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BEYOND YALTA

This issue of the IFDA Dossier includes, among others, papers on two critical issues: Poland, and the nuclear threat. They are linked by what one might call the logic of Yalta. In this town of Crimea, in 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin, leaders of the two super-powers which were about to emerge victorious from a six-year war, carved up what they considered the world. People were not in a position to react.

The world has radically changed since then, with the decolonisation of the Third World and the emergence of the Non-aligned movement, as well as the reappearance of Europe. Yet the super-powers, now equipped with the most deadly weaponry which ever existed on this planet, continue to act as if the world were still theirs. They interpret the endogenous social movements for liberation in terms of their rivalry. They exercise their hegemony in what they consider their immediate provinces - the Americas or Eastern Europe; they intervene to consolidate and expand it elsewhere.

The persistence of the logic of Yalta hinders autonomous social movements, and brings closer the danger of nuclear war.

But the logic of Yalta is not the logic of the people. On 25 January, in Santiago, Chile, half a million fearless young women and men demonstrated, on the occasion of the funeral of former President Frei, their opposition to the US-backed military junta and their hope for another Chile. As dark as the Polish predicament appears, the Polish workers, peasants and students united in Solidarność will not give up. Nor will the people of Central America. In Western Europe, beyond the socialist victories in France and Greece, a massive popular movement resists the nuclear threat. Never since Yalta have so many people in so many countries expressed their will for autonomous change.

If there is any 'mutuality of interest' on this planet, it is in the overcoming of the logic of Yalta, the search for disarmament and for social liberation in the spirit of democracy and cultural pluralism.
Original language: English

Abstract: State power structure versus people's power is the issue underlying the birth and development of Poland's Solidarność. Through a series of "trial and error" in mobilization efforts (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976) the workers gained experience on coping with suppression and reprisals. The events at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980 marked the beginning of occupational strikes by workers who were not ready to surrender their action until their demands were met and institutional guarantees agreed upon by the authorities. Such action spread all over country and resulted in the creation of free trade unions everywhere - which finally merged into one - Solidarność - which became a mass movement responding to society's demands for renewal.

In part II, the author analyzes the situation of Poland in the light of the postulates of another development: the satisfaction of needs; endogeneity and self reliance; harmony with the environment; the need for structural transformations; and necessary action towards the achievement of these goals.

UN AUTRE DEVELOPPEMENT EN POLOGNE

Le conflit entre la structure de pouvoir étatique et le pouvoir populaire est sous-jacent à la naissance et au développement de Solidarność. Au travers d'une série d'expériences d'auto-mobilisation populaire (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976), les travailleurs ont acquis une expérience unique. Les événements survenus au chantier naval Lénine à Gdansk, en août 1980, ont marqué le commencement de grèves sur le tas, par lesquelles les travailleurs ont montré leur volonté de ne pas céder jusqu'à ce que leurs revendications soient satisfaites et des garanties institutionnelles acceptées par les autorités. Ce mouvement s'est répandu dans tout le pays et a résulté dans la création de syndicats libres partout, jusqu'à leur fusion au sein de Solidarność, lequel est devenu un mouvement de masse traduisant la volonté sociale de renouveau.

La seconde partie de cet article analyse la situation de la Pologne à la lumière des postulats d'un autre développement: satisfaction des besoins; endogénéité et autonomie; harmonie avec l'environnement; transformations des structures; et l'action nécessaire à la réalisation de ces objectifs. (Español, pag. 22.)
ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT IN POLAND

15 months ago (on 14 August 1980) an unemployed electrician jumped over the fence of Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, climbed on a cart that stood nearby and said to the workers who had gathered in the yard: "I declare an occupational strike!". After one year, that formally poorly-educated fellow was one of the most seriously considered candidates for the Nobel peace prize and his name is well known to probably half of the world's population (China included).

15 months ago the development pattern of a nation located somewhere in Eastern Europe had hardly provoked any interest within the international development community. After one year it wouldn't be an exaggeration to speak of excitement in the same circles when a word of long-forgotten meaning, "solidarity" (Solidarność in Polish), is mentioned.

What has happened? What is the nature of the changes occurring in Poland? It is not easy to formulate a final answer. Most succinctly: we are trying to socialize the state. It is a process, an unfinished process, some would even say the very beginning of a long, let's hope successful, story.

Certainly, it is not possible to give a detailed description, event by event, in a paper that must not be too long, although I don't think it is a wrong place and time to give as much inside information as possible. One who follows West or East European mass media should not feel well informed. There is so much bias and misunderstanding on both sides! But, as we now know in Poland very well too well, I would say there are limits. For a paper also.

Therefore, the other option for me was to prepare something of a synthesis. However, to keep it coherent, such a synthesis should be based on a few key elements, should pivot upon one central theme. Thus an idea came to my mind that all around we are looking - North or South, East or West, all disappointed - for another, better development. What has helped in my decision to concentrate on another development as a core element of this paper is the mature existence of such an idea within the international community. Owing to the efforts of people linked with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, the concept of another development has been well elaborated and presented in widely-known publications.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) "What Now - Another Development", The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on Development and International Cooperation, Uppsala, Sweden, and Development Dialogue and IFDA Dossier - periodicals published by the above mentioned institutions, or better - groups (not INSTITUTIONS).
Before analyzing our other development or - more precisely - our would-be other development, a few words should be said about the basics of the Solidarność movement.

1 The Emergence of Solidarność

LESSONS FROM RECENT HISTORY

The main question that one meets almost everywhere is: "What really is Solidarność?". It is difficult to answer this question precisely, but a quick glance at the historical background of the events that erupted in summer 1980 would help to understand some of the features of today's situation.

The whole 37-year post-war period could be characterized as one of continuous search by society for a development pattern that suits our aspirations and stems from our cultural heritage. Today we may say that our past authorities, which only over very short intervals represented a majority of our society, did not understand the necessity of meeting those two conditions.

The origins of today's troubles reach as far back as 1948. Even before that, just after the war, the situation wasn't rosy since a new social system had been introduced by means of revolution, and revolution is never accepted by the whole of society, particularly when it comes mostly from abroad. But there was much enthusiasm among large strata of society, to whom a new, better system seemed to be in sight. It should be added that socialism as an idea has had long roots in Poland and has had many followers since the mid-19th century.

However things changed for the worse in 1948. It was a year when so-called stalinists grabbed exclusive power, imposing alien development patterns upon our society - in our cultural, social, political and economic life. And although some goals proclaimed by the ruling group could satisfy quite a substantial part of society, our cultural heritage was almost totally neglected, if not condemned.

1956: Change must come from the people (not from the power structure)

After several years, it became apparent that goals were still only goals, that reality was much worse than in the Six-year Plan, and that the price which society has been paying was too high. As a result we had the first milestone in our post-war workers' movement - the 1956 Poznań protest. The reasons for that protest were almost the same as those of last year, except that poor living conditions and abuse of power had hit people then with greater force than recently. The workers were so spontaneous in their protest, so poorly organized and so inexperienced in such an action, that their protest against the totalitarian state could yield only one result - tens of them (some say over a hundred)
were killed.

Later in that year, the "destalinization" process started officially and in Poland it went under the banner of "the Polish road to socialism". Władysław Gomułka, just released from prison by his suddenly friendly comrades, got almost unconditional support from the society. Workers as well as intellectuals were full of hopes for the future. And the first years, or rather months, that followed the "Polish October" were full of signs of a change in policy that would have been close to the aspirations and the cultural heritage of Poles. Economic decentralization, the beginnings of workers' councils (based on Yugoslav experience), the abandonment of many superfluous doctrinal axioms (like that linked with the land ownership question), the rehabilitation of many previously-condemned patriots, the improvement in relations between the state and the church (including the release of our primate, the late cardinal Wyszynski) and the growing openness of the system to pluralism - all these gave grounds for well-founded hopes for the democratization of the way our society was governed. Some were even hopeful that our society would gradually govern itself.

Just a few weeks ago we celebrated the 25th anniversary of that "Polish October". But it was a bitter anniversary. We did not in fact celebrate it, we mourned it! There is no doubt that we lost the chance we had in 1956. Most of the promises and hopes die relatively quickly (the workers' councils had only 2 years of weak existence); some lasted longer, but very few of them were fulfilled.

However, we learned an important lesson from our experience during the Gomułka period. Today, while seeking whom to blame for our failure then to build a new development pattern, some of us point to the authorities, to Gomułka's system of exercising power. And such an answer is correct, of course. But the blame is more to be laid on ourselves, on the ruled ones. It was our task to make use of the circumstances and create a new, Polish, socialism that would have been attractive to the majority of us, not only to the bureaucrats, as it happened. This conviction that we should take our fate into our own hands was the most important result of that experience as far as the consciousness of society and subsequent events are concerned.

1970: Workers are powerful in their factories (not on the streets)

During the period 1956-1970, the economy stagnated, and the social and political situation worsened. There were some sporadic protests, mostly by intellectuals, but without any help from other groups of society. They were easily suppressed (like the 1968 protest by writers, students and scholars). The authorities intensified their erroneous policies, thus alienating themselves almost completely from the society.
Once again, in 1970, the workers couldn't stand the situation any more and there were strikes on the Baltic coast. These strikes and demonstrations ended the same way as in 1956. The authorities resorted to arms and again tens (some say over a hundred) of protesting workers were killed. Next, a change in the top leadership was made and Edward Gierek started his term with the then famous visit to the shipyard and by asking workers the well-known question: "Will you help me?", which got a positive response from a still-trusting large part of society.

That year we learned another lesson: never go out into the streets. Workers have power as long as they are in their working environment - in the plants not in the streets.

1976: Change must be institutional (not personal)

As in 1956, the new leaders accepted the protest by admitting that it wasn't - as the ousted leaders claimed - a counter-revolutionary or anti-socialist rebellion, but a fully justified workers' action against poor living conditions. And the workers agreed that they were not against the system but against the way system was run.

The change of the group at the top, however, didn't mean a change of the method of government, which remained virtually unaltered, with a few modifications not always for the better. Society still had almost nothing to say in the matters concerning itself, losing what remained of its control over the bureaucracy whose power increased enormously. One of the worst features of the 1970s was that a degenerating autocratic system promoted people who were corrupt, incompetent, dishonest and politically schizophrenic (i.e. that they declared socialist ideology and acted quite to the contrary). The type met most often among the ruling group was characterized by almost unlimited drive for material goods and total lack of moral virtues. And such an attitude, like a cancer, slowly penetrated the tissue of the nation.

Gierek's team made a few gestures towards society, mostly as far as economic well-being was concerned - like stimulating consumer aspirations and meeting a few of them. It later appeared that those aspirations were activated mostly among those groups of society which were linked somehow with the ruling elite and were fulfilled in the most shortsighted way - just by taking credits from abroad and eating them up.

The faults in economic policy speak for themselves but almost equally grave mistakes were made in other spheres of societal life, particularly in culture. Our history in the school textbooks was falsified, our best writers banned from publishing, our emigrant scholars forgotten. The main source for fulfilling cultural aspirations was supposed to be television, overloaded with primitive propaganda.

The first warning of popular discontent came in 1976 when the workers in Radom and Ursus protested against price increases.
Brutal police intervention and a slander campaign helped to suppress the protest once more. The bureaucracy was unable to learn anything from that protest; it just pretended to ignore the warning. On the other hand, 1976 is seen as a breakthrough in a struggle which society had been fighting for years. From that year on, an alliance between workers and intellectuals was formed and which finally led to the events of August 1980. And society definitely ceased to trust its governors who came from the same political circles as their predecessors and acted within the same mechanism.

Thus the conclusion was also reached that the change of names at the top, if it is not accompanied by institutional reforms with entrenched guarantees, is not a real change and can't be accepted. And it was our third and final lesson. So it can not be said that we learned our lessons quickly - the class lasted for a quarter of a century at least - but we learned them well.

The crisis of 1980

The situation by the end of the decade 1970-1980 was extremely critical and it was critical in almost each section of our society and each sphere of its life. Our economic statistics recorded a negative growth rate in 1979, something like -2.5%, if the statistics told the whole truth. That was an exceptional figure for a planned economy. But behind the figures severe market problems were hidden; as always, supply couldn't catch up with demand, but the gap had been widening rapidly. Economic mismanagement and waste and increasing foreign debt (which like other vital economic information was kept secret) was felt by people who witnessed the gradual disappearance of goods which either were imported or produced with imported components. But the worst for society was the conviction that we were going nowhere. The situation of the late 1970s has been recently described by our economists as a total disintegration of economy.

At the same time, the alienation of the bureaucracy reached its height. All decisions were taken by the party and state bodies which completely evaded social control, protecting themselves against any criticism by censorship. Decisions concerning the most vital things in our life were made with only one aim: to satisfy or accommodate circles or lobbies within the centralized power structure. The "nomenklatura" system, i.e. the exclusive right of the party to nominate its own people to the thousands of more or less important posts in all spheres of life, was applied to maintain power. This system, disregarding qualifications and favouring narrow institutional loyalty, brought about heavy losses, particularly in our economy.

And in opposition to such a degenerated power structure we had by the end of the 1970s a society which had learned its lessons from past protests, and which was educated, having high aspirations, and united in its dissatisfaction with the prevailing situation and the whole system of exercising power. People felt also encouraged and to some extent obliged to action by the fact
that one of the highest moral authorities in the world - the Pope - was from Poland.

Although it is easy to see things this way today, it can be said that it was no wonder that the protest of 1980 took the form it did, that workers learning from the past organized strikes within factory premises, that they were determined to continue their protest until institutional changes were guaranteed. They wanted changes which would not only protect authorities against making further "sorry mistakes" (which hit not them but the whole society) but also help to transfer power to the workers or, more generally, to society. And this time the authorities recognized the protest from the very beginning. The workers left no illusions as to their determination and their mistrust of verbal promises. If the new party leader (since each wave of strikes always brought a change of leader) were to ask the workers again: "Will you help me?", the only answer he could expect would be: "Definitely not, we'll make it by ourselves, and we mean it!".

The aims of Solidarność

The wave of occupational strikes started in July, then spread rapidly throughout Poland, but the heart of the movement was at Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk where, after 18 days of tension and uncertainty and also determination and support from all over the country, the Interfactory Strike Committee led by Lech Wałęsa and aided by a group of experts signed with a governmental commission an agreement known today as The Agreement. Out of 21 already historical postulates one was put in front - it was the demand to create free trade unions, independent from the party and the state. The unions then mushroomed throughout the country and finally merged into one which took its name after the Lenin Shipyard's Strike bulletin - "Solidarność". And that union as well as the right to strike appeared as our institutional guarantee that past mistakes will never be repeated again.

So trying to answer the initial question "what really is "Solidarność?"", the answer closest to the truth would be that "Solidarność" is a mass, popular social movement, which came into existence as a trade union but soon afterwards - responding to the society's demand - has become an organization with which lie the hopes of millions of Polish people, hopes for a better life, for - as we say it - renewal.

The programme passed at its first Congress says:

"At the beginning of our Union there were simply needs of common men, their sufferings and disillusions, hopes and yearnings. Our Union has grown out of the rebellion of Polish society, experienced over three decades of breaking human and civil rights; out of the rebellion against ideological discrimination and economic exploitation. It has been a protest against the existing system of exercising power.

"But we did not mean living conditions only, although life was bad, work hard and very often fruitless. History has taught us that there is no bread without freedom. So we also meant justice, democracy, truth, law observance,
human dignity, freedom of ideas, repair of our country - not only bread, but butter and sausage (...). Economic protest has had to be a social protest at the same time, and social protest has had to be a moral protest at the same time."

To conclude this short introduction to further analysis, it can be said that over the post-war period we have had an evolutionary process intensified by revolutionary outbreaks of anger and hampered by the resistance of bureaucracy, whose strength varied over time. The trend has been quite clear - it is a slow, tiresome and painful but steady process under which power has been gradually - not without obstacles - shifting from the hands of few to the hands of many (we call it a gaining of subjectivity by society). And those "many" want to work out a Polish pattern of development which is geared to the fulfillment of already high aspirations and rooted in cultural tradition, but which first and foremost is for people who live here and now, in Poland, at the turn of the 20th century, in other words - for real people. And they don't mind calling such a system "socialism".

One final remark should be made. At the beginning we had an exogenous development pattern, imposed upon society and maintained with the help of external forces. But as time passed, the part those external factors played has gradually been diminishing and replaced by internal forces. In particular, it seems that since 1956 our society could have done much more than it did to determine its own development pattern, which would better fit our society and would not antagonize our neighbours. It is a pity that we took such a long time to realize this and to learn how to do it.

II Prospects for Another Development in Poland

It now seems useful to review our emerging development pattern to check if it is really going to be different from what we had until the birth of Solidarność. The analysis is based predominantly on ideas and documents originated in union circles or close to them.

The authors of the concept of another development, as it has been described in "What Now"1/, point to five pillars of another development, which would be:

1) geared to the satisfaction of needs, beginning with the eradication of poverty;
2) endogenous and self-reliant, that is relying on the strength of the society which undertakes it; and
3) in harmony with the environment;
4) another development requires structural transformations and
5) immediate action towards it is necessary and possible.

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1/ "What Now" op.cit., p.28
An attempt will now be made to analyze, point by point, if according to the above criteria changes which are occurring in Poland now are leading us to another development.

(1) SATISFACTION OF NEEDS

The present situation

It is difficult to make an objective analysis of the degree to which needs have been satisfied over the last three decades in Poland. The reasons are numerous. A major one is that the problem, owing to its political content, has never been honestly and publicly researched. Officials claimed that, even when things were not good enough, they were certainly improving. The people did not always think the same. The issue of need satisfaction appeared here and there, mostly in development plans, but the real fulfilment of those plans was rarely accounted for. Poverty was too shameful a phenomenon to be acknowledged. However, despite the lack of reliable statistical data, it can be said that pockets of poverty have been existing in Poland. The latest figures, revealed recently, give an estimate of poverty-stricken people - those below a social minimum line - at several millions. (The author hopes that it is understood that neither needs nor poverty in Poland are comparable to those in really poor countries of the world.)

Food shortage has been a recurring problem for us. Meat shortages, in particular, have been a constant element in our everyday life for years. It is worth noting that all the above-mentioned political crises in Poland were hastened by increasing difficulties faced in obtaining food by the majority of people (owing to inadequate supplies and price increases). Although no one has gone hungry, it can't be denied that meeting of this need has never been an easy task for millions of families. Postulate no. 10 of the Agreement calls for priority for satisfying domestic demand for food, and only then to export food surpluses. And Postulate no. 11 demands temporary introduction of meat rationing coupons which it was hoped would solve the unbearable meat situation of the late 1970s. And these Postulates reflect the actual situation better than all statistics.

Habitat is without any doubt the need which is least satisfied in Poland. The starting point in the whole idea of habitat is a shelter: the average waiting time for an apartment well exceeds 10 years and it never was significantly shorter. Even the official statistics show a bleak picture here. The feeling of society is reflected by Postulate no. 19 which calls for shortening of the waiting period for accommodation.

Health services have been severely criticized for a long time. The quality of services in particular leaves much to be desired. In recent years the neglect of this sector, which as "unproductive" received inadequate investment, resulted in acute shortages of medical essentials.
It should be mentioned that, particularly in the last decade, health services and housing were extremely unequally distributed among society. While the situation of the majority deteriorated from year to year, certain groups that made up ruling elite enjoyed a "housing boom", that is they were encouraged to build private villas and country houses furnished with luxuries. Similarly, health services were provided for a few at a level unheard of by the majority.

Postulate no. 16 says: "Working conditions in health sector have to be improved in order to provide full medical care for working people".

Education is the most difficult need to assess. Once the basic education is provided for all and the quantitative indices are satisfactory, then it is a complex task to analyze the quality of the educational system. One needs to have a set of criteria for judging the system. And it is not easy to tell, in these times, which critical remarks are justified and which just follow the tide of general criticism. The feeling is, however, that school has hardly been creative and has aimed instead at preparing un-critical, obedient citizens. That impression has been deepened by such facts as the falsification of social sciences in the school text-books (mainly history) the lack of humanities in curricula, etc. As with the health sector, education has received insufficient investment and teachers are underpaid.

It can be assumed, therefore, that although need satisfaction is a dynamic concept which changes over time and is subject to the influence of many factors (like, for instance, the demonstration effect that pushes the line of satisfaction further away) and although the real policy over that issue has fluctuated in the past - basic needs have not been fully met. And what are the chances for improvement in this area?

The Solidarność programme

In the Solidarność programme (passed at the union's First Congress in October 1981) the issue of basic needs has been treated very seriously. The need for adequate food supplies is stressed and the whole question of proper nutrition of society has received priority among the Union's goals. Since no one in Poland challenges the importance of the food issue, it might be hoped that the situation would improve considerably in the future. It is only a matter of time. The guarantees are constituted by certain structural changes which are starting to be made in the rural areas.

Notwithstanding the poor performance of the state sector in agriculture, it has been enlarged and provided with inputs which exceeded by far the inputs allocated to the private farmers. Now these farmers have guarantees that individual agriculture will be a permanent element in our economic landscape. This means that they will not be treated as something the state wants to get rid of as soon as circumstances would allow. They are ensured of equal treatment with the state sector as far as inputs are concerned and
they are promised that the industry would start to produce necessary agricultural machines and equipment. (Only 4% of industrial production was for agricultural purposes in recent years). Independent peasant trade unions are to act as the watchdogs over the changes. The biggest of these, Solidarność of Individual Farmers, has close ties with the main Solidarność organization.

The housing problem is treated seriously also. However, the chances for improvement are not as good as in agriculture. Solidarność seeks a solution for the critical situation of millions of people waiting for their own apartment in a reanimation of people's initiative at the local level. It can be said that the "small is beautiful" slogan should be particularly recommended for our construction sector. Previous governmental housing policy was based on imported technology and so-called "house factories" which produce big elements to be assembled on construction sites. This killed the small construction sector, local brick factories, small design offices and so forth.

Therefore it is hope that, after removing some legal barriers, it will be possible to create a "housing boom" for all. The regional chapters of the union have been obliged to exercise social control over the realization of housing policy.

In the field of health, Solidarność stresses the need to increase supplies of medical equipment, the need to reorganize health services, particularly by making them more accessible to the public, and the importance of preventive medicine. The emphasis is laid on the protection of maternity and the health of the young generation. To reach these goals, the union proposes to entrust territorial self-governing bodies with the power of decision and control over health care in local communities. It is also considered necessary to raise the professional ethics of employees in this sector.

And finally education. The union is determined to protect the educational system from subordination to the political, economic and ideological interests of state and party authorities. Solidarność intends to achieve this by enabling parents to influence the goals, contents and methods of the education of their children. Economic and social reforms have to be made not only to improve the material standards of society but also to develop culture and education, says the programme. To make up for the losses in this sector, caused by erroneous bureaucratic policies, it is necessary to draw up a social programme to rescue national culture and education. To that end, all local space initiatives will be supported by Solidarność which counts on independent organizations (associations, clubs, societies) as important forces in the process of socializing culture and education. It also demands an increase in the share of this sector in investments, which lately have been rather small.

In the discussion about culture and education, a yearning for truth appears almost everywhere. To write and speak the truth is seen as a necessary condition for the development of social consciousness and for preservation of national identity. It may be
said that the society has waged a total war against lies in all spheres of life.

There are many voices now in the world saying that culture is the most important factor in the process of development. Such a view seems to be valid and applies to the Polish situation as well, where the importance of culture and education is now indisputable. To quote the Pope: "History shows that our nation, being doomed for death many times, preserved its identity not by physical force but supported solely by its culture."

**Prospects**

The changes proposed by Solidarność carry promises of better life for all by paying much attention to basic needs. Not all the demands are new and many of them appeared in various forms in the past official development plans. Unfortunately, many of the plan promises were never realized. Very often they had to be postponed in favour of other plan targets, mostly those which resulted from a model that gave priority to heavy industry. The really new elements are contained in the part of the programme that deals with culture and education. It is clear that the past educational and cultural system run by and for the bureaucracy cannot be continued. Should all the aims be fulfilled, we would witness a great turn to an alternative system of education which would bring about many beneficial changes. However, this prospect is conditioned very strongly by political developments. If the system progresses, as we hope, towards greater pluralism and diversity, then, no doubt, culture and education would gain in autonomy. In fact, the evolution of the political system is a precondition for all Solidarność solutions. The union intends to help people to obtain what they need principally by reanimating people's initiative, by having power exercised by local self-governed and self-reliant territorial councils, i.e. by replacing hierarchical, vertical links with horizontal, interdependent ones.

So the careful thesis can be put forward that the first pillar of another development is on a good way to be erected and that it is going to be strong, although the foundations for that pillar are not ready yet. And they will not be ready by tomorrow either.

On the other hand, it must be remarked that all needs other than education are discussed now mostly in quantative terms. And it is no wonder that, in view of the recent level of their satisfaction, a more sophisticated vision would not appeal to the people. Let us hope that once quantitative satisfaction is achieved, higher values would start to prevail in the area of consumption. And, learning from the experience of other countries, we may well avoid problems they have nowadays.

(2) Endogeneity and self-reliance

The second pillar of another development, endogeneity and self-reliance, is the one which is probably most characteristic for the
Solidarność movement in Poland. Trying to find its identity and its roots in Polish culture and history, the movement appeals to patriotism as a unifying factor. Some would even say that there is too much nationalism. But those now frequently met symbols: white and red flags, white and red arm-bands and ribbons, the red Solidarność logo against a white background, the national anthem and other patriotic songs - express people's longing to continue the heritage of our culture. Our national anthem was even sung at the party congress last summer, which was quite new for such a meeting. Apparently Polish society wants to draw from its thousand-year-old cultural treasury. And we draw also from that part of it where socialist ideas and the names of people who long ago formed socialist ideology in our country have been stored and not used officially, because they belonged to the "wrong" faction.

The other feature is the mass appearance of religious symbols. The picture of the Pope was hung on the Lenin Shipyard's gate during the strike and mass celebrated there, too. Anytime there is a longer strike one can be quite sure that sooner or later people would request a priest to come and celebrate field mass; some sermons have been extremely good. People express in such a way their feeling that religion has been an integral part of our history and culture and that the Church has presented over the years certain stable moral virtues, which were absent in the public life in past decades.

And it is not that national symbols were forbidden before or that people were discouraged to show them. Nothing like that. And this outburst of patriotism is not pointed, directly or indirectly, against any other nation. It is directed against propaganda, against the falsification of our history, against the decline of morality, against the vagueness towards which our society had been drifting before August 1980. The aim is for the people and the nation as a whole to regain their identity and to keep the movement united. Patriotic and religious values are the only ones which can guarantee those goals for the time being.

The same tendency is to be seen in the return to old historical names of small towns and villages located in the areas populated by minorities. Those historical names were senselessly 'polonized' in the 1970s. The Solidarność regional chapters bear also old traditional and almost forgotten names of those regions. In the words of a popular song "let Poland be Poland", with all her good and bad, but thus alive and real.

Is such a movement an endogenous one? The answer must be positive. And the authenticity of the movement has been first and foremost proved by the way the union came into existence. People, out of their inner need, formed thousands of local free trade unions in factories and hospitals, at the universities and post offices. They had no ready formulas and they could not expect much help from outside. But they overcame countless problems, driven just by the feeling of solidarity with others.

The other question is if, as the result of the movement, a self-reliant society will be created in the national and local spaces.
One can also give a positive answer. But it takes time to realize the changes. In the last section of the paper more will be said about self-management and self-government which are seen as key elements in ensuring people's self-reliance. Anyway, the past 15 months have shown the tendency quite clearly.

The whole movement, from its very beginning, has been self-reliant. It is a simple truth but indeed we have had to rely on ourselves only. And that characteristic feature of the union is a guiding principle for each individual member, and for each factory or regional organization. We have to rely on ourselves but there are ten million of us united by the spirit of solidarity. So members of the union can rely on others also, at least as long as this spirit is alive. (The principle of solidarity has been placed in Union's statutes).

Self-reliance is widely practiced within the union. The powers of factory organizations are quite vast. For many people, mostly older ones, used to old vertical links, the new situation is sometimes difficult to comprehend. If there is anything to be done, members of the Union have to organize themselves around that task, at the level which they deem appropriate for its performance, and they just do it. They may ask for assistance from a higher level of the union, but the initiative and main burden of the job lie upon them. Solidarność is a loose federation of regional chapters, which in turn have not very much to say over local developments at the factory level. That is why many protesting actions have been organized independently, just by people who have sensed a wrong or have been unable to solve their problems in another way. That loose organizational structure has been altered recently to strengthen the governing body of the Union, but it has not affected the rank and file much.

Some would say that self-reliance within the union was to a large degree forced upon it by the conditions under which Solidarność started. Facing the hostile attitude of the bureaucratic apparatus, and therefore being unable to count on anything but its own strength, the union had to become self-reliant. The spontaneity of its birth helped to that end also. It remains to be seen if this feature will not vanish as the union gathers more strength, if the union gathers enough will to fight bureaucracy within its own organization.

Nowadays, however self-reliance within the union is undeniable. An interesting example of self-reliance at the supraregional level is the rise of "Network" (Sieć in Polish). A network of leading plants within the independent union came into being in early Spring of 1981. Originally conceived as the "Network for Cooperation and Information Exchange", it comprises representatives from the country's major industrial establishments. The need for such a structure was first sensed in the Gdansk shipyard last January when the question of Saturdays off work emerged. At that time, people still tended to think that decisions had to come from above and Union leaders, especially from smaller enterprises, uncertain as to what to tell their rank and file (ie. whether they should turn up for work or not) kept calling on the yard's people about
the issue. But the yard people had nowhere to phone. The idea
was mooted therefore to consult other big enterprises across the
country. The first formal contacts were made and in April represen-
tatives of ten major factories met in Gdańsk shipyard. From
that meeting on they have been keeping regular contacts and are
one of the major forces that shape and influence society's views
on many issues. The Network's major activity field is a widely
understood economic reform.

Another important element in the area of self-reliance are the
"Territorial Commissions for Cooperation". In one district of a
city, the Solidarność organization of the biggest local factory
assumes a leading role and organizes around itself other local
union branches with the aim of acting jointly over certain issues.
Those territorial commissions will undergo a critical test this
winter, when lack of energy, food, transport, etc. will make local
self-reliant activities necessary. Much more important in this
context would be cooperation in the housing districts, but as the
whole movement is based on industrial enterprises it will take
time for people to organize on another basis. It must be remem-
bered that people had been discouraged from such initiatives for
years and it takes time to learn the "know-how" needed for gen-
une social cooperation, without orders and assistance from above.

Natural self-reliance is to be achieved later. The realization of
self-governed society, which is the major goal of the Solidarność
programme, would bring about national self-reliance. However, one
of the conditions towards this end is a significant improvement
of our economic performance. Otherwise, we will have to rely
heavily on our neighbours and on Western creditors for many years
to come.

Our endogenous and self-reliant development will require our
neighbours to accommodate to the new situation in Poland. But,
since major political and social forces in the country have already
expressed their will to maintain close and friendly ties with our
neighbours, even assuring them that such a friendship would have
broader support from society than it has had until now, there is
no reason to think that our recent changes should cause any serious
nervousness across our borders.

(3) Harmony with the environment

At the first union congress, among the amendments passed to its
constitution, one concerns particularly the protection of the en-
vironment. The statutory goals of the union have been, inter alia,
supplemented by "undertaking of activities for the protection of
man's natural environment". That point is developed further in the
programme, under the head "The Union fights for an effective pro-
tection of man's environment". The word "effective" is important
here, since there is a common opinion in Poland that we have had
very good laws in the field of environment protection but that
those laws have not been observed. The complaints about the alarm-
ing state of environment, about cases of water and air pollution,
about the poisonous chemical substances present in building mater-
ials and in food, etc. were all kept secret from the public by the
censorship. When these were revealed, society was shocked. This
immediately resulted in closing down a big aluminium works in Southern Poland, which was proved to be a major source of pollution.

The movement for the preservation of nature, although still scattered, is slowly gaining strength and many organizations which have environmental protection included among their goals hope now to be able to act more effectively. In the Union's programme, it is said that, to protect the environment, the superiority of social goals over productive ones must be recognized. Accordingly, all environmental issues should be included in the forthcoming economic reform, existing laws should be amended and enforced, social organizations dealing with the protection of environment should be represented at all levels of elective bodies. Worthy of note are demands for obligatory publication of full information on the state of environment and, particularly, for inclusion of environmental issues in educational curricula.

The effect of these demands remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is a positive sign that the union has taken those issues under its wing because an effective way of protecting the environment is to curb pollution, and pollution originates mostly at the factory level, which is the union's major area of influence. Therefore it is hoped that factory Solidarność organizations would take charge of local environmental protection by controlling utilization of the cleaning apparatus, by active protesting against particularly damaging technology and by everyday care. In their action, they can count on assistance from the Solidarność regional commissions for environment protection which have been set up recently. The possibility of protecting nature by mobilising millions of people through the union's channels opens a great chance for improvement in this field. But the side-effect of the proposed economic reform tempers that optimism, since the reform would make enterprises self-financed and consequently the high cost of environmental protection would push self-management in the direction of minimizing it. Some conflicts seem to be inevitable and a lot has to be done in this field by education.

Summing up, one can say that we are not going to live at once in full harmony with the environment but at least further pollution of it will be checked. An environmental lobby is being formed (Polish Ecological Club has come into existence), many people are aware of the problem and, on account also of the strength of the Union and changes underway, things might turn for the better quite soon.

(4) Structural transformations

Two main areas are undergoing structural transformations in Poland - the economic and the political structures.

In the sphere of economy, the most important development is an initiation of the process towards true socialization of the means of production. Significant changes are also expected from the economic reform which is due to start by the beginning of 1982. The main advocate for economic transformations in the economic field
is the "Network", mentioned above. Since its ideas are most matured and they in fact reflect the position of the biggest industrial enterprises in Poland - the main force of the movement - a short description of "Network's" stand seems to be useful.\footnote{Part of this section is based on the article "Network position" that appeared in the Solidarność newspaper Congress Post (no. 11) issued on the occasion of the First National Congress of the Union.}

The Network starts its analysis by asserting that the centralized socialist economy has ceased to function. Directives are not reaching their proper destinations and the bureaucratized administration is incapable of solving the simplest problems. Therefore it is necessary to break the chains restraining economic initiatives and to restore respect for well-organized labour.

To cure the economy of its paralysis requires far-reaching transformations both in the central authorities and in the enterprises. It requires the abolition of the present system of centralized planning, of rewarding enterprises for meeting planned targets, of distributing raw and intermediate materials, investment and financial means according to the plan of employment and wage ceilings, of price setting and so forth.

The enterprises have to be self-dependent, self-managed and self-financing. Those attributes are also the foundations of economic reform.

The self-dependence of enterprises can only be attained by a far-reaching reorganization of the central administration. The ministries of individual industries must be eliminated and replaced by one Ministry of Industry and Trade. Enterprises must not be run by the central planning body. Instead of the minute planning of everything important and unimportant, the central plan should deal exclusively with the mapping out of strategic goals for the entire national economy. This plan will be only for the government, not for the enterprises, which will be able to work out their own independent plans but their performance will be governed by economic efficiency and not by planned targets set by bureaucratic bodies. Government will have the right to direct the activity of enterprises towards the achievement of the central plan's strategic targets, but only through economic measures. As far as prices are concerned, the enterprises should have full freedom to sign contracts at market prices. The state should retain the right to set maximum prices only for a few commodities (such as bread, milk, school textbooks). By the end of 1981 the whole middle level in the organizational structure (bureaucracy!) of our industry must be eliminated and replaced by the voluntary industrial enterprises associations.

Self-management in an enterprise means that the workers and their representatives - the workers' councils - are the highest governing body. The organizational and official dependence of top management on administrative bodies and the party's "nomenklatura" system must be abolished. The principle must be introduced that only the workers' council can nominate and recall the manager, who in turn must be subordinated to it and must implement its resolutions while running the enterprise on a day-to-day basis.
the workers' council, chosen by all the employees in a popular, direct and secret election, will map out the strategic goals of the enterprise. Among its tasks are decisions concerning the enterprise's lines of activity and development, plans, structure, regulations, personnel policy, distribution of profits, the nomination of the general manager and unlimited control over the enterprise's economic activity.

As far as the self-financing is concerned the practice of subsidizing "planned deficits" should be replaced with self-financing, which means that an enterprise's income (or bank credit) has to cover all its expenses. Those enterprises which work well will be able to survive, and the uneconomic ones will be threatened with collapse.

Wages must become related to an enterprise's profits so that the workers can directly benefit from their own work. This, however, means that workers in unremunerative enterprises would earn less, or that their livelihood could even be threatened. Therefore, to defend the interests of working people a guaranteed minimum wage must be introduced. Such a minimum wage would be fixed in the work contract, with the remainder of an employee's earnings dependent on profits. The minimum wage and the admissible wage brackets, as well as indexing the minimum wage to the cost of living, will be determined in negotiations with trade unions.

According to the Network's stand the basic type of enterprise will be the social enterprise. These will be the old state enterprises given full self-dependence, self-management and self-financing. The majority of municipal enterprises must function on this principle too. The term "state enterprise" should be reserved for those which will operate within the framework of the so-called economic infrastructure (railways, postal services, etc.). Their self-dependence will be limited. Like the commercial banks and regional branches of the National Bank, they will also have self-management councils, whose power, however, will be limited.

These far-reaching proposals by the Network caused a profound shock within the old bureaucratic system. At the beginning they were almost all rejected and numerous accusations in the state-controlled mass media appeared such as it was a union's attempt to take over power, that only a total chaos could result from introduction of self-management, that it would not be a social but a group ownership, and therefore social interests would be endangered and so forth. However, social pressure was so strong, past experiences so bad and the arguments for self-management as the only way out so reasonable, that gradually many reservations were withdrawn and finally a compromise has been reached over the issue and our Parliament passed the laws on state (not social?) enterprises and self-management of state enterprise. In the compromise, both sides gave some ground. According to the laws, workers have the right to elect the management and the authorities have the right to appoint directors of such plants as those subordinate to the ministries of defence, justice, finance and the like. The full list of those enterprises will be drawn up jointly later. The law will also not apply to the state railways, airlines, postal
services, state insurance company, etc. As a principle, both sides - the workers' councils and the government - have a right of veto over the appointment of directors and finally may appeal to the court.

Although the new laws do not fully meet the social expectations, they constitute a major breakthrough in the process of structural transformation. It seems that workers now possess much more economic power than they ever did before, and on the other side bureaucracy has lost an important sphere of influence - maybe the most important. Great hopes for recovery and lasting improvement in our economy are linked to this change. One thing is for sure - there is no return to the old, ineffective way our economy was managed, there is no return to the omnipresence of bureaucracy in the economic life. And although the new laws have been in effect only since October there are many signs that the self-management movement is gaining momentum.

Developments in the political arena proceed at a much slower pace. Most of the proposed changes are still proposals only, and some of them seem to be interesting for the realization of another development. The Solidarnośc programme devotes a whole section to the problematique of a "Self-governed Country". Emphasis is laid on socialization, on self-organization of society. It may be added that, although it is a section dealing with political structure, it makes quite clear the difference between Solidarnośc and any political party. Whereas a party political programme seeks to convince electors that only the party would improve their well-being and fulfill aspirations, Solidarnośc lays out a programme of national recovery by the self-organization of society.

There is a deep need for a total reform of public life in Poland, says the programme. Democracy in a self-governed society should be based on ideological, social, political and cultural pluralism.

To that end all independent and self-governed institutions would enjoy full union support in all spheres of society's life. The most important agent for the change towards democracy is a genuine, authentic workers' self-management. Crucial to the democracy are also territorial self-governing representative bodies. Therefore changes need to be introduced into the electoral law concerning those territorial councils. The freely-elected councils would have full financial and organizational self-dependence and much more power to decide on local matters than they have had until now.

Other changes also have to be made such as Parliamentary electoral law reform, changes in the structure of Parliament (self-government chamber), empowering trade unions with the law-making initiative and so forth. Much is said about the necessity of observing civil and human rights, about the introduction of full openness in public life (access to state documents), etc.
Immediate action

Those changes must take place if our development is to be more people-oriented, if it is going to suit our society better. What are the chances for such changes to realize? Quite good, I would say. The prospects for an alliance of all major forces (Solidarność, Church and Party) have been carefully outlined recently. The large part of society is now politically active and people know what they want. People, who have really changed since August, who have got rid of fear, of passivity. That change is probably the greatest thing that happened over the last 15 months. And the transformation of the country would come in the wake of the changes in people's minds and attitudes. But this transformation is also guaranteed by the authentic popular movement, encompassing 10 million people.

The danger, now, could arise if the movement itself becomes undemocratic and divided. And it is not an imaginary threat. Solidarność acts in the still centralized, very often hostile, environment and, since its effectiveness in the rapidly changing situation very often calls for immediate action, some of the union's decisions must be centralized also. That is why strong central authority in the union mirrors the government's power structure. The members being very sensitive about the internal union democracy hope that, once the political situation is settled, then the power vested in the leader of the union will be withdrawn and full democracy would flourish.

The authors of "another development" concept conclude their analysis with the conviction that immediate action is necessary and possible. The author of this paper harbours the hope that his chaotic presentation of recent changes in Poland, made with another development in mind, has proved that such an immediate action is necessary and, yes, is possible!

(Viene de la pag. 3)

OTRO DESARROLLO EN POLONIA

El conflicto entre la estructura del poder estatal y el poder popular es subyacente al nacimiento y desarrollo de Solidarność. A través de una serie de experiencias de automovilización popular (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976), los trabajadores han adquirido una experiencia única. Los acontecimientos ocurridos en el astillero naval Lenin en Gdansk, en Agosto de 1980, marcaron el comienzo de huelgas mediante las cuales los trabajadores han mostrado su voluntad de no ceder hasta que sus reivindicaciones sean satisfechas y las autoridades les acuerden garantías institucionales. Este movimiento se extendió en todo el país y condujo a la creación de sindicatos libres en todas partes, hasta su fusión en el seno de Solidarność, el cual se transformó en un movimiento de masas que traduce la voluntad social de renovación.

La segunda parte de este artículo analiza la situación de Polonia a la luz de los postulados de otro desarrollo: satisfacción de las necesidades; endogeneidad y autonomía; armonía con el medio ambiente; transformación de estructuras; y la acción necesaria para la realización de estos objetivos.
Abstract: The development crisis faced by the Third World proves the fallacy of European modernization theories which held that the Europeanization of culture would promote the development of Third World by suppressing the traditional cultures. A challenge is thus posed to the concept of a European world culture, i.e. cultural domination. The author draws parallels by examining Eastern European history on the basis of the question whether the economic transformation generated by world capitalism in the region had proved to be capable of creating the conditions for genuine development, or was it sustaining and recreating under-development in general and producing permanent structural imbalances. Looking at recent trends in the Third World, the author proposes "traditionizing modernity" as an organizing principle which consciously refers to the progressive national traditions in order to mobilize the populations for social transformation and nation-building.

Résumé: La crise du développement dans le Tiers Monde souligne l'échec des théories européennes de modernisation qui prétendent que l'europeanisation de la culture favorise le développement du Tiers Monde en supprimant les cultures traditionnelles. Le concept d'une culture mondiale européenne - c'est-à-dire de la domination culturelle - est ainsi mis au défi. L'auteur établit un parallèle avec l'histoire de l'Europe orientale en examinant la question suivante; la transformation économique engendrée par le capitalisme mondial dans la région a-t-il créé les conditions d'un développement authentique, ou a-t-il entraîné et récréé le sous-développement et produit des déséquilibres structurels permanents? Sur la base des tendances récentes dans le Tiers Monde, l'auteur propose la "traditionalisation de la modernité" comme principe d'organisation qui se réfère délibérément aux traditions nationales progressistes et tend à faciliter la mobilisation pour la transformation sociale et l'édification nationale.

(Resumen en Español pag. 32)
Attila Agh

TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-EUROPEAN NATIONAL CULTURES

I.

Are the non-European national cultures "a colossus on feet of clay", i.e. without massive foundations in the national economy and state? Are the extremities of non-European cultures to be ridiculed or the traditional attitudes and values to be blamed for the underdevelopment of Third World countries?

These questions have to be raised since in modernization theories as well as in European public opinion traditionality appears as the main obstacle to development in non-European nations. There is a strong European bias against traditionality: the traditional cultures have to be destroyed in order to reach modernity, that is traditionality and modernity are arch-enemies. We think this is a pseudo-contradiction but we do not dwell on the fact that the representatives of European cultures - namely those of Western Europe and the United States - forget about their own historical past in which traditionality played a very important and stimulating role in modernization. Based on the East European experience, we try to undermine the "European paradigm" about traditional culture as the main obstacle to development and/or modernization by showing its stimulating role in East European "delayed" modernization. This is why we concentrate on the relation of traditionality and modernity in a particular world historical context and in order to characterize this important but contradictory role of traditionality stimulating modernity we introduce the term and the concept of "traditionizing modernity". With the description of the development of East European cultures as the key for understanding the development of non-European ones we offer a "European contribution" to the concept of development.

To start with, not only the thesis about the blocking effect of traditional cultures is central to modernization theory but also the intent is clear enough behind the warnings about the danger of the recent waves of cultural nationalism in the Third World: it is to suggest that nowadays there is a change for the worse in cultural development in comparison with the previous era of rapidly spreading World Culture. We think, this has been effectively the reverse of the truth: nowadays new, young and vigorous national cultures are emerging to the international arena to challenge both the previous masters' national cultures and Europeanized world culture. In this respect Wallerstein's argument on the cultural domination as a result of economic and political domination deserves to be quoted in extenso:
"What of the cultural sphere? Was there no place for ideas, values, science, art, religion, language, passion and color? Of course, there was, for cultures are the ways in which people clothe their politico-economic interests and drives in order to express them, hide them in space and time, and preserve their memory. Our cultures are our lives, our most inner selves but also our most outer selves, our personal and collective individualities. How could there not be a cultural expression of hegemony? Such expression would not be in all cases cultural dominance. Core powers often dominate peripheral areas, imposing a sense of inferiority on people regarding their own culture; it is, however, unlikely that a hegemonic power would be able to do the same with other core powers. At most, in the latter case, the culture of a hegemonic power can serve as a model, especially a technological model; but cultures are precisely arenas where resistance to hegemony occurs, where appeals are made to the historical values of established "civilisations" against the temporary superiorities of the market. This is true today and was no less true in the seventeenth century". 1/

Cultural hegemony and cultural dominance are, of course, more important and more dangerous phenomena today than they were in the 17th century because of the mounting interdependence of national cultures as a result of the massive improvements in communications after 1945. On the other hand "cultural resistance" and efforts to formulate national identity of their own is also reinforced by the pressure of Europeanized world culture in the Third World countries. This primary emphasis on cultural nationalism in the Third World countries can only be understood from the fact that national identity is the condition sine qua non of national development as such. The recent development crisis has proved the failure of European modernization theories and strategies which all shared the thesis that the Europeanization of culture would promote the development of the national economy and state by suppressing the traditional national cultures, i.e. by getting rid of the "main internal obstacle" to development. None the less, there are even nowadays a lot of concepts - sometimes pretending to be marxist ones - describing the story of colonization as the penetration of modernity to the non-European world and its victorious march against traditionality:

"The industrialization of the West from the late eighteenth century onwards ... tended to initiate and then accelerate modern development in the rest of world, which otherwise would have remained comparatively stagnant. Western economic expansion aroused the non-Western world to a modernization process for which its own internal development has not yet prepared it. There were three aspects of this impetus: destruction of pre-modern cultures and modes of production; stimulation of aspirations new in both degree and kind; implantation of elements of modern civilisation, both culturally and economically". 2/

The author, Bill Warren goes on by stating that the "cultural transfer" served the "modernizing aims" of colonizers and was disturbed only by a "nationalist mythology" of colonized peoples.
He cites W.K. Hancock's description of Ghana's modernization as a fight for rapid economic development against traditionality, i.e. for the sake but against the will of the local population:

"We must remember that the opening up of Africa is a very recent occurrence, and we must admit that the traditional way of life in that continent imposes many hindrances to rapid economic transformation. And yet the transformation has in some parts been amazingly rapid".

Warren emphasizes repeatedly and unequivocally the progressive character of Western cultural export - or even aggression - to the Third World and considers cultural resistance itself and the ensuing modern national cultures as a result of this cultural modernization:

"The association of modern education with societies that combined enormous economic, technological, and military power with parliamentary democracy and individual rights represented a major liberating force in custom-bound societies and an important cultural export, which in the end was used against the colonial power itself.... Imperialism was the means through which the techniques, culture, and institutions had evolved in Western Europe over several centuries... sowed their revolutionary seeds in the rest of the world. This culture was in many respects unique, and contributed much of value to humanity... we must accept the view that the epochal imperialist sweep was indeed a titanic step towards human unity (on the basis of the greatest cultural and material achievements so far attained by humanity)"

This is what we call the European paradigm of World Culture and non-European national cultures which in its special form in Warren's book claims to be the genuine marxist concept of culture. The point is whether the peoples most, and directly, affected by Europeanized world culture "want to hold onto as much as they can of their traditional culture". Or, as Warren declares, "if the rise of modern nationalism has shifted attitudes, ideologies, and rhetoric in a very different direction, it has nevertheless failed to alter the fundamental effort to assimilate Western culture, values and technical achievements".

After having identified the major problems in the current literature concerning non-European national cultures we try to introduce a regional approach in the development of national cultures. This comparison is clearly the most relevant for the theory of non-European cultures since it demonstrates the transition between the different historical ways of development instead of being confined to the extreme contrasts (say, Western Europe and Black Africa). We suggest that there are two models of national development (nation-building), the first is the (Western) European one which is organic - the evolution starts with the emergence of a national economy and the further developments of a national state and culture are based on it - , the second is the non-European one which is inorganic, that is, the evolution usually starts with the result of the European model, with a sometimes
artificially made - national state or with a national culture prepared by cultural resistance and it goes in the opposite way, to build up a national society and economy "from above" and in many cases without success.

It can be seen from these two models that the national cultures as well as the national state play a primary role in the process of Third World modernization, a very different one from its role in Western Europe. World historically this primary role was played in Eastern Europe for the first time - and somewhat later in Latin America, which underlines the parallel of the two regions in this respect - and this is why the East European development may serve as a bridge between the poles of the center and periphery of world capitalism as key to the understanding of non-European cultures and as a contribution to development theories.

II.

It is well known that Eastern Europe became a periphery of European capitalism from the 16th century onwards and responded to the demand of Western Europe for primary products. This led not only to a trade dependency on the economically advanced countries in the 16-18th centuries but generated some fundamental social and cultural changes, namely the preservation of pre-capitalist mode of production in a new form as a function of the emerging world capitalism ("second serfdom"). Seemingly, the initial penetration was blocked administratively but actually capitalism penetrated only in order to produce this function, and not as genuine capitalist development. The first challenge occurred in the 16th century when the evolution of the international division of labour began to take shape and the major outlines of the pattern of dependency of Eastern Europe on Western Europe were established. The second challenge occurred in the wake of the industrial revolution, in the 19-20th centuries, when Eastern Europe became a semiperiphery of world capitalism and the preponderance of foreign capital and skills reduced radically the spread effects which would otherwise have been produced by a real challenge. Finally, under the impetus of foreign rule (Austrian, Prussian and Russian empires) and capital (German, French, English investments) the classical model of dependent industrialization was materialized in Eastern Europe and has determined its historical path so far. Our presumption is that the above described East European development model does not rest upon the inherent characteristics of these societies inherited from their feudal period but rather upon the specific historical circumstances under which they developed in the framework of world capitalism from the 16th century onwards. Moreover, failures in the modernization of political structures and cultural self-consciousness were at least partially due to the specific features of capitalist expansion in Eastern Europe.

We are aware that the problems we have summarized are discussed by the literature in detail 4/ but this is only the background
against which we would like to elaborate our concept of traditionizing modernity. Now we may return to this concept at greater length since the East European way of underdevelopment provides clear guidelines to identification of the East European kind of development of national cultures. What is more, the description of East European underdevelopment in general is consistent with, indeed is the condition for, the classification of non-European national cultures and specification of the East European regional one.

The overall effect of Western European capitalist development cannot be confined to its economic consequence, although the question arises first whether the economic transformation generated by world capitalism in Eastern Europe proved to be capable of creating the conditions for a genuine development of the national state and culture, or it was sustaining and recreating under-development in general producing permanently structural imbalances in the relationship of the major social spheres or sub-systems (national economy, state and culture). In our opinion, the latter was the case. This is why we concentrate in our paper on the unevenness of development of the above mentioned social sub-systems.

As a primary products exporting periphery Eastern Europe was, so to say, a contemporary of Western Europe only in its consciousness, i.e. at the level of theory and culture. This aspect, however, was extraordinarily important since Eastern Europe was faced with the demonstrative effect of Western modernization which threatened the survival of its nations (Poland). The shock of Western progress and modernization brought about a cultural nationalism throughout Eastern Europe in the 18-19th centuries with its very characteristic ambiguity: on the one hand Eastern Europe tried to imitate Western developments and catch up with it, on the other this cultural nationalism was strongly opposed to it on behalf of the national traditions and, as Wallerstein would say, appeals were made to the values of established, endogenous civilizations. Since from the emergence of East European cultural nationalism onwards the same ambiguity has been repeated in the other regions of the periphery and semi-periphery of world capitalism as well and the same ambivalence could be detected against Western modernization in the policies and concepts of progressive, modernizing forces of all countries, this casts a considerable doubt on the widespread commonplace that modernization in itself embodies the highest value and, on the other side, traditionality in itself is necessarily reactionary. This concept is dualistic, or even manicheistic, distributing good and evil to the opposite poles, because a successful modernization in some countries usually means a more fierce competition for the others in the military-political and economic respect (as it was the case with European absolutisms which were reactions to British hegemony) or modernization from outside threatens with dependency and lopsided development (as it was the case with Eastern Europe).
What is more, in these centuries there were no independent and national states and economies (integrated national markets) in Eastern Europe. With a certain exaggeration we could state that the recent East European nations existed at that time only in the form of their cultural nationalism or national identity, literature etc. which offers, once again, a striking parallel with the non-European nations before their "flag independence". The lack of a well-established national economy and a "strong" national state was a specific feature of East European development before 1914 in comparison with West Europe and this is why a great emphasis was laid on the national cultures being the "only" form of national existence. The national culture or cultural nationalism became the main organizer, catalyst and programme-builder of nation-building or modernization. This modernization process, however, was to be carried out in a national framework in Eastern Europe, as it happened so earlier to the West European nations. The "modernizing elite" had to mobilize the national forces with an appeal to the national values of the historical traditions, to call for national unity in support of the socio-economic reforms. Thus the emphasis was laid inevitably on historical continuity and specificity as far as national unity and opposition to the outer forces were concerned and on historical discontinuity as far as the internal revolutionary programme and the suppression of reactionary traditions were concerned.

To be brief, the policies of East European "modernizing elites" might be characterized in general by what we called traditionizing modernity. This attitude was very characteristic e.g. for the Hungarian "reform era" in the first half of the last century or for Poland in the same period, the other nations in the southern part of the region followed suit at the end of the last century. The Hungarian reformers evoked the spirit of the past in their fight for an independent Hungarian national state and national economy: they wore "ancient" Hungarian costumes, "discovered" the old Hungarian mythology - or the poets and writers created it quite anew since it was mostly forgotten - and with the revival of old, sometimes archaic, Hungarian words and names succeeded in renewing the national language and literature. This was the "fashion" all over Eastern Europe: the drama of modernization began on an artificially made historical scene with the players fighting against traditions on behalf of traditions. And Western Europe looked at this colourful carnival with hatred and irony, ridiculing the "childish" behaviour of the "modernizing elite" using traditions for their national purposes as if the English revolution had been conceivable without referring to prophet Habakukk and the French one without the rhetoric of the Roman republic.
The same hatred, irony and misunderstanding is manifested in the Western countries towards the recent expressions of traditionizing modernity in the contemporary world, e.g. against so called revival of Islam etc. It is not that they do not "understand" these "exotic" cultures sticking only to their extreme manifestations and overexaggerating their "medieval" features. Simplistic view or not, in our opinion, the interests of the industrially advanced nations of the West are against the independent national developments in developing countries and they expect developing countries being oriented towards the imitation of the Western model of development and modernization virtually deprived of any specific national features.

Obviously it is outside the scope of this paper to explore in detail the nature of regional variants of non-European cultures. A few points, however, must be made on the major outlines of their similarities and dissimilarities with the East European model:

First, we think, a historical documentation would conclusively demonstrate that there is no evidence of any direct relationship between traditional attitudes and values and the recent developmental crisis in the Third World countries. But for a historical approach the opposite seems to be proved by the facts: at least some "traditional" attitudes and values are neo- or pseudo-traditional, that is they are "artificially" generated and constantly reinforced by the external factors of dependence and underdevelopment. A simple comparison between Japan and India shows that Japan was fostered by her traditional culture in many ways and India was forced back into a neo-traditionalism during the centuries of British colonial rule.

Second, in such a way, to us, it goes without saying that only a healthy cultural nationalism could foster the national identity and culture which, in turn, is able to generate a genuine national development. Traditionizing modernity is an organizing principle and revolutionary pattern which consciously refers to the progressive national traditions in order to mobilize the large masses of population for a deeply going social transformation and nation-building. Our approach suggests a fight between two kinds of tradition and/or modernization and we are against any dogmatic approach to the controversy between modernity and traditionality. Modernity is quite often connected with aggressive external forces and strives to preserve the economic and socio-cultural dependence in a holy alliance with the internal reactionary "traditional" classes (as the British made it in India with maharajas and zamindars), and, at the very end, the complete assimilation leads to the "death of a nation".

Third, genuine - i.e. effective and independent - development or modernization presupposes a creative application of the international models to the local and particular conditions and therefore, it must have a specific national character. Even this na-
tional "face" of development appears as a mobilizing factor, and, as it is many times argued in the modernization literature, social progress and modernization are met with much less resistance if they are strongly connected with the active traditions and a continuity is maintained between the old and the new in the modernization process. The farther a local culture is from the European tradition, the greater emphasis must be laid on its specificity for an efficient modernization.

Fourth, there is an internal dynamism and logic of national cultures leading either to extremism or to a normally developed specificity. Once the particular character of a modern national culture has been established, it tends to generate a self-reinforcing momentum since it opposes to the Europeanized world culture in its "universality" as well as to the other national cultures based on their own particularity, like the Myrdal's model of cumulative causation transferred from the economy to the culture. When relative normal circumstances for national development are secured in the international arena, this cumulative causation leads to a building up of the specificity of a national culture, if not, the external factors are threatening the nation, and modernity appears as an outside aggression and offense against the national traditions, as the case is with most of the Third World countries, this challenge is met with extreme manifestations of cultural nationalism. Thus national consciousness is alerted against the external influence, sometimes confusing its misdeeds and benefits, and produces pseudo-"medieval" forms of national culture.

To conclude: as a marxist point of view, too often a statement is made about the relative independence of culture from the economy and politics as a mere lip-service to a fundamental marxist tenet without a profound argumentation. Our short analysis of traditionizing modernity has tried to go beyond this by specifying the relative independence and active role of national culture in Third World countries and regarding the significance of the basic needs strategies for overcoming the recent developmental crisis. We suggest that the role of the specific national cultures in the process of development and modernization have to be tackled more seriously than hitherto.
Notes


8/ See, for Latin American, Leopoldo Zea, El pensamiento Latino-Americano (Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1965) and Latinoamérica en la Encrucijada de la historia (Mexico, UNAM, 1981).

(Viene de la pag. 23)

TRADICION Y MODERNISMO EN EL DESARROLLO DE LAS CULTURAS NACIONALES NO EUROPEAS

Resumen: La crisis de desarrollo en el Tercer Mundo marca el fracaso de las teorías europeas de modernización que pretenden que la europeización de la cultura favorece el desarrollo del Tercer Mundo al suprimir las culturas tradicionales. La idea de una cultura mundial europea, es decir, de la dominación cultural, es así puesta a prueba. El autor establece un paralelo con la historia de Europa Oriental al examinar la siguiente interrogante: ya sea que la transformación económica engendrada por el capitalismo mundial en la región ha creado las condiciones de un auténtico desarrollo, o ha arrastrado y recreado el subdesarrollo y producido desequilibrios estructurales permanentes. Basándose en recientes tendencias del Tercer Mundo, el autor propone la "tradicionalización de la modernización" como principio de organización que se refiere deliberadamente a las tradiciones nacionales progresistas y tiende a facilitar la mobilización para la transformación social y la construcción nacional.
Abstract: The author sees the Lomé Convention as an instrument of promoting the imposition upon the ACP partners of European culture, a culture whose tenets of consumerism and underlying alienation are being criticized in Europe itself. The capitalist logic underlying the Convention comes from a culture which perceives the world as a big trading place, on which man is of interest only as a seller and a purchaser of goods. Products cannot be stripped of their cultural origins and implications as their purchase has a direct impact on life patterns, value systems and attitudes, and social relations.

Thus economic, political and cultural domination begun in colonial times is today being perpetuated via trade, the transfer of capital, technology and know-how and the media which increases dependency.

Resumen: El autor ve la Convención de Lomé como un instrumento de imponer la cultura europea a los países ACP, cuyos postulados de consumo y alienación que se están criticando en Europa misma. La lógica capitalista que subyace a la Convención proviene de una cultura que ve al mundo como un gran mercado en el que el ser humano sólo es interesante como vendedor y comprador de bienes. Los bienes no pueden ser despojados de sus raíces culturales y implicaciones porque su adquisición tiene un impacto directo en los estilos de vida, los sistemas de valores y actitudes, y las relaciones sociales.

Ainsi, la domination économique, politique et culturelle qui a pris naissance à l'époque coloniale se perpétue par le commerce, le transfert de capitaux, de techniques et les médias, et la dépendance s'accroît.
Wolf-Dieter Just

THE WORLD AS A TRADING PLACE ON CULTURAL PRESUPPOSITIONS AND EFFECTS OF THE LOME CONVENTION

Recently the Kenyan writer Meja Mwangi was invited to a cultural festival in West Berlin. On that occasion a ten-day programme had been worked out for him so that he might learn something about the culture of the Federal Republic. To his surprise he was hardly given any opportunity to meet people and see how they live. His guide would rather take him from one museum, castle, art exhibition and concert to the other. He was also granted the privilege of sleeping in a 300 year old hotel, "smelling of history" as his guide explained. Mwangi did not like this smell and he was puzzled: Do these people have to go into a museum in order to see their own culture? Where does it exist today? What does it mean in the daily life of people?

For Mwangi the visit to Germany was not his first encounter with European culture. He had already encountered it all through his life at home in Kenya. And there this culture was not embodied in art exhibitions and Bach music. European settlers occupying the "white highlands", that part of his country with the most fertile soil; white missionaries calling his cultural traditions primitive and pagan; the colonial army, which defended the interest of these Europeans against his own people, and killing many of their freedom fighters. This is what it stood for.

Whoever approaches the topic of "development and culture" ought to keep this historical background in mind - the violent confrontation of two cultures. This is not only relevant as an explanation of the past but of the present as well. It is the background to the kind of economic, political and ideological domination still going on today, e.g. in the relationship between former colonies and their "mother" countries. Subsequently I will advance the somewhat provocative thesis that even the so much praised Lomé Convention ought to be interpreted in this light, or to put it more precisely - that it continues to promote the imposition of European culture upon our ACP partners.

1. An exploration of new territory

Inquiries into the significance of the Lomé Convention for the culture of the ACP countries involve an exploration of new territory. As far as I see, this question has never been asked by those in responsibility nor by those involved in scientific research on the Convention. And like most unusual questions this one will initially raise a quizzical smile. All too far seems the distance between the ACP-Stabex-Sysmin-EDF jungle and what we call "culture". Is culture not pre-eminently that which finds its expression in music and dance, poetry and art? This is at least what our newspapers suggest, when after "politics",
"economics", "local news" and "sport" they finally get to the section on "culture". There we usually find reports on art exhibitions, opera performances, new novels and similar things. What has that to do with prices of sugar and beef, with customs duties and rules of origin?

My thesis holds that this is a typical sign of our Western culture; that the distance between the one and the other seems so far to us that the reality of our life is so neatly divided up into certain compartments like politics, economics, social affairs, culture, religion, etc., and that their interconnection tends to be forgotten. As though man would not appear in all these compartments of life as one and the same subject and as though this parcelling out of his life would not do violence to his nature in its wholeness!

Let us have a look at the Lomé Convention with its 191 articles plus protocols and annexes: Could this piece of literature originate from any other cultural sphere than the occidental one? Is not its technical nature and the rational "spirit of capitalism" (M. Weber) underlying it a specific feature of the West? Is its spirit not one, which perceives the world as a big trading place, on which man is just of interest as a seller and purchaser of goods? Certainly - the Convention has also been signed by 58 representatives from countries which belong to entirely different cultural spheres. But this does not seem to be based on the fact that these cultures are so much the same, but that more and more they are being made the same. This process of levelling, called "imposition of culture" by I. Illich, began in colonial times and is perpetuated today via trade and commerce, the transfer of capital, technology and know-how, the media, tourism, etc. Lomé must be understood as part of this process as will subsequently be shown. The fact that former colonies have now gained political independence does not seem to matter very much in this respect. We find, on the contrary, writers from those countries constantly bewailing the fact that there has been no real new beginning. "What did we fight for in the struggle for independence, if now white is just substituted by black?" This question is repeatedly asked by the Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o in his well-known novels.1/

2. A comprehensive concept of "culture"

Subsequently a concept of culture shall be used which refuses to confine itself to its spiritual-elitist or folkloristic definitions or to the antiquities imprisoned in museums. Culture should be understood as everything "which man makes out of his world and what he thinks and speaks thereby. Thus everything is culture, which is not nature. Culture is achieved, is creation in accordance to human design. Nature is grown" 2/. Such a concept of culture leaves behind the restrictions mentioned above. It also rejects assertions that there are people without culture or with "primitive" cultures 3/. Finally, it refuses the evolutionist
point of view originating from the 19th century and still playing -
consciously or not - a very important role today. According to
this view each society in its cultural development must pass
through a number of stages. These stages in the evolutionary pro-
cess are principally the same for all societies. The Europeans
are - how could it be otherwise - at the most advanced stage.
This arrogant Eurocentrism still underlines various strategies,
which today are proposed for Third World development. This is
particularly true of the so-called "strategy of catching up"
("Aufholstrategie") which like most of these strategies conceives
of this "catching up" in purely economic terms. It has found its
classical expression in W.W. Rostow's book The Stages of Economic
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge 1960). The under-
lying assumption is one of unilinear evolution: culture is
undergoing a constant process of modernization, which, at all
stages, is made necessary by economic growth but which in turn
makes growth possible.

This viewpoint comes very close to the Lomé philosophy. It pre-
supposes that the only possible goal of the evolution of the Third
World is the reproduction of the Western model. The differences
between the model and its imitators are seen either as a lack or
a lag. In order to narrow the gap belief is placed on the mira-
culous effects of transfers of capital, technology and know how
from North to South. The aim is rapid economic growth. That
there can also be other, more comprehensive goals of development,
e.g. "human" growth, real self-reliance, etc., is beyond imagina-
tion. But "what happens if the present Western model comes to
be seen ... as a form of anti-development (i.e. which causes
underdevelopment in the Third World and which constitutes no model
at all for development)?"

3. The cultural impact of trade

The interconnection of Western development policies and the trans-
fer of Western culture can well be exemplified by reference to the
trade promotion measures which are central to the Lomé Convention.
As article 1 states, "the object of this Convention is to promote
trade between the ACP states and the Community taking account of
their respective levels of development...". The various trade
promotion measures "from the production stage to the final stage
of distribution" are first of all meant to increase "the value and
volume of ACP exports". (Article 20). Thus the Convention guaran-
tees free access to the Community market for 99.5% of the ACP
countries' exports. There is no reciprocal obligation. That means
Community exports to ACP countries are not granted preferential
treatment. Also various other measures such as the Stabex system
are meant to promote trade and especially the export production of
ACP countries.

The text of the Convention seems to suggest that trade promotion is
an end in itself. This assumption, however, needs thorough
questioning. Trade is certainly much more than just the "innocent"
exchange of goods against money or of goods against goods. Unfortunately this "more" is perpetually ignored by economists. Goods are something supposed to serve man in one way or another, be it for own consumption or for manufacturing and profitable sale, for the defence of man in his struggle for survival and a good life, etc. Thus goods - in our case merchandise - ought not be be seen as objects in isolation or something "neutral". They are related to the human being, his/her life-context, life style and his/her will to live.

Exploring this relationship one needs first of all to ask who are the subjects of trade activities. These are certain people, people pursuing particular interests. Who are these people and what are their interests? How do their interests relate to the interests of other people? Is this relationship politically and socially acceptable? Whether the promotion of trade is a good or a bad thing depends on the answers to these questions. Their relevance and often explosive nature becomes obvious, if one thinks of the frequently made proposition that the EEC-ACP trade is first of all a deal between local elites and European TNCs. If this is true, we see, how questionable it is to consider trade promotion as an end in itself.

Moreover, a careful examination is required concerning the impact of the objects of trade, the merchandise, upon the recipients and their lives. The exchange of goods via trade is, of course, of great influence on life conditions and on the way people relate to nature, to other people and to themselves. This is another reason for the close interrelation between trade and culture, which we defined as the "which man makes out of himself and his world and what he speaks and thinks thereby". If, for example, the Third World buys cars from the North, this does not simply mean the import of a certain means of transport. It means the import also of an "ideology", which is somehow "built in". This ideology implies a certain relationship of man towards time and space, which users of those cars have to internalize in order to meet the objectives of this purchase. It is, for example, obvious that the car will change the daily agenda of the one who starts to use this object regularly. But it will, on a deeper level, do much more to that person as it will change the attitude towards time as such. The possession of a car does not, for example, seem to fit very well with the significance and value Africans used to put to time in its past tense. A car requires an orientation towards the future. The culture out of which this product evolved, considers first of all future time as a precious good, which requires active planning and optimal exploitation. A product, in this case the car, cannot be stripped of this cultural origin with its specific value systems and attitudes etc.

The user of the car will also develop a different attitude towards space. Places that used to be far away are suddenly very close; travels will be planned which in earlier times had been beyond imagination. This new mobility will certainly have its impact on
life style and social relations. The user of the car might gain a new social status and be looked at with admiration and perhaps also envy. Others will want to have a car too and do what they can to get one. Due to his mobility the user can now also be more selective with respect to his social contacts. This implies certainly more freedom, but also more scope for social escapism.

Another important aspect lies in the fact that cars cost money - not only for the initial purchase but also for maintenance, petrol etc. This money could, of course, also be spent differently, e.g. for more basic needs or social needs etc. Purchasing a car implies a certain value judgement: you give priority to this object rather than to something else, which might have been given more prominence in the past. Thus an object of trade also has a significant cultural or "ideological" impact on its subject. Finally an increase in the number of cars in a country will, of course, also change the environment (pollution, demand for more roads, petrol stations, workshops, etc.) and the structure of imports (petrol, spare parts, etc.).

These are just some of the cultural impacts going along with the import of cars. Whether they are desirable or not can only be decided, if one faces the complexity of this impact.

The text of the Lomé Convention exhibits very little sensitivity for this important relationship between human beings and trade, human beings and merchandise. Only Article 5.1 is an exception, which allows for restrictions on imports, exports and goods in transit "on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security, the protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value ...". But in the next paragraph the authors hasten to state: "Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not in any case constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade generally". So trade remains an end in itself although some qualifications were obviously unavoidable.

At this stage some objections may be raised. The point may be made that trade usually flows in two directions. Thus trade may indeed affect a levelling of cultures but this levelling works both ways. As there is almost an equilibrium in ACP-EEC trade the cultural impact of ACP merchandise upon Western Europe should be as strong as the impact of EEC merchandise on ACP cultures. This, however, is not true for two main reasons.

First of all because the ACP is for the EEC only of marginal importance, while for ACP countries EEC trade is of utmost significance. Less than 7% of the EEC's total imports originate from ACP countries, while about one half of ACP imports come from the EEC. So the ACP countries are much more dependent on the EEC than vice versa. This disequilibrium will, of course, also be
reflected in the degree of cultural dependency.

Second, even more important in this respect, is the structure of EEC-ACP trade. While EEC exports to ACP countries consist mainly of manufactured goods (85%), the ACP exports consist mainly of raw materials. According to our definition, culture is what man makes out of his world. This means in our case that among the traded goods only those can be considered as cultural products which have undergone human manufacture. Raw materials as such do not bear cultural features, they belong to nature. This makes obvious, in which direction culture is transferred. Significantly the Stabex-system does not cover manufactured goods, thus confirming the cultural one-way traffic. There may be a balance of trade in ACP-EEC relations, but that is a rather abstract economic indicator. What matters in the lives of people is the cultural impact and this is entirely "unbalanced".

Finally the cultural impact of the structure of production must be mentioned as it is promoted by EEC-ACP trade. Lomé clearly promotes export production in ACP states. That means production for foreign markets. Through Stabex it is the export of agricultural products, which is particularly encouraged. This has a number of undesirable cultural consequences. It increases the degree of dependency and is incompatible with self-reliant development. The old international division of labour inherited from colonial times is being reinforced. It obliged the former colonies to serve the centre as suppliers of raw materials and cheap labour. The land is increasingly used for export production rather than for the supply of local markets. This makes agricultural imports from developed countries increasingly necessary. Zaire is a typical example. Due to the export orientation of its agriculture, food production for domestic consumption has gradually decreased to such an extent that the country has to spend 30% of its foreign exchange on the import of food stuffs. With this in mind Article 83 of Lomé II seems something of a mockery:

"The basic objective of agricultural cooperation between the Community and the ACP States must be to assist the latter in their efforts to solve problems relating to rural development and the improvement and expansion of agricultural production for domestic consumption and export and problems they may encounter with regard to security of food supplies for their populations".

And Article 89 even goes so far as to say that "... the ultimate aim of ACP States is to become self-sufficient in food production". Most questionable in this respect is a new type of TNC, which has evolved during the last twenty years and which is involved in the agri-business. These TNCs produce agricultural products in the Third World for markets in the industrialized countries. They use capital intensive technologies and cause rural unemployment as well as the kind of cultural alienation mentioned above. The Third World is attractive to them as it offers cheap land, cheap
labour and a favourable climate. They are big obstacles to agrarian reforms, diversification of production and local and regional self-reliance with respect to food supply. Lomé encourages this business in at least three ways:

- the so-called rules of origin protect European TNCs against imports from third countries;
- Stabex guarantees stability of export prices and encourages monocultures due to Article 29 which says that the system applies only to the exports of products on which an ACP State depends for at least 6,5% of its total export earnings;
- EDF favours the improvement of infrastructures which make the transport of raw materials easier and cheaper.

From the cultural point of view the most questionable aspect in all this is the increasing degree of dependency which is caused by the Convention. Dependence means that local people cannot determine themselves, what is to be produced, where, by whom, with what kind of technology and under which circumstances. The fact that decisions of this kind are taken outside is probably the strongest cause of cultural alienation. People ought to determine themselves "what they make out of their world". Otherwise their human dignity is offended and the "production" of their own culture made impossible. Thus all men have a right to their own culture according to the Human Rights Charter of the UN. The fathers of the Convention are in fact aware of this. They state under the objectives for agricultural cooperation that it should contribute "to increasing the populations' capacity for self-development, notably through greater control over their technical and economic environment" (Article 83.2f.). The decisive question, however, is whether the nature of the Convention makes this possible.

4. Lomé II and the Human Rights issue

Justice would not be done to the fathers of the Lomé II Convention, however, if one point was not mentioned, where the "humanum" did play a role in the negotiations. This involved the suggestion by the Nine that a reference concerning respect for human rights be incorporated within the framework of the Convention. But this attempt failed and the reasons for it are significant for our subject matter.

First of all an initiative of this kind is perfectly in line with the Treaty of Rome, which in fact is less technocratic than the political praxis of the EEC. Part Four dealing with "The Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories" is in this context of particular importance. It states the primary objective of the Association as follows "to further the interest and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in
order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire" (Article 131). This goal is to be accomplished in accordance with "the principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (cf. the preamble).

However, the course of negotiations over a reference to human rights in the Convention became more and more embarrassing for both sides. Originally the EEC wanted the right to suspend assistance should an ACP state seriously violate human rights. Underlying this move was particular concern about the events in Idi Amin's Uganda and the continuing aid given to that country. The ACP countries were not totally against such a reference in the Treaty, provided that it was reciprocal in nature. They were hoping such a reference could be used against maltreatment of students, trainees and migrant workers originating from the ACP states and residing regularly in EEC countries. It was also assumed that EEC trade with South Africa was a possible subject for reciprocal action. The EEC, however, without explanation rejected the ACP declaration on non-discriminatory treatment for ACP migrant workers 21 and in this way defeated any notion of reciprocal respect for human rights. This of course, "left little inducement of the ACP countries to accept a proposal for introducing human rights provisions into the Lomé text" 21.

The ACP countries rejected a reference to human rights mainly for the following reasons:

- such a reference could be used as a pretext for intervening in their countries' internal affairs;
- Lomé was essentially a forum for economics and trade, not for the discussion of political problems;
- the concept of human rights itself was too complex and subjective as a basis for a trade agreement.

Considering these reasons one can certainly see a point in the first and third one, while the second one tries to separate things which in fact cannot and should not be separated. The Lomé Convention cannot be considered just as an economic agreement because it affects people's culture in the wide sense of our definition.

As far as the first reason is concerned it needs to be said that protection of human rights has not for quite some time been considered as a matter solely of domestic jurisdiction but has risen to the level of international concern 107. Acceptance of that point would also mean acceptance of EEC trade with South Africa. Here the reasoning of ACP states does not seem to be consistent. On the other hand it must be remembered, that "the parties are not on an equal footing: the EEC can take sanctions against an ACP state, but mostly the reverse is not true" 11. One can understand the worry of ACP representatives that the EEC might feel free to use e.g. trade boycotts as a weapon, whenever the policy
of a particular state did not coincide with its own interests. The third point rightly states that the issue is a very complex one. It would be very questionable e.g. to blame various Third World countries for violations of human rights and to turn a blind eye to the causes of that situation in colonial history and in the present international economic system. In this respect it has to be asked, whether the Lomé Convention itself is a "clean" affair. It promoted for instance the export of food stuffs (peanuts e.g.) from the Sahel at a time when great numbers of people there were starving to death. Is that not a violation of human rights?

5. Conclusion

Most critics of Lomé contend that it is just a "drop in the ocean". They appreciate the preferential trade arrangements and the Stabex system, but criticize its rather small financial resources and ask why the EEC should have a special relationship with these 60 Third World countries and not the remainder. These critics can see in Lomé at least a small step in the right direction. The integration of Third World countries into the international market, industrialization, increased foreign aid, and the transfer of capital, technology and know how from North to South are considered as beneficial and important means to achieve some sort of welfare in the Third World. The international division of labour as such is not called into question, although it must, of course, become more "rational, just and equitable" 12.

This paper has tried to call these convictions into question. They are geared towards giving Third World countries a better share of the "international cake", but real structural changes are not seen to be necessary. If development, however, is considered as an integral, value-loaded cultural process encompassing political participation, social relations, education, production, consumption, natural environment and well being, the narrow economistic orientation of those strategies must be overcome.

One could, of course, argue, that cultures have always influenced each other in history and often to their mutual enrichment. But such mutuality requires partners that are on an equal footing. This is not the case in ACP-EEC relations or generally in present North-South relations. All measures to integrate Third World countries into the international market reinforce the cultural one way traffic from North to South and result finally in the reproduction or even imposition of the western model. This model, however, is at present not only under attack from Third World critics. People in industrialized countries are also becoming more and more disillusioned with it. They become aware of its ever increasing social and ecological costs; of the power that inanimate objects (e.g. sophisticated machines, consumer goods etc.) have gained over man and his life; of the growing marginalization of great parts of the population and whole regions.
Thus it seems this model has not very much to recommend it as an export to the South. Perhaps the time has come for people in the North to learn their lesson from cultures in the South concerning more human ways of living and social organisation and about more sensitive attitudes towards nature.

One of our main criticisms of the Lomé Convention was that it does not really change the existing structures of dependency. Thus people in ACP countries have little scope to determine themselves "what they make out of their world" - except for their national elites, who are, however, often under strong western influence and alienated from the people and their own cultural roots. Alternatives to the Lomé approach for Third World development can be found in the various strategies aiming at greater self-reliance. Strategies of this kind have been proposed e.g. by the Dag Hammarskjöld Report What now? (1975), the Cocoyoc Declaration (1974), by Ecumenical thought on the subject, and by a number of individual scientists like D. Senghaas and J. Galtung. These strategies cannot be presented here in detail. They all understand development as a complex and integral cultural process, which must be geared to the "growth of man" and not just to the growth of things. Production is, of course, an important means of development. But its primary concern is to satisfy human needs (material and non-material ones). Thus economic growth or trade can never be ends in themselves.

The concept of self-reliance entails a critique of the integration of the Third World into the international market. Its structures of production need to be radically changed and oriented more towards domestic markets. The necessity of international trade is not entirely denied but it must be one of partners, which are more or less on an equal footing; thus South-South trade needs to be promoted. Oteiza describes this alternative type of development approach as "implying (1) the severance of existing links of dependence operated through the international system by the dominant countries, (2) a full mobilization of domestic capabilities and resources, (3) the strengthening of links-collaboration with other Third World countries, and (4) the reorientation of development efforts in order to meet the basic needs (not just the minimum) of the peoples involved". To these objectives one may add (5) a just distribution of wealth, (6) decentralisation and democratisation of decision-making power and (7) concern for the ecological balance. Such a strategy would clearly be in line with a cultural approach to development as it gives man an optimum of freedom to shape his world in accordance with his own design.

No doubt the implementation of such a strategy will be very difficult given the present power structures at both national and international levels. But that should not keep us from defining clearly, which goals are desirable for development and it should also not keep us from striving for such goals in the face of countervailing forces.
Footnotes:


4/ Rist, op. cit. p. 4f.

5/ Up to now, however, this has not resulted in balanced development of trade. EEC exports to ACP countries have under Lomé I grown faster than the respective imports. Thus the balance of trade, which was positive for the ACP countries in the early 70s has become negative in 1978.


7/ For the "least" developed, landlocked and island ACP States, the percentage is 2%.


10/ cf. Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter and Young-Anawaty, op. cit. p. 96.


(Viene de la pag. 33)

EL MUNDO COMO MERCADO - LAS HIPOTESIS CULTURALES Y LOS EFECTOS DE LA CONVENCION DE LOME

Resumen: El autor ve en la Convención de Lomé un instrumento de imposición de la cultura europea a los países asociados de la ACP, cuyos principios de consumo y la alienación resultante son criticados en la misma Europa. La lógica capitalista que sirve de base a la Convención proviene de una cultura que ve al mundo como un amplio mercado donde los seres humanos no interesan como tales sino solamente como compradores y vendedores de bienes. Los bienes son inseparables de su origen cultural y su adquisición tiene un impacto directo en los estilos de vida, los sistemas de valores y las relaciones sociales.

De este modo, la dominación económica, política y cultural que empezó en la época colonial se perpetúa a través del comercio, la transferencia de capitales, de técnicas, los medios de comunicación de masas, y así la dependencia sigue aumentando.
Abstract: The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour, or it can move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both. This is the first sentence of the conclusions of a group of 27 governmental experts on the relationship between disarmament and development which worked for three years under the chairmanship of Inga Thorsson, Swedish Under-Secretary of State for Disarmament. The experts' study was presented last fall both to the first (political) and second (economic) committees of the United Nations General Assembly. We reproduce below the essential part of Inga Thorsson's presentation to the Second Committee.

LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS EST INCOMPATIBLE AVEC LE NOEI

Résumé: Le monde peut soit poursuivre la course aux armements, soit avancer consciemment et à une vitesse délibérée vers un ordre international, politique et économique, plus soutenable. Il ne peut suivre simultanément les deux voies. Tel est l'avertissement par lequel s'ouvre le chapitre des conclusions d'un groupe de 27 experts gouvernementaux sur les relations entre le désarmement et le développement, qui a travaillé pendant trois ans sous la présidence d'Inga Thorsson, Sous-secrétaires d'Etat (Suède) pour le désarmement. L'étude des experts a été présentée l'automne dernier à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, tant à la première commission (affaires politiques) qu'à la deuxième commission (affaires économiques). Nous reproduisons ci-dessous l'essentiel de la présentation faite à la Seconde Commission par Inga Thorsson.

(Resumen en Español pag. 53)
Inga Thorsson

THE ARMS RACE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NIETO

In broad terms, the present Study has taken into account the current situation in the field of disarmament and the importance of disarmament for détente, international peace and security, economic and social development, the promotion of international cooperation and their reciprocal relationships. The Study has been made in the context of how disarmament, when achieved, can contribute to the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Furthermore, the Study was required to be forward-looking and policy-oriented, enabling it to serve as a basis for decisions on concrete actions to reallocate real resources through disarmament measures to economic and social development, particularly in Third World countries.

Common sense alone tells us that military preparations are an economic burden. The arms race and development are to be viewed in a competitive relationship, particularly in terms of resources. Or to put it another way: the arms race and underdevelopment are not two problems; they are one. They must be solved together, or neither will ever be solved.

It is a historical fact that governments have, over the past 30 years, spent vast resources on armaments, resources which - on grounds of morality, on grounds of equal human justice, on grounds of enlightened self-interest - ought to have been directed to ending world poverty and building for human and material development. In this way world armaments are among the causes of poverty and underdevelopment.

The 1972 United Nations study on this same theme concluded that disarmament and development "stand fundamentally apart". Taking their point of departure, this statement is still true. Ten years ago and, as duties of the industrialized countries went, development was simply equated with development assistance. But since then, the development discussion has been broadened to involve basic structural changes in all societies, within states and among states, including more equitable distribution of income, access to the means of production and greater participation by all groups in decision making, and progress towards the establishment of a New International Economic Order.

In the present Study, we have introduced a new conceptual framework, defined in a dynamic triangular interrelation between disarmament, development and security. We have taken a broader approach to the problem of security. In our era, national security can no longer be equated with military might. Even less can international security, i.e. security for all, do so. Also, we demonstrate that threats to security may be made and aggravated in
many ways, including those that go far beyond purely military threats. It was recognized by the first UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament that the arms race itself has become a threat to the security of nations. Thus, disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, would directly enhance security, and, therefore, prospects for development.

National security is not a goal in itself. Its ultimate purpose must be to secure the independence and sovereignty of the national state, the freedom of its citizens, freedom and the means to develop economically, socially and culturally, which defines exactly what we mean by "development". In today's world this can never be achieved by any state at the expense of others. In a world of interdependence, only through global, or international security will it be possible to reach the objective of national security - for the ultimate goal of freedom, well-being and human dignity for people throughout the world.

Today there is an array of intensifying non-military threats which aggravate the security problems of states. Such non-military threats can be described as

- widespread reductions in prospects for economic growth;

- existing or impending ecological stresses, resource scarcities - notably in the field of energy and certain non-renewable raw materials - and a growing world population. Today's stresses and constraints may translate into tomorrow's economic stresses and political conflicts;

- the morally unacceptable and politically hazardous polarization of wealth and poverty.

The appalling dimensions of poverty, the destruction of the environment, the accelerating race for arms and the resulting global economic malaise are largely problems of our own making. The Group states that it is well within our collective capabilities and within the earth's carrying capacity to provide for basic needs for the world's entire population, and to make progress towards a more equitable economic order, at a pace politically acceptable to all. The Group reaffirms that the arms race is incompatible with the objectives of a new international economic order. Of course, also in the future, economic growth is possible even with a continuing arms race, but it would be relatively slow, and very unevenly distributed both among and within regions of the world. We show, on the other hand, that a cooperative management of interdependence can be in the economic and security interests of all states. But the adoption or rather the evolution of such an outlook is quite improbable if the arms race continues.

It is imperative that non-military challenges to security are treated as non-military. If this is not recognized, if states fail to accept and persevere in tackling these challenges through voluntary measures and cooperation, there is a grave risk
that the situation will deteriorate to the point of crisis where, even with a low probability of success, the use of military force could be seen as a way to produce results sufficiently quickly. This is far from being a remote possibility. In recent time there has been a marked and increasing tendency in international relations actually to use or threaten to use military force in response to non-military challenges, not only to "security", but also to the secure supply of goods and the well-being of the nations, facing these challenges.

The Study has documented that at least 50 million people are directly or indirectly engaged in military activities world-wide. This figure includes, inter alia, an estimated 500,000 qualified scientists and engineers engaged in research and development for military purposes.

Military research and development remains by far the largest single objective of scientific enquiry and technological development. Approximately 20 per cent of the world's qualified scientists and engineers were engaged in military work at a cost of around $35 billion in 1980, or approximately one-quarter of all expenditure on research and development. Virtually all this R & D takes place in the industrialized countries, 85 per cent in the USA and the USSR alone. Adding France and Britain would push this share above 90 per cent. It stands to reason that even a modest reallocation to development objectives of the current capacity for military R & D could be expected to produce dramatic results in fields like resource conservation and the promotion of new patterns of development, better adapted to meeting the basic needs of ordinary people. This is, i.e. evident from the fact, which is also among our findings, that, on an average, a military product requires 20 times as much R & D resources as a civilian product.

The 1972 report on the subject identified more than 70 possible alternative uses. Our present investigations suggest, in more elaborated and detailed ways, for instance, that production workers in the military sector could quite easily transfer their skills to the development, production and installation of solar energy devices. Environment, housing and urban renewal are other areas likely to gain from the possible rechanneling of military R & D. New transport systems, particularly in urban areas, are sorely needed and have long been regarded as a major civilian alternative for the high technology industries in the military sector.

In purely financial terms, world-wide military expenditures by 1981 exceed, the astounding level of 520 billion dollars, representing 6 per cent of world output. This amount is roughly equivalent to the value of all investible capital in all Third World countries combined. The effect on the economic and social spheres in our societies of the arms race extend far beyond the fact that 5 to 6 per cent of the world's resources are not available to
help satisfy socially productive needs. The very fact that these resources are spent on armaments accentuates the inefficient allocation of the remaining 94 to 95 per cent, within and between nations. Three fundamental characteristics of the arms race reinforce this dislocation: first, the sheer magnitude of the volume of resources; second, the composition of expenditure, most particularly the stress on R & D, affecting investment and productivity in the civilian sector; and thirdly, the fact that this massive effort has now been sustained for over thirty years.

As an illustration of the contribution which can be made by disarmament measures, even limited, to world development, one study submitted to the Group projects global economic prospects under three types of hypothetical scenarios, viz., a continued arms race, an accelerated arms race, and modest disarmament measures involving the release of some resources for reallocation into the Third World. Utilizing the United Nations input-output model of world economy, it is calculated that an acceleration of the arms race would adversely affect global economic well-being in all but one of regions of the world. A wealth of numerical data is presented in chapter III of the report. I will here highlight some general results. Besides the negative impact on per capita consumption, an accelerated arms race will also result in a decline of the world's stock of capital, reduce the value of non-military exports, and entail reductions in industrial employment in the poorest regions of the world.

In contrast, a scenario of even modest disarmament measures is shown to yield higher per capita consumption for different regions and in addition bring about a higher world GDP, a larger capital stock, a general increase in the agricultural output, to mention only a few of the obvious economic gains. Besides these global economic gains, a scenario of modest disarmament would also yield significant benefits for the poorest regions of the world. This conclusion is by itself of considerable significance, when it is remembered that in many cases, increases in military outlays by industrial countries have been accompanied by a decline in their aid transfers, despite the repeated request for the fulfilment of the UN targets for official development assistance and despite the fact that existing volumes of assistance are grossly inadequate to meet the basic requirements for the poorer countries. The report shows that even a minor part of savings from modest disarmament has the potential of dramatically enhancing present levels of assistance.

We can make similar calculations for the past. For instance, if half the funds spent on armaments throughout the world from 1970 to 1975 had instead been invested in the civilian sector, it has been calculated that annual output at the end of that period would have been 200 billion dollars higher than it actually was - a figure in excess of the aggregate GNP of Southern Asia and the mid-African regions. And mark well, this growth would most likely have been achieved without any extra demand for investible
resources.

Military outlays fall by definition into the category of consumption and not investment. As a consequence, steadily high or increasing military outlays tend to depress economic growth. This effect may be direct through displacement of investment, and indirect through constraints on productivity (...).

On the basis of the present report, and the research commissioned for it, we can confidently conclude that military budgets are dead-end expenditures in all kinds of economies, be they market, centrally planned, or mixed; be they industrialized or not. Military expenditures do not foster growth. Through their inflationary effects - thoroughly analysed in the study - and the general economic and political malaise to which they contribute, military spending inhibits the capital investment required for development. Through the drain on the most valuable research talents and funds, it restrains productivity gains and distorts growth in science and technology. The military sector is not a great provider of jobs, on the contrary. Military spending is one of the least efficient kinds of public spending. It drains away funds that could relieve poverty and distress. The very nature of military spending heightens tensions, reduces security and underpins the system which makes even more arms necessary.

The structural changes implied by the movement toward a New International Economic Order require a strong and sustained political commitment. Costs and benefits are difficult to compare in conventional ways. The costs tend to be felt sooner than the benefits. But there is little doubt that all societies would reap major benefits from a reduction in the economic burden of military activities and that there is a strong mutuality of interest between industrialized and developing countries in this respect. Therefore, the Group unanimously recommends that Governments urgently undertake studies to identify and to publicize the benefits that would be derived from the reallocation of military resources in a balanced and verifiable manner to address economic and social problems at the national level and to contribute toward reducing the gap in income that currently divides the industrialized nations from the developing world and establishing a New International Economic Order.

The Group has examined the technological feasibility and economic potentials of a process of conversion of resources from military to civilian purposes. The main object, in economic terms, is to devise short- and long-term policies designed to consolidate the goal of disarmament with economic goals of growth, monetary stability, full employment and foreign trade balance. While, as a matter of course, conversion itself will have to await some measure of disarmament, preparation and research for an economic conversion policy cannot be deferred until such time.
The defence industry everywhere is characterized inter alia by a high degree of geographical concentration. It also involves a considerable degree of specialization of its workforce. This apparent exclusiveness should not prove to be an unsurmountable problem, because:

1. conversion and redeployment are not phenomena uniquely associated with disarmament. Any form of economic and social change represents a continuous process of conversion;
2. conversion is feasible as a significant part of military demand relates to goods and services essentially identical to civilian ones.

Primary responsibility for conversion, in an overall sense, inevitably falls on the central government, particularly as regards planning and initiation of preparations for such a process. The nature and extent of government involvement, following disarmament measures, in the process of conversion itself will vary from country to country, depending largely on the prevailing type of economic system. If transition is to be as smooth as possible and involve the minimum waste of finite resources it is vital that every effort be made to anticipate the extent and the character of the conversion problems that will arise. It is therefore obvious to the Group, that preparations for conversion should be among the first steps on the road to disarmament. Hence, the Group recommends that Governments create the necessary prerequisites, including preparations and, where appropriate, planning, to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent economic and social needs, in particular in the Third World.

The General Assembly mandated the Study to indicate concrete actions to reallocate real resources released through disarmament measures to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the Third World. In doing so, the Group has also considered a French proposal presented at the Tenth Special Session on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development.

Obviously, the achievement of disarmament measures which will release real resources will in the first instance most directly benefit those States which are affected by these measures. Practical ways by which disarmament may redound to the benefit of development in the South may take many forms. Beside changes in economic relations to the benefit of the Third World, it is widely recognized that increasing the magnitude and predictability of flows of capital to the Third World, as grants or on concessional terms, is of vital importance. One proposed way of fostering these flows would be to establish a special fund for development to be financed from budgetary savings through the implementation of disarmament measures, as well as a levy on armaments, or voluntary contributions. The Group is unanimous in its opinion that
the disarmament dividend approach to financing a fund - by which savings won by concrete disarmament measures or a portion thereof would be allocated to development needs - is most in accord with the United Nations conception of disarmament and development as well as being the most feasible. The Group unanimously recommends that further consideration be given to establishing an international disarmament fund for development and that the administrative and technical modalities of such a fund be further investigated by the United Nations with due regard to the capabilities of the agencies and institutions presently responsible for the international transfer resources. (....)

No analysis of the socio-economic gains of disarmament can be complete with referring to its catalytic effects, which may eventually produce a global climate more conducive to further and cumulative measures in the same direction. This would be in contrast with the present situation where higher outlays on the military sector are often attributed to the continued threats emanating from an adverse strategic environment. An outstanding feature of the prevailing international climate is the uncertainty which is characterizing the exercise in rearranging the North-South relationship within the framework of a NIEO, as well as the uncertainty of stabilizing the East-West relationship within the framework of détente.

In both these respects, the catalytic effects of military restraint can considerably improve the results obtained so far because the politico-strategic considerations governing the arms race tend to interfere with the economic considerations demanding a cooperative management of global interdependence. Stabilization of the international monetary system, rectification of trade imbalances, resolution of the existing balance of payment difficulties and a continuous flow of capital, finance and technology among the more and less industrialized economies, constitute, as this committee is well aware, some of the basic prerequisites of a NIEO. Disarmament measures can improve the prospects of international cooperation in all these spheres because there are sufficient indications to suggest that the ongoing arms race has exacerbated the disruptive influences on the international monetary system, aggravated the balance of payment problems of the less industrialized economies and interrupted a continuous flow of capital and technology transfers among the more and the less industrialized economies.

Successive crises in the international monetary system imputable in part to the massive creation of international liquidity through the deficits of some reserve currency countries, have been significantly associated with galloping inflation and rapid increases in military expenditures. The growing international traffic in arms has also contributed to the balance of payment problems of the importing countries. 75 per cent of arms traded internationally go to the Third World.
The disruptive influence of the arms race has become a matter of particular concern in the field of international trade. The increasing preoccupation of the market economies with their immediate problems of stagflation is seen to affect their role as the largest participants in the aid and trade relations of the Third World.

It is widely acknowledged that the true foundation of national security is a strong and healthy economy. The present Study presents overwhelming evidence that the contemporary military establishments significantly distort and undermine the very basis of sustained economic and social development in all countries. Accordingly, the Group recommends that all Governments, but particularly those of the major military powers, should prepare assessments of the nature and magnitude of short- and long-term economic and social costs attributable to their military preparations so that the general public be informed of them.

This Study has in my view strengthened the economic and social case for this disarmament-development relationship by identifying military spending as an impediment to economic growth and social development and the arms race as an obstacle to the establishment of a New International Economic Order.

The Group has indicated the political and economic potentials of rationally imperative alternatives in suggesting that policies aimed at implementing the disarmament-development relationship are likely to broaden the base of East-West détente and put the North-South dialogue in a mutually advantageous frame of reference.

Its report should not be considered an individual project. I should like to express a hope for an effective follow-up process, to the benefit, first of all, of the billions of human beings, inhabiting this world of ours.

(Viene de la pag. 45)

LA CARRERA ARMAMENTISTA ES INCOMPATIBLE CON EL NOEI

Resumen: La humanidad puede continuar la carrera armamentista, o avanzar concièntemente y a una velocidad deliberada hacia un orden internacional, político y económico más sostenible. Pero ella no puede seguir simultáneamente los dos caminos. Tal es la advertencia con la que se abre el capítulo de las conclusiones de un grupo de 27 expertos gubernamentales sobre las relaciones entre desarme y desarrollo. Este grupo ha trabajado durante tres años bajo la presidencia de Inga Thorsson, sub-secretaria de Estado (Suecia) para el desarme. El trabajo de los expertos ha sido presentado el otoño último a la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, tanto a la primera comisión (asuntos políticos), como a la segunda comisión (asuntos económicos). Nosotros reproducimos la parte más importante de la presentación hecha a la segunda comisión por Inga Thorsson.
THE ANTINUCLEAR-WAR MOVEMENT

by George Kennan 1/

The recent growth and gathering strength of the antinuclear-war movement here and in Europe is to my mind the most striking phenomenon of this beginning of the 1980s. It is all the more impressive because it is so extensively spontaneous. It has already achieved dimensions which will make it impossible, I think, for the respective governments to ignore it. It will continue to grow until something is done to meet it. (...) It is largely a reaction to the negative and hopeless quality of our own cold war policies, which seem to envisage nothing other than an indefinitely increasing political tension and nuclear danger. It is not surprising that many Europeans should see no salvation for themselves in so sterile a perspective and should cast about for something that would have in it some positive element - some ray of hope.

Least of all does this neutralist sentiment necessarily represent any timorous desire to accept Soviet authority as a way of avoiding the normal responsibilities of national defense. The cliché of "better red than dead" is a facile and clever phrase; but actually, no one in Europe is faced with such a choice, or is likely to be. We will not be aided in our effort to understand Europe's problems by distortions of this nature. (...) No - this movement against nuclear armaments and nuclear war may be raged and confused and disorganized; but at the heart of it lie some very fundamental and reasonable and powerful motivations: among them a growing appreciation by many people of the true horrors of a nuclear war; a determination not to see their children deprived of life, or their civilization destroyed, by a holocaust of this nature; and finally, as Grenville Clark said, a very real exasperation with their governments for the rigidity and traditionalism that cause those governments to ignore the fundamental distinction between conventional weapons and the weapons of mass destruction and prevents them from finding, or even seriously seeking, ways of escape from the fearful trap into which the cultivation of nuclear weapons is leading us.

Such considerations are not the reflections of communist propaganda. They are not the products of some sort of timorous neutralism. They are the expression of a deep instinctive insistence, if you don't mind, on sheer survival - on survival as individuals, as parents, as members of a civilization.

Our government will ignore this fact at its peril. This movement is too powerful, too elementary, too deeply embedded in the natural human instinct for self-preservation, to be brushed aside. Sooner or later, and the sooner the better, all the governments on both sides of the East-West division will find themselves compelled to undertake the search for positive alternatives to the insoluble dilemmas which any suicidal form of weaponry presents, and can only present.

1/ George Kennan, a senior US diplomat, was, among others, ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and to Yugoslavia (1961-63).

(Excerpted from The New York Review of Books, 21 January 1982.)
Abstract: Can the nuclear question be kept cordoned off from the overall routine administration of state power? This paper analyses the unaccountability of US presidents to the citizenry in the area of nuclear armament. The public, and even Congress, are ill informed about presidential authority in this area. Worse still, citizens of secondary nuclear and non-nuclear democracies have, in the interests of the geopolitics of alliance, "delegated" authority over the deployment of nuclear weaponry to leaders of another state. The author concludes that the existence of nuclear weaponry, even without any occurrence of nuclear war, interferes with democratic governance. On the other hand, recent European anti-nuclear mass sentiment could be an important stimulus to democracy.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE END OF DEMOCRACY

Prospects for democratic governance are definitely connected with the dynamics of hegemonic statecraft. For instance, it is notable, as Eqbal Ahmad has pointed out, that fascism flourished in the inter-war period precisely in those states among the capitalist industrial powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) that had been substantially excluded from the imperial game of colonizing non-Western peoples and expropriating their raw materials. It is also notable that hegemonic leaders of the day "provoked" a lethal rivalry for colonial spoils that eventuated in general war.

In our own era there is an apparent link between post-colonial hegemonic tactics and anti-democratic interventionary diplomacy, part of an overall plan to make the world as safe as possible for transnational corporations and banks. Capital flows depend upon stable political environments that offer rewards by way of profits and stable political environments can only be achieved, given mass discontent and mobilization rampant in the Third World, by institutionalizing repression. The widespread militarization of the internal political order of the Third World expresses the extent to which the functional requirements for order virtually require a permanent declaration of war by governing elites against restive citizenries. This hegemonic dynamic is reinforced in Third World countries by economic pressures to curtail inflation and labor demands, solicit further extensions of international credit, contain social demands for anti-poverty public services, that is, by the whole relatively recent IMF dimension of anti-democratic influence.

Such a geopolitical/geoeconomic array of anti-democratic pressures is generally understood, at least in progressive circles. Gino Germani was an unusually perceptive interpreter of modern threats to democracy; he was particularly aware of the anti-democratic consequences of an emergent interdependence on all levels of international life. More than almost any contemporary political theorist, Germani sensed that democracy could no longer be reconciled with the fragmentary organization of the planet into territorially separate and rival sovereign states, regardless of the political will or ideological predisposition of national leaders. Such an insight has revolutionary implications, suggesting, for instance, the absolute necessity of evolving a global perspective as a precondition for sustaining genuinely democratic modes of governance. Incidentally, a globalist outlook, as Germani also understood, need not be centralist in aspiration, but might most plausibly work toward superseding statist dominance by decentralist withdrawals of legitimacy and the formation of a world system out of relations among what Christian Bay calls "natural political communities".

* An earlier version of this paper was discussed at the 1981 Workshop on Psychohistory held at Wellfleet, Massachusetts, and devoted to the theme of nuclear weapons and nuclear war; I am grateful to workshop participants for many helpful comments, as well as for the constructive suggestions made by my Princeton colleagues Michael Doyle and Robert C. Tucker.
In this essay my concern is with the structural relevance of nuclear weaponry and strategy to the future of democracy. The central contention is that the existence of nuclear weapons, even without any occurrence of nuclear war, interferes with democratic governance in fundamental ways. In other words, we don't have to wait for Armageddon to begin paying the price, as measured by the quality of democracy, for a system of international security constructed around the central imagery of nuclear deterrence. To presume this relevance of nuclear armaments and doctrines to democracy is itself somewhat unusual. For instance, one searches in vain the pages of the Trilateral Commission's notorious study, The Crisis of Democracy, for any reference to the erosion of democratic governance as a consequence of "the nuclear revolution"; the Trilateralists' idea of "crisis" is based on the alleged erosion of authority and stability through the undisciplined tactics of social movements demanding reform that surfaced in the late 1960s, a phenomenon described elsewhere in positive terms as the beginnings of a participatory model of democratic revitalization. In the background, of course, is a concern about the preconditions for capitalist efficiency under contemporary conditions, including a fear that the work ethic, achievement syndrome, and greed impulse are being drained away by cultural developments, including a substantially alienated intelligentsia in so-called mature capitalist countries.

The nuclear weapons question is inserted on the orthodox agenda of liberal democracy in a dramatically perverse way by David Gompert, overseer of an influential study, Nuclear Weapons and World Politics, a product of the 1980's Project of the Council on Foreign Relations. Gompert writes:

In the long run, the existence of nuclear weapons could fundamentally alter government-citizen relations. If, over time, the need of governments to field expansive deterrent forces is not appreciated by citizens who no longer sense a real nuclear threat, popular support for the maintenance of forces could fade - and governments might feel themselves compelled to provide for deterrence without the consent of the governed. 1/

Evident in this remarkable passage of unsurpassed reification, is a presumed priority being accorded "the government" on nuclear military policy over and against the possible opposition of "the citizenry". Democracy is turned on its head, not out of any alleged emergency that prevents either consultation or the participation of representative institution, but because the perceptions of "the rulers" are favored over the adverse will of "the people" in an area of disagreement. Such a realistic vision of what has already become standard operating procedure throughout the nuclear age, raises to the level of explicit ideology the dire impact of nuclear weaponry upon democratic governance.

Daniel Ellsberg, a former government official with responsibility in the nuclear policy area, confirms the extent to which American presidents were prepared to use nuclear weapons in non-defensive roles and far beyond what the American people were ever allowed to understand. Ellsberg writes, as follows:

When I did most of my working plans in '59, '60 and '61, ... I assumed that I was reading basically retaliatory plans ... The generals knew better. They knew that these plans were not at all for retaliation because, on the contrary, the Russians had no ability to strike first. So all these plans were really initiative plans, first-strike plans.
And, then, more concretely:

What I discovered, going back to Truman who made such threats in 1950, is that every term of every President has seen the serious recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of plans involving the initiation of nuclear warfare under certain circumstances. More significantly, at least four Presidents have secretly authorized advanced preparations for such first-use, or have actually threatened adversaries with U.S. first-use in an ongoing crisis.²

Ellsberg has documented these assertions thereby suggesting that political leaders in the United States have throughout the nuclear age failed to consult with or disclose the occasions on which the use of nuclear weapons was seriously contemplated. In this sense, the government's refusal to accept notions of public accountability in the nuclear domain has been consistent and bipartisan.

In one of the few attempts at a systematic discussion of the relevance of nuclear weapons to the constitutional processes of the United States. Michael Mandlebaum considers their impact largely as a matter of adding an "enormous responsibility" to the presidency and of producing an unavoidable increase in governmental "power".² Mandlebaum even hazards the view that "Perhaps the reason for delegating nuclear authority to the President is similar to the role that anthropologists have assigned to divine kingship: a means of coping with forces that seem beyond human powers of understanding and control". Of course, the view of "delegation" here is very strained, as the Congress, let alone the public at large, are ill-informed about the nature of presidential authority with regard to nuclear weapons. In a formal sense it is true that this grant of authority seems consistent with the underlying constitutional conception of the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Yet more substantively, the actuality of nuclear weaponry is such, with its requirement of constant readiness, as to defy the moral constitutional expectation that the President must have the unchallenged authority to make battlefield decisions in wartime, an authority conceived of as pertaining only to that special circumstance of emergency and national unity that is presumed to exist during a properly declared war. As is obvious, and will be discussed later in this essay, nuclear weapons by their very existence forever obliterates the occasion of "peace", thereby, in my judgment, depriving a democratic policy on one of its most essential preconditions. Even optimists about the capacity of the modern state to uphold democratic values generally concede that governing procedures for accountability by leaders and participation of citizens are substantially abridged in the context of "war". Thus, a permanent state of war, not by the nature of political will or the character of international antagonisms, but as a structural reflection of the nature of modern weaponry, casts a dark shadow across the very possibility of a democratic policy. Citizens of secondary nuclear and non-nuclear democracies, at least to the extent that their governments take part in the geopolitics of alignment, via alliance relations, have "delegated" this awesome authority over the deployment and use of nuclear weaponry to leaders of another state! Here, again, such a delegation may conform to the formal logic of constitutionalism, but it shreds the fabric of democratic substance seemingly beyond repair.

More substantively, this new grant of powers to a particular leader does entrust an awesome actual capability to a fallible, flawed human being or, at most, to a small, often hidden, inner group of advisors. Traditionally, divine right
prerogatives even if pathologically abused could only produce limited damage, although of a severe sort for a given time and place. Increasingly, the leadership of the main nuclear powers possesses a capacity for destruction commensurate with what traditional religions attributed to the divine, a capacity to cause in the fullest sense a global or human apocalypse. Authority and power to inflict such results by a single process of decision suggests the extent to which the citizenry is inevitably and permanently excluded from determinations that decisively shape societal destiny.

But it is not only the upholders of constitutional legitimacy that overlook the relevance of the nuclear weapons dimension. Sheldon Wolin, in an eloquent introductory editorial to his new journal of progressive opinion, pointedly titled Democracy, nowhere indicates that nuclear weapons may foreclose democratizing prospects in unsuspected, unacknowledged, and crucial respects. His emphasis is on "the steady transformation of America into an anti-democratic society" as a consequence of the increasingly authoritarian character "of the country's primary institutions". Similarly, Alan Wolfe in his excellent book, The Limits of Legitimacy, devoted to an assessment of anti-democratic pressures on the liberal state, neglects even to mention the relevance of nuclear weaponry. Both Wolin and Wolfe are fully aware, of course, that nuclear weapons are crucial political "facts" that are reshaping the modern state, but they interpret political reality on the basis of traditions of political thought, oblivious to the reality of nuclear weapons.

Perhaps, the failure to emphasize nuclear issues partly reflects an attitude that their relevance is so manifest as to be taken for granted or so "structured" into our world context as to be beyond the domain of practical politics, however radical their intention. In either event, I believe the failure to address the issue of nuclear relevance is an important omission for any serious reflections on the current democratic prospect.

André Glucksmann writes that "Everything subtle, profound, definitive and rigorous that has been said about nuclear weapons - which means not much - was said already a century before." By this provocative assertion, Glucksmann is arguing that antecedent acquiescence in "totalist thought" had completely vested in the state ample authority and modalities to subordinate ethics to considerations of state power - "The nascent order of reciprocal terror was a feature of Western culture long before the invention of nuclear weapons." And, of course, such an observation is pertinent. The moral ease, for instance, with which American decision-makers adopted atomic tactics in the 1939-45 war was definitely "facilitated" by belligerent policies already routinized, especially terror bombing of civilian centers of population. This striving for nuclear rectitude was, in a sense, reinforced by the Nuremberg Judgement that imposed criminal punishments upon "immoral" political behavior of the defeated leaders of Germany and Japan, but neglected "the wrongs" of the victorious powers.

Taking at face value Glucksmann's contention that the secular triumph of totalism ideology had already destroyed the moral foundations of state power long before Hiroshima, I find myself unable to go along with the postulate of continuity as a way of avoiding the need for specific analysis and commentary on the distinctive relevance of nuclearism. In this regard, I agree with the important recent assessments of nuclear relevance by E.F. Thompson and Robert Jay Lifton, as well as the earlier wide-ranging analysis of Karl Jaspers.
Thompson, in an indictment of left/Marxist thought for its failure to highlight the nuclear issue, analyzes the contemporary political situation beneath the overarching, trans-ideological category of "exterminism", that is, as underscored in his own title "The last stage of civilization". As is now widely known, Thompson's special concern is centered on the particular victimization of Europe as a potential "theater" of apocalypse in a struggle waged by the superpowers who, in effect, seek to maintain their homelands as "sanctuaries", that is, as "off-limits" in the event of a nuclear exchange. Thompson notes in passing that "a prior condition for the extermination of European peoples is the extermination of open democratic process". Underneath this assertion is the conviction that citizens would never knowingly give their assent to such a suicidal arrangement, and that therefore their rulers (not any longer mere leaders) must impair their access to knowledge and their rights to act on what they know. Repression at home, preferably by anodyne means designed to induce apathy, becomes a necessity of governance if security is to be premised, directly or indirectly, on the logic of exterminism. Again nuclearism and democracy collide in a specific, concrete manner.

In writing that probes the psychological and cultural significance of nuclear weaponry, Robert Lifton reaches conclusions startlingly similar to those of Thompson. As he puts his emphasis, the new capacity for totalist destruction "changes everything (fundamentally alters our ultimate and immediate relationships in ways...) and seems to change nothing (it is apparently ignored by much of the human race, which goes about business as usual)". Note that for Lifton, the element of continuity is maintained not by the antecedent terrorism of state power, as alleged by Glucksmann, but by the failure of most people, including leaders, to grasp the radical novelty of nuclear weaponry. This novelty centers upon the sheer magnitude of potential destruction, giving secular reality to what had previously been a largely symbolic reality associated with the apocalyptic premonitions of religious tradition.

As Lifton goes on to suggest, the special aura of urgency in the United States around atomic espionage issues during the 1950s, culminating in the incredible ritual of capital punishment enacted in response to "the crimes" of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, was associated with guarding the unprecedented power and with anxiety about the potential vulnerability created by nuclear weaponry. The full absurdity of the security pretext for internal repression became evident only two decades later when bomb designs were written up as undergraduate student exercises and do-it-yourself bomb-producing technology became the subject matter of monthly magazine articles. What is not absurd, however, is the governmental need to frighten its own citizenry into subservience by insisting that no one challenge the awesome authority of the government to engage fully and secretly in the apocalyptic end-game of exterminism. We note the recent reflex outburst by Ronald Reagan's National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, in reaction to the European grassroots movement against nuclear weaponry. In a rare post-1945 breakdown of Atlanticist decorum, Allen publicly castigated the emergent European mood, saying that "... outright pacifist sentiments are surfacing abroad. One recent incident of concern is the split in the British Labor Party. Right now the second largest party in Great Britain has adopted as part of its official platform the renunciation of nuclear weapons. We are even hearing, in other countries, the contemptible 'better red than dead' slogan of a generation ago". Allen's words lend substance to Lifton's fear of "the particularly dangerous radical right embrace of American nuclear weapons" that "might well lead one to seek nuclear Armageddon as a way of achieving total
purification”. The animus of the revival of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist hatred, the resumption of the Cold War and arms race, marks the current period as a peculiarly dangerous phase within the wider context of nuclearism. As such, we can expect an intensification of anti-democratic institutional initiatives. Such an expectation has been confirmed in the early months of the Reagan presidency by such steps as an upgrading of the CIA, a renewed stress on the linkage between national security and broad governmental prerogatives of official secrecy and surveillance procedures, an attack on the Freedom of Information Act, and an impending proposal to reinstate capital punishment in relation to the federal crime of espionage. A concrete instance of this attitude of sufferance toward the citizenry occurred on September 19, 1980 when a monkey wrench dropped in a Titan II silo located near Damascus, Arkansas producing a large explosion. Local residents were naturally anxious to discover whether large amounts of radiation had been released. Astonishingly, the Pentagon took the incredibly arrogant position that it would neither confirm nor deny the reports that a nuclear explosion had occurred, or that there was a fallout danger. And more astonishingly, the public generally acquiesced in this display of official arrogance. Incidents of this sort, inherently revealing, are also indicative of a process whereby the citizenry is thoroughly demoralized with respect to citizen rights and duties, being subjected to an experience of learned helplessness.

One scarcely-noticed dimension of nuclearism is the dubious legality of nuclear weapons. In fact, the entire edifice of the law of war rests upon the central prohibition of indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians and includes separate prohibitions for weapons that cause victims “unnecessary suffering” or disproportionate damage. It hardly requires a learned disquisition to comprehend the radical inconsistency between the minimum reading of the law of war and the insistence on national discretion to threaten and use nuclear weaponry. Such an inconsistency is peculiarly significant for democratic polities as their deepest pledge is to govern within a framework of law (a government of laws not men). Furthermore, all “mature democracies” insist that every political entity claiming sovereign rights accept the obligations of the international legal order, virtually as evidence of its intention to participate as a state in international life. The hue and cry directed at the Iranian governing authorities for their failure to uphold the immunity of American diplomats and embassy premises during the 1979-81 Teheran hostage crisis was based on the apparent rejection by the Khomeini leadership of this behavioral standard.

The claims of international law in the war/peace area are particularly strong in relation to the United States’ conception of political legitimacy. It was, after all, the United States that had taken the lead throughout the century to circumscribe sovereign discretion in relation to force and had after the 1939-45 War insisted on criminal liability for political leaders who commit war crimes.

Some apologists for nuclearism contend lamely that under international law the sovereign is permitted to do everything that has not been expressly prohibited. There is some basis for such a contention in relation to certain subject matter, but it hardly seems applicable to nuclear weaponry. In this setting law follows closely the minimum imperatives of morality; international law has since the 17th century been an uneasy blend of governmental consent for contrived rules and procedures and natural law postulate. In our time, conventional moral outrage is concentrated upon “terrorism”, the victimization of the innocent for the sake of ulterior political motives. It hardly takes a master moralist
To reach the conclusion that nuclear weaponry and strategy represents terrorist logic on the grandest scale imaginable, yet the popular discussion of terrorism usually exempts nuclear weapons despite the currency of such phrases as "the balance of terror". The point here is that law and morality converge to condemn nuclearism, an acknowledgment increasingly being made by religious and cultural leaders of independence and stature.

To suggest that nuclear weapons are illegal and immoral, and that leaders who threaten or contemplate their use are guilty of crimes of state, is to raise core questions about the legitimacy of any governance structure. Reliance on nuclear weapons is not just one of many governmental functions, it is in many ways the decision undertaking of national political leadership, one upon which almost everyone agrees, all else hinges. If that undertaking is perceived by a substantial fragment of the citizenry as a criminal enterprise then it will be impossible for political leaders to achieve legitimate authority. Deception, secrecy and coercion will become increasingly indispensable instruments of governance, not to handle anti-social deviants, but to prevent citizens of the highest moral authority from challenging the absolutism of the state. Criminal prosecutions of those who dare expose this state secret of illegitimacy disclose the inevitable dilemma of "democratic" governments that embrace nuclearism. Either the government ignores such protests and acts of resistance despite the loss of legitimacy or it prosecutes its clearest moral voices despite the loss of legitimacy. There is no way for a democratic political leadership to retain its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry for very long if a sustained campaign around the legal and moral status of nuclear weapons is mounted. Some overarching questions emerge. Can democratic forms retain even provisional vitality when their substance is so deeply perverted? Or do these forms become atrophied, rituals that disguise the passing of democracy from the scene? Can the nuclear question be kept cordoned off from the overall, routine administration of state power? Responses to these questions vary from country to country and depend on the consciousness of the citizenry and the perceptions of national leaders, as well as upon the tension level of international relations. In general the higher the tension level, the greater the anti-democratizing impact of the legitimacy dilemma arising from the existence of nuclear weaponry.

The focus on the United States is not meant to exempt the Soviet Union from scrutiny, but since the Soviet system seems procedurally anti-democratic in its essence it falls outside the strict scope of this inquiry. To the extent that the Soviet political leadership relies on nuclear weaponry a crucial dimension of authoritarian governance is added. By now, whatever may be said about its earlier ambivalence, the Soviet Union seems to be fully committed to a reliance on nuclear weapons as a means of upholding its interests. Because secrecy and public participation are so curtailed in the Soviet political system, there seems to be little opportunity for citizen opposition to nuclearism, while at the same time, reliance on nuclear weapons places formidable, rarely acknowledged constraints on the possibilities of democratizing reform taking hold within Soviet society.

Of course, I am not arguing that nuclear weapons nullify all democratizing impulses at the state level. It is certainly possible to alter government/citizenry relations in a democratizing direction despite a reliance, directly or indirectly, upon nuclear weapons. It is rather a matter of structural constraint that bears on the most essential issue of state power in a manner
that is anti-democratic in an extreme sense (here, democracy refers not only to the consent of the governed, but also to the idea of a government of laws, not men, which given shared human vulnerability has to include policies at the state level bearing on war/peace, resource use, and environmental protection).

The broad implications of this analysis are two-fold: the restoration of democratizing potential at the state level depends on the downgrading and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons as an element of international political life; secondly, normative opposition to nuclear weapons or doctrines inevitably draws into question the legitimacy of state power and is, therefore, more threatening to governmental process than a mere debate about the propriety of nuclear weapons as instruments of statecraft. The Machiavellian question is foremost: can a system of sovereign states ever manage to get rid of a decisive weapon by which an unscrupulous leader might impose his will? The course of international history strongly supports a negative reply. In effect, democracy, as a political framework, seems to be a permanent casualty of the nuclear age, although democratic forms as an increasingly empty shell, can persist, disfiguring for some time the actuality of their inner collapse. The trend toward authoritarian governance, although prompted mainly by other factors, may also be, in part, a consequence of the anti-democratic influences of totalist attitudes and capabilities operative even in non-nuclear states (often reinforced by way of alliance or acceptance of "a nuclear umbrella").

Of course, there is an apparent paradox present. The erosion of democracy by way of nuclearism is, at the same time as the European movement suggests, a stimulus to democracy. It may yet be possible for citizens to organize in such a way as to exert some measure of democratic control over nuclear weaponry short of achieving its total elimination. Advocacy of a no first use declaration and posture could provide a realistic goal for democratic movements seeking to restore balance in the relationship between government and citizenry and sanity to the quest for international security.

The future of democracy then is at one with two intertwined explorations: the possibility of a post-Machiavellian international political order and of a post-nuclear world. In central respects, safeguarding and restoring the democratic prospect for mature capitalist polities depends on a comprehensive world order solution. The beginning of such a solution may involve delegitimizing the state in the area of national security. For this reason the religious, medical and legal campaign against nuclearism seems of vital relevance to the very possibility of a democratic revival.

FOOTNOTES
2/ Nuclear Armament: An Interview, pamphlet of The Conservation Presss, undated.


6/ Same, p. 150; Simone Weil and Stanley Diamond push the argument back further, maintaining that the fundamentally coercive nature of the state has been the ground for all subsequent modes of official violence. For brief discussion of their views see Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), pp. 128-131.


11/ This danger is heightened by adoption of first-strike strategic thinking, by new weapons innovations, and by conflicts and instabilities that threaten hegemonic patterns of Western influence over resource-producing countries in the Persian Gulf and southern African regions.


13/ Typical of discussion is the assumption that international law currently imposes no restraints on the discretion of governments to use nuclear weapons. See for example Michael Mandlebaum, "International Stability and Nuclear Order: The First Nuclear Regime", in Gompert, cited note 1 at pp. 23-24, where such discretion is connected with the absence of express treaty restrictions and the general unenforceability of international law. For refutation see paper cited in note 14.

14/ For comprehensive treatment of this and related issues see Falk, Lee Meyrowitz, and Jack Sanderson, "Nuclear Weapons and International Law", (unpublished paper, date February 1981).

15/ See e.g. James W. Douglass, Lightning East to West (Portland, Oregon: Sunburst Press, 1980); see also Delhi Declaration on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (1978).

16/ The main focus of a book to be written jointly by Robert Jay Lifton and myself, bearing the tentative title Toward a Post-Nuclear World: An Exploration.
1. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY

1.1 Development and economic growth

Development is frequently considered an economic issue. Increase in GNP (Gross National Product); diversification of the economic structure; expansion of foreign trade are indeed elements and - in many cases - pre-requisites for development. However development is more than that. As many authors have defined, development is a continuous and self-sustained process of structural changes in the economy and in the society. In this sense, improvements in the quality of living and political participation of the masses are just as important for development as economic diversification and increased production. Consequently, development can also mean better educational and health standards, adequate housing for the population as well as political freedom, assuring more opportunities for popular participation in economic and political decisions.

1.2 The "perverse" development of Third World countries

According to this latter concept regarding development, it is hard to admit that Latin American countries are really developing. Even countries which present higher rates of economic growth - in some cases comparable to the rates of the industrialised countries - are not developing because in many cases statistical data does not reveal real income concentration and marginalization of large
portions of the population.

Several studies performed by United Nations' agencies, as for example, ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America) and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) reveal that, in the last decades, economic growth in Latin American countries was associated with income concentration, increasing dependence of national economies on foreign capital; accelerated expansion and penetration of transnational corporations; impoverishment of large sectors of population both in urban and rural areas.

These studies point out that such a contradictory process is due, mainly, to the particular type of expansion of capitalistic enterprises which is taking place in the continent. In fact, this capitalistic expansion - under the leadership of the transnational corporations and the support of authoritarian or "populist" political regimes - is very rapid, both in the cities and in the rural areas. As a consequence, medium-sized and small enterprises (agricultural, commercial and industrial) are substituted by large corporations. This substitution does not represent a larger (and less costly) production of wage goods but increased production of luxury goods, which only the small, privileged, upper-income strata can afford. It represents also drastic and very rapid changes in the technologies of production, causing premature depreciation of capital, foreign indebtedness and unemployment, since the new techniques introduce higher automation levels, and reduce labour demands.

In the rural areas the consequences of this substitution process are particularly serious. The accelerated growth of commercial farms causes the expulsion of indigenous and peasant populations from areas where these have long established a kind of family subsistence agriculture. This is the case in all of the Latin American countries, characteristically evident in the interior of Brazil. The expulsion of these populations (often with violence) from their traditional lands causes migration to the urban centers and to still 'undeveloped' territories. In the first case, this large migration causes serious social problems since the cities are not prepared to offer employment, housing, and urban facilities to
the migrants. The result is increased numbers of slums and shanty towns, urban criminality, prostitution, and marginality. In the second case, the migrants settle precariously in distant regions, where they re-create the same kind of traditional family subsistence agriculture. Soon they are discovered and expelled again by a new infiltration of commercial farms. For this reason the conclusion of FAO studies is that this kind of capitalistic expansion - often called "agricultural modernization" - destroys while re-creating traditional agriculture in Latin America.

Economic effects of this process of "perverse" agricultural development are very negative: agricultural productivity increases slowly, because the gains obtained by the modern commercial farms are offset by the deterioration of the subsistence farms; social expenditures must increase in order to alleviate the consequences of the impoverishment of the small farmers; food production does not increase in a pace compatible with population growth, because commercial farms are predominantly oriented towards export commodities; ecological equilibrium is often disrupted, since commercial farms usually adopt unfavourable and destructive methods of forest clearance.

Economic effects, however, are not the most severe. Peasant economies and peasant cultures are often totally destroyed with the expansion of commercial agriculture in these rural areas, frequently involving even violence and physical confrontation. Peasants are expelled without any recognition of their rights to the land and to the benefits of their labour in clearing virgin areas. This is the main reason why Catholic bishops and priests are becoming increasingly involved in conflicts with government authorities in Latin America. As a matter of fact, they are in many instances the only refuge and support the peasants have in their disputes with the large landowners.

2. JUSTICE IN VIEW OF CONTRADICTORY REALITIES

2.1 This brief description is sufficient to demonstrate that what happens presently in Latin America is not an integrated development, but rather a perverse and contradictory process of
economic growth.

2.2 From an ethical point of view, this process is evidently unjust, favouring the enrichment of few and the impoverishment of many. To sanction and solidify this reality, authoritarian regimes have developed and "invoked" the doctrine of National Security, thus being able to silence and, in many cases, totally eliminate undesirable political and ecclesiastical opposition.

2.3 This situation has its roots in a capitalistic economic system that fosters dependence. The actual policy of North-South economic relations maintains this contradictory and unjust situation. I wish to call to mind a few points regarding this relationship of inequality and violence against the Third World:

a) Divisiveness of International Labour Interests. Often transnationals are instruments of stripping the national economies, and industrial distribution policies turn the Third World into either a dumping ground for pollution or an open field for extracting riches.

b) Exploitation of dependent countries' raw materials exists along with the exploitation of its work force characterized by lamentable work conditions and unjust wages.

c) Political support is given to authoritarian governments in order to maintain a situation without possibility of change.

d) Support and development of the ideology of "communist" danger is evident where every and any economic change is seen to weaken the influence of the West and strengthen "communistic invasion". This ideology becomes the justification for repressive social and political pressure in the Third World; repression is exercised on central points of change such as land and agrarian reform, organization of worker movements, and their just demands.

3. THE TASK OF VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

The contribution of voluntary development agencies to the Latin American people should be considered in the framework of the
reality here briefly described.

As a general rule in more recent times, international development agencies have been giving financial and technical aid to projects which try to alleviate the severe effects of these economic and social modernization processes. There is no need to stress the importance of this policy orientation. However, an important question should be raised in relation to this policy: Are these projects capable of resolving the consequences of this "perverse" process of economic growth going on in Latin America?

As a matter of fact, international agencies - and especially, voluntary international agencies - do not possess sufficient financial resources to fund projects which could represent a real transformation in the situation of the poor in Latin America. Hundreds or even thousands of small projects aimed at providing better health facilities, technical assistance or credit to small farmers, or sewage and electricity to the several millions who live in the "favelas" will not change the situation substantially.

The only way to effectively solve the poverty problem is through structural changes in the economy of Latin American countries. In the context of this continent, structural changes mean: agrarian reform; reduction of the external dependence; wealth and income distribution by means of drastic tax reforms. These are, obviously, political issues. Needless to say, such structural reforms will not be granted graciously to the people by those who enjoy the privileges in the present situation. Only through political pressure, exerted by the poor, will it be possible to change the structures which create and re-create poverty in Latin America. The poor people, by the very fact of their condition, are not conscious of their rights and not prepared to transform them into clear political targets. This requires a level of consciousness and organization which they have not as yet reached. Therefore, the first priority for those sincerely engaged in eliminating poverty in Latin America should be to stimulate and improve methods of CONSCIENTIZATION and ORGANIZATION of the rural and urban masses.
4. PROJECT FOR CONSCIENTIZATION AND ORGANIZATION

In order to attain this dual objective of "conscientization" and "organization", two dimensions should be considered and integrated in the preparation of the "development projects" to be sponsored:

- Criteria for the selection of projects should give higher priority to projects directly related to training, research, and communication (press, radio, films, TV) provided they demonstrate their close connection with effective popular movements.

- In the framework of assistance policies oriented toward the elimination of poverty, individual projects should be considered as "pilot projects", aiming mainly at creating organizations of workers, peasants, poor people, women and minority groups, helping them to discover their basic dignity as human persons and awakening within them a new awareness of justice and participation.

- The first step of volunteer Agencies should be the consideration and examination of responsibilities in their own countries of origin. An indispensable criteria for action is universal pressure against the sources of economic injustices. All projects which promote solidarity with the worker movements and defense of worker rights in the Third World would become the objective for any service agency endeavour. On the same level, efforts to combat manipulated fears of communism among men with vested interests in the established economic system or among the simple people must also be criteria for services or projects that will be developed.

If voluntary development agencies adopt this policy orientation, the projects they sponsor will have a multiplying effect in the accumulation of pre-conditions for real social change. Otherwise, they will be limited to philanthropic goals that may be very justifiable on humanitarian terms, but which contribute more to the maintenance of the "status quo" than to a real change in an infra-human and unacceptable social situation.
Recent reports suggest that during Zimbabwe's first year of independence, remarkable successes in defusing political and racial tensions have been accompanied by increasing economic and financial difficulties. Important increases in incomes and a rising government budget deficit have led to rapidly growing consumer demand. During the first year of independence, the Zimbabwe economy achieved very impressive real growth rate of over 8%; however, the increase in total demand has been so large that growth in production is increasingly insufficient to satisfy it. As a result, inflationary pressures are building up and the foreign exchange reserves have declined quite rapidly, as imports rise much faster than exports.

Although there are many positive aspects in Zimbabwe's economic prospects (including the country's large potential in agriculture as well as the substantial credit and aid flows which the international community has committed to Zimbabwe), it seems of great priority that economic measures are taken soon to prevent large financial disequilibria developing.

As recent experiences have clearly shown (for example, in Jamaica, Portugal and Chile during the seventies), very large financial disequilibria are in fact particularly harmful in situations where a government is introducing important social and economic reforms which it hopes will lead the country to socialism. The great importance of correct financial policies during attempts at transition to socialism and the fact that it is precisely socialist governments, more than conservative ones, which need most to follow deliberate and often strict financial policies is very rarely recognised by economists and politicians on the Left. Neglect of finance has been particularly common during the initial stages of socialist revolutions throughout different countries; it was perhaps best summed up by Kristinskii, the first Soviet Comissar (Minister) of Finance, when in 1919 he said:

"Finance should not exist in a socialist community. I therefore apologise for speaking on the subject!"

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Surprisingly similar statements could be found in most attempts at building socialism. However, as past experiences have repeatedly shown, socialist governments particularly need an adequate financial policy so as to avoid too large an expansion of total demand, as this will inevitably lead to scarcities, high inflation and foreign exchange crisis. These have several particularly negative effects for a government attempting a transition to socialism. Very high levels of inflation will not only disrupt market links within the remaining private sector, but even more importantly will make an effective system of planning and control of the rapidly growing State sector very difficult, if not meaningless. Furthermore, as Chilean and Jamaican planners discovered in the seventies, (and Soviet planners had discovered in the early twenties) the innumerable problems and disruptions resulting from large financial disequilibría distract valuable time and effort from essential tasks, such as development of an effective planning apparatus. Too rapid an increase in total demand will also inevitably lead to large increases in imports: if this is not accompanied by export growth and/or net inflow of foreign credit, foreign exchange reserves will be exhausted (as occurred for example towards the end of Allende's Popular Unity Government in Chile and of Manley's government in Jamaica). When foreign exchange reserves are exhausted, it is difficult for any government to obtain additional external finance from private banks of international financial institutions; in such circumstances it will be practically impossible for a socialist government to obtain such finance, unless it accepts conditions incompatible with its socialist aims. It should therefore be a crucial target of economic policy of countries trying to carry out socialist changes to pursue or accumulate a prudent level of foreign exchange reserves, permitting thus a much larger degree of autonomy from foreign pressures and protecting the country from unexpected unfavourable changes in the international environment or net outflows of capital by those frightened of socialism. Large foreign exchange reserves obtained through prudent financial management are particularly crucial - even though specially hard to attain - in the difficult international conditions (of rising import costs and low growth of world trade) which will probably face most oil importing Third World countries during the eighties.

If financial disequilibría became very large, they may challenge the viability of the economy and of the socialist government. In such cases, they may become an important factor (or excuse) leading to the government's downfall either through elections or through violent counter-revolution. The defeat of Manley in Jamaica last year illustrates the former, while the military coup in 1973 in Chile tragically illustrates the latter case. Furthermore, both experiences suggest that very large financial disequilibría not only strengthened those social forces most strongly opposed to socialism but also strengthened those most committed to strict economic orthodoxy and "free market" economies.

A prudent financial policy is difficult to implement in a country attempting to introduce socialism. Often socialist governments take power when the economic situation is already rather critical (for example, when the Bolsheviks took power in 1917). Furthermore, the triumph of a socialist government or revolution raises tremendous pressures on the government to greatly increase real wages and salaries, to spend much more on housing,
education and health. The international or internal situation may require increases in defence spending. At the same time, it may often be difficult to increase taxes significantly, as the rich will inevitably be reluctant to finance a socialist government's increased expenditure. This was particularly clear in Chile, where the Congress - controlled by the opposition - rejected systematically most of President Allende's taxation initiatives. The large deficits in the Government Budget resulting from such trends will lead inevitably to very large increases in the money supply, with negative medium-term effects on inflation and balance of payments.

Though it is difficult, the task of defining adequate financial policies during the transition to socialism is by no means impossible. It requires in the first place that socialist theorists, who have to date concentrated mainly on a critique of the capitalist system or on the political aspects of the transition to socialism - such as the nature of the class struggle - devote more of their time and effort to the study of short-term economic management for countries trying to pursue socialist policies. The study of past experiences - both of successes and failures - should provide very valuable insight, even though obviously they cannot be mechanically applied in different contexts. Perhaps even more important than this academic or theoretical pursuit is a thorough discussion within socialist parties of these issues, both when socialists are in office and before they gain power. A point which needs to be clarified at grass-roots level is that even under socialism, there are real constraints to economic growth; as a consequence, it is necessary to decide the increase in incomes which different groups and sectors can receive without leading via excessive demand to financial crisis. Although there may be idle spare capacity in industry and unemployment of the work-force at the time when the socialist government takes over power, it is necessary to clarify the extent to which production can rise if these resources are fully used. What are the bottlenecks in the economy which will inhibit their full use? What are the additional problems - of management and planning - which recently nationalised enterprises may face in the short term and which may further limit production increases? These questions traditionally receive insufficient attention by parties on the Left, particularly during the initial enthusiastic stages of a revolution, when so many of their followers over-estimate the short-term economic potential of socialist transformations and implicitly believe that financial problems tend to disappear as structural reforms are carried out.

At a more concrete level, it seems essential to discuss - even before elections which may result in a socialist victory - necessary measures to avoid aggregate demand reaching levels far above potential supply. The definition of an incomes policy seems crucial, such that will not only guarantee income increases mainly to those who are least well paid, but which will also establish limits to the general level of wages and salary growth, consistent with the existing constraints.

Simultaneously, taxation measures need to be defined which will reduce the purchasing power of the richer groups. If there is opposition to higher taxes in Parliament (as occurred in Allende's Chile and may even occur in Mitterand's France), alternative measures to reduce the income of the richer groups must be found so as to finance higher levels of incomes for the poorer groups as well as higher welfare spending.
The problems of defining correct financial policies in transition to socialism pose an important challenge to socialists not only in the Third World, but also in the industrialised countries. Today, they are of great relevance in France; tomorrow, they may be of crucial importance in Britain. Even if a socialist government in Britain took over power after the present shock of monetarist policies, and would therefore find an economy with ample idle resources, the dichotomy between an explosion of expectations and the significant - but clearly limited - possibilities of increased production would still be a very important one.

As we saw, in 1919 the Soviet Commissar for Finance apologised for speaking on finance, as it should not exist in a socialist community. One hopes that in future experiences of transition to socialism, economists in the Ministries of Finance, Central Banks and trade union organisations, will be too busy with the complex task of designing imaginative and feasible financial policies - functional to the survival and success of their government - to have the time or the willingness to apologise for their work.

STRATEGIES ALTERNATIVES DE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA REGION MEDITERRANEENNE - RELATIONS ENTRE LES STRATEGIES NATIONALES, REGIONALES ET MONDIALES

UN PROGRAMME DE RECHERCHES DE L'UNITAR

Ce programme, financé par le Département de la coopération pour le développement de la République Italienne, fait partie de l'ensemble des programmes de l'UNITAR pour l'Afrique, ensemble intitulé Stratégies pour le Futur de l'Afrique, dont le siège est à Dakar sous la direction de Samir Amin, également coordinateur de ce programme particulier.

1. Couverture du projet, champ des recherches, durée.

1.1 Le Programme couvre l'ensemble de la région méditerranéenne lato sensu. S'agissant d'un programme de réflexion sur les stratégies du développement et de la coopération économique et sociale, et non d'un programme technique portant sur la Méditerranée en tant que mer, il couvrira au Nord les pays suivants: Espagne, Portugal, France, Italie, Yougoslavie, Albanie, Grèce, Turquie, Malte et Chypre; au Sud, l'ensemble des pays arabes, y compris ceux non riverains de la Méditerranée, la coupure du groupe arabe selon que ses composants ont ou non une façade sur cette mer n'ayant aucun sens économique et politique.

Il a pour objet d'examiner les relations (de cohérence ou d'incohérence) entre les différentes stratégies nationales en cours ou qui pourraient être considérées dans la perspective d'une coopération approfondie en vue du développement de l'ensemble de la région.

Bien entendu, les pays de la région ne sont pas isolés du reste du monde et
entretiennent des relations avec d'autres partenaires que ceux de la région. Par exemple, certains pays d'Europe ont opté pour la Communauté Européenne; la Yougoslavie et les pays arabes font partie du groupe des Non alignés et du Tiers Monde (les "77" aux Nations Unies); les États arabes ont opté en principe pour une intégration arabe prioritaire etc... À l'exception de l'Albanie, tous les pays de la région sont largement ouverts sur la division mondiale du travail, indépendamment de leurs options sociales (libérales ou socialistes), et entretiennent des relations avec toutes les régions du monde industrialisé de l'Ouest et de l'Est. De surcroît, les pays européens de la région ont, par le biais de la CEE, des relations particulières avec certains groupes du Tiers Monde, notamment les ACP (dont 4 pays arabes), tandis que les États de la Ligue arabe et ceux de l'O.U.A. (dont sont membres 9 pays arabes d'Afrique) donnent à la coopération afro-arabe une place particulière dans le cadre de la coopération générale Sud-Sud.

Dans ces conditions, il est nécessaire d'examiner non seulement les politiques nationales, mais également celles des régions et groupement considérés, comme aussi les tendances et options qui se posent au niveau global. Le souci de privilégier une coopération méditerranéenne éventuelle ne doit pas faire négliger les autres contraintes qui pèsent sur les pays de la région. Il ne s'agit pas, bien entendu, d'opposer un "bloc méditerranéen" éventuel au reste du monde, ce qui ne correspond au souhait de personne, ni à aucune force réelle.

Ce programme est conçu dans une perspective qui privilégie l'objectif du développement de ceux des pays de la région qui sont des pays du Tiers Monde. Certes, il s'agit d'un programme de coopération méditerranéenne en vue du développement de l'ensemble de la région, rives Nord et Sud. Néanmoins les objectifs de l'affermissement de l'autonomie (non autarcique bien entendu) nationale et globale arabe doivent être considérés dès le départ comme essentiels à la perspective. D'ailleurs ne peut-on pas considérer que cet objectif d'un meilleur développement autocentré des pays du Tiers Monde, pris individuellement et collectivement, loin d'être un objectif hostile au développement global de la planète, est peut-être l'un des éléments essentiels d'un autre développement, pour les pays industrialisés comme pour ceux qui le sont moins? La crise contemporaine pose ces questions, tant au plan des orientations internes du développement national qu'à celui du système mondial. Si l'objectif d'un monde polycentrique est souhaitable, une plus grande autonomie globale des pays de la région, au Nord et au Sud de la Méditerranée vis-à-vis des Puissances dominantes plus fortes économiquement et militairement, n'est-elle pas possible, et même nécessaire à la réalisation de cet objectif?

Cette perspective est la raison d'être même de ce programme, en sa qualité de programme associé, intégré dans l'ensemble des programmes "Stratégies pour le Futur de l'Afrique". Evidemment, en choisissant de retenir la coopération méditerranéenne on a accepté implicitement l'idée que cette coopération peut être cohérente avec la priorité des objectifs nationaux et populaires arabes.

1/ Coordinateur du programme, Samir Amin, B.P. 3501, Dakar, Sénégal
2/ Cf. Dossier FIPAD
1.2. Ce programme de recherches est conçu dans un esprit de collaboration académique entre les groupes de chercheurs intéressés. Le programme envisage de réunir dans les différents groupes de travail qui restent à définir 60 à 80 chercheurs de la région méditerranéenne, en veillant à ce que la proportion de moitié pour le Nord et moitié pour le Sud soit respectée et que chaque groupe soit transméditerranéen. Les groupes poursuivront leurs recherches en commun aussi longtemps qu'il leur paraîtra nécessaire. Le programme devra néanmoins être pensé sur la base d'un horizon de 2 à 3 ans. Certains groupes pourraient être constitués pour des périodes plus brèves, se recomposant au gré de l'évolution de la recherche d'ensemble. Ainsi donc un maximum de flexibilité doit être assuré.

Le programme se déroulera sur deux phases. Au cours de la première phase de 12 mois, des groupes de recherches seront constitués en vue de la préparation d'un colloque qui examinera collectivement les résultats de cette étape préliminaire et les suggestions de travail. Ce sont ces suggestions qui constitueront le programme de la seconde phase, postérieure au colloque, au cours de laquelle les travaux approfondis conduits dans le cadre des différents groupes feront l'objet de débats au sein de réunions restreintes d'ateliers. La durée prévue pour la seconde phase devrait être assez longue pour permettre un plein épanouissement du programme, bien que si des engagements moraux de financement couvrant 3 ou 4 ans peuvent être obtenus, les crédits ne seraient débloqués que sur une base annuelle, selon la coutume.

L'ampleur de la recherche implique un rassemblement pluridisciplinaire; même si l'accent est mis sur les problèmes et les options économiques de développement.

2. Quelques observations sur la problématique de la recherche

2.1. Les pays de la région méditerranéenne partagent un fonds commun historique que nul n'ignore. Sans tomber dans le discours culturaliste rappelant la place de la région dans la civilisation universelle et singulièrement celle des mondes euro-chrétiens et arabo-islamique, il n'est peut-être pas inutile de considérer dans l'histoire proche des éléments qui ont pu façonner des singularités de la région par rapport à d'autres.

On pourrait, à titre illustratif, considérer dans cette optique les thèmes suivants:

a) La singularité des constructions étatiques de la région permet-elle de parler d'un "modèle" de "l'État méditerranéen", et de sa politique, par contraste avec "l'État du Nord" ou l'État d'autres régions du Tiers-Monde? Ou bien la division, même si elle est récente, entre une Méditerranée Nord européenne et relativement développée et une Méditerranée Sud façonnée par la domination coloniale et semi-coloniale moderne, "sous-développée", a gommé une tradition commune éventuelle?

Sans doute, dans un passé lointain, l'hellénisme, l'empire romain puis le christianisme, ont-ils unifié jusqu'à un certain point des civilisations dont certaines comptent parmi les plus anciennes du monde. Qu'en reste-t-il? La division Europe chrétienne-Asie et Afrique musulmanes, le partage de l'Europe du Sud entre Rome et Byzance, l'unification ottomane ont-ils brisé cet héritage à jamais? Ou plus réellement c'est le démarrage du capitalisme en Europe qui a créé le fossé qui n'a cessé ensuite de se creuser pendant quatre siècles?
Toujours est-il que, aujourd'hui encore, des traits communs paraissent caractériser l'État et la vie politique dans l'ensemble de la région: classes dirigeantes fonctionnant plus comme des oligarques que des bourgeoisie, rapports de clans, clientèles et parentés se substituant aux systèmes de carrières etc... Ces caractères, que l'on peut qualifier rapidement de "sous-développés", sont-ils propres à la région, à des degrés divers, ou se retrouvent-ils ailleurs, précisément partout où le développement capitaliste moderne est encore peu avancé? Proviennent-ils d'un fonds commun: d'une formation sociale qui, de la fin de l'Empire romain à la Renaissance Européenne, sur les deux rives de la Méditerranée, dans ses formes italiennes ibérique, byzantine, arabe et ottomane, s'est démarqué du féodalisme? On a parlé ici d'une "féodalité"de dignitaires et de marchands, par opposition à la féodalité des seigneurs ruraux du Nord. La place relativement importante des rapports marchands dans la vie économique, dans l'idéologie et dans l'organisation politique - l'importance urbaine - caractérise-t-elle la région et a-t-elle laissé des marques encore actives?

b) La singularité des formations sociales de la région permet-elle là aussi de parler du modèle de "société méditerranéenne". À l'époque moderne en tout cas la prédominance de la composante agraire dans l'ensemble des classes dominantes modernisées est un fait général. Fait de sous-développement sans doute, mais dont les formes spécifiques puissent aux racines profondes de l'histoire.

L'objet de cette recherche n'est certainement pas de répondre à ces questions d'histoire, et encore moins de verser dans un quelconque historicisme. Car il reste que - c'est là au moins une hypothèse de travail - la transformation de ces formations au cours du dernier siècle a accentué des destinées divergentes. Au Nord, avec plus ou moins de retard, on est progressivement entré dans l'ère industrielle capitaliste. Au Sud, la colonisation a brisé les tentatives de renaissance autonome et a périphériisé les sociétés. L'un des thèmes de la recherche pourrait être précisément d'examiner - pour les opposer si cela est correct - les modèles divergents de la modernisation de type central de l'Italie et de l'Espagne (et aussi de la Yougoslavie, de la Grèce et du Portugal) et de celle de type périphérique des pays arabes.

2.2 Le caractère globalement moins avancé de la région à l'époque moderne et contemporaine (par rapport à l'Europe du Nord ou à l'Amérique du Nord) a légué des problèmes auxquels tous les pays de la région se heurtent aujourd'hui, notamment: (a) les formes spécifiques de l'exploitation de la force de travail et, (b) le problème alimentaire.

Ces deux sujets pourraient également constituer des thèmes de recherche trans-méditerranéens. Suggérons ici:

a) En ce qui concerne les forces de travail:

On a remarqué la place que l'émigration occupe ou a occupé dans l'histoire récente de presque tous les pays de la région. Mais ce fait commun n'évolue-t-il pas de manière divergente aujourd'hui?

Au Nord de la Méditerranée, l'émigration externe tend à se réduire, du moins avec l'accélération de la croissance (en Italie et en Espagne). Se substitue à celle-ci un nouveau mode "d'emploi" local, où le travailleur est partiellement ouvrier (parfois encore à l'extérieur) paysan et fournisseur de services (tourisme). Ce fait est-il en relation avec la division internationale du
travail européenne? Témoigne-t-il d'une place relativement subalterne de l'Europe du Sud, où les formes de la domination formelle du capital ont encore une place importante? Est-il porteur de phénomènes politiques propres, comme le "populisme"?

Au Sud, l'émigration vers l'extérieur ou vers les villes locales procède d'un modèle plus classique de développement périphérique, dans lequel l'écart villes-campagnes se creuserait. S'y ajoute à l'époque récente la grande migration intra-arabe.

Peut-on donc rattacher ces formes différentes de la force de travail dans les deux sous-régions à des places différentes que celles-ci occupent dans la division internationale du travail?

b) En ce qui concerne le problème alimentaire:

Le déficit alimentaire est le produit récent d'une évolution divergente entre l'agriculture et l'urbanisation. Cette évolution affecte tragiquement la région arabe. L'Europe du Sud, en se pliant aux perspectives de la division européenne du travail, tant au sein de l'agriculture (renonciation à l'agriculture de céréales, de viande et de lait et accent sur l'agriculture de légumes et fruits exportés vers le Nord) que d'une manière plus globale, a répondu à ce problème d'une manière spécifique. Le monde arabe doit-il en faire autant, ou au contraire valoriser, dans le cadre d'une perspective d'autonomie alimentaire, son potentiel agricole? Et par quels moyens: l'appel à l'agribusiness et à ses techniques, l'encadrement étatiste-coopérativiste de la petite paysannerie, ou le contrôle des paysans sur certaines industries conçues pour servir le développement rural?

2.3 Des éléments nouveaux opèrent, produits de l'évolution mondiale, pour transformer (dans la même direction ou dans des directions divergentes) les économies du Nord et du Sud de la Méditerranée.

On pourrait signaler, parmi les effets de ces évolutions nouvelles et les problèmes qu'elles posent, les questions suivantes:

a) La question de l'énergie vient évidemment en tête de liste. L'Europe est, comme on le sait, dépendante à l'extrême dans ce domaine, particulièrement à l'égard du Golfe et de l'Afrique du Nord. De plus, cette dépendance est renforcée par la place que les pétrodollars occupent dans le système financier européen et par la champ privilégié qu'offre le développement industriel des pays pétroliers aux placements de capitaux européens et aux exportations de technologie.

b) La question de la construction européenne et des conflits d'intérêts au sein de l'Europe, notamment dans le domaine de la politique agricole commune. Cette question rejoint celle des effets de l'élargissement de la CEE à la Grèce, à l'Espagne et au Portugal, puisque cet élargissement remet en cause les avantages consentis aux pays arabes associés, notamment maghrébins dont l'agriculture d'exportation est concurrente de celle des pays européens mentionnés.

c) La question de la coopération afro-arabe, dont l'ampleur se voit considérablement renforcée par les moyens financiers des membres de l'OPEP. Le problème est de savoir si cette coopération s'inscrit dans la poursuite de la tradition des relations Nord-Sud, dont elle renforcerait les moyens, ou si elle amorce, ou pourrait amorcer, un type nouveau de relations Sud-Sud conçues dans la perspective de l'autonomie collective ("collective self-reliance").
d) La question des objectifs stratégiques des transnationales (européennes et autres) et de leurs plans, dans la crise actuelle, de relocalisations éventuelles. Le problème exige un examen détaillé par branche notamment pour (i) le pétrole et la pétrochimie, (ii) la chimie, (iii) la sidérurgie, (iv) les industries de l'agribusiness, (v) les industries légères de main d'oeuvre, (vi) le tourisme. Pour chacune de ces branches, quelle place chacune des deux sous-régions méditerranéenne, européenne et arabe, occupe-t-elle dans la DIT, en fonction des différents scénarios d'évolution globale, régionale et locale?

Chacune de ces questions devrait normalement constituer l'objet d'une recherche appropriée d'un groupe transméditerranéen.

2.4 Comme on le voit par l'énoncé même des questions précédentes, beaucoup des réponses aux problèmes auxquels les sociétés méditerranéennes sont confrontées dépendent d'évolutions globales. C'est-à-dire que l'on ne saurait étudier de la problématique de la région la question de la politique des puissances à l'égard de la Méditerranée. Car il y a longtemps que la Méditerranée a cessé d'être controllée par des Méditerranéens: après le mare nostrum romain, l'hégémonie arabe, puis celle des villes italiennes, est venue l'ère de la Méditerranée britannique (Gibraltar, Malte et Suez) aux XIXème siècle, à laquelle a succédé, après le temps des conflits 1914-1945 (le conflit germano-britannique), l'ère de la Méditerranée américaine peut être remise en cause par l'apparition dans la région d'autres puissances importantes.

Bien que la recherche envisagée ne porte pas sur la géopolitique méditerranéenne et les politiques des puissances, il est évident que l'impact de celles-ci sur les développements régionaux et nationaux ne saurait être effacé.

2.5 Une appréciation critique des réponses nationales et régionales en cours ou envisagées aux défis de notre époque s'impose donc. Parmi ces réponses on signalera trois ensembles de problèmes:

a) Les problèmes de l'association économique de certains pays arabes à la CEE. L'association en question répond-elle aux exigences d'une stratégie de développement convenable pour les pays du Sud? Est-elle seulement un héritage des structures façonnées par la colonisation, notamment française, au Maghreb?

b) Les problèmes du "dialogue euro-arabe" et du "trilogue euro-arabo-africain". Quels sont les enjeux de ces échanges de vue et des négociations éventuelles qui pourraient en découler? Comment s'inscrivent ces enjeux dans les stratégies globales de l'Europe vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis, du Japon, de l'URSS d'une part, du monde arabe dans le cadre global du non alignement et de la stratégie des 77 d'autre part?

c) Les problèmes des réponses nationales à la crise. La crise représente en effet un défi immédiat qui appelle parfois des réactions contraires à des options à plus long terme. On sait qu'en 1929 la crise a entraîné, notamment en Europe du Sud, des replis nationalistes semi-autarcistes puis le ralentissement aux uns et aux autres dans le conflit des puissances de l'époque. L'intégration internationale, infiniment plus profonde aujourd'hui, interdirait-elle des réactions analogues? L'Europe de la CEE résistera-t-elle à la crise? En 1929 les pays arabes, alors colonisés ou semi-coloniaux, n'étaient pas en situation de formuler leurs propres politiques de réponse à la crise. Le sont-ils aujourd'hui? Et comment réagissent-ils en fait ou pourraient-ils réagir?
2.6 L'objet de la recherche n'est certainement pas de formuler des recommandations aux États de la région, mais seulement d'analyser les conséquences des différentes options possibles. Il reste que ces options globales doivent être explicitées pour les uns et les autres.

La région dans son ensemble, avons-nous dit, se situe dans une gamme de positions moyennes au plan de la division internationale du travail : les pays européens méditerranéens dans la gamme moyenne haute, celle de pays industrialisés tardivement ; les pays arabes, dans une différenciation très forte, dans la gamme moyenne, celle des pays du Tiers Monde semi-industrialisés.

La question est donc : ces pays ont-ils intérêt à se rapprocher en se faisant des concessions mutuelles et en s'octroyant des positions privilégiées, pour constituer un ensemble plus fort collectivement vis-à-vis d'autres ensembles ? Poser la question dans ces termes c'est aborder évidemment la question des préoccupations réelles prioritaires notamment de l'Europe. L'Europe se préoccupe-t-elle avant tout de sa compétitivité avec ses concurrents industrialisés, les États-Unis et le Japon ? Dans ce cas, elle serait tentée d'envisager ses relations avec le monde arabe et l'Afrique exclusivement comme un moyen de renforcer cette compétitivité, fut-ce au détriment d'un développement mieux équilibré en faveur du Sud. Si une autre stratégie est possible - souhaitable ? - fut-ce précisément au détriment de cette compétitivité, quel pourraient en être les axes principaux ? Le "non-alignement" arabo-africain et plus généralement du Sud, non alignement de faibles au plan économique, peut-il être renforcé par un "non-alignement" à sa manière de l'Europe ?

3. Les modalités de mise en œuvre du programme

3.1 Ce programme de recherches sera conduit comme un programme associé du projet UNITAR "Stratégies pour le Futur de l'Afrique". Il bénéficiera, comme programme associé, de l'autonomie financière, ayant son budget propre.

3.2 Le programme implique la collaboration de chercheurs et centres de recherches tant européens qu'arabes et africains. Les thèmes de travail des différents groupes, qui ressortent d'ailleurs des paragraphes précédents, seront définis de manière à impliquer la constitution de groupes transméditerranéens. Certains sujets appellent la constitution de groupes afro-arabes (par exemple le thème de la coopération afro-arabe). D'autres, nécessaires à l'intelligence d'ensemble de la recherche, n'impliquent logiquement que la constitution de groupes européens (comme par exemple l'analyse des réponses nationales à la crise d'un pays méditerranéen européen, ou l'analyse des rapports Nord-Sud au sein de la CEE). Le soutien de la Coopération italienne étant destiné à l'aide aux pays "en voie de développement", les études de ce genre ne seront pas financées par le programme. Elles sont néanmoins utiles, et cela constitue un motif supplémentaire pour une recherche active de coopération.

La liste des centres de recherches et des chercheurs qui seront invités à s'associer au programme sera déterminée ultérieurement, lorsque les milieux intéressés auront été systématiquement sondés.
NATIVE AMERICANS' STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

an Inter Press Service Feature
by Mario de Cautin

Some 600 million people inhabit the American continents. Thirty million of them are native to this land, survivors of what has been characterised as 'the worst genocide in human history'.

There are few detailed statistics concerning the problems of native peoples in the Americas. Some Latin American countries proudly proclaim their racially mixed heritage but for the most part, there is a general reticence when it comes to racial minorities.

To discuss the situation and needs of indigenous people would open the subject of their annihilation and the expropriation of their lands, not to mention contemporary racial discrimination and cultural subjugation.

It would also be difficult to do more than estimate the native population of four and a half centuries ago, when the European conquerors began to arrive.

The Europeans came first to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, later to South America and finally to North America.

Archeologists today are astounded by the accomplishments of, for example, the Maya people of Southern Mexico and Northern Central America in the fields of architecture, mathematics, astronomy, irrigation, etc.

In what is now the valley of Mexico, home of one of the largest metropolises of the modern world, the Aztec people lived before Columbus came. They maintained a high order of social organisation and were masters of metal working, jewelry and trade.

The Inca civilisation of what is now the countries of Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and part of Chile built 5,000 kilometres (about 3,000 miles) of highways seven metres wide which were better and longer-lasting than those built in Europe a century later.

During the conquest and colonisation of America, native people were hung as 'heretics', worked in Mexican and South American silver mines until they died, and in North America they were simply massacred in large numbers and steadily backed into the most remote and often least desirable land.

But virulent European diseases, to which the native Americans had no immunity and for which they had no medicine, took the largest toll.

There were at least 13 million native Americans in what is now the United States and Canada when the white man came. Now there are about a million left in the United States and 175,000 in Canada.

The Mapuche people of Chile were never fully conquered, although they are now beginning to mix with the European descendants. Of the over one million native people in Chile, there are some 450,000 left.
In Brazil, native people today are legally considered as 'minors', and they can take no part in legal or contractual proceedings without being represented by a government-approved counsel.

Four centuries ago, there were at least a million native people in Brazil, today there are scarcely 150,000, most of them hidden deep in the Amazon.

The United Nations Human Rights Commission in 1979 admonished Brazil for the frequent massacres of indigenous people carried out by plantation owners' private armies and government forces.

In the past the usual reasons for killing the natives were gold, silver and fertile land. Now most of the gold and silver is gone, but on reservations set aside for indigenous people, if the land is fertile it must be fought for.

Today, uranium, oil, copper and lumber are frequently the background of clashes between native people and business or state interests.

The seventh US cavalry massacred almost a whole tribe of Sioux people at Wounded Knee, South Dakota in 1890. Gold was at stake then. In 1980, the US army returned to Wounded Knee, again to attack the Sioux people, this time over uranium in South Dakota's Black Hills.

The Auca people of the Ecuadorean Amazon area were forced off their land when a Texaco-Gulf consortium discovered oil there. The land of the Campa people in the Peruvian Amazon is now being sold off in lots to European descendants, after the Campas were chased away.

When gold and tin were discovered in the Uraricaa valley, on the border between Venezuela and Brazil, the Yanomami people began to die from bubonic plague and food poisoning, both, say investigators, the result of chemicals sprayed from helicopters by the white men.

Of the 15,000 Nambiquara people living in the Brazilian Mato Grosso forests at the turn of the century, only 200 survive today. Reports in the 1960's indicated that 'someone' had dropped candy bars from planes into Nambiquara lands. Once the native people had decided the candy was safe to eat, the planes began to drop poisoned candy bars to them.

Quiche Maya people went to Mexico last year to testify at the Bertrand Russell Tribunal, where they would only appear with their faces covered. The jails of neighbouring Guatemala, where they live are filled with Quiches, they explained.

Sixty per cent of Guatemala's population are indigenous people.

According to the Quiches' testimony, the Guatemalan army has begun regularly to raid their communities 'in search of guerrillas'. The real reason, the Quiche people say, is that they live on top of the largest oil deposit in Central America. Since its discovery, the Quiches have been interminably harassed, they testified.

In Bolivia, where 3.3 million Quechua and Aymara people make up 60 per cent of the population, tin is the backbone of the nation's economy, and almost all the miners are indigenous people. The mines are the focus of civilian opposition to the military government and consequently the focus of government repression.
The Ayamara and Quechua people live high in the mountains, and the mines are at a high altitude as well. A frequent punishment for native people who have transgressed the white man's law is banishment to the tropical lowlands of Eastern Bolivia.

Physically unaccustomed to living in the lowlands, the highland people contract pneumonia and other respiratory ailments, often dying in that unfamiliar land.

But there are still 30 million native people in the western hemisphere, five per cent of the population. In five Latin American countries, they are the majority: Guatemala, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Ecuador.

In Mexico there are some seven million Nahuatls (descendants of the Aztecs), Mayas, Otomies, Zapotecs, Mixtecs, Tzoltziles and other native peoples. In Venezuela, a million. In Honduras, over 350,000, and an undetermined number in other Central American countries. In Argentina, there are a few indigenous people in the North and East. In Uruguay, the indigenous people were either wiped out or assimilated into the mainstream society.

But this genocide was not carried out without cost to the dominant culture. The revolts led by Lautaro (Mapuche), Caupolican (Araucanian), Tupac Amaru (Inca), Cuauhtemoc (Aztec), Hatuey, Sitting Bull, Geronimo and Red Cloud from the United States plains region, Wovoka, Cajeme and countless others are a symbol of native Americans' continuing resistance.

As the Russel Tribunal said in its final statement, 'the Indians of America confront the machinery of economic exploitation and cultural castration with the civilising message of an ancient, unvanquished people'.

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**Depo-Provera**

- Depo-Provera is a contraceptive injection. It is given to thousands of women all over the Third World.
- Yet it is not considered safe enough for general use in Britain or the United States of America. Why are there such double standards?
- The Campaign Against Depo-Provera's booklet gives detailed evidence of the drug's abuse by governments, drug companies and the international family planning agencies.
- The booklet sets out the grim health hazards of the injection - risks of cancer, danger to the children of women taking the drug, alarming side-effects. Women who receive the drug can suffer from heavy and unpredictable menstrual bleeding, rapid weight gain, headaches, depression, hair loss.
- Monkeys given Depo-Provera developed cancer of the womb, beagle dogs developed cancerous breast tumours, and these animal experiments suggest that the drug interferes with the body's natural mechanisms for fighting all kinds of infection. Yet all this evidence has been largely ignored or dismissed, and the injection is given to healthy women with the aim of controlling population growth.
- The Campaign Against Depo-Provera argues for a world-wide ban on this contraceptive and accuses the International family planning agencies of racist double standards in encouraging the use of this hazardous injection.

- Depo-Provera: a report by the Campaign Against Depo-Provera.
  from: Campaign Against Depo-Provera, 374 Gray's Inn Road, London W.C.1. U.K.
Lokayan is a project on democratic and decentralized development, sponsored by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies. Carried out in collaboration with a large network of concerned intellectuals, activists and opinion-makers, it is a response to the human situation facing us in the 1980's.

This situation arises out of (a) a development and planning process that has increased poverty and injustice and rendered millions of human beings destitute, (b) a model of science and technology that has undermined the autonomy and dignity of diverse peoples, their sources of sustenance and their traditions of mutual help and self-reliance, (c) a political process that has centralised power, undermined democratic institutions, devalued public standards, and made the state an instrument of personal and private interests, superpower penetration and militarization of major regions of the world.

Against these powerful structural and cultural forces which threaten to undermine democratic institutions there are also some rather far-reaching developments of a positive kind at work which need to be identified, strengthened and consolidated. Among these are (a) a far-reaching process of mass awakening, challenging age-old hegemonies and asserting democratic rights of the people, (b) a process of social and political consciousness among some sections of the educated classes who are willing to question earlier assumptions about development and technology, are engaged in a variety of experiments, and are willing to join with the underprivileged in their battle against vested interests, and (c) a widespread feeling (including among sections of political parties and the administration) that the existing state apparatus has become an obstacle and that there is need to draw upon a wide array of activists outside the usual political and governmental framework - in voluntary institutions, in new experiments at the grass-roots and in local and regional movements for social transformation and dignity.

Lokayan is based on the belief that a new movement for change can be built by drawing upon the latter set of forces. It seeks to do this by engaging the various elements identified above - concerned intellectuals, grass-roots activists and men and women of talent and experience drawn from diverse fields - in a series of dialogues in various regional contexts as well as across regions on major issue areas.

Lokayan also organises national colloquia, held with a view to bringing together activists, concerned professionals and experts on a common platform to discuss certain national issues and in particular those that affect the oppressed and peripheral segments of society. The assumption is that so many micro-movements to which the action groups are drawn are a response to a larger malaise and provide the rudiments of an alternative model of development. There is a need to articulate these various responses into a consolidated and systematic critique of the established models and a frame of action.

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1/ Exchange Building, 13 Alipur Road, Delhi 110054, India
towards an alternative.

*Lokayan* has a small research wing which engages in dialogues with a cross-section of the Indian people in various regions and tries to bring their thinking, values and aspirations at the centre of our educational, economic and political institutions.

In order to facilitate this larger political process, *Lokayan* puts out and circulates as widely as possible the results of all these activities, as well as critiques thereof, so that gradually there emerges a new ideological crystallization that provides a basis for action at various levels and in various fields.

Finally, and this follows all that is said above, *Lokayan* seeks to contribute to ending the isolation and fragmentation that divides the various movements for change and to foster cohesion and unity in the ranks of those who would like to act together but are, for various reasons, unable to do so.

Along these various lines, *Lokayan*, which started its various activities in mid-1980, has organised a series of regional as well as interregional dialogues on pertinent issues, and through these, seeks to build a network of activists, intellectuals and citizens engaged in a wideranging critique of existing theory and action and in actively moving towards an alternative framework of theory and action. The *Lokayan Bulletin* (also brought out in Hindi and, shortly, in other regional languages) is a medium to facilitate such a network and for moving towards a consolidated movement for social and political change.

During the first 18 months of its operation, thanks largely to the overwhelming response of various local activists, *Lokayan* will have (a) organised eighteen regional dialogues in eleven states and union territories, (b) held three colloquia on major areas of national importance, (c) held three national level consultations with experts and activists, (d) brought out three issues of its *Bulletin* in English, two in Hindi and one in Gujarati. Bulletins in other regional languages are being planned.

Through all this the *Lokayan* network has energised, directly and indirectly, a variety of individuals engaged in action movements on behalf of the people, mostly the underprivileged and deprived - the dalits, the tribals and the rural poor generally. These are reported in the *Bulletin*. Itself not an activist organisation, *Lokayan* seeks only to clarify issues, bring people who are anyway engaged in various activities together and make them think and act together. Through the same process it also seeks to highlight intellectual and ideological issues immanent in such struggles and which call for systematic study and debate with a view to moving towards a new crystallization of issues and answers relevant to our time, the Indian society and its larger global context.
LETTERS

I have intended to write for some time to thank you most cordially for sending me the IFDA Dossier from the beginning, a Dossier which I have come to value and preserve, not only for myself, but also to lend to others. I must honestly admit that I was sceptical of the idea at first. The reasons you will understand: I have been guided through my long career in development by the conviction that true development comes from the unfolding of the societies concerned, propelled mainly by their own dynamic, i.e. by the healthy forces inside them. My scepticism, therefore, was one of principle, to the effect that outside influences are, in the final analysis, marginal, often distorting and, at best, merely a general context with diverse reactive effect. You have convinced me that a lively forum of exchange of novel, often pioneering, ideas usually generated from within developing societies and widely disseminated can have a profound impression on thought and practice and can materially aid the stirring and unfolding which I have mentioned. It also serves as a corrective to many, the dominant, ideas that obscure issues and distort understanding.

But I am not writing to lecture to you. I have a modest request to make and an offer to mention. I have retired from FAO, where I worked for agrarian reform and rural development, I have now completed a major analysis - of book size - of the political economy of agrarian conflict and reform on a world scale aimed at elucidating the forces at work and the context, and I am returning to my native Cyprus to work on "alternative development". If you wish to continue your generosity you can send me the Dossier there. My offer is that I would be willing to contribute to your cause in any way that will help you, now that I hold no official position. I trust that your good work will blossom further.

D. Christodoulou, Flat 21, Park Court, 6 Char. Mouskos Str. Nicosia 162, Cyprus.

We sincerely appreciate your printing of "... Fear, Anxiety and Hate we still keep... but we know our lessons a little better now." - page 71 - 73 IFDA Dossier 26.

Until the present, there has been no positive changes in the land in question. Very significant though to us is the strong and conscious solidarity of the people - the peasants involved in the case. We will win this one. We know there is no hope in the present system to bring that about. We know our lessons.

Again our sincere thanks for the awareness that your publication of the article will generate all over. We will be happy to share further the depth of this experience with more friends.

Lot S. Miranda, President of the Punla Foundation Incorporated, P.O. Box AC-378 Quezon City, Philippines.
DISARM OR DIE

That was the main message from the representative of over 70 million trade unionists worldwide when a special session of an enlarged International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Executive Board met in Brussels in November. The special Board meeting, on the single topic of peace, security and disarmament, examined the unions' vital role in efforts to achieve lasting peace. The Board adopted a detailed policy document and an Appeal for Immediate Resumption of Negotiations on Disarmament.

Linking peace with the issues of unemployment, hunger, poverty and oppression, the Appeal stresses that "defence requirements do not justify the arms race". At the same time, states must, in line with the United Nations Charter, "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation".

The ICFTU rejects "the myth that nuclear weapons are only for defence" and says that their deterrent effect is "outweighed by the threat to security". The idea of a limited nuclear war is "a fatal illusion". Condemning both "the reliance on nuclear weapons" and "the build-up of conventional arms", and pointing out that the one can be used as a pretext for the other, the ICFTU insists that governments "must disarm or life will be obliterated". It therefore appeals "to all governments concerned":

- to abandon the illusion that they can achieve security through increasing nuclear and conventional forces;
- to resume immediately negotiations leading to effective disarmament measures under international control;
- to take and implement confidence-building measures;
- to enforce fully existing treaties, particularly on non-proliferation of nuclear arms;
- to commit themselves to promoting détente between East and West and the resolution of conflicts through negotiation and agreement: and immediately
- to agree on the withdrawal and termination of production of SS 20 missiles by the URSS and the abandonment of the production and deployment by the USA and its allies of Cruise and Pershing II missiles and the production of enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons.

The policy document makes similar points. More particularly, it emphasises the urgent need for effective international control of the arms trade and for immediate steps towards general balanced disarmament under effective international control.

In addition to the disarmament measures mentioned in the Appeal, there should be "agreement on the creation and progressive enlargement of nuclear-free zones".
The employment effects of disarmament are an important consideration. The ICFTU document puts the number of people involved at about 60 million - half in industry, half in the armed forces. The resources used for making armaments could be better devoted to peaceful, constructive production which would "create more jobs than the capital-intensive defence industries". However, many highly influential national and international companies have a "vested interest" in maintaining arms production. Reconversion to alternative production must be under public control, with union participation. Commitment to reconversion must be part of future disarmament agreements. National and international action on reconversion and the creation of alternative employment is essential.

The arms race, says the ICFTU, "diverts resources which are crucial for the development of the Third World", and it therefore insists that the armament budgets of all nations should be cut and the resources reallocated to development.

For the reasons cited in the Appeal, the policy document stresses that any nuclear strategy endangers security.

The ICFTU and its affiliates undertake to promote all the above aims, and will invite assistance in this from International Trade Secretariats and friendly trade union organisations. The unions will campaign both by informing the workers and the public at large of what is at stake and by influencing governments and intergovernmental organisations.

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**MEDECINE INDIGENE ET POPULAIRE D'AMERIQUE LATINE**


Par un travail méthodique rigoureusement contrôlé, les chercheurs s'efforcent de décrire la médecine 'indienne' avec le souci permanent de la confronter avec la médecine occidentale. Un exemple, la recherche de l'efficacité de la phytotherapie traditionnelle: le problème essentiel, pour certains biologistes ayant une formation anthropologique, est d'étudier un modèle expérimental pour l'analyse des plantes indigènes et l'évaluation des doses reproductibles.

L'étude comparative des valeurs respectives de la thérapeutique traditionnelle et de la médecine moderne occidentale constitue un travail de base indispensable; il ne devient fructueux que s'il est suivi d'une réelle évolution des mentalités qui permette une intégration des deux médecines. De même que l'observateur occidental doit se libérer de l'idée que la science médicale occidentale - devenue "cosmopolite" - est la seule véritable, le thérapeute indien doit pouvoir dégager et reconnaître les valeurs effectives de la médecine traditionnelle et y intégrer les éléments de la médecine 'cosmopolite'.

Dans le discours médical qui s'instaure entre le médecin et le patient, il existe un rituel thérapeutique propre à chaque culture. C'est peut-être sur cette trame intime commune que l'on pourra essayer d'intégrer différentes médecines au sein d'une communauté rurale ou urbaine. (Dr. Nguyên Ngoc Hanh).
Mud, mud, by Anil Agarwal 1/

Housing may be the Third World’s most unsolvable problem. In most cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America, from one-quarter to over half the people live in dilapidated, makeshift shelters in slums and shantytowns, and the numbers are growing. Between 1975 and 2000, urban dwellers will double in East Asia, increase two-and-a-half times in Latin America, and treble in Africa and South Asia.

Third World planners have also neglected rural housing. A UN body reports: "As many as seven out of ten homes in the rural areas of developing countries are currently so unsuitable for human habitation as to require replacement or major alteration". Even with the rush to the cities, it is likely that 46 percent of the world’s population will still be living in Third World villages by the turn of the century in extremely bad conditions under leaky, makeshift, wormy roofs.

Many Third World governments have responded by setting up housing programmes, yet their efforts at best, have proven futile. Most households are too poor to pay for even the cheapest approved dwellings that can be built.

Against this background, Anil Agarwal examines what governments and aid agencies are doing about the problem - and what the poor can do for themselves. Housing standards, he says, have mostly been adopted from the West. Official housing schemes have emphasized the "delivery of housing units", something which the poor can do for themselves, given the right opportunities. Also, housing schemes have paid little attention to local materials, and encourage imports of cement and steel. Cement, argues Agarwal, is too expensive to meet Third World housing needs. But mud, adobe, earthbricks, soil-cement and other traditional materials are cheap enough to make a big impact. In addition, they are readily available, require less capital, and can be produced and used by poor people themselves.

Mud technology grew out of the cumulative experiences of peoples over hundred of years. History shows that mud has built palaces and cathedrals, vaults and arches. In the Nile Valley mud buildings have stood for three hundred years. Even today, over half the Third World’s population lives in mud buildings of one form or another.

Mud homes provide excellent insulation; they are cooler in the summer and hotter in winter than concrete. Although they are cheap and strong, mud is easily eroded by water, does not easily stick to wood, and is difficult to fashion into roofs. But improvements in design and technology can counter these problems, Agarwal says, and he cites a variety of interesting country experiences.

The second half of Mud, mud is devoted to studies in Iran, India, Afghanistan, China and 16 other countries which illustrate the potential of earth-based architecture in a variety of cultures and climates. It documents age-old building techniques and designs and modern-day housing schemes that utilize these. Here, Agarwal also acknowledges the contributions of Egyptian Hasan Fathy, author of "Architecture for the Poor" - the first serious attempt to focus on mud architecture. From CENDHRRA DEVELOPMENT MEMO, P.O. Box 458 Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines.

NATIONAL SPACE

- Dag Poleszynski, The dominant way of life in Norway: Positive and negative aspects (University of Oslo, Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, UN University), mimeo. 38pp.
- ----, Overdevelopment and alternative ways of life: The case of Norway (University of Oslo, Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, UN University) mimeo. 35pp.
- Autogestions (no.7, automne 1981), "Irlande: Au-delà du terrorisme"

THIRD WORLD SPACE

Felipe Herrera, El escenario latinoamericano y el desafío cultural (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Galdoc, 1981), 114pp.


Radomiro Tomic, "Que hacer?", Análisis No. 40 Año IV. Nov.81 (separate) Santiago, Chile.


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Johan Galtung, Peace and world structure (Essays in Peace Research, Vol.IV) (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1980), 735pp. In this fourth of five volumes of Essays in Peace Research, the author discusses the peace problematique between societies. The book is divided into four parts: 1. International interactions, 2. An analysis of the world structure, 3. Technical assistance and 4. Predictions for the 70s and 80s. In the section dealing with international interaction, such subjects as summit meetings, diplomacy, foreign news and air communication are discussed, but also the East-West system and Norway as an international actor are touched upon. Part 2 focusses on such themes as integration and imperialism, non-territorial actors and general world structure.

Peace problems: Some case studies (Essays in Peace Research, Vol.V) (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1980), 498pp. Peace problems: Some case studies is the fifth and last volume in the series Essays in Peace Research. It differs from the others in being more focussed on concrete peace problems: on European security and cooperation, on the Middle East, the Korean problem, Cuba as a model of anti-imperialist struggle and socialist development; the US in Indo-China and its aftermath (defining for a whole generation the essence of peace politics). The second part of the volume, however, is concerned with particular issues, such as the explorations into space, summit meetings, ecology and class politics, technical assistance as an instrument of Western expansion, the Law of the Sea conferences; Pugwash as an approach is also dealt with. In the final essay Galtung outlines new tasks for peace studies, beyond the horizons of the 60s and 70s, and there is also a dialogue with some of the critics of his approaches.


PERIODICALS

. Balai Quarterly Journal, published by Philippines based BALAI Fellowship and edited by Sr. Mary Soledad Perpinan; 4 issues/year, 24pp. per issue. The Asian word for 'house', BALAI is also an acronym that stand for 'Building Asian Links Against Imperialism'. BALAI is open and welcoming to all who wish to be in fellowship. Its binding force is a common concern for the peoples of Asia, victims like others in the Third World of the insidious effects of imperialism in all its forms. Each edition of the Balai Quarterly Journal serves as a primer to a critical international issues. Simple and concise, popular in form, the journal is primarily published for those who cannot go to libraries nor subscribe to expensive periodicals. Another feature that distinguishes the journal from others is its firm conviction that, given the opportunity, Asia has all the natural and human resources necessary for self-reliance. (BALAI, P.O. Box SM-447, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Philippines).

. The Arab Alternative Futures Dossier, no.2, September 1981. Published jointly by the United Nations University and the Third World Forum, in English and Arabic. Third World Forum, Middle East Office, 39 Dokki St., P.O. Box 43, Orman, Cairo, Egypt.
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. Manuel Berrera, Chili: Autoritarismo político, aperturaismo económico y política laboral (Casilla 1021, Santiago 22, Chile), 12pp.

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. Hari Mohan Mathur, Cooperation in administrative training among developing countries: Experiences with sharing the Indian expertise (Ministry of Home Affairs, Training Division, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, New Delhi-110 001), 13pp.

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. E. Gelpsi, Division internationale du travail et politiques educatives (UNESCO, Place de Fontenoy, 75007 Paris 7e), 20pp. + 10pp (annexe).

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