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RISORGIMENTO?

Les héros sont fatigués, the heroes are tired. Would the title of a movie of the 60s apply to the forerunners of Official Development Assistance (ODA)? The figures published by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development certainly bear that out. In terms of ODA related to gross national product, Canada went down by 22% to 0.42% from 1975 to 1980. From 1979 to 1980, England reduced its ODA by one third to 0.34%. Even Norway and Sweden decreased theirs by 12 and 19% to 0.82 and 0.76%. Only The Netherlands increased its effort by 6% to 0.99%, but there are indications that it may also be affected by the downward trend.

Explanations are many, and all bad: the crisis, unemployment, inflation, narrow national priorities - as if the only starting point for real development everywhere were not the mutuality of interests between peoples in the North and peoples in the South.

In this climate of despondency, aggravated by the deadlock in the global negotiations, the new Italian policies deserve being singled out. Italy was at the bottom of the ODA ladder with only 0.08% in 1979. That year, the Parliament decided to reach the DAC average of 0.34% by 1983. The amounts voted to this effect are of a significant magnitude: 1 billion US dollars last year, 1.2 this year, 1.5 next year (at current rate of exchange).

Even more significant, these resources should serve the satisfaction of fundamental human needs and the pursuit of self-reliance, as decided by the Chamber of Deputies in the resolution which is reproduced below (pp. 67-72).

Beyond the facts, the important question is why?

The whole story began in 1979. A small party, the radical party, realized that 17 million children were to die during that year - the International Year of the Child. It launched a national campaign for development cooperation which resulted in the Parliamentary decision mentioned above. And those familiar with What now - another development, the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on development and international cooperation and with the third system project report (IFDA Dossier 17, 1980) will recognize an unusually high degree of like-mindedness between these texts and the resolution of the Italian Parliament.

If there is a lesson in this, it is that the combination of political vision and peoples’ mobilization can work out political change, that efforts of small groups are never wasted. Let us hope that the lesson of this new Italian risorgimento will be heard in North Europe and in Canada, where the development cooperation drive started in the 60s.
SELF-RELIANCE IN UNEXPECTED PLACES

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Abstract: Self-reliance is most discussed in relation to national or the Third World (collective self-reliance) spaces. But if it is obvious that market forces do not favour local self-reliance, it is impossible to rely only on the state. In fact, millions of people are trying to improve their living conditions through their own efforts. On the basis of examples in Africa (Cameroon, Senegal, Niger), India and Latin America (Venezuela, Trinidad), the author examines the relationship between local and national self-reliance; he distinguishes five cases: opposition from the state, tolerance, benign support, substantial encouragement and the initiative from above. He concludes that while local self-reliance can more or less function without government, national self-reliance is an empty word when not rooted in local communities.

AUTONOMIE LOCALE LÀ OÙ ON NE L’ATTEND PAS

Résumé: L’autonomie, ou développement autocentré (‘self-reliance’) est le plus souvent discutée dans les espaces nationaux ou du Tiers Monde (‘collective self-reliance’). Mais s’il est évident que le marché ne favorise pas l’autonomie locale, on ne saurait pour autant s’en remettre complètement à l’Etat. En fait, des millions de gens ont entrepris d’améliorer leur sort par leurs propres efforts. Sur la base d’exemples africains (Cameroun, Sénégal, Niger), indiens et latino-américains (Venezuela, Trinidad), l’auteur examine les rapports entre l’autonomie locale et nationale; il observe cinq cas: l’opposition totale de l’Etat, une certaine tolérance, un appui modeste, un encouragement réel, et l’initiative d’en haut. Il conclut que si l’autonomie locale peut s’exercer en dehors du cadre étatique, l’autonomie nationale demeure en revanche un slogan si elle n’est pas enracinée dans l’espace local.

(Resumen en Español pag. 13)
SELF-RELIANCE IN UNEXPECTED PLACES

Dimensions of Self-Reliance

To many observers of the development scene, self-reliance is an ideology proclaimed by the leaders of a very limited number of states. Essentially, only the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of Korea, Tanzania and Madagascar have a sufficiently elaborate doctrine, formulated in a number of charters, declarations and official statements, to be included in that category.

This narrow view of self-reliance is the result of a state-centric approach to development studies. The state is seen as the provider of a doctrine for all and as the sole engine for development. It is at the level of the state-unit that the success or failure of development is measured, through such indicators as the Gross National Product, the rate of inflation or the balance of payments deficit.

To understand the full meaning of self-reliance, we must broaden our perspective by including the following four dimensions:

- self-reliance in a historical perspective,
- self-reliance as practised by states who do not proclaim to do so,
- self-reliance at the level of local communities within states (local self-reliance) and at the level of a group of states (collective self-reliance),
- self-reliance in specific sectors of production of goods and services.

Remaining at the level of nation-states, a vast research programme directed by Dieter Senghaas at the University of Bremen, has determined aspects of autocentric development in a variety of European states from 1750 to the present, e.g. Switzerland (1750-1820) and Belgium (1820-1860). It is true that almost any country has gone through periods during which measures of selective delinking (Abkoppelung) have been taken towards the outside world.

Most European countries in the 19th century protected themselves from British goods, while in the 20th century, the Soviet Union followed by a number of Eastern European countries after 1945, broke many economic ties with the former capitalist centres. But to the extent that this simply involves policies of trade

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protectionism or nationalisation of private foreign property, it is not yet autocentric development. Senghaas himself defines the latter as a development process in which, as the final result, self-sustained growth and social development are combined. Such development is, as a rule, based on an increasing differentiated agro-industry structure (characterised by increasing internal division of labour, increasing inter-linkages within and between sectors in terms of dense input-output, interdependencies between agriculture, consumer goods industry, intermediate goods industry and producer goods industry). Such development can be observed in most industrial countries.  

This brings us to an important conceptual clarification. For us, autocentric development in the Third World today is aimed at the liberation from dependence on the outside world. It should move a country from a condition of being a periphery to a dominant centre to that of a centre of its own (without, incidentally, creating its own peripheries). Within the variety of forms of autocentric development, de-linking is only the negative side of self-reliance. Self-reliance is a positive force, building on the human resources of a society to invent its own path of development, to use its own innovative capacity in order to solve its own problems. If external influences hamper this process de-linking should take place. But to merely cut off trade links or take away foreign property, without an internally generated development effort, will not produce any positive consequences. Only where a clear definition of what self-reliance is to achieve exists, and efforts towards realisation are visible, should measures of delinking from the outside world be adopted.

Case studies by members of the Senghaas research team include Algeria and Cuba as illustration of autocentric development. This is correct if the above definition by Senghaas is adopted. But are these cases of self-reliant development? Algeria is definitely not. Despite repeated references to Islam as a source of inspiration for a different, more endogenous type of development, the model prevailing in Algeria is external, a mixture of models found in the industrial world. Oil is also a factor in the external determination of Algeria's development and so is the method of having entire industries delivered ready for use from abroad. This must be kept in mind when looking at the kind of development Third World countries have proposed within the New International Economic Order. Indeed, Algeria played the key role at the Algiers meeting of the Non-Aligned in 1973 and President Boumedienne inaugurated the first world-wide meeting on the issue (6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, April-May 1974). He made no reference to self reliance.

Cuba is in a completely different situation. Early American embargoes practically forced her into relying more on her own forces. But the inherited economic structure led her into a new external dependence of exceptional magnitude. Cuba should be looked at
closely from the point of view of sectoral self-reliance, e.g. in agro-industry, health or education.

The Primordial Importance of Local Self-Reliance

With Development Decades proclaimed at the United Nations one after the other and a New International Economic Order brought to paper, while poverty steadily increased over the years for large segments of the population in the Third World (and even in such industrial countries as the United States), something had to give. It was the myth that the state, in cooperation with other states and international organisations, is the sole and best promoter of development. With it went the myth, although belatedly resuscitated by Ronald Reagan, that transnational corporations should do the job. Some TNC representatives themselves, when facing their critics, see no difficulty in admitting that they cannot develop Third World countries. All they can do is to implement specific projects whose value for the population concerned must be carefully examined in each case.

Statements of this kind are not always appreciated and therefore brushed aside as ideological rhetoric (socialists and leaders of Third World countries do not like the one about the state; capitalists and leaders of market-economy countries are not pleased with the one about the TNCs). But in our case, the statements are based on the language of the unheard voices: action for self-development. Today, millions of people in the Third World have turned their backs on official development strategies and are trying to improve their living conditions through their own efforts. Some of the older self-help organisations, such as the Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka, have acquired world fame. Host have sprung up only in the seventies. Let us briefly look at a few.

An old regulation in Cameroon limits government action in water supplies to towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants. A typical illustration of the urban bias in development. Over the last 15 years, thousands of villagers have come out and built their own water installations. They created Village Water Councils which collected money from each family (for some up to 25% of their annual cash income) and set up a collective work schedule with each member of the community coming out to construction sites twice a week. What they still need is technical advice on the location of the nearest fresh-water source and on the purchase of suitable equipment such as pipes. This they can obtain from a government community development agency or from foreign non-governmental aid organisations. But approximately 80% of the total investment is made up of labour and capital provided by the villagers.

Two remarks should be made about this type of development. First, most of the villages where traditional social structures were relatively well preserved, succeeded better in organising community work. Some of the most conservative chiefs saw the human and political importance of such initiatives and either took the lead
themselves or designated a dynamic personality as project organiser. In artificially constituted villages, where populations of diverse origins only came together over the last few decades, for instance to work on a nearby plantation, the initiators of a project sometimes needed one or two years alone to set up a Village Water Council. Second, such activities are not accounted for in the calculation of the Gross National Product. From the point of view of the villager, clean water within reach represents one of the most important improvements in the quality of life and yet, official statistics do not include this as real development.

In Southern Senegal, about 12 bush-taxi hours away from the Ministry of Planning and Development, a farmer who became an accountant and then returned to the land is today the leader of a vast movement comprising more than 20,000 villagers ("Association Jeunesse Agricole de Casamance", AJAC). Through their own cooperatives, the farmers buy their supplies and market their products. Here also, water development is a priority. Joint efforts are made in the field of training. The Association has also set up village cooperative pharmacies.

The Minister is glad that the farmers are helping themselves. He sees no objection to foreign non-governmental organisations giving outside support to such movements. He is glad because the development his Ministry is planning for deals with large infrastructural projects, industry and vast plantations. And this must be the reason why the Casamance farmers never saw any development originating out of Dakar.

In Kornaka, a village in Niger, farmers over the years grew increasingly impatient with the ineffectiveness of imported chemical products against the rodents who consume a large fraction of their meagre harvest. They finally came to rediscover an ancestral technique to catch the animals, decided to improve on it and succeeded so well that the Government of Niger propagandised the Kornaka traps all over the country. 2

This case permits us to illustrate the multi-faceted implications of self-reliant development. Economically, the farmers benefitted by obtaining more food. Psychologically, it was important for them to see that they could solve a problem with local resources where the science of foreign experts had failed. In a small way, they may have contributed to saving foreign exchange for the country.

India has probably thousands of self-help organisations. Very often, the central issue seems to be a dispute between small farmers and landless workers on the one side, larger farmers and landlords on the other. The organisations are clearly involved in rural class struggle and are often the victims of violent repression. Some have nevertheless succeeded in improving the living standards of the poorest segments of the population.
In view of long-standing Indian experience in biogas technology, energy self-reliance opens interesting perspectives for poor rural communities. In the village of Injambakkam, south of Madras, the farmers cultivate less than half of their available rice lands because of the high cost of imported fertilisers, diesel for water pumps and kerosene for domestic lighting. A 12-year programme started in 1980 based on community biogas plants, use of local plants to replace imported insecticides, the introduction of energy saving stoves, the establishment of nitrogen-fixing algae in the fields, etc., will make the village not just self-sufficient but a significant exporter of food and energy. Observers from the University of Strathclyde note that "food consumption can increase by around 200%, indigenous energy production by 85%, and overall solar energy capture by 150% - all within 12 years. Should such a strategy for decentralised development be extensively adopted then some 550 million Indians alone would benefit, 2.5 billion people globally and, by 2000, around 3.6 billion people living in the rural areas of the Third World". 1

In reports from Latin America, self-reliance has often been described as a force of resistance against penetration and as a means of opposing the state. Paraguay, during the period 1811-1870, is presented as a case of national self-reliance, combined with self-defence against Argentina and Brazil. 2 In contemporary Columbia, a perennial struggle between the state and the campesinos of the interior has led to the creation of autonomous zones, some even termed independent republics (Marquetalia, El Pato). Inhabitants of these zones have sometimes made it impossible for government representatives to obtain access. On the other hand, they have forced redistribution of land through simple occupation of several hundreds of thousands of hectares. In specific cases, cooperation with the state apparatus exists through such institutions as agrarian reform authorities or rural banks. The aim of the "campesinos" is the satisfaction of their basic needs, as decided by them, on the basis of self-financing. The history of this attempt at self-reliance coincides, since the 1940s, with a permanent confrontation between the campesinos and the state and, at one point, a civil war (the "Violencia") which left over 300,000 people dead. 2

The self-help organisations of the urban poor in Venezuela are also described as emerging in situations of conflict with government, notably when the already poorest segments of the population are feeling negative social effects of an inconsiderate "modernisation" policy. This occurs for example when authorities dispatch their bulldozers to bring down the "barrios", the self-constructed habitat in the slums, to prepare for the construction of a highway or an office building, when unemployment rises or when minimal public services fall below a tolerance point. Government reacts sometimes through repression, sometimes with a minimal social reform programme which then coopts the organisation and takes away its autonomy.
In the nearby Caribbean island of Trinidad (where this paper was written), an initiative now internationally known was launched after the Black Power uprising of 1970. A priest and a famous West Indian cricket player, struck by the fact that the inhabitants of Laventille, the poorest slum part of Port-of-Spain, had burnt down their local school, spent two years in patient dialogues with members of that community to see whether they would like to define some constructive project which could benefit them and which they could do on their own. Today, Servol (Service Volunteered for All) is a relatively large organisation with its Life Centres all over the country. Its training workshops not only earn most of their income through contracts in the community, but the self-trained masons, plumbers, welders and carpenters set up new buildings required as the project expands. One of the highest principles of Servol is reflected in Julius Nyerere's statement: "The purpose of education is the development of man as a member of society". He makes a distinction "between a system of education which makes liberated men and women who are skillful users of tools and a system of education which turns men and women into tools".

This enumeration of achievements in local self-reliance could go on for ever. Let us conclude it by referring to the many thousands of movements which have sprung up in the last decade in the industrial countries, whose common denominator is a critical attitude towards maldevelopment and the search for an alternative way of life. Although the term self-reliance is rarely used in this connection, the terminology adopted still suggests that this is the basic principle, as illustrated by the concept of "citizen's initiative" (Bürgerinitiativen). Several institutions concerned with research on Third World development have included the alternative way of life movements on their priority list.

The Relation between Local and National Self-Reliance

The few examples given offer a wide spectrum of possible relationships between self-help organisations and governments. First, there is the case of almost total opposition, as illustrated by the cases of Columbia and Venezuela. Due to the perseverance of strong segments of the population to obtain the land on which they themselves can grow their own food, or the determined resistance of slum-dwellers against a certain type of social change, governments were forced to accept some degree of self-determination of parts of the population, although not in any legal sense.

Second, we have cases where self-help organisations are allowed to do "their own thing" and may even get some verbal expression of sympathy. The example drawn from Senegal is a case in point. This applies also to the attitude of most Western European and North American governments towards alternative way of life movements. But somewhere all these governments draw a line: their tolerance does not go beyond the point where such organisations see themselves as being involved in a political struggle or where they resort to forms of action considered illegal (e.g. house occupations, creation of autonomous youth centres).
Third comes the case of benign support. The late Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams; told the man who had launched Servol, Gerard Pantin, that he should not get too close to government, but retain his autonomy. On specific occasions, when a piece of land or some construction materials were needed, the government would always be of help. Pantin calls this: "cooperation at arm's length". It certainly reflects benevolence on the part of the government, but also a desire that such a movement should remain marginal. What counts for the government is that the dominant model of imitative development, steered from outside (oil, investment, technology) and benefiting the local middle-class, should not be disturbed. William's attitude was probably a wise one: he realised that Servol would lose its identity and efficiency if it associated itself too much with government. But it also contains a paradoxical element: a local and sectoral initiative in self-reliant development is approved, supported, even admired, but any idea of self-reliance at the national level is regarded as utter nonsense. The total neglect of agriculture and the almost complete dependence on foreign expertise, be it in the oil industry or in the telephone system, are proofs of a radical rejection of national self-reliance as soon as it involves even a minimum effort of organisation and discipline. In all this, Servol emerges as a powerful moral force, which commands nation-wide respect.

Fourth, there are cases where local efforts are given substantial encouragement in order for similar initiatives to evolve on a nation-wide scale. This is what the Government of Niger did with the Kornaka traps, while the Government of Cameroon was eager to see that all villages should be assisted in the type of water-development originally confined to the English-speaking area of the country. This could be called a spill-over effect from the local to the national level. This is most certainly a crucial situation, for it is only to the extent that a growing number of sectors of development (pest-control, water, health, etc.) are "improved by a growing number of communities that self-reliance has any future as a type of national development strategy. In other words, it is one thing to have a spill-over effect from a sectoral development in a few local communities to the same sectoral development in all local communities, but a truly qualitative change in the development strategy will come about when so many sectoral changes are occurring in all communities that the entire nation can become self-reliant towards the outside world.

This brings us to a fifth category, where self-reliance is first proclaimed at the national level and then brought to the people. This has happened in Tanzania and Madagascar where, building on traditional social structures, self-reliance was to become the basic method of development in the ujamaa villages and in the fokonolona. In passing, one may also mention the case of Switzerland during the 1939-45 war when this country, heavily dependent on food imports, was encircled by fascist countries. Following the idea of a then senior official in the Department of
Agriculture, T. Wahlen, who twenty years later became the country's President, the Government "invited" the entire population to grow food on every square inch, of land, lawns and flower gardens included. Some degree of control was exercised, partly by citizens themselves. This definitely made the country more self-reliant, but the delicate question arises whether one may still speak of individual and local self-reliance, when the idea is actually forced upon a population from above. The issue has been raised in connection with Tanzania. Logically, there is no way in which the use of force can be reconciled with the idea of people using their own initiative to develop themselves. But in the real world, as in all cases referred to so far, the question always arises as to where the idea originally came from.

The Leader and the Socio-Cultural Context

Self-reliance exists since the appearance of humans on the surface of the earth. It has been largely destroyed by the division of labour which accompanies the Western model of development. When it resurfaces in various parts of the world, it is usually because of either one or several of the following reasons:

- the preservation of strong community ties,
- the persistence of a philosophy of group solidarity and of performance through joint efforts,
- growing dependence on external forces,
- a threat to the survival of a group,
- the presence of an articulate leader.

It appears from this that self-reliance is not an idealistic concept in the sense that it emerges from the skull of a genius and then trickles down to the "masses". But in given historical circumstances, and within a precise cultural context, leaders do come forward to suggest a programme of action.

From the outset, Mao built on elements of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, introduced a Marxist-Leninist analysis and took into consideration Chinese history and social structure. The Revolution was built on the recognition of the importance of all these elements, not just one. A class struggle was necessary if self-development was not to be confined to separate pockets of China, but become the national policy.

Some feel that self-reliant endeavours stand and fall with a leader. This has been said about India and South America, where micro-projects seem to be coming and going. This view is rather pessimistic, for in some communities, once the idea has been suggested and substantial advantages gained from it, the people will not allow it to disappear when the leader packs his bundle. This is largely so because the original motivation for most types of self-development is in a strongly felt deprivation, both materially (non-satisfaction of basic needs) and psychologically (alienation...
from a dominant society, dependence on others). It is in the process of determining where the deprivation really is and where the dependence comes from, that the idea of relying on one's own forces instantly follows. Gerard Pantin developed some very simple principles in the course of his action, e.g. "do not presume that you know someone else's problem", "do not be too quick to jump forward with your solution", and "when you finally start doing something, make sure that the people themselves are involved in planning and implementation". This form of procedure has obviously nothing to do with "imposed self-reliance", but it still requires the presence of someone who asks questions, formulates some answers and indicates possible direction for action. It is likely that such a leader, by his behaviour, will encourage others to emerge. The likelihood is therefore given that the initiative will survive its leader.

A leader will probably not succeed with the concept of self-reliance where a population does not really perceive certain basic needs, nor understand the forces at work which keep it in a state of dependence. Also, it is possible that populations which have practised self-reliance will cease to do so once they have attained a high level of satisfaction of basic needs.

Conclusion

Local self-reliance has been attempted almost everywhere in the world, be it as an organising principle for the entire range of activities of a community or within a specific sector of life. In many cases, due to benign neglect, tolerance or even active encouragement, such efforts have succeeded. Generally, national governments could do a lot more in this direction. They sometimes even speak of self-reliance on an international level, but are not aware of the implications for local communities, because their only frame of reference is the national one. Thus, the now current idea of "collective self-reliance" among Third World countries, in defence of their interests against industrial countries, can become counter-productive for local communities when its aim is simply to obtain more investments, technology and trade. The expansion of the currently known type of agro-business, for instance, will hamper self-reliant efforts in food production. So, in addition to various forms of internal encouragement national governments can give to local communities, some degree of protection from international and transnational interference with these communities is also required.

While local self-reliance can more or less function without governments, national self-reliance is an empty word when it is not rooted in local communities. A nation cannot reduce its dependence on aid, food imports or industrial technology if all groups within the country are not working towards that aim.
Notes


(Viene de la pag. 3)

AUTONOMIA LOCAL DONDE NO SE ESPERABA

Resumen: La autonomía o desarrollo autocentrado ("self-reliance") es a menudo discutida en los espacios nacionales a del Tercer Mundo ("collective self-reliance"). Pero si es evidente que la economía de mercado no favorece la autonomía local, no es solución tampoco, el dejar todo en manos del Estado. De hecho, millones de seres humanos han decidido mejorar su existencia a través de sus propios esfuerzos. Basado en ejemplos africanos (Camerún, Senegal, Nigeria), indios, latinoamericanos (Venezuela, Trinidad), el autor examina las relaciones entre la autonomía local y nacional, y analiza cinco casos: la oposición total del estado, una cierta tolerancia, un apoyo modesto, un estímulo real, y la iniciativa que viene desde arriba. El autor concluye que si la autonomía local puede ejercerse fuera del marco estatal, la autonomía nacional, por el contrario, seguirá siendo un slogan si no está profundamente conectada al espacio local.
The IFDA/IPS Special United Nations Service

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A microfiche collection of IFDA Dossier

Available from Inter Documentation, Poststrasse 14, 6300 Zug, Switzerland: a two-volume set of microfiches (20,784 pages on 213 microfiches) reproducing IFDA Dossiers 1 to 20 (January 1978 to December 1980) as well as the complete collection of the Third System Project papers and indices. Price: 950 Swiss francs.
Abstract: All over the Third World, organized groups of peasants and workers are rediscovering the potential of people’s theatre as a weapon in their struggles. People’s theatre contributes to the conscientization in which Paulo Freire - and the author of this paper - see a key element of all social struggle. Because it draws on people’s skills and creativity, the theatre reinforces identity and self-confidence. It does not simply give the oppressed a chance to express their frustrations, nor is it a means of spoonfeeding them with externally prescribed messages. On the contrary, it is a theatre which challenges the participants to look critically at their situation and change it. The author’s reflection is illustrated by examples from Latin America, Asia and the United States.

Résumé: Partout dans le Tiers Monde, des groupes organisés de paysans et d’ouvriers redécouvrent le potentiel du théâtre populaire comme arme dans leurs luttes. Le théâtre populaire contribue à la conscientisation dans laquelle Paulo Freire - et l’auteur de cet article - voient un élément-clé de toute lutte sociale. Farce qu’il utilise le talent et la créativité populaires, le théâtre renforce l’identité et la confiance en soi. Il ne se limite pas à donner aux opprimés une occasion d’exprimer leurs frustrations, et encore moins est-il un moyen de véhiculer des messages préfabriqués à l’extérieur. Au contraire: il s’agit d’un théâtre qui suscite chez les participants un regard critique sur la situation qu’ils vivent et les incite à vouloir la changer. La réflexion de l’auteur est illustrée par des exemples d’Amérique latine, d’Asie et des Etats-Unis.

Resumen: Por todas partes en el Tercer Mundo, grupos organizados de campesinos y obreros redescubren el potencial teatro popular como arma de sus propias luchas. El teatro popular contribuye a la conscientización en la cual Paulo Freire - y el autor de este artículo - ven un elemento esencial de toda lucha social. Porque utiliza el talento y la creatividad del pueblo, el teatro refuerza la identidad y la confianza en sí mismo. No se limita a dar a los oprimidos una ocasión de expresar sus frustraciones, y menos todavía es un medio de transferir mensajes prefabricados. Al contrario: se trata de un teatro que suscita entre los participantes una mirada crítica sobre la situación que ellos viven y los incita a desear cambiarla. La reflexión del autor es ilustrada por ejemplos de América Latina, de Asia y de Estados Unidos.
All over the Third World organized groups of peasants and workers are rediscovering the potential of people's theatre as a weapon in their struggles for land, better working conditions, and political rights. This new tradition builds on a long history of people's songs, drama, dance, drumming, and puppetry being used in resistance against colonial and other forms of oppression, (e.g. Ngugi, 1972; Richmond, 1973; Masiye, 1977). It also relates to the fresh emphasis given by Freire and others to the development of a critical consciousness as a key component of struggle.

People's theatre provides a means of building this consciousness, mobilizing people for action, engaging in struggle and reflecting on the struggle. It is the people's medium, drawing on their skills and creativity and expressing their concerns and analysis: as something that people are good at, it reinforces the growth of identity and self-confidence. For conscientization purposes it is a powerful codification, a means of mirroring reality in order to stand back and study it critically. It is powerful not only because the people are capable of creating the code themselves (and therefore are not dependent on an externally imposed code) but also because it portrays conflict and therefore lends itself to a dialectical view of the world. This makes it particularly useful for expressing the reality of class conflict, for reflecting the class relationships which influence social situations. This opens up the possibility of making a structural analysis of society, demystifying the notion of social change as a neutral technical process.

This use of theatre is not a cathartic one, simply giving the oppressed a chance to get their grievances and frustrations off their chest; nor is it the 'banking' one of spoonfeeding the oppressed with externally prescribed messages, fitting them into a stereotyped developmentalist mould. This is Brechtian theatre, challenging people to look critically at their situation and change it, provoking insight into the ruling class myths controlling consciousness, including the myth that the world cannot be transformed. This turns theatre from a monologue fostering passivity or pseudo-therapy into a dialogue in which the 'audience' are actively engaged in the production of meaning. It converts the 'audience' from passive recipients of received truth to active protagonists in creating a theatrical experience (which reflects their own sense of their situation), criticising it, and using this analysis (and further theatrical experience) in working out political strategies and engaging in struggle.

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In this approach the theatre performance is not the total experience; it must be linked with critical analysis, organization, and struggle. The performance can provide a dialectical view of the world but this must be consolidated and sharpened through dialogue and action; it must be part of a continuing process in which past action (struggle) provides the dramatic material (a historical view of reality) for analysis and strategy leading to future action (struggle).

This form of theatre is being widely used in education, organization, and struggle by groups of small farmers, landless labourers, urban workers, urban squatters, and other oppressed groups in Latin America and Asia: for example in Cuba (Sedley, 1979), Mexico (Nunez, 1978), Panama (Leis, 1976), Peru (TAREA, 1974), India (Renuka, 1978), Philippines (Morante, 1977), Sri Lanka (Devananda, 1977). It is starting to be used more extensively in conscientization work in the Caribbean (Caribbean Contact, 1979) and in Africa (Kidd, 1979).

Theatre and the development of revolutionary consciousness

One of the key insights of Freire is his notion of education as cultural action. Since oppression has both a physical and a psychological dimension, overcoming oppression requires both collective struggle and the development of a revolutionary consciousness - the awareness, among other things, that people create culture, that people can transform the world.

Augusto Boal, a colleague of Freire, has shown how theatre can be used in creating a revolutionary consciousness. He experimented with theatre as an educational medium in the national literacy programme in Peru. This programme, called ALFIN, was organized during a period (1972-1974) when class struggle was intense - the peasants and rural workers were forming organizations and seizing land, urban workers and squatters were organizing strikes, demonstrations and other forms of militant action. This was during the second, more right-wing phase of the new military regime; in the first phase land reform was initiated by the military government.

2 This section is based on Augusto Boal's 'Experiments with People's Theatre in Peru', pages 120-155 in Theatre of the Oppressed (New York: Urizen Books, 1979). During the same period (50's to mid-60's) in Brazil when Freire was testing out his ideas in an educational context, Boal was experimenting with theatre as a weapon in the class struggle.

3 This qualification is important: the conscientisation programme did not take place in a vacuum, but responded to the tremendous advances by the working class during this period.
In Boal's approach which operates within a Freirian framework, the literacy group starts with a series of physical exercises designed to make participants aware of their bodies, the physical capacity and deformations produced by oppressive working conditions. These are not just loosening up exercises: they involve an analytical component in which the working class participants begin to see how their bodies are governed by work and other aspects of an oppressive social structure. The recognition that their bodies are deformed in similar ways leads to an awareness of their common social conditions and to a heightening of class consciousness.

The second stage is a set of exercises (again involving critical social content based on people's experiences) introduced to demonstrate participants' capacity for theatre, for expressing themselves through their bodies. These games and exercises are important in building the self-confidence needed to use theatre as a tool for developing a revolutionary consciousness. "In Latin America creativity is seen as a subversive activity - as a result people have been conditioned to feel they have no talent, no creativity" (a Columbian popular theatre worker). Through demonstrating peasants' and workers' capacity for creativity, these games help in transforming them from their traditional role of passive observation to one of active engagement in dramatic action - an analogue for the same transformation (the Freirian goal) in real life from fatalistic passivity to assertive action.

In Boal's third stage theatre is used as a means of developing a critical understanding of reality and of exploring how it can be changed. But instead of merely talking about change, the participants are encouraged to 'rehearse' it, to try out different ways of transforming reality and to discuss the implications of each strategy. This involves three exercises - Simultaneous Dramaturgy, Forum Theatre, and Image Theatre. Each exercise is based on the analysis of a problem or issue (both global issues such as imperialism and more localized issues such as water shortage) and the search for a workable solution through testing out various solutions in dramatic action and then criticising them.

In Simultaneous Dramaturgy the participants 'write' the scenario, telling a group of actors what to do in portraying various solutions to a problem. The participants can intervene at any point to change the action or words, to 'rewrite' the scenario. They are in charge and the actors simply follow their directions. In Forum Theatre the participants again intervene in the staging of the solution, but this time they take over the action from the actors. Instead of telling the actors what to do, they insert themselves into the actors' roles, showing how the scene should be played by doing it themselves. In Image Theatre each participant has a turn in expressing his/her analysis of the problem, through 'sculpting' the bodies of the other participants to project a certain image. This image or codification is discussed and then
the same 'sculptor' designs new images to reflect the ideal situation and the transitional situation. In this way people can begin to experience and understand the process and consequences of revolutionary action.

In these different ways various strategies for change are rehearsed and analyzed. These exercises help to reinforce the participants' growing awareness that they are in control of their situation, that they are not simply subject to deterministic forces, that they can transform reality. Instead of receiving the finished texts or theatre of the dominant class in their role as passive observers, they are making their own theatre and using it as a means of developing their own ideas and trying out various strategies for overcoming oppression.

But, of course, rehearsing the revolution is not enough; this type of 'role-playing' helps in building confidence and a revolutionary consciousness and in strategizing for struggle, but it cannot take the place of actual struggle. For theatre's direct links with struggle we need to turn to other examples.

Theatre as a tool for expanding participation

Participation is an important factor in structural transformation. It can release creative energies kept dormant under feudalism or imperialism and involve the working class in controlling the direction and nature of social transformation.' People's theatre can play a role in expanding this kind of participation. 4/

Another good example can be drawn from Peru. In 1973 at a time when the Peruvian government was starting to institute land reform, one campesino union grew impatient waiting and occupied the land of several absentee landlords in their area. They organized themselves to defend their occupation with a system of sentries on all entrances to the area, solidarity agreements with truck-drivers to keep them supplied with food, etc. A government land reform official came out to negotiate with them, asking them to return the 10 blocks of land and wait for the government reforms to take effect. They refused and sent the bureaucrat packing. He returned later, offering the campesinos one block of land and promising more in future. Again they refused. This process continued with increasing offers of land each time in exchange for the return of the

4/ 'Participation' as used here must be distinguished from the way in which it has been used in NFE rhetoric in the 1970's. There, as Mbilinyi (1977) and Galli (1978) show, 'participation' suited the World Bank's mission to reach and socialize the Third World rural poor - a policy of token participation in exchange for population and ideological control and decreasing class struggle.
remaining land. On one of these visits, one of the organizers, Mrs Yuyi, got so fed up with these delaying tactics that she grabbed the bureaucrat by the neck, lifted him up and said: 'Listen, you little worm, we want all the land - now!!' The campesinos finally won but it was a Phyrric victory - the government land reform officials moved in, organized the campesinos into a co-op which they (the bureaucrats) dominated, and destroyed support for the union. The campesinos in effect became labourers on a state farm.

One year after the occupation an NFE agency which had worked with the campesino leaders encouraged them to make a critical assessment of their experiences. These leaders decided they must extend this possibility for reflection to the whole campesino organization. They prepared a rough drama for presentation at a rally which was being organized by the government co-op officers. After several hours of high-flown speeches by government officials, the campesinos, who were seated in an open field, were becoming very hot, tired, and bored. Then the drama group started their presentation, standing up in the middle of the crowd (and foregoing the stage and mikes at the front of the audience). They explained that the drama would deal with their life before, during and after the occupation and that people should interrupt if they disagreed with the history or if something was left out. The drama started, people's attention was intense, and at the end of the first scene, someone stood up and shouted: 'Yes, compañeros, that was the way it was before our struggle started ...' Everyone began to talk at once and to make comments. This was their history, the story of their struggle, being re-enacted before their eyes.

In the second scene when they started to show the confrontation with the government, one woman shouted out: 'Hey, I'm going to be Mrs Yuyi.' She joined the actors and at the appropriate moment picked up the government official (an actor) by the neck and threatened to beat him if he didn't give them all the land. This got a great laugh. Soon other people started to join in the drama, coming up to the performing area, interrupting the drama and saying: 'Hey, you left out such-and-such an incident' and then telling the story or dramatizing it. Afterwards the discussion was very lively. People got up and talked about all of the events of their struggle and what had happened since their victory:

'All the things we fought for are now controlled by government.'
'We've let them destroy our union and now they run the show.'
'All we've done is change bosses.'
'When we started we had little food. Look at us now, we're still starving.'

This example demonstrates the power of theatre in getting people involved, talking, taking part in the dramatic action, and critically assessing their situation. However it also shows the
limits of an educational approach which is not linked with political and organizational work. The drama sparked a lot of discussion, participation, and critical insight but it failed to lead to the rebuilding of the campesino union. There was no follow-up work to build on the momentum and enthusiasm generated by the theatre performance. Part of the failure can be attributed to the NFE organization's false assumption that conscientization in itself would trigger off successful political struggle. Their programme of popular theatre, literacy, and the training of campesino leaders helped in developing a more critical understanding of the campesinos' socio-economic situation but it took place, on the whole, outside the context of the union's struggle and the day-to-day organizational work. The NFE organization felt constrained by their relationship with the government from getting too actively involved in the union's affairs. Fearing they might lose their government training contract by supporting the union openly they remained outside the struggle and the union's attempts to resist co-option. They followed the struggle from the sidelines, dealing with some of the issues in their workshops, but not working directly with the campesino union. As a result they failed to provide the stimulus or support for an on-going assessment by the union of its political and organizational strategies (in relation to the struggle and to government's co-option attempts) and left the union ripe for a take-over by the Agrarian Reform bureaucrats. This example shows clearly that heightened political consciousness on its own does not create a strong organization nor the conditions for a successful political struggle. People come to a full critical consciousness in the process of building an organization and struggling for their rights.5/

Theatre and struggle

We have seen that theatre and critical reflection on their own are not enough; they need to be directly linked with organization and action. Several examples can be drawn from Asia in which theatre has been successfully built into a process of conscientization, community organizing, and struggle. For example in one case from southern India, this mix of theatre, critical reflection, and struggle takes place within the context of regular meetings and political action by Harijan labourers (members of the most oppressed Indian caste) with the support of a Harijan organizer who lives in one of their 6 villages and visits each village once a week.

5/ In the assessment of Freire's work in Brazil a misinterpretation is often made that his conscientization work was a precondition for political action, that it triggered off a revolutionary movement. In fact, as Freire has clarified in Pedagogy in Process, his work evolved in response to peasant and worker struggles (1978, p. 110). Thus conscientization became an additional tool for deepening class consciousness, sharpening the perception of the contradictions in the social relations of production and heightening the worker's struggle (which was already going on).
The labourers in these 6 villages are linked in a union with workers who are similarly organized in other villages. In the meetings which are held at the end of the work day the labourers discuss their situation, agree on a priority problem and work out a strategy for solving it. Then they hold a public meeting for the whole Harijan community at which the issues and the proposed strategy are discussed. The issues are presented through songs and short dramatic sketches. As one organizer explained to me during an interview in August 1978:

'Everyone in the community must understand what the issues are and what action is required in order for us to be successful. Since it is the younger group in the community who have framed the proposal for action, we use a cultural occasion to deal with the generation gap, to communicate with our elders in a form they are comfortable with. It is important that we get their full support.'

One of the issues they tackled was 'housing'. There was provision in the development plan for the allocation of housing sites but the local bureaucrats had done nothing. In presenting this issue to the community meeting one of the group members sang:

I'm a poor man
I have no house
Government has lots of money
But they never help us.
Where can I sit?
Where can I sleep?
Where can I eat?
I can sit only under the sun.
Government has big plans
But we poor people
Our voices are not heard
What shall we do?

While singing this song he acted out the problems of being homeless, wandering through the audience, lying down on the ground, and showing through mime how difficult it is without a roof over one's head. At the end of the song he repeated the last line 'What shall we do?', opening the meeting to discussion. The community discussed various strategies for challenging government inaction, finally settling on the organizer's proposal. After the community meeting, the group sent a petition to the local welfare officer and when no reply was received, they followed this up with

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6/ This form of solidarity is necessary not only to increase their collective strength but also to eliminate scabbing during strikes in an area of high unemployment.
individual representations. When this failed they threatened to carry out a hunger strike in front of his office. This forced the official's hand and he allocated sites.

Theatre has been used not only in mobilizing people for struggle but also as a confrontational or strategic tool in strikes or demonstrations themselves. For example in one Philippines squatter community faced with eviction, a squatters' union came up with an ingenious mixture of drama and religious symbolism to stop the bulldozers from destroying their homes. They organized a mass demonstration within the cover of a religious play (since demonstrations are banned under Martial Law). They dramatized the Exodus story of the Angel of Death who kills the first-born sons of the Egyptians but spares those of the Israelites who protected themselves by marking their doors with blood. They produced posters bearing the slogan 'We will not leave this place'. At the climax of the drama the 'Moses' actor blessed each poster and put it on the door of each house explaining 'Whoever destroys this house will be cursed by God.'

In the Philippines, a very religious country, a curse is the strongest way of making the oppressor think twice before doing anything against whatever is sacred. This Alinsky-style ruse kept the bulldozers at bay, helped make the people feel secure, and played a key role in the squatters' victory. Before each confrontation with the bureaucrats or other authority-figures the union leaders prepared themselves through role-playing. For example, in preparing to challenge the way they were being treated by an arrogant local doctor, they role-played the confrontation with someone pretending to be the doctor and the spokespersons playing their own roles. After the role play the whole group would analyse it, work out stronger arguments and questions and agree on the strategy for the meeting. One thing they discovered from this process was that women on the whole were more effective speakers than men because they were better at 'keeping their cool' during confrontations with authority.

Once the struggles are underway theatre can provide a means of evaluating each stage of the struggle and raising the participants' awareness, winning more support for the struggle, and bolstering the morale of the participants. Just as campesino theatre in the

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7/ In an earlier confrontation with the same official the union organized a mass demonstration to protest government inaction in providing water for the villages. When letters to this officer failed to get a response, all of the women marched with water buckets to his office, surrounded it, and 'gheraoed' the official, not budging an inch until he promised to provide the tube wells.

8/ On another issue (water) the women marched on the city hall with their children, kitchen ware and washing, washed their pots and clothes in the washstands at city hall, and then camped in the office of the mayor until he agreed to listen to their demands for water.
USA developed on the picket lines of the California grape pickers' strike to meet the need for political education and humorous relief in a long, drawn-out struggle (Hostetler, 1975) so too have songs and skits emerged on the picket lines, demonstrations, and occupations in the Third World to meet similar needs. In Peru, the Philippines and India this activity seems to be remarkably similar. Participants in the struggle are joined by their families and other members of the community on the picket line in the evening for an all-night vigil. They talk about the day's events, evaluate their progress, and plan their strategy for the following day. Song-making and improvising skits are woven into this process - a form of conscientization, recreation, and entertainment, and an expression of solidarity and commitment. For example in one community vigil observed in Peru (during a strike by the Peru Teachers' Union for recognition of the union, salary increases, the release of imprisoned teachers, etc.) the teachers, students, and community members sat huddled together against the cold, making up new songs for the struggle until 3 o'clock in the morning. This was authentic collective creation - everyone throwing in their ideas on the words of the songs and several alternatives being tried out until people were happy with the result. There was a tremendous amount of satisfaction in creating their own songs and the process clearly served to boost morale and solidarity. The song-making process was one of conscientization - reflecting on experience, analyzing issues, and drawing out key principles. And finally the activity was a lot of fun.

Mies describes a similar process in India:

Five or six women will huddle together, squatting on the ground and putting their heads together ... Then they start the songs and the crowd will repeat every verse in chorus ... If one looks at these revolutionary songs one cannot but be astonished at their clear analysis of the new type of agrarian capitalism, of the class structure in the area, and of the role of the government and foreign aid which came to them in the form of grain 'meant for animals only'. In the songs the Gujars (landlords) are attacked as having cheated them of their lands, their bullocks, even their ploughs, and of having monopolized the rural co-operative societies, thus appropriating all government funds for development ... The refrain of many of these songs is that now the poor are fed up with empty promises and will take things in their own hands. 'The lion in the cage has woken up and now the day of revolution has come'. (Mies, 1975, pp. 64–65)

Summary comment

These case studies have shown how theatre can be used as a medium for expressing the concerns and problems of the oppressed; as codes for generating critical class consciousness and as a form of
role-playing to rehearse revolutionary action; and as an organizational, confrontational, and evaluative tool for struggle.

However, their main purpose was to demonstrate the importance of the operational and historical context in which theatre is used, in determining whether the theatre 'programme' leads to a successful political struggle. It is not enough simply to express problems (through theatre) if this is not linked with critical analysis of and action on the underlying causes and structures; it is not enough to rehearse struggle if this does not lead to struggle. Moreover 'conscientization theatre' which is aimed at liberation (in a Freirian sense) cannot operate in a vacuum on the margins of class struggle; it must develop a sense of history and relate it to the current struggles by workers and peasant organizations. This has implications for the institutional setting of the programme: if it is based in an organization which is apprehensive about challenging dominant structures (e.g. government support, aid relationships, etc.) it is not likely to be rooted in struggle. On its own, people's theatre will never be anything more than an interesting and exciting spectacle, a chance to let out grievances and frustrations. It will work as a medium for social transformation only when it is woven into an on-going process of critical analysis, organization and struggle.

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Peace is a Conscious Choice

From the point of balance in the hearts of all beings.
And the point of balance within ad that exists
in the universe,
Let there stream forth a healing ray of lovingness
and unity.
Let this ray encircle the resistance that is met
in everyday life and allow us to act in compassion.
May it transform the watts of separateness between
people and countries into doorways of unity.
May it shine as a light to remind us that all things,
large or small, work themselves out.
And we have the conscious choice of a peaceful
existence during these times;
And may that light shine brighter and more radiant with
each moment, as we choose a peaceful solution.
Let there stream forth this healing light from all our
hearts — to the heart of the Earth.
May the Earth accept this light as a gift for the
unconditional love it has, in all ways, given to us.

May we think peace
May we talk peace
May we act in peace
May each of us be peace on Earth
PERVERSE GROWTH AND MALDEVELOPMENT – LESSONS FROM POLAND’S COLLAPSE

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Abstract: The main reason for the errors (including those of Western bankers) in evaluating the state and prospects of the Polish economy (before the crisis) lies in an analysis which unduly privileges the tempo of growth and changes in the structure of industrial output while neglecting more fundamental aspects of development such as income distribution, the structure of output in terms of authentic use value, non-market production, or the qualitative conditions of work. These are the roots of maldevelopment and a growth which could be termed perverse in as far as it undermines even the economic, social and ecological bases of a sustainable development. In this light, the author examines the Polish experience and compares it to certain Third World countries. In the South as in the North, whether market or state-run, the crisis of maldevelopment is a challenge to the Left. Will it be capable of defining and implementing another development on the basis of a dialogue between the civil society, the state and the economic forces?

CROISSANCE PERVERSE ET MALDEVELOPPEMENT - LEÇONS DE L’EFFONDREMENT POLONAIS

Résumé: La raison principale des erreurs de jugement (y compris celles des banquiers occidentaux) sur la situation et les tendances de l’économie polonaise (avant la crise) due à une analyse privilégiant indûment le rythme de croissance et les changements dans la composition de la production industrielle et négligeant des aspects plus fondamentaux du développement comme la distribution du revenu, la composition du produit en termes de valeur d’usage authentique, la production non-marchande ou la qualité de la vie au travail. Telles sont les racines du maldéveloppement et d’une croissance que l’on peut appeler perverse dans la mesure où elle sape les bases mêmes - économiques, sociales, écologiques - d’un développement soutenable. L’auteur examine à cette lumière l’expérience de la Pologne et la compare à celle de certains pays du Tiers Monde. Au Sud comme au Nord, qu’elle soit soumise au marché ou à l’Etat, la crise du maldéveloppement est un défi à la gauche. Saura-t-elle définir et mettre en œuvre un autre développement dans le dialogue entre la société civile, l’Etat et les forces économiques?

(Resumen en Español pag. 39)
Lessons from Poland’s collapse

Taken at face value, the basic indicators relative to Poland appended to the latest World Bank Report point to a cheerful success story. The country could pride itself on a 5.2 per cent average annual rate of growth of GNP per capita over the last two decades (from 1960 to 1979) – and even more so on a growth rate of 6.1 per cent from 1970 to 1979. As late as 1979, some international experts were still convinced that, acute short-term difficulties notwithstanding, Poland’s economic future was bright and bullish thanks to her basically sound efforts to expand export-oriented industries by means of massive inputs of Western technology. In a clear overestimation of this process of modernization, as well as of the country’s natural resource endowment in coal, copper and sulphur, Western banks and governments allowed the Polish foreign debt in hard currency to snowball from less than 1.3 billion US dollars in 1971 to 9.1 billion in 1975 and over 25 billion in 1980. The ratio of debt service to hard-currency export earnings increased from a tolerable 25 per cent in 1975 to an unmanageable 101 per cent in 1981, far in excess of all bankers’ rules of prudence, even in our times of excess liquidity of petro-dollars and euro-currencies. Clearly, international bankers must have been among the last people still to believe in the regime’s self-congratulating propaganda, heralding the accession of Poland to the rank of the tenth industrial power in the world. Why so?

Part of the explanation is to be sought in the built-in tendency of the Polish economic management system to report fictitious output and thus secure higher personnel bonuses. The misguiding gap between reported and actual performance must have been considerable and widening, even though precise quantitative estimates are lacking.

Some politically wishful thinking about luring Poland away from the Soviet bloc may have also intervened, especially after the August 1980 strikes on the Baltic coast and the creation of the independent trade unions. But the main reason for a persistent and systematic error in the evaluation of the state and prospects of the Polish economy lies in an analytical framework which gives too much credit to the tempo of growth and to changes in the structure of industrial output (a proxy for modernization), while neglecting several far more fundamental criteria of development, such as:

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income distribution; the actual composition of output in terms of authentic use-values; the non-market production of goods and services by households and the informal social sector; the qualitative conditions of work, of living and the conviviality of society; and the sustainability of the process, in both economic and ecological terms.

None of these criteria is automatically fulfilled by growth as such. More often than not a correlation occurs between rapid growth and maldevelopment, featuring deterioration of the quality of life, growing maldistribution of income and rising costs of managing the economy and society (the Marxian "faux frais" of production, which eat up a substantial part of the final output) and, last but not least, the increased rate of exploitation of nature.

Furthermore, growth can be perverse in so far as it saps surreptitiously the conditions - economic, social and ecological - for sustainable development.² This perversity can take different, by no means mutually exclusive, forms: systematic misallocation of scarce resources to uses that do not add to the development potential of the country nor contribute to the satisfaction of socially legitimized goals; inflating the flow of GNP by predatory incorporation of the stock of natural resources; concentrating investment of additional production capacities while allowing the decapitalization and ultimate decay of the existing stock of equipment, housing and infrastructure; externalizing the social and ecological costs of production up to a point where social and environmental disruption become unbearable and paralyze the economy; turning out goods for which no effective demand exists, either because of their low use-value or because of their poor quality, and forcing society to accommodate itself to the consumption of such goods for lack of alternatives and/or in response to demand manipulation by means of political and commercial propaganda; allowing an inflationary process to absorb the growing gap between effective demand and the insufficient supply of goods required by the public.

Even though the concept of perverse growth was elaborated in the sixties to account for situations in Third World countries, Poland's performance during the last decade offers an almost laboratory-pure case of perverse growth and maldevelopment under conditions of "statism", i.e. a non-capitalist, state-dominated economy increasingly geared to its short-term survival, as well as that of the bureaucracy managing it. Thus defined, "statism" appears as a degenerate form of either real socialism - as in Poland's case - or of Third World mixed economies with a more or less heavy bias towards empty socialist rhetoric. In both cases, an essential feature of "statism" is the gradual disappearance of a credible vision of national development capable of motivating large masses of population.
But the maldevelopment phenomenon is not limited to the case of "statism"; it also encompasses situations in the industrial market economies, pointing to the need to overcome everywhere the straitjacket of quantitative economic analyses. Development or maldevelopment (actually a mix of both in most cases) should be seen as a historical process, whose complexity can only be grasped through an understanding of its cultural, social and ecological aspects and their interrelations, not necessarily amenable to measurement.

In Poland's case, neither the party bureaucrats nor the international bankers seem to have been too concerned with these dimensions, mistaking growth - a necessary condition either for development or for maldevelopment - for a sufficient condition for development. The rigidity of Poland's overcentralized planning and management systems, and the total lack of built-in checks and balances, meant that, once the Polish economy was set on a wrong track, the high rate of growth proved a curse. It magnified distortions and led ultimately to a virtual collapse, after having made unbearable the daily struggle for existence under conditions of persistent shortage of most staples, endless queuing inefficient rationing, black marketing, almost total depreciation of the zloty and continuous deterioration of all public services.

The maldevelopment spiral (1970-80)

Government economists and Solidarity activists agree to a surprisingly large extent in their analyses of the last decade.

After the bloody repression of the December 1970 food riots on the Baltic coast, Poland set out on a two-pronged, but internally inconsistent path under the new leadership of Gierek. On the one hand, a populist consumerist policy was launched in an attempt to restore the Party's popularity. Material incentives were emphasized, wage and income differentials increased to the point of probably exceeding the range of post-tax incomes from work in the West, the purchase of individual motor-cars, durable goods and dwellings was encouraged, tourism abroad expanded. Poland was to emulate Western consumption standards. For once, the Party line and public tastes coincided. Real income per capita grew by 9.6 per cent from 1971 to 1975, 7.2 per cent in 1976 and 6.1 per cent in 1977. It then declined by 0.6 per cent in 1978, 2 per cent in 1979, 4 per cent in 1980 and a full 13 per cent in 1981, to reach back to its 1974 level.4

On the other hand, an over ambitious- not to say megalomaniac - industrialization plan was elaborated to hasten a qualitative jump from "extensive growth" to a high-productivity, outward-looking, instantly-modernizing "intensive growth" that would put Poland among the most advanced industrial powers of the world. Large-scale imports of Western technology were to play an important role in this plan, enabling the country to reach, with up-to-date and competitive products, for its share of new markets in the booming world economy.
In many a sense Polish planners were thinking along the same narrow, technocratic and productivist lines as World Bank and IMF experts trying to sell the outward-looking development strategy as a panacea to Third World countries, forgetful of the hard realities of the fluctuating international economy, of the vested interests of transnational corporations and international banks, of the formidable neo-protectionist barriers that the newly industrialized countries - be they capitalist or socialist - would have to overcome in a world where free-trade talk goes hand in hand with beggar-my-neighbour policies. For the second time in its postwar history of economic misgivings, Poland fell victim to a mimetic choice of an exogenous model, the difference being that the Stalinist pattern of industrialization, pursued from 1948 to 1955, was inward-looking and almost autarkic.

The heavy emphasis on steel and mining proved wrong and costly, even though Poland was by no means the only country in the world to take a wrong view of the future of steel and to bank on the prospect of continuous expansion of world trade. Massive imports of Western technology, far from working a miracle, turned out in many a case to have been poorly chosen and ill-adapted to Polish conditions. Projects required a longer gestation period than expected* and their costs rocketed, prompted by the inflationist spurt in the world economy. The repercussions of the two oil shocks, even though cushioned by the Comecon pricing system, the deterioration of energy and transport services, and irregularities in the supply of imported materials played havoc with the half-completed industrial plants and transformed many brand new factories into idle white elephants.

Meanwhile, the investment effort and the consumerist policies could not be sustained except by resorting to large-scale foreign indebtedness and rampant inflation. The more so that agriculture failed to keep up the expected pace of expansion owing to a combination of policy shortcomings, inadequate investment in the private sector (which accounts for roughly 80 per cent of agricultural land but is starved of capital and equipment) and climatic adversities. The average index of food production per capita was only 6 per cent higher in 1977-79 relative to 1969-71 and a decline in production occurred in 1979 and 1980.

Poland's smooth fall into the foreign debt trap, made even easier after 1973 with the flood of petro-dollars to Western banks, reads like a textbook case for Third World economists to meditate upon. To the figures quoted at the beginning of this article, one can add the steep increase in the cost of servicing foreign credits, amounting, according to official Polish data, to 61 million dollars, i.e. 4.7 per cent of the debt in 1971, 547 million dollars, i.e. 9.8 per cent, in 1980.5/ The virtual collapse of the Polish economy in 1980/81 was technically prompted by the drastic cuts in the import bill motivated by the inability to service the debt. At a time
when Poland most needed a cushion in the form of additional imports to offset the bad agricultural results and to withstand the industrial investment cycle, it was forced to curtail imports from 1977 onwards with disastrous economic consequences leading, ultimately, to the disorganization of the whole economy.

Paradoxically, Poland's foreign debt is, at present, General Jaruzelski's strongest asset in his political dealings with the West and the most efficient shield of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc against meaningful economic sanctions, capable of forcing the Polish junta to re-establish the respect of law and fundamental human rights. To have such an effect, the sanctions would have to be fairly comprehensive and precise, i.e. they should affect the whole trade between the West and the East and, if necessary, be also imposed on third countries trying to preempt the market opportunities arising out of the embargo. Of course, their cost to the West, mostly to European countries, would be very substantial, since Poland and other Eastern European countries would probably retaliate, notably by declaring default on their debt servicing and repayments, thus setting up a potentially dangerous domino effect in the international finance markets. The more so that some Third World countries could be tempted to follow suit. That is why the prospect is rather for phoney reprisals in the short term, the West's punitive efforts appearing "more like those of a toothless poodle than a majestic lion" and for periodical rescheduling and recycling of the Polish debt, at an ever higher cost to the debtor country. In spite of not being (as yet) a member of the IMF, Poland will be pressured to accept the principle of conditionality, i.e. further financial accommodation by the West will be made dependent on Poland's acceptance of strict rules of austere economic conduct, domestically and abroad, so as to be able to earn as soon as possible an export surplus in hard currency and start servicing the debt regularly, if not repaying the principal. Those Third World countries whose economic future and social balance are heavily mortgaged by the strict rules of financial orthodoxy imposed by the IMF will no doubt observe carefully the handling of the Polish case, both by the Western creditors and the Eastern European allies.

While the order of magnitude of the Polish foreign debt is by and large known, the picture with respect to the evolution of the internal pricing systems and inflationary pressures is much less clear, among other things on account of an almost total lack of reliable data on the working of parallel markets, moonlighting jobs, prices effectively paid by consumers for goods and services, distorting effects of persistent shortages, hidden price increases in the form of phoney quality improvement and recently - because of the virtual collapse of the Polish currency - the apparent growth of the barter economy. To remain on safe ground, we may say that:

**Primo**, inflationary pressures kept growing throughout the period, as evidenced by the widening gap between aggregate demand and
supply. While this is only a very partial measure of the inflationary phenomenon, it is nevertheless used for lack of a better indicator by both government and Solidarity economists.

Secundo, since the attempts to change the prices of basic foodstuffs led to violent reactions of the working people in 1970, 1976 and 1980, the government kept certain consumer prices at an absurdly low level, subsidizing the producers heavily, but even so did not succeed in ensuring balance between supply and demand. It was ultimately forced to establish rationing and again failed to meet the quota. Under such conditions, it is no wonder that peasants fed their horses, cattle and poultry on subsidized bread and that the black market for meat proliferated.

Tertio, it is very difficult to assess the net results on people's incomes and standards of living of the price distortions, moonlighting, parallel markets, an ever wider circulation of foreign currencies sent to many Poles by their relatives living abroad or brought back from travels to the West and exchanged for zlotys at rates well above the parity of purchasing power for the average basket of goods, yet corresponding to the actual relative prices of certain luxuries and durables in short supply on the official market ... The mere enumeration of these phenomena shows how little resemblance the actual Polish economy bore to any model contemplated by economists, least of all with a tightly controlled system. However, it may be safely assumed that the system worked in favour of a minority of privileged groups - black marketeers but also those in possession of foreign exchange - and discriminated heavily against rank and file wage earners. The top echelons of party and government bureaucracy belonging to the "nomenklatura" had their own material privileges, not to speak of the corruption that spread under Gierek more than at any other moment of the post-war Polish history.

Quarto, and we touch here by far the most important aspect of Polish maldevelopment, in the conditions described above it was only natural that the attitude of people toward work and public property should be, to put it mildly, quite recalcitrant. The daily show of wastefulness in the use of resources, environmental degradation, administrative inefficiency and red tape, unwarranted privileges for some and hardship for all the others was far more eloquent than the exhortations of the regime and the material incentives offered for hard work. Cheating the official bosses and moonlighting became national sports. That is why, in spite of all the investment and up-to-date technology, Poland could not jump on the bandwagon of intensive growth. It lacked the cultural and institutional environment and, therefore, the moral incentive.

The deep roots of the crisis

It would be only too easy to attribute the collapse of the Polish economy to a combination of exogenous factors beyond the control of Polish policy makers and planners - the worldwide economic
crisis - and an accumulation of subjective mistakes committed in the last few years by incompetent and corrupt officials. In fact, this will most probably be the explanation advanced by Jaruzelski's junta, anxious to single out and put on trial scapegoats among former leaders, including Gierek himself, rather than to question fundamentally the working of the system. But Polish planners were, on the average, well trained. Since the late fifties they had known that the erratic price system was counter-productive. They saw the disaster coming and even alerted the political leadership to the impending dangers. Why then were these not averted?

The deep roots of the crisis must be sought well beyond 1970, in the failure of the abortive Polish spring in October 1956 which brought to power a partly renewed leadership with Gomulka - a political prisoner during the Stalinist period - as first secretary.

In spite of the hostility of her neighbours which stopped short of an invasion - Poland's lack of a frontier with the West seems to have saved her from the fate of Hungary and later on of Czechoslovakia - the country proceeded to sweeping reforms. Collective farms, established against the will of peasants, were allowed to disband; even today, about 80 per cent of agricultural land belongs to individual family-operated farms. Workers' councils were elected in factories and the trade-union bureaucracy was severely shaken. A modus vivendi was reached with the Catholic church, not without far-reaching concessions on the part of the Communist State. Compared to her neighbours, Poland became an island of cultural and scientific freedom, light censorship (eased but never abolished altogether), wide-open exchanges with the West. A carefully dosed measure of pluralism and discussion was injected into the working of the political institutions without questioning, however, the primacy of the Party. An Economic Council, composed of internationally-renowned scholars, was set up to propose a fundamental reform of the functioning, management and planning of the Polish economy. After difficult and protracted negotiations, Gomulka managed to write off a substantial part of the Polish debt accumulated with the Soviet Union as a result of the unfair prices imposed on the "satellites" by Stalin. Thus the country could engage on a fairly unorthodox "Polish road to Socialism" and, through the so-called Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, even raise in a very oblique way the prospect of finlandization.

All that gave Gomulka a capital of good-will and popularity only comparable in Eastern Europe to that of Tito. Yet he did not use the opportunity thus created to fully denounce and correct distortions brought about by the accelerated industrialization implemented through the six-year plan (1949-55). Nor did he let the reforms go far enough to question the very foundations of centralized planning and management, geared to what amounts to a war economy, textually and metaphorically to the extent to which
rapid modernization requires a heavy concentration of scarce resources on a few selected priorities.

Poland's post-war experience has been basically one of an underdeveloped country, terribly destroyed by war, attempting a shortcut to development and bridging in the span of one generation the gap separating her from the advanced industrialized powers.

Undoubtedly the Soviet-type planning proved efficient in reaching some spectacular but in reality limited goals: rapid absorption of redundant rural manpower in industrial and tertiary activities, laying out the foundations of a modern industrial economy, rebuilding from ruins Warsaw and several other cities ... Full employment with a very low average productivity of labour could be defended on social grounds as a method of income distribution less damaging ethically than an apartheid dual economy consisting of a highly productive advanced sector and a mass of assisted unemployed. Contrary to smaller or industrially more advanced countries, like Czechoslovakia, Poland did not suffer too much economic damage from the imposition of the Stalinist model of heavy industrialization aimed at self-sufficiency.

But these achievements were obtained through a system of ruthless, arbitrary and overcentralized management, with little or no regard for economic efficiency or, the regime's rhetoric notwithstanding, for social equity. The top bureaucracy emerged as a privileged caste, while the regime also produced its underdogs and pariahs heavily discriminated against, including people condemned to forced labour. Shielded behind secrecy, ostensibly imposed by the cold war, the planners were not politically accountable. The performance of the economy was kept hidden from the public, as were the details of income distribution, complicated by an elaborate system of material advantages for the nomenklatura.

None of these negative features was fully abolished after 1956, even though many positive changes occurred. The thrust of the reforms dealt with the narrowly-conceived functioning of the economic system, as if it could be separated from its broader political context. The reformers stopped short of a thorough reform of price and income distribution systems and, still more important, were not bold enough to produce free circulation of information, to accept bona fide pluralistic discussion of goals, policies and results, in other words, to render politically accountable the policy-makers, the planners and the managers. Poland dramatically missed her historical chance of a reformist attempt at giving socialism a human face. Step by step, and one by one, the reforms announced after 1956 were emptied of their content, exploiting the lack of democratic experience of the workers and the inability of the intellectuals to articulate a concrete programme of action. Somewhat shaken at the beginning, the bureaucracy ended up by regaining complete control of the situation. The promise of self-management faded away, the workers' councils fell into oblivion, censorship was once more tightened.
In 1968, just a few months before the Warsaw Pact's military intervention in Czechoslovakia, a crackdown on students and intellectuals, accused of being part of a Zionist and revisionist conspiracy, sounded as a requiem for the Polish spring. The Socialist Leviathan once more became the sole actor on the scene, depriving the civil society of any significant possibility of dialogue and, still less, of social control over the doings of the State.

The 500 days of Solidarity

The bitter memories of the unsuccessful reformist experience of 1956-68 and of the repressions in 1956, 1970 and 1976 were decisive in shaping the free trade union movement born out of the August 1980 strikes on the Baltic Coast. "Solidarność" aimed above all at extending the sphere of individual and collective freedoms in daily life, at restoring symmetry between managers, who were to be elected, and workers, but also between the civil society at large and a State at last made accountable.

In spite of its inconsistencies, fluctuations and tactical mistakes, this was a radically anti-totalitarian upsurge. Hence, it could not be tolerated by the Soviet rulers. We still lack the perspective to analyse in detail the 500 eventful days separating the Gdansk agreement from the coup de force of December 13, 1981; the analysis should be from the point of view of the intellectual elaboration of institutional and policy proposals aimed at making the country liveable. They were many, diverse, sometimes contradictory, not always practical. They certainly did not add up into a coherent project; in a sense, they were programmatically directed against the very idea of such a rigid project, thus giving to Solidarność a slight libertarian flavour. Historical circumstances explain a good deal. Poland has had little experience of local democracy and of institutions other than the State at one extreme and the family at the other. The Catholic Church in Poland did not commit itself to a social programme as it did in Latin America.

Far more important was the existential aspect, making of these sixteen months a deeply felt collective experience proving that life could be different and richer in spite of the deteriorating economic conditions, that freedoms were not abstract categories of empty slogans, that the real country could simply ignore the legal country and the bureaucracies sustaining it. Whether the economic collapse was deliberately deepened by the authorities or left to run its course unchallenged, no doubt it paved the way for the military intervention and, at the same time, provided a perverse theme for the Soviet bloc propaganda: Solidarność is now being held responsible for a situation which in reality constitutes the failure of a development model relentlessly applied for almost four decades. Poland's economic collapse can by no means be attributed to the events of the last two years.
Is "normalization" possible?

Most probably yes, if this ominous word is to be understood according to Soviet jargon as an euphemism for the rule of force. The state of war may not be even needed for long, because a system of hidden violence has already been set up. Under the pretext of the economic reform (of which more below) tens or even hundreds of thousands of workers are going to lose their jobs. Under a special law promulgated by the military junta, all men between 18 and 45 years of age can be conscripted for heavy or unhealthy work to be provided by the State, for all practical purposes the sole employer in Poland if we except the individual peasants. In plain words this may mean the prospect of more or less forced labour for those fired from the factories or the universities for political reasons.

Of course not, if by normalization one understands a return to normal conditions of work, life and enjoyment. The economic reform about to be implemented will once more attempt to single out the sphere of economic activity and approximate it to a mechanistic paradigm, as if an economy were a Swiss- or Soviet-made watch and working people Pavlovian dogs responding to material incentives and, if need be, to the stick.

To start with, working people will be submitted to shock treatment: by a combination of a drastic increase of controlled prices, the freeing of prices for many industrial articles and partial income adjustments to offset the steep rise of the cost of living, their real wages will be reduced by a quarter to a half. The exact amount is difficult to figure out from the official data. As for the individual farmers, they are being asked to deliver to the State additional grain as a loan; a return to the abhorred system of compulsory deliveries - a euphemism for requisitions - cannot be, ruled out. We are thus in presence of a scenario which reminds us of Brazil in 1964, Chile after the coup d'état in 1973, Argentina under the rule of the generals, one which closely resembles the stabilization plans of monetarist obedience, tried time and again on the backs of the people of Third World countries. Eliminating free trade unions and establishing the rule of violence is a necessary prelude to drastic fiscal, income and price policies aimed at curbing inflation, rationalizing the working of the economy and extracting a higher economic surplus at the expense of working peoples' standards of living.

Totalitarian regimes, whether of right or left, are very efficient in externalizing the social and ecological costs of accumulation. Of course, in the Polish case there are no private capitalists to benefit from the situation, but this difference cannot be invoked, as it has often been, to condone the violation of economic justice and still less of other human rights. By contrast, these regimes are unable to reach a social consensus and establish with the public (or private) sector enterprises and the civil society a social contract stimulating positive attitudes to work. That is why the
economic reforms imposed by the Polish military junta are likely to falter, one possible response from the authorities being the escalation of violence. It is now a matter of speculation for historians whether, after the Gdansk agreements, consensus was at all within the reach of negotiating parties, why the government chose to play a foul game with Solidarność and to what extent Solidarność could have succeeded in persuading people to accept a programme of self-imposed austerity.

The coup de force of December 13, 1981 produced the final break between the real country and the official country, between a nation which expected too much from its army and feels betrayed by it, and an alienated power perceived as a foreign occupation. In the present situation, which evokes in people's minds the memories of 1939-45, not to work well will be considered a patriotic virtue, a relatively safe way of protesting or simply expressing the feeling of having been abused and deceived. Kadarism as a lesser evil seems out of reach for Poland, contrary to post-1956 Hungary. There are at least three reasons for this: another quarter of century of lost illusions has added up, the Polish economic crisis is very deep indeed, the international environment far more adverse.

Another development needed

The Polish disaster closes a historical period, inaugurated in 1956 by the denunciation of Stalinism at the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Hopes ran high in those days. The Communist movement was freeing itself from Soviet domination and becoming polycentric. Different roads to socialism would blossom instead of the disastrous repetition of the Soviet model. The dogmatic straitjacket of the unilinear interpretation of history was buried for ever.

Looking at the ruins left by the Polish experiment, in the wake of the repression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, one reaches the inescapable conclusion that the possibility of any road to socialism, whatever it still means in ideological terms, has vanished for the Eastern European countries imprisoned in the Soviet empire. The grim prospect for them is that of a Soviet-sponsored "statism", more or less repressive, according to the intensity of popular resistance and to the will and ability of the Western democracies to exert constant pressure on the Eastern European governments.

Meanwhile, the thesis of the pluralism of development paths finds its confirmation in the variety of maldevelopment cases. In this essay, Poland has been compared with Latin America. The parallel immediately leads to discarding the collapse of the Polish tightly planned economy as an argument a contrario for the marketeers' approach, as it is matched by the Argentinian catastrophe prompted by the blind application of Friedmanite policies. The Argentine
military junta was quite successful in establishing a reign of terror, but it let the real wages plunge to a level estimated to be 40 per cent lower than in 1974 while unemployment grew to an unprecedented 20 per cent of working force. Argentina is plagued by hyperinflation and runs a very high foreign debt, in spite of being self-sufficient in oil and a successful exporter of grain and meat.

Maldevelopment is also widespread in industrialized countries. It is time to cease to treat our stagflation as one more recession and to look at our structural problems: the rapidly growing faux frais (managing costs) of our economies, to start with the staggering armaments budgets; the chronic unemployment due i.a. to our inability to control technical progress and change the sharing of productivity between more output and less working time in favour of the latter; the crisis of welfarism due to its paternalism, bureaucratization and exceedingly high costs; and, last but not least, the environmental disruption. None of these problems is likely to find a solution through, the application of reaganomics, quite to the contrary.

The Left must find original responses to the maldevelopment crises in the North and in the South, as well as propose a new set of rules of the game for the international economic institutions. The Polish lesson dramatically emphasizes the urgency and the complexity of this task. There should be room for thoroughly renewed, adaptable, participatory and contractual development planning, free from economic reductionism and narrow instrumentalism. Such planning should emerge from a sustained dialogue between the civil society, the State and organized business and be guaranteed by the enshrining of fundamental human rights. This condition, so conspicuously absent in the Polish experience, is absolutely necessary for the unfolding of a truly democratic societal learning process, to stimulate peoples' creativity and to start removing the many obstacles on the way to development.7

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(Viene de la pag. 27)

**CRECIMIENTO PERVERSO Y MAL DESARROLLO: LECCIONES DEL DERRUMBE POLACO**

Resumen: Las razones principales de los errores de apreciación (incluidos los de los banqueros occidentales) sobre la situación y las tendencias de la economía polaca (antes de la crisis) se deben a un análisis que privilegia indebidamente el ritmo de crecimiento y los cambios en la composición de la producción industrial, y descuida aspectos más fundamentales del desarrollo como la distribución del ingreso, la composición del producto en términos de valor de uso real, la producción no comercial, la calidad de la vida en el trabajo. Estas son las raíces del mal desarrollo y de un crecimiento que podríamos llamar perverso en la medida en que destruye las bases mismas - económicas, sociales, ecológicas - de un desarrollo racional. A la luz de estas ideas, el autor examina la experiencia polaca y la compara con la de algunos países del Tercer Mundo. En el Sur como en el Norte, la crisis del mal desarrollo, ya sea responsabilidad del mercado o del Estado, es un desafío para la izquierda. ¿Será capaz de definir y poner en marcha otro desarrollo en el diálogo entre la sociedad civil, el Estado y las fuerzas económicas?
NOTES


3/ The concept of perverse growth was elaborated in the sixties to analyse Brazil and other Third World countries. For applications, see: Sachs, I., Studies in Political Economy of Development (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979) and also: "Development, Maldevelopment and Industrialization of Third World Countries", Development and Change (London, vol.10 no.4, Sage, October 1979).


5/ See in particular: the Government Report on the state of the economy prepared by a team chaired by Prof. Czeslaw Bobrowski and published in July 1981 as a supplement to Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw. For the point of view of Solidarność, see: Ruczynski, W., Po Wielkim Skoku (After the great leap forward), Warsaw: PWE, 1981 and several articles in the weekly Solidarność.


L'ADMINISTRATION RURALE EN AFRIQUE PEUT-ELLE DEVENIR L'INSTRUMENT D'UN VERITABLE DEVELOPPEMENT ?

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Résumé: L’administration du développement rural repose sur un système par lequel les décisions sont habituellement prises par des fonctionnaires d’origine urbaine qui font souvent montre de préjugés et d’ignorance à l’égard des cultures et traditions paysannes. Les paysans sont rarement consultés quant à leurs besoins réels, et la rencontre paysan-fonctionnaire se situe dans un environnement de relations inégales et de malentendus.

L’auteur plaide pour de nouvelles stratégies de développement rural qui comprendraient une modification des systèmes de prix et d’impôts, de manière à donner aux paysans plus de pouvoir sur le fruit de leur travail et sur les services qui affectent leur vie quotidienne, la restitution du pouvoir de décision aux communautés de base et un système éducatif qui privilégie les activités agricoles et artisanales rurales. Il conviendrait également de rééduquer les administrateurs ruraux dans ce sens.

COULD RURAL DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA BECOME AN INSTRUMENT OF GENUINE DEVELOPMENT ?

Abstract: Rural development administration is usually based on a system in which decisions are made by urban-based functionaries, with a built-in bias against, and ignorance of, peasant cultures and traditions; where the peasant populations are hardly ever consulted on their genuine needs and where the peasant-functionary encounter takes place in an environment of unequal relations and misconceptions.

The author calls for a rethinking of rural development strategies which entails such measures as modifying the price and tax systems to give peasants more control over the product of their work, the restitution to the grassroots of decision-making as well as control of services that affect people’s everyday lives, and an educational system which places emphasis on artisanal and rural industrial activities. This also calls for a re-education of the rural development administrators to conform to the shift of responsibility for development from them to the peasants.

(Resumen en Español pag. 53)
Jacques Bugnicourt

L’ADMINISTRATION RURALE EN AFRIQUE PEUT-ELLE DEVENIR L’INSTRUMENT D’UN VERITABLE DEVELOPPEMENT ?

Quels sont les rapports des agents publics avec la population rurale ?

Pour mieux comprendre le type de rapports qui s'établit entre les cadres administratifs ou assimilés et la population rurale, sans doute faut-il se demander comment les uns considèrent les autres (et vice-versa) et, à partir de là, quelles relations s'instaurent entre eux dans la vie quotidienne.

1. Quel est donc le point de vue des agents publics sur la campagne en général et, plus particulièrement, sur les paysans?

Tout d'abord, il est indéniable que, dans la plupart des pays africains, l'image de la campagne n'est guère valorisée dans l'esprit des fonctionnaires. Dans l'un des pays du Golfe du Bénin, pour évoquer une affectation éloignée de la capitale, on parlait de "mangolisation", du nom d'une petite localité du Nord, où étaient relégués, jadis, les éléments jugés politiquement trop remuants. Excepté s'il s'agit du voisinage immédiat d'une grande ville, le fait d'être nommé en milieu rural est fréquemment ressenti comme une catastrophe, à tel point qu'on peut parler d'affectation-sanction. D'ailleurs, il n'est pas exclu que les nominations à certains niveaux de décision ne se fassent, pour une part, dans cette optique. Il s'agit, incontestablement, d'une dépréciation du contexte rural aux yeux de ceux qui, en principe, sont chargés de l'encadrer et de le promouvoir.

À cela s'ajoutent, vis-à-vis des paysans eux-mêmes, des sentiments mêlés. Il n'est pas rare que des cadres du milieu rural évoquent le caractère arriéré, le primitivisme, pour ne pas dire la mentalité bornée des paysans. Les sentiments se situent, généralement, entre le mépris et l'indifférence.

Si c'est là l'attitude générale, ce n'est pas le comportement unanime des agents publics en milieu rural: il n'est pas question de sous-estimer l'action personnelle de certains cadres qui passent hors de leurs bureaux le plus clair de leur temps et s'efforcent de travailler avec les villageois. Mais ce n'est pas suffisant pour contrecarrer le poids des stéréotypes courants et de la pratique de la majorité des agents publics.
La manière même dont est organisée l'administration et dont se font les promotions implique une sous-estimation du milieu rural. Les indices supérieurs et les postes de responsabilité se trouvent tous en ville. La récompense, pour ceux des fonctionnaires ou assimilés qui font du bon travail à la campagne, n'est-elle pas de la quitter?

Dans ce système la promotion signifie, pour un agent public, soit s'occuper d'un rayon d'action plus large, d'une population plus nombreuse, soit avoir une tâche d'un niveau jugé plus important. Dans les deux cas, il est déplacé vers une agglomération plus vaste. Cette pratique exclut, dans presque tous les cas, l'avancement sur place et l'amélioration progressive dans le temps, sans leur faire abandonner la zone rurale, de la condition des agents ayant les meilleures performances.

2. Les fonctionnaires cependant arrivent-ils à imposer aux paysans le stéréotype qu'ils ont d'eux? Certes, la question doit être posée et, dans certains pays, il semble qu'il faille répondre par l'affirmative. Il apparaît que de nombreux paysans sont impressionnés par le style de vie et par le pouvoir d'achat des fonctionnaires. Mais cette administration ambiguë n'emporte en général ni le respect ni la confiance.

Il serait sans doute important de mieux connaître le point de vue des cadres en contact avec la population sur la possibilité que celle-ci participe au développement. Si l'on pose une question comme: "quelle devrait être, à votre avis, la participation de la population au développement?", ou une autre du type: "dans quel domaine et sous quelle forme les paysans... pourraient-ils, à votre avis, prendre des décisions concernant leur développement?", on risque d'obtenir des réponses à la première et à la seconde qui ne soient pas nécessairement cohérentes entre elles. En fait, même si l'échantillon des interviews recueillies... n'est pas assez large pour être significatif, on peut en déduire cependant l'existence d'un net hiatus entre la position de principe et la pratique des cadres concernés.

A travers mille comportements de détail, le paysan ressent la supériorité que s'attribue le fonctionnaire, dont la sollicitude, d'ailleurs, va d'abord aux autres agents publics du bourg ou du village, qu'il considère comme ses pairs, avant d'aller aux paysans.

De surcroît, la plupart des fonctionnaires ou assimilés sont jugés "jeunes", ce qui est une allusion à la fois à leur âge et à leur comportement. Bon nombre - parce qu'ils ne sont pas issus des terroirs où ils se trouvent ou même parce qu'ils ignores la langue de ceux avec qui ils vivent - passent pour des "étrangers". On leur reproche, souvent, de travailler à la destruction des coutumes ou des valeurs des sociétés rurales africaines et il n'est pas rare, aussi, qu'on mette en doute leur efficacité et leur honnêteté.
3. Le stéréotype du paysan dans l'esprit des agents publics et celui du fonctionnaire dans l'esprit des paysans ne sont pas nature, on s'en doute, à donner à leurs relations un caractère direct et cordial.

En général, le style des rapports entre fonctionnaires et paysans laisse plutôt à désirer.

3 a. Tout d'abord, les paysans adoptent souvent une attitude de dépendance à l'égard des fonctionnaires. Les hommages rendus, les sourires distribués, les propos élogieux font partie de l'arsenal de défense traditionnelle de la paysannerie à l'égard de ceux qui exercent le pouvoir. Ils font aussi partie, souvent, de la politesse traditionnelle dont on fait bénéficier même des gens pour lesquels on n'éprouve pas une estime excessive. Ainsi, ils font semblant d'être attentifs; mais ils n'ont pas d'illusion.

Prêts à saisir un avantage passager, les paysans n'en tirent pas de conclusion pour l'avenir: ils sont habitués, même s'ils n'en font rien paraître, aux promesses non suivies d'effets et aux bonnes paroles sans conséquences.

Les agents publics, pour leur part, n'ont pas toujours la même politesse. Ils affectent de "ne pas perdre leur temps en salutations inutiles". Et l'on voit de tout jeunes employés de préfecture ou moniteurs adresser des remontrances à de vieux chefs de famille. D'ailleurs, la manière même dont la plupart des fonctionnaires s'informent donne à réfléchir. Ils agissent en pesant une série de questions qui prend vite, à l'égard de celui qui est questionné, l'allure d'une sorte d'inquisition. On l'enferme dans une grille, d'où il ne peut sortir que par oui ou par non, ou en donnant des chiffres que, souvent, il ignore lui-même et dont il se demande, toujours, quel usage on risque de faire à ses dépens.

A cela s'ajoute que, souvent, le paysan ne comprend pas la langue de communication - français, anglais ou portugais - ou bien qu'il n'est pas du même groupe culturel que celui qui lui parle. Cette incompréhension totale ou partielle de l'instrument linguistique de contact renforce le caractère étrange du langage employé, de mots et de concepts dont la plupart des paysans et des pasteurs n'ont pas la clé.

3 b. Cependant, dans les relations qui s'établissent entre agents publics et paysans le plus inquiétant n'est pas qu'ils ne se comprennent pas; ce qui est grave, c'est que les rôles ont été distribués une fois pour toutes: les uns décident, les autres exécutent.

Il est admis, surtout dans les zones les plus éloignées de la capitale, là où aucun "originaire" du village n'est devenu fonctionnaire et capable ainsi de défendre sa parenté, que les préfets, commandants, commissaires, etc., de même que ceux qu'ils déléguent (gardes ou agents de divers services) donnent des ordres. C'est là le plus grave: les agents publics décident à la place des paysans.
3 c. Ces décisions multiples des agents publics en milieu rural n’ont pas comme unique effet de briser l’initiative des paysans ou de leur imposer des programmes ou des tâches dont ils ne veulent pas, ou qu’ils auraient souhaité autres. Ces décisions ne revêtent pas seulement un caractère souvent inattendu ou insolite. Elles présentent cet autre trait spécifique de pouvoir concerner à n’importe quel moment, n’importe quel domaine.

Les agents publics pénètrent en effet profondément dans le tissu villageois, ainsi que dans l'intimité des sociétés locales et des familles.

Dans l'organisation "traditionnelle", le chef de famille et/ou le conseil de village décident en matière de statut des personnes et d'utilisation des terres, comme pour l'essentiel de l'éducation et de la formation. Les classes d'âge prennent également certaines décisions, dans des domaines précis. Dans certaines zones, des sociétés ou des associations d'hommes ou de femmes, à buts divers, jouent un rôle dans certaines limites tracées par la coutume. Là où l'Islam a gagné, se superpose à ces compétences villageoises le pouvoir arbitral et éducatif du marabout. Il peut s'y ajouter, en certains lieux, le prestige d'un notable ou d'une famille "historique", recours possible pour les villages en divers domaines.

L'exercice du pouvoir, aux deux niveaux, n'est pas absolu: lorsque l'affaire est importante, le décideur s'entoure toujours des conseils d'une assemblée (familiale, villageoise, intervillageoise...) et les décisions s'inscrivent dans le cadre de la coutume et de la religion.

C'est d'abord la colonisation qui a ébranlé cette organisation. Puis les progrès de la monétarisation, l'intensification des flux culturels provenant de la "capitale" ou de l'étranger, et surtout la mise en place d'un encadrement administratif plus serré et plus intense ont fait que les décisions concernant la population rurale ne sont plus prises par les mêmes qu'au paravant, et qu'elles sont autres - par le lieu, par le temps, par le contenu, par la formulation, par la publicité, par la sanction.

Si, actuellement, l'aptitude à décider au niveau villageois paraît si limitée, la raison principale en est que les paysans ont le sentiment d'avoir perdu leur autonomie décisionnelle. Ils continuent, certes à prendre les décisions de la vie quotidienne, mais à tout moment peut intervenir venant de plusieurs côtés, un ordre ou un "souhait" qui, aussitôt, prévalent sur ce qu'on envisageait de faire.

On se trouve ainsi en face d'une situation complexe.

1/ Ou, dans d'autres zones, celui de devin anti-sorcier ou de missionnaire.
Un *pouvoir externe formel* intervient sporadiquement, mais fermement; ce n'est pas seulement le sous-préfet qui l'incarne mais aussi:

a) les instituteurs et autres formateurs qui font apparaître de peu d'utilité la formation "traditionnelle" donnée par le groupe;

b) le moniteur qui dit quels champs délimiter et cultiver, et quelles techniques employer;

c) la police et la justice qui vont jusqu'à s'interposer entre père et fils ou filles.

Proches de ce pouvoir formel se trouvent les responsables régionaux et villageois du parti.

3 d. On comprend qu'il ne soit pas aisé d'établir un véritable dialogue entre la population rurale et ceux qui lui imposent leurs vues et s'ingèrent quotidiennement dans leurs affaires.

Lorsqu'il s'agit de rapports périodiques avec certains paysans, pratiquement toujours les mêmes, les agents publics peuvent avoir l'impression de contacts plus confiants. Cependant, d'études faites au Sénégal, il résulte que dans un groupe villageois, ceux qui prennent les décisions habituellement ne sont pas les mêmes que ceux qui sont mis en contact de l'administration quand elle se manifeste.

Lorsque, pour diverses raisons, la population doit envoyer des délégations à tel ou tel agent public, les dés sont d'emblée pipés. Les villageois ont mis au point un certain nombre de scénarios répondant aux circonstances qui peuvent se présenter. Ainsi, un groupe qui fait des démarches auprès du sous-préfet ou du caïd, peut être déférant et résigné, ou surpris, ou à la rigueur indigné: dans tous les cas, il s'agit d'attitudes préparées auparavant. Dans de nombreuses zones, les paysans disent avoir appris à leurs dépens ce que coûte la spontanéité et la confiance dans les relations avec les agents publics.

Le cas d'assemblées ou de réunions cadres/paysans appelle, quant à lui, des observations plus précises.

Il existe, dans nombre de pays, ou bien une représentation paysanne dans des assemblées, où se trouvent également des fonctionnaires, ou bien la pratique régulière de réunions informelles d'agents publics avec les conseils de villages. La situation, évidemment, varie d'un pays à l'autre.

Ainsi, voici quelques remarques qu'on a pu faire à propos de ce qui se passe au Maroc:

"En de nombreuses occasions les fonctionnaires rencontrent la population et la consultent. C'est exact - et il nous a été donné
d'assister à certaines de ces rencontres. Cependant, il n'existe pratiquement que deux scénarios standards. Dans le premier, une ou deux personnes considérées comme représentant la population sont les seules à prendre la parole. Mais il n'est pas sans intérêt de savoir qui sont ces représentants. Le plus souvent, celui qui "fait autorité" dans la collectivité est l'un ou l'autre des personnages les plus riches - parfois d'ailleurs venu de l'extérieur, de la ville notamment. Ce qu'ils disent se regroupe autour de deux thèmes, à égale proportion - remerciements et desideratas. Parmi ceux-ci, presque tous se rangent dans l'optique de la modernisation à l'euro péenne, c'est-à-dire: demande d'avoir un dispensaire, une poste, un souk, des maisons modernes, l'électricité... Dans la seconde possibilité, il n'y a même plus les deux ou trois interlocuteurs qui énoncent quelques idées qu'on ne trouve dans la bouche des fonctionnaires en visite, mais simplement une approbation généralisée et répétée du style "tu avais raison, tu as bien dit, c'est ça qu'il nous faut". Ainsi, ou bien la discussion n'a lieu qu'avec un petit nombre de personnes qui se trouvent en situation de domination, par rapport à la communauté, ou la discussion n'a pas lieu du tout. Dans le premier cas, renseignements pris auprès de la majorité des paysans, les objectifs qu'ils auraient suggérés eux-mêmes s'ils avaient pu parler auraient été, au moins pour les deux tiers, différents de ceux évoqués par leurs "représentants". Dans le second cas, ou bien les paysans se refusaient à tout commentaire, ou bien ils indiquaient qu'ils n'avaient rien dit parce qu'ils pensaient que leurs souhaits n'avaient aucune chance d'être pris en considération".

Il faut prendre garde à ceci, qu'un rite s'est institué au cours du temps, et qu'on le perpétue. Pour répondre soit à des directives gouvernementales, soit à une aspiration qui est la leur, de nombreux fonctionnaires procèdent avec le paysan... à des échanges de vue collectifs: cette apparence de la consultation, cette forme de participation verbale n'est de nature ni à permettre aux cadres de se mettre vraiment au service de la population, ni à redonner confiance aux paysans... dans les collectivités de base.

Les différentes modalités actuelles des relations agents publics/paysans reflètent avec beaucoup d'exactitude le rapport de force présent entre les deux catégories sociales, la représentation que chacune d'elles a de l'autre et leurs relations quotidiennes.

Peut-on imaginer, au cours des prochaines années, une modification décisive de ce rapport de force et une transformation profonde des attitudes et comportements?
Comment un nouveau type d'agents administratifs et un nouveau style de relation avec les paysans pourraient-ils servir un autre développement ?

En exposant le type de relations que les agents publics établissent avec les paysans, on a quelque peu, et à dessein, forcé la note. Aussi bien le fallait-il, puisque les avertissements de René Dumont, depuis vingt ans, et ceux, plus récemment, de quelqu'un comme François de Ravignan restent apparemment sans grand écho.

Il est temps pour nous, maintenant, d'afficher moins de partialité et de nuancer le jugement.

D'une part, il faut rendre hommages à quelques réussites remarquables et à de nombreux dévouements obscurs. D'autre part, on doit se garder d'une *condamnation morale* d'agents qui ne s'avèrent ni meilleurs ni pires que ceux qu'on trouve ailleurs, mais sont "coinçés" dans une conjoncture historique difficile. Le propos, en tout cas, n'est absolument pas, dans cet article, de dénoncer ou de condamner, mais d'attirer, si possible, l'attention sur ce fait essentiel: que ce n'est pas avec un appareil administratif tel qu'il existe dans la plupart des pays africains auxquels l'on fait allusion ici que l'on va développer en profondeur les campagnes. On parviendra, peut-être, à créer quelques îlots de prospérité rurale, à mettre en place des cultures industrielles sur des zones relativement vastes, mais au prix du maintien de la majeure partie de la paysannerie dans une situation sociale et psychologique assez triste et, pratiquement, de l'abandon de vastes zones considérées comme peu productives ou "retardées".

Si les perspectives apparaissent bien celles qu'on vient d'évoquer, on n'échappe pas à la nécessité, si risquée soit-elle, d'explorer une alternative qui puisse s'exprimer en termes de stratégie, de définition de nouvelles tâches, de mise en place d'un nouveau contexte culturel.

\[1\] Ainsi, il serait contraire à la vérité de laisser penser qu'on considère comme essentiellement négatif le bilan de l'action des agents publics en milieu rural africain. Des routes et pistes se construisent sur lesquelles circulent aussi les paysans, des vies humaines sont sauvées tous les jours, une partie de la production supplémentaire sert à financer une amélioration de la vie quotidienne des paysans, de l'eau potable, des vêtements un peu meilleurs, des chaussures, parfois des habitations qui résistent mieux aux intempéries, etc.

\[2\] Ce zonage sommaire n'est pas une vue de l'esprit: il s'inscrit noir sur blanc dans un certain nombre de plans de développement.
1. La première question qui vient à l'esprit pourrait se formuler ainsi:

. parviendra-t-on à insérer les agents publics du milieu rural dans une nouvelle stratégie de développement?

Plusieurs aspects du problème peuvent être envisagés:

a) la modification du système des prix, des impôts, etc., pour réduire le prélèvement opéré sur les campagnes et laisser entre les mains du paysan une part plus importante des résultats de sa production: ceci constituerait la pierre de touche de la nouvelle politique;

b) la multiplication d'industries rurales, à la fois pour conditionner et valoriser les productions de la "brousse" et, aussi pour produire dans les campagnes les articles de consommation destinés, pour l'essentiel, aux ruraux et, pour le reste, aux consommateurs urbains;

c) afin de favoriser l'utilisation généralisée des ressources locales et de temps de travail jusqu'ici peu rentabilisé, la restitution ou la dévolution du pouvoir de décision, dans de nombreux domaines, aux groupes de base;

d) afin de rendre plus efficace l'action des groupes de base, notamment dans l'aménagement des terroirs et la création ou la gestion d'activités artisanales et industrielles, mise en place de nouveaux types de formation partant des possibilités de l'environnement.

2. C'est par rapport à la nouvelle stratégie que pourrait être entreprise une redefinition des tâches des agents administratifs du milieu rural.

2 a. Tout d'abord, il est certain que subsistera une administration "administrante" chargée de représenter le pouvoir central, d'assurer l'ordre et - fonction désormais essentielle - de dialoguer avec les groupements de base et les associations. Cette attitude fondamentalement nouvelle, que l'on attend de l'administration, implique une modification de recrutement, de la formation, des profils et des rôles des fonctionnaires chargés du milieu rural.

2 b. Ensuite se pose le problème redoutable de l'administration de services. Une première possibilité, ici, consiste à examiner les divers types de services qui peuvent être pris ou repris en main par les villageois. Un exemple: dans certains pays, le service postal s'étend et les paysans payent des impôts pour qu'un "spécialiste" - le facteur - passe 2 heures par jour à distribuer les lettres, dans un village où tout le monde se connaît: les paysans ne devraient-ils pas payer un peu moins d'impôts et assurer eux-mêmes cette distribution du courrier? Des questions analogues
surgissent à propos des bâtiments: est-il nécessaire de construire séparément une école, une poste, un dispensaire, une salle de réunion? D'une part, n'y-a-t-il pas une utilisation polyvalente possible des locaux? D'autre part, certains agents ne peuvent-ils pas meubler utilement leur temps en assurant plus d'un service à la fois? Au Kenya, un certain nombre de pompistes des stations-services vendent, en même temps, des timbres-poste. De même, le postier ne pourrait-il pas, dans les nombreuses localités et où il est loin d'être surchargé de travail, vendre en même temps des cachets d'aspirine et, pourquoi pas, tenir le registre d'état-civil?

Mais il ne s'agit pas seulement de coordination, de simplification, de recherche de l'économie ou du plein-emploi des moyens "limités" existants. La préoccupation qui devrait dominer la réorganisation serait d'assurer au maximum le contrôle des usagers, c'est-à-dire, dans ce cas, des paysans - sur les services qui leur sont destinés.

Dans ce contexte, nombre de questions surgiront, il est vrai: par exemple, est-il nécessaire que le salaire des agents publics soit, comme c'est le cas bien souvent, de plusieurs fois supérieur à celui des paysans parmi lesquels ils vivent ou, encore, ces agents publics doivent-ils nécessairement être intégrés dans des corps organisés au niveau national, avec assurance sociale garantie, retraite, etc.? On rencontrerait, d'ailleurs, sur cette voie, nombre de difficultés, comme l'articulation des représentants locaux des divers services avec les instances régionales ou nationales, ou comme l'inspection et le contrôle de ces services.

2 c. Enfin, il est un autre type d'administration rurale qui reste presque complètement à imaginer, c'est celui d'une véritable administration du développement.

Par rapport à ce qui se passe actuellement, il faudrait, en premier lieu, débarrasser les agents publics d'une illusion. Ce ne sont pas eux les responsables du développement, mais bien les groupes paysans. Le rôle de l'agent public pourrait être, à l'avenir, de répondre aux demandes, d'aider à satisfaire les besoins essentiels, de valoriser les techniques existantes et de les compléter, s'il le faut, par d'autres techniques, d'éviter l'accaparement des bénéfices du développement au profit de quelques-uns, d'encourager le travail en commun de plusieurs villages ou groupes de villages.

C'est bien dans cette perspective que se situerait des agents polyvalents de développement ou d'aménagement, qui seraient les courroies de transmission entre les groupes de villages et diverses administrations aux échelons supérieurs. Et, à côté d'eux, trouveraient place un certain nombre d'agents spécialisés recrutés par les villageois, en partie parmi eux, ou avec leur assentiment et autant que possible payés par eux - ceci allant de pair, d'ailleurs, avec la multiplication de formations de brève durée, pour apporter à des paysans des qualifications supplémentaires.
3. Tout cela n'a de chance de réussite, bien sûr, que s'il existe, aux niveaux de décision, une claire volonté politique d'œuvrer au profit des masses rurales. Cette volonté, pour autant, ne suffit pas. Si les hommes qui doivent appliquer la nouvelle politique n'ont pas vécu avec les paysans et appris à les écouter, on peut redouter qu'ils évitent les errements habituels.

En tout premier lieu, c'est l'ensemble du système de formation qu'il faudrait revoir de fond en comble. Parallèlement, les stéréotypes défavorables au monde paysan devraient être combattus en même temps que se modifieraient les flux informatifs nationaux et que se multiplieraient les échanges d'information autour des expériences à la base.

4. Enoncer brièvement ce qui précède prend l'apparence d'un programme et, peut-être, pour ceux qui connaissent bien le terrain, d'une rêverie peu réaliste. Ceux-là, cependant, savent qu'il existe déjà, en fait, bien des tentatives et des expériences s'inscrivant dans cette ligne de recherche.

Même si les généralisations s'avèrent le plus souvent désastreuses, certaines maisons familiales rurales, certains villages ujamaa, certains clubs de jeunesse agricole, certains conseils de communautés rurales, certains groupements paysans, certaines expériences d'animation ont, dans divers pays, en certains lieux et pour quelque temps, démontré d'une part que le pouvoir paysan pouvait localement s'exercer dans le sens d'un développement réel et, d'autre part, que certaines méthodes, non pas d'encadrement mais d'appui à ce développement paysan, étaient applicables et fructueuses.

Certes, il ne s'agit que de cas limités, dérisoires peut-être par rapport au contexte d'ensemble - pas assez pour extrapoler, certes, mais suffisamment pour inciter à la recherche et à la réflexion.

Certains de ces exemples, isolés pour le moment, préfigurent autre chose et il ne faut pas craindre, pour l'avenir, de poser le problème en termes de modèle. Il existe actuellement un modèle administratif surimposé sur les campagnes africaines et il importe de le mieux analyser. Cela contribuera sans doute à la définition, non pas à partir de schémas préétablis, mais dans la praxis d'un développement vécu par la population, d'un autre modèle, sans doute fort différent du précédent, plus cohérent avec l'effort exigé de la paysannerie africaine si elle souhaite trouver une autre issue à la situation présente que sa propre disparition.
Les relations agents publics/paysans constituent non seulement un face-à-face de catégories professionnelles différentes, de gens ayant plus d'intérêts divergents que de préoccupations communes, mais surtout une mise en contact de deux mondes - économiques, culturels, psychologiques - différents. Ces rapports agents publics/paysans se trouvent à la charnière entre de telles oppositions d'intérêt et de telles différences de culture qu'il n'est pas certain qu'on puisse les surmonter.

Un modus vivendi s'établit certes. Chacun porte un masque et joue sa comédie. Dans plusieurs pays, tout se passe comme ceci: les paysans font semblant de consentir des efforts de développement que les fonctionnaires font semblant d'encadrer.

Cependant, les agents publics ne sont pas seulement les exécutants, généralement peu enthousiastes, de consignes officielles. Les fonctionnaires et assimilés jouent, en milieu rural, un rôle bien plus important que ne le laisse supposer leur activité apparente. Par exemple, à travers la masse monétaire qu'ils représentent, ils deviennent, globalement, un agent économique important, ou encore, insérant peu à peu nombre de techniques nouvelles dans la vie villageoise, ils en transforment insensiblement la société et, à la longue, modifient l'allure de la vie quotidienne. Même s'ils manquent de zèle et de moyens - ce qui est le plus souvent le cas - ils sont les *vecteurs du modernisme dans les campagnes* - mais est-ce synonyme de vecteurs du développement?

Si l'on estime qu'un développement qui profite à la majorité de la population ne se conçoit, dans la plupart des pays d'Afrique, qu'avec l'effort de l'ensemble des villageois pour répondre aux besoins de base et accroître leurs possibilités de production, les techniques, souvent utiles, apportées par les agents publics trouvent le plus souvent leur contrepartie dans l'inhibition du milieu, rendu passif et incertain de ses propres possibilités.

Le plus souvent, les agents publics du milieu rural ne sont-ils pas ceux qui minent, jour après jour, le pouvoir de décision qui restait aux paysans et leur faculté d'agir en groupe, en fonction de leurs propres objectifs? À certaines exceptions près, ces agents publics ne sont-ils pas les "émietteurs" de la paysannerie?

Dans cette perspective, bien des formes passées ou présentes de la résistance paysanne prennent une valeur positive et l'on ne peut plus prétendre, aujourd'hui, que, lorsque des "broussards" tiennent tête à l'administration, ceci constitue une attitude nécessairement rétrograde et condamnable.

C'est dans un tout autre esprit que des paysans ivoiriens, par exemple, voient les choses.
"Savoir bien ce que nous voulons pour pouvoir tenir tête, s'il le faut. Si l'autorité finit par voir que tu as raison, elle revient sur son idée. Il faut dire quand on n'est pas d'accord, obtenir la décision ou faire attendre son refus. Pour réussir, prendre conscience de ce que tu veux et de ce qui peut te blesser"...

"Tenir tête? Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire?" - "C'est quelqu'un qui 'prend-responsabilité-à-la-main', qui résiste aux pressions..."

Peut-être ne doit-on pas oublier, aussi, que lors des mouvements qui ont secoué l'Afrique aux temps de la décolonisation, les paysanneries ont fourni de larges contingents armés, depuis l'Algérie jusqu'au Mozambique, en passant par le Maroc, le Cameroun, Madagascar et le Zaïre. Il serait important de réfléchir sur la part de révolte paysanne dans ces diverses insurrections et dans celles qui se poursuivent actuellement.

On fera bien également de se souvenir que, dans plusieurs cas, les paysans armés ont massacré des agents administratifs dont on pouvait estimer - d'un point de vue extérieur à leurs préoccupations - qu'ils leur étaient utiles: des instituteurs, des moniteurs agricoles, par exemple. Il faudrait bien comprendre pour quoi ils ont agi ainsi.

Une réflexion à ce propos aiderait peut-être à déterminer les conditions qui permettraient que les agents publics en milieu rural deviennent les alliés des masses paysannes africaines et se mettent à leur service pour un vrai développement.

Cet article a été extrait, avec l'autorisation de l'auteur et de l'éditeur, des parties II et III d'une longue étude parue sous le même titre dans la Revue française d'administration publique, 2 Avenue de l'Observatoire, Paris VI. La première partie de l'étude, "Que représentent réellement les agents publics affectés au milieu rural?", et qui traite de leur fonction économique, technique et sociale, a été entièrement omise.

(Viene de la pag. 41)

LA ADMINISTRACION RURAL. EN ÁFRICA PUEDE TRANSFORMARSE EN INSTRUMENTO DE UN VERDADERO DESARROLLO?

Resumen: La administración del desarrollo rural descansa en un sistema mediante el cual las decisiones son habitualmente tomadas por funcionarios de origen urbano que a menudo hacen muestras de prejuicios y de ignorancia cuando se trata de tomar en cuenta las culturas y tradiciones campesinas. Los campesinos son raramente consultados en cuanto a sus necesidades reales y las relaciones campesino - funcionario se sitúan en un ambiente de desigualdad y de malos entendidos.

El autor aboga por nuevas estrategias de desarrollo rural que incluyan una modificación de los sistemas de precio y de impuestos de manera que den a los campesinos mayor poder sobre el fruto de su trabajo y sobre los servicios que afectan sus vidas cotidianas. Sería necesario restituir el poder de decisión a las comunidades de base y crear un sistema educacional que de prioridad a las actividades agrícolas y artesanales rurales. Igualmente convendría reeducar a los administradores rurales en este sentido.
DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS OF THE ARAB OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES

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Abstract: The Arab oil exporting countries' fortunes have been widely publicized, but their problems and the constraints are generally overlooked. Aside from the fact that the source of their financial affluence is the depletion of their most important natural resource, the ten countries of OAPEC are very diverse in population, size, national product, relative weight of oil, non-oil resources, natural environment and human resources. Five or six countries have more capital funds than they can feasibly invest in their internal economic development, but they depend heavily on oil exports (and the consequent habits of importation of goods) and labour and skills imports. The other countries have more diversified resources but are or will be short of investment funds. Although diversity presents problems, it could also provide great opportunities for regional cooperation and economic integration, given political harmony and a common will. The author illustrates the potential for cooperation in examining seven joint development opportunities.

CHOIX DE DEVELOPPEMENT DES PAYS ARABES EXPORTATEURS DE PETROLE

Resume: La richesse soudaine des pays arabes exportateurs de pétrole a fait couler plus d'encre que leurs problèmes et les contraintes qui affectent leur développement. Outre le fait que cette richesse provient de l'épuisement de leur principale ressource naturelle, les dix pays de l'OPAEP sont très divers par la population, la taille, le produit national, le poids relatif du pétrole, les ressources non-pétrolières, l'environnement, les ressources humaines. Cinq ou six d'entre eux disposent certes de capitaux excédant leur capacité interne d'absorption, mais leur développement est hypothéqué par une double dépendance des exportations de pétrole (et les habitudes d'importation de biens qu'elle entraîne) et des importations de main d'oeuvre, notamment technique. Les autres ont des ressources plus diversifiées, mais manquent déjà ou manqueront bientôt de capitaux à investir. Cette diversité ne va pas sans problèmes, mais elle peut aussi être l'occasion de la coopération régionale et de l'intégration économique, à supposer qu'existent harmonie politique et volonté commune. L'auteur illustre le potentiel de coopération en examinant sept occasions de développement concerté.

(Resumen en Español pag. 66)
The Arab oil exporting countries form a group of countries whose fortunes have been widely publicized and greatly exaggerated, but whose problems and constraints are generally overlooked or at best grossly under-estimated. Perhaps we can do some justice to these countries by looking more deeply into their development problems and options.

It is generally assumed that these countries, because of their recent financial affluence, have a wide range of options to do just about anything they want. Although the source of their financial affluence is the depletion of their most important natural resource, they are generally depicted as the recipients of great transfers of wealth from the oil importing countries. The fact that the OAPEC reserve to production ratio declined from 97 to 46 years between 1960 and 1980 is generally not regarded by the oil importing countries as a transfer of vital resources in their favour. Although oil revenues are not income in the classical sense of the word, it is often shown that the oil exporting countries are enjoying rapid economic growth. They are generally assumed to be the wealthy countries of the world, even though their combined GNP, including oil exports, is only a fraction of that of France.

When the oil exporters managed for the first time to exercise their rightful option to determine the price of their exports, they were accused of holding the world at ransom. Although the oil price adjustment was long overdue and although it was responsible for introducing fundamental and needed adjustments in energy production, pricing and consumption, it was often argued that the increase in the price of oil would bring about the collapse of the world economic system. There were many forecasts made by reputable institutions which stated that the so-called surplus funds accumulated by the oil exporters would be more than 800 billion dollars by 1980. It was also often argued that these funds would be such a heavy burden on the international monetary system that it would simply give way to panic and confusion with lasting damage to world trade and investment."

When these colossal and gloomy forecasts did not materialize, there was a noticeable shift toward less dramatic but perhaps more serious accusations against the oil exporting countries.

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1/ Ali Attiga of Libya is the Secretary-General of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). He is also a member of the Council of IFDA. The text reproduced here was excerpted from an address delivered to the IBRD in Washington in December 1981.
World inflation, which has been with us since 1945 and whose origin can be found in such basic economic factors as diminishing productivity and misallocation of resources in favour of unproductive activities such as armaments, was suddenly attributed to the price of oil. Although less than two per cent of the GNP in the industrial countries is spent on oil imports, it is often argued that the price of oil has been the major cause of the rapid increase of world inflation.

Other familiar and time-honoured economic problems such as business cycle, recession, unemployment, trade deficits and monetary instability in the industrial countries are often wrongly attributed to oil prices. On this basis one would expect that there will be those who would attribute the recent upsurge in interest rates to oil prices, even though it happened at a time when oil prices were declining in both nominal and real terms.

When the oil exporting countries, especially the OAPEC group, began to exercise the option of improving their economic relations with the oil importing Third World countries, world attention focused on the impact of oil imports on the economies of these countries. In order to enlarge the size of their oil import bill, countries of Southern Europe and others such as South Africa were included in the definition of "developing countries". Perhaps this is the only case where this kind of definition is adopted.

Although a few of the larger and relatively advanced countries account for more than 70 per cent of oil imports by the Third World, there has been generally no attempt to point this out, which has made for more misunderstanding and confusion both within and outside the Third World. The same is true for the general lack of distinction between the oil and non-oil components of the balance of payments deficits of the oil importing Third World countries. Only those who are familiar with the details of the merchandise imports of Third World countries know that less than 20 per cent of the value of these imports is attributable to oil. The rest of the merchandise imports and all of the invisible imports represent non-oil items imported mainly from the industrial countries tries. The same is true of investment income remitted from Third World countries. Why then not talk about the trade deficits in machinery or foodstuff or other manufactures imported by Third World countries?

When the Arab oil exporting countries used their option to increase aid to and purchases of goods and services from other Third World countries, their net contribution was not properly recorded in the data on world trade and aid. Thus although more than 90 per cent of the OPEC aid to Third World countries is contributed by a few Arab countries, members of OAPEC, it generally appears as aid from the OPEC countries as a whole and thus greatly understates the contribution of the Arab countries in terms of their GNP and on a per capita basis. Also, the fact that Arab aid to other Third World
countries is virtually never tied to purchase agreements and is
given on highly concessional terms or as outright grants is often
ignored or understated in comparison with the aid from the
industrialised countries. Substantial remittances of workers and
other invisible trade payments from oil exporting to other Third
World countries are usually not properly identified in the balance
of payment figures.

Perhaps I have taken more time than you would expect on some of
the external sources of pressure and confusion facing the oil
exporting countries. However, I feel it is necessary for us all to
keep these problems in mind as we move on to examine their
internal development options.

So far, we have spoken of the Arab oil exporting countries as if
they were a homogeneous group. As you well know this is not the
case. In fact, within the OPEC group\footnote{Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Jamahiriya, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.).} we have the largest and
the smallest Arab countries in terms of population (Egypt and
Qatar) and almost the same is true in terms of area (Algeria and
Bahrain).\footnote{Sudan is the largest followed by Algeria.} Four of the ten OPEC states have 85.3 per cent of the
members' total population of about 97 million, yet in 1980 they
possessed only 31 per cent of the GDP of OPEC member states ($395
billion). The share of oil revenues in the GDP of OPEC is about
54 per cent, but more than 81 per cent of this is produced by the
major oil exporters in the group. However, these figures take into
account only the direct share of oil revenues in the GDP whereas a
large share of the income from the non-oil sector is due to the
investment and expenditure of oil revenues.

There are also great differences among the OPEC countries in
terms of non-oil resource endowment, natural environment and human
resources. Generally, countries which have accumulated capital
funds from the export of oil are short of non-oil resources, while
those which have more of these resources are relatively short of
financial assets. Although the wide diversity of resource
endowments presents great difficulties in coordinating petroleum
development policies, it can also provide great opportunities for
regional cooperation and economic integration. But such
opportunities can be utilized only if there is political harmony
among the countries concerned, together with the determination and
will-power to build a common future. While this is clearly a sound
development option, its implementation will largely depend on the
assessments and perception of each country's own interests and
potentials. This is why we must leave this option until we have
examined individual country development options.
In such a situation the ten member countries of OAPEC will have different development options depending on their size, natural resources, management skills and political orientation. Six of the member countries depend almost completely on oil revenues and in some cases on income earned from the foreign investment of unspent oil revenues. The other four members have more diversified natural and human resources. For them oil revenues constitute an important, but not the most important, source of livelihood. In other words, five or six member countries have more capital funds than they can feasibly invest in their internal economic development, but they depend heavily on oil exports and on imported labour and foreign skills in almost all disciplines. The other four or five members are or will be generally short of investment funds, but they have or will have more than their needs of labour resources, especially common unskilled labour.

If all the countries in the two groups proceed along separate paths to development, then their individual development options will indeed be limited. The major oil exporters will have to continue exchanging crude oil or consumer and capital goods and services with little or no prospects for economic diversification or economies of scale. Theoretically, each of them should have the option of regulating its production of crude oil in accordance with its development needs. In practice, this has seldom been the case. For example, prior to 1973 the oil exporting countries had no control over production or price levels. The oil market was largely controlled by the concession-holding companies, and the price of oil was kept very low for a long period of time. With this kind of market structure, the only option open to the oil exporting countries for increasing their oil revenues was simply to encourage the oil companies to increase the volume of exports.

With the oil price increase of 1973/74 and the subsequent changes in the ownership and management of the upstream segment of the international oil industry, the oil exporting countries began to have some options with regard to production and price levels. But these options are viable only when a country has accumulated sizeable financial reserves and has excess production capacity. In this case the country can choose either to reduce production in order to prolong the life span of its reserves, to defend a given price level or to raise production in order to increase its oil revenues.

But the development option of a country in this position is limited by its internal capital absorptive capacity. Its accumulated reserves will have to be invested abroad under conditions and circumstances largely beyond its control. The only option the investor has is to transfer his funds from one asset to another or from one country to another but always within the limits as determined by the market and the host country. Most of the foreign investment of oil exporting countries still takes the form of financial assets and bank deposits on a renewable basis. Inflation and currency fluctuation are responsible for the continuous depreciation in the value of these investments.
With excess capital on hand, the major oil exporting countries are under constant pressure to continue increasing their expenditure on internal development and domestic consumption. But because of several serious institutional and physical bottlenecks in the labour and commodity markets, much of the increased expenditure simply adds to domestic inflation and raises the cost of development. As this trend continues, it quickly absorbs an increasing share of the oil revenues with no noticeable increase in domestic productivity. Since several of the major oil exporting countries do not levy direct taxes but impose only token indirect taxes, the whole expenditure of the country, whether public or private, becomes a direct charge on the proceeds of oil exports. In this way, a development programme which may have been designed to help lessen the heavy dependence of the economy on oil exports may in practice lead to the opposite result. This may well explain the close correlation between changes in oil revenues and the volumes of expenditure, imports and trade balances of the oil exporting countries. It also explains the almost total dependence of all economic activities on changes in government expenditures on investment and consumption.

This sort of heavy dependence on oil revenues tends to lead the development process in the direction of more consumption of imported goods and services with corresponding neglect of the basic development problems of the economy and society at large. In this kind of a situation it is quite possible to attain high levels of education and high standards of living for the whole country without improving the overall economic performance of the citizen or raising the productivity of the economy. Imported goods, foreign contractors and foreign labour, all paid for by the export of oil, can readily give the appearance and psychology of an affluent society.

It is clear that governments of the oil exporting countries are trying hard to overcome these serious problems threatening their economies, but their scope for action is greatly limited by the pressure of events on the one hand and by the narrow natural and human resource base of their individual countries on the other. In their efforts to cope with this problem, they have all tried to invest in infrastructure, social services and the downstream sector of their oil industries. Between 1974 and 1979 the overall share of investment in infrastructure was about 40 per cent of the total, with special concentration on industrial infrastructure (electricity, water, transportation and telecommunications).

In the major oil exporting countries, more than 80 per cent of industrial investment is in refining, gas projects, petrochemicals, fertilizers, basic metallurgy and cement. Yet despite the emphasis on basic industry, it is estimated that the production of most oil and basic petrochemicals will be only a small percentage of total world capacity in 1985 and perhaps even as late as 1990 and beyond. Moreover, the domestic consumption of these products is rising so rapidly that there may not be much surplus left for
export. But even if there is some export capacity, it will face foreign trade restrictions and severe market competition if producers follow separate and perhaps competing marketing policies. If this happens then investment in the petrochemical industry will not provide a viable development option. Such investment can be viable only if undertaken on a regional scale and based on effective policy coordination among the oil producing countries.

With this basic conclusion, we can now turn our attention to the other four member countries of OAPEC, whose natural resources are more diversified and their labour force more abundant. For the economies of this group of countries, oil exports are important but not absolutely essential. Although rising oil revenues have the same basic effect on these economies as on the other group, their total impact is less evident. Basically, these countries still need more investment in agriculture, rural development, industry and social services. They also need to create job opportunities to reduce unemployment and cope with the expanding labour force. It is highly doubtful that they can achieve significant success in this direction if they continue to develop on the basis of the individual country development option. Just as countries almost totally dependent on oil cannot succeed in reducing this dependence if they proceed with the separate and competing development options, the other countries, less dependent on oil, may not succeed in achieving their full development potential without significant cooperation among them and especially between them and the former group of countries.

This chain of reasoning brings us back to the regional development options. If we follow this option we open a number of joint development opportunities. Perhaps the most important are the following:

1. **Intensive development of human resources**

Although the total population of the OAPEC area is about 97 million, the total active labour force is only about 26 million, giving an activity rate of 27 per cent compared with about 40 per cent in the industrialized countries. The overall illiteracy rate is still high, and the level of skills and know-how is very low even among those having the benefit of a basic education. With the combined financial and human resources of the OAPEC countries as a group, various educational programmes and training centres could be established according to the specific needs of development projects. At present, cooperation in this field is limited. Instead, there is increasing dependence on imported foreign labour. This type of dependence can be significantly reduced or even eliminated, provided there is effective joint effort among the oil exporting countries and between them and other Arab countries in the field of manpower development.

2. **The discovery and development of natural resources**

Within the OAPEC area there is a wide scope for productive investment in exploration for more oil and gas and enhanced oil recovery
from existing reserves. There is also a pressing need for more intensive and systematic surveying and exploration for mineral resources in general. Because of border problems and similarities of geophysical conditions and natural environment, it would be much more economical and fruitful to undertake joint or coordinated investment programmes. The acquisition of the necessary technology and know-how by local staff and institutions will also be more feasible and less costly if joint projects are given a greater role in this vital area of economic development.

3. **Agricultural development and fishing**

At present the OAPEC area is highly deficient in food supplies. In 20 years' time, when its population about doubles, more than twice the present food supplies will be needed if the average per capita consumption is to be raised. Yet more than 50 per cent of the present supply is imported from non-Arab countries. There are at least four or five OAPEC countries with substantial agricultural potential. There are other Arab countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Morocco whose agricultural sectors can absorb high investments provided that substantial efforts are made to create the infrastructure and rural institutions needed for modern agriculture. Again, this can be done only on a joint regional basis with substantial participation by the oil exporting countries.

4. **Industrial development**

Within the OAPEC area, the oil industry (refining and petrochemicals) offers a feasible development option provided it is undertaken on a regional basis or with a significant degree of development policy coordination among the main oil exporters. Basic petrochemicals and energy intensive industries can provide an efficient outlet for the gas resources of the area. Utilizing the gas and oil resources in these industries is more beneficial for the development process than exporting LPG, LNG or methanol. The intermediate and final products of these industries can be used for domestic consumption and export. Such a development option will also help the oil exporting countries individually and as a group to acquire modern technology and create alternative employment opportunities for their growing labour force. A well-trained and efficient labour force will be a vital asset even after the oil reserves have been exhausted.

5. **Development of energy resources**

Although the Arab countries have the largest share of proven conventional oil reserves, their share of total proven energy resources is no more than 9 per cent. At present they are supplying the world with, nearly twice that percentage, which means that if this trend continues without new additions to energy reserves, the Arab countries will be among the first energy producers to run out of this vital development input. If present production and consumption
levels continue, several OAPEC members will cease to export oil and some will start importing within the next decade. This is an urgent problem whose solution requires regional cooperation in oil and gas exploration and in the development and extension of gas and power lines across political borders. There is also wide scope for cooperation in the development of new and renewable energy sources, especially solar energy and nuclear power.

6. The development of research and applied technology

There are many common problems and mutually beneficial opportunities in the OAPEC area which require research, field studies and technology centres. Experience has shown that individual country efforts are often inadequate and too fragmented to achieve serious and continuing research, engineering design and technology application to local conditions and requirements. Again, the combination of the human and financial resources of OAPEC and other Arab countries can provide the essential requirements for real progress in these vital fields.

7. Joint monetary and financial markets

Despite the relative financial affluence of several oil exporting countries, their monetary and financial institutions are still geared to pumping national savings into the money and capital markets of the OECD countries. Although many joint banks and investment institutions have been created, their basic operation is still largely oriented in that direction. Therefore, there is a great need for creating and expanding investment opportunities in shares and equity on a regional basis in the private and public sectors. Despite all the talk about surplus capital in some Arab countries, there is not enough talk or work in identifying and promoting the pressing investment needs of the economies of many other Arab countries. Specific policies and programmes need to be developed for the achievement of this purpose.

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These are the major development options which I believe are highly suitable for the future needs of the oil exporting countries. They are also suitable for the needs of all the Arab countries. In fact the opportunities will be even greater if there is close regional cooperation and joint development activity in several areas of the Arab world. I believe it may be the only option which can successfully use the temporary oil resources as a bridge for achieving self-sustaining development, including the use of new and renewable sources of energy. Such an approach will also provide the best means of consolidating mutual defence and security problems which are often the source of local rivalry and conflict.
I am well aware that these development options cannot be readily taken. On the contrary, the present political configuration and super-power conflict in the area seem to be working in the direction of further national fragmentation, internal conflict and regional crisis. However, I believe it is the moral and professional duty of those working in regional and international institutions to resist these tendencies in the Arab countries or in other parts of the world. Fortunately, the Arab countries have a wide base of common culture and heritage upon which to build a common future. But the real question is how? It is my belief that it cannot be achieved through immediate and sporadic political unity imposed from the top. Nor can it be realized through violence or military adventure. This leaves only the gradual peaceful and evolutionary development option. It is a long, tedious and frustrating process, but experience has shown that with patience, faith and hard work, remarkable and lasting results can be achieved.

The main mechanism for progress in this direction will be joint institutions and joint projects in certain key areas such as those outlined above. There are now many such institutions and projects within the OAPEC area and the Arab world as a whole. However, in many cases they lack the necessary resources and operate without the necessary policy coordination among their member countries. In my opinion, this is the major problem facing joint Arab organizations and projects. The solution of this problem should be given top priority at the national and regional levels. Only then will real development goals be attainable.

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I will conclude my presentation with a brief description of OAPEC, its purpose, activities and achievements. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries was established in 1968 with a membership of only three countries. OAPEC provides a reasonable case of a regional organization applying some of the options outlined in this talk. Its main purpose is to work for cooperation among its members in the petroleum industry. To achieve this, the organization has followed three main lines of action with varying degrees of success.

1. Coordination of the members' national petroleum development policies.

2. Promotion and exchange of technical expertise, studies and relevant data among its member countries and between them and other regional and international institutions.

3. Establishment of joint development projects in the field of hydrocarbons and related activities.

Since it would take too long to tell you in detail what OAPEC has achieved in each of these lines of activity and the problems it has encountered, I will confine my brief to general statements.
In the area of direct policy coordination OAPEC has not been able to achieve its objective, largely because of a strong tendency for individual country action and a clear preference for country projects, especially after the increase in financial resources and the greater access to world markets following the 1973/75 changes in oil price and ownership. This is also the area where politics exert the greatest impact and seem to inflict the most serious damage on the fundamental concept of policy coordination and regional cooperation.

On the brighter side, considerable progress has been achieved in the promotion and exchange of expertise, training and technical studies in all important areas of the oil industry. But although these achievements are important and encouraging, they are still modest in comparison with the common needs of the member countries. They have to be strengthened in scope and depth and supported by greater reliance on local expertise and regional institutions.

In the area of joint projects OAPEC has so far established five major companies and one training institute. Two of the companies are involved in oil and gas transportation\(^{1}\), one in downstream petroleum investment\(^{2}\), another in petroleum services with special emphasis on upstream operations\(^{3}\), and the fifth and most recent company is in petroleum engineering consulting services\(^{4}\). The training institute\(^{5}\) is designed mainly to prepare local instructors for national petroleum institutes and to conduct courses and seminars in manpower planning and management in the oil industries. The companies and the institute are directly owned by the member countries and are managed independently of OAPEC. They are located in different member countries, and about two billion dollars have been invested in them.

Although each of these institutions has made some progress toward achieving its objectives, they all suffer from the lack of a common development environment. They still have to work outside the national policies of the member countries. They need more determination, resources and time to achieve their basic purpose of creating joint ownership and common capability in the vital areas of the oil industry.

As for the near future, OAPEC is planning for the establishment of another company for shipbuilding and repair in Algeria and for a

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\(^1\) The Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company (AMPTC), Kuwait, and the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company (ASRY), Bahrain.

\(^2\) The Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation (APICORP), Saudi Arabia.

\(^3\) The Arab Petroleum Services Company (APSC), Libyan Jamahiriya.

\(^4\) The Arab Engineering Company (AREC), Abu Dhabi.

\(^5\) The Arab Petroleum Training Institute (APTI), Iraq.
joint company in oil exploration. I should also mention that each of the five existing companies is empowered to establish subsidiaries and joint projects as it deems necessary. Some of them, especially the Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation (APICORP) and the Arab Petroleum Services Company (APSC), have already established and participated in several ventures of this kind.

Another interesting and pioneering feature of the OAPEC institutional structure is the Judicial Board, which was officially established this year. The board is composed of nine judges and has compulsory jurisdiction in disputes between OAPEC companies, between them and the member governments or OAPEC itself, and between OAPEC and member governments. It has voluntary jurisdiction in other areas, provided they are within the field of hydrocarbons. The existence of the Judicial Board should facilitate interpretation and enlargement of the joint legal code which governs the activities of OAPEC and its sponsored companies. This should further facilitate the integration of joint economic activities into the national policies of the member countries. At least this is our great hope. The Judicial Board is the first joint juridical body in the Arab world.

(Viene de la pag. 55)

ELECCIÓN DE MODELO DE DESARROLLO DE LOS PAÍSES ÁRABES EXPORTADORES DE PETRÓLEO

Resumen: La riqueza repentina de los países árabes exportadores de petróleo ha hecho correr más tinta que los problemas y dificultades que afectan su desarrollo. Más allá del hecho que esta riqueza proviene del agotamiento de su principal recurso natural, los diez países de la OPAEP son muy diferentes por la composición de su población, su dimensión, el producto nacional bruto, el peso relativo del petróleo, los recursos no petroleros, el medio ambiente, sus recursos humanos. Cinco o seis de ellos disponen de capitales que exceden su capacidad interna de absorción, pero su desarrollo está hipotecado por una doble dependencia de exportaciones de petróleo (y las costumbres de importación de bienes que ello acarrea) y de importación de mano de obra, especialmente técnica. Los otros países tienen recursos más diversificados, pero ya carecen y carecerán aun más de inversión de capitales. Esta diversidad no deja de tener problemas, pero también puede ser una oportunidad de cooperación regional y de integración económica, suponiendo que existe armonía política y voluntad común. El autor ilustra el potencial de cooperación al examinar siete posibilidades de desarrollo concertado.
HUMAN NEEDS AND SELF-RELIANCE ARE THE TWO PILLARS OF DEVELOPMENT
says the Chamber of Deputies of Italy

On 6 April 1982, the Italian Chamber of Deputies passed the following resolution, presented by Members from all parties but the neo-fascists, and accepted by the Government. It is certainly a marking along the path to genuine international development cooperation, and we can only hope that it will be recognized.

Italy had already decided to increase significantly its official development assistance to the Third World: it is to increase from some US$270 million in 1979, or 0.08% of the gross national product, to at least US$1,500 million or 0.34% of the gnp in 1983. This is the average of the OECD countries, the level that the Italian authorities have decided to reach in three years.

An interesting fact is that this dramatic change is essentially due, as John Lewis, Chairman of DAC, noted in his 1981 Review, to the efforts of a small group of politicians and development activists, starting with those of the radical party, supported by a wide spectrum of the Italian political forces and, above all, a large sector of the public opinion. The story of this should be written. In the meantime, IFDA, in cooperation with a few members of the Chamber of Deputies (including some of the drafters and signatories of the resolution) and with the Department for Development Cooperation of the Foreign Ministry, organized in Rome from 20 to 22 April, a private seminar on 'The need for alternative development cooperation policies and practices: the Italian opportunity'. The following resolution of the Italian Parliament suggests that the opportunity is a real one.

The Italian Chamber of Deputies,

· taking note of the floor debate on the 1982 Budget Proposal, during which time ample attention was paid to the problems of cooperation with the developing countries;

· having premised that:

- at the start of the third United Nations development decade, no appreciable progress has ensued either on the instrumental

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level or that of the war against hunger and poverty, such that more than a billion human beings are living below the threshold of utter destitution and five hundred million people suffer from serious malnutrition, while the disparities between the various areas of the world and between the different social groups continue to grow and the rate of development of the majority of Third World countries is very low and, in some cases frankly negative;

- the principle responsibility for this situation lies with the development policy carried out for the last twenty years, based on the simplistic exportation of the richer countries' development models, on the growth of the gross national product through a process that has based itself too much on forced industrialization, isolating the ruling élites from their social context and marginalizing the poorest sectors of the population;

- this development model failed to take into account the real needs of the population and its economic programme was completely given over to the so-called "trickle-down effect" which was to have redistributed the wealth produced by the modernizing élites down to the poorest levels of the population;

- this theory has proven to be illusory because the wealth, when it is produced, becomes concentrated in the hands of a few who have shown no interest in sharing it with the rest of the population;

- for their part, the industrialized countries have generally acted in the logic of exploitation, in contrast with real long-term common interests, and have too often used the countries of the Third World as the theatre for planetary confrontation, accelerating the arms race and using development aid as a means of political pressure;

- the degradation of this development model, which continues to be applied and to produce its negative effects, is such that there can be no further delay in the search for alternative
strategies based on priority satisfaction of basic human needs, starting with food, and on the pursuit of self-reliance, which would liberate the countries of the South from dependence on those of the North;

- this search has led to a redifinition of the concept of development, no longer limited solely or predominantly to the production of material goods, but confronting globally the problem of man's fulfilment and the protection of his fundamental rights, in the first place those elementary ones tied to subsistence, but at the same time, also the rights to expression, creativity, convivality and to decide one's own destiny;

- not only the non-governmental agencies particularly committed to seeking development alternatives, but also the official international bodies and the governments of the Third World countries have identified the satisfaction of basic needs and the search for a self-reliant, endogenous development, especially in the area of food, as the pillars of a new development model that would correspond to the central role of human beings and the defense of their fundamental rights;

- the problems regarding the fight against world hunger and for development are the great issues of our time, such that they have occupied the most vigilant minds in every part of the globe and have mobilized public opinion to an extent never seen before, calling out that, today and not tomorrow, concrete and binding commitments be made and concrete steps be taken in order to put an end to this scandal of the earth;

- the solution to the tragic problem of hunger cannot be found by perpetuating, or even worse, broadening the mechanism of food assistance which until now has for the most part served the interests of the donor countries, provoking a sensible reduction in the local production of food, new and costly eating habits, and thus new dependeny, as well as a serious delay in the process of modernizing local agriculture;
- the combined economic and nutritional gap in the food availability of the developing countries is of such large dimensions that it can be narrowed, as United Nations resolutions have been asserting for some time now, solely by a sustained increase in food production for local and regional markets, stimulating agricultural development especially in the poorest countries, with the aim of increasing their level of global self-sufficiency and food security;

- a coherent and sustained action against hunger and for cooperation based on the satisfaction of basic human needs and self-reliance implies the concommitant implementation of both conjunctural and structural initiatives linked to the binding request to Third World governments to invert their development priorities, putting the agro-alimentary sector in the first place and giving priority to the programmes benefiting the poorest strata of the population;

- the fight against hunger and for development has become more difficult because of continued demographic growth, such that the Colombo Conference on Population and Development repeatedly and explicitly stressed the necessity for the industrialized countries to give international aid to the developing ones in the field of population.

commits the Italian Government:

- to reorganize its cooperation policy with Third World countries, abandoning the old model and acquiring a new and more complex dimension of development, understood as the integral fulfilment of the life aspirations of every man and woman - of the whole man and woman;

- to allot gradually all the funds earmarked for cooperation with Third World countries in the form of public aid to development, for the realization of projects aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the poorest strata of the population, and to the achievement, in the shortest time possible, of self-reliance, first and foremost in food production, limiting food assistance
to foreseeable and unforeseeable emergencies, of human or natural origins, in the amount and under conditions such as not to compromise the full and quickest development of local food production;

- to draw up, for such, an end, integrated plans for both conjunctural and structural action, directed at safeguarding human life and promoting a self-reliant and endogenous development in the spirit of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament and the appeal launched by 53 Nobel Prize winners which was its inspiration and which has been endorsed by heads of state and government, cabinet ministers, members of parliament, leaders of international bodies, local administrators, intellectuals, religious leaders, men and women in the sciences and the arts, as well as common citizens of all countries;

- to promote relations of permanent cooperation for the utilization of natural resources, with particular regard for renewable or ecologically sound energy sources, service infrastructures and communications;

- to make use, for the timely implementation of these plans, of the structures and the experience of the international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, in agreement with the governments of the interested countries, on condition that they accept to carry out the necessary reversal in priorities in their development policies in favour of the agro-alimentary sector destined for the production of food for local consumption, and that they commit themselves to take the necessary measures to meet the needs of the least-favoured elements of the population;

- to modify, in consequence, the current practice whereby development aid is subordinated to the needs of foreign trade, expressly forbidding the use of aid credits and grants to Third World countries separately and jointly, for the purposes set forth in law 227 of 24 May 1977, which intended to improve the competitive position of Italian firms operating on the
international market, and limiting the use of mixing to the sole and exclusive financing of projects that correspond to the criteria inspiring the new cooperation policy based on the satisfaction of basic needs and the pursuit of a self-reliant endogenous development, in accordance with the indications given by the international bodies linked to the United Nations;

- to separate aid credits from commercial ones and to concentrate in a sole chapter of the expenditures estimate of the Foreign Ministry all the funds relative to development cooperation that contribute to determining our quota of public aid calculated by the DAC, in such a way as to render this aid more concrete, timely and effective;

- to include the population problems among the priorities of the cooperation development policy, allocating in 1982, for assistance in the field of population, one per cent of the aggregate amount of money appropriated for public aid to development, progressively increasing this percentage in the following years to the point where the average amount of the donor countries is reached, using for the most part multilateral channels, with particular reference to the specialized institutions of the United Nations.

Ajello, Bonalumi, Forte Francesco, Ravaglia, Pasquini, Biondi, Vizzini, Crucianelli, Spaventa.
ABOUT UNDERSTANDING – IDEAS AND OBSERVATIONS ON CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Sven Hamrell's preface to Andreas Fuglesang's book \textsuperscript{1}

The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report (What Now: Another Development) devoted one of its ten main points to the need for improving public information and cross-cultural understanding:

\textit{Citizens have a right to inform and be informed about the facts of development, its inherent conflicts and the changes it will bring about, locally and internationally.}

\textit{Under present conditions, information and education are Only too often monopolized by the power structure, which manipulates public opinion to its own ends.}

\textit{A global effort should be made to give the new international relations their, human dimension and to promote the establishment of genuine cooperation between peoples on the basis of equality and recognition of their cultural, political, social and economic diversity. The image of the Other should reach each of us, stripped of the prevailing ethnocentric prejudices, which are the characteristic feature of most of the messages currently transmitted.}

\textit{Such an effort should be concerned both with information and with education in the broadest sense of the word; it should be directed towards 'conscientization' of citizens to ensure their full participation in the decision-making process.}

Since this was written, an ever growing importance has been attached to the communications problématiques as is evident from the debates in UNESCO and in the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as from the work undertaken by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (the MacBride Commission), whose main results were published in 1979 under the title \textit{Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow: Many Voices, One World}. But while most of these efforts to transform the present international information structures and to redress existing imbalances have been made in a fairly abstract manner and at a rather high political level, there have also been a number of attempts to tackle the problems of communication at the grassroots level. An important contribution of the latter type has been made over the last ten years by Andreas Fuglesang, who in 1972 organized the first Dag Hammarskjöld seminar on applied communication in the Third World and who has since then directed or actively participated in three more Dag Hammarskjöld seminars, resulting in

\textsuperscript{1} Uppsala (Sweden): The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1982, 232 pp.; US$20.
four publications carrying his name and testifying to the conceptual and practical value of his work.

As Andreas Fuglesang is well aware, we are now entering the 'information age', characterized by an ever increasing rate of innovation, which sees computers, computerized automata and processing systems outdated almost as soon as they leave the assembly plants. While it cannot be denied that new and astonishingly successful applications of this electronic technology are made almost every day, it will take some time before it is possible to assess the impact of the 'information revolution' on the Third World and on South-North relations. But what may be said with some certainty is that we now, in the industrialized countries, are witnessing a widening gap between the quantity of information being disseminated and the quality of communication taking place between individuals and that the explosive developments in media technology have done little to prevent cultural isolation and alienation. A mere 100 years ago, words were largely spoken or written between human beings. Now, words are spoken to and from machines. It is somewhat disconcerting to contemplate what will happen when the Third World is hit by the full implications of this development.

But however menacing these new technological developments may be or whatever hopes they may hold for the future, there still prevails in many villages and urban communities in Scandinavia - as in many other parts of the world - an old political belief that one can achieve understanding and solidarity among human beings. Understanding in an international context is likely to be achieved when the people in such local communities perceive that the problems of communities in other countries and cultures are inextricably linked to their own. When this perception takes root, the 'sacrifices' necessary for the transition to Another Development are more likely to be made. The ultimate task of development communication is therefore to expand these areas of local community solidarity until a dimension is achieved which promotes a continuing global dialogue between the cultures of the world.

Andreas Fuglesang's new book should be read and judged in this context. The Dat Hammarskjöld Foundation initiated this work by requesting an updated version of Fuglesang's popular book *Applied Communication in Developing Countries: Ideas and Observations*, originally published in 1973. Fortunately, instead of an update, a new book 'about understanding' emerged. Thanks to Fuglesang's extensive Third World experience, the book has not become an abstract discourse but retains its practical orientation. Fuglesang introduces new and bold perspectives in his analysis of the role of communications in social and economic development. His argument that social transformation can be described in terms of social information processing provides new and valuable insights. But as a practical guide to the issues of development communication, the book is primarily focussed on the dilemmas confronting the development workers in the Third World. In this book, they will be gratified to find many valuable observations and ideas that they can apply to their respective work situations.

With his unfailing trust in people, his advocacy of people's ability to decide the direction of their development, and his demonstration of solutions found by people, Fuglesang has made a significant contribution to the conception of Another Development and to the discussion of the approaches and strategies involved in reaching this goal.
One of Andreas Fuglesang's central contentions is that cross-cultural communication must concern itself with the fundamental question of language. Under the overwhelming onslaught of the media technology, the role played by language in cross-cultural communication has been given only secondary importance. The failure of the ideals of international understanding and solidarity may, however, be accounted for in part by the fact that we have not built into our practical approach a component for an empathetic appreciation of what our sisters and brothers in other cultures really have to say. It is this challenging objective that Andreas Fuglesang has set for himself in this new book About Understanding, which is likely to have a profound impact on the development and direction of the emerging field of cross-cultural communication.

**About Understanding**
—ideas and observations on cross-cultural communication

by
Andreas Fuglesang

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 1982

MASS MEDIA ET PRESSION IDEOLOGIQUE - LE POINT DE VUE DU PAPE JEAN-PAUL II

Lors de son voyage en Afrique, en février dernier, le Pape Jean-Paul II a eu l'occasion de s'exprimer sur les problèmes des mass media. L'importance de sa prise de position justifie que nous la reproduisions ici.

En un laps de temps inférieur à deux ans, je fais une seconde visite au Continent africain. Cet entretien avec vous, et particulièrement avec les représentants de la presse, radio et télévision des pays africains, m'offre l'occasion de réfléchir avec vous sur l'importance pour l'Afrique qu'ont aujourd'hui les moyens de la communication sociale.

Ici, vous en êtes aux premières phases de développement de vos moyens de communication sociale, alors que les pays hautement industrialisés ont déjà atteint un très haut niveau en ce secteur. Cette situation accroît vos responsabilités,

[1] (Source: Osservatore Romano, Vatican, édition française, 23.02.82)
mais vous offre une occasion unique. Par votre activité, honnêteté professionnelle et zèle dévoué à la cause de la vérité, vous pouvez apporter une contribution décisive à ce continent. En orientant totalement les mass média vers le service de l'homme et en ne publiant que des informations objectives, l'Afrique pourra déterminer son futur développement.

Nous savons que dans ce secteur comme dans d'autres, il existe de dangereux déséquilibres et que différentes organisations internationales se sont élevées contre cette situation. Dans le monde de la presse, radio et télévision, il existe une tendance à exercer une pression externe des pays les plus forts qui veulent imposer non seulement leur technologie, mais aussi leurs idées. C'est pourquoi, je sens qu'il est très important de veiller inlassablement à la sauvegarde de la souveraineté nationale par un emploi correct des moyens de la communication sociale, précisément parce que ces moyens peuvent devenir des moyens de pression idéologique. Une telle pression idéologique est bien plus dangereuse et insidieuse que certains moyens de coercition plus visibles.

L'Eglise catholique ne cessera d'attirer l'attention sur le rôle de la communication sociale. Depuis le Concile Vatican II, elle n'a fait que multiplier ses efforts dans ce secteur. Cette année, nous commémorons le Xème anniversaire de la publication de l'Instruction Pastorale Communio et Progressio. Il y a dans ce document trois mots qui se détachent de manière saillante: sincérité, honnêteté et vérité. Si chacun de vous réussit à mettre ces principes en pratique dans votre sphère d'action, alors les moyens de la communication sociale deviendront véritablement, pour toute l'humanité, les moyens du progrès culturel et social, les moyens d'un authentique progrès.

Voilà l'espérance qui se joint à ma gratitude pour tous vos sacrifices et services que vous avez rendus durant mon pèlerinage à travers le Nigeria.

THE COFFEE SYSTEM - A CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIANS

by Marcos Arruda

Words, unfortunately, do not have the power of images. Picture small peasants working in a coffee plantation in Brazil, El Salvador, Ethiopia or Indonesia. They are often landless and have no fixed habitat. They are only seasonally employed. They have many children who age too fast, whose bodies are thin and whose hearts are empty of hope. Their attempt to form unions and struggle for their rights usually meet with violence and repression. They are some of the world's poorest people.

\textsuperscript{1} The author was the coordinator of the World Council of Churches. Programme on Transnational Corporations and a member of the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses (IBASE, Brazil) and of the Transnational Institute (Amsterdam) (Rua Vicente de Souza 25, 22.251 Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro, RJ., Brazil)
Now a second image: you are sitting among business executives in a comfortable salon on the top floor of a North American skyscraper, where you learn that the 1979 coffee sales of the largest US-based coffee processor, General Foods, were higher in dollar value than the GDP of at least 20 countries of the Southern Hemisphere; or are drinking a cup of Nescafe by Lake Geneva with a Nestlé director who tells you that his company’s total sales in 1980 were worth 21 times the total exports of Tanzania.

The coffee worker and the transnational trader and processor are two links in the same chain, which we will call the coffee system. The coffee worker is at the production end of the chain, you, the coffee consumer, are at the other. Between the two is a long and complex sequence of links, including such activities as marketing, shipping, roasting, packaging and retailing. Plus advertising! Most people know of the stimulating and cardiotonic properties of coffee due to its active ingredient, caffeine. However, that coffee has become a necessary part of the diet of whole populations the world over is mainly a result of advertising. In the US, the country that consumes 40% of world coffee production, millions who live a tense and strained life characteristic of modern, overcrowded cities, add to their daily stress 5 to 8 cups of coffee. Advertising is partly responsible for this excess consumption.

The coffee system

Let us quickly examine the coffee system. Coffee is not an essential food commodity: we cannot do without vegetables or cereals but we could easily do without coffee. Yet coffee is the second largest international trade commodity by volume, with exports worth over US$11 billion in 1980. Who are the actors in the coffee production system? Who benefits from this intensive and profitable business? What does the coffee system teach us about the world market system, transnational firms and banks, and the ethics of big business? And why should churches and Christians be concerned?

The producer - As a tropical product, coffee is a commodity typical of the underdeveloped South: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Uganda and Ethiopia, and Indonesia are among its largest producers and exporters. Brazil alone is responsible for one third of world export production. Brazilian coffee production is in the hands of some 250,000 growers. But slowly the sector is being penetrated by large conglomerates: already in 1977, 20% of the growers accounted for 97% of the coffee land. The large plantation owners normally extract huge profits at the expense of their workers. Many coffee labourers receive US$1.00 to 1.50 per day for the 6 weeks of berry picking and much less during their other time in the plantation. Benefits from increased international coffee prices do not usually trickle down to coffee workers. The Brazilian Coffee Institute itself recognized that the 1977 tripling of bean prices had "no direct reflection on wages."1

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2/ Ibid., p. 27.
In 1960, Third World countries were able to buy a tractor for the price of 160 bags of coffee; in 1977 they had to give 400 bags in exchange for the tractor. In that same year, Nicaragua could purchase 13 barrels of petroleum with one bag of coffee; by 1981 the same coffee bag was worth only 2½ barrels. This deterioration of the terms of trade has obliged poor countries to export much more coffee in order to obtain the same amount of imported goods. It is clear, therefore, that the benefit to producer countries is decreasing in relative terms. This is particularly serious in the case, for example, of the 9 African countries who are dependent on coffee for 25% of their export receipts.

The trader - If the coffee growing sector is still relatively fragmented, the subsequent links in the chain are increasingly oligopoly-dominated. Trading actually involves three actors - the local trader who buys from the producer and takes the bean bags to the port; the international trader who transports the bags to the importer; and the roaster and processor who buys the bags from the international trader. Local traders still play an important role in the first operation, but a number of international traders, in association with big international banks, are gaining space. Among the most powerful marketing agents are ACLI International (US-based, controls 10% of the world coffee market), Volkard (Switzerland-based) and J. Aron (US-based). In Brazil, a group of 10 export firms controls 65% of green export volume. The 15 largest control over 80%.

Giant corporations, which have made their fortune in other trades, are also diversifying into coffee marketing. This is the case of Volkswagen which in 1980 formed a trading venture - Trans-Trading Exportadora S.A. - with a Brazilian-based transnational bank. The largest buyer from Brazil is General Foods (GF). This giant food processor often buys from private producers at unannounced prices, stores the coffee and then uses its inside knowledge to hedge and speculate in the futures market. Speculation actually accounts for at least 25% of future contracts. GF is the world's largest private coffee importer and second only to the US itself. Its annual purchases from Brazil are higher than those of 9 of the largest consumer countries, including Japan, Switzerland and the UK. Undoubtedly, the concentration of marketing power allows a decreasing number of giant traders, backed by powerful financiers, to reap a large portion of the coffee business surplus.

The processor - This link in the chain accounts for roasting, processing and distribution to retailers. In the world market only 20 of the major food processors are significant producers. The 8 largest processors control 55-60% of the world sales, with the two largest firms - GF and Nestle - holding nearly 20% of the world market. In the US, the number of independent coffee roasters decreased from 261 in 1963 to around 40 in 1978. Of these, GF and Procter & Gamble

\[\text{Transnational Corporations in Food and Beverage Processing, (New York: United Nations Centre on TNCs, 1981) p. 79.}\]
alone control more than 50% of the roast coffee market. Roasters also stockpile coffee. This allows them to practice inventory speculation: when bean price increases they pass the cost on to the grocers, thus being the sole beneficiaries of the extra profit.

The processors’ market power is largely based on two factors. One, the key role they play in negotiating International Coffee Agreements between producer and consumer countries. In the US, processors formed a lobbying agency - the National Coffee Association - which exerts a major influence on US policy and succeeded for years in blocking the Brazilian effort to organize the producer countries. In negotiations, the companies play off various producer countries in an effort to gain the lowest price. Solutions are reached only when processors, via the government of their home base, are assured a dominant role. Two, the strong position of processors is maintained by advertising and promotion, and by control of processing patents. These actually make the coffee industry one of little competition and very high profits. The advertising budgets of GF and Procter & Gamble (the world’s largest advertisers) combined exceed the World Health Organization annual budget. In the US, more than 3.5% of coffee sales revenue is spent on media advertising by the 4 leading processors. The largest European processors - Nestle (Switzerland), J. Jacobs (UK), Tchibo (FRG), Brooke Bond Liebig (UK), Cadbury Schweppes (UK), J. Lyons (UK) and Melitta (FRG) - also spend huge amounts on advertising. In short, the concentrated structure of coffee processing is responsible for the concentration of another fat portion of the surplus in the hands of giant TNCs.

A challenge to Christians

“What man is so stupid as not to see that corporations are nothing else than mere monopolies? Even the temporal law of the heathen forbids them as openly injurious, to say nothing of the divine law and Christian statutes. They have all commodities under their control and practice without concealment all the tricks that have been mentioned; they raise and lower prices as they please and oppress and ruin all the small merchants, as the pike the little fish in the water, just as though they were lords over God’s creatures and free from all the laws of faith and love... No one need ask, then, how he can belong to the corporations with a good conscience. The only advice to give him is: let them alone, they will not change. If the corporations are to stay, right and honesty must perish; if right and honesty are to stay, the corporations must perish.”

Luther's comments, from as far back as 1524, about the transnational capital corporations are as valid today as they were in his time. In fact, modern monopolies have developed much more subtle and sophisticated ways of doing what he criticizes, of being what he condemns. The study of the international coffee system offers a clear illustration of this. Five years of study and action on TNCs and the world market system have given us some valuable insights:

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2 Monopolies were forbidden by the Roman civil law.

2 Martin Luther "On Trading and Usury" (1524), Luther's works, Philadelphia Edition, Vol. IV, pp. 34 and 35.
a) the free-market system is based on a 'monetary mystique' whereby capital and money are seen as human goals, and human freedom is conceived as a consequence and by-product of price and market freedom. The standard bearer of this mystique is capital, especially transnational capital, in its battle against the nation states with their tendency to intervene in social and economic affairs;

b) unruly competition has marked the free-market system with a structural tendency toward market and price monopoly and the exclusion from any significant level of decision making of those who are directly affected, either as producers or as consumers. Thus, only the privileged minorities are actually 'free';

c) the industrial capitalist system, based on the belief that the free market, backed by appropriate government intervention, can guarantee economic as well as political and social freedom for all and can ensure work for everyone, has failed. The present world economic crisis is a dramatic illustration of this. Its disastrous effects on those who live from their labour are the result of corporate and state policies, and not just 'the invisible hand' of the market forces;

d) transnationalization of capitalist production has effected deep changes in national economies, national institutions and national elites. Together with the development model characteristic of the industrialized West, the value system, ideology and theology of capital and money were also transnationalized. An extreme outcome of this development in the poor world is the national security states, working in close collaboration with TNCs;

e) the logic that guides the behaviour of capitalist institutions - maximization of profits on 'free' markets - precludes recognition of the human being as an active subject, and thus in its very essence conflicts with the logic of the majorities and the vision of a holistic human society;

f) overcoming injustice and oppression implies creating a new national and international order based on principles such as belief in the human being as subject and centre of history and the inalienable right of every individual to be integrated into society through his work, and to be able to satisfy his needs by means of his labour;

g) there are only two major social networks or institutions which have the capacity to resist the power of transnational capital and develop alternatives on a transnational basis - workers' and consumers' movements and religious movements. Both are rooted in communities of ordinary people and both are transnational institutions, with vast potential for developing international cooperation and solidarity.

Today, more than ever before, the central problem of human society is distribution of power. For the Gospel, it is a matter of sharing. Jesus's simple and direct message "love one another as I have loved you" cannot be fulfilled without the just and sustainable sharing of wealth, power and knowledge. This is the challenge put to us.
An eight-year campaign by Canadian churches against bank lending to repressive governments is beginning to hit sensitive nerves in Canada's major financial institutions. Launched in 1974 by Canada's major Christian churches, the Toronto-based 'task force on the churches and corporate responsibility' argues that Canadian banks bolster unsavoury regimes by their lending policies.

The ecumenical coalition's main objective is to 'respond to the needs of sister churches working with disadvantaged groups, wherever the decisions of Canadian banks or corporations appear to have an adverse effect on people who have no power to affect those decisions themselves'.

The church-bank war is generally hidden from view, surfacing publicly only once a year during bank shareholder meetings. But efforts to reflect 'god's preferential option for the poor' continues in private sessions throughout the year. In March four churches won an unexpected degree of support from the rest of Alcan. Aluminium's shareholders for a proposal that the Canadian Transnational review its investments in South Africa. The four churches own just 61,000 of Alcan's 82.6 million publicly issued shares, but they won over holders of nearly nine per cent of the company's shares at Alcan's annual meeting here. "By historical measures 8.8 per cent is one of the highest I have seen" said William Davis, United Churches of Canada treasurer. "Similar motions proposed by shareholders of US firms generally get less than 3 per cent support", he added.

With a budget of only 38,000 US dollars a year, compared with assets of 280 billion dollars at the banks, the task force is fighting a David and Goliath battle. But its constant criticism of Canadian bank lending to 'oppressive regimes', could start a chain reaction throughout the financial community, some bankers fear. Once begun, they say, the process could decimate loan portfolios worth billions in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe.

Until recently, Canadian banks maintained a united front against the church coalition. But in 1980, the first domino fell when the Toronto-Dominion Bank - Canada's fourth largest - announced it would make no new loans to South Africa. Last year, the Royal Bank of Canada, the country's largest financial institution, decided not to lend money to Pretoria if it felt that the funds would support apartheid. These successes for the task force, however, have not been matched in the trade field. Despite a 1977 commitment by the Canadian government not to support commercial links with Pretoria, trade relations between the two countries has boomed. The value of imports and exports jumped from 190 million US dollars in 1979 to 445 million in 1980.

Ottawa is still offering export insurance facilities to Canadian firms which deal with South Africa. The ecumenical coalition has also failed to convince
Canadian banks to stop selling the South African gold coin, the Krugerrand. But it is hoping for more success in the area of loan disclosure, having already revealed that Canadian banks loaned 272.8 million US dollars to Chile between July 1980 and March 1981. Total Canadian bank lending to Bolivia amounted to 347 million US dollars from 1976 to 1978, it says too.

"More and more people", noted the Christian coalition at its last meeting, "are becoming aware of some of the social injuries caused or perpetuated in Canada and abroad by decisions made in the boardrooms of corporations".

AN INNOVATIVE SERVICE FOR THE POPULAR MOVEMENTS

The Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses (IBASE) 1/

In recent years, the emergence of Brazilian popular movements has been characterized by unique depth and strength. Today, the diverse forms of popular organization, the growing awareness of relevant social problems and their causes, and the search for alternative paths can be seen throughout the country under the leadership of labor unions, professional and neighborhood associations as well as urban and rural grass-roots communities.

These popular organizations, however, are confronted by a highly centralized, modernized and internationalized system of domination which poses new challenges to the development of truly popular participation processes. In the last 17 years of authoritarian regime, centralization of economic, political and cultural power was equalled by the capacity to produce distorted images of reality, under the disguise of modernization and new technologies, through control and manipulation of the media. In this context, the people face a sophisticated 'manufactured' system of information that conveys a biased version of reality. Direct knowledge of reality therefore becomes atomized at the grass roots and centralized at the level of the country's ruling elite, making reliable and updated information the privilege of a few.

Some initiatives to generate alternative information and analysis have been recently observed in universities and research centers; likewise, other regional and local institutions have developed valuable research and communication activities. Most of these initiatives, however, are limited largely by: (a) institutional constraints; (b) regional or local character of their initiatives; (c) lack of resources and specialization; and (d) absence of effective articulation with the grass roots, capable of unifying, generalizing and transmitting alternative knowledge on a national scale. An added constraint is the relative distance of these centers from the direct actors of the social transformation; this distance results from both the structural limits of these institutions and from their elitist behavior in that which concerns popular movements.

1/Rua Vicente de Souza 25, 22.251 Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Brazil.
General objectives of IBASE

IBASE's main objective is to provide an effective service of support and consultancy to the popular movements, including the organization of voluntary working groups of technicians and the implementation of a data bank strictly at the service and according to the expressed needs of popular organizations - grass-roots communities, churches, trade-unions, neighborhood associations', and so on. The originality of this initiative lies in its method of collecting socio-economic information not only from official sources and the media, but also by popular groups. As well as articulating elaboration of data-based reports and analyses with the expressed requests of popular organizations. Reliable information is thus transformed into usable knowledge for alternative policy formulation by popular organizations. In this way, IBASE is an attempt to (a) break the monopoly of socio-economic information, and (b) to help transform this information from an instrument of domination into a tool for achieving a participatory, democratic, self-reliant development.

Origins of IBASE

IBASE formally initiated its activities as a non-profit, non-partisan, independent institution in January 1981. The IBASE project emerged from several seminars, consultations and discussions in Brazil and abroad which began in mid-1979. In February 1980, IBASE's program proposals were presented to and discussed by the 15 participants of the Itaici meeting of the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB), chaired by D. Evaristo Arns, Cardinal of Sao Paulo and member of the IFDA Council.

Those preliminary discussions, together with several meetings involving members of the IBASE team and representatives of popular organizations, stressed the urgent need for a systematic service of the kind proposed by IBASE. As a result of the support given to the project in the initial discussions, several workshops were organized to develop in detail IBASE's activity plans and to discuss forms of articulation with the popular movement. Leaders of trade-unions, grass-roots communities and others participated in those workshops:

The inputs received by the team permitted the completion of IBASE's program proposal by March 1980. The proposal took into account the needs of reliable data accumulation, information sharing and consultancy of the popular movement, as expressed in those workshops.

Implementation of the program

IBASE receives information and analysis demands of popular groups, and transmits them to appropriate working groups (composed mostly of technicians on a voluntary basis) constituted and coordinated by the IBASE team. The working group, together with the human and material resources of IBASE's data bank, gathers the required data and elaborates reports which are returned to the requesting groups for evaluation (is the information in the report satisfactory? Is the language of the analytical material adequate and understandable? Does the data require more elaboration? Does it agree with preliminary information already in the hands of the requesting popular group? etc).
The popular group will then be able to use the requested analytical report elaborated by IBASE as an input to formulate guidelines for action. As a result of such an interaction, a three-way learning process is established, as follows: (a) IBASE personnel and volunteer technicians learn about the real and most urgent information needs of the popular movement; (b) the popular group learns about data interpretation, reliable information sources, analytical methods, and so forth; (c) IBASE provides a link through which different popular organizations can share their knowledge and problems. The basis for a popular information-sharing network on a national scale is thus established.

A key element in implementing such an information-sharing linkage is the development of a suitable, effective, reliable and easily accessible data bank, so that source data can be processed and utilized in real-time and not simply as memory of the past. IBASE is designing the data bank with the help of popular leaders and volunteer technicians. In order to quickly process and output some key indicators, a small data processing system based on a personal-scale microcomputer has been installed and is fully operational. In addition, a reference library has been receiving information materials from many national and international sources.

An example of the way in which IBASE relates to the popular groups; in a meeting between IBASE's volunteer group of economists and leaders of shipbuilding workers' unions these leaders requested IBASE's help to gather information on the financial situation of shipyards; the unions were initiating the discussion of new contracts and had to confront the managers' argument that the companies were near bankruptcy and therefore significant wage increases were out of question. With the help of the data bank, updated information on the companies was immediately made available to the unions, and more reports are being prepared to help them organize their 1981 wage campaign.

**Organization and availability of services**

A project of this nature must of course establish limits within which it can provide effective services. Thus, for the purpose of organizing the data bank and of giving priority to the technical fields, which are of main interest to the needs of popular organizations, IBASE has framed its availability of services into four 'analytical modules' covering government policies: the economic structure; the social and political structure and international relations. These modules can be expanded and diversified whenever human and material resources allow it and upon specific requests. The modules serve only to define the technical fields within which IBASE is able to deliver consultancy and support services to the popular movement in their elaboration of alternative policy proposals; they are not 'research modules'.
A grassroots movement against nuclear arms is growing in the United States, and the Reagan administration is feeling the pressure. A loosely knit coalition of religious, professional and community groups are organizing seminars, letter campaigns and sponsoring resolutions calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to end testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons: 'the nuclear freeze'.

A national public opinion poll taken in March 1982 by the Yankelovitch, Skelly and White firm, found that 70 per cent of the American public favours an early freeze on nuclear weapons. Seven state legislatures, 45 city and county councils, and 306 local town meetings in New England have passed such resolutions, which have been placed on the November election ballot in California, New Jersey, Delaware, Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin and Oregon.

Caught off guard by what Rabbi Michael Robinson, Vice-Chairman of the fellowship of reconciliation, calls "the democratisation of American foreign policy", the Reagan administration and the Congress have been forced to face the nuclear arms issue and address public concern about US nuclear policy. Resolutions in the House of Representatives and the Senate calling for a nuclear freeze - one immediate, one over the long term - are gaining support on Capitol Hill. During a March 31 nationally televised press conference, President Ronald Reagan said "while Washington supports reduction in nuclear weapon's, a simple freeze would be 'dangerous'". But four former senior defence officials have publicly questioned US nuclear strategy, which they helped to develop over the last three decades.

Writing in the latest issue of 'Foreign Affairs' magazine, the former officials, including former Defence Secretary and World Bank President Robert McNamara, said the United States should end its commitment to a nuclear first use strategy in defence of Western Europe. Further eight books dealing with the threat of nuclear war, including Jonathan Schell's much publicised 'The Fate of the Earth', are scheduled to roll off the presses this month.

The political clout of the freeze campaign constituency is enormous. There are active freeze campaigns in 300 of the 435 congressional districts across the country. The endorsement of the nuclear freeze resolution by the state legislatures of New York, Connecticut, Oregon, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Vermont and Massachusetts, represents over 40 million Americans. In California alone, 600,000 people signed petitions to have the resolution placed on the ballot in the November elections. The freeze campaign has been endorsed by the National Council of Churches, the United Presbyterian Church, large segments of the Catholic Church, the Union of American Hebrew congregations, the National Conference of Black Mayors, high technology professionals for peace as well as hundreds of national and local organisations.

Inter Press Service, United Nations Building, Room 485, 10017 New York, USA.
Distribution of world military expenditure, 1971 and 1980

World military expenditure, 1960-80
US $ thousand million, in constant (1978) prices and exchange rates*

* The figure for 1980 corresponds to $500 thousand million in 1980 prices.

Sipri Brochure 1981
Shares of world exports (by country) and world imports (by region) of major weapons, 1977–80

* The values include licences sold for the production of major weapons.

Value of world major weapon* exports to the Third World, 1961–80

Values are in US $ thousand million, at constant 1975 prices

* The SIPRI arms production and trade data cover the four categories of major weapons—that is, aircraft, missiles, armoured vehicles and warships.
Senators Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield have sponsored a resolution which calls for 'a complete halt to the nuclear arms race', a 'mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further development of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, and the pursuit of major, mutual and verifiable reduction in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems'. Twenty-four out of 100 US senators have co-sponsored the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution, and an identical resolution in the House of Representatives has been endorsed by 166 out of the 435 legislators. But President Reagan supports another resolution sponsored by Senators Henry Jackson and John Warner which calls for a freeze, but only after the two countries' forces have been brought to 'equal' levels. During his press conference President Reagan became the first US President to say the Soviet Union had a 'definite margin of superiority' over the United States in nuclear weaponry. Before entering into nuclear arms reductions with the Soviet Union, President Reagan says the United States must close what he calls the 'window of vulnerability'.

The Jackson-Warner resolution, with 60 supporters in the Senate and 155 in the house, says that unless the United States reduces the 'imbalance' in nuclear forces, a freeze at this time will strengthen the Soviet advantage in nuclear arsenals. But the National Executive Committee of the national weapons freeze campaign has called the Jackson-Warner resolution 'a call for mutual escalation' of nuclear forces. The Committee calls on President Reagan to 'support the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution which proposes that we first freeze, then reduce, instead of build-up first, and then reduce and then freeze'. Senator Kennedy feels that his resolution, and not Jackson's, accurately reflects the mood of the country. "We have the support of millions of people across the breadth of this nation who do believe that we ought to bring a halt to this nuclear madness".

Rabbi Robinson of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the oldest peace group in the United States, agrees. He recently returned from a three-month tour of the United States during which he spoke about the freeze campaign and the nuclear arms race. He told IPS that he saw the "building of a people's counter-force to the military". "A cross-section of the American people are affirming life in the face of the threat of a nuclear holocaust", he said.

Six US cities have now approved 'jobs with peace' referendums calling for an increase in federal funds for local human services programmes and a reduction in expenditure on nuclear weapons. Similar referendums will be on the November election ballot in 20 more cities including Chicago, Atlanta, Baltimore, Milwaukee and Seattle.
THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: A "SIXTH POLE"?

by Pierre Drouin

How to get rid of them? When travelling abroad, Mr. François Mitterand likes to lift discussions above money issues. However, the economy is clinging more and more to politics: result of the crisis. This was well-understood at the European Council in Brussels where, in spite of France's determination, it had been necessary to bring up Great Britain's financial claims; this was all the more so during the French president's visit to Japan.

As we can well imagine, Tokyo hardly appreciates France's import restrictions on twenty-seven Japanese products, including automobiles, electronic equipment, televisions and textiles. But Paris isn't any happier about the 1981 trade deficit of 9 billion francs with its Asiatic partner.

More and more in the middle of the economic conflicts of the Western nations, Japan is making uncomfortable both the United States and the European Community. Nevertheless, the spotlight on the Empire of the Rising Sun should not leave in the background the coming to power of the "new industrial countries" (NIC) as the OECD calls them. From the South-East Asia to Latin America, they increasingly intervene in world business.

New Japans? Certain optimists (among whom the World Bank president A.W. Clausen) would have us believe so. In a speech delivered last January, he proposed breaking up the North-South pattern and replacing it by a model with eight poles or centres of economic activities; four of which to be heavily industrialized regions: Western Europe, North America, Japan and Eastern Europe.

Another key group are the oil exporting countries of the Near East. The new countries on the way to industrialization would be the sixth. Finally, the very populated Asian countries - China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan - and the poor countries of Africa south of the Sahara would be the two last poles.

An intellectually interesting distribution but in our opinion, with the drawback of removing too quickly the problem of underdevelopment. Of course, the Third World is no longer what it used to be, but the oil exporting countries of the Gulf can't get away from it any more than the famous NICs. The former live on a monoproduction whose difficulty to maintain regular growth we see today. The latter are spread-out in conflicting socio-economic structures, often weighed down by debts and caught up in frightening differences in the standard of living, etc.

Let's take the case of Brazil, often cited as an example, a sort of champion of the NICs. Its first nuclear power station will be put into operation most assuredly, soon to be followed by two others. However, this country 'has run into debt more than any other in the Third World: US$63 billion'. Its inflation rate is... up to three figures (105%), its industrial production down 3% compared with the equivalent period in 1981, unemployment reaching 12% of the active population.

1 Translated from French with the permission of the author. The paper was originally published in Le Monde, 16.04.1982.
2 In Tokyo, in front of the Yomiuri International Economic Society.
Therefore, it would be quite unwise to speak of "new Japans", in reference to the NICs, as M.P. Judet says in his recently published and remarkable short study of the "new industrial countries". Undoubtedly "they are following... a Japanese direction characterized by an industrialization founded on unequal growth, wage discrimination, urban overcrowding, etc." (They "consume people in order to produce things", in the powerful words of François Perroux). Still, the economies can not succeed yet in building their own bases (the test of housing is characteristic), nor can they create an interior market large enough to establish a true industrial system.

This being, the eruption of the new industrial countries remains a foremost phenomenon of this decade. It helps to upset the international business map a little more every day.

**An Increasingly Richer Palette**

According to the latest GATT report, the world volume of exchanges stagnated in 1981, but the cause is found essentially in the drop in oil sales (14%). In agricultural and manufactured products, business has continued to grow, 5% and 3% respectively.

What is most remarkable these last few years, is the part that the NICs have taken in these exchanges. (South-South trade has more than doubled in three years). For a long time, foreign investors have sought countries with low wages and their free zones. According to M.P. Judet, we have arrived at the third generation of such activity: the symbol of the first is the establishment of American electronics firms along the Mexican border; the second generation was more interested in the zones of Hong-Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, than Singapour and Malaysia in which interest is now waning; the third generation is looking towards Indonesia, India, Bangladesh and Sri-Lanka where wages are even lower than in India. The wave is spreading into China.

The free zones alone are not reason enough to explain the industrialization movement that has touched the NICs - e.g. Brazil has no free zone on its land.

More interesting than the increasing volume of business being done by the NICs is the enlargement of their 'palette'. It seems 'normal' that manufacturing, using considerable amounts of manpower, is localized in those countries, and that they export shirts, toys, etc. Their presence on the international market has now a completely different style:

1) Extensive construction work, notably in the Near East, has enabled these new competitors to assert themselves. American companies have been badly beaten by Korean ones, which are profiting not only from the low cost of their own engineers but from the high productivity of their personnel. South Korea is building hospitals, cement factories and other industrial units in addition to harbour installations and office buildings. Brazil and India are following in this way.

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2. A free zone is an "enclave that benefits from a customs extraterritoriality and is totally or partially exempt from national jurisdictions".
These countries would not have been able to have such a share of the market if first they had not developed their competence on a large enough national market.

2) In the 'export "basket"' of these countries we can now find mechanical and electrical products, durable goods and machines: boats, automobiles, agricultural machinery, turbines and even machine tools. India is the most advanced in this last area, exporting even to the United States and Great Britain.

3) 'Turn key' industrial units are now supplied by Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Argentina and India, sometimes acting as relays of a transnational firm.

Their presence on the world markets gives proof of strong dynamism through outward looking financial procedures as well as through the creation of international trade networks of the Japanese kind (like Interbras in Brazil), and even the contribution of foreign subsidies.

Exterior Dependence and National Activity

In his study, M.F. Judet makes a series of observations worthy of mention:

1) To appreciate the new industrial countries' dynamism, it is not enough to state that they are recovering from an "export-oriented industrialization" when in Argentina and Brazil in the 1930s industrialization arose from an import substitution model. First, these economies are very diversely "open": extensively so for Southeast Asia, slightly for Latin America; in addition, they have a well-protected interior market.

2) Most of the NICs were prosperous agricultural economies first (Hong-Kong and Singapore are exceptions). For example, in 1930 a local chemical industry provided Korean agriculture with fertilizer; pump and small tractors followed:

3) Dependence on foreign technology and credit is still very heavy in the NICs; but it must not cover up the importance of national activity. Numerous iron and steel and petrochemical industries originate from interior stimulation, the State being the principal lever. Even if the exterior debt is sometimes high, it must be remembered that capitalistic growth has always been accompanied by running into debt.

4) More than everyone else, it is the workers who carry the weight of this growth. The average work time of Korean workers has been pushed to 60 hours per week. Social security is slight and incomplete in the Latin American countries and embryonic in Western Asia. However, in Korea, health insurance has become compulsory since 1981, in enterprises employing at least 100 wage earners. Average pay remains low but there are differences more or less based on special functions; twice as high in Japan as in Korea for an accountant's position; four times higher in Japan than in Thailand for an unskilled labourer. In Singapore, this year the government had to give up its policy of high salaries in the face of the serious drop in foreign investments as of the end of 1980.

Here we touch on one of the strategy limits of the new industrial countries— which in spite of the aforementioned interior stimulation, is far from automatically leading to an autonomous industrial development. We can observe the increased competition in exporting among these production countries and the

5/ See in Tiers Monde (July-September 1981) the study of this subject by Agnes Gallez and Jean-Louis Troupin.
push of protectionism from the ones doing the importing. Especially in the advanced technology, the NICs are coming up against the politics of transnational companies which intend to maintain their control on market and technology.

Nothing more motley, so we see, than this "sixth pole" of economic activity, according to the classification of Mr. Clausen. It is indeed fascinating to watch closely in order to know how the mechanics of economic growth are set off on poor ground - and also to understand the dangers of excess pressure in the pipelines of development.

Les nouveaux guides Sud-Nord

Les rapports entre pays du Nord et pays du Sud sont au coeur des mutations contemporaines. Migrations de travailleurs, hausse du prix du pétrole, endettement international, problèmes des matières premières, transnationales, inflation mondiale, ventes d'armes, redéploiement industriel, tels sont les titres de nos journaux, telle est la matière d'une information souvent déroutante.

Chacun éprouve le besoin de se situer face à des bouleversements qui affectent jusqu'à notre existence personnelle et familiale. Pour cela, des documents sont nécessaires qui, tout en apportant une information à jour et une analyse sérieuse, permettent de prendre du recul et d'éclairer l'action. Ces documents que les experts connaissent doivent devenir plus largement abordables. Tel est le but des petits ouvrages de la collection Nord-Sud.

Economie et Humanisme a plus d'un titre pour mener ce projet. Dès la fin des années 40, les recherches du Père Lebret ont alerté les Français sur le sous-développement et la découverte du Tiers Monde, comme en témoigne son ouvrage classique Suicide ou survie de l'Occident. En 1978, Construire un nouvel ordre mondial, avec son Manifeste et ses documents annexes, recueillait un écho certain.

La collection Nord-Sud est un pas de plus dans la même direction. Ses ouvrages vont concrétiser la triple dimension des relations Nord-Sud: une dénonciation des rapports inégaux entre pays industrialisés et pays du Tiers Monde; une tentative de faire connaître le nouvel ordre mondial qui s'élabore; une information sur les expérimentations que des groupes d'hommes tentent en vue de produire et de vivre autrement. Sans se limiter à la critique, ces ouvrages cherchent à proposer du neuf. S'ils parlent des organisations internationales et des États, ils s'intéressent surtout aux peuples eux-mêmes dans leur vouloir de vivre ensemble et dans leurs efforts d'auto-développement.


Economie et Humanisme, les Editions Ouvrières, 13 Avenue Soeur Rosalie, F-75621 Paris, France.
Ross Kidd and Nat Colletta, Tradition for development: Indigenous structures and folk media in non-formal education (Bonn: German Foundation for International Development, Education and Science Division, Simrockstrasse 1, 5300 Bonn 1). This is the report on and papers from an international seminar organized by the German Foundation for International Development and the International Council for Adult Education held in Berlin, November 1980. The bulk of the text is case studies on non-formal education and development programmes that have adopted a 'cultural approach'; these include programmes based on an indigenous structure (e.g., a traditional organization or an indigenous process of collective work) and programmes using the performing arts as a communication tool or alternating as an educational process.

The report at the end of the text summarizes the debate between those at the Seminar who viewed the 'indigenous culture' approach as a means of revitalizing conventional development work and those who were critical of the manipulative tendencies of this approach and who advocated as an alternative a popular culture controlled by popular organizations. (639pp.)

Ross Kidd, The performing arts, non-formal education, and social change in the Third World: A bibliography and introductory essay (The Hague: Centre for Study of Education in Developing Countries, Postbus 90734, 2509 LS The Hague, The Netherlands). The bibliography includes 1,800 items on the use of the performing arts as a medium for education and social action in the Third World. It is introduced by a 'state of the art' review of the varying contexts in which the performing arts are used (e.g., mass educational campaigns, local extension work, conscientization, popular organizing, etc.), and the methods adopted in each context. The aim is to bring together in one volume a range of relatively fugitive material (mainly from Third World sources) on this newly emerging field.

Direct, bulletin mensuel sur l'utilisation de la technologie en éducation publié par le Centre d'information et d'échanges-télévision de l'Agence de Coopération culturelle et technique, 13, quai André Citroën, 75015 Paris, France.


. David Werner, Environnement africain: Là où il n'y a pas de docteur (ENDA, B.P. 3370, Dakar, Sénégal), 442pp.


Une seule grande recherche sociologique a pu être menée en Pologne sur Solidarité. Une équipe franco-polonaise dirigée par Alain Touraine a reçu le double appui du Centre de Recherche de Solidarité et de l'Université de Varsovie. Appuyée sur la méthode de l'intervention sociologique, elle a formé, d'avril à novembre 1981, des groupes de militants d'entreprise dans six villes: Gdansk, Szczecin, Varsovie, Lodz, Katowice et Wroclaw. Les chercheurs ont aidé ces membres actifs de Solidarité à mener l'analyse de leur propre action et à la confronter avec celle d'autres groupes, puis ils ont soumis à leur tour leurs hypothèses et étudié les effets qu'elles produisaient sur eux. Les comptes-rendus de ces centaines d'heures de travail en commun constituent un document de valeur exceptionnelle sur le mouvement qui a soulevé et transformé la société polonaise.

Ce livre n'est ni un récit, ni un simple témoignage de sympathie, si forts que soient les liens qui attachent tous les chercheurs à l'action exemplaire de Solidarité. C'est à la fois une analyse approfondie de la nature et de l'évolution d'un mouvement dont l'importance est immense, et une réflexion sur quarante ans d'histoire des régimes communistes en Europe et des poussées sociales qui en ont fait éclater l'illusion totalitaire.

. Parity: An American farm program that works (The U.S. Farmers Association, Box 496, Hampton, Iowa 50441, USA), 21pp.


. John W. Forje, *The one and indivisible Cameroon: Political integration and socio-economic development in a fragmented society* (P.O. Box 3011, S-22003 Lund, Sweden).


. Yan Tinbergen, "Caminhos para o socialismo", *Economia e Socialismo* (no.56, Inverno 1982), pp.36-43.

### THIRD WORLD SPACE

The Africa Research & Publications Project, P.O. Box 1892, Trenton, New Jersey 08608, USA. The Africa Research & Publications Project is a coalition (a working group) of African activists. Its objective is to promote a democratic dialogue among Africans and their friends on vital issues and problems facing African peoples. The short term goal of the Project is to function as a clearinghouse for African movement publications. In addition, the ARPP Working Group will engage in and promote critical research on specific problem-areas regarding Africa's development, and develop informational materials on Africa's quest for democratic and progressive social structures and the struggles for national liberation.

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GLOBAL SPACE


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THIRD WORLD SPACE

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GLOBAL SPACE

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JUSTINIAN F. RWEYEMAMU

1942-1982

Our friend Justin is no longer physically with us. He died of cancer, in New York, on 30 March, leaving Joan, his wife, with five children and expecting two - now born.

Justinian, an active member of the Executive Committee of IFDA since its creation, was an outstanding representative of the post-independence generation of African scholars and militants.

Born in Bukoba (in what was then called Tanganyika) less than forty years ago, he managed in his short life to do much for the intellectual and economic liberation of his continent.

An economist, mathematician and philosopher who studied at Fordham and obtained a PhD from Harvard, he was a professor of economics at the University of Dar Es Salaam and the dean of its Faculty of Social Sciences. He was the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Planning and the Personal Assistant to the President of the Republic.

Recognized abroad he was appointed member of the Committee for Development Planning by the Secretary General of the United Nations. He was a member of the secretariat of the Brandt Commission and spent his last two years in the office of the United Nations Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation.

Justinian was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Third World Forum and the chairman of the Council for the development of economic and social research in Africa (CODESRIA).

It is the intention of IFDA, the Third World Forum and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, in cooperation with other institutions with which Justinian was associated, to publish, together with a complete bibliography of his books and articles, a collection of unpublished or out of print papers, and to establish an annual Justinian F. Rweyemamu contest for post-graduate African Students.

This will be our way of continuing to work with Justinian and encouraging young African scholars to follow his example.

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