and make necessary arrangements. They occasionally provide financial assistance for meetings.

Membership includes:
- Yup Zaw Hkaung of Jadeland company
- Lamai Gum Ja
- Hkapra Khun Awng
- Nshan San Awng.

The group also has a 7-member official documentation team.

Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>KIO Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17/06/2011</td>
<td>Laiza, Kachin</td>
<td>KIO Central Committee</td>
<td>4 leaders of the Kachin National Consultative Assembly (KNCA)</td>
<td>The government offered a verbal ceasefire with the KIO but was rejected unless there was a recognition of political rights, political talks outside the country and with the presence of foreign mediators. KNCA reps: Tsum Hpawng Sin Wa, Labang Gam Awng, Ding Yau Zau In -- sent by U Thein Zaw (MP and former military general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>30/06/2011</td>
<td>Laja Yang Village, Kachin State</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Gun Maw and 4 other leaders</td>
<td>Col. Than Aung</td>
<td>Discussion about a ceasefire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Peace Creation Group

Website: http://peace-talkcreationgroup.com/
Facebook: http://facebook.com/PeaceTalkCreationGroup
Email: welcometopcg@gmail.com
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Person(s)</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01/08/2011</td>
<td>Laja Yang village, Kachin state</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Gun Maw and 4 other leaders</td>
<td>The KIO demanded that the government negotiate a nationwide ceasefire with all ethnic armed groups. The government urged the KIO to sign a ceasefire, no agreement was reached but both sides agreed to continue meeting for further discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2011</td>
<td>Ruili, China</td>
<td>Lanyaw Zawng Hra U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>Full scale delegation level talks. No agreement was reached. Other KIO reps: Col. Lahpai Zau Raw, Lt-Col. Lazing Ji Nawng, Lt-Col. Maran ZauTawng, Sumlut Gam and Lama Gum Hpan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19/01/2012</td>
<td>Ruili, China</td>
<td>Sumlut Gam and 11 other leaders U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>The government continued to urge the KIO to sign a ceasefire but no agreement was reached. KIO complained that the Myanmar military was attacking their frontline position while talks were being held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08-10/03/2012</td>
<td>Ruili, China</td>
<td>Sumlut Gam and 7 other leaders U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>No agreement reached but a joint statement was signed that tentatively agreed five points, continue political dialogue, building trust, a drawdown in troop levels, coordination of military activities in the conflict zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/06/2012</td>
<td>Maija Yang</td>
<td>Sumlut Gam and 4 other leaders U Aung Min</td>
<td>Informal Meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/06/2012</td>
<td>Maija Yang</td>
<td>Sumlut Gam and 4 other leaders U Aung Min</td>
<td>Agreed to work towards more meaningful talks in the next round and include the presence of army C-in-C Soe Win. Aung Min laid out a map detailing the government's proposal for the relocation of military bases to sites where both armies would be farther apart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>KIO Rep</td>
<td>Govt Rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/30/2012</td>
<td>Ruili, China</td>
<td>Sumlut</td>
<td>Aung Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/02/2013</td>
<td>Ruili, China</td>
<td>Sumlut</td>
<td>Aung Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/2013</td>
<td>Ruili, China</td>
<td>Sumlut</td>
<td>Aung Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/30/05/2013</td>
<td>Myitkyina, Kachin State</td>
<td>Sumlut</td>
<td>Aung Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/10/2013</td>
<td>Myitkyina</td>
<td>Sumlut</td>
<td>Aung Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/09/2013</td>
<td>Myitkyina</td>
<td>KIO</td>
<td>MPC technical team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/10/2013</td>
<td>Myitkyina</td>
<td>KIO</td>
<td>MPC technical team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic cooperation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNFC Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NCCT Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Laiza ethnic conference 1 Attendee Signed agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Law khee lar ethnic conference 2 Attendee Signed agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Military allies TNLA, AA and ABSDF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 Meetings with other groups

8 Generation Students Group leaders (06/01/2013)

7 Meetings with foreign actors

9 Cooperations

10 Observers at meetings

China, UN, Euro Burma office, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

Developments

Dialogue

1 Panglong agreement and spirit

2 Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire

3 Code of Conduct: control area

4 Monitoring: crisis mediating body

V KIO's Technical Advisory Team

5 Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring

6 Military relations

The Parties agree to undertake efforts to achieve de-escalation and cessation of hostilities continue discussions on military issues related to repositioning of troops

7 Observers

Political

8 Public consultation

V KIO held public consultation meetings in Laiza and meeting with civic groups in Myitkyina.

9 Legalisation

10 Release political prisoners

V Released some KIA soldiers from prisons in 2013

11 Human Rights

12 Ethnic Rights

13 National day

Resettlement

14 ID card

15 Resettlement plans

continue to undertake relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement of IDPs in consultation with each other.

16 Demining
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>A = Term sign in peace agreements; D= Demand; ^= started; V = Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
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<td>NSAG company</td>
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<td>SEZ/SIZ</td>
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<td>Development projects</td>
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<td>Development initiatives</td>
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<td>Development: Tourism</td>
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<td>Car licenses</td>
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<td>Media</td>
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<td>Ethnic language in primary school</td>
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<td>others</td>
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<td>Drugs</td>
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<td>Drug eradication</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Unilateral campaign for drug eradication in Kachin state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statements

- 19 Jan 2013 - KIO reply to the President's office statement saying Burmese government to stop the conflict in Kachin state
- 20 Jan 2013 - KIO's statement on armed conflicts in Kachin state
- 10 Oct 2013 - KIO and Govt 7 points agreement
Kuki National Organisation - Burma

SUMMARY

Founded: 28 July 2013
Headquarters: Mobile Headquarters
Operational Area: The land strips of Myanmar's townships (sub-division or districts) located along the border with India such as Tonzang township, Tamu township, Myothit township, Homalin township, Laysi township and Khamti township.
Estimated Strength: 200+
Leader: Pu. Letlam
CEC members:
- President: Pu Letlam
- Vice President: Pu Chuchung
- General Secretary: Pi Ngangai
- Joint Secretary: Pu Khupmang
- Defence Secretary: Pu Paulneo
- Information and Publicity Secretary: Pu Seigin
- Home Secretary: Pu Michael Sasat
- Head of Intelligence: Pu Letkholun
- Secretary, External Affairs and Liaison: Pu Boipu
- Secretary, Human Rights Law and Analysis Wing: Pi Lalam

The first Kuki National Organisation/ Kuki National Army (KNO/KNA) was founded on 24 February 1988 with the sole aim of realising the Kuki Peoples' lost rights and fights for recognition in the form of Federal State Unit in both India and Myanmar where their land has been divided. Following the 2010 Myanmar elections, a series of consultation meetings...
with Kuki CBOs and political groups decided to separate the KNO into two organisations for India and Myanmar. The bifurcation was officially inaugurated at a ceremony held between 27-28 July 2013.

Since 1988, the KNO-B has had about twenty armed confrontations with the Myanmar army and lost three comrades. It has been able to obtain and recover over fifty weapons, and killed nine personnel and one officer from the Myanmar army. However since 2010 elections they have had no clashes with the Myanmar army.

### Peace Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clashes #:</th>
<th>0</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Meetings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Date Location AA rep Govt Rep Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ethnic cooperation</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>UNFC -</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>NCCT -</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Laiza ethnic conference 1 -</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Law kheelar ethnic conference 2 -</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Military allies</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Meetings with other groups</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Meeting with foreign actors</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>National conferences</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Partnerships</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Observers at meetings</td>
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<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Oct 2013 - Open letter to the Myanmar Peace Center</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Karenni National-Progressive Party

Summary

Founded: 1957
Headquarters: Nyar Mu, Shardaw Township, Kayah state (also known as Karenni)
Operational Area: Loikaw, Shar Daw, Ho Yar (Pharu So township), Daw Tamagyi (Dee Maw So township)
Estimated strength: 600+
Leader: Chairman Abel Tweed

KNPP's armed wing, the Karenni Army, has fought the Myanmar military for the self-determination of its people. Decades-long war has resulted in thousands of civilians being displaced from their homes, many of whom have sought shelter in Thai refugee camps.

CEC members:
- Chairman: Abel Tweed
- Vice-Chairman: Khu Oo Reh
- Secretary 1: Aung San Myint
- Secretary 2: Shwe Myo Thant
- Members: Khu Hte Bu
- Khu Daniel
- Khu Plu Reh

Military leaders:
- Commander-in-Chief: Gen. Bee Htoo
- Deputy Commander-in-Chief: Maj. Gen. Aung Myat

Peace Process

Stage 1: 7 March 2012

Source: Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process
10th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government

Stage 2: Union level peace talks (9 June 2012)

Clashes: less than 10

Official delegation team

Rotational

Liaison offices

1. Loikaw 25/07/2012
2. Shadaw 01/08/2012
3. Hpa-saung 27/07/2012

Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>KNPP Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01/12/2011</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>Khu Oo Reh</td>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>Preliminary peace agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/02/2012</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>KNPP U Aung Min</td>
<td>Discussed allowing the KNPP to open liaison offices, free movement in Myanmar, and rehabilitating IDPs in Karenni State.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/04/2012</td>
<td>Mae Hong Son, Thailand</td>
<td>Vice-chairman Abel Twee, Khu Oo Reh</td>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>Preparatory meeting for Union level talks A Reference Guide 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 09/06/2012 Loikaw, Kayah
Khu Oo Reh U Aung Min Union level 14 point agreement

7 10/11/2012 Chiang Mai, Thailand
Abel Tweed U Aung Min Preparatory meeting. KNPP participants: General Secretary Khu Oo Reh, Second Secretary U Aung San Myint, Commander-in-Chief Gen. Bee Htoo Mediators (govt affiliated): Hla Maung Shwe, Nyo Ohn Myint

8 19-20/06/2013 Loikaw, Kayah
Khu Oo Reh U Aung Min Union Level 8 point agreement

9 16/08/2013 MPC, Yangon
KNPP secretary-2 Shwe Myo Thant MPC technical team Informal meeting. Shwe Myo Thant handed over the name list of KNPP’s technical team.

10 22-23/10/2013 Loikaw, Kayah
KNPP U Aung Min Discussed the govt’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement draft and implementation of previous peace agreements.

11 14/11/2013 Loikaw, Kayah
KNPP Kayah state chief minister KNPP reps met the Kayah state minister about education and health care issues.

Ethnic cooperation
1 UNFC Member
2 NCCT Member
3 Laiza ethnic conference 1 Attendee Signed agreement
4 Law khee lar ethnic conference 2 Attendee Signed agreement
5 Military allies
6 Meetings with other groups 88-Generation Student Group (11/9/12), Kayah BGFs: KNPP, KNPLF, KNDP, KNSO, KNPDP (17/9/13)

7 Meetings with foreign actors US ambassador (26/10/12)

8 National conferences
9 Partnerships KNPP, KNLP, KNPLF (cooperation on health programs)

10 Observers at meetings UNHCR, UK, USA
1. Panglong agreement and spirit
   To hold talks with all ethnic ceasefire groups, organisations and political parties

2. Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
   A
   To discuss the demarcation of controlled territories, define military camp locations and movement

3. Code of Conduct: control area
   A
   Joint monitoring committee with 5 from KNPP and 5 from Govt.

4. Monitoring: crisis mediating body
   A
   Technical team
   CBO observer team

5. Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body
   A
   Technical team

6. Military relations
   A
   D
   To safeguard the Mae Sae border gate between Thailand and Myanmar
   (Withdrawal of government’s forces from Kayah state), (transform a military training center into a social center)

7. Observers
   Political

8. Public consultation

9. Legalisation

10. Release political prisoners
    A
    Release all KNPP members and affiliates

11. Human Rights
    A
    KNPP will cooperate with the government’s Human Rights Commission, both sides agree to form a locally based human rights monitoring group

12. Ethnic Rights

13. National day

14. Resettlement

15. ID card

16. Resettlement plans
    A
    Both sides will discuss the systematic resettlement of IDPs; the government will assist in the resettlement of KNPP families providing support for business ventures
    Govt to assist the food-shelter - clothing for the KNPP soldiers.

17. Demining
    A
    KNPP, KNPLF
Economic

17 NSAG company Kayah Htarnay (Kayah Land) company (lead exploration) and Tamaw Htar (import/export of teak wood).

18 SEZ/SIZ Development projects

19 Development initiatives Cooperate with INGOs and NGOs on health, education and social development, communicate with the Kayah state government.

20 Development: Tourism

21 Development issues To provide the region with electricity in 2014.

Social

22 Car licenses 20 cars for tax free and 40 car licenses with preferential tax rates

23 Media Ethnic language in primary school

24 Ethnic language in primary school

Others

25 Kayah state government will form an observer group to survey public opinion about construction of a govt military training school.

Drugs

26 Drug eradication

Environment

27 Environmental impact assessment (EIA) Transparency and monitoring for development projects, especially the Ywa Thit hydro-electric dam on Salween river.

Statement:

31 Jul 2011 - KNPP demanded that the govt hold dialogue for national reconciliation, resolving the conflict and a ceasefire with all ethnic armed groups.

1 Jun 2012 - KNPP stated that the “peace roadmap” put forward by Naypyidaw won’t be successful on its own. Only an alliance based on the policies of the United Nationalities Federal Council can ensure that the ceasefire will endure.

3 Mar 2012 - KNPP Statement on Ceasefire Talks

23 Oct 2013 - 7 points agreement between KNPP and UPWC

All elements of peace agreements: A= Term sign in peace agreements; D= Demand; ^= started; V = Achieved; X = Failing
Government name: Kayin National Union (KNU)
Armed wing: Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)

http://karennationalunion.net/  http://knuhq.org/

SUMMARY

Founded: 1947
Headquarters: Mobile HQ
Operational Area: Than Taung, Taungoo, Nyaung Lay Bin, Hlaing Bwe, Hpa-an, Hpa-pun, Kawkareik, Kyar-Inn Seik Gyi, Kyeik-don, Northern part of Tanintharyi region
Estimated strength: 5,000+
Leader: Gen. Saw Mutu Say Poe

The KNU has been fighting for determination and autonomy in one of the world’s longest civil wars. Following Myanmar’s independence from the British in 1948, the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) was formed to fight against the central government. This name was later changed to the KNU.

CEC members:
Chairperson: Gen. Saw Mutu Say Poe
Vice-Chairperson: Naw Zipporah Sein
General Secretary: Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win
Secretary-1: Padoh Saw Thawthi Bwe
Secretary-2: Padoh Mahn Mahn Mahn
Defence Department: Maj. Saw Roger Khin
Deputy Commander-in-chief: Brig. Gen. Saw Baw Kyaw Hae

Member:
Padoh P. Thamein Tun, CEC Member
Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung, CEC Member
Padoh Ta Doh Moo, CEC Member

Department heads:
Padoh Mahn Ba Tun, Forestry Department
Padoh Kawkasar Saw Nay Soe, Transportation Department
Padoh Hla Tun, Management and Information Department
Padoh Saw Eh K’lu Shwe Oo, Health and Welfare Department
Padoh Saw Hla Tun, Organizing and Information Department
Padoh Saw Lah Say, Education and Cultural Department
Padoh Saw Roger Khin, Defence Department
Padoh Saw Kae Le, Mining Department
Padoh Saw Eh K’lu Say, Justice Department
Padoh Saw David Thakabaw, Alliance Affairs Department
Padoh Saw Aung Win Shwe, Foreign Affairs Department
Padoh Saw Ah Toe, Interior and Religion Department
Padoh Saw Khay Hsur, Finance Department
Padoh Saw Dot Lay Mu, Agriculture Department
Padoh Saw Dot Lay Mu, Chief Judge

Peace Process
New ceasefire signed
6th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government
Stage 2: Union level peace talks


Official delegation team

Chairperson: Gen. Mutu Say Poe
Vice-Chairperson: Naw Zipporah Sein
General Secretary: Padoh Saw Khwe Htoo Win
Secretary 1: Padoh Saw Thawthi Bwe
Secretary 2: Padoh Mahn Mahn Mahn
Defence Dept: Maj. Saw Roger Khin

Liaison offices
1. Pa-an (29/09/2012)
2. Three Pagoda Pass (15/05/2012)
3. Tavoy/Dawei (10/04/2012)
4. Myawaddy (18/08/2012)
5. Kyauk Gyi (09/04/2012)

Economic liaison office
1. Mawlamyine (22/11/2013)
2. Pa-an
3. Yangon

Karen Peace Support Team (KPST)

Address: No.410, 3rd Street (South), East Gyo Gone, Insein Township, Yangon, Myanmar.
Telephone Number: +0095-9-8575 225
Contact Persons:
1. Rev. Mathew Aye, coordinator of Karen Peace Support Team
2. Susanna Hla Hla Soe, Co-Coordinator of Karen Peace Support Team
Full details see a statement document

KPST’s Role in Peace Negotiation
1. Organizing media (domestic and international)
2. Observers
3. Facilitating meetings
4. Community participation

Members:
2. Secretary: Naw Tun Aung Chain, Karen Development Network
3. Treasurer: Naw Hla Hla Soe, Karen Development Network
4. Member: Saw True Blood, Individual
5. Member: Saw Kenneth Wai Thaw, Individual
6. Member: Saw Kyaw Swar, Karen Affairs Committee
7. Member: Nan Myint Tin, Karen Affairs Committee
8. Information Disseminator: Nyaw Nyaw (secretarial support), Individual

We (Karen People) want peace in our heart, in our community, in Karen State.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22/09/11</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Thailand</td>
<td>Informal meeting: KNU leaders told the government delegation that they did not want to hold peace talks with state-level officials because they lacked the authority to reach a binding agreement. The meeting was attended by Christian community leaders, Buddhist monks and MP Saw Boe Ni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/09/11</td>
<td>Col. Soe Soe, Gen. Mutu Say Poe, Padoh Rogers, Khin, David Taw</td>
<td>Bringing a letter of request for development project in Papun area along with a permission letter from Karen State chief minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/10/11</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Thailand</td>
<td>Preliminary meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/11/11</td>
<td>Mae Sai, Thailand</td>
<td>Informal ceasefire agreement. Mediators included: Nay Win Maung, Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Tin Maung Than and Harn Yawnghwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/12/11</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Thailand</td>
<td>KNU Peace Team: David Taw, Kwe Htoo win, Padoh Rogers, Gen. Mutu Say Poe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/01/12</td>
<td>Hpa-an, Kayin</td>
<td>Gen. Mutu Say Poe, U Aung Min State level 11 point ceasefire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8 24/03/12 Mae Sot Zipporah Sein Aung Min, Aung Lwin, Khin Yee Preparatory meeting. Other KNU delegates: David Taw, Gen. Mutu Say Poe, Kwe Htoo win, Htoo Htoo lay, Mae A Sein, Saw Mu, Rogers Khin.

9 05/04/12 Hpa-an, Kayin Zipporah Sein U Aung Min Cease-fire monitoring rules and liaison offices were discussed.

10 06/04/12 Yangon Zipporah Sein U Aung Min Union level 13 point ceasefire

11 07/04/12 Naypyitaw Zipporah Sein President Thein Sein Goodwill visit

12 08/04/12 Yangon Zipporah Sein Aung San Suu Kyi

13 10/04/12 Bago and Hpa-an, Kayin state Zipporah Sein U Aung Min Discussions on maintaining the ceasefire and the opening of liaison offices. There was a ceremony for the presentation of two vehicles for use at KNU liaison offices in Hpa-an and Dawei. KNU delegates included: Chief of Staff Gen. Saw Mutu Say Poe. Govt delegates included: U Khin Yee from the Union level Peace-making Work Committee, Kayin State Chief Minister U Zaw Min, other state ministers and other officials.

14 26/06/12 Mae Sot, Thailand Zipporah Sein Aung Min Discussions centered on liaison offices.

15 06/08/12 Myawaddy, Thailand Zipporah Sein Aung Min Preparatory meeting Karen reps. included: Padoh Saw Thawthi Bwe, Naw May Oo and Saw Aung Win Shwe. Govt reps included: Immigration Minister Khin Ye, Soe Thein and the Karen State Minister Zaw Min. Mediators: Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Hla Maung Shwe, Tin Maung Than from...
Myanmar Egress, Ngwe Soe, Ko Ko Maung and spouse Ma Su from the Dawei Princess Company.

16 03-09/12
Hpa-an, Kayin state
Zipporah Sein
Aung Min
34 point Code of Conduct agreement (in principle were agreed for further discussion with respective high ranking).
Also discussed and submitted the Burmese army troops out post relocations with detailed positions in Karen states.

Govt reps included:
Immigration Minister Khin Yee, Soe Thein and Karen state chief Minister Zaw Min

Mediators included:
Four domestic and three foreigners, Hla Maung Shwe.

17 05-06/01/13
Naypyidaw
Mutu Say Poe
Thein Sein,
Aung Min,
VP Sai Mauk Kham, C-in-C Min Aung Hlaing
Union Level Peace talks:
Ongoing discussions and the implementation of peace agreements.

18 14/06/13
Yangon
Mutu Say Poe
Aung Min
and MPC
Closed door meeting

19 15/06/2013
MPC,
Yangon
Padoh Saw Tar Doh Moo
MPC
officials/technical Team
"Code of Conduct" both delegations plan to meet again in July. Head of the KNU Technical Team of Ceasefire Code of Conduct

20 23/08/2013
Yangon
RCSS + KNU
MPC Discuss on Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

21 31/08/2013
Naypyitaw
RCSS + KNU+CNF (Gen. Mu Tuu Say Poe, Maj. Tu Tu Lay from KNU, Maj. Sai La and Maj. Sai Mein from RCSS)
Vice president Dr. Sai Mauk Kham, Vice
Snr. Gen. Soe Win, U Aung Min, U Thein Zaw
Informal meeting about Govt’s plan to sign nationwide ceasefire agreement in October. (1)
Commitment of ceasefire (2) Framework for political dialogue (3) All inclusive in Conference (4) midterm working process negotiations is proposed by KNU-RCSS. It’s an informal meeting.
Informal meeting
KNU leaders meet government and commander-in-chief for 2nd time in Naypyitaw.

Informal meeting
Discussed series of bomb explosions in Yangon and other towns.

Agreed 4 points.
1. To return the villages in KNU’s control area which were seized by government troops in 1997
2. To negotiate with military liaison officers for activities in the region
3. Permit Karen language teaching in schools
4. To cooperate with government for local development
Ethnic cooperation

1. UNFC Member
2. NCCT Member
3. Laiza ethnic conference
   Attendee Signed agreement
4. Law khee lar ethnic conference
   Attendee Signed agreement
5. Military allies
6. Meetings with other groups
   KNU leader Zipporah Sein met with NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon (08/04/2012).
7. Meetings with foreign actors
   USA
   MPSI
   Norwegian People's Aid
   Nippon Foundation
   KNU leaders met with US Ambassador Derek Mitchell on Jan.11, 2013 in Hpa-an to discuss the country's current political landscape and ongoing ceasefires.
8. Kyaukkyi project: resettling an estimated 1.5M Karen IDPs, providing food, farming equipment, clearing land mines and establishing liaison offices. Funded by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and implemented by CIDKP (Committee of Internally Displaced Karen People).
   Agreed to supply food donations for IDPs
9. National conferences
10. Partnerships Member Karen Armed Groups Solidarity Committee
   (KNU, DKBA, KPC, Karen BGFs)
11. Observers at meetings
   The Dawei Princess Company was involved in facilitating the peace process between the KNU and Myanmar government, as well as financing and arranging meetings and travel for the government peace delegation. It also paid for the setup and the running cost of the KNU liaison office in Dawei. Company boss U Ko Ko Maung and Managing Director U Ngwe Soe (retired military officer) attended peace meetings at the early stage of negotiations.
| Developments                                                                 | Page 1 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--
| Dialogue                                                                    | 1 Panglong agreement and spirit |
| Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire                                           | 2 Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire |
| Code of Conduct: A Code of conduct - 34 points                            | 3 Code of Conduct: A Code of conduct - 34 points |
| Monitoring: Crisis mediating body                                           | 4 Monitoring: Crisis mediating body |
| Monitoring: Ceasefire monitoring body                                       | 5 Monitoring: Ceasefire monitoring body |
| Military relations                                                          | 6 Military relations |
| D relocation of government troops                                           | 7 Observers allow national media outlets to participate in the peace process to provide accurate information about developments |
| Political                                                                   | 8 Public consultation |
| D The Karen Baptist Convention (Burma) invited officials from the KNU and community based organizations from the Thai-Myanmar border to attend a meeting to explain the ongoing ‘peace talks’ with the government (17/11/2012) |
| Legalisation                                                                | 9 Legalisation |
| Release political prisoners                                                | 10 Release political prisoners |
| Human Rights                                                                | 11 Human Rights |
| Ethnic Rights                                                               | 12 Ethnic Rights |
| National day                                                                | 13 National day |
| Resettlement                                                                | 14 ID card Kyaukkyi project |
| Resettlement plans                                                          | 15 Resettlement plans |
| Demining                                                                    | 16 Demining |
| Economic                                                                    | 17 NSAG company |
| SEZ/SIZ                                                                     | 18 SEZ/SIZ |
19 Development projects
A support the basic needs of the people and ensure that development projects have the full participation and support of residents.

20 Development initiatives
A resolve rehabilitation and land problems for civilians. The KNU land policy to be proposed to the government - an effort to protect lands that were confiscated or stolen for recent development projects and business development in Karen State. It was the result of a 2 day workshop with KNU leaders and CSOs, and the group promised to start documenting land confiscation cases. (25/07/2013).

21 Development: Tourism

22 Development: Internet

23 Car licenses
V 40 cars for tax free and 80 car licenses with preferential tax rates

Social
24 Media
25 Ethnic language in primary school
V Government has permitted Karen language teaching in primary schools in Taninthari region.

Education
Education: Karen State Govt announced that during 2013-2014 budget year, 95 schools will be built in Karen State in replacement of old schools. There is more focus for Pha-am Township. Karen Education Department and the Karen Teachers Working Group held a summer camp for teacher training in a government controlled area, Pway Poe Kla village, east of Taninthayi.

KNU health department Development and government health director for Karen State, agreed to cooperate to fight malaria at a meeting in April (04/04/2013). On 23 May meetings between officials from the KNU Department of Health and Welfare and the government's Health Directorate for Karen State resulted in plans to coordinate health care services in Karen State.

The KNLA announced they had set up the Big Tiger Foundation with a startup amount of 100,000 Thai Baht (USD 3100), to provide medical care and basic supplies to poor patients. Multiple offices of the Foundation were inaugurated in hospitals in Kawkareik Township, Karen State on August 31. KNU opened a medical clinic in Kawkareik township on Nov 20, 2013.
Statements

03 Jan 2013 - KNU-Statement on President Thein Sein’s invitation

09 Jan 2013 - The Communique of Karen National Union on meeting with President U Thein Sein

17 Jul 2013 - KNU Geneva call statement (Karen Version)

21 Jul 2013 - KNU Geneva call statement (Burmese Version)

21 Jul 2013 - KNU Geneva call statement (English Version)

26 Sep 2013 - KNU Information Release (English Version)

26 Sep 2013 - KNU Information Release (Burmese Version)

25 Oct 2013 - Statement of Emergency KNU Leadership Meeting on Recent Bomb Plots (English Version)

25 Oct 2013 - Statement of Emergency KNU Leadership Meeting on Recent Bomb Plots (Burmese Version)

26 Oct 2013 - KNU and RCSS joint Statement (English Version)

26 Oct 2013 - KNU and RCSS joint Statement (Burmese Version)

21 Nov 2013 - KNU’s brigade 6 released a statement (Burmese Version)
KNLA/KNLA Peace Council
http://karenpeacecouncil.com

SUMMARY
Founded: 31 Jan. 2007
Headquarters: Tokyo, Kawkareik Township, Karen state
Operational Area: Tokyo, Kawkareik Township, and Shan State, Myanmar
Strength: <200

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council was formed after the former KNLA brigade 7 commander Maj. Gen. Saw Htay Maung was dismissed by the KNU for initiating peace talks with the Myanmar army without the approval of the KNU central committee in 2007. Maj. Gen. Saw Htay Maung signed a peace deal with the Myanmar junta on January 31 that year and transformed his brigade 7 into the KNU/KNLA Peace Council.

CEC members:
Chairman: Saw Htay Maung aka Saw Htein Maung

Peace Process
Stage 1: State level peace talks
Previous ceasefire: 11 Feb. 2007
Official delegation team

Saw Htay Maung, Dr. Timothy Laklem, Saw Yin Nu, Dr. Naw Ka Paw Htoo, Saw Eh Kaw Htoo, Saw Joseph, Dr. Saw Aung Than, Naw Karen Na

Liaison offices

1. Myawaddy
2. Paya Thone Sue
3. Kawkareik
4. Mawtaung
5. Kawthoung

Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>KPC Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21/1/2013</td>
<td>Pa-an, Karen state</td>
<td>Htay Maung</td>
<td>Aung Min</td>
<td>The government requested the KPC to become a political party and surrender arms, however the KPC rejected and will try to discuss the issues further.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ethnic cooperation

1. UNFC - NCCT Member
2. Laiza ethnic conference
   Attendee Signed agreement
3. Law khee lar ethnic conference
   Attendee Signed agreement
4. Military allies
5. Meetings with other groups
   10/02/2012 met Aung San Suu Kyi
   10/03/2012 met with Maj. Saw Hla Ngwe, joint secretary of the KNU
6. Meetings with foreign actors
   Nippon Foundation, USA
7. National conferences
8. Cooperation Member
9. Karen Armed Groups Solidarity Committee (KNU, DKBA, KPC, Karen BGFs)
   Karen Unity and Peace Committee (KUPC)
   includes Karen armed groups, Karen CBOs/CSOs and Karen BGF.
10. Observers at meetings

Developments

1. Panglong agreement and spirit
2. Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
3. Code of Conduct: control area
   Members of KNU/KNLA Peace Council are allowed to maintain a presence at Maela Hta and Tokawko village
4. Monitoring: crisis mediating body
5. Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body
6. Military relations
7. Observers

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State will allow and render assistance for self-reliant undertakings for quickly fulfilling the basic needs, education, health, transport, water and electricity supply in the area for resettlement of national races that are residing in another country and render assistance for self-reliance. Provide accommodation to "region peace and development troops". Cooperating with KNU, DKBA and Karen BGFs.

More exploration and trade licences for timber and mineral extraction to avoid exploitation from Thailand.

V 20 cars for tax free and 40 car licenses with preferential tax rates.
National Democratic Alliance Army

SUMMARY

Founded 1989
Headquarters: Mongla, Eastern Shan state
Controlled Area: Mongla, Shan state (Special Region # 4)
Estimated strength: 3,000+
Leader: Sai Leun (also known as U Sai Lin and Lin Mingxian)

The National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS) is an ethnic ceasefire group based in Mongla, Myanmar. It was formed in 1989 after troops separated from the former Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and still maintains close ties with other groups that used to make up the CPB: MNDAA, UWSA and the NDA-K.

CEC members:
- Chairman: Sai Leun aka Sai Lin
- Vice Chairman: San Pae/ Hsan Per
- General secretary: Sao Hseng La

Peace Process

New Ceasefire: 7 Sept. 2011
2nd resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government

Stage 2: Union level peace talks (27 Dec. 2011)

Previous ceasefire: 30 June 1989

Liaison offices

Yangon, Taunggyi, Kengtung, Tachileik, and Mandalay (re-opened)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>NDAA Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07/09/2011</td>
<td>Kengtung, Shan state</td>
<td>San Pae Aung Thaung</td>
<td>State level</td>
<td>7 point ceasefire agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/09/2011</td>
<td>Kengtung, Shan state</td>
<td>San Pae Aung Thaung</td>
<td>Special Region (4)</td>
<td>Several agreements for better education, health, agriculture, transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/09/2011</td>
<td>Kengtung, Shan state</td>
<td>San Pae Aung Thaung</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elimination of illegal narcotic drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/12/2011</td>
<td>Mongla, Shan state</td>
<td>Sai Lin Aung Thaung</td>
<td>Union Level</td>
<td>6-point ceasefire agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/10/2012</td>
<td>Kengtung, Shan state</td>
<td>Vice-snr Gen. Min Aung Hlaing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement to cooperate against drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/12/2012</td>
<td>Mongla, Shan state</td>
<td>Sai Lin Aung Min</td>
<td>Granted permission to produce</td>
<td>1.000 tons of timber (out of 10.000 tons requested), construct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hydropower plants and operate mineral mines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Command; and Maj Gen Aung Soe, Commander, Northeastern Region Command

6 09/05/2013 Mongla, Shan state

NDAA UPWC vice chairman Thein Zaw

Discussed the 2014 national census and ongoing development projects in the area

7 03/09/2013 Kengtung NDAA Shwe Mann Goodwill meeting.

8 04/10/2013 Pang Sang NDAA UPWC Informal meeting.

Discussed the national census and ID card issues.

Ethnic cooperation

1 UNFC -

2 NCCT -

3 Laiza ethnic conference 1 -

4 Law khee lar ethnic conference 2 -

5 Military allies

6 Meetings with other groups SNLD chairperson U Khun Tun Oo visited Mongla (Dec. 6-9, 2012) accompanied by RCSS/SSA liaison officers.

7 Meetings with foreign actors China


9 Cooperations UWSA and MNDAA

10 Observers at meetings Developments Dialogue

1 Panglong agreement and spirit

2 Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire

3 Code of Conduct: control area

4 Monitoring: crisis mediating body

5 Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body

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6 Military relations
    Cooperate with defense forces of the state for security and defense of the state

7 Observers

8 Public consultation

9 Legalisation

10 Release political prisoners

11 Human Rights

12 Ethnic Rights

13 National day

14 ID card

15 Resettlement plans

16 Demining

17 NSAG company

18 SEZ/SIZ

19 Development projects
To allow the NDAA access to mining, coal and gold exploration and production

20 Development initiatives
To cooperate to improve tourism, mining, and electricity in NDAA controlled areas
To allow outside business groups to invest in the NDAA areas
To send researchers to the area to assess natural resources
To allow access to teak wood trading for 10,000 tons, as well as 10,000 tons of other hardwoods
To allow NDAA control of border checkpoints and to receive border checkpoint tax fees
To allow NGOs and the U.N. to help improve the area
To supply NDAA areas with rice, fuel oil and money

21 Development: Tourism
To open tourism areas for Thai and Chinese tourists

22 Development: Internet

23 Car licenses
To give 25 cars for tax free and 50 car licenses with preferential tax rates
Social Media

Ethnic language in primary school and others

A Cooperate to improve education, health and transportation in NDAA controlled areas

Government officials will be sent to run government offices in NDAA areas and NDAA people will be sent to work in NDAA liaison offices in government controlled areas

Drugs

Drug eradication

NDAA to take part in government’s 15 year (1999-2014) drug elimination plan

Environment

EIA

A = Term sign in peace agreements; D = Demand; ^= started; V = Achieved; X = Failing

Statements

10 Jan. 2013 - NDAA, UWSA and SSPP/SSA issued a joint statement for the government to stop its offensive against the KIO/KIA and start political dialogue

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New Mon State Party

Armed wing: Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA)
Website: http://nmsp.info/

SUMMARY

UNFC member
New Mon State Party
NCCT member

Founded: July 1958
Headquarters: Ye Chaung Phya, Mon state
Operational Area: Thaton, Paung, Chaungsone, Mawlamyine, Hpa-an, Kawkareik, Kyeikmayaw, Mudon, Thanbyuzayap, Ye, Yayphyu, Three Pagoda Pass, Myeik-Dawei, and Kyar-Inn-Seik Gyi
Estimated strength: 800+ (2,000 reserved)

Mon separatists formed the Mon Peoples Front (MPF). The group was later reformed and renamed as the New Mon State Party (NMSP). Since 1949, the eastern hills of the state (as well as portions of Thaninthayi Division) have been under NMSP control. In 1995, they agreed to a ceasefire with the Myanmar government.

The NMSP tried unsuccessfully to promote constitutional and political reform through the National Convention until 2008. Communications broke down in April, 2010 after refusing to transform into a Border Guard Force (BGF). However the situation did not deteriorate into outright armed conflict. Negotiations following reforms led to the renewal of the ceasefire agreement at the state-level and a commitment from the government to negotiate ceasefire agreements with all non-state armed groups before the end of 2012 so that inclusive political dialogue can commence at the Union level.

The Myanmar military originally granted the group nominal control of an area of Mon state spread out over 12 cantonments, largely along the Ye River and two areas to the north in Thaton and Moulmein Districts. In addition they were also given 17 industrial concessions in areas such as logging, fishing, inland transportation and gold mining, and were also allowed to make trade agreements with companies in Malaysia and Singapore.

The Myanmar military recognized the creation of 3 refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. These camps, based at Halokhanee, Bee Ree, and Tavoy in Mon state, were supported by the Mon Relief and Development Committee (MRDC) with cross-border assistance from the Thai-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) - now known as The Border Consortium (TBC).
The Myanmar military originally agreed to supply the NMSP with four million kyat (nearly US $3,500) in economic aid each month for the political body to function, however, this ended in 2005 after the NMSP boycotted the National Convention. A number of other concessions were also later withdrawn, most notably lucrative logging rights that were revoked in 1997 purportedly over the group’s signing of the Mae Tha Raw Hta agreement which had a provision supporting the NLD.

The NMSP fought alongside the KNU and was an active member of a number of ethnic alliance fronts including the National Democratic Front (NDF), the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) and the National Council Union of Burma (NCUB) with the latter two including Bama pro-democracy groups.

On 5 August 2009, Mon Revolution Day, the NMSP announced that it would not transform its armed wing into a Border Guard Force (BGF).

Central Committee members: 27

Chairman: Nai Htaw Mon
Vice-Chairman: Nai Han Thar (Nai Hongsar)
General Secretary: Nai Aung Min
Member: Nai Tala Nyi
Member: Lt. Col. M Seik Chan (in charge of Mawlamyine office)
Member: Maj. Kyi San (in charge of Mawlamyine liaison office)

Central Military Committee: 7

Commander in Chief: Brig. Gen. Layi Gakao
Deputy Commander in chief: Col. Banya Mae San
Member: Lt. Col. Hangsar
Member: Lt. Col. San Aye

Peace Process
8th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government
Previous ceasefire: 29 June 1995
8th stage: Union level peace talks
Rejected the BGF scheme: April, 2010

Post-Ceasefire Clashes: 2

Refugee Camp: Ban Don Yang (Thai side)
IDP camps: Halokhanee, Balikdon Figt, Chel Daik, Pa Nan Pain (inside Myanmar)

Official delegation team
Outside the country: Nai Hong Sa, Nai Tala Nyi, Nai Hong Sa Bun Thai
Inside the country: Nai Htaw Mon, Nai Rawsa, Nai Tala Nyi, Gen. Zay Ya, Nai Aung Min (S-1), Bri-Gen La Yi Kaung

Liaison offices
NMSP's liaison offices opened in 1995 after a ceasefire agreement with the SLORC. They were closed in April, 2010 after the NMSP rejected transforming into a BGF. All liaison offices reopened one day after the new ceasefire agreement on 26 Feb. 2012.

1. Mawlamyaing
2. Mudon
3. Thanbyuzayat
4. Ye
5. Yaybyu (Yaphu village)
6. Three Pagoda Pass
7. Kyaik Mayaw
8. Zin Kyeik (Paung township)
9. Myeik (Mreuik)
10. Myawaddy
*economic office

Mon Peace Monitoring Group
Following a peace process monitoring workshop at Shwe Myint Moh Tun Hotel, Mawlamyine city, Mon state on 7 June 2013, 15 members were selected to run a peace monitoring group for Mon State.

About 120 representatives from Social Welfare minister of Mon State, Economic and Planning minister of Mon State, Mon affairs minister in Karen State, Politicians, Mon state MPs, businessmen, civic groups, youth groups and individuals attended the workshop.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location, Province/State</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06/10/2011</td>
<td>Ye Township, compound of govt. Infantry Unit No. 61, Nai Tala Nyi Mon state</td>
<td>Minister for Security and Border Affairs, Col. Htay Myint Aung. Preliminary meeting. The party also proposed that the government announce a nationwide ceasefire and to hold a dialogue with the UNFC to solve political problems. Other NMSP delegates: Nai Baya Lai; and Nai Hong Sar. Other govt. delegates: Colonel Tun Tun Nyi of the Southeast Command; and Mon state municipal officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/11/2011</td>
<td>Ye Chaung Phya, NMSP headquarters</td>
<td>Nai Htaw Mon 5 member envoy from the Mon state Govt as peace create team (peace mediators). Preliminary Meeting. Other NMSP delegates: Nai Rawsa, Nai Hong Sa. Govt Delegates: former NMSP central executive member Nai Tin Aung and former central committee member Nai Soe Myint; Mon National Democratic Front central executive member Nai Thet Lwin, Dr. Min Kyi Win, Buddhist Abbot Sayadaw Bhaddanta Kaytumarlar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/02/2012</td>
<td>Mawlamyine, Mon State</td>
<td>Nai Rawsa U Aung. State level 5 point Ceasefire. Other NMSP delegates: Bri-Gen La Yi Kaung, Nai, Tala Nyi, Maj. San Aye, Nai Arca. Other govt. delegates: Union Minister U Soe Thein, Union Minister U Zaw Min, State Chief Minister U Ohn Myint, Commander of South-East Command Maj-Gen Tin Maung Win, Mon state Minister for Security and Border Affairs Col Htay Myint Aung, the General Staff Officer (Grade-I) (People’s Militia), the Mon state Advocate-General, the secretary of Mon State Government and officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>NMSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 25/02/2012</td>
<td>Mawlamyine, Mon State</td>
<td>Nai Rawsa U Aung Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 11/04/2012</td>
<td>Mawlamyine, Mon State</td>
<td>Nai Aung Min, Nai Tala Nyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 04/08/2013</td>
<td>Mawlamyine, Mon State</td>
<td>NMSP MPC technical team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Military allies

6 Meetings with other groups
   ethnic political leaders

8 generation leaders who visited Mon
state (11 Nov 2012)

7 Meetings with foreign actors
   Nippon Foundation

8 National conferences
   Plan to hold national conference

9 Cooperations

10 Observers at meetings

Developments

1 Panglong agreement
   and spirit
   To start political dialogue between representatives of armed national races organizations and representatives of the government after ceasefire of all armed national races organizations. In case ceasefire is not secured with all the organizations till December 2012, to start the political dialogue between representatives of the ceasefire organizations and representatives of the government.

2 Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire

3 Code of Conduct:
   control area

4 Monitoring: crisis
   mediating body
   To continue talks on national reconciliation, based on political compromises with participation of representatives of domestic national political parties and democratic forces.

5 Monitoring: ceasefire
   monitoring body

6 Military relations
   To not extend military strength in Mon state and related areas in period of ceasefire.

7 Observers
   Allowing observers to participate in meetings.
8 Public consultation
To have the right to communicate with the public and help each other.
To have the right to communicate with domestic political parties.
To have the right to communicate with news agencies and media.
To inform the public of outcomes of political dialogue as required.
To conduct negotiation in advance in communicating with the foreign diplomats.

9 Legalisation
10 Release political prisoners
To release all political prisoners remaining in the prisons and to free comrades of New Mon State Party in prisons with sympathy as well.
Releasing imprisoned party members including Nai Myo Thway and Nai Yekka (2012)

11 Human Rights
To avoid forced labour by both sides, apart from volunteers. To solve problems of land confiscation by the Myanmar military.

12 Ethnic Rights
13 National day
Resettlement
14 ID card
15 Resettlement plans
16 Demining

17 NSAG company
V NMSP has been doing business including construction, agro-business, trading and timber under Ramanya United Company established by NMSP in 2012.

18 SEZ/SIZ
19 Development projects
20 Development initiatives
21 Development: Tourism
22 Development: Internet
23 Car licenses V 25 cars for tax free and 50 car licenses with preferential tax rates
To work for stability and development of education, health and social sectors of the region in coordination with respective national races armed organizations and the government as the ceasefire comes into effect.

Statement:
19 Jun 2012: The NMSP has threatened to break its four-month-old ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government if Naypyidaw fails to hold political talks with all the ethnic armed groups by the end of this year, according to the party secretary.

08 Feb 2012: NMSP chairman said that the group will not sign a ceasefire with the Myanmar government while it continues to wage war against ethnic Kachins.
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang

SUMMARY

Founded: 1 Jan. 1980
Headquarters: Mobile HQ
Operational Area: Lahe, Lay Shi, Hkamti and Nanyun in Sagaing Region
Estimated strength: <500
Leader: S. S. Khaplang

The NSCN-K has been fighting to achieve a union between Naga living in the northeast states of India and the Sagaing Region in Myanmar. In 1988, the NSCN split into two fractions; the NSCN-K led by S. S. Khaplang based in northern Lahe and Nanyun townships in Sagaing Region, Myanmar and the NSCN-IM, led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah in India. According to the 2008 Constitution, the Leshi, Lahe and Nanyun townships in Sagaing Region are described as a Naga Self-Administered Zone. Since 2010, the NSCN-K and the Myanmar government have not engaged in armed clashes. After the ceasefire in 2012, many of their soldiers deserted.

CEC members:
Chairman: S. S. Khaplang
General Secretary: Dali Mangru Ao
Commander-in-Chief: Khole Konyak
CEC member: U Kyaw Wan Sein

No major developments since ceasefire agreement and also did not participate in the ethnic conferences. The group however did receive 15 cars for tax free and 30 car licenses with preferential tax rates.

Peace Process

New Ceasefire: 9 April 2012
12th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government

Stage 1: State level peace talks
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Armed Group</th>
<th>Other Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09/04/2012</td>
<td>Khamti, Sagaing</td>
<td>Y. Wangtin Naga and six others</td>
<td>Sagaing Region Minister for Security and Border affairs, Col Kyi Naing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/08/2013</td>
<td>MPC, Yangon</td>
<td>4 representatives from NSCN-K</td>
<td>U Aung Min NSCN-K leaders discussed about to open liaison office in Khamti and local development in their area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Armed Wing: Pa-Oh National Liberation Army
Email: pnlopower@gmail.com
Website: http://pnlo.org/

UNFC member
NCCT member

SUMMARY

Founded: 2009
Headquarters: Laybwer camp, near Homong, Southern Shan State
Operational Area: Hsi Hseng, Hopong, Nam San, Lan Khur and Mawk Mai in Shan State
Estimated strength: 400+
Leader: Khun Myint Tun

The PNLO is the combined force of the Pa-Oh People's Liberation Organization (PPLO) and the
former PNLO. The PPLO was led by Col. Khun Okkar and formed on 18 June 1991 to continue
the armed struggle after its mother organisation Pa-Oh National Organization (PNO) led by
U Aung Kham Hti, signed a ceasefire with the government. The former PNLO was a SNPLO
splinter group (Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organization) led by Brig. Gen.
Khun Ti Soung and formed on 10 June 2007.

The two groups were officially united at a Pa-Oh National Conference held on 7-9 Dec.
2009 that formed the newly structured PNLA and PNLO, and drafted the PNLO constitution.
Attendees included the Pa-Oh Youth Organization, Pa-Oh Labor Union and individuals such
as U Khun Myint Tun (Thaton MP in 1990 election) and Khun Tin Swe (member of NCUB and
PDC). Col. Khun Okker was elected as the chairman, and Brig. Gen. Khun Ti Soung as vice­
chairman. The conference chose the name PNLO to honor the former PNLO’s initiation and
commitment to the “third revolution”.

The first PNLO congress held in Laybwer military camp on 16-20 May 2013 elected new
central committee members in which Khun Myint Tun was appointed the new chairman.
Previous chairmen Col. Khun Okker and Brig. Gen. Khun Ti Soung have since become patrons.

The PNLO’s current headquarters is located near the Thai-Myanmar border opposite Mae
Hong Son, Thailand.
Central Committee Members:
Patrons: Col. Hkun Okker, Brig-Gen Khun Ti Saung, Khun Tet Lu
Chairman: Khun Myint Tun
Vice-Chairman: Col. Khun Thurein
General Secretary: Col. Aung Kyaw
Joint General Secretary (1): Khun Thomas
Joint General Secretary (2): Nang Nwe Nwe
CEC Member: Khun Tin Shwe Oo
CEC Member: Lt. Col. Khun Ohn Maung
CC Member: Khun Tun Tin
CC Member: Lt. Col. Khun Kyaw Htin
CC Member: Lt. Col. Khun Swe Hto
CC Member: Nang Phyu Pyar
Chief of Staff: Col. Khun Thurein

Peace Process

New Ceasefire: 25 Aug 2012
13th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government

Stage 2: Union level peace talks (23 March 2013)

# Post-Ceasefire Clashes: none

Official delegation team PNLO Peace-Making Group

State level: 7 members
1. Khun Myint Tun (Team leader)
2. Col. Khun Thurein (Deputy Leader)
3. Brig. Gen. Khun Ti Saung (Member)
4. Maj. Khun Kyaw Htin (Member)
5. Khun Ooh (Member)
6. Khun Tun Tin (Member)
7. Maj. Khun Swe Hto (Member)
Union level: 12 members

1. Col. Hkun Okker - Team Leader
2. Khun Myint Tun - Deputy Leader
3. Col. Khun Thurein - Member
4. Col. Aung Kyaw - Member
5. Khun Ooh - Member
6. Khun Tin Shwe Oo - Member
7. Maj. Khun Swe Hto - Member
8. Khun Htee - Member
9. Khun Tun Tin - Member
10. Khun Thomus - Member
11. Nang Nwe Nwe - Member
12. Nang Myint - Member

Liaison offices
1. Taunggyi (26/01/2013)
2. Thaton (21/08/2013)
3. Maukmai (08/12/2013)
4. Hsi Hseng (To be opened soon)

Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>PNLO Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/12/2011</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Col. Hkun Okker</td>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>Informal peace meeting for both PNLO and UNFC leading to preliminary talks. PNLO Chairman Khun Okkar said that his group will observe talks involving other ethnic organization that are members of the UNFC and met with the government separately in order to study the issues being presented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 5/2/2012 Chiang Mai, Thailand
Khun Myint Tun, Col. Khun Thurein, Khun Tun Tin
U Aung Min
Preliminary meeting
Both sides plan to hold a formal state level meeting in the following month.

3 22/04/2012 By phone Col. Hkun Okker
U Aung Min
Preliminary meeting
Both sides plan to hold a formal state-level meeting in the following month.

4 27/06/2012 Bangkok, Thailand
Col. Hkun Okker, Khun Myint Tun
U Aung Min
Preliminary meeting
Agreement to sign a 7-point draft agreement.
Other PNLO delegates: Khun Myint Tun
Other govt delegates: Minister of Immigration and Population U Khin Yee

5 28/07/2012 Yangon
Khun Myint Tun and Col. Khun Thurein
U Aung Min
Preliminary meeting
Discussed ideas for the upcoming official meeting for State level ceasefire agreement. Meeting followed an exploratory trip by the PNLO peace delegation inside the country (Taunggyi, Thaton township).

6 25/08/2012 Taunggyi, Shan State
Khun Myint Tun and Col. Khun Thurein
U Aung Min
State Level ceasefire agreement
Other government delegates: union Ministers, representatives of the Lower house and Upper house, Shan state Chief Minister Sao Aung Myat and state government members, Commander of Eastern Command Maj. Gen. Soe Htut and senior military officers
7 23/03/2013 MPC, Yangon
Col Khun Okkar, U Khun Myint Tun, Col Khun Thurein and CEC members
U Aung Min, Union Ministers U Khin Maung Soe, U Win Tun and U Ohn Myint, Shan State Chief Minister U Sao Aung Myat
Union Level peace agreement in ten major sectors including relief, social affairs, anti-drug, regional development, continued ceasefire and political dialogue.

8 02/09/2013 Taunggyi RCSS, PNO, PNLO
U Shwe Mann, U Thein Zaw, Gen. Aung Than Htut
Informal meeting Shan state government asked for 50% of Shan state revenue to spend in Shan state

9 20/09/2013 Taunggyi RCSS, SSPP, PNLO
U Aung Min

10 5-6/09/2013 Naypyitaw Khun Myint Tun and Khun Tin Shwe Oo
U Aung Min, U Khin Yi, U Win Tun, U Soe Thein and U Than Htay
Informal meeting discussed the continued implementation of union level peace agreements, nationwide ceasefire, participating in national census.

Ethnic cooperation
1 UNFC Member
2 NCCT Member
3 Laiza ethnic conference Attendee Signed agreement
4 Lawkheehlar ethnic conference 2 Attendee Signed agreement
5 Military allies
6 Meetings with other groups Shan-Kayah-Mon Trust Building Conference
7 Meetings with foreign actors
8 National conferences
9 Cooperations
10 Observers at meetings Nippon Foundation donated 1,200 rice bags to PNLO (January 2013)
Developments

1. Panglong agreement and spirit
2. Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
3. Code of Conduct: control area
4. Monitoring: crisis mediating body
5. Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body
6. Military relations A to maintain the location of PNLO/PNLA troops both sides agreed to be positioned at designated areas both sides agreed not to take arms to other regions except in designated areas discussions will take place regarding any violations of the signed code of conduct to jointly manage food, clothing and shelter for troops cooperate on public security
7. Observers
8. Political public consultation
   V 22/07/2012: As per the invitation from U Aung Min, seven members from PNLO’s peace delegation visited Myanmar for ten days from 22 - 31 July to hold several consultation meetings with individuals, the state Pa-Oh political parties, religious leaders, and Pa-Oh activists. They visited PNO patron U Aung Kham Hte, as well as the PNO chairman and other PNO senior leaders; held consultation meetings with Pa-Oh CBOs and CSOs at the PNO headquarters, and met with the abbot of Taung Kyaung Kyi monastery; traveled to Thaton Township in Mon state to hold several consultation meetings with the Pa-Oh community, senior Pa-Oh monks, and National League for Democracy Thaton (NLD-Thaton).
9. Legalisation
10. Release political prisoners
11. Human Rights
12. Ethnic Rights
13. National day
14. Resettlement
15. ID card
16 Demining
17 Economic
18 NSAG company
19 SEZ/SIZ
20 Development projects:
21 Development: Tourism
22 Car licenses
23 V 15 cars for tax free and 30 car licenses with
24 Social
25 Ethnic language in
26 others
27 Drug eradication
28 EIA
A= Term sign in peace agreements; D= Demand; ^= started ; V= Achieved; X = Failing

 Statements
12 Jan 2014 - Message to 51st anniversary revolution day of T’ang (Palaung)
21 May 2013 - Statement of PNLO 1st Congress
26 Mar 2013 - National Day Message
23 Mar 2013 - PNLO Union Level Agreement (Burmese)
23 Mar 2013 - PNLO Union Level Agreement (English)
01 Jan 2012 - PNLO 2012 New Year Statement
31 Jan 2011 - Statement of PNLO Annual Meeting
21 Sep 2010 - PNLO Statement on International Day of Peace
27 Feb 2010 - PNLO Statement on Pa-Oh National Day
27 Feb 2010 - PNLO Honorable Message for Pa Oh National Day

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Shan State Progress Party

Government Name: Shan State Army (North) Special Region-3

UNFC member
NCCT member

SUMMARY

Founded: 1964/1989
Headquarters: HQ in Wan Hai, Kehsi Township, northern Shan state
Operational Area: Nam Kham, Langkho, Hsipaw, Kyauk Mae, Mong Hsu, Tang Yang, Mongyai, Kehsi, Lashio Township
Estimated strength: 4,000+
Leader: Lt.Gen Pang Fa

The SSA was renamed the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP/SSA) in 1996. Until 1989 the SSA fought against the former Myanmar military regime. After splitting from Mong Tai army led by Khun Sa, the SSA signed a ceasefire with the government. They were pressured to transform into a BGF in 2010 which was accepted by SSA brigade 3 and 7 complied, but rejected by brigade 1 led by Lt. Gen Pang Fa.

CEC Members: General Secretary - Sao Khun Hseng, Sao Khur Tai
Sec 2 - Sao Kham Ti
Spokesperson - Sao Sai La
Member - Sao Naw Lek, Sao Sai Ba Tun

Central Committee Members: 31 members
Commander-in-chief: Sao Pang Fa

*Sao Sai Ba Tun is an NCCT member.
Peace Process

7th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government

Stage 2: Union level peace talks (28 Jan. 2012)

Previous ceasefire: September 02, 1989

# Post-Ceasefire Clashes:
2012: 130
2013: 71 clashes

Official delegation team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>SSPP Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naypyidaw</td>
<td>29/10/2012</td>
<td>Sao Naw Lake U Aung Min</td>
<td>SSPP asked the government to withdraw the Myanmar military from 4 locations around Wanhai. Other govt delegates included: MP Thein Zaw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taunggyi, Shan state</td>
<td>28/01/2012</td>
<td>Col Khun Hseng U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>State and Union Level agreement Other SSA-N delegates: Sao Kherh Tai Other govt delegates: Col Aung Thu, Minister for Security and Border Affairs, and 4 others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liaison offices

1. Lashio (Opened - Ko Latt; in-charge)
2. Taung Gyi (Opened - Sai Kyaw Zaw; in-charge)
3. Kho Lam (Opened - Sai Kyaw Lwin; in-charge)
4. Muse (not opened)
5. Tachilek (unconfirmed)
from the Shan state Government

3 22/06/2012 Mandalay Unknown Unknown Emergency meeting following heavy fighting that started on 17 Jun. 2012. The government agreed to withdraw from two of SSPP military bases. The bases include: Kunnamile and Loi Pha Pheung in Monghsu Township, southern Shan state.

4 10/10/2012 Northeastern military headquarters, Lashio Col. Khun Hseng U Aung Min Both sides agreed to cooperate on a new village for families of the SSPP and IDPs. The arrangements were made in exchange for the release of Myanmar military soldiers who were being held by SSPP. The government donated 1,000 sacks of rice and 2 hand-push tractors. Other govt delegates: U Thein Zaw, Shan State Chief Minister Sao Aung Myat, Brig-Gen Aung Soe, Brig-Gen Min Naung, Deputy Ministers Maj-Gen Zaw Win, Ohn Than and Aye Myint Maung, Deputy Attorney-General Tun Tun Oo. Mediator: U Hla Maung Shwe

5 31/10/2012 Kho Lam, central-east military command HQ Col. Khun Hseng Central-east military command commander Gen. Min Naung Agreement: SSPP will open a liaison office in Kho Lam, SSPP camp does not need to move from Ta-Sampu boat port area, allowed to explore lead and ruby in Mong Shu area. Other SSPP delegates: Sao Naw Lek, Sai Kyaw Win, Maj. Khur Mao Other govt delegates: G1 Myo Htut Oo, Maj. Ye Yint Win, Maj. Kaung Kyaw (intelligence)
Discussed recent skirmishes.

Emergency meeting.

SSPP demanded Myanmar army columns to withdraw from their control area. Government's representatives promised they would inform the president.

Four points agreement:
- Adhere to the Jan 2012 agreement
- Solve problems by peaceful means
- Both sides should not burden civilians
- Meet with military officials about demarcation control areas.

Ministers U Win Myint, U Khin Maung Soe, U Kyaw Kyaw Win, Sao Aung Myat (Shan state Chief Minister), Gen Than Htut Oo (Triangle command), Brig. Gen. Min Naung (Central east command), Brig. Gen. Aung Soe (Northeast command), Col Aung Thu (Shan state Border Affairs), Col. Soe Win (Defence ministry), U San Shwe Aung (Border Affairs ministry)
to a political dialogue.

10 06/09/2013 Lashio, Shan State
SSPP U Shwe Mann, Thein Zaw and MPs
Informal meeting

11 20/09/2013 Taunggyi, Shan State
RCSS, SSPP, PNLO
U Aung Min
Informal meeting on the sidelines of the Shan-Kayah-Mon state Trust Building Conference held on 21-23 Sept 2013.

Ethnic cooperation
1 UNFC Member
2 NCCT Member
3 Laiza ethnic conference 1 Attendee Signed agreement
4 Law khee lar ethnic conference 2 Attendee Signed agreement
5 Military allies
6 Meetings with other groups
7 Meetings with foreign actors
8 National conferences
Attendee Shan Conference “Trust building for peace” (26 Nov 2012)
9 Co-operations member CSSU
10 Observers at meetings

Developments
1 Panglong agreement and spirit
2 Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
3 Code of Conduct: control area
SSPP soldiers be allowed to be based in Wanhai and other temporary locations.
4 Monitoring: crisis mediating body
5 Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body
6 Military relations
7 Observers
8
9

Will continue talks for ensuring regional peace, stability and development, enabling the troops to earn their living and ensuring lasting peace in the region.

Resettlement of over 3500 people including SSP family members to Mong Kaung sub-Township and Mongshu Township. Responsibilities for the livelihoods of family members, transportation, better living standards.

Demining Economic

NSAG company SEZ/SIZ Development projects:

Development initiatives A Regional development tasks and recuperation of vacant and virgin lands for cultivation of long-lasting trees and seasonal crops.

Development: Tourism Development: Internet Car licenses V 20 cars for tax free and 40 car licenses with preferential tax rates

Social Media

Ethnic language in primary school others Drugs

drug eradication A Environment

28 EIA
Statements

31 Dec 2013 - SSPP/SSA released a statement on the Central Committee meeting

21 Sep 2013 - An interview with SSPP General Hso ten 7 days news

08 Jul 2013 - SSPP/SSA released a bi-annual meeting statement

10 Jan 2013 - NDAA, UWSA and SSPP/SSA joint statement for the govt to stop its offensive against the KIO and start political dialogue
Government: Shan State Army - South (SSA-S)
http://rcssanc.org
http://taifreedom.com

SUMMARY

Founded: 1964/1996
Headquarters: Loi Tai Leng, Southern Shan State
Operational Area: Mong Ton, Mong Hsat in Eastern Shan State, Mong Pan, Mong Nai, Laikha, Kunching, Lawksawk, Maukmai, Mongkang, Nam Sang in Southern Shan State, Kyaukme and Nam Kham in Northern Shan State
Estimated Strength: 6,000+
Leader: Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk

The SSA-S was formed from the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) by Lt-Gen. Yawd Serk that opposed the ceasefire with the government made by the mainstream SSA. The SURA was a breakaway faction of the Mong Tai Army led by drug lord Khun Sa and previously was the original Shan State Army.

Affiliations: Former Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) and Mong Tai Army (MTA)

RCSS holds election every four years. Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk was re-elected in Feb 2014 as a chairman of RCSS for another four years.

CEC members: 11 members
Chairman and Commander-in-chief: Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk
Vice chairman 1: Maj. Gen. Sai Yi
Vice Chairman 2: Col. Kherh Ngeun
General Secretary: Lt. Col. Siri
Chief of Civil Administration and chief of peace delegation: Brig. Gen. Pawng Kherh
Commander of eastern military command: Lt. Col. Gawn Zeun

*RCSS is a member of Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU). The CSSU was established in 2009.*
on Oct 15, 2013. The CSSU’s members include the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Shan State Joint Action Committee (SSJAC - a coalition of SNLD and SSPP) and the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, as well as 13 civil society organizations.

### Peace Process

- **New Ceasefire**: 2 Dec 2011
- **4th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government**
- **Stage 2**: Union level peace talks (16 Jan 2012)

#### # Post-Ceasefire Clashes:
- **2012**: 68
- **2013**: 76

### Official delegation team

**Chief Negotiator**: Brig. Gen. Pawng Kherh

### Liaison offices

1. Taung Gyi (22/02/2012)
2. Keng Tung (22/02/2012)
3. Tachilek (29/02/2012)
4. Mongton (29/02/2012)
5. Kho Lam (21/03/2012)
6. Muse (business liaison office)

### Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>RCSS Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19/11/11</td>
<td>Thai-Shan border</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk</td>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>Informal ceasefire; Other SSA-S delegates: Sao Khuen Sai, Mediators: Nay Win Maung, Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Tin Maung Than, Harn Yawngwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Taunggyi Sai Lu U Aung Min

level 8 point ceasefire

Other govt delegates: Khin Maung Soe, Col Aung Thu, the minister of Border Affairs and Security; Shan State Chief of Justice Maung Maung; and General Staff Officer (Grade-1) of Triangle Regional Command Lt-Col Zaw Tun Myint.

Taunggyi U Khin Maung Soe

Preparatory meeting

16/01/12 Taunggyi Sai Baung Khe U Aung Min

Union level 11 point ceasefire

Other govt Delegates: U Win Tun, Minister of Forestry; No 2 Electric Power Minister, U Khin Maung Soe; Sao Aung Kyat, Chief Minister of Shan State; Deputy Minister of Defense, U Zaw Win; Attorney General, U Tun Tun Oo; Minister of Shan State Border Security, Col Aung Thu; Col Kyaw Soe Lin (Defense ministry); Triangle Region G1, Col Zaw Tun Myint and Central Eastern Region G1, Col Zaw Min Aye.

19/05/12 Kengtung Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk U Aung Min

12-point agreement


28/10/12 Tachileik Pawng Kherh Col. Aung Thu (Shan State border affairs)

Tripartite 9 point anti-drug agreement between RCSS, Govt and UNODC (Rep: Jason Eligh A Reference Guide 2014 | 181
President said to cooperate Reposition of Arms groups, Resettlement, Job Creation, Education and Development Project. For constitution amendment, Hluttaw will proceed. RCSS said they are fighting not for Confederation State, it is for Federal, Democracy, Self-determination, Participation.

MPC in Yangon Col. Sai La and Maj. Lao Hseng MPC Technical Team Informal meeting. They discussed the nationwide ceasefire and political talks. RCSS also demanded Government forces retreat from their military camp area.

RCSS + KNU MPC Technical Team Discuss Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

UPWC president Sai Mauk Kham expected to get nationwide ceasefire in October. (1) commitment of ceasefire (2) framework from both sides negotiation for political dialogue (3) all inclusiveness in Conference (4) midterm working process negotiations is proposed by KNU-RCSS. It's an informal meeting.

Informal meeting

RCSS/ KNU U Aung Min, U Khin Yi Informal meeting - The NSAG 14 point draft nationwide ceasefire accord was in principle accepted by the govt's technical team.

RCSS, SSPP, PNLO U Aung Min (Informal meeting) Sidelines of the Shan-Kayah-Mon state Trust Building Conference 21-23 Sept 2013. RCSS discussed recent clashes with the Myanmar army.
Ethnic cooperation

UNFC - NCCT - Laiza ethnic conference
Law Khee Lar ethnic conference
Military allies
Meetings with other groups
RCSS and UWSA held a second meeting for counteract narcotic drugs and harvest replacement planning (28-29 Dec 2012),
Meetings with foreign actors
RCSS liaison officers accompanied SNLD chairperson U Khun Tun Oo to visit NDAA National conferences
Cooperation Member
Anti-drug
UNODC
MPSI
Committee of Shan State Unity (CSSU)
PNLO anti-drug partnership
Tripartite anti-drug agreement
IDP needs assessment
Observers at meetings
Developments
Dialogue
Panglong agreement and spirit
Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
Code of Conduct:
control area
Coordinate with each other in advance before moving with arms out of designated positions.
The two sides will remain at positions agreed upon by both sides.
Designation of areas will be discussed further at the Union level talks.
Monitoring: crisis mediating body
Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring
Two sides to conduct joint field survey A peace-monitoring group will be formed before the end of July 2012 after the nomination by the two sides of suitable persons

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RCSS organized a meeting of the Shan State scholars on 22-23/08/2012 and formed Peace Monitoring Committee consisting of 19 members, some of them highly regarded in the Shan community, volunteered to become Peace Monitors to be watchdogs against truce violations between government troops and the armed resistance.

The RCSS is free to hold political consultations with individuals, groups and communities throughout the country.

A small team of SSA led by Awng Hseuk spoke to the public gathering in Pongpakhem, located 16 km north of the Thai-Myanmar border and announced that the RCSS will stop collecting taxes and recruits from the ordinary people. (19/01/2012)

The RCSS will urge the people for their participation in the political negotiations with the government during the upcoming 2013.

Two sides will continue to build up mutual trust to enable the RCSS to be totally withdrawn from the list of unlawful associations.

Members and supporters of RCSS who are in prison will be released except for those who have been imprisoned on criminal charges.

National ID cards will be issued to members, family members and people residing with the RCSS.

Government will assist families of the RCSS members to earn adequate.
NSAG company A X has set up 6 companies under the name Shan Taung Tan Cherry on 14 May 2012, these include travel and tours gems and jewelry, trading, services, industry and hotel.

RCSS leaders concluded a seven-day tour of businesses. At the invitation of the government peace team led by Railway Minister Aung Min, a seven-member RCSS team visited Yangon and Mandalay and a three-member team visited Muse in northern Shan State.

Despite business permits, the RCSS has not been allowed by the Myanmar army to start agro-business activities in the agreed area.

Special industrial zone will be set up and controlled by the RCSS.

A 10-day visit inside the country from 15-24 January 2012, included the signing of the Union level agreement for security and development and meetings with both Shan political parties and civil societies.

RCSS is permitted to request assistance from and coordinate with NGOs and INGOs.

RCSS/SSA will be allowed to register its Tai Freedom news agency after the new media law comes into effect.

Government will assist the RCSS in the preservation and promotion of Shan literature and culture.

Government, UNODC and RCSS will undertake surveys in Mongnai and Mongpan townships for a crop substitution pilot project to be jointly implemented.

Environment

EIA

In primary school

Others

Drugs

drug eradication

A= Term sign in peace agreements; D= Demand; ^= started; V= Achieved; X = Failing

As from region peace agreements to the Burmese, 1st Edition, Ananada A. Khetting

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Ta'ang National Liberation Army

http://palaungland.org/eng
http://pslf-tnla.blogspot.com

UNFC member
NCCT member

Political wing: PSLF (latest Palaung political group; not to be confused with PSLO that disarmed in 2005 and transformed into a Militia)

Founded: 1992 (Jan)
Headquarters: Mobile
Operational Area: Naung Cho, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Kutkai, Namtu, Mann Ton, Namhsan, Mong Mit, Mongoke in northern Shan state

Estimated strength: 1,500+

Leader: Tar Aik Bong (Chairman), Tar Bone Kyaw (General Secretary)

Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO/A) made cease fire to the government in 1991 and disarmed in April 2005. Palaung leaders Tar Aik Bong and Tar Bone Kyaw formed the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) to fill the gap of armed struggles and continued to fight against the Myanmar military. Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) is the army wing of PSLF. Currently, TNLA are fighting alongside the KIA and SSPP/SSA against the government in northern Shan state.

After the 2010 elections, the government recognized the areas that Palaung (also known as Ta'ang) inhabit in northern Shan state as an administration zone. However it remains very underdeveloped and there are very few schools and hospitals.
**Peace Process**

*Non-ceasefire group*

|-----------|------------|-------------|

*Official delegation team*

None

*Liaison offices*

None

### Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>TNLA Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31/07/2013</td>
<td>Muse, Shan State</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Tar Bone Kyaw, Tar Khu Larn</td>
<td>U Aung Min, Pyithu Hluttaw Socio-economic Development Committee Chairman U Maung Maung Swe</td>
<td>Preparatory meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/10/2013</td>
<td>Shwe Li, China</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Tar Bone Kyaw</td>
<td>MPC technical team</td>
<td>Informal Ethnic cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UNFC Member

1

### NCCT Member

2

### Laiza ethnic conference

1 Attendee Signed agreement

### Law khee lar ethnic conference

2 Attendee Signed agreement

### Military allies

KIO/KIA

### Meetings with other groups

4

### Meetings with foreign actors

5

### National conferences

6

### Co-operations

7

### Observers at meetings

8
Developments
Demands from PLSF Central Committee meeting (from Aug 6-8, 2012):
1. To stop military offensives in Ta’ang areas.
2. To declare a nationwide ceasefire.
3. To hold an inclusive political dialogue with all ethnic groups.

Statements
05 Nov 2013 - TNLA Statement over conflict with government army
04 Aug 2013 - PSLF/TNLA held a public meeting in Mann Ton township
01 Aug 2013 - PSLF/TNLA Statement on peace talks in Muse town (Eng)
01 Aug 2013 - PSLF/TNLA Statement on peace talks in Muse town (Bur)
31 Jul 2013 - TNLA’s 9 points proposal in Muse meeting
26 Jul 2013 - Statement on the meeting between TNLA and UPWC
08 Feb 2013 - Letter to the President requesting an invitation to ceasefire talks
18 Jan 2013 - Palaung statement on the 50th Golden Jubilee National Revolutionary Day
12 Jan 2013 - Statement on Golden Jubilee Palaung National Revolutionary Day
23 Sep 2012 - Palaung group statement on peace
15 Oct 2012 - PSLF statement to encourage the Palaung community about the peace process
12 Jan 2012 - PLSF statement on 49th National Revolution Day
United Nationalities Federal Council

SUMMARY
Founded Feb. 16, 2011

The UNFC is the latest coalition of ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar, aligned with the government. The UNFC was renamed and reformed from the Committee for the Emergence of Federal Union (CEFU), founded in Nov. 2010. The UNFC wants to represent all ethnic armed forces during peace negotiations with the government.

Previous Ethnic Alliances:
- National Democratic Front (NDF), 1976-ongoing
- Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), 2001-ongoing

Objective:
The UNFC wants to establish a Federal Union in Myanmar. They have already formed the Federal Union Army (FUA) to protect ethnic areas.

UNFC members (previous members of CEFU):
1. Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)
2. New Mon State Party (NMSP)
3. Shan State Army-North (SSPP / SSA)
4. Karen National Union (KNU)
5. Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)
6. Chin National Front (CNF)

5 new members:
1. Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)
2. Arakan National Council (ANC)
3. Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO)
4. Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) also known as Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF)
5. Wa National Organization (WNO)

(Previous 6th new member Kachin National Organisation has merged with the KIO)

6. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)

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UNFC Technical Team

1. Padoh Mahn Mahn (KNU)
2. Col. Ji Nawng (KIO)
3. U Aung San Myint (KNPP)
4. Khun Myint Tun (PNLO)
5. Nai Kwe Hong Mon (NMSP)
6. U Twan Zaw (ANC)
7. Saw Aw Baw Mu Ku Thay (KNU)

Comprehensive Union Peace & Ceasefire Agreement Memorandum of Understanding with Nippon Foundation

Organisation structure:
Each member organization appoints 2-4 individuals for representation in the UNFC Council.
Presently, there are 22 members of the UNFC Council, 10 are elected Central Executive Committee members.

Federal Union Army (Formed December, 2011)

CEC members:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chairman #1</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Zau Seng KIO</td>
<td>Khun Abel Tweed KNPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chairman #2</td>
<td>Khun Abel Tweed KNPP</td>
<td>Padoh David Tharckabaw KNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Nai Hong Sar NMSP</td>
<td>Nai Hong Sar NMSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretary #1 / spokesman</td>
<td>Col. Hkun Okker PNLO</td>
<td>Padoh Mahn Mahn KNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretary #2</td>
<td>Shwe Myo Thant KNPP</td>
<td>Col. Hkun Okker PNLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Mahn Nyein Maung KNU</td>
<td>Dr. Khin Maung ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Dr. La Ja KIO</td>
<td>Dr. La Ja KIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Dr Suikhar CNF</td>
<td>Naw Zipporah Sein KNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Bawmwang Laraw KNU</td>
<td>Nai Kwe Hong Mon NMSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>A Reference Guide 2014</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 23/12/2011</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Col. Hkun Okker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 09/11/2012</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>Nai Hong Sar, Col. Hkun Okker, and several other UNFC leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 20/02/2013</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>Nai Hong Sar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 13/07/2013</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>Nai Hong Sar, Padoh Mahn Mahn, Other Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 27/08/2013</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>UNFC technical team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 08/09/2013</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>UNFC U Aung Min, U Khin Yi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNFC meetings:
29/07/2013 Chiang Mai, Thailand
MNDAA, NBF, UWSA, NDAA

07/10/2013 Chiang Mai, Thailand
All UNFC members
Discussed the framework for political dialogue with government and nationwide ceasefire.

22/11/2013 Chiang Mai, Thailand
UNFC, RCSS, WGEC
1. Khin Mg Swe - NDF
2. Daw Than Than Nu - Democratic Party Myanmar
3. Myo Nyunt - Democracy and Peace party
4. Sai Aik Pao - SNDP
5. Zaw Aye Maung (Rakhine minister in Yangon)
6. Saw Tun Aung Myint (Karen minister in Yangon)
7. Noe Htan Khat (Chin minister in Sagaing)
8. U Zoe Zam - CNP
9. Sai Nyunt Lwin - SNLD
10. Nay Myo Wai - Peace and diversity Party,
11. Nan Khin Htwe Myint - NLD
They discussed about federal army and federal union, for trust building in future political dialogue.

Workshops:
13-15 Jan 2014, Political framework workshop co-organized by UNFC and NCCT.
9-11 Jan 2014: Nationwide Ceasefire Accord workshop co-organized by UNFC and NCCT.
2-5 Dec 2013: Security Sector Reform outcome of the Northern Ireland Peace Process
24 Nov 2013: UNFC and political parties held a workshop for federalism
7-10 Oct 2013: UNFC held an emergency meeting in Chiang Mai
29-31 July 2013: UNFC held a conference
5-7 July 2013: Lessons from Aceh peace process
Roadmap

The 6 points Ethnic Peace Roadmap: (27/09/2012) - alternative to government's peace roadmap

1. The armed ethnic nationality organizations, political parties, women and youths organizations and civil society organizations will hold meetings to lay down points that will included in the Framework for Political Dialogue.

2. Union government representatives and unified representatives for ethnic armed organizations will hold meetings to establish the Framework for Political Dialogue.
   a) Holding meetings in a place acceptable for both sides.
   b) Proceedings of the meetings are to be conducted in the presence of neutral international observers and the points agreed upon are to be promulgated jointly for public knowledge.

3. After establishing the Framework for Political Dialogue by representatives of the government and the armed ethnic resistance organizations, conferences of the ethnic peoples are to be held in the states or divisions, as necessary, for clarification and approval.

4. To hold a national conference of the various nationalities participated by representatives of the ethnic armed organizations, political parties, civil society organizations, women and youths organizations.

5. A Union conference, participated by an equal number of representatives from the ethnic forces, the democratic forces and the government is to be held in the form acceptable to the three forces, and based on Panlong Spirit; the agreements adopted by the conference are to be regarded as the "Union Accord".

6. The Union Accord is to be implemented in accordance within a precise time frame.

Demands

UNFC requested to discuss four main issues in 2012

1. To plan a meeting between UNFC and the government in Japan under the moderation of The Nippon Foundation.
2. Ways to solve the ongoing sectarian violence in Rakhine state.
3. The implementation of UNFC’s Six Point Ethnic Peace Roadmap.
4. Ending the fighting between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and Myanmar military.

Informal agreement: (9 November 2012)

1. To resolve political issues by political means.
2. Hold political dialogue with all armed organizations as one and not separately.
3. To discuss the following topics during the formal meeting that is being planned at the newly established Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) in Yangon next month: framework for political dialogue, agenda, timeline, technical assistance and logistics.
Foreign activities

24 Apr 2012 - Tokyo, Japan: Three UNFC Central Executive members, Dr. La Ja, Col. Hkun Okker and Padoh David Tharckabaw traveled to Tokyo to talk with the Japanese government. UNFC leaders discussed the current political situation in Myanmar, the UNFC's role in resolving the ongoing conflict and about peace talks between the government and ethnic armed forces.

27 Sept 2012 - USA: A UNFC and National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) joint delegation led by KNU Central Executive member Padoh David Tharckabaw and Joint General Secretary and Spokesperson for the UNFC Col. Hkun Okker travelled to the US. During this time they met with US and UN officials to talk about Myanmar's ethnic peace process. Other members of the delegation included UNFC Member of Foreign Affairs; Sao Swy Mangrai, UNFC Member of Military Affairs; La Awng and U.S. Representative for the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB); Moe Chan.

1-5 April 2013 - Tokyo Japan: UNFC members visited Japan to meet the new Japanese prime minister and discuss the new granting of humanitarian assistance to ethnic people in Myanmar

May 2013 - UK: UNFC sent a delegation to the United Kingdom, led by the alliance's chairman Lt-Gen N.Ban La and Secretary General Nai Hong Sa to study the peace process in Northern Ireland. N'Ban La (Chairman), Nai Han Thar (Secretary), U Solomon (CNF), U Solomon (Lahu), Bum Wam Laraw (KIO), and a representative from ALP.

Statements

01 Jan 2013 - UNFC statement on Myanmar military offensives in Kachin state
10 Jan 2013 - UNFC annual meeting statement
20 Jan 2013 - UNFC Public Relation and News Unit press statement
21 Jan 2013 - The UNFC and NCUB released statements condemning President U Thein Sein's government's war in Kachin state as a step backward in achieving peace and democracy in Myanmar
09 Jul 2013 - UNFC Press Release (Burmese)
08 Sep 2013 - Joint statement between Government and UNFC (Eng)
10 Sep 2013 - Information Release on 2nd Preliminary Meeting between UNFC and UPWC (Eng)
11 Oct 2013 - UNFC emergency council meeting statement
11 Oct 2013 - UNFC statement on Laiza summit and Myitkyina meeting (Eng)
12 Nov 2013 - UNFC statement on Laiza summit and Myitkyina meeting (Bur)
25 Nov 2013 - Joint Statement of UNFC & UNA (Bur) (Eng)
27 Nov 2013 - UNFC Press Release (7/2013) (Eng)
United Wa State Party

Political wing: United Wa State Party (UWSP)
Armed wing: United Wa State Army (UWSA)

Government Name: Shan State (North) Special Region-2

SUMMARY

Founded: 1989
Headquarters: Pangkham (also known as Phangsang)
Operational Area: Pangsang, Mongmau, Pangwai, Nahphan, Mongpawt, Hopan, Mak Marng, Mongton, Mong Hsat, Tachileik, Mong Pan, Mongyaung
Estimated strength: 30,000 (reserve 10,000)
Leader: Bao You Xiang

The UWSP administers 6 designated townships of the Wa Self-Administered Division as stipulated in the 2008 Constitution. Its official name was announced by decree on 20 Aug. 2010. The UWSP rejected the government’s Border Guard Force scheme in 2009. The group maintains close ties with China (both politically and economically) and uses Chinese as the party’s working language.

The UWSP military wing the Wa army is estimated to number 30,000 troops and 10,000 auxiliary members. They are the largest ethnic army in Myanmar and reported to be a major player in the opium, heroin and amphetamine drug trade. However the UWSA control area has been declared drug free and the group owns large business conglomerate Thawda Win Company, formerly known as the Hong Pang Group. It was originally formed from members of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) following its collapse in 1989.

With the 2008 constitution, UWSP/UWSA established Wa self-administration region composed of Hopan, Mong Mau, Pang Wai, Nar Phang, Mak Marng and Pang Sang (Pang Kham) township in Shan state.

The UWSA has 5 divisions deployed along the Thai-Myanmar border and 3 divisions in China-Myanmar border.

On Thai-Myanmar border:
1. 778th Division
2. 772nd Division
3. 775th Division

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4. 248th Division
5. 518th Division

On China-Myanmar border:
1. 318th Division
2. 418th Division
3. 468th Division

CEC Members:
Chairman: Bao You Xiang
Vice-Chairman: Xiao Mingliang (Shouk Min Lyan)
Commander-in-chief: Bao You Xiang
Deputy commander in chief: Zhao Zhongdang
Spokesperson: U Aung Myint
In charge of external affairs: Zhao Guo-ann
Deputy in charge of external affairs: Sam Khun
Supreme court chief: Li Zhao Guo
In charge of finance and business affairs: Bao You Liang

Peace Process
New Ceasefire: 6 Sept. 2011
1st resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government
Stage 2: Union level peace talks (25 Dec. 2011)
Previous ceasefire: 9 May 1989
Sporadic clashes with the Myanmar army have occurred since 2009 (no official announcement of fighting by either side).

# Post-Ceasefire Clashes: none

Official legation team

A Reference Guide 2014
### Liaison offices

1. Lashio  
2. Tang Yang  
3. Keng Tung  
4. Tachilek  
5. Taung Gyi  
6. Mandalay  
7. Yangon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>UWSA Rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06/09/2011</td>
<td>Kengtung</td>
<td>Bao Youliang</td>
<td>U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>State level ceasefire agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/10/2011</td>
<td>Lashio</td>
<td>Xiao Ming Liang</td>
<td>U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>Union level Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The UWSP agreed not to secede from the Union. Discussions included: the reopening of education, health and liaison offices, reassignment of staff, drug eradication in cooperation with the government, implementing measures for border region development, arrangements made for economic-driven industries. Related agreements were signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/12/2011</td>
<td>Pangsang</td>
<td>Xiao Ming Liang</td>
<td>U Aung Thaung</td>
<td>Union Level 6 Point agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government representative Aung Thaung urged the UWSP to take part in the upcoming by-elections expected to take place early next year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/05/2012</td>
<td>Pangsang</td>
<td>unknown unknown</td>
<td>Regime officials visit Pangsang, Shan state for meeting with UWSA officials.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 17/08/2012 Wiangkao
and Pangsang
Xiao Ming
Liang
Deputy Border Affairs minister Maj Gen Zaw Win
Official visits by Maj Gen Zaw Win to the Wa area.
Other UWSA delegates: Bao Youri, Zhao Zhongdang, Bao Youliang, Ai Lone, Zhao Guo-ang, U Aung Myint, Bo Laikham and others

6 06/10/2012 Kengtung
Xiao Ming
Myanmar army chief vice-snr Gen. Min Aung Hlaing
Both sides agreed to cooperate in eradicating drugs.

7 16/11/2012 Pangsang
Xiao Ming
Northeastern Region commander Maj-Gen Aung Soe
Goodwill visit and inspection of UWSA's Hong Pang Company.

8 04/12/2012 Pangsang
Xiao Ming
U Aung Min The discussions centered on economic and development programmes. Other governmentt delegates included: U Thein Zaw, U Soe Thane, Border Affairs Minister Lt-Gen Thein Htay, Shan state Chief Minister; Sao Aung Myat, Shan State Security and Border Affairs Minister Col Aung Thu, Triangle Region Commander Maj-Gen Than Tun Oo, Northeastern Region Commander Maj Gen Aung Soe.

9 20/03/2013 Lashio, Shan State
Xiao Hsarm Khun
U Aung Min Sideline meeting at the Shan-Kayah Trust-building for Peace Conference. Wa called for a separate statehood could be decided only by the Union legislature.

10 12/07/2013 Kengtung
Zho Guo-ang aka Kyauk Kaw Ann (External affairs in charge)
UPWC Crisis meeting: 5 point agreement

11 03/09/2013 Kengtung
UWSA U Shwe Mann
Informal meeting.
Informal meeting.

U Thein Zaw proposed 9 points including the national census, ID cards, local development, permitting government servants to work in Wa territory and nationwide ceasefire signing ceremony.

Ethnic cooperation:
1. UNFC
2. NCCT
3. Laiza ethnic conference
4. Law Khee Lar ethnic conference
5. Military allies NDAA, MNDAA
6. Meetings with other groups
7. Meetings with foreign actors
8. National conferences Shan-Kayah Trust-building for Peace Conference
9. Cooperation
10. Observers at meetings

Developments:
1. Panglong agreement and spirit
2. Efforts for Nationwide ceasefire
3. Code of Conduct: control area
4. Monitoring: crisis mediating body
5. Monitoring: ceasefire monitoring body
6. Military relations A continue holding talks to cooperate on defence forces of the State for security and defence of the State as one as it agrees not to disintegrate the State and secede from the State at all
7. Observers
12 Ethnic Rights

Demanding more self-administration and autonomous township continue negotiating matters related to enabling representatives in townships of "Wa" Special Region take seats in each Hluttaw - encouraging proper representation of Wa in their respective areas.

13 National day

Resettlement

14 ID card

Resettlement plans

15 Demining

16 NSAG company V Enterprises: Hong Pang Company (founded in 1998) changed its name to Thawda Win Company in 2012. It is a conglomerate involved in construction, agriculture, gems and minerals, logging, petroleum, electronics, telecommunications, factories, bank, distilleries, department stores, airline, hotels and brewery. The group is based in Panghsang with offices in Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio, Tachileik and Mawlamyine. Ho Chun Ting, aka Aik Haw aka Hsiao Haw, the son-in-law of Bao You-Xiang, is the principal owner and managing director of Yangon Airways and chairman of Tetkham Co Ltd that runs a chain of hotels. Thawda Win Company has subsidiary companies including (1) Tet Kham Co. Ltd (2) Myanmar Dagaung Co. Ltd (3) Mong Mao Co. Ltd.

18 SEZ/SIZ

Development projects: Adoption short-term and long-term socio-economic development plans

Union government to help increase opportunities for national races youths in "Wa" Special Region to pursue education with the mindset to develop their insights, to equip them with vocational skills.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Jan 2013</td>
<td>NDAA, UWSA and SSPP issued a joint statement for the govt to stop its offensive against the KIO/KIA and start political dialogue.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Aug 2012</td>
<td>RCSS + UWSA commanders say tensions between the two armies have subsided following a &quot;misunderstanding&quot; that caused a face off opposite Chiang Mai's Fang District in northeast Myanmar.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jun 2011</td>
<td>UWSP's statement concerning ongoing clashes between the Myanmar military with the RCSS/SSA, KIA and KNLA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Government’s peace plan

President Thein Sein has pledged to make the ethnic issue a national priority, offering dialogue with all armed groups and dropping key preconditions for talks. Specifically, dropping the demand for the groups to become border guard forces, and then an unprecedented national conference to seek political solutions to ethnic divisions. Plans for a peace process were drawn up by the Ethnic Affairs and Internal Peace Committee set up by both Houses of the People’s Parliament and the National Parliament.

The latest Union-level peace team is made up of a central committee for making policies and a working committee for implementing policies associated with ceasefire negotiations. The central committee (UPCC) is chaired by President Thein Sein, while the working committee (UPWC) is chaired by the Vice President Sai Mauk Kham. Prior to the Union-level peace team, there were 2 government peace teams led respectively by U Aung Thaung and U Aung Min, who divided their tasks geographically. The MPC was created in November 2012 to assist the peace team’s work.

Tasks: In 2013, the government changed its state and union level peace plan towards the nationwide ceasefire and political dialogue towards a union accord. The NDSC makes the executive decisions for the ceasefire, while the Chief negotiator President’s office minister U Aung Min, assisted by the MPC’s technical team, negotiates peace agreements with the NSAGs. Peace and trust building between the ethnic and government side, as well as public outreach are also important tasks of the peace team. Implementation of peace related policy is carried out by the MPC, government ministers, union and state level ministries. Humanitarian work is also overseen by the chief minister of state and State Security and Border Affairs ministry with the assistance of foreign donors and organisations. Other key ministries include the Border Affairs ministry, Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement ministry, Environmental Conservation and Forestry ministry and Health Ministry. In April 2013, Union Peace Making Committee and MPC members led by U Aung Min also travelled to Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States of America on a two week trip to observe peace activities.

Funding: The exact amount of funding for the peace process is unknown. The government initially did not allocate any state budget for the peace plan when new ceasefire talks were renewed in 2011. In 2013, there was a 1 million kyat endowment for peace, diverted from original funding for the construction of housing for parliamentarians in Naypyidaw. The New Light of Myanmar reported donations by government ministries, parliament and domestic companies for humanitarian aid and development. The Peace Donor Support Group which was requested by President Thein Sein is also a crucial source of funding. Money is channeled through various routes, some through the MPC, while others go through the Border Affairs ministry and other related ministries. In January 2014, the President requested K7 billion for government’s peace plan from the 2014 state budget beginning in April.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State level: Ceasefire, set up liaison offices and travel without holding arms to each other's territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union level: Confidence building, holding political dialogue, implement regional development tasks in terms of education, health and communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign agreement for eternal peace in the presence of the parliament represented by nationalities, political parties and different walks of life.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army proposed:**

1. To have an actual desire to achieve peace
2. Keep the promises made in agreements
3. Not to take advantage from the peace agreement
4. Not to add burden on locals
5. Action must be in line with current laws and regulations
6. Action must be in accordance with the 3 main national causes and 2008 constitution

**President Thein Sein's guideline:**

1. To cooperate and negotiate for the demands of ethnic armed groups
2. Reapprove the ceasefire agreement
3. Move forward to political dialogue after signing a ceasefire agreement
4. Working together with all ethnic armed groups (all inclusive) for peace

---

**Peace Working Committee - Ceasefire guidelines**

In order to reach peace agreements (with ethnic armed groups), Union-level Peacemaking Work Committee will carry out the following duties and report to the Union-level central executive committee:

**State level Peace negotiation - 5 Terms**

1. To ceasefire from both sides
2. To deploy troops only in agreed territories
3. Prohibit carrying arms outside the designated territories
4. Open liaison offices in areas agreed by both sides (no arms allowed)
5. In order for the negotiation process to proceed to Union Level negotiation, each group will have to form an official delegation team and negotiate the place and time for Union Level negotiation.

**Union Level Peace Negotiation - 8 Points**

1. To remain forever in the Union
2. To accept the Three National Causes: non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national sovereignty and perpetuation of national sovereignty
3. To cooperate in economic and development tasks
4. To cooperate in the elimination of narcotic drugs
5. To set up political parties and enter elections
6. To support the implementation of the 2008 constitution
7. To cooperate in the elimination of corruption
8. To support the implementation of the 2008 constitution
6. To accept the 2008 Constitution and to make necessary amendments via Parliament by majority consent
7. To fully enter the legal fold for permanent peace and live, move, work in accord with the Constitution
8. To coordinate existence of only a single armed forces in accord with the Constitution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDSC (11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense and Security Council</td>
<td>executive decisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>President Thein Sein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vice-President Nyan Tun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vice-President Dr. Sai Mauk Kham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wunna Maung Lwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>People’s Assembly Speaker Shwe Mann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>National Assembly Speaker Khin Aung Myint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services Vice Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Deputy Commander-in-Chief vice-Snr. Gen. Soe Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Lt. Gen. Wai Lwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs Lt. Gen. Ko Ko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Minister of Border Affairs Lt. Gen. Thet Naing Win</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Peace Central Committee (UPCC) (11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creates policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair by President Thein Sein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Vice President U Nyan Tun (replaced U Tin Aung Myint Oo, Aug.16, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vice President Dr. Sai Mauk Kham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attorney-General Dr. Tun Shin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Director of President’s office U Min Zaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Speaker of the Upper house U Shwe Mann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Speaker of the Lower house U Khin Aung Myint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Minister of Home Affairs Lieutenant-General Ko Ko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Defense Minister Lieutenant-General Wai Lwin (replaced General Hla Min)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant-General Thet Naing Win (replaced Lieutenant-General Thein Htay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) implements policy. The Chairman is Vice President Dr. Sai Mauk Kham, the Vice-Chairman is President Office Minister Aung Min, and the Vice-Chairman is D-G of the Government Office U Myo Tint Kyi. There are 8 ministers, including U Ohn Myint (Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Ministry), U Soe Thein (President Office Ministry), U Than Htay (Rail Transport Ministry), U Khin Yee (Immigration and Population Ministry), U Win Htun (Environmental Conservation and Forestry Ministry), U Khin Maung Soe (Electrical Power Ministry), Maj. Gen. Maung Maung Ohn (Deputy Minister, Border Affairs Ministry) (replaced Gen Zaw Win, 28 Oct, 2013), and U Htun Htun Oo (Chief Justice). There are 10 region or state chief ministers, including U La John Ngan Seing (Kachin State), U Khin Maung Oo (aka U Bu Reh (Kayar state), U Zaw Min (Kayin state), U Ohn Ngai (Chin State), U Thar Aye (Sagaing Region), U Ko Myat Ko (Tanintharyi Region), U Nyan Win (Pegu Region), U Ohn Myint (Mon State), U Hla Maung Tin (Rakhine state), and U Sao Aung Myat (Shan state).

The Committee also has 18 ethnic parliament members from both the Lower and Upper Houses. These include Daw Dwe Bu (Kachin), U Soe Reh (Kayar), U Saw Thein Aung (Kayin), U Ngon Maung (Chin), Daw Mi Yin Chan (Chin), U Ba Shein (Rakhine), U Sa Ti Phan (Shan), U Hla Tun (Naga), U Kyin Wan (Wa), U Sa Khont Taint Yain (Kachin), U Sann Rahe (Kayar), U Saw Htun Mya Aung (Kayin), U Paw Lyan Lwin (Chin), U Saw Ohn (Mon), U Ohn Tin (Rakhine), U Sai Kyaw Zaw Than (Shan), U Myat Ko (Naga), U Sai Pao Nut (Wa), etc.

Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC)

Address: No. 11, Shweli Road, Kamaryut Township, Yangon 11041-11044.

Opened: Nov.3, 2012

Headed by: Aung Min (President's Office Minister)

Run by: Soe Thein (President's Office Minister), Khin Yee (Immigration and Population Minister)

Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Academic), Hla Maung Shwe (Myanmar Egress), Aung Naing Oo (Vahu Development Institute), Dr. Min Zaw Oo (Academic), Kyaw Soe Hlaing, Tin Maung Than (Myanmar Egress)

MPC technical team: U Hla Maung Shwe, U Tin Maung Than, U Kyaw Soe Hlaing, Dr. Min Zaw Oo, Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, U Aung Naing Oo, U Nyo Ohn Myint, Dr. Andrew Ngun Chung Lian, Dr. Naw Rebecca Tin

The Government of Myanmar opened the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) in Yangon as part of an agreement with the Norway-led Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG). It was established to assist the Union Peacemaking Central Committee and the Union Peacemaking Work Committee for the peace process. It coordinates all peace initiatives and acts as a one-stop service center for donor governments and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that want to support the peace process. In addition, it serves as a platform for government officials, members of ethnic militia groups, civil society organizations, international donors and INGOs to meet and negotiate.

The MPC was originally reported to have opened in July 2012 on U Wisara Road. It was actually opened on November 3, 2012 with a start-up fund of EUR 700,000 from the European Union (a member of the PDSG) and four houses provided by the Myanmar government. The opening ceremony was attended by the European Commission (EC) President Barroso.

On March 25, 2013 it also received $1.2 Million from the Japanese government for its running costs. On November 5, 2013 it also requested 1 billion kyats for the peace budget in Parliament, 100 million kyats already used in advance for the MPC.

The Myanmar Peace Centre plays a key role in the development of a peaceful nation inclusive of Myanmar's ethnic diversity.
The Myanmar Peace Centre achieves its mission by providing policy advice and strategic level guidance as well as coordinating government activities in five key areas: Ceasefire Negotiation Programme (CFN), Peace Dialogue Program (PD), Peace Building Operations Coordination Program (PBOC), Outreach and Public Diplomacy Program (OPD), and Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC).
1. Ceasefire negotiations and implementation
2. Peace negotiations and political dialogue
3. Coordination of assistance in conflict affected areas
4. Outreach and public diplomacy
5. Mine Action

Phase 1: November 2012 - February 2013

Specific Objective 1 - Effective monitoring and implementation of ceasefire agreements is ensured.

Specific Objective 2 - Consult with wide range of stakeholders to develop a plan for political dialogue.

Specific Objective 3 - Peacebuilding activities build confidence in the ceasefire agreements and in the longer term political process.

Specific Objective 4 - Build widespread public understanding of the peace process.

Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC) is designed to complement efforts to achieve the specific objectives, as a specialized project for humanitarian demining under the peace process.

Phase 2: March 2013 to August 2014
Created at the Laiza ethnic conference 30 Oct - 2 Nov 2013, the NCCT will represent member ethnic armed organizations when negotiating with the government’s peace negotiation team. The NCCT is expected to be temporary until member NSAGs sign the NCA, and will be replaced by another committee to write up the political framework and dialogue. It is primarily run by funds from member NSAGs, and miscellaneous support by the Nippon Foundation e.g. venue fees for the meeting. Chiang Mai meeting held at Alpine Golf Resort in Chiang Mai on 29 Dec. 2013.

The NCCT Representatives of RCSS attended but did not sign the 11-common position as it needs to consult the Committee for Shan State Unity prior to signing any agreements. The two other major ethnic armed groups UWSA and NDAA were also invited to attend but they couldn’t attend the conference.

Member organisations
1. Arakan Liberation Party
2. Arakan National Council
3. Arakan Army
4. Chin National Front
5. Democratic Karen Benevolent Army
6. Kachin Independence Organization
7. Karenni National Progressive Party
8. Karen National Union
9. KNU/KNLA Peace Council
10. Lahu Democratic Union
11. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
12. New Mon State Party
13. Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization
14. Palaung State Liberation Front
15. Shan State Progress Party
16. Wa National Organization
17. RCSS did not sign
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Mother Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nai Hongsa (aka) Nai Han Tha</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>NMSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Padoh Kwe Htoo Win</td>
<td>Deputy leader 1</td>
<td>KNU, General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Gun Maw</td>
<td>Deputy leader 2</td>
<td>KIO, Deputy C-in-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Kyaw Han</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ms. Mra Raza Lin</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>ALP, CEC member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Twan Zaw</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>ANC, General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dr. Lian H. Sakhong</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>CNF, Presidium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Col. Saw Lont Lon</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>DKBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shwe Myo Thant</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>KNPP, Secretary-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gen. Dr. Timothy Laklem</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>KPC, Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Col. Hkun Okker</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>PNLO, Patron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sai Ba Tun</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>SSPP, CEC member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ta Aik Nyunt</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>WNO, Secretary General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NCCT Meetings:**

- [Laiza conference](#) (30 Oct - 2 Nov 2013)
- [Law Khee Lar conference](#) (20-25 January)
- NCCT held a 3 days workshop holding in Chiang Mai on 9-11 Jan. 2014.
- NCCT will have political framework workshop on 13-15 Jan. 2014.

**NCCT-Government Meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>EAOs rep</th>
<th>Govt Rep</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>04-05/11/2013</td>
<td>Myitkyina</td>
<td>18 arms groups</td>
<td>U Aung Min, Thein Zaw</td>
<td>Government presented 3rd NCA draft</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>26/11/2013</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>NCCT</td>
<td>U Aung Min, Thein Zaw</td>
<td>Reviewing the Govt draft of nationwide ceasefire agreement, Laiza agreement. Federal Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15/12/2013</td>
<td>Yangon</td>
<td>NCCT MPC technical team</td>
<td>Informal meeting</td>
<td>Informal meeting. They discussed single text document and nationwide ceasefire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>29/12/2013</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>U Aung Min, Thein Zaw, MPC technical team</td>
<td>Informal meeting</td>
<td>Informal meeting. They discussed single text document and nationwide ceasefire.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
1. NCCT released a statement on Law Khee Lar meeting on Jan 25, 2014
2. Eleven Point Common Position of Ethnic Resistance Organizations on Nationwide Ceasefire
Appendix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Participants</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 5/1/13</td>
<td>Naypyitaw</td>
<td>KNU</td>
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<td>3 6/1/13</td>
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<td>Union Level Mutu Say Poe C-in-C of Defence Services Vice-Sr Gen Min Aung Hlaing</td>
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<td>4 9/1/13</td>
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<td>Code of Conduct Gen. Mutu Say Poe Vice-Senior General Min Aung Hlaing</td>
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<td>5 22/1/13</td>
<td>Myawaddy, Kayin state</td>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Union Level Gen. Saw Lah Pwe U Aung Min, Maj. Gen Maung Maung Ohn</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 4/2/13</td>
<td>Ruili, China</td>
<td>KIO</td>
<td>Preparatory U Sum Lut Gam U Aung Min Chinese Ambassador, KNU, RCSS, EBO and ENC reps</td>
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<td>7 13/2/13</td>
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<td>Informal Yawd Serk U Aung Min</td>
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<td>UNFC</td>
<td>Preliminary Nai Hong Sar U Aung Min Yohei Sasakawa</td>
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<td>KNU</td>
<td>Informal Gen. Saw Mutu Say Poe VP Sai Mauk Kham</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 11/3/13</td>
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<td>KIO</td>
<td>Preliminary Sum Lut Gam and KIO Deputy Chief of Staff Brig-Gen. Gum Maw. U Aung Min and Lt-Gen. Myint Soe KNU, PNLO, RCSS, NDAA, NMSP leaders, 3 Chinese diplomats, 4 representatives from PCG.</td>
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<td>13 20/3/13</td>
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<td>Union Level (Agreement) Col. Khun Okker U Aung Min reps from youth, women and labour affairs orgs</td>
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<td>Hpa-an</td>
<td>KNU</td>
<td>Informal KNU leaders U Aung Min</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 3/4/13</td>
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<td>SSPP</td>
<td>Crisis Col. Khun Hseng U Khin Maung Soe (minister of electric power no.2), U Win Myint (minister of trade and commerce) and myanmar military high ranking officials</td>
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<td>17 4/5/13</td>
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<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Crisis Maj. Maung Lay Kayin State Security and Border Affairs Minister Aung Lwin</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>Preparotary Leaders UPWC vice chairman Thein Zaw for census issue</td>
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<td>Panghsang</td>
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<td>Preparotary Xao Min Liang and Pao Yo Yi UPWC vice chairman Thein Zaw for census issue</td>
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<td>Code of Conduct Padoh Saw Tar Doh Moo and Padoh Saw Hla Tun MPC officials</td>
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<td>Preliminary Technical Team of UNFC Technical Team of MPC</td>
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<td>35 31/7/3</td>
<td>Muse</td>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td>Preliminary Lt. Col. Tar Bone Kyaw U Aung Min SSPP, NMSP, KIA, Palaung Youth and Senior Citizens</td>
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<td>36 4/8/13</td>
<td>Mawlamyaine</td>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>Informal Nai Tala Nyi, Nai Kyi San, Nai M.seik Chan Hla Maung Shwe, Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Aung Naing Oo and Nyo Ohn Myint discuss about nationwide ceasefire</td>
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<td>State Level (Ceasefire agreement) Than Khe Kayin State's border affairs minister Col. Aung Lwin Min Ko Naing &amp; Mya Aye from 88 generations,observers from Nippon foundation and Center for Peace and Conflict Studies</td>
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Appendix 2: Total meetings between government and NSAGs in 2013 - page 1
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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Appendix 2: 11-Point Common Position of Ethnic Resistance Organizations on Nationwide Ceasefire

Preamble (to be confirmed)

Basic Principles

1. Leading to peace
2. Acknowledgment of the Panglong Agreement
3. A genuine Federal Union
4. The formation of a Federal Army (future)
5. Protection of ethnic rights
6. Equality
7. Inclusiveness
8. A negotiated settlement
9. Joint implementation
10. Transparent & Accountable

2. Objectives

2.1 To build mutual trust
2.2 To cease direct confrontational hostilities
2.3 To abide by a mutually agreed Military Code of Conduct
2.4 To re-ratify all previous agreements between the government and ethnic armed organizations, and initiate a political dialogue that will lead to peace.
2.5 To establish an ethnic state-based federal union following a comprehensive political dialogue.

3. Establishing a Common Road Map (to be negotiated)

3.1 Negotiating an inclusive “Framework for National Political Dialogue”
3.2 Signing a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
3.3 Initiating a national political dialogue
3.4 Convening a national Conference based on the spirit and principles of Panglong in order to be able to sign a Pyidaungsu Accord
3.5 Ratifying the Pyidaungsu Accord
3.6 Implementing the Pyidaungsu Accord

4. Basic Issues to be included in a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (to be negotiated)

4.1 Military matters
4.2 Liaison Office matters
4.3 Agreement to a national political dialogue
4.4 [List of other issues]

[Appendix 2 concludes]
4.4 Ratification of the framework for a political dialogue

4.5 Protection of civilians

4.6 Agreement on a military Code of Conduct

5. Implementation (to be negotiated)

5.1 A mechanism for the joint monitoring of the ceasefire

5.2 A joint Committee to steer the political dialogue

5.3 An independent Human Rights Committee

5.4 An agreed time frame

6. Trust-Building Measures

6.1 Right attitude and willingness to negotiate

6.2 Freedom of movement

7. Removal from the Unlawful Organizations List (to be elaborated)

8. Transitional Measures (to be negotiated)

9. Signing of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

10. Ratification of the Agreement

11. Miscellaneous

The signatories agree to work together to implement the Common Position.

Signatories:

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Khaing Thuka</td>
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<td>Arakan Liberation Party</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Twan Zaw</td>
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<td>Arakan National Council</td>
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<td>Arakan Army</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Pu Zin Cung</td>
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<td>Chin National Front</td>
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<td>Gen. Saw Moshe</td>
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<td>Democratic Karen Benevolent Army</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Karenni National Progressive Party</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Saw Mutu Say Poe</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>KNU/KNLA Peace Council</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Lahu Democratic Union</td>
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Appendix 2:
Note: The Restoration Council for Shan State is in full agreement with the Common Position but refrained from signing since the newly formed Committee for Shan State Unity (17 October 2013) of which it is a member, requires that it be consulted first prior to signing any agreements.

Witnesses:
1. Harn Yawnghwe, Euro-Burma Office
2. Yup Zau Hkawng, Peace-talk Creation Group
3. N'Shan San Aung, Peace-talk Creation Group

Appendix 2: 3