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ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT IN GRENADA

An IRDA delegation visited Grenada in May at the invitation of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.

Grenada is a small country of the Eastern Caribbean - it has 110,000 inhabitants on some 340 km², and, for whatever it means, a gross national product of US$460 per capita. In spite of a very fertile volcanic soil, it imports, at increasing costs, a large part of what it eats, and, until recently, the problem of malnutrition was ignored. It exports, at decreasing prices, nut-megs, cocoa and bananas. It has no industry. Its mini-airport is unfit for either night landing or regular-size planes, which means that its touristic potential remains underutilized. Unemployment is widespread. Until two years ago, it had 17 doctors, no dentist, and 3 students on Government scholarships in Universities abroad.

This is the result of 29 years of tyranny, before and after independence (1974). The situation was so bad that the opposition - the New Jewel Movement - could easily take over, in a bloodless revolution, on 13 March 1979.

Since then, the country has set in motion a process of far-reaching social change, material as well as political.

The economy - which rests on three sectors, state, private, cooperative - is now geared to the satisfaction of fundamental human needs. Idle land is being put into production, and fishing modernized. Local processing of fruits and fishes has started. Young children get milk, and primary school feeding programmes reach the whole country. 2,500 jobs have been created. The number of doctors has doubled; dental clinics, health centres and stations have been opened. Education is high on the priority list, both in and outside formal schools; an alphabetisation campaign is underway as well as training and recycling programmes for young peasants, teachers, civil servants and others. There are 220 students abroad. A new, larger airport is being built.

The state recurrent budget is US$ 28 million, and local income balances expenditures. Its investement budget amounts for its part to US$35 million, of which one third each for the airport and for food production (the corresponding figure, in 1978, was US$3 million).

Structural transformations are taking place in the social sphere as well. A mass-based system of participatory democracy is being established, from the local space up. Militant people's organizations - women, youth, peasants, workers - contribute to give content to the new democracy. Women play a crucial role in all fields of development.

(cont. on page 96)
SELF-MANAGEMENT AS A DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVE: REFLECTIONS ON THE PERUVIAN EXPERIENCE

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LA AUTOGESTION COMO ALTERNATIVA DE OTRO DESARROLLO: REFLEXIONES SOBRE LA EXPERIENCIA PERUANA

Resumen: Después de la toma del poder por los militares dirigidos por el general Velasco en Perú en 1968, un programa de transformaciones estructurales fue puesto en marcha. El objetivo era llegar a una democracia social ampliamente participativa, basada en la democracia industrial y en la autogestión, y a una democracia política apoyándose en algunas organizaciones específicas respaldadas por el Estado.

Sin embargo, este proyecto tenía tendencia a desconocer los intereses adquiridos de ciertas organizaciones ya existentes, así como las contradicciones involucradas en la creación, desde arriba, de organizaciones populares. En 1974, el proceso institucional culminó con la creación de un Consejo Nacional de Propiedad Social y de un Fondo Nacional de Propiedad Social. Pero las dificultades económicas y políticas, básicamente de origen extranjero, originaron el fin del proyecto Velasco.

A la luz de los hechos descritos en este informe, los autores plantean algunos problemas con respecto al alcance de la autogestión, a los problemas de implementación, a las reacciones de 'egoísmos de grupo' y a la problemática de la participación (¿Quién participa, por qué, cómo?).

La última sección del artículo se refiere a las perspectivas del futuro.

L'AUTOGESTION COMME ÉLÉMENT D'UN AUTRE DÉVELOPPEMENT: RÉFLEXIONS SUR L'EXPÉRIENCE PÉROUVIENNE

Résumé: Après la prise du pouvoir par les militaires dirigés par le général Velasco au Pérou en 1968, un programme de transformations structurelles a été mis en oeuvre. L'objectif en était une démocratie sociale pleinement participative fondée sur la démocratie industrielle elle-même basée sur différentes formes d'auto-gestion ouvrière, et la démocratie politique basée sur un certain nombre d'organisations spécifiques encouragées par l'État.

Ce projet a cependant négligé les intérêts acquis de certaines organisations préexistantes de même que les contradictions inhérentes à la création par en (suite p. 12(14)).
SELF-MANAGEMENT AS A DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVE: REFLECTIONS ON THE PERUVIAN EXPERIENCE.

INTRODUCTION

In Peru one out of every four employed workers is a member of a worker-run enterprise. Each day over 700,000 workers have to confront and deal with the problems facing over 7,000 worker-run firms in an environment characterized by economic and political uncertainty. To what extent do these firms and their workers represent an alternative development model within Peru's "pluralist" economy?

What are some of the lessons that have been learned during the past decade through the establishment of various forms of worker participation and self-management? What are some of the issues and dilemmas that have been and are being raised and faced and that may be of relevance for other countries exploring alternative development possibilities?

Self-management as a form of workers' organization no longer enjoys the degree of support that Peru's military government gave it in former years. Since 1974 the workers have experienced a decline in their living standards in the context of the country's most serious economic crisis this century and this has affected the viability and even threatened the existence of many of their firms. In the context of a transition from military to civilian rule; of new forms (or, rather, the resurgence of old forms) of political articulation favourable to the urban bourgeoisie; and of an improving export income which promises to restore real income levels to their early seventies levels by the mid-eighties, self-managed enterprises and their worker-owners face new challenges and opportunities.

The Peruvian experience in the field of self-management offers ample material for analyzing which elements of that experience have proved valuable; the limitations and restrictions encountered; the key questions in any attempt to introduce forms of self-management in a context of dependent capitalism; the possibility of developing a general theory of self-management; the experiences that could prove to be valid for other countries; and, concretely, the perspectives for self-management in Peru under present conditions and given the specific problems that the poorer and marginalized sectors face.

Mario Padron, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo (DESCO), Av. Salaverry 1945, Lima 14, Peru.
In the face of a disintegration in the support for civilian President Belaunde, an economic crisis and growing (but not necessarily unmanageable) political chaos, the armed forces, led by General Juan Velasco, took over the government in a bloodless coup d'état in late 1968. After several years it became clear that a tenously predominant sector of the armed forces grouped around President Velasco was intent on implementing a number of "structural" changes aimed at transforming the nature of Peruvian society.

As these reforms began to take shape and began to be intellectually articulated by civilian allies within the state bureaucracy a vision emerged of a future fully participatory social democracy constructed on the bases of an industrial democracy consisting of various forms of worker-managed enterprises and a political democracy based on newly created, government sponsored, interest organizations. As we shall later see, this idealistic - even utopian - version tended to overlook the interest of and difficulties posed by existing political parties, unions, cooperatives and other worker organizations and the contradictions involved in the creation of democratic grass roots organizations by top-down, authoritarian methods and institutions.

The previous civilian government had passed in 1964 a General Cooperatives Law which, together with a number of fiscal and other incentives, had promoted the rapid growth of a wide range of cooperatives. However, these were mainly service cooperatives, including building societies, savings and loans cooperatives, consumer cooperatives and marketing cooperatives, with very few production cooperatives being formed. Weakly articulated internally, the cooperative movement tended to serve as a basis of economic support for the predominant capitalist enterprises and as a basis of political support for the APRA political party.

Under the Velasco Government (1968-1975), the cooperative movement lost the fiscal and other incentives it had enjoyed and tended to languish in a state of relative stagnation due to the unfavourable economic and political conditions it confronted.

Despite its generally negative attitude towards pre-existing cooperatives, the first major piece of reform legislation - the Agrarian Reform Law of 1969 - sought to expropriate haciendas throughout the country and convert them into agrarian production cooperatives, rather than divide and distribute the land to former farm labourers and surrounding peasant communities. In fact, two forms of cooperatives were created: the agrarian production cooperatives (CAPs) composed of farm labourers who had worked on the estates before expropriation and who became the new owners and managers and the agrarian social interest societies (SAIS), formed on the basis of sheep ranches in the high grasslands (puna) of the Andes, where ownership and control was shared between ranch shepherds and neighbouring peasant communities. Both were, of course, production cooperatives but little attempt was made to coordinate their activities with those of other organizations within the cooperative movement. However, second level cooperatives (called centrales) to provide common services such as purchasing, marketing, accounting, etc. were sponsored. Except for
centrales dedicated to the export of specific products such as wool, coffee and sugar, the performance of the centrales has in general been disappointing.

To complement these new forms of economic organization in the rural sector based on self-managed forms, the Government, through its quasi-political organization SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social: National System to Support Social Mobilization), organized the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA: National Agrarian Confederation) on the basis of local district agrarian leagues and departmental agrarian federations as a means for giving political representation to the agrarian sector. Despite shortcomings, the CNA was clearly the most representative and autonomous of all the political organizations created by the Velasco Government.

In 1970 an Industrial Community Law was passed whereby all firms with more than five workers or more than S/.1,000,000 in annual sales (about US$ 22,000 at 1970 exchange rates) were required to establish an industrial community composed of all workers in the firm, from general manager to doorkeeper. This community was to receive 25% of the firm's annual profits, 10% to be distributed in cash amongst the community members and 15% in the form of company shares, either through the issue of new shares or by buying out existing shareholders. Whether holding shares or not, the community was to participate in the shareholders' meetings and have a minimum of one representative on the board of directors. Through this mechanism it was intended that over a period of years the workers through their industrial community would achieve a 50% share in the ownership and control of the company. It was never made clear what would happen when this 50 - 50 situation was reached, nor how potential impasses would be resolved, though rumours circulated that once a substantial number of firms achieved this status they would be converted into production cooperatives. Later laws created similar communities in telecommunications, mining and fishmeal firms, with the added twist that in the last two sectors compensation communities were also established to redistribute shares and cash benefits from the more profitable to the less profitable firms.

As in the case of the agrarian sector, a representative political organization, CONACI (Confederacion Nacional de Comunidades Industriales: National Confederation of Industrial Communities) was organized. However, in its founding conference in 1973 disputes between SINAMOS and the Ministry of Industry as to who would control (or "orient") the nascent Confederation led to later divisionist movements, fatally weakening its effectiveness as a national spokesperson for the industrial communities. This was further compounded by opposition or, at best, suspicion by unions and their national confederations who viewed the creation of CONACI as an attempt to undermine their power and influence and widespread conflicts with individual employers and employer organizations who viewed the industrial communities as a threat to their "prerogatives" and eventual existence.
Finally, in 1974 the Social Property Law was passed. Under this law worker self-managed firms would be created (although a number of pre-existing, bankrupt firms taken over by their workers were also incorporated) and integrated into a sector where all the firms would be owned by all the workers in the sector. These firms could be created in any economic sector and would receive top government priority with the goal that the social property sector would eventually become the predominant sector in the economy and the principal basis of the eventual participatory democracy. A new government agency, CONAPS (Consejo Nacional de Propiedad Social: National Social Property Council), was established to govern and promote the new sector in its initial stages and a financial agency, FONAPS (Fondo Nacional de Propiedad Social: National Social Property Fund), created to provide initial financial support and a mechanism for social capital accumulation at the sectorial level. When a sufficient number of firms had been created they would be grouped into regional units for planning and coordination purposes and an assembly representing all the firms in the sector would be formed for planning and policy making purposes.

This new law and the self-management model contained in it reflected the culmination of five years of extensive experimentation and reflection over the appropriate form of self-managed enterprise in Peru. Unfortunately, it also represented a swan song for the Velasco Government. By 1974 the effects of the world economic crisis were being felt in Peru making the creation of any new firm - whatever its design - an increasingly hazardous and difficult task. Political conflicts on a number of fronts with powerful sectors of society were taking their toll in the increasing politicization and disunity within the armed forces. As important sectors of the society passed from estrangement to active opposition, newly emerging sectors of the rural and urban working class were insufficiently experienced and organized and lacked conviction that the Government's program was sufficiently coherent to warrant their total support. Finally, the president's failing health seriously limited his ability to reconcile conflicts within the armed forces and maintain the hegemony of the fragile military-civilian-bureaucratic coalition which had been the driving force behind the reforms.

If the Velasco Government had a reformist (or "revolutionary") mission whose detailed outlines only became clear towards the end of its term, the Morales Bermudez Government, which assumed power in another bloodless coup in August, 1975, saw its mission as one of coping with what was perceived as a growing political and economic crisis. Although continuity with the policies and programs of the previous government was promised, within a year it was clear that this was not to be the case. A dramatic decline in export income, rampant inflation, a crippling overseas debt burden and lack of organized political support led him to seek a reconciliation with those sectors of society, especially the urban bourgeoisie, which had been in conflict with the Velasco Government. These new alliances and the changed economic policies devised as a
way out of the economic crisis rendered the Velasco "model", and the organizations created on the basis of it, increasingly irrelevant to the new strategy and potential threats to its implementation.

However, these changes did not represent any noticeable relief for the traditional cooperative movement. Though active harassment ceased, "benign neglect" was not sufficient for it to recover its former dynamism and towards the end of the Morales Bermudez Government they looked with increasing optimism towards a civilian government, especially if it were APRA-dominated.

The Morales Bermudez Government was prepared to accept the agrarian reform as a fait accompli and devoted its efforts to maintaining government control over the CAPs and SAIS, defending them against threats of invasions from surrounding peasant communities and seasonal workers and, within the limits of a policy more inclined to give lip service to agriculture as the country's first priority rather than a real transfer of resources, seeking to consolidate the enterprises through such measures as condoning the agrarian debt.

Since the industrial bourgeoisie was one of the key elements in the new political alliance and in the economic recovery program the industrial community had little chance of surviving in its original form. In 1976 the legal definition of a small business was changed so that firms with sales of up to S/.32,000,000 at that date would be considered "small" and for that reason exempt from the requirement to have an industrial community. By this definition about 60% of firms would be considered small. Later legislation in 1977 and 1978 eliminated the community's participation in shareholder meetings, allowed the community's share of the profits to be invested in forms other than the purchase of shares and in the case of the latter converted them into individual, rather than community, shareholdings. The theoretical maximum to which these shareholdings could rise was lowered from one-half to one-third and the permission to transfer them after five years meant that the concept had been transformed into a form of widely distributed share-ownership with nominal participation in the board of directors. Thus, the industrial community passed from being an evolutionary path towards codetermination or self-management to a Peruvian version of peoples' capitalism.

Under the Morales Bermudez Government an evaluation of the social property sector was carried out. Many projects were dropped; its status was reduced from "predominant" to "priority" and not even that was respected in practice; emphasis was placed on investments in labour-intensive, marginal and rural projects, rather than highly profitable, technologically sophisticated and rapidly growing sectors; and the supply of capital was limited and made available on not particularly favorable terms. Growth was limited; in a travesty of the ideals of self-management most firms were kept under strict government control until late 1979, and many found themselves locked into supplying segments of the market (especially when satisfying basic needs) whose purchasing power had
been drastically reduced. When the Constituent Assembly produced in mid-1979 a new constitution that failed explicitly to mention social property or the social property sector, the Government embarked on a frantic program to constitute the approximately fifty social property enterprises in formation, organize the regional units and elect the sectoral assembly so that an independently functioning sector could be let loose to sink or swim in a sea of capitalism and faced with the waves created by the new, and not particularly sympathetic, civilian government.

This brief thumb-nail sketch of the various forms of self-managed enterprises created during the seventies in Peru as part of an effort to create an alternative development strategy forms the backdrop for the following reflections on the successes and failures, and problems and possibilities of self-management as a development alternative.

REFLECTIONS

The definition of the "scope" of self-management

Self-management implies participation in its widest sense, including at the level of the enterprise itself (and all the matters to be decided in its management) and at the level of the society as a whole (including the sphere of political decisions).

But self-management, when it does not include specified areas in which the worker can exercise his decision making, ceases to be a mobilization factor.

In this sense, the Peruvian experience provides various examples for understanding this phenomenon. Land and participation, for example, were offered to the rural worker in generic and, therefore, ambiguous terms. Yet he could not decide what to produce, how to produce, how much to produce, what price to set for his produce, how much income he could receive, nor how to market his produce. The margins or "scope" of his participation were thus reduced to their minimal expression because of the lack of any defined and precise boundaries.

By contrast, it is surely the case that, in imposing such boundaries, the state apparatus would have restricted the definition of participation, thus revealing its use of the concept.

This would have enabled the worker to clearly identify the spheres in which he was not permitted to decide, thus generating an additional reason for protest over the types of decisions forbidden to him. But, in this case, he was offered participation in broad, general terms. While, on the other hand, in practice there was very little about which he was allowed to decide. Once again, the contrast arose between what was said and what was really permitted; a contrast which served to create agitation and as a catalyst for his becoming aware of the reality in which he lived and of the unviability of the model proposed by the state apparatus "from above".
In addition, the fact that self-management was presented in ambiguous terms meant that it had a different meaning for the worker than for the public official charged with its implementation. For the peasant, it meant the possibility of improving his standard of living and his access to the decision making structure, while for the functionary it signified an ideological device in whose name the worker ought to abstain from strikes, work stoppages, and economic and political demands because in making them he would be undermining his own interests as "owner" (theoretically, of course) of his firm. An instrument of liberation in one case and of oppression in the other, self-management was left ambiguous and used as an ideological tool by the dominant sectors of the society.

It is worth pointing out, however, that these distinct meanings will always exist, since they arise from the class position of the worker and of the public official, or of whoever acts as the promotional agent of self-management.

But it seems to be equally clear that self-management, even when used as an ideological weapon for rationalizing and defending an existing order, incorporates elements of mobilization and conscientization. This occurs when the worker compares the real situation in which he lives with that society (or aspects of it) with "full participation" that the state apparatus, or whoever uses the concept, offers him, even when they do so for their own ends.

Problems in the implementation of a self-managed sector

In Peru there was an attempt to implement a self-managed sector in the society: the social property sector. It would therefore be appropriate to make a more detailed and minute analysis of the strategy followed, the achievements, the difficulties and the causes of its deterioration and almost its deformation as it appears today.

Did it represent a "final" model pushed by a group of utopianist libertarians who could not realize their goal because of the specific circumstances surrounding the military government? Was the strategy of promoting many self-managed organizations in order to be able to count on "seeds" from which a correct one later would prosper? Should they have been more "realistic and pragmatic" or, by contrast, even more audacious in the creation of enterprises? Were the financial mechanisms sufficiently flexible and opportune? Was the logic of economic profitability firmly established (or should it have been)?

Should they have avoided (as seems to have been the case) forms of political organization for articulating the enterprises? Should the production cooperatives and industrial communities have been included? Was a political party necessary to sustain and defend self-management and the interest of the workers and the reforms and improvements obtained? Was it possible (or should it have been possible) to distinguish artificially between
an economic and a political sphere for the organization and re-
presentation of the workers? What was the role played by the
congree social property enterprises created: Villa El Salvador
(CUAVES), Decision Campesina, Moto Andina, etc.? Were the "institu-
tionalization" mechanisms created (SINADEPS, FONAPS, etc.)
sufficiently autonomous and in the hands of the workers them-
selves or were they rather additional elements for control by the
state apparatus? Were they then promotor is or controllers of
popular initiatives?

Self-management and "group egoism"

When forms of self-managed organization are introduced within a
capitalist context, they face a hostile environment that can have
various consequences. The first is that of subsuming these forms
within the ruling capitalist system, converting them in this way
into another kind of firm operating within the logic of profit-
making. A second consequence may be violent opposition both at
the level of words and actions leading to their disappearance.
A third type of result if the deforming of the enterprise, that
is, causing it to lose its self-managing character through the
effects of the "group egoism syndrome".

The Peruvian example of the sugar production cooperatives offers
food for thought in this regard. They were introduced into a
capitalist environment in conditions of generalized unemployment,
exploitation and extraction of the surplus generated by workers
(by the state and through the market to which production was
oriented). The state apparatus controlled and supervised the
cooperatives, yet they lacked a design beyond that of the indivi-
dual enterprise that would incorporate other organizations at the
regional level. These conditions constituted a set of factors
that favored the rise and development of the "group egoism" that
the worker who was a member of a production cooperative experien-
ced as against other workers.

But the Peruvian experience also offers contrary examples of land-
less peasants incorporated into the cooperatives at the initia-
tive of the cooperative members "in spite of" the logic of income
maximization. Various mobilizations, land invasions, pronounce-
ments and concrete struggles sharpened the worker's perception
that this "group egoism" had its origin in the capitalist system
in which he found himself.

Is the "egoism" of the workers, then, a consequence of the system
in which these different forms of organization are inserted?
What is the price of solidarity when the remuneration for indivi-
dual work is different from that received for collective work?
How can this "egoism" be combated? Are there cases when this has
occurred? What were the results?
The fundamental questions: Who participates? Why? How?

The introduction of self-managing forms of organization, within a context of institutional changes, requires a definition as to who are the actors in such a process of participation. The worker, the citizen, the socio-political organizations and the apparatus of the state are, perhaps, the four most clearly identifiable agents. They are the ones who are going to "participate" and exercise their right to determine, giving form to the decision making structure.

But their participation will be real and effective only when the reasons for participating are clear and defined. The identification of "what is distributed", of the "scope" or sphere of decision making, is thus an equally indispensable element. According to whether their immediate interests are more directly affected, their participation will be more intense. But when the subject of participation is more "remote" or ambiguous, it becomes deformed and can become susceptible to manipulation by workers. There may be participation in decisions about the social product or wealth generated and about the limited resources and their distribution and use, but only to the extent that they are identifiable and clearly defined.

It is also important to be able to count on clear rules of the game guiding the form of exercising this right to decision making. Whether we are dealing with geographical or sectoral units or specific spheres of everyday life, there ought to be clear rules of the game (indicating the possibilities and limits) that govern the exercise of participation.

The Peruvian legislation was not sufficiently precise about "how to participate". The dimension of the "commune" (or district), for example, was not included when the analysis of other historical realities (Yugoslavia, China and Poland, for example) show that this is an important factor for establishing the limits to, reason for, and interest in participating.

To the extent that concrete aspects of participation are identified, interest in it will exist. Those interests (and rights) that have been expropriated from the worker and the citizen by the "established order", by the state or by the different sectors and social forces will also be perceived. Self-management will then be on a realistic path: of a historical process that it itself generates and feeds.

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Self-managed organizations have lost the substantial support they enjoyed from the state apparatus in previous years. During the early seventies the Velasco Government's gradually evolving political "model" placed increasing emphasis on the creation of self-managed enterprises as the economic building blocks and social-political worker and neighborhood organizations as the political building blocks of what was said would be a fully
participatory social democracy. Indeed for a brief period during 1974-75 — precisely when its fortunes were waning — the public discourse proclaimed that the social property sector would become predominant.

In fact, this support for self-management was never either unqualified or disinterested. The cooperative movement which preceded the Velasco Government lost a member of government financial and tax incentives and suffered serious setbacks during the seventies, principally because of its close association with the Acción Popular and APRA political parties, especially the latter, whose bases of support the Velasco Government was keen to undermine. Although the cooperative movement was weakly articulated internally and served to support rather than question the predominant capitalist system, the treatment received at the hands of the Velasco Government served to create resentments and hostilities between the pre-existing cooperatives and the newly formed agrarian production cooperatives, SAIS and social property enterprises.

The Morales Bermudez Government looked for political support from the bourgeoisie, petit-bourgeoisie and foreign capital — as well as, of course, the armed forces — distancing itself with increasing speed from the organized rural and urban proletariat. This led to a rapid drop in support for social property enterprises; an attempt to assert greater controls over the agrarian cooperatives and SAIS; the conversion of the labour communities from models of codetermination to a version of "peoples capitalism"; and increasing repression of trade unions. The economic crisis, the politicization which threatened the unity (and longer term political power) of the armed forces, the loss of a sense of "mission" and international pressure led the Morales Bermudez Government to seek a way out via an agreement with those political parties the Velasco Government had sought (unsuccessfully) to eliminate and which represented the social classes which now formed the basis of support for the Government.

In this period of transition between military and civilian rule there has been an effort to "tidy up loose ends", defending the agrarian cooperatives and SAIS against peasant invasions in some cases, bailing them out of bankruptcy in others, and trying to put others on an independent and financially viable footing. Face-saving efforts have been made to shore up the weaker social property firms to try to get them on a sounder economic basis and nearly all firms have been suddenly found to be able to govern themselves, enabling the mechanisms to be established (five regional units and the national assembly) for converting the social property sector into one essentially independent of state control and support.

While these developments signal a significant decrease in state control and intervention and while the improving economic situation increases the chances for economic survival, the overall prospects for self-management in Peru in the medium-term future are not very exciting. The major political parties are firmly wedded to maintaining Peru's condition as a dependent capitalist society. Within that limitation they are prepared to return to
the policies of the sixties of giving support and incentives to various forms of cooperatives as a way of "humanizing" the rougher edges of capitalism, as a way of creating a popular economy functional to the needs of private enterprise and as a way of creating bases of political support. The past heritage of authoritarian creation, intervention and political manipulation means that the elements from which a popular economy could potentially be formed - various kinds of cooperatives, trade unions, social property enterprises and labour communities - are now desarticulated and divided politically, economically and ideologically. Once again, the political enmity between APRA and the Marxist left, which dates from the debates between Haya de la Torre and Mariategui in the twenties, is reflected in the competition for support from (and control over) popular organizations, practically eliminating the possibility that in the medium term future a strong, united and politically articulate self-managed sector allied with other elements of a popular economy (especially unions) present a credible challenge to capitalism in Peru.

Nevertheless, something remains. Not only have intense experiences been lived through but also important lessons have been learned. A sufficient number of self-managed enterprises exist to provide a potential training ground in democratic management for a significant number of workers. The potential exists for developing a dynamic and relatively self-contained "people's economic sector" if resources can be managed with skill and the economic and financial circuit closed. If political and ideological clarity are achieved a popular economic base exists which could be employed in support of the struggle for liberation and development. Past experiences have taught important lessons and raised critical issues some of which will serve in the continuous search for a viable national development alternative.

Résumé: (suite de la page 3).

haut d'institutions participatives à la base. En 1974, la construction institutionnelle culminait avec la création d'un Conseil national de la propriété et d'un Fond national de la propriété sociale. Mais les difficultés économiques et politiques, largement d'origine extérieure, mirent fin au projet Velasco: celui-ci fut remplacé par le gouvernement Morales Bermudez, lequel abandonna peu à peu le modèle Velasco.

A la lumière de cet exposé factuel, les auteurs posent un certain nombre de questions concernant la portée de l'autogestion; les problèmes de mise en oeuvre; les réactions de 'égoïsmes de groupe' et la problématique de la participation (qui participe, pourquoi, comment?).

La dernière section de l'article envisage les perspectives d'avenir.
LES ENJEUX DE LA VIE ASSOCIATIVE EN FRANCE

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Résumé: La victoire historique du 10 mai de la gauche aux élections présidentielles françaises donne un relief tout particulier à cet essai, écrit il y a quelques mois à la suite du colloque organisé en janvier dernier par l'Association pour le développement des associations de progrès. Le phénomène est massif: une centaine d'associations se créent chaque jour en France, et leur nombre total se situe entre 300 et 500'000. La vitalité du mouvement ne saurait masquer son hétérogénéité, ni ses contradictions. Il n'en reste pas moins que cette floraison, qui traduit sans doute la crise structurelle de la société française, peut être un instrument privilégié de la dynamisation de la société civile ou 'tiers système'. Le renforcement des marges de pouvoir et d'autonomie des collectivités locales est de nature à faire progresser la décentralisation, la démocratie directe, et la responsabilité sociale des citoyens.

THE STAKE OF THE ASSOCIATIVE LIFE IN FRANCE

Abstract: The historic victory, on 10 May, of the French left at the Presidential elections, gives a special importance to this paper, written a few months ago after a colloquium organized in January by the Association for the development of associations for progress. The phenomenon is a massive one: some one hundred new associations are set up every day in France, and their total number is in the 300 to 500,000 range. But the vitality of the movement cannot hide its heterogeneity nor its contradictions. Nevertheless, this blossoming, which translates the structural crisis of the French society, could be a privileged instrument for the dynamisation of the civil society or 'third system'. The extension of the spaces for the power and autonomy of local communities could promote decentralization, direct democracy, and citizen's social responsibility.

LOS PROBLEMAS DE LA VIDA DE ASOCIACION EN FRANCIA

Resumen: La victoria histórica del 10 de Mayo de la izquierda en las elecciones presidenciales francesas da una importancia muy particular a este documento, escrito hace algunos meses, después de un coloquio organizado en Enero pasado por la Asociacion para el Desarrollo de las Asociaciones de Progreso. El fenómeno es masivo: alrededor de un centenar de asociaciones se crean, cada día, en Francia y su número total se sitúa entre 300 y 500'000. La vitalidad del movimiento no puede esconder su heterogeneidad ni sus contradicciones. Sin embargo, este florecimiento, que traduce, sin duda, la crisis estructural de la sociedad francesa, podría ser un instrumento privilegiado de la dinamización de la sociedad civil o 'tercer sistema'. El fortalecimiento y la ampliación de los márgenes de poder y de autonomía de las colectividades locales podría hacer progresar la descentralización, la democracia directa y la responsabilidad social de los ciudadanos.
LES ENJEUX DE LA VIE ASSOCIATIVE EN FRANCE

Ces réflexions nous ont été inspirées par le colloque de la DAP, Association pour le Développement des Associations de Progrès 1/, présidé par François Bloch Lainé, qui s'est tenu à Grenoble en janvier 1981, et dont le thème était: "Pour une nouvelle règle du jeu social: le rôle des associations". Celui-ci faisait suite à celui de Reims en novembre 1976 et de Lille en janvier 1979, et clôturait les cinq années de mission que s'était fixé la DAP, notamment de convaincre le pouvoir d'établir de nouvelles règles du jeu face au "phénomène associatif". Bien que la DAP n'ait pas réussi à atteindre les objectifs qu'elle s'était fixés, elle compte respecter le terme qu'elle s'était donné et laisser la place à d'autres initiatives.

1. Vitalité et hétérogénéité du monde associatif

Le fait associatif, régi par la Loi de 1901, s'est caractérisé au cours des dernières années par un essor particulier: une centaine d'associations se créent chaque jour en France. Les créations annuelles se sont accélérées rapidement: de quelques centaines en 1930, elles sont passées à quelques milliers en 1950, ont dépassé 10'000 vers les années 60 et 30'000 en 1977. Compte tenu d'une vie, d'une activité et d'une mortalité mal connues, le chiffre global des associations en activités à l'heure actuelle est estimé se situer entre 300'000 et 500'000 par le Ministère de l'Intérieur.

La vitalité actuelle du phénomène associatif est généralement rapprochée de la crise structurelle - à la fois économique, sociale, culturelle et institutionnelle - que traverse la société. S'y expriment les aspirations multiples au changement, l'aspiration à de nouvelles formes d'organisation (participation, auto-gestion, décentralisation) et la recherche de nouveaux styles de vie. Cependant s'il est hors de doute qu'il peut être considéré comme l'un des signes de dynamisation de la société civile, encore faut-il apporter quelques nuances sur le contenu du monde associatif qui est non seulement hétérogène, mais comprend également un certain nombre d'associations, et ce sont souvent les plus importantes, qui n'ont guère d'association que le nom.

Il peut s'agir de structures qui utilisent le statut juridique souple et commode de la Loi de 1901 (associations d'études et de recherche, ou de formation par exemple), ou encore de personnes physiques qui se déguisent en personnes morales pour donner plus de poids à leur action, ou bien encore d'associations qui ont été

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1/ DAP, 9 rue Vauvilliers, 75001 Paris. On y trouve les documents relatifs aux colloques, et notamment le numéro 74 de la revue Pour: "Pour le progrès des associations", par François Bloch Lainé.
directement créées par les départements ministériels, les collectivités locales ou des établissements publics, et qui ne sont que les prolongements de leurs propres services. On trouve également de nombreuses associations, notamment dans les secteurs socio-culturels, qui créées au départ pour répondre à un besoin non satisfait par les services publics, sont passées au fil des années sous la tutelle de l'administration et devenus de grosses structures employant un personnel nombreux et de quasi institutions para-publics ou encore de véritables entreprises.

Quant au secteur associatif proprement dit, il concerne la défense du droit des minorités, l'expression de solidarités, d'intérêts ou d'idéologies communs, la gestion du quotidien, de la vie socio-culturelle, la création de services nouveaux (boutiques de santé, librairies-rencontre...) et même des activités de production (association de paysans-artistes...). On y trouve les objets les plus divers, des tailles qui vont de quelques adhérents à des milliers, des modes de fonctionnement extrêmement variés (certaines reposent sur le bénévolat, d'autres emploient des salariés en nombre plus ou moins important) et des durées de vie très variables.

Le fait associatif en soi ne présuppose aucun jugement de valeur cohérent sur le contenu mais seulement l'adhésion volontaire d'individus isolés à un groupe en vertu d'un objectif commun, matérialisé par le versement d'une cotisation et par des prestations en temps. Ce qui nous paraît particulièrement intéressant dans le fait associatif ce sont précisément les points suivants:

- la lecture de la société au travers des mailles du filet associatif, c'est celui du pluralisme, de la diversité: tout peut s'y exprimer;
- le réseau de micro-collectivités ainsi définies par rapport à un objet précis et limité constitue autant de parcelles de la vie sociale par rapport auxquelles les individus expriment librement le choix de leur appartenance et leur solidarité et y participent par adhésion volontaire;
- la liberté d'association et la simplicité réelle de la constitution en fait une forme privilégiée d'initiatives collectives;
- le fait associatif permet, par le biais de la constitution d'une personne morale, l'opportunité de l'expression publique de convictions, de luttes, de solidarités, de projets...

La vie associative est donc par nature en puissance un lieu de créativité sociale, d'expression individuelle et collective, d'initiative et d'intervention pour les acteurs de la société civile en dehors de toute structure pré-existante.

2. L'originalité du fait associatif

L'originalité du fait associatif réside dans deux caractéristiques: un mode d'organisation fondé sur la participation des membres et une vie associative qui n'est régie que par son propre
dynamisme bien que, nous l'avons déjà mentionné, ces principes de base soient loin de coïncider toujours avec les faits.

- **Liberté législative et créativité juridique des associations**

La Loi de 1901 qui légitime la liberté d'association autour d'un objectif autodéterminé, laisse la seule responsabilité aux membres du collectif de sa formulation, de son organisation, de sa réalisation. Il s'agit en particulier de prévoir et de réglementer l'exercice d'un pouvoir horizontal à l'intérieur de l'association, de rechercher des modalités de participation, notamment dans les grandes organisations, de se préserver contre les risques d'accumulation de l'exercice du pouvoir, et d'agir "autrement" que les stéréotypes de la vie sociale. C'est en ce sens un lieu privilégié de l'apprentissage et de l'expérimentation de la participation et de la démocratie directe, dans la mesure où les associations, dans leur pratique, y sont attentives.

- **Evolution et remise à jour des pactes sociaux**

Le principe même de la vie associative repose sur l'adhésion des associés au "pacte" qui les lie; celui-ci doit être régulièrement réexplicite et réactualisé pour valider l'objectif de l'association et son mode de fonctionnement de façon à éviter qu'elle ne tombe en désuétude, soit qu'elle ne s'institutionnalise.

La vie associative est régie par sa propre dynamique et là l'unique règle est celle de la pratique. C'est pourquoi les associations sont un mode d'organisation par essence temporaire: elles sont vouées à disparaître soit qu'elles aient rempli leur mission, soit qu'elles aient échoué, à moins qu'elles n'aient la capacité créative et militante de se renouveler et de faire évaluer leurs objectifs.

Par exemple le Planning Familial, créé par un petit groupe de militants et devenu une grosse structure, se déclare néanmoins "toujours en avance d'une loi". Son premier objectif fut la liberté de contraception, que ses militants prit l'initiative de diffuser bien avant que n'ait été obtenue la promulgation de la loi et que cette fonction ne lui soit officiellement reconnue par les pouvoirs publics. Puis ce fut, au côté d'autres groupes militants dont des groupes de femmes, la lutte pour la liberté d'avortement, problème qui n'est pas encore vraiment résolu à l'heure actuelle. La formulation de nouveaux objectifs relatifs à la liberté des femmes d'assumer leur sexualité et leur maternité, semble justifier la poursuite en avant de leur existence et de leur action, bien que les groupes les plus moteurs sur ce type de problèmes actuellement se trouvent au sein de structures militantes plus récentes.

L'institutionnalisation ou la récupération par les pouvoirs publics est le grand danger qui guette les associations, dès lors que leurs objectifs et leurs actions connaissent un certain succès, par l'écho qu'ils provoquent dans le public, et/ou par l'absorption par l'appareil d'Etat de l'innovation sociale dont
ils sont porteurs. Ce problème est délicat et doit être nuancé et nous y reviendrons ultérieurement; en particulier, il pose le problème du rapport et du partage des pouvoirs et des sphères d'action et de responsabilité entre les pouvoirs publics et la société civile.

3. Autonomie des associations, lieu d'exercice de pouvoir de la société civile et lieu de médiation

Le mode associatif est souvent un mode d'organisation, de mobilisation, de luttes autour d'une revendication ponctuelle, en dehors des structures politiques et syndicales, bien qu'il puisse s'appuyer sur celles-ci. Qu'il s'agisse du droit des piétons, du droit à l'avortement, de crèches sauvages ou de la défense contre la pollution d'une industrie donnée, l'association permet de rassembler des personnes isolées. Sous couvert de la constitution d'une personne morale forte d'un certain nombre d'adhérents, celle-ci permet de constituer un interlocuteur unique, représentatif, au travers duquel pourra s'opérer le dialogue, la lutte et les négociations suivant les cas.

Les pouvoirs publics ne sont pas les seuls interlocuteurs auxquels s'affrontent les associations, pour faire reconnaître leurs revendications ou leur champ d'intervention, tant s'en faut; cependant, ils le sont souvent dans la mesure où la vie associative interviennent sur un terrain "public", soit qu'il relève de la tutelle de l'administration (culture, action sanitaire et sociale, jeunesse et sports, environnement et cadre de vie...), soit des municipalités.

Par ailleurs, les associations, dès lors que les cotisations ne couvrent pas leurs besoins financiers, sont très dépendantes des subventions de l'Etat et des collectivités locales pour se procurer les ressources nécessaires. Deux mesures peuvent améliorer cette situation:

- d'une part l'instauration d'un "mécénat populaire", pour reprendre l'expression de la DAP, ce qui suppose des réformes fiscales appropriées, et où le public choisirait de verser directement à des associations de son choix une partie de ses revenus, ce qui permettrait à un grand nombre d'associations de fonctionner sur la base d'un soutien direct de citoyens qui acceptent de les cautionner;

- d'autre part l'établissement de véritables rapports contrac- tuels entre un certain nombre d'association, notamment celles qui assurent un service public, et l'Etat, sans que celles-ci soit soumises à un contrôle trop rigide qui mette en tutelle leur capacité d'initiative et d'innovation et leur autonomie.

4. Les pouvoirs publics et la notion d'"intérêt général"

L'une des grandes causes de la crise institutionnelle et du malaise social tient à la superposition des notions de nation,
L'appareil d'État français se prolonge en une constellation de structures administratives, ce que A. Touraine appelle "l'État administratif", chargées d'assurer le service public au nom de l'intérêt général, dont il détient le monopole. Il agit au nom du principe de neutralité et de l'égalité d'accès de tous les citoyens, et redistribue une partie du surplus sous forme de services sociaux. S'il est incontestable que par le passé, le 'Welfare state' a joué un rôle de progrès social important, il s'avère qu'aujourd'hui ce monopole, sinon ce rôle, lui est contesté. D'abord, en même temps que les tâches assumées se sont multipliées et amplifiées, l'appareil administratif s'est considérablement gonflé et a perdu de son efficacité.

Ensuite, les principes de neutralité et d'égalité d'accès à tous sont très érodés et contestés; l'appareil d'État est perçu comme étant au service du pouvoir politique dont il tire sa légitimité plus que comme garant d'un intérêt général dont il serait le dépositaire et le garant. Quant à l'appareil administratif qui en partie, dans ses méandres, échappe même au contrôle du pouvoir d'État, il est souvent le règne de l'arbitraire.

Enfin, les directives et les normes qui réglementent les services publics (éducation, santé, enfance...) sont souvent ressenties plus comme des contraintes rigidifiantes.

L'accomplissement des services d'intérêt général dans le système actuel de l'État-Providence, délégué de droit aux services publics, souffre de plusieurs lacunes graves:

- la normalisation unificante qui ignore le droit à la différence et les particularismes locaux et sociaux. Ainsi l'école publique laïque, en même temps qu'elle démocratisait l'enseignement et luttait contre l'emprise de l'Eglise sur l'école, a diffusé de façon autoritaire un modèle unique et a notamment réprimé de façon souvent violente l'expression des cultures locales et régionales;

- la rigidité institutionnelle peu perméable à l'innovation. Or, l'initiative de l'innovation se trouve au sein même de la société civile, notamment dans le milieu associatif, au fur et à mesure de l'émergence d'un nouveau besoin social. La faire reconnaître et entériner par les pouvoirs publics suppose une lutte épuisante et souvent vaine ou qui aboutit souvent à sa dénaturation. Il est rare qu'une administration prenne l'initiative d'une innovation sociale, et l"aménagement du temps" au Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie est probablement l'un des rares exemples;

1/ Thierry Schwartz; l'État et la notion de services publics, rappel historique, Four, no. 68-69, décembre 1979.
- l'impossibilité aux usagers des services publics de participer à la conception et au fonctionnement de ces services et la mise sous tutelle de la société civile à l'égard de l'Etat-Providence. Les prises d'initiative sont difficiles à assumer dans la mesure où elles sont soumises dans bien des cas à un rapport conflictuel avec les représentants de l'Etat.

La vie associative est également l'un des canaux de l'expression, par l'un ou l'autre de ses aspects, de l'intérêt général, multiforme et diversifié, parallèlement à celui, uniformisé et codifié, exprimé par les pouvoirs publics. Il ne s'agit pas de substituer l'un à l'autre, mais d'établir des règles du jeu qui leur permettent de coexister, de dialoguer et de faciliter l'aménagement de ponts entre les deux (coopération, ou transfert d'une innovation du secteur associatif aux pouvoirs publics, ou d'une responsabilité des pouvoirs publics au secteur associatif) en particulier:

- les besoins sociaux sont évolutifs et l'innovation peut-être plus facilement mise en œuvre dans le cadre associatif qu'au sein des collectivités publiques. Dans ce cas, par le biais d'un rapport contractuel entre les pouvoirs publics et le secteur associatif, ce service nouveau peut être assuré par le secteur associatif, et éventuellement repris ultérieurement par les services publics lorsque celui-ci a "pris sa place" et que l'enjeu militant associatif a déperri de lui-même;

- par ailleurs le secteur associatif peut, de façon beaucoup plus souple que les services publics sous contrôle étroit de l'administration, offrir des solutions diversifiées aux besoins sociaux. Par rapport à l'intérêt général, l'apport associatif peut être l'expression d'une société pluraliste;

- les associations permettent l'expression du droit des minorités sociales, culturelles, municipales ou nationales face aux pouvoirs établis. L'intérêt général se doit de protéger l'expression de ces minorités et leur droit à vouloir vivre autrement;

- enfin, le fait associatif, en tant que lieu d'initiative et d'auto-organisation sociale, est en soi une forme d'expression de l'intérêt général. Si l'on veut promouvoir une société qui se désengagerait du recours systématique à l'assistanat de l'Etat-Providence, comme c'est le cas actuellement en France, dans tous les secteurs de la vie sociale et des services, il faut redélimiter clairement les secteurs de l'autonomie sociale et ceux des prérogatives de l'Etat et entre les deux les champs d'interface régis par des rapports contractuels.

La garantie de l'indépendance du secteur associatif autonome est liée à son financement. Selon les cas et les besoins, soit il est autosuffisant par le biais des cotisations; soit il peut recourir au financement social privé que justifieraient des aménagements fiscaux appropriés, les individus pouvant ainsi choisir de reverser une partie de leurs impôts à des associations dont ils se déclarent solidaires; soit aussi il peut être aidé, surtout à son démarrage par des subventions publiques, sur la base de leur utilité sociale, sans contrainte quant à la nature de l'activité.
les subventions d'emplois d'utilité collective regis par la Délégation à l'Emploi répondent bien, par exemple, à cette souplesse dans leur conception, bien que dans la pratique leur attribution soit assujettie au pouvoir de décision des préfets).

Par ailleurs, le secteur associatif qui, soit par la nature de son activité, ou par le service nouveau qu'il propose, peut être considéré comme "participant de l'intêret général", doit pouvoir négocier avec les pouvoirs publics un contrat qui les lie relativement à un aspect défini de leur activité, sans que ce rapport contractuel, en dehors de la mission délimitée par le contrat, ne porte atteinte à son autonomie ni à sa capacité d'évolution et d'innovation. Ainsi les termes du contrat doivent pouvoir être reformulés selon les besoins.

Actuellement il existe la formule de "concession de service public", bien établie dans le Droit français. Mais celle-ci établit des rapports de subordination étroitement contrôlée, et non pas des rapports paritaires de nature contractuelle. Elle ne permet pas d'opérer une décentralisation de missions de l'Etat ou des collectivités locales au secteur associatif, mais agit de fait comme un instrument de "déconcentration".

5. Décentralisation et vie associative

Le débat sur la décentralisation, par rapport à laquelle il faut préciser que la réforme des collectivités locales prévue en France ne constitue qu'un piètre progrès, concerne de très près les associations. En effet, en renforçant les marges de pouvoir et d'autonomie des collectivités locales, on opère un rapprochement entre le pouvoir de décision et la société civile, facilitant dans le principe la participation des citoyens à la vie de la cité et à la démocratie directe.

Il est clair que la concentration des pouvoirs au niveau national incite les milieux associatifs à faire de même, pour parvenir à se "hisser" jusqu'aux sphères nationales, gymnastique en soi épuisante et ségrégative socialement, qui les amène à reproduire les formes de pouvoir contre lesquelles elles se sont créées. N'y parviennent de fait que les associations dont les promoteurs ont une bonne connaissance du fonctionnement de l'Etat et de l'administration et des "relations", et ce ne sont pas forcément celles qui ont le plus d'utilité sociale.

On remarquait à Grenoble la présence de nombreux élus locaux de municipalités "de pointe" très soucieuses de faire participer les associations à la vie locale, et de nombreuses associations de vocation municipale. Le dialogue qui s'est opéré sur la base d'une toile de fond qui tendait à projeter la décentralisation comme un remède à l'atrophie des sphères d'autonomie de la société civile jugulée par un pouvoir centralisateur prolongé par les ramifications de l'appareil administratif nous a induit à formuler les remarques suivantes:
- le renforcement des pouvoirs des collectivités locales risque de mettre les élus locaux en position de "barons", si l'exercice du pouvoir continue de leur être délégué, sans que ne soient clairement instituées des modalités de contrôle et de participation de la population, et définies des sphères d'autonomie de la société civile;

- la vie associative, dans ses rapports avec les collectivités locales, risque de subir un paternalisme pesant, soit un contrôle très immédiat et de voir ses actions directement récupérées par le jeu de la politique électorale locale;

- les collectivités locales tendent à favoriser la vie associative dans des secteurs par rapport auxquels elles opèrent de la même façon que l'administration centrale en "déconcentrant" certains de ses services publics (culture, loisirs, animation de voisinage...), peu innovants dans leur contenu, et peu passibles d'être le lieu d'exercice de contre-pouvoirs;

- la vie associative, qu'elle soit d'ailleurs de portée locale ou nationale, recouvre de fait une sur-représentation des couches sociales moyennes et supérieures. Lorsqu'elle est censée participer directement à la gestion de la cité, cette ségrégation sociale est grave et il incombe aux milieux associatifs et aux autorités municipales de résoudre ce problème. Il est probable que ce n'est pas seulement le principe même du fonctionnement de la vie associative qui est en cause, mais surtout les enjeux et les objectifs qu'elle se définit et qui sont représentatifs des couches sociales qui en sont les promoteurs;

- l'impulsion d'initiatives municipales ne peut guère se substituer aux initiatives sociales et celles-ci font de fait plus souvent office de "vitrines". Par exemple, l'APU (Atelier Public d'Urbanisme), initiative municipale de Meylan, a peu à voir avec l'APU de Roubaix (Atelier Populaire d'Urbanisme), créé à l'initiative des habitants du quartier de l'Alma-Gare de Roubaix, soutenu et mû par de longues luttes pour obtenir la réhabilitation de leur quartier selon leur propre plan d'urbanisme.

Si ces remarques font état de constatations assez décourageantes, elle ne remettent cependant pas en cause le principe même de la décentralisation à notre vue. Elles ne font que renforcer la nécessité de délimiter et de préciser les sphères d'autonomie de la société civile et la nature de ses rapports avec les pouvoirs publics, qu'il s'agisse du pouvoir central ou des pouvoirs locaux.

Si les associations doivent participer de fait à la gestion de la cité, il faut que le rapport contractuel entre elles et les pouvoirs publics soit conçu de façon à définir, élargir et respecter leur espace d'autonomie et à assurer leur continuité d'action.

Par ailleurs, s'il est sûr que si leur champ privilégié d'intervention est celui de la gestion du quotidien à l'échelle du voisinage immédiat, du quartier ou de la commune, elles sont
aussi celui de l'innovation et de l'expérimentation sociales, celui de l'expression des minorités et des solidarités et celui de l'exercice de contre-pouvoirs. A ces titres divers, elles constituent des interlocuteurs des pouvoirs locaux par rapport au secteur qui les concerne directement, mais aussi au plan de la politique générale locale.

**Conclusion**

Par les services multiples et variés qu'il offre et par la réponse rapide que ceux-ci procurent par rapport à l'évolution des besoins - qu'il s'agisse de besoins qualitativement évolutifs, ou simplement "oubliés" par l'Etat-Providence - le secteur associatif tient une place importante dans la société et dans le contexte de la crise de l'Etat-Providence, son rôle est appelé à s'accroître.

Mais, comme le fait remarquer J. Delors, les associations ne doivent pas faire le jeu d'une conception dualiste de la société où elles joueraient le rôle "d'assistantes sociales gratuites d'un système économique performant". Leurs perspectives d'avenir sont étroitement liées à la reformulation de la conception du travail dans un autre modèle de développement. Celle-ci, dans sa conception actuelle, subit une double crise, celle du chômage structurel et celle de la contestation du travail lui-même par un "mouvement anti-révolution industrielle". "Il faut, dit J. Delors, concevoir comme travail tout ce qui consiste à produire des productions utiles et à transformer les relations sociales".

Cette conception élargie du travail et de la production assigne en effet un rôle renouvelé à la formule associative et à sa fonction sociale, dans une société où le progrès technique bien géré et une redistribution du revenu plus équitable permettraient aux individus de disposer du temps et de l'argent nécessaires à ces activités associatives. Les sphères d'intervention directe et monolithique de l'Etat seraient alors réduites au profit de celles que la société civile assureraient de façon autonome et selon le principe du droit à la différence, tout en bénéficiant de l'accès aux ressources publiques sans lesquelles il n'est pas possible d'assumer des actions soutenues.

Certes, la vie associative n'est que l'une des formes d'organisation collective de la société civile dont on ne peut considérer qu'elle constitue en soi la base d'une révolution sociale, mais sa vitalité et son renouveau sont l'indicateur d'un mouvement social au travers duquel les individus expriment, notamment dans le secteur des services au sens très large, leur capacité de s'autogérer et d'innover pour satisfaire leurs propres besoins ou de nouveaux besoins émergents.
Co-opting Freire: A Critical Analysis of Pseudo-Freirean Adult Education

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Abstract: In this paper, Ross Kidd and Krishna Kumar make an attempt to examine the application of Freirean pedagogy in some recent adult education work. In the first part of the paper, they present a theoretical model which explains some of the prominent socio-political and economic aspects of this work.

In the second part, a case study of an international programme in non-formal adult education operated by a major non-government agency is made.

Prior to these two sections Kidd and Kumar provide a brief overview of the historical circumstances in which Freire's work and concepts came to international attention.

The case study provides one instance of the process by which pseudo-Freirean pedagogy domesticates the literacy learners of some Third World countries. The co-optation of Paulo Freire is an important aspect in the political economy of education in the Third World today. The study shows how a philosophy of liberation, which originated in a Third World country, can be used for developing a strategy for perpetuating dependence. Evidently, the process cannot be seen in isolation from the socio-economic factors that characterise the relations between the countries that have economic power and the countries that lack such power.

La récupération de Freire: Une Analyse Critique de l'Éducation des Adultes Pseudo-Freirienne

Résume: Les auteurs examinent les applications de la pédagogie de Paulo Freire dans un certain nombre d'activités d'éducation des adultes. La première partie de l'article présente un modèle théorique qui explique certains aspects socio-politiques et économiques importants de ces activités.

La seconde partie constitue une étude de cas d'un programme international d'éducation non-formelle des adultes mis en œuvre par une importante agence non-gouvernementale.

Préalablement à ces deux sections, les auteurs présentent un bref panorama des circonstances historiques dans lesquelles le travail et les concepts de Freire ont fait l'objet de l'attention internationale.
L'étude de cas fournit un exemple du processus par lequel la pédagogie pseudo-freirienne domestique les alphabétisés dans quelques pays du Tiers Monde. La récupération de Freire est un aspect important de l'économie politique de l'éducation dans le Tiers Monde actuel. L'étude montre comment une philosophie de la libération, née dans un pays du Tiers Monde, peut être utilisée pour la mise au point d'une stratégie qui perpetue la dépendance. De toute évidence, le processus ne peut être isolé des facteurs socio-économiques qui caractérisent les relations entre pays disposant d'un pouvoir économique et les pays qui en sont privés.

LA FALSIFICACION DE FREIRE: UN ANALISIS CRITICO DEL SISTEMA PSEUDO-FREIREIANO EN LA EDUCACIÓN PARA ADULTOS

Resumen: En este informe, Ross Kidd y Krishna Kumar examinan la aplicación de la pedagogía de Freire en el contexto de trabajos recientes en la educación para adultos. En la primera parte del informe se presenta un modelo teórico que explica algunos aspectos económicos y socio-políticos sobresalientes.

En la segunda parte se investiga un programa internacional en educación no formal para adultos impulsado por una importante agencia no gubernamental.

Anteriormente los autores presentaron una breve perspectiva del contexto histórico dentro del cual los conceptos de Freire recibieron renombre internacional.

El estudio proporciona un ejemplo del proceso por el cual una pedagogía pseudo-freiriana llega a domesticar los que luchan contra el analfabetismo en ciertos países del Tercer Mundo. La falsificación de las ideas de Paulo Freire es un aspecto importante de la economía política de educación en el Tercer Mundo. El estudio demuestra como una filosofía de liberación que tuvo su origen en un país del Tercer Mundo puede usarse para el desarrollo de una estrategia con el propósito de perpetuar la dependencia. Evidentemente, no se puede mirar el proceso en forma aislada de los factores socio-económicos que caracterizan las relaciones entre los países que tienen poder económico y aquellos a quienes les falta.
Ross Kidd */ and Krishna Kumar

CO-OPTING FREIRE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PSEUDO-FREIREAN ADULT EDUCATION /**

Paulo Freire's writings are now known around the world, and within the last decade several agencies of adult education have tried to reflect his influence in their policies and work. The terminology associated with his writings has found a place in reports and declarations coming from a wide range of national and international organisations. In fact, one can say that terms such as 'conscientisation', 'dialogue', 'banking', and 'culture of silence' have become household expressions in adult education.

Until the sixties, non-formal education operated on the margins of developmental activity, with little financial support and having weak links with economic projects. It usually catered to a small section of Third World societies, such as the relatively well-off farmers who attended agricultural extension programmes. As Mbilinyi has shown, there was no material basis for extending education to the majority of citizens:

There was no basic economic or political need for expansion of the primary education base, since 'super-exploitation' was possible without investment in our fundamental attention to either raising the level of productive forces within agricultural production or to fitting ideologically the peasants and workers to their place in production (p. 498).

In the late sixties, the demand for increasing food production in the Third World was heavily emphasised by international development agencies and the rich industrialised countries. During this period, a concomitant demand was made on non-formal education to provide the training required for the new technology of food production which was publicised under the 'Green Revolution'. In 1965, UNESCO and UNDP launched the Experimental World Literacy Programme, with the aim of increasing rural productivity by combining literacy instruction with vocational training in technology-dependent agricultural practices. This programme was essentially aimed at creating a qualified work force, and for this aim, areas of potential economic growth and the people who would have the resources for increasing production were chosen. The UNESCO programme coincided with, and in many cases provided an educational support, for the 'Green Revolution'.

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By the end of the sixties, the traditional structures of rural society in the Third World countries and the impact of the Green Revolution had combined to create an explosive situation. In order to safeguard the interests of transnational corporations and the Third World elites, it was necessary to contain social discontent. The strategy designed by the World Bank, USAID, and other agencies was a modified Green Revolution - an attempt to extend the same technology, in a modified form, to the small-scale peasant, along with credit and other government services. Land reforms and other structural changes were, once again, absent from the planners' considerations. The basic aim was to incorporate the peasant into the new production system. Under the banner of 'participation' in development, he was to be drawn away from any form of political participation which could ultimately prove harmful for the status quo.

The small-scale peasant, who had so far been excluded from most non-formal educational provision and agricultural development programmes, now became the target of developmental planning under the Integrated Development Strategy. Non-formal education was to play an important role in this strategy as the training and socialising mechanism to create the new 'peasant capitalist'. This was no narrow economic programme, like the earlier work-oriented literacy programme launched by the UNESCO. The purpose of the new programme was to cover all those aspects of a peasant's life that could facilitate his initiation into a consumer economy; aspects such as agriculture, health, sanitation, nutrition, fertility, and small-scale entrepreneurship. Massive amounts of money were spent by agencies like the World Bank and USAID to investigate the potential of non-formal education.

During this period, when the new aims of non-formal education were being formulated, the educational philosophy and practice of Paulo Freire became widely known through the English translations of his writings. Freire had developed and tested his ideas in Brazil and Chile within the context of peasants' and workers' struggles for land ownership, better working and living conditions, and political rights. In his writings, he presented mass-illiteracy as a structural problem caused by oppression of the masses by the powerful classes in society. According to him, the problem could be solved only by breaking the oppressive structure. His work inspired many progressive groups throughout the world to use educational communication as a tool in struggles against oppression. He also attracted the attention of those agencies that were developing an educational methodology for the incorporation of the small peasant into the consumer economy under the auspices of the Integrated Rural Development Strategy. These agencies found in Freire's terminology a progressive gloss which could make their approach marketable in the Third World. By co-opting Freire's terminology and concepts, they could hope to influence the direction of political change in the Third World.

The educational theory which grew out of the co-option and distortion of Freire is referred in this paper as the 'pseudo-Freirean perspective'. Having shown its historical roots, we
would now examine the theory in detail - what it is and how it represents a dilution of Freire. Of course, there is no formalised school that operates under this label, but there is a definable group of institutions and individuals who seem to have distorted Freire in a common way. We will try to provide synthesis of their ideas. This, of course, is our reconstruction of their ideas and methods. The reconstruction is based on our analysis of a number of documents put out by the ministries of education in several countries including India, Thailand, and Turkey; institutions such as Literacy House, Lucknow World Education, New York; and the University of Massachusetts Centre for International Education; and the writings of a number of individuals involved in non-formal adult education.

Our concern here is not with the lack of orthodoxy in breaking from Freire's ideas. Our concern is with the development and promotion of a theory that operates under the cover of Freirean terminology, and serves material interests which are directly antithetical to Freire's aim of transforming the structures of oppression in the world. What we are attacking is: first, the watering down of an important idea which has served the interests of the oppressed in their struggles for liberation, and secondly, the use of Freirean terminology and method without its substance as a smokescreen for the continued domestication of Third World peasants and workers in the interests of foreign capital.

The pseudo-Freirean perspective

The pseudo-Freirean perspective operates in adult education through the following steps:

- naming the central problem as 'poverty' rather than as 'oppression';
- identifying the cause of poverty as the self-inflicted deficiency of the poor, rather than oppression;
- proposing, as treatment, to change the behaviour of the poor through transmission of information and skills;
- coverting Freire's method into a 'neutral' classroom technique without 'politics'; and
- defining 'action' as coping activity.

The pseudo-Freirean perspective systematically avoids the use of the term 'oppression'. Terms like 'poverty', 'disadvantage', and 'deprivation' are used in the place of oppression. There is a "myth-making effort to identify as diabolical all thought-language which uses such words as 'alienation, domination, oppression'" (Freire, 1970, a). The shift in terminology is significant, since 'oppression' leaves no doubt about the cause of nature of the problem whereas 'poverty' is ambiguous and suggest many possibilities. Oppression is an aspect of exploitation in an economic and social relationship. This connotation is not necessarily there when we talk about poverty.
This shift in terminology can be attributed to a theoretical basis. The pseudo-Freirean theory seems to be based on the concept of a 'culture of poverty' - the view that the poor have a distinctive set of self-inflicted habits and characteristics which explain their poverty and prevent them from improving their situation. For example, in stating the aim of a literacy project as "helping the learner to become critically aware of the reasons for his poverty and his backwardness", Mehta (1978) juxtaposes 'poverty' and 'backwardness', suggesting that it is the same learner who is poor as well as backward. Another example can be drawn from this statement regarding poverty and underdevelopment:

... peasant cultures are commonly characterised as lacking innovativeness, being fatalistic, seldom deferring present gratification for future advantages, and holding a limited view of the world. People in such cultures tend to believe that all the desirable things in life are in fixed supply, so that if someone accumulates an abnormally large share of good things it is at someone else's expense. This philosophy helps explain the mutual distrust in inter-personal relations, the low degree of empathy, and the limited aspirations one often encounters in traditional societies. 1/

This itemisation of putative defects and negative characteristics of the poor, as an explanation of their poverty, finds scientific justification in the writings of those sociologists who have created the 'culture of poverty' theory, citing lack of achievement motivation (McClelland), failure to conceptualise progress (Foster), unwillingness to take risks (Cancian), etc, as explanations for underdevelopment and poverty.

While this view has been seriously challenged in other fields, it seems to take a long time to be discredited and to die out in adult education. Charles Valentine has provided the most detailed critique of the 'culture of poverty' theory, and he has shown that the much publicised characteristics of the poor are better explained as the poor's response to their conditions than as causes of their poverty:

Lack of work, lack of income, and the rest pose conditions to which the poor must adapt through whatever socio-cultural resources they control. These conditions are phenomena of the environment in which the poor live, determined not by behaviours and values of the poor but by the structure of the total system... this larger structure is perpetrated primarily by the economic and political actions of the non-poor. (Valentine, 1968; p. 116)

One means of treating Freire's concept of 'culture of silence' as 'culture of poverty' is by misinterpreting Freire's use of terms

like 'naive consciousness', 'fatalism', 'superstition', 'naivety', etc. By using these terms in an everyday sense, and without establishing a relationship between these terms and oppression, pseudo-Freireans are able to justify their own view of poverty as a self-inflicted phenomenon. Such a view distracts attention away from what the dominant classes are doing to the poor, focusing instead on what the poor are doing to themselves. Indeed, Freire describes the oppressed as 'naive', 'superstitious', 'fatalistic', etc, but he never suggests that these are self-inflicted characteristics or that the culture of silence is a self-generated phenomenon. What he means is that the oppressed are unable to objectify themselves in relation to the dominant classes, and they accept the oppressor's view of themselves. "The only way to understand the culture of silence", Freire says, "is to see it as a totality that is itself part of a larger complex... it is not something born by spontaneous generation on the spot. Rather, it arises from the inter-relations of the Third World and the metropolis" (Freire, 1975). Thus, the 'culture of silence' is inextricably linked to and defined by the dominant word of the oppressor. The 'naivety' of the oppressed is linked to their being an object of oppression. The 'culture of silence' is not an isolated, independent culture with its own internal dynamics. It exists in relation to the dominant culture by which it is defined.

From 'liberation' to 'domestication'

The pseudo-Freirean view of poverty helps us comprehend how another popular Freirean term, 'critical consciousness', is used in pseudo-Freirean literature. If the operative source of poverty is to be found among the poor themselves, then the remedy must come from the same source. Thus, the pseudo-Freirean perspective suggests that poverty can be overcome by changing the poor, by helping them develop better habits and skills, rather than by a change in the social structure.

Lacking structural perception, men attribute the sources of their situation to something within themselves rather than to something in objective reality... If the explanation for those situations lies... in men's own 'natural' incapacity it is obvious that their action will not be orientated towards transforming reality but towards that resumed incapacity. (Freire, 1970b, p. 36)

When pseudo-Freireans talk about 'critical consciousness', they mean an awareness in the poor of their needs and the information that is available for fulfilling these needs. The social problems that cause oppression, such as low wages, unequal access to land, water, and education, are ignored. The strategy is to manipulate the consciousness of the oppressed, thereby perpetuating and reinforcing the dependence of the oppressed on external definers of their consciousness. This is precisely what domestication is.
La Belle (1976) makes a useful distinction between this 'deprivation-development' strategy for social change and Freire's 'dependency-liberation' strategy. The former is based on a psychological view of disadvantage (deprivation) and prescribes behaviour modification (development) as the solution. The latter explains disadvantage as the result of structural inequalities that create dependency and proposes to increase the power of the oppressed (liberation) as a solution.

The 'deprivation-development' strategy is the crux of the pseudo-Freirean argument. It provides a route out of the liberal dilemma on how to handle Freire's politics:

Freire's techniques have been adapted for establishing a dialogue and engaging the learner in reflection rather than more political connotations of his approach. 1/

By suggesting that poverty is self-inflicted, and not a product of oppression, that the major problem is lack of skills, rather than structural constraints, the pseudo-Freireans succeed in bypassing the political aspect of Freire. They are able to accommodate him within the liberal-humanist model of adult education. They create the impression that Freire is simply another in the tradition of technique-innovators. They recognise the authoritarian nature of traditional teaching, and consider Freire as yet another classroom-methodologist who can help the adult educator in shedding some of the authoritarianism of his traditional role. According to Griffith, "Freire's notions about the necessity for making the student an active, questioning, thinking participant in the formal education process are neither new nor revolutionary". 2/

In urging that the adult learner should be involved in his own learning, Griffith says, Freire belongs to a long line of humanist educationists.

The pseudo-Freireans accept Freire's criticism of 'banking' education, and appear to use his concept of 'dialogue', but they apply this term interchangeably with 'discussion'. They claim to have 'adapted and adopted' such conscientisation techniques as the use of pictures to represent life situations and the use of generative themes. It is precisely through such 'adaption and adoption' that in the UNESCO work-oriented literacy method, which we have discussed earlier, Freire's codes of unemployment, hunger, oppression, and liberation could be translated into developmentalist modules of family planning, nutrition, sanitation and modern agriculture. Evidently, Freire provided a revolutionary gloss to such projects, and his revolutionary associations supplied a smoke-screen for the real intent of non-formal education which was to legitimise existing social relations in the Third World and between the Third and the industrialised world.


Pseudo-Freirean pedagogy converts dialogue into a form of 'discovery learning' making a mockery of Freire's philosophy. In this conversion, dialogue becomes a search for the 'right' answers, predetermined by the programme planner and provided to the teacher, normally through a teacher's guide. In effect, dialogue thus becomes a subtle form of 'banking', a means of propagating the new myths of development. In his "Pedagogy of the Oppressed" Freire had anticipated this dilution of 'dialogue' into an instrument for domestication: "Without this faith in man dialogue is a farce which inevitably degenerates into paternalistic manipulation" (Freire, 1970a). Authentic dialogue is possible only when people are trusted and given the change to ask their own questions and make their own decisions. Indeed, pseudo-Freireans appear to be doing something similar, but the methods they apply show that what happens in their projects is quite different.

A good illustration can be drawn from the methodology of 'problem solving'. It is usually presented as a multi-step process involving an examination of the facts of a problem-situation, identification of the likely consequences of alternative actions, and selection and implementation of the final alternative (Mezirow, op. cit.). The rhetoric suggests a two-way communication and active engagement of the learner in the problem-solving process. However, the reality, as our case study will presently show, is that of a predetermined, technical, and narrowly defined process. 'Problem-solving' is, in fact, a pseudo-Freirean version of Freire's concept of problematisation. The inclusion of 'problem-solving' as one of the skills to be taught through a literacy programme implies that adult illiterates are poor problem-solvers. Such a view of the people obviously does not regard the survival techniques used by them to cope with a hostile economic structure and difficult physical circumstances as problem-solving skills.

Pseudo-Freirean Pedagogy starts by denying that people have problem-solving skills, and goes on to supply pre-packaged information on problem-solving methods and behaviour. For pseudo-Freireans, each problem comprises segregated bit of life that poses an immediate difficulty and must be offered an immediate solution. Thus, they offer a disintegrated view of life in the name of an 'integrated' method. Their dilemma is:

... like that of many educators who really want to do good and therefore bring change, but who insist that it is always others who must learn, who must change. They therefore seek new techniques and "innovation", rejecting the basic issue as unrealistic, that it is not compatible with the reality defined by the status quo. They are in favour of the revolution, as long as it doesn't change anything. (Williams, 1971; p. 83)

For Freire, authentic dialogue must lead to action which is then analysed and evaluated before further action. This process of action and reflection is what Freire calls 'praxis'. Action is not just any action; it involves collective struggle to challenge the existing social relations which determine some of the basic components of social life, such as, access to land, water, housing and income. In several pseudo-Freirean programmes where the idea of collective action is cultivated, collective potential is
channelled towards pre-planned economic projects like chicken or vegetable farming, and no attempt is made to challenge the inequities in the economic and power structure. The assumption behind such programmes is obviously the view that low production rather than unjust social structure is the problem, i.e., only if the poor would produce more they would be better off.

Pseudo-Freirean method: A case study

With the help of our theoretical framework of pseudo-Freirean pedagogy, we made a case study of a major non-formal adult education agency operating in the Third World, namely World Education, Inc. Our main reason for selecting this agency as a case was the scale of its coverage. It supports projects in 50 countries, and its publications circulate in 138 countries. A second reason of our choice was that the period of most rapid growth in World Education's life of twenty-eight years synchronises with the period in which pseudo-Freirean pedagogy developed, namely the seventies. A third reason comes from the fact that the funding sources of World Education include both agencies such as the World Bank and USAID as well as privately owned transnational corporations like General Foods, IBM, Exxon, Carnegie, and foundations such as Ford, Buttenheim, and Tinker.

What is known today as World Education was established in 1951 under the name of World Literacy, Inc, mainly to assist Literacy House (then Literacy Village) in the north Indian province of Uttar Pradesh. Literacy House was started in the early 1952 by Welthy H. Fisher, an American Presbyterian missionary. World Education's initial area of operation was confined to India, and Literacy House remained its field laboratory for a long time. World Education's first major project outside India was in Thailand where it developed the prototype for the National Adult Literacy Programme. The methodology developed in this project was later transported to Turkey, Ethiopia, Kenya and Bangladesh, as well as to World Education's home country, the United States, under the project called 'AIM: An Exemplary Program for International Experience'. (AIM stands for Apperception-Interaction Method). World Education's area of operation corresponds to the American sphere of influence. The major countries it has served during the period of our study are Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, India and Turkey in Asia; Colombia, Honduras and Guatemala in Latin America; Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia in Africa.

The time for rapid and expansive growth in World Education's activities came in 1968, after it submitted proposals to the USAID for funds for "linking literacy programmes and family planning education". (It is worth noting that in the 1968-72 period, USAID funding for population control programmes escalated four-fold, from $34 million to $123 million, while USAID's health care funding dropped from $164 million to $60 million). According to World Education's President, Thomas B. Reehn, "the aims of this programme were twofold: (1) to attack the problems of resistance
to family planning arising from tradition, religion, superstition, fear, ignorance, and economic concern, and (2) to develop non-formal functional education programme directed toward out-of-school young adults with the lowest literacy levels, where the needs are greatest" 1/. The proposals were accepted, and in the next five years - i.e., from 1969 to 1974 - World Education revenue increased five-fold, from $200,000 to over $1,000,000 (WE Annual Report, 1973-74). The project which enabled World Education to increase its revenue, staff, and area of operations so remarkably was called "functional education for family life planning", and this programme provided the organisation with its new and overall identity in the Third World.

Like many other non-formal adult education agencies, World Education has carried in its work over the decade of the seventies a distinct stamp of the ideas and terminology associated with Paulo Freire. The organisation's annual report for 1976-77 proudly declared this lineage:

Provocative challenges to traditional assumptions about adult learning have been born and nurtured in Latin America. Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich, and others have produced a new generation of educators who know from their own experience that peasants and the urban poor are both learners and teachers... We find enthusiastic response among these young educators to our understanding of the partnership between learners and teachers in a dynamic educational process.

In a monograph which outlines the programme design for the Functional Education for Family Life Planning, David Harman points at Freire's distinction between 'banking' education and the new, dialogue-based pedagogy professed in the monograph (Harman, 1973). We have already given an example of the importance attached to Freire by another World Education theorist (Srinivasen, cf. footnote 1, p.32). Allusions to Freirean ideas are to be found all over the literacy materials and reports produced by or associated with World Education as our discussion of some of these materials will presently show.

Curriculum for domestication

The functional literacy programme in Thailand, which started in 1970, offers us a key example of World Education's curriculum planning. As an active collaborator with the Thai Ministry of Education, World Education's personnel made a major attempt in Thailand to modernise a conservative adult education programme by offering their technical expertise and progressive-looking terminology. The curriculum was developed on the basis of a survey of people's beliefs, habits, living conditions, needs and language patterns. People's problems were spotted during the survey, and the final curriculum was supposed to reflect these problems. Such a survey smacks of Freire's strategy to send project members

1/ Thomas B. Keehn, 'A Programme Plan for Functional Education and Family Life Planning', Literacy Discussion, (3 (1) 1972), pp. 5-16.
to the villages in order to obtain a participant's view of oppressive conditions in which villagers live. The Thai surveys were similar to Freire's strategy only in a superficial way as we can easily see if we notice the stated purpose of these surveys in the ministry documents:

The ultimate goal of the Thai concept-oriented program of functional literacy and family life education is to improve the living conditions of the people in the rural areas by attempting to correct misconceptions and to change the outmoded behaviours. (Ministry of Education, Thailand, 1972)

The assumption in this statement is clearly what we have earlier shown as the pseudo-Freirean theory of the culture of poverty. Placed in the light of this assumption, the baseline survey of people's needs and problems becomes a sham. It is only logical that people are described as the 'target populations' in such surveys: indeed, people are targets of manipulation in the Thai curriculum. According to Bernard and Armstrong (1979), in the Thai surveys "the role of the villagers is limited to providing the baseline information". Data analysis and interpretation, and the determination of "what ought to be", is done by an inter-agency committee of local experts.

The Thai curriculum illustrates the range and the nature of people's 'problematic' behaviour which is the target of change under literacy teaching. Four main areas comprise the first level curriculum: agriculture, health and family life, economics, and civics. The topics listed under these are characterised by a blatant didacticism. Economic and political aspects of the material conditions of Thai people are totally ignored, whereas the need for cleanliness, budgeting, and obedience to official advice are emphasised. Clearly, the curriculum is not meant to deal with structural problems. Its purpose is to develop acceptance of the status quo. It is significant that the central symbol of the Thai programme was a Buddhist figure of achievement, the Khit Phen man who behaves rationally and with 'contentment under all circumstances and accepts suffering in the name of avoiding useless striving.

The Thai curriculum had several of the fundamental features of the pseudo-Freirean mode of operation. In its technicist concern, it was perhaps more sophisticated than any other similar programme in the world. The use of looseleaf covers and cards in place of the traditional primer merely disguised the real orthodox nature of the programme.

In our examination of literacy materials developed with the help of World Education experts in Thailand and Turkey, and the primers produced by the Literacy House, Lucknow, we found that the reality symbolised in them is highly artificial and totally removed from the material conditions of people's life in these countries. The crucial problems and challenges facing the people seem to undergo a process of deft concealment and disjunction through their presentation in the materials. The structural relationships of economic classes are never depicted. Instead, one finds a collection of selective images of life, in an unspecified economic setting along with a didactic text. Objects that can provoke any dialectical understanding, such as the contrast between the rich and the
poor, are simply removed from pictures and the text; and the symp-
toms, rather than the causes, of problems are attacked. The over-
all image of society that is projected in the primers is that of
harmony and co-operation, rather than of the actual conflicts and
divisions.

Pseudo-Freireans follow Freire in calling the key problems they
attack in the materials as 'generative themes' or 'codes', terms
that World Education theorist David Harman acknowledges to have
come in their current usage from Freire's work. The themes that
Freire calls generative should "contain the possibility of unfold-
ing into again as many themes, which in their turn call for new
tasks to be fulfilled" (Freire, 1970a, p. 93). The themes we see
in the literacy primers, on the contrary, are one-dimensional and
flat, incapable of leading the learner to a better understanding
of the structural context of his oppression through associative
thinking. In fact, they come across as a set of slogans which
victimise the learners by making them feel inadequate, and thereby
reinforcing their dependence. "Aao Charcha Karen", a Hindi primer
published by the Literacy House in India (Tripathi and Prakash,
1978), offers some good examples of the treatment given in several
other primers to common Third World situations. The key to hap-
piness, according to this book, lies in family planning through
birth control:

How lucky are the people who are born in small families. They
have no dearth of anything. They face no problems. All the
means of pleasure and comfort are within their reach. Life is
heaven for them. (Our translation of Lesson 18)

The philosophy that it is lucky to be born in a small family is
parallel to the messages given in this book on other common prob-
lems:

Eating just rice has a bad effect on health.
Eat eggs to make up for protein deficiency.
Crowds are increasing because of increasing in population.

Everywhere, the so-called 'problem-centered' lessons of the primer
subtly try to divert the learner's attention away from the econo-
ic and political causes of social and personal problems. The
sentence about rice-eating does not show why so many people in
India are forced to eat only rice. It presents them as people who
have a bad habit grown out of ignorance. The sentence about pro-
tein deficiency does not allow people to question why an age-old
source of protein in Indian diet, lentils, has become scarce and
expensive, and its per capita availability has declined in the
post-Green Revolution period. The Indian literacy learner is
simply being asked to switch from lentils to eggs.

The pseudo-Freirean view of knowledge consists of right and wrong
answers. The 'correct' answer is predetermined by the planner,
and 'packaged' in the primer and other materials. The teacher's
job is simply to dispense the pre-packaged knowledge. While he
must be prepared with the 'correct' answers to anticipated ques-
tions, he must also maintain an air of exploratory participation
in the group discussion. Pseudo-Freirean programme planners insist on calling their strategy as 'dialogue', but the practices they recommend in the teacher-guides is indistinguishable from 'banking'. Freire has warned against using the codes as bureaucratic formulas. The pseudo-Freirean practice is not only in glaring contrast to Freire, but also to their own theorists:

...the essence of education is that it does not drive people to accept predetermined ends but, instead, fosters the initiative for them to participate intelligently in the choice of ends. Educators do not set out to convince, persuade, or engineer consent. This is the realm of propagandists. Rather, educators help people to become more aware, to understand more clearly, to decide more rationally whether or not to adopt birth control practice.

This statement looks like mere rhetoric if we examine the Thai programme in which Mezirow played an important role. The correct answer in most of the basic lessons of this programme could only be one word that was to be filled in by the learner.

The irony of the teacher's behaviour in a pseudo-Freirean programme comes out most visibly in the Turkish programme where a dramatic representation is implanted in narratives to be read aloud. The purpose of this representation is to make class-discussion truly 'live'. The narratives start with a conversation about a problem; enlightening information is offered in the middle part, and the end presents a resolution. The dogmatic nature of the dialogue cannot be mistaken:

Doctor Ayhan Tezel (to Ali Dede): I like your village very much. May be the reason for this is that I am a villager myself. Your village is very poor. But it is sweet and charming. Poverty may also be overcome.

Ali Dede: Poverty and prosperity depend on the person's own ability.

Ali Dede confirms the self-infliction theory of poverty which is the backbone of World Education's educational thinking. It is inevitable that the questions and answers that follow the problem-dramas of the Turkish teacher-manuals should put blatantly what the dramas convey somewhat deftly. A problem-drama titled "How to Live as a Human" is followed by this set of recommended question and answer between the learner and the teacher:

Learner: Why do we get unbalanced, one-sided nutrition?
Teacher: Because we don't know how to get balanced nutrition.

The learner's image as reflected in the Turkish and several other materials is that of a foolish, ignorant person. In lesson after lesson of the Turkish programme we hear about worried people suddenly becoming jubilant by coming to know how a new habit or thing can change their world.
Conclusion

Our case study provides one instance of the process by which pseudo-Freirean pedagogy domesticates the literacy learners of some Third World countries. The co-optation of Paulo Freire is an important aspect in the political economy of education in the Third World today. Our study shows how a philosophy of liberation, which originated in a Third World country, can be used for developing a strategy for perpetuating dependence. Evidently, the process cannot be seen in isolation from the socio-economic factors that characterise the relations between the countries that have economic power and the countries that lack such power.

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initiation à l'écodéveloppement

Avec l'édition arabe de 'Que faire - un autre développement' publié au début de cette année par la SNED à Alger (voir annonce en arabe dans ce numéro) voici, cinq ans après le Rapport Dag Hammarskjöld 1975, un ouvrage réalisé à partir des contributions à ce projet des chercheurs du CIRED sous la direction d'Ignacy Sachs. Sa première partie couvre l'écodéveloppement en tant que projet de civilisation, la croissance économique et le développement des inégalités, les impasses des modèles de développement. La seconde partie envisage les alternatives: écodéveloppement et satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux (alimentation, agriculture, santé, habitat, technologies industrielles appropriées pour un développement autocentré).

Abstract: 'Development' policies pursued during the last three decades in India not only failed to alleviate rural poverty, but overall growth was accompanied by growing immiseration of the rural poor. Malnutrition increased pari passu with concentration of land and technocratic strategies.

This paper describes an innovative development policy which is attempted by the Left Front government of West Bengal. Radical land reform is the cornerstone of the rural development programme. It implies fixing and implementing land ceilings and land redistribution, but it does not stop there.

Through land ceilings, some 1.2 million acres have been vested in the State (this represents more than a quarter of the 4 million acres thus transferred nationwide) and more than half of this has already been distributed to one million beneficiaries (57% of which belonging to the scheduled castes and tribes).

The policy includes alternative institutional credit support and other forms of financial assistance; appropriate technologies for irrigation; development of infrastructure through food for work programmes; a new system of tax collection; legal assistance; new linkages between bureaucracy, rural self-governing institutions and rural workers' organizations.

The process of implementation of land reform with its emphasis on direct participation of the beneficiaries is releasing impulses of change already discernible. Thus a dispossessed humanity is emerging in the countryside to wrest its legitimate place in society.

Réformes agraires au Bengale occidental

Résumené: Les politiques de 'développement' appliquées en Inde depuis trente ans n'ont pas seulement failli à réduire la pauvreté rurale, mais la croissance s'est accompagnée d'une paupérisation croissante des masses rurales. La malnutrition s'est accrue parallèlement à la concentration de la terre et à des stratégies technocratiques.

Cet article décrit la politique innovatrice du gouvernement du Front de gauche du Bengale occidental. Une réforme agraire radicale est la pierre angulaire du programme de développement rural. Elle implique l'établissement et
l'application de plafonds fonciers et de mesures de redistribution, mais elle ne s'arrête pas là.

Résultat de la fixation de plafonds, un demi-million d'hectares ont été confiés à l'Etat (à comparer au total de 1.6 millions d'hectares pour toute l'Inde) et plus de la moitié de cette surface a déjà été redistribuée à un million de bénéficiaires, dont 57% appartiennent aux castes et tribus les plus misérables ('scheduled castes and tribes').

La politique comprend des mécanismes nouveaux de crédit et d'autres formes d'aide financière; des technologies appropriées pour l'irrigation; la réalisation des infrastructures par des programmes d'alimentation pour le travail; un nouveau système de perception des impôts; une aide légale; de nouvelles relations entre la bureaucracie, les institutions rurales d'autogestion élues et les organisations des travailleurs ruraux.

La mise en œuvre des réformes, avec son accent sur la participation directe des bénéficiaires, libère des énergies pour le changement. Ainsi les damnés de la terre s'affirment pour arracher leur place légitime dans la société.

REFORMAS AGRARIAS EN BENGALA OCCIDENTAL

Resumen: Las políticas de 'desarrollo' aplicadas en la India desde hace treinta años no solo han fracasado en reducir la pobreza rural, sino que el crecimiento ha sido acompañado de una miseria creciente de las masas rurales. La malnutrición ha aumentado paralelamente a la concentración de la tierra y a las estrategias tecnocráticas.

Este artículo describe la política innovadora de desarrollo del gobierno del Frente de Izquierda de Bengala Occidental. Una reforma agraria radical es la piedra angular del programa de desarrollo rural. Ella implica el establecimiento y la aplicación de medidas de limitación de la propiedad agrícola y de redistribución de la tierra, pero no llega sólo hasta ahí.

Como resultado de la tijacicón de dichos límites, medio millón de hectareas han sido entregadas el Estado (esto representa más de un cuarto de los cuatro millones de hectareas así traspasadas en toda la India) y más de la mitad de esta superficie ya ha sido redistribuida a un millón de beneficiarios, de los cuales el 57% pertenece a las castas y tribus mas miserables y organizadas.

La política comprende nuevos mecanismos de crédito y otras formas de ayuda financiera; tecnologías apropiadas para la irrigación; la realización de infraestructuras por medio de programas de alimentación para el trabajo; un nuevo sistema de recolección de impuestos; asistencia legal; nuevas relaciones entre la administración, las instituciones rurales de autogestión elegidas y las organizaciones de trabajadores rurales.

La puesta en marcha de la reforma agraria con su acento en la participación directa de los beneficiarios está liberando energías para el cambio ya perceptible. De esta forma, el sector desposeído de la humanidad, que vive en el campo, está levantándose para arrebatar el legítimo puesto que le corresponde en la sociedad.
LAND REFORMS IN WEST BENGAL

It is now well recognised that development policies pursued during the last three decades in our country failed to alleviate rural poverty. On the contrary, there are evidences to indicate that overall growth was accompanied by growing immiserisation of the rural poor. Institutions established for the benefit of the disadvantaged groups often served the interests of the rural rich. The poor were not allowed access to their services. Technical extension services invariably served surplus farmers and institutional credit meant for the poor reached those who often refinanced it to the poor at usurious rates of interest. The poor were deprived of the benefits accruing from the totality of activities which went on in the name of development.

For the country as a whole the per capita rate of growth of gross domestic product between 1960 and 1976 was 1.3. But during almost the same period the percentage of rural population below the poverty line increased from 42 in 1960-61 to 47.6 in 1973-74. Disaggregated figures for some of the 'affluent' States corroborate the general trend. In West Bengal, for example, the percentage of total population below the poverty line increased from 40% in 1960-61 to 66% in 1973-74. Similar figures apply to Utter Pradesh (42 to 63%) and Bihar (41 to 59%).

The entire development strategy followed so far particularly in respect of the rural sector had been basically technocratic in nature. It was thought that given the system as it were, injection of adequate dosage of input-mix together with the building up of basic infrastructure like irrigation, road, electricity, output would increase; and this would have a general toning up effect on the rural economy benefiting all concerned. Advent of the "miracle seed" buttressed this thesis. Unfortunately, the beneficial fall-out of the new technique of agricultural production was very limited in its spread and it sharpened rural differentiation both relatively and absolutely. Studies made by F.A.O. indicate that during the period 1969-1974 (the hey-day of green revolution) the number of persons suffering from malnutrition increased both absolutely (from 141 to 175 million persons) and relatively (from 26 to 30% of total population).

There are also indications of growing concentration of land on one hand and equally increasing incidence of landlessness on the other. The significant increase in the number of agricultural workers between 1961 and 1971 also indicates growing pauperisation of the

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lower layers of peasantry. If the technocratic approach to development continued without touching the structure in any significant manner, it had been estimated that the share of the lower 40% of the population in the gross national product which was 17% in 1975 would come down to 15% in 2000.

The traditional wisdom that with the growth of the size of the cake everyone's share would increase proved false. Increase in GNP was accompanied in our country with increase in both relative and absolute levels of poverty and destitution for growing numbers of people. Benefits of economic growth did not trickle down as predicted. They were siphoned off somewhere up in the line leaving more people hungry, shelterless, illiterate, diseased and destitute than thirty years ago. It had been proved that mere injection of packages of critical inputs in the agrarian sector and creation of rural infrastructure would only benefit those who possessed and controlled productive assets. With highly skewed pattern of land distribution any development policy which aims at delivering desirable baskets input-mix for raising output would only increase rural differentiation. In land-scarce, labour-abundant economy with a high degree of concentration of landownership and inequalitarian distribution of productive assets, fundamental structural change in the form of radical land reform provides the only sure and swift method of reducing rural poverty. Such structural overhaul, however desirable it might be, is not possible within the given legal and constitutional frame. Hence the attempt of the Left Front Government has been to implement land reform measures within the existing legal parameters to enable the rural poor to benefit from the process of development. Land reform is considered as the cornerstone of the entire rural development strategy in West Bengal.

Poverty encompasses the totality of life and existence of the afflicted population. Hence to be effective any antipoverty programme with land reform as the major component has to be multidimensional in its design and impact. A programme of land reform which stops at merely distribution of land or with an enabling legislation for security of tenure of sharecroppers is bound to have a minimal effect. On the other hand, with the reversal process initiated by the entrenched interests and with no support system for the potential beneficiaries, their conditions could be, as well, worse off in the post reform situation than before. The land reform programme of West Bengal recognises this critical deficiency of the traditional administrative approach. That is why an attempt has been made to remedy the situation by developing a broad support mechanism by establishing functional linkages with the bureaucracy, elected rural self-governing institutions and rural workers' organisations. This is the main difference of the land reform programme currently being implemented in West Bengal with the attempts made earlier in the State and in other States of India.
The main features of the programme of land reforms in West Bengal are:

(i) Quick recording of the names of the sharecroppers (barga-dars) through "Operation Barga" and thereby securing to them the legal rights that they are entitled to.

(ii) Distribution of already available ceiling surplus vested lands among the landless and the land poor rural workers with the active cooperation of the Panchayati raj institutions.

(iii) Drive to detect and vest more ceiling surplus lands through quasi-judicial investigative machinery with the help of rural workers' organisations and Panchayati raj institutions.

(iv) Giving institutional credit cover to the sharecroppers and the assignees of vested land to irreversibly snap the ties of bondage they have with the landlords and money-lenders.

(v) Assigning permanent title for homestead purpose to all the landless agricultural workers (including sharecroppers), artisans and fishermen up to 0.08 acres who are occupying lands of others as permissive possessors.

(vi) Providing tiny sources of irrigation to the assignees of vested lands through bamboo tubewells where underground hydrological conditions permit such technology and bank financed dugwells with heavy subsidy from the State in other suitable areas with a view to induce such assignees to go in for high value multiple cropping to improve their economic status.

(vii) Giving financial assistance in the form of subsidies to the assignees of vested land for development of their lands.

(viii) Abrogation of the old revenue system which was a hangover from the Zamindari era and substituting it by a new measure under which revenue is assessed on land-holding above a certain valuation on progressive rate. Small and marginal farmers have been exempted from revenue burden.

(ix) Restoration of land alienated by poor and marginal farmers through distress sale provided the purchaser himself is not a poor peasant having land-holding less than 1 acre.
Designing Food for Work Programme for developing rural infrastructure which would primarily benefit the assignees of vested land and marginal farmers as well as to give them sustenance during periods of distress to tide over the crisis and to prevent retransfer of land to affluent farmers.

Though *recording of sharecroppers* as such is not a new element in the land reforms administration of the State what is novel about the present programme is the massive drive to register the names of the sharecroppers with the collaboration of the groups of beneficiaries and with the active assistance of rural workers' organisations and rural self-governing institutions. Typically bureaucratic method of recording the names of sharecroppers failed to achieve any significant success. Individually sharecroppers felt diffident to come forward and register their names against the wishes of the landowners because of fear of retaliation. Hence, in "Operation Barga" which was launched by this Government towards the end of 1978, the emphasis has been to develop group action among the potential beneficiaries to enable them to overcome the fear psychosis by creating a mutual support system. An important feature of the new methodology is to have group meetings with the potential beneficiaries in the evening in the localities where they stay. In such meetings the sharecroppers are encouraged to express their grievances and to relate experiences of various social and economic injustice that they suffer. Officials who attend such meetings explain the benefits that bargadars are entitled to under the law and the advantages that would accrue, through recording of their names in the record of rights. Immediately thereafter, tentative lists of claimants are prepared which are followed by public verifications of such claims in field in presence of both the landowners and the claimant sharecroppers on the next day. After the field verification a provisional list is hung up in all the important places in the cluster of villages where the operation is going on. Landowners are given opportunity to file objections which are also heard and verified in the field in public. Thereafter, certificates of sharecropping are distributed among the beneficiaries. This methodology which depends heavily on the group action of the sharecroppers is qualitatively different from the traditional revenue court approach where the poor are at a disadvantage as against the rich, because of their inability to engage lawyers and to produce documentary evidence which they do not have. Most of the sharecropping agreements are oral in character and therefore there is no documentary evidence to support their claims. It also enables rural workers' organisations to effectively participate in the programme of registration by organising the sharecroppers in groups. They put forward their claims in groups and their claims are verified in field in public. This procedure enables them to overcome the fear complex and reduces the possibilities of severe retaliatory action on the part of the landowners because of their knowledge that such action would meet with the organised resistance. The results of this
new methodology has been fairly good. Till 30th April, 1980, some 850,000 sharecroppers were recorded out of an estimated number of roughly 2 million.

Most difficult aspect in "Operation Barga" is the identification of the sharecroppers. To overcome this difficulty a significant amendment has been made in the Land Reforms Law under which a person lawfully cultivating the land of another is presumed to be the bargadar if such a person is not a member of the family of the other person whose land he cultivates and the burden of proving that such a person is not a bargadar lies on the landowner. This innovative, and imaginative amendment giving a presumption in favour of the bargadar and shifting of onus of rebuttal to the landowner has brought about a sea-change in the technique of identification and recording of bargadar. This provides the legal frame of the massive "Operation Barga".

One of the major difficulties encountered in implementing "Operation Barga" has been the ex-parte injunction orders from the courts, which are being issued with the intensity of monsoon shower. Often the new methodology is being challenged as illegal on a total misappreciation of the facts and law. Association of rural workers in the process of recording is often misinterpreted as partisanship on the part of the administration totally ignoring the prescriptions of the ILO Convention 141 - "Convention Concerning Organisations of Rural Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social Development". Parliament ratified this convention. Hence the methodology of "Operation Barga" is justified not only on the ground that it provides a mechanism of direct participation of the beneficiaries in the implementation of the programme but also because it has a legal sanction behind it.

Till date through the operation of various land ceiling laws approximately about 1.17 million acres of agricultural land have been vested in the State. Incidentally, West Bengal is the only State in India which has vested so much of agricultural land through implementation of ceiling laws. Out of little over 4 million acres of agricultural land declared surplus throughout the country, West Bengal's contribution has been 1.17 million acres. This figure does not include the Government waste land and the lands of the tenants who have come under direct relationship with the Government after the abolition of Zamindary. Out of this 1.17 million acres, 630,000 acres have been distributed among little over 1 million beneficiaries of whom roughly 57% belongs to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Distribution of ceiling surplus vested lands to the eligible landless and landpoor agricultural labourers and sharecroppers has been rather tardy. Often former landowners continued to exercise possession and enjoy usufruct of these lands by clandestine arrangement with lower echelons of bureaucracy. Not infrequently their henchmen or their landless relatives were inducted on such
lands soon after vesting who had been exercising some influence or
other to prevent their ejectment and distribution of such land to
genuinely landless persons. There were cases where the old owners,
who continued to dominate the village life, just asked the landless
workers and sharecroppers not to prefer their claims on such land.
That apart innumerable writ petitions have been filed in the High
Court some of which are pending for pretty long periods. Latest
statistics show that about 171,000 acres of vested agricultural
lands have been hit by injunction orders of the High Court and
Civil Courts. It is estimated that there are 20,000 Civil Rules
in the High Court and 27,000 Civil Suits in different Civil Courts.
While the landowners can pursue their cases with single minded
devotion and with new techniques and ruses which their money,
power and social position can commandeer, it is becoming increa-
singly difficult to keep track of these matters even with a special
panel of State lawyers and a separate legal cell in the Department.
Tradition of inviolability of private property inculcated through
the centuries permeates the judicial system including the legal
profession in general and it becomes easy for the affected pro-
pertied classes to draw judicial sympathy with the plea of injured
innocence on any antiproperty legal measure. What appeared to be
very surprising was the role of the legal profession. Whether
because of constant espousal of the cause of propertied classes or
because of the impulse to be on the right side of the Establishment
to protect their business interests or because of the lack of
inner conviction, by and large, the profession in the State failed
to rise to the occasion in the legal battles in the law courts.
Perhaps, their class interests often transcended their professio-
nal ethics with the result that programme was being stalled through
innumerable injunction orders. Land Reform continues to be a
major victim of the private property cult of the juridical system
even after the abolition of the Right to Property from our Consti-
tution. Roughly 374,000 acres of vested ceiling surplus agricul-
tural lands are still available for distribution. To overcome the
inbuilt inertia of the administrative machinery which often coa-
lesces with the land-owning classes in the rural areas a signifi-
cant role has been assigned recently to the elected Panchayat
Samities at the Block level to vet the list of eligible persons
villagewise and to recommend names for assignment of vested lands
not exceeding one acre per household without any premium. With
the involvement of the elected rural self-governing institutions
in distribution of vested land it is expected that work would be
completed with expedition. Even assuming that some of these lands
may be submarginal roughly 350,000 destitute households would be
immediately partially rehabilitated.

Though West Bengal's achievement in vesting of ceiling surplus
land is significant by all India standard, there is scope for
further vesting of land if the deficiencies in the law could be
removed. Tasks involved in detecting ceiling surplus lands are:
(i) identification of families having or suspected to have lands
above ceiling (ii) locating and identifying all the plots of land
in the possession of every such family both according to record of rights and in reality including tracing of benami or clandestine transfers of property made to friends, relatives or other persons real or imaginary through fictitious or collusive transactions, (iii) initiating legal processes for vesting of all surplus land including lands held in benami, and (iv) taking over possession of land vested after completing the quasi-judicial and administrative processes. For any massive drive to detect and vest ceiling surplus land unstinted help and cooperation of sharecroppers and agricultural workers are essential. They have the full knowledge of both real and nominal owners. It is only on their evidence that sham and collusive transactions could be detected and nullified. Earlier experience showed that without security of cultivation and alternative source of employment, in a changed situation sharecroppers and agricultural workers who took initiative in finding out such land had to suffer enormously.

Hence "Operation Barga" which ensures security of cultivation to the recorded bargadars and well designed Food for Work Programme which assures alternative employment in times of need are two very important complementary measures for detection of ceiling surplus lands. During 1979 on an average 4400 acres of agricultural land vested in the State per month. It could be substantially stepped up with removal of the present deficiency in the law. Most of the big landowners have secreted away their land in the names of nominal title holders. If such holdings could be declared illegal for the purpose of land ceiling huge area would still vest. Entire thrust would be shifted to this programme after Operation Barga is completed.

Developing an alternative institutional credit support system for the beneficiaries of land reform is a remarkable feature in West Bengal. Usury along and rack-renting are the two potent instruments of rural exploitation. Mere assignment of surplus land or recording of names of sharecroppers really does not help people much unless simultaneously attempts are made to meet their credit needs. It may look astounding, but it is a reality that a large number of village poor accept consumption credit with a rate of interest ranging from 150 to 300 per cent per annum. The usual practice is to take a bag of rice during the lean season and to return a bag and a half immediately after harvest. Duration of the loan is three to four months. Sometimes they borrow with stipulation to return double the amount. There are various sophistication and ramification of this system of extraction. Immediately after launching of Operation Barga, reports were received about stopping of consumption credit by landowners and hiking of rates of interests as retaliation. Though cooperative system has fairly widespread network, as elsewhere it is controlled by the village rich. There were reports of using cooperative finance by the landowners for usury. Promulgation of law for universal membership was followed by largescale default by cooperative credit societies. It was not unlikely that societies were made temporarily defunct to dissuade and to prevent the marginal farmers and
sharecroppers from becoming members and to dry up the source of institutional credit forcing them to come to the landowners and money lenders for credit. Hence in the kharif (approximately mid-March to mid-July) season of 1979, a big programme of financing of sharecroppers and assignees of vested land by nationalised commercial banks, the State Bank of India and regional rural banks was launched. There were innumerable difficulties in putting through this scheme. Banks are accustomed to dealing with large amounts for a small number of accounts. There is an inbuilt aversion on the part of the banks to deal with large number of accounts with small amounts. And on the top of it a lot of promotional activities were required to wean away the village poor from the fold of the usurers who used all types of ploys to prevent development of new credit system over which they had no control. Banks had their problem of inadequacy of staff to tackle this programme. In West Bengal rural branches of commercial banks had 0.04 field officers per branch. Therefore, apart from the institutional psyche of the banks, there was the formidable problem of organisation. Lists of recorded sharecroppers and assignees of vested land, prepared and certified by revenue officials, were supplied to participating branches. Panchayats were requested to sponsor cases. Revenue and development staff were deployed to prepare documentation. About 52,000 bargadars and assignees were given a bank loan. Though compared to the total number of bargadars and assignees this figure may look small, its significance could be appreciated when it is compared with performance of the banks during the seventies. Between 1972 and 1978 all the banks together opened around 79,000 differential rate of interest accounts in the agrarian sector. In 1979 kharif season alone under the leadership of the State Government they opened additional 52,000 accounts. During the rabi (approximately mid-November to February) season over 7,000 borrowal accounts were opened mainly for the assignees. Thus during the year little over 59,000 new borrowal accounts were opened exclusively for the village poor. State Government has been very particular about repayment of loans. To induce prompt repayment, West Bengal Government introduced full interest subsidy scheme for those who paid back the loan within the stipulated period. Bank branches have given fund out of which they paid the interest and later on rendered accounts. That apart, revenue, panchayat and development agencies have been instructed to join the campaign for prompt recovery of bank loans. Experience shows that rate of recovery is fairly good, and particularly, much better than the rate of recovery of loans advanced to higher income groups in the villages. Consumption loan is built into the bank loans on the basis of imputed cost of labour at the minimum rates of wages multiplied by the average mandays required to raise a particular crop. In the kharif season of 1980 the programme was to cover 160,000 new beneficiaries under bank finance. The main problem is to devise a self-sustaining organisational frame to ensure popular participation and to cover increasing number of beneficiaries season after season.
A large number of landless sharecroppers and agricultural workers live on the landowners' plots as permissive occupiers. Landowners allow them to do so to have the services of such persons at their beck and call. Whenever bargadars recorded their names or the agricultural workers wanted higher wages they faced the threat of eviction from the homestead plots. This affected their morale adversely and put them to immense difficulties. To obviate this situation a programme of conferring titles on such permissive possessors up to .08 acres of land has been undertaken. The progress so far has not been significant. Only 41,000 families benefitted so far. But, with active support of the rural workers organisations, it is expected that the rate of conferment of titles would pick up in the coming months.

The revenue system that was prevalent in the State was a remnant of the old zamindary era. Whatever rent was payable by the raiyats and under raiyats to the superior landlords was converted into revenue payable to State when they became tenants directly under the State with slight marginal adjustment. Under the zamindary system there was no rational basis for fixation of rent. Therefore the anomalies which crept into the rent structure continued in subsequent post abolition period. Under the new Land Holding Revenue Act, valuation of land holding has been made the main determinant of revenue assessment. Land-holdings whose valuation fall below Rs. 50,000 have been totally exempted from revenue assessment. Land-holdings above that value are being assessed on progressive rates. This will have the effect of relieving marginal, small and middle farmers from revenue burdens and mopping of some surplus from the upper-middle and rich farmers.

A serious attempt to implement these modest land reform measures has thrown up certain basic issues which require reflection. In the debate on the failure of implementation of land reform in our country in the early seventies the administrators, social scientists and even politicians found a catch-all reason - 'lack of political will'. It was argued and quite correctly 'with resolute and unambiguous political will all other shortcomings and difficulties could have been overcome; in the absence of such will even minor obstacles became formidable road-blocks in the path of Indian land reforms'. While no one would dispute the basic logic underlying this statement, inbuilt road-blocks in a pluralistic society are not really minor. They are formidable. West Bengal's experience shows even with definite political will at the top, to carry through any measure of reform which aims at slight rearrangement of property relationship in a constitutional frame through the rule of law is a herculean task beset with impediments the magnitude which was totally unknown previously. It is true that without political will nothing could be done, but its existence does not solve all the problems. Sharp reaction of the entrenched interests is both predictable and understandable. But inner dynamics of agencies which are expected to implement the programme often cause surprise.
The main agency of implementation of land reform is the bureaucracy. The middle and upper rungs of bureaucracy in West Bengal have hardly any connection with land unlike in most other States. Recruits come from urban middle class, many of whom are migrants from erstwhile East Pakistan. The coalescing of interests of rural landed gentry and the bureaucracy which happens in other States is not a common feature in this State. Even so generally the bureaucracy maintains a stance of hostile neutrality to the entire issue of land reform. The reason lies in the age-old tradition of the administration of maintaining order, with or without law. The main burden of administrative ethos and procedure, general civil and criminal laws, judicial pronouncements and practices is the maintenance and safeguarding of existing property relationship in the rural areas. Hence it is natural for the bureaucracy to develop a bias against any action or an isolated law which aims at altering the existing socio-economic arrangements. Hence it was felt that to carry through the programme, additional change of the bureaucracy was necessary. The Government has undertaken a programme of holding reorientation camps where 30 to 40 landless agricultural labourers and sharecroppers and a dozen or two officers of different ranks stay together, eat together and work together for three to four days. The village poor are encouraged to speak out their bitterness and to identify according to their perceptions the reasons of their being destitute and poor and to suggest remedial measures. Having seen their own images in the eyes of the poor, quite a few officials felt disturbed and started questioning the correctness of their past behaviour and activities. It sets in a process of change of mind at least among a few functionaries at the cutting edges of the administration.

The process of implementation of land reform with its emphasis on the direct participatory role for the village poor is releasing impulses of change which are already discernible. A disinherited, deprived and dispossessed humanity is emerging in the countryside to wrest its legitimate place in society.
L'ÉCONOMIE ALGÉRIENNE ENTRE L'AUTONOMIE ET LA DEPENDANCE

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Résumé: 18 ans après l'Indépendance, au lendemain de l'adoption du Plan quinquennal 1980-84, cet article analyse la situation de l'économie algérienne par rapport à l'économie mondiale et mesure le degré d'autonomie et de dépendance de son fonctionnement.

Les plans successifs ont recherché l'autonomie par la valorisation des ressources naturelles; l'industrialisation en profondeur; et la transformation des structures agraires. La dépendance, multiforme, se nourrit des contradictions objectives comme des insuffisances de la politique du développement. On peut en trouver des manifestations dans la politique énergétique (rôle des exportations), industrielle (choix des investissements et des types de technologie) ou agricole (déficit alimentaire).

Le renforcement de l'autonomie implique la réduction des prélèvements extérieurs sur l'économie algérienne (prix des hydrocarbures); le renforcement des capacités nationales de reproduction des équipements; et la diversification dans la composition des exportations.

THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY BETWEEN SELF-RELIANCE AND DEPENDENCE

Abstract: 18 years after Independence and following the adoption of the 1980-84 Plan, the paper discusses the situation of the Algerian economy in the context of the world economy and assesses its relative self-reliance and dependence.

The development plans have sought self-reliance through the development of natural resources; industrialization in depth; and transformation of agrarian structures. Dependance is multiform and rests on objective contradictions as well as on the shortcomings of development policies. Examples could be found in the energy policies (importance of exports), industrial policy (choice of investment or technologies) or agricultural policy (food deficit).

The strengthening of self-reliance requires a decrease in the external levy on the Algerian economy (price of hydrocarbons); increase of the national capacity for capital goods; and diversification in the composition of exports.
LA ECONOMIA ARGELINA ENTRE LA AUTONOMIA Y LA DEPENDENCIA

Resumen: 18 años después de la independencia, y después de la adopción del Plan quinquenal 1980-85, este informe analiza la situación en que se encuentra la economía argelina en el contexto de la economía mundial y evalúa la autonomía y la dependencia de su funcionamiento.

Los planes sucesivos han tratado de realizar la autonomía por medio de la valorización de recursos naturales, la industrialización a fondo y la transformación de estructuras agrarias. La dependencia, multifacética, se alimenta de contradicciones objetivas tanto como de las inscripciones de las políticas de desarrollo. Se puede encontrar ejemplos en la política de la energía (el papel de las exportaciones), de la industria (la selección de inversiones y de tecnologías) o en la política agrícola (déficit alimenticio).

El fortalecimiento de la autonomía implica la reducción de deducciones exteriores hechas sobre la economía argelina (el precio de hidrocarburos); el fortalecimiento de la capacidad nacional de reproducción de capital y la diversificación en la composición de exportaciones.

**مراجع**

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18 ans après l'indépendance, au lendemain de l'adoption du Plan Quinquennal 1980-84 on peut tenter d'analyser la situation de l'économie algérienne par rapport à l'économie mondiale et mesurer le degré d'autonomie et de dépendance de son fonctionnement.

Le modèle théorique de base qui a servi de fondement à l'accumulation rejette explicitement ou implicitement toute spécialisation statique de l'économie et toute insertion dans une division internationale inégale du travail. Les relations économiques internationales sont considérées comme un moyen du développement dont la nature et le rythme sont définis en dehors d'elles. Ni le modèle de spécialisation dans les exportations des produits primaires, ni le modèle de substitution aux importations ne sont acceptés comme fondement théorique des actions de développement. La valorisation des ressources naturelles sur le plan mondial, le lancement d'une industrialisation en profondeur, la transformation des structures techniques et sociales de l'agriculture sont considérés comme les éléments principaux d'une politique de développement autonome seule susceptible d'écarter les obstacles connus d'une croissance tirée par les exportations ou de substitution aux importations.

Le marché mondial sert à mobiliser les ressources financières et technologiques indispensables à la mise en œuvre et à l'accélération du processus d'intégration économique interne.

Si dépendance il y a, elle est considérée comme un mal nécessaire mais provisoire du passage à l'autonomie. Celle-ci, à son tour, est définie comme une situation dans laquelle l'économie algérienne a des rapports d'échange avec l'économie mondiale, caractérisés par la similitude des biens et services échangés du point de vue du travail et de la valeur ajoutée qui y sont incorporés.

Tel est le projet. Il convient de passer en revue les conditions de réalisation de ce projet en identifiant les éléments d'autonomie et les facteurs de dépendance qui coexistent à l'heure actuelle, avant de tracer les perspectives d'avenir.

1. Les facteurs d'autonomie

Après l'indépendance et une période relativement courte d'inertie dans la politique de développement, le lancement et la mise en
oeuvre des plans successifs de développement ont obéi à trois principes fondamentaux de politique économique:

1.1 La valorisation des ressources naturelles.
1.2 L'industrialisation en profondeur.
1.3 La transformation des structures agraires.

Chacun de ces éléments apparaît comme un volet de la politique de développement autonome.

1.1 La valorisation des ressources naturelles

La valorisation des ressources naturelles sur le marché mondial apparaît comme le lieu contradictoire de la dépendance et de l'autonomie. En procurant les moyens financiers du développement, elle permet de promouvoir et de consolider le développement des autres secteurs orientés vers les marchés internes.

Cette valorisation a eu deux aspects. Le contrôle majoritaire de la production des hydrocarbures a été le résultat en 1971, d'une longue série de négociations et de conflits avec les opérateurs essentiellement des firmes françaises traditionnellement installées dans le Sahara algérien et confirmées dans leurs droits par les Accords d'Evian de 1962 et les Accords de 1965. Depuis cette date, la Loi Fondamentale a défini les conditions d'intervention toujours minoritaire du capital étranger dans le secteur des hydrocarbures à l'exclusion du gaz et a fixé les attributions de la Société National des Hydrocarbures.

Mais le contrôle de la production ne vaut que par son prolongement naturel, le contrôle du marché. Dans ce domaine, l'action de l'OPEP, dont l'Algérie est un membre actif, a contribué à détruire la pratique commerciale de l'énergie à bon marché et a permis à travers les hausses successives du prix du pétrole le maintien du pouvoir d'achat du brut à son niveau de 1974. Les initiatives récentes pour établir une parité des prix du pétrole et du gaz, dont la place dans les exportations algériennes va devenir croissante, permet de consolider la politique de valorisation des hydrocarbures à l'exportation.

La valorisation des ressources naturelles comporte cependant des éléments de dépendance qu'il faudra identifier plus loin.

1.2 La politique industrielle

L'industrialisation en profondeur rejette la satisfaction des besoins externes ou de la demande interne telle quelle est structurée par l'histoire économique dépendante de l'Algérie. 1/ Elle

se donne pour objectif la restructuration globale des marchés de biens de consommation comme de biens d'équipement à travers la mise en place progressive et ordonnée de branches de l'industrie telles que l'industrie chimique, la sidérurgie, l'industrie mécanique et électrique, l'industrie de matériaux de construction, etc...

Ce faisant, l'industrialisation évite les pièges de l'import substitution et l'instabilité commerciale, financière et technologique des industrialisations tournées vers l'exportation. Néanmoins, elle appelle une rigueur considérable dans la politique des investissements, le choix des techniques et l'organisation du secteur industriel. Dans ce domaine, la prépondérance du secteur public et la soumission des intérêts privés industriels à la logique d'ensemble constituent des impératifs de la réussite de l'industrialisation en profondeur.

La transformation des structures, des programmes et des méthodes du système éducatif dans son ensemble constitue une garantie de l'efficacité de la réalisation et du fonctionnement de l'appareil industriel par le développement des capacités scientifiques et technologiques nationales à tous les niveaux de qualification. Ainsi conçue et ainsi tentée, l'industrialisation constitue un élément de l'autonomie. Sa mise en œuvre a révélé d'autres formes de dépendance et désigné les progrès à réaliser.

1.3 La transformation des structures agraires

La réussite de l'industrialisation mais surtout la réalisation d'un développement au profit de la majorité implique des politiques agraires en vue de développer l'intensification de la production agricole, d'accroître les revenus des paysans et de limiter la dépendance alimentaire déjà amorcée à la période coloniale du fait des spécialisations agricoles mises en place après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Dès 1963 sur les terres coloniales, à partir de 1971 sur les terres des absenteïstes et des grands propriétaires fonciers, la réorganisation des structures techniques et sociales de l'agriculture a constitué un volet sinon important du moins notable de la politique économique d'ensemble.

Force est de reconnaître néanmoins que la polarisation des moyens physiques et humains, par les activités non agricoles, le niveau d'organisation du secteur agricole ont contribué à développer une domination de l'espace économique non agricole sur l'espace économique agricole et plus largement rural, avec des effets négatifs sur la production agricole et la répartition globale des revenus. 1/

L'intégration inter-sectorielle positive entre l'industrie et le développement rural dans son ensemble nécessite sinon une inversion des priorités du moins une gestion plus attentive et plus coordonnée des différents éléments de la politique économique d'ensemble. Le Plan 1980-84 constitue une étape dans ce sens, en raison des investissements importants consacrés à l'agriculture et à l'hydraulique.

2. Les éléments de la dépendance

La dépendance est multiforme. Certains de ses aspects résultent de la mise en œuvre du processus de l'autonomisation révélant le caractère contradictoire de toute politique de développement dans le monde contemporain tandis que d'autres aspects de la dépendance résultent des insuffisances de la politique elle-même.

2.1 La politique énergétique

La politique énergétique doit à la fois procurer les ressources externes nécessaires au développement et garantir l'autonomie énergétique à long terme d'une économie de plus en plus exigeante en énergie sous toutes ses formes.

Dans ce cadre général, la dépendance apparaît et se développe chaque fois que, en raison d'une variation défavorable des termes de l'échange ou d'une évolution défavorable des paliers extérieurs, l'Algérie est obligée de porter sur le marché mondial des quantités croissantes d'hydrocarbures dont les coûts s'alourdissent nécessairement et dont le remplacement ultérieur par des sources alternatives d'énergie ne pourra être réalisé qu'à des coûts plus importants et probablement à travers des mécanismes de dépendance plus forts, si on songe par exemple à la technologie nucléaire.

Fort heureusement le dernier Plan, en précisant la notion de réserves stratégiques, amorce une politique plus raisonnable en la matière. Celle-ci gagnerait à être complétée par des mesures favorisant la croissance de l'offre d'énergie hydroélectrique et solaire et limitant la consommation d'énergie sous toutes ses formes particulièrement dans les secteurs non productifs.

Il faut aussi noter ici que le passage à des prix relatifs normaux entre le pétrole et le gaz ne constitue pas, loin de là, une condition suffisante du rétablissement de rentabilités relatives égales, étant données les coûts de production, de liquéfaction et de transport du gaz naturel.

2.2 La politique industrielle et les conditions de la reproduction

À partir de 1974, l'accélération du rythme des investissements, particulièrement dans l'industrie, a produit des effets pervers
dans la politique du développement. Deux de ces effets sont particulièremment regrettables : un affaiblissement de la maîtrise de l'orientation des investissements, une aptitude décroissante à mettre en place, faire fonctionner et reproduire les équipements.

La sélection des investissements a été moins efficace que nécessaire puisque dans l'industrie, mais aussi dans d'autres secteurs, des projets non prioritaires ont pu voir le jour et se réaliser en raison du dynamisme de leurs initiateurs plus que de leur nécessité économique. Il en a été particulièrement ainsi dans l'industrie de biens de consommation mais aussi dans certaines industries de biens intermédiaires. Inversement, l'urgence réelle ou supposée d'autres besoins, la crainte des obstacles technologiques, les conditions même de réalisation des investissements ont retardé, de manière excessive selon nous, la réflexion et l'action en vue du développement de l'industrie des biens d'équipements dont la part dans les investissements industriels n'a cessé de décroître, y compris dans le Plan 1980-1984.

De même, l'accélération du rythme des investissements a favorisé l'apparition de formes très intégrées d'importation des technologies. Cette évolution, nécessaire dans certains cas mais pas dans tous, a freiné les progrès possibles de l'engénierie nationale, retardé la conception et la mise en œuvre d'une politique nationale des biens d'équipement et surtout, comme des débats récents ont pu le montrer, alourdi la "facture technologique" payée par l'Algérie à ses fournisseurs étrangers.

Le dynamisme des investissements et l'importation massive de connaissances, de compétences, d'équipements ont conduit, au delà du caractère cumulatif des liaisons et dépendances technologiques, à une accélération de l'endettement extérieur en fin de période. Cette situation est rendue plus préoccupante du fait du déficit alimentaire.

2.3 Le déficit alimentaire

Le dynamisme de la politique non agricole (investissements, emplois, revenus), les problèmes d'organisation et de gestion, des exploitations agricoles ont, dans des conditions naturelles globalement difficiles, découragé les paysans et freiné la production agricole obligeant le recours de plus en plus fort aux importations de produits alimentaires pour satisfaire une demande urbaine, et même rurale, en forte croissance.

Les raisons des glissements relèvent de la théorie comme de la pratique de la planification. Des mécanismes pervers, certains diront même des phénomènes de polarisation, se sont développés ouvrant la voie à des inégalités sectorielles, des inefficacités de production et des instabilités dans l'allocation des moyens humains. Le résultat global en est que le renouvellement de l'outil de production et, encore plus, son fonctionnement et son
élargissement vont dépendre de l'importation des connaissances, des compétences et des équipements. Cette situation risque de perdurer d'autant plus que le prochain plan consacre des masses importantes d'investissements au rattrapage des secteurs dits sociaux: éducation, habitat, santé, etc...

3. Les perspectives d'avenir

L'expérience algérienne montre les difficultés, aussi bien internes qu'externes, de réalisation d'un développement autonome par rapport aux forces qui structurent l'économie mondiale à leur profit. 1/ Elle nécessite un approfondissement de la réflexion en matière de politique industrielle pour cerner les possibilités et les limites d'une industrialisation autonome dans un pays du Tiers Monde.

Il n'est pas inutile d'identifier ici quelques aspects de la politique future qui permettra de renforcer les facteurs d'autonomie et d'affaiblir les causes de la dépendance.

Trois aspects nous paraissent importants:

3.1 Diminuer les prélèvements sur l'économie algérienne.
3.2 Accroître les capacités nationales de reproduction des équipements.
3.3 Diversifier la composition des exportations.

3.1 La diminution des prélèvements sur l'économie algérienne

La réduction des prélèvements sur l'économie algérienne nécessite d'abord une meilleure valorisation des ressources naturelles et particulièrement du gaz naturel.

Il est normal que la valorisation de ces ressources atteigne le niveau des prix des sources alternatives d'énergie.

C'est à cette condition qu'on peut réellement parler de récupération de la rente liée aux hydrocarbures et envisager une régulation de la production qui tient compte des besoins énergétiques à long terme de l'économie.

La réduction des prélèvements nécessite aussi une meilleure aptitude à négocier, les contrats d'achat à l'extérieur, quelle que soit la nature de ces achats.

Elle suppose aussi une croissance des productions nationales, en particulier de la production agricole, pour exclure l'achat à l'étranger de ce qui normalement, peut être produit localement.

3.2 La croissance des capacités nationales de reproduction des équipements

La mise en place d'une industrie de biens d'équipements soulève des problèmes théoriques et pratiques considérables. La nature, la taille, la qualité des équipements doivent être choisies de manière judicieuse pour parvenir dans ce domaine, à une situation de moindre dépendance de l'économie à l'égard de l'extérieur dans le long terme.

De même, le choix des partenaires dans ce type de coopération industrielle est un problème délicat à résoudre quand on sait le degré de monopolisation et de cartellisation atteint, au niveau mondial, par la majorité des branches fabriquant les biens d'équipement.

Il n'est pas exclu de penser que la coopération Sud/Sud et Est/ Sud pourra être avantageuse dans ce domaine.

Parallèlement, au plan interne, la mise en place de ces industries, dont certaines sont grosses consommatrices de capitaux, nécessitera un financement adéquat dont la mobilisation impliquera certainement une vision globale différente aussi bien du fonctionnement de l'économie que de la répartition des revenus surtout si l'option est prise en faveur de la préservation des ressources en hydrocarbures et d'un endettement extérieur moins contraignant.

En tous cas, seuls le développement d'une industrie nationale des biens d'équipement et la croissance de capacités nationales de conception et de réalisation permettront d'atteindre, ne serait-ce que progressivement, l'objectif essentiel d'une politique de développement : l'intériorisation du changement technologique.

3.3 La modification de la composition des exportations

Echanger des ressources naturelles non renouvelables, quel que soit leur prix, contre des produits manufacturés est un signe de sous-développement et de dépendance.

Dans les conditions économiques de l'Algérie, et en supposant un certain succès dans la politique nationale des équipements, il faudra toujours importer et donc trouver les moyens de financement de ces importations.

L'autonomie nécessite la promotion d'exportations industrielles. Celles-ci jouent ici le rôle de financement des importations et non de moteur de la croissance. Les possibilités de croissance des exportations industrielles de l'Algérie ne sont pas évidentes si on exclut, les industries dites "de main-d'oeuvre" pour les- quelles l'économie algérienne n'est ni économiquement ni socialement préparée et si on exclut les industries grosses consommatrices d'énergie dans lesquelles les coûts en capital, et
probablement les surcoûts, devront être compensés par des charges de fonctionnement moindre, en l'occurrence un faible prix de l'énergie. Dans ce cas, il n'est pas exclu que le coût en devises de l'unité produite soit aussi important que son prix de vente sur les marchés externes si on évalue les charges en énergie à leur prix mondial, comme on doit le faire.

Il reste alors à explorer attentivement d'autres voies en prenant en considération la nécessité à chaque fois de lier, pour une production choisie, marchés internes prioritaires et exportations.

Il nous semble utile d'orienter la réflexion vers certains types de biens d'équipement et d'explorer les voies et moyens d'une coopération industrielle et commerciale avec d'autres pays du Tiers Monde.

**Conclusion**

L'analyse de l'expérience algérienne de développement et d'industrialisation permet d'énoncer quelques idées qui peuvent être d'une certaine utilité pour la théorie du développement.

La première idée est que l'exclusion de l'investissement direct étranger dans les activités de production est un élément nécessaire mais non suffisant d'un développement autonome. La politique technologique globale joue un rôle essentiel dans ce domaine.

La deuxième idée est que, contrairement à une vision dominante, le développement ne dépend pas exclusivement des moyens financiers dont dispose un pays mais de sa capacité à concevoir, mettre en place, utiliser, entretenir, reproduire l'outil de production.

La troisième idée est que la réussite ou l'échec d'une politique autonome d'industrialisation dépend à la fois de causes externes et de causes internes. Les premières s'appellent stratégie du capital et internationalisation, les secondes s'identifient au jeu des forces sociales en présence et à leurs stratégies propres.

Elle indique enfin que l'opposition faite en théorie entre développement par substitution aux importations et développement par les exportations est une opposition académique et qu'il est préférable d'opposer développement dépendant et développement autonome et populaire.
The world economy is currently characterized by an exceptionally high rate of inflation. In this connection, it may be relevant to point out some facts on the causes and consequences of this phenomenon. The industrialized countries have been blaming the oil price rises for the current international inflation, although a number of studies have firmly established that this assertion is not only exaggerated but simplistic. In fact, there is now considerable evidence that the increase in oil prices has often been the result, not the cause, of world inflation. For example, while world export and import prices increased at less than one percent per year during the 1960's, they increased at 30% per year during the 12 months preceding the first major increase in oil prices in 1973/74. One of the reasons for this was the sharp increase in world monetary reserves, which doubled within a period of only 3 years (end of 1969 to end of 1972) 1/. The huge deficits recorded by Third World countries in 1975 were largely attributed to the industrial recession in that year rather than to the increased costs of their oil imports which, according to Western sources 2/, amounted to only 1.6% of their total gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, the rate of inflation in industrialized countries averaged about 7% per annum during the period 1976-78, despite the freezing of the price of oil during that period and its drop in real terms. The IMF reported that the increase in the rate of inflation in these countries in 1979 began well before the impact of that year's increase in oil prices could be felt 3/.


2/ Morgan Guaranty & Trust, World Financial Markets, September 1930. In fact, according to an analysis carried out by the OPEC Secretariat and based on IMF figures, the increase in value of the oil imported by non-OPEC Third World countries from OPEC sources, represented only 18.7% of the increase in value of their imports from industrialized countries in the period 1974-79.

According to GATT, the major causes of inflation in the industrialized countries are their monetary and fiscal policies rather than the increased costs of their oil imports, the total of which constitute only 2% of the combined GNP of the OECD countries. Strong evidence of the crucial role of such policies in fueling inflation in these countries is the reduced inflation rate achieved by Germany and Switzerland, two heavy oil importers, where the rate between 1973 and 1978 decreased from 6.9% to 2.5% and from 8.8% to 1.1%, respectively. A recent detailed study by the OPEC Secretariat on the inflation in a number of OECD countries concluded that the contribution of oil price rises to their inflation was only 0.4% in 1973, 1.6% in 1974, 2.5% in 1975 and less than 1% in 1976 (ranging from 0.5% in France to 0.7% in Italy). The inflation imported from the industrialized countries has been a major problem for most Third World countries since the early 1970's. The IMF expects inflation rates in the 1980's not only to be highly pronounced but widely spread among the major industrialized countries. On the other hand, persistent international inflation is seriously eroding the value of the current account surpluses accruing to the oil exporting Third World countries. This is posing a serious dilemma for these countries in their decisions as to whether to keep the oil in the ground, or to continue to deplete their limited oil wealth by turning it into financial holdings whose value erodes over time. According to OPEC, the oil revenues of 10 Arab oil producers increased by 56% in nominal terms in 1979 but international inflation and currency fluctuations depressed their value to below 1974 levels. And according to the IMF, the estimated US$115 billion 1980 current account surplus of the oil exporters is broadly equivalent, in real terms, to the US$52 billion surplus they recorded in 1974.

Slow growth and continued inflation are also expected to have their adverse effects on the Third World countries' exports to the industrialized countries' markets. Exports of primary commodities (excluding fuels), which account for some 55% of the merchandise exports of the Third World countries, are expected to grow by only 3.3% per year during 1980-85. Furthermore, Third World countries' exports to the industrialized countries are facing additional difficulties resulting from the rise in protectionism since 1970, particularly against their manufactured goods. Although such goods account for only 24% of the Third

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2/ OPEC Secretariat, The Impact of Oil Price Adjustments on the Economies of the Major Industrialized Countries (DE/35/80/M1CEB/123, May 1980, unpublished). This conclusion is supported by GATT's Annual Report International Trade 1978/79 (September 1979), p. 10, which categorically described the view that the oil price increase was a major causative factor behind the resurgence of inflation as "dangerously wrong".

World countries' total exports, they are the fastest growing category among all exports. Recent counter-measures, such as the GATT-sponsored Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) completed in April 1979, are of little effect compared to the increasing protectionist sentiment, the recent consolidation of trade restrictions, and the adoption of non-tariff and other trade restrictions by some countries. These constitute a serious cause for concern, especially for the few semi-industrialized Third World countries, including a number of Asian Countries 1/. The increase in the volume of Third World countries' exports to the industrialized countries has not, on the other hand, been accompanied by an increase in the unit price of these exports (with the exception of oil). Third World countries, particularly those in the low income group, have not been experiencing a satisfactory improvement in their terms of trade. For example, during 1967-72 the annual growth rate in the terms of trade of the Third World countries which do not export oil was -1.1%. After some improvement in 1973 and later during 1976 and 1977, the annual growth rate in their terms of trade has remained negative since 1978 2/. Moreover, the IMF estimates a larger deterioration in their terms of trade in 1980 than was previously predicted. This is particularly serious for the exports of tropical agricultural products and metals 3/.

The situation we have just described clearly points to the difficulties facing the Third World countries in generating sufficient resources in order to reduce their growing current account deficits and to carry out their long-term adjustment programs. As a result, most of these countries will either have access to sufficiently large amounts of external resources on reasonable terms, or must face serious financial difficulties.

There seems to be little prospect, however, for a massive increase in the volume of concessional aid to the Third World countries. Net disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD were estimated at 0.3% of the donors' total GNP in 1979. This is far below the target of 0.7% of total gross national product (GNP) endorsed by the UN General Assembly in the early 1970's.

1/ A recent study has confirmed that, in 1978, two Asian countries (South Korea and Taiwan) and Hong Kong accounted for some 50% of the total imports of manufactured goods by the industrialized West from non-oil producing Third World countries, and seven countries (the above three plus Mexico, Brazil, Singapore and India) accounted for 75% of such imports; cf. Financial Times, 17 November 1980, p. 4.


According to the World Bank, net flows of ODA from DAC countries are expected to be about 0.36% of GNP in 1985, which is lower than the 0.39% projected earlier by the same source\(^1\) and is about half the level which the Brandt Commission urged donors to reach by 1985.

The growth of commercial bank lending, crucial to the middle-income Third World countries in particular, may also slow down during the 1980's as a result of the emergence of supply constraints in many commercial banks and private lending institutions, the sharp rise in the debt service ratios of some Third World countries and the worsening of their debt servicing capacity. Furthermore, in their private borrowing in the 1980's Third World countries will be facing increasing competition from some old and new borrowers. These include the industrialized countries which are planning massive investment programs in the energy field, the European centrally-planned economies, which are planning to increase their borrowing, and China, which is entering the financial market in order to finance huge modernization programs.

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All the previously mentioned factors lead to the often-expressed conclusion that Third World countries will soon have to face lower economic growth, and therefore devastating socio-economic consequences. We should not accept this conclusion, however. The Third World countries must face the challenge and look for realistic and effective solutions. It would be presumptuous on my part to prescribe such solutions, but in my view, a good part of the answers to the problems of Third World countries in the 1980's and beyond depend on their achieving three major objectives:

(i) effective socio-economic reforms at home which would enable them to develop efficient management, a disciplined work force, a fair distribution of economic gains, and consumption patterns consistent with their limited resources;

(ii) massive flows of resources from the North and between themselves to complement their domestic savings, and

(iii) a more equitable international economic and financial system which would provide the basis for a more acceptable international division of labour and for fair international relationships of production and exchange.

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These objectives cannot be achieved without bold policy actions at home and considerable solidarity among the Third World countries, based on enlightened awareness of all the issues involved. In this connection three points may be worth emphasizing:

1. South-South discussions should reflect a sense of realism that has often been absent in the fora where the South's demands have been debated. Third World countries must recognize the fact that part of their dilemma is of their own making. There is no denying that external factors have exacerbated the situation, as I have just indicated. But this may present only half of the truth. For it is also true that most Third World countries are doing little or nothing to check the menacing growth rates of their populations, to curb their military spending, to avoid expenditure on prestige projects, or to rationalize patterns of consumption in their societies. While we address the external factors affecting our Third World countries and try to find realistic solutions to their economic problems, we should not ignore the need for hard corrective measures at home.

2. The South must also recognize that promoting easy solutions based on inaccurate data or false hopes can only be counterproductive. Specifically, it would be a mistake if Third World countries continue to assume that some of them, i.e. the members of OPEC, can provide a panacea for all their financial troubles. It is true that OPEC members have done a great deal in the way of helping other Third World countries and that they are reasonably expected to continue these efforts as long as they are able to do so. To extend this to saying, as many have already done, that the solution to the present financial predicament lies in the hands of OPEC, or that OPEC is the only qualified midwife for the birth of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), cannot, in my view, provide a serious contribution to the discussions.

To place the capacities of OPEC member countries in their true perspective, I should remind you that the total GNP of the 13 OPEC countries reached US$379 billion in 1978 according to the World Bank Atlas. This represented barely 4% of global GNP in the same year, and 7% that of the OECD countries. It is hardly half the GNP of Japan and less than 10% of that of the United States. The comparison is much more striking when confined to the GNPs of the few OPEC countries in possession of significant net liquid assets. In fact, the combined GNP of seven Arab members of OPEC, including Algeria and Iraq, stood at a mere 19% of the GNP of Japan in 1978.

Furthermore, the savings of these countries, their so-called "surpluses", are in no way comparable to the surpluses of other countries, as they do not result from the intrinsic strength of a national production machinery. Rather, they are the outcome of oil extraction far beyond the financial needs of the domestic economies of these countries. In fact, they maintain such high
levels of oil production simply out of their concern for the stability and welfare of the world economy. Being the monetary realization of a depletable national resource, these savings should naturally be invested with great prudence. Without such prudent investment, the future generations of these countries would find themselves without oil and without savings and would again be dependent on the little income derived from their other meager resources.

3. The financial problems of Third World countries differ from one country to another in their origin and magnitude. In particular, there is a marked difference between the financial problems of the low-income and those of the high-income and semi-industrialized countries. The generally advocated solutions to the problems of the latter countries, such as greater access to capital markets and elimination of the trade barriers to their exports of manufactured goods, may be of little relevance to the low-income countries. There is an obvious need, therefore, to devise different detailed solutions for the different problems of the various categories of countries and to avoid prescribing panaceas which may provide attractive slogans but no real solutions.

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I would like to turn now to the role of OPEC member countries in the cooperation with other Third World nations through the difficult years to come. Since some OPEC members initiated their aid programs in the 1960's, their role has generally been seen as providers of funds on concessional terms. This is certainly a role which some of them will continue to play as long as they are in a position to do so. However, it cannot, and should not be envisaged as the only role to be expected from these countries in a lasting and balanced framework of cooperation.

I shall not attempt to dwell here in detail on the aid record of OPEC member countries. The target ratio of 0.7% of ODA to GNP was greatly exceeded (fourfold) by OPEC donors as a group, as early as 1975. In the more relevant case of the so-called surplus Arab countries, the target was exceeded in that year by more than 22 times by Qatar, 20 times by the United Arab Emirates, 11 times by Kuwait and 6 times by Saudi Arabia. In 1979, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq ranked at the top of the list of world donors, in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNP. In fact, six OPEC countries have consistently been on the list of the main ten world donors in terms of the proportion of net disbursement to GNP since 1975. Two of these countries (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) are among the top seven donors on the basis of absolute amounts of concessional aid. No need to recall here that not one OPEC country is sufficiently developed or industrialized to use its aid to secure external markets for its products or to ensure control over the sources of the primary commodities needed for its industries. Nor do we have to point out that the figures
used to measure OPEC aid and to compare it with OECD assistance are greatly deflated in favour of the OECD group, for many technical reasons which we have elaborated on other occasions 1/.

It must only be stressed that the high level of OPEC aid has been provided out of deep concern for the welfare of the South and the need for fostering self-reliance among its countries. OPEC countries are continuing their efforts to foster solidarity and enhance aid efforts through new initiatives. In early 1980, these countries substantially modified the Agreement Establishing the OPEC Fund, converting it from an international account of temporary character to an on-going international agency for development finance with open-ended resources which so far exceed US$4 billion.

Some OPEC members (Algeria and Venezuela) are now calling for a substantial increase in the Fund's resources (up to US$20 billion) and for the restructuring of its capital base to enable it to borrow from the capital market.

Furthermore, OPEC's Long-Term Strategy Committee has already adopted a proposal advanced by Iraq for the establishment of a new global fund for energy and development to be financed by both the industrialized and OPEC countries. The amount contributed by the industrialized countries to that Fund would depend on the annual rate of inflation as reflected in the price increases of manufactured goods, food and services exported by them to the Third World. The amount to be contributed by OPEC countries would, on the other hand, reflect the total oil price increase, due to inflation, of the cost of oil exported to other Third World countries. Other Third World countries will not be required to participate in the financing but will be full members of the proposed Fund.

More recently, Iran also proposed an aid plan to immediately reimburse Third World countries on a grant basis for the financial burden resulting from OPEC oil price increases through a new OPEC Fund to which member countries would pay 10% of the increase in their oil revenues (on the assumption that the oil imports of the Third World countries account for about 10% of total OPEC oil exports). This Fund would be managed by a joint committee of OPEC countries and oil importing Third World countries.

Although it may be premature to predict the outcome of these different proposals they stand as evidence of the continuing concern of OPEC countries for the financial problems of other Third World

1/ See, e.g., I. Shihata, OPEC As A Donor Group, 1980; and Shihata & Mabro, The OPEC Aid Record, 1979 (OPEC Fund Publications).
nations. They should result in greater aid flows from all sources and, hopefully, in new international arrangements more responsive to the aspirations of the Third World.

In addition to concessional flows, the so-called "surpluses" of some OPEC countries have been successfully recycled to both industrialized and Third World countries through private commercial banks and international financial institutions. Despite an earlier outcry about the possible difficulties involved, lending by commercial banks has been especially important in meeting the needs of the Third World countries. In fact, in 1974-75 the recycling of these surpluses through the financial markets and the IMF's oil facility enabled many Third World countries to maintain a relatively strong economic growth. For example, among the oil importing Third World countries, the largest borrowers from the private banks are reported to have recorded real GNP growth of 5.3% in 1975 1/. In 1979, concern was again expressed about the inability of the commercial banks to recycle the OPEC surpluses, but the process was in fact relatively smooth and bank lending expanded by about 24%, nearly as high as the 26% increase recorded in 1978 2/. According to the Bank for International Settlements, in 1979 a great part of the OPEC countries' deposits with Western Banks (estimated at 80%) were recycled to Third World countries.

As we pointed out, the worsening external debt situation of the Third World countries and the increasing exposure of commercial banks in these countries may slow down the private bank lending to them in the 1980's, though not to the exaggerated extent reflected in general reports earlier this year. This situation calls for new initiatives to encourage the private banks to sustain their important role, and to enable international institutions to shoulder a greater responsibility in the recycling process. Unfortunately, instead of searching for new initiatives, it has been suggested by certain circles that the time has come for OPEC countries alone to lend their funds directly to other Third World countries. In simple terms the argument suggests that lending to the Third World countries has become too risky for Western banks, but should nevertheless be good enough for OPEC lenders.

1/ Morgan Guaranty & Trust, op. cit. p.1. In fact, according to the World Development Report, 1980, the middle income countries of East Asia, the Pacific achieved a GNP growth rate of 8% in 1970-80 (against 7.7% in 1960-70) and the Latin American and Caribbean countries achieved 5.8% in 1970-80 (against 5.7% in 1960-70) op. cit., p. 99.

Banks and investment companies owned or controlled by OPEC countries have in fact mushroomed in recent years (their number is now at least ten times larger than in 1974), and are becoming increasingly involved in operations in the Third World countries 1/. Therefore, a more constructive approach would be to study the ways these institutions could expand their exposure in the Third World countries without running greater risks than they would normally accept for their investments in the rest of the world.

The issue of risk also applies to other private banks. Two years ago, during a seminar organized by Chase Bank, I suggested that private banks should consider establishing a collective insurance scheme to protect themselves against the remote possibility of default by Third World countries 2/. (I say "remote" because, as far as I know, of all Euromarket loans in the form of bonds there have been only 19 cases of default, of which 18 are accounted for by private US borrowers and one by a Japanese company).

The idea is simply to replace the self-insurance sought individually by banks through the higher spreads they impose on Third World countries, by a collective insurance pool whereby risks would be uniformly shared by the participating banks, at lower cost to each participant. A proposal for an international safety net arrangement was subsequently made by the Chairman of the Deutsche Bank to enable banks to share liquidity, when required as a result of delays in payment. The Governor of the Bank of Greece has also advocated the creation of an international loan insurance fund which would be financed by governmental and certain inter-governmental financial institutions. It is hoped that practical measures of this type will soon be taken to lessen the risk of increased bank exposure in the Third World countries.

I wish to submit here another idea, since I am addressing a group of distinguished governors of Central banks who, I am sure, believe as much as I do in the importance of self-reliance in development. The idea simply involves the creation by the Third World countries of collective mechanisms for guaranteeing their

1/ It has been estimated that Arab banks alone have lent or co-managed some US$40b worth of commercial loan syndications between 1977-79, of which US$32b went to Third World countries. See Rehman Sobhan, "Institutional Mechanisms for Channeling OPEC Surpluses within The Third World", Third World Quarterly (Vol. 2, No. 4, October 1980), p. 735.

2/ The lecture was printed in the Journal of Energy and Development (Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 291-303), under the title "OPEC Aid, the OPEC Fund, and Cooperation with Commercial Development Finance Sources" and has reappeared in several other publications.
foreign debts. These mechanisms could take the form of joint loan guarantee corporations or even of institutionalized regional swap arrangements by which liquid assets would be made available to each participating bank when needed to meet obligations towards third parties. Details could be worked out to ensure that the implementation of such schemes would benefit all participating countries.

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We must stress that providing loan financing should not be the sole purpose of recycling. Recycled funds must be put to optimum use to meet the needs of development as well as the structural adjustments needed over the coming decade to reduce the balance of payments deficits, increase investment, especially in indigenous energy resources and food production, and reduce the menacing population growth rates. These goals cannot be left to the private lending institutions; the official bilateral and multilateral lending institutions must shoulder a good part of the responsibility.

As you well know, the World Bank has responded to the long standing request for program financing and has reoriented part of its activities to its new "structural adjustment loans" and towards larger involvement in the energy sector. However, the initiative in these new areas should not be carried out at the expense of the other sectors. Therefore, these efforts must be matched by the availability of additional resources through a wider use of the World Bank's capital base and additional substantial replenishment of IDA resources. One may note here that the management of the World Bank has already proposed a substantial increase in the level of the bank's operations in the immediate future.

It must also be noted that the IMF has now authorized lending of up to 600% of a nation's quota over the next three years, which amounts to virtually tripling past borrowing rates and raising its total lending to about US$7-10 billion annually. Yet, to play an effective role in meeting the needs of the Third World countries, the IMF will surely have to accelerate the process it has already started by adapting its conditionality to the conditions of the Third World countries, and by easing the supply constraints in these countries' economies.

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To allow for a more balanced, mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation among OPEC and the rest of the Third World countries, four other areas of future cooperation seem particularly promising. Although some progress has been made in these areas, they will have to be studied in detail to remove existing obstacles and pave the way for a significant expansion. They are (a) direct investment; (b) trade; (c) labor migration; and (d) technical cooperation.
First, there is definitely wide scope for direct investment of OPEC funds in other Third World countries on a commercial basis, especially in the form of joint ventures and similar arrangements. Several Arab member countries of OPEC have already set up joint ventures for projects in the Arab world. Similar schemes have recently been organized in other Third World nations, and there exists great potential for a significant expansion of such activities. Some economists in OPEC countries are tending toward the view that the investment of OPEC funds in Third World countries may provide a brake against world inflation and therefore against the erosion of the real value of OPEC savings. They strongly argue that the mere placements (deposits and purchases of financial instruments) of OPEC funds in industrialized countries, which do not represent new real investments, could easily lead to a net loss in the real value of the assets involved. Investing the funds in new real investments in the Third World, where they have their greatest potential, would, on the other hand, protect their real value while adding to the real wealth of the world and discouraging inflation 1/

However, it must be stressed that while there are good investment opportunities for OPEC funds in the Third World, particularly the Asian countries, the climate for such investment is not always encouraging. For example, a recent study by an Indian scholar suggests considerable scope for OPEC equity investment in joint ventures with Third World country Governments and private sources, but cites as a serious reason for lack of progress on this front the lack of confidence on the part of OPEC investors in the managerial talent and the market environment of many of these countries. The study concluded that institutional and policy mechanisms aimed at creating confidence would greatly facilitate the transfer of OPEC surpluses to the Third World 2/. The potential for direct investment in the Third World is in fact hampered by physical and institutional constraints. The aid efforts of OPEC and other donors could no doubt help unblock these bottlenecks, by combining the soft financing of infrastructure projects with the commercial financing of new investments. A frank exchange of views between the holders of surplus funds and the countries in need of their investments should be followed by effective measures to facilitate such investments for the benefit of both parties.

Second, although trade between OPEC and other Third World countries has increased considerably since 1973/74, there is room for greater expansion. The value of OPEC exports to other Third World

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countries grew at an average rate of approximately 30% per annum in the period 1973/78. At the same time, their imports from other Third World nations, especially Asian Countries, rose significantly, at an average rate of 35% per annum \(^1\). OPEC countries have a low level of industrialization and this situation accounts for their meager demand for the raw materials and semi-finished goods of the other countries of the Third World. As their development plans are implemented, however, this obstacle will be gradually removed. New mechanisms, including export credit arrangements, should also be developed to ensure greater economic exchange among Third World countries as they continue their development process.

Third, labor migration to 8 Arab OPEC Countries, accounted for remittances to Third World countries, most of which are in the Asia region, amounting to US$6.5 billion in 1977 according to the World Bank \(^2\). Although many benefits are derived by both the labor exporting and host countries, there are also certain social costs to be borne by both sides. Improved planning and management of labor migration is badly needed to minimize such costs and to ensure optimum benefits to the economies of all the countries concerned.

Fourth, there seems to exist scope for much greater technical cooperation between OPEC and other Third World countries. Some OPEC countries could contribute to the development of energy resources in other Third World countries on the strength of their acquired experience in the oil sector. An illustration of the useful cooperation in this field could already be found in the technical assistance provided by Indonesia to Bangladesh. OPEC countries also stand to benefit from this kind of cooperation in other sectors given the disparate technical capabilities in various Third World countries and the recent technical achievements of some of them, especially in Asia.

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Apart from the areas of possible expanded cooperation between OPEC and the rest of the Third World, OPEC has been using its relative strength to gain ground for the reform of international financial institutions and, more generally, for laying a foundation for the long-sought New International Economic Order. Ample evidence of this could be discerned in the active role played by OPEC countries in the relevant special sessions of the UN General


Assembly and in the CIEC (the Paris Conference). Some fruits of these efforts have already materialized in the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Common Fund as new international financial institutions where Third World countries have the stronger say.\(^1\)

The conclusion to the negotiations over the establishment of IFAD was reached after OPEC countries pledged, through the OPEC Fund, to contribute more than 40% of the initial resources, provided Third World countries as a group acquired two thirds of the voting power while the non-OPEC Third World countries remained under no obligation to contribute to IFAD's resources. Through the large financial contribution of the OPEC Fund and the active role played by OPEC countries' representatives in the negotiation of the Agreement Establishing IFAD, a new chapter in the history of international financial institutions was launched.

The prolonged negotiations on the establishment of the Common Fund quickened pace when the OPEC Fund, on its own initiative, agreed to meet the contributions to the Common Fund of all the 'least developed countries' and to make a sizeable voluntary contribution to this Fund's Second Window as well. The measures which were meant to accelerate the process of negotiation and to strengthen the hand of the Third World in this process have yielded positive results, despite the strong initial objections of some industrialized countries to the very principles on which the Common Fund is based.

The proposal of OPEC's Long Term Strategy Committee to establish a new Joint Energy and Development Fund marks yet another step through which the OPEC countries may achieve a dramatic development for the benefit of other Third World countries. Other details of the report of this Committee are indeed based on the same principle of realistically using the OPEC countries' position, as the main exporters of oil and the holders of large sums of financial assets, to secure better bargains for the under-privileged South in its attempt to improve its lot in the World economic order.

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All those who have the interests of the Third World at heart realize that a strong OPEC is to the advantage of the Third World as a whole. The strength of OPEC represents a unique chance for the Third World. But we all have to realize that this strength is based on the transient phenomena of extensive oil production

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\(^1\) For more details, see Shihata, 'The OPEC Fund and the North-South Dialogue', Third World Quarterly (Vol. 1, No. 4), pp. 28-33.
and the resulting accumulation of net liquid assets. Through solidarity among Third World countries, mutual benefits can accrue to all before this opportunity is lost. The surpluses of the oil producers should be seen, however, in their true perspective: as a monetary form of a depleting asset that does not necessarily add to the wealth of oil producing countries. It is in the interest of these countries, and of the World at large, that practical mechanisms be established for the transformation of these assets into new real investments which would provide them with revenues in the post-oil area. To the extent that these investments are implemented in other Third World countries, OPEC will also play a major role in the international redistribution of income to the benefit of the poorer countries. This redistribution has already started and is becoming a social imperative on the international scene. The sooner it is achieved in an orderly manner, the happier the inhabitants of this planet will be.
The special International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Conference in New Delhi, March 18-20 1981, marks a major stepping-up of the ICFTU’s campaign for a new international economic and social order. After three days of intensive debate, the 250 participants from 65 ICFTU affiliates, 14 friendly trade union organisations and 7 International Trade Secretariats agreed on the following statement of intent which maps out the priorities for 1981 and the years ahead.

A statement of intent - the Delhi Declaration

The world economy is in a severe crisis which will only deepen unless prompt action is taken by governments. Without urgent, concerted action the already intolerable poverty of 800 million people in the developing world will worsen still further. Unemployment will rise in both North and South, increasing social and political tensions and conflicts within and between nations. An increase in the enormous number of jobless in the South threatens an explosion of catastrophic proportions.

But these disastrous trends need not become reality. There is an alternative. That alternative lies in the acceptance of the 'one world' concept, leading to an integrated global strategy for balanced development. It involves a change in the direction of economic policy in the industrialised countries, more effective development policies for the people of the South, a massive transfer of financial resources to developing countries, a global energy compact, reforms in the international monetary system - in short, a new international economic and social order.

THE ICFTU World Conference on "The Trade Union Role in Development" signifies the commitment of free and democratic trade unions to international cooperation for balanced development. Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere. Trade unions have a duty to work for economic growth throughout the world, social progress and the narrowing of the gaps between rich and poor within and between nations. The strong mutual interest between workers in the South and North in a programme for balanced global development has always been underlined by the ICFTU - in fact this concept is the justification for our existence. We are happy that this theme has been taken up so strongly in the Brandt Report.

Main Elements of a Global Programme for Balanced Development

i) The recognition of the role of trade unions in the creation of a new economic and social order based upon the principles of freedom of association and the right to organise and bargain collectively.
Reform of the international monetary system, including a massive transfer of financial resources to developing countries, interest rate 'disarmament' and multilateral recycling of the oil surpluses.

A global energy programme composed of a monitoring system for oil stockholding, greater stability in oil prices and supplies, an energy fund to enable developing countries to import essential oil supplies at preferential prices, improved energy conservation, accelerated exploration, investment in alternative energy sources and more efficient use of fossil fuels especially coal.

A genuine transfer of technology to the South by both bilateral and multilateral measures in order to build up a large-scale investment in labour-intensive production.

Coordinated measures by industrialized countries to bring about full employment, growth in real incomes, higher official development assistance, structural adjustment to the new pattern of world trade and the control of inflation.

A much greater emphasis in developing countries on programmes to satisfy Basic Needs and invest in human development, as well as increased industrial and agricultural output, with the objective of bringing about self-sustaining growth and large-scale job creation.

An elimination of protectionist trade barriers coupled with stronger public policies backed by an International Reconversion Fund aimed at the adjustment of investment and employment and the introduction of a just and impartial social clause in the GATT, based on ILO instruments.

A comprehensive programme of commodities including finance for the processing of raw materials in developing countries.

An effective UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) which regulates the role of TNCs in development, ensures the full involvement of trade unions and incorporates the existing ILO Declaration of Principles on Multinationals and Social Policy.

**Trade Union Follow-up to the Conference**

Affiliated organisations should inform their members of the ICFTU's policies for a new international economic and social order. Support for a world-wide concerted programme for growth and balanced development should form part of affiliates' national campaigns against unemployment and poverty.

Affiliated organisations should press their Governments to respond positively to the recommendations of the Brandt Report. The 1981 ICFTU World Economic Review should be used to reinforce national centres' own policy proposals for growth and development.

Trade union education programmes, especially in industrialised countries, should stress the need for a major effort to accelerate the development
of the South. The ICFTU will follow-up this world conference through seminars and workshops at the regional level.

iv) Trade unions in developing countries should continue to build effective, free and democratic organisations. They should strengthen their ability to analyse economic problems and work out policy proposals for discussion with Governments.

v) Trade unions in the industrialised countries should seek to ensure that a substantial volume of development finance should be channelled into trade union education and socio-economic projects.

vi) National affiliates, in cooperation with the ICFTU and its regional organisations, should promote their own development projects. These should include pilot schemes for employment creation; rural development projects; bringing women and youth into the main stream of development; programmes for the improvement of education standards - especially literacy - vocational training, housing, nutrition, sanitation and health care.

vii) The ICFTU expects to meet the chairman of the proposed North-South Summit in Mexico City in October to press for action on the conclusions of the New Delhi Conference and the Brandt Report. Affiliates in the participating countries should also meet their Governments before the Summit.

viii) The ICFTU and its affiliates will seek to ensure, through the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD, that the forthcoming OECD Ministerial Council gives full consideration to the trade union proposals for a concerted global programme for growth and development, and will seek to similarly influence the Heads of Governments meeting in Ottawa in July.

ix) The ICFTU will renew its pressure on the United Nations General Assembly for an early and constructive outcome of the global negotiation on a new international economic order. Similarly affiliates should stress to their governments the need for agreement.

x) The ICFTU will request early meetings with the IMF, the World Bank and other intergovernmental agencies to press the case for greater trade union involvement.

xi) The ICFTU Executive Board, through its Economic and Social Committee, will regularly monitor progress on the conclusions of the special World Conference and report to its affiliates.
The build up of military capability and the military expression of power is used by nation states for internal purposes, such as the attainment of social cohesion and stability in civil society (and sometimes within the military establishment itself). This usually expresses itself through nationalism, the protection of freedom, economic survival of the nation and its citizens. In postwar years arms production itself has become integrated into arguments relating military preparedness with economic survival. High spending on arms and arms production is itself now justified in terms of direct benefit to national economies. Military R&D is supposed to 'spin off' benefits for medical science, or the communications industry. Military production is supposed to make viable enterprises which otherwise would not exist. The export of arms is supposed to make a valuable contribution to the balance of payments.

Yet economists in a number of countries have contested this view. They have maintained that high military spending damages national economies. In the USSR the military have first priority for high quality steels and plastics, plus first call on the best qualified technicians and scientists. In the U.S.A. it is concluded that areas with a high dependence on military or arms production facilities have suffered more economic and social distress and dislocation than other areas. In Britain no less than 52% of total Government research and development expenditures is located in the 'defence' industry, compared with 3% in housing.

The most comprehensive information about arms spending and its effect on national and local economies appears in the U.S.A. A recent United Nations study on the arms industry concluded that nothing useful could be said about the impact of arms on the British economy as real information was so closely guarded.....

In the U.S.A. much recent work on the arms economy has been sponsored by the International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers. In 30 States, many of them major recipients of military contracts, IAM members suffer a net loss of job opportunities when military spending is high. A Pentagon budget of $124 billion costs the machinists' union over 18,000 jobs in the civilian sector - with a net job loss of 30,000 jobs a year. The IAM, the machinists' union is supposed to be the major beneficiary of arms spending in the U.S. In general, every additional 31 billion of Pentagon spending causes a net loss of 11,600 jobs in the U.S.

Apart from the jobs question, several U.S. researchers maintain that high arms spending is inflationary. Firstly because most military contracts operate on
a cost-plus basis; a recent report by the General Accounting Office showed that 55 major Pentagon projects cost 70% more than was originally estimated - 47% of which was attributed directly to bad planning and mismanagement in the contracted corporations. Secondly because military spending pre-empts spending on other goods - goods which are actually of use to people and to the economy. Thirdly because the Government borrows high-cost money in the markets to help finance military spending. Fourthly because military contractors also bid for large sums in the money markets - tending to cause an increase in interest rates.

Finally in the U.S. there is research on the impact on the civilian economy of high military spending in relation to the pre-emption of scientists, technicians, investment and production capabilities. It is argued that mass transit, housing and other civilian facilities have suffered because of this arms industry induced distortion in the economy.

In Britain there have been three case studies on alternative work for military industries - alternatives to the MRCA Tornado, the Chieftan Tank, and the ASW Cruiser. In each case an assessment of skills and facilities has been made, and specific alternatives suggested. These alternatives include: mining machinery, irrigation and other types of marine pumps, alternative energy source equipment, recycling plants, marine engines, medical technology, etc.

Arms conversion the CAITS/Lucas workers' way

It has always been the intention to raise arms conversion as part of a more general appraisal of corporations' policies and actions and their effects on workforces; these appraisals being carried out with shop stewards committees which represent blue and white collar workers.

The development of workers' own plans for their companies is the ultimate objective, and experience has shown that, given a real choice, the trade unionists that have engaged in this activity have not chosen military production as a basis for their plans.

The experience of developing workers' plans in military and arms production facilities unavoidably raises many of the economic, social and political questions covered in this statement on arms conversion, not in just a theoretical way, but very practically - for the basic question is often about jobs or job security.

In this way there is a grass roots concern and knowledge developing amongst those people who are actually engaged in arms production. This not only represents a crucial sector of the population that disarmers have always sought to influence, but also represents a crucial force in the arms industry.

In this sort of approach it is possible to integrate:-

- The question of jobs and job security in the arms industry.
- The question of allocation of resources in the economy.
- The question of civilian alternatives to arms production.
- The question of 'real' international relations between peoples working in the same corporation, and therefore more generally too.
The question of democracy, and the effects on democracy of high military preparedness.

Arms Conversion provides a means whereby ordinary people can have a practical influence and effect on the arms race.

The Centre for Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems (CAITS) was established at the North East London Polytechnic by the London Aerospace Company Shop Stewards Committee. In 1978, the Committee had proposed a Corporate Plan listing 100 products which could be made in London Aerospace, instead of high technology military aerospace equipment. These include product proposals in the fields of medical equipment, defence, banking systems, alternative energy sources, remote control devices (telecontrol) and transport systems. The plan can also be a means to fight unemployment. The battle is still on, and in part of it, the Combine Committee set up CAITS to research the social and economic implications of socially useful products.

ECONOMICS, DEVELOPMENT AND THE CONSUMER

by Khor Kok Peng */

In November 1980, the Consumers Association of Penang (Malaysia) organised a Seminar on Economics, Development and the Consumer in Penang.

The aims of the Seminar were to examine:

(i) Development as a process which involves the satisfaction of basic consumer needs which at the same time is environmentally sound and makes rational use of natural resources;

(ii) the extent to which this concept of development is incorporated into the planning and implementation of development strategy in Malaysia and the Third World;

(iii) economic issues faced by Third World consumers, such as inflation, shortages of essential goods, access to credit facilities, poor quality of products, economic costs of pollution, and the satisfaction of basic needs such as food, nutrition, health and other social amenities;

(iv) recommendations on how to improve the workings of the economy so as to improve the economic well-being of consumers.

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We hoped that through this Seminar many vital and basic issues of Third World development could be brought up to public light and be communicated to the public at large.

We are pleased to report that the Seminar was a great success. Altogether, there were 250 participants, including academics, development experts, government officials, teachers, trade union representatives, community workers and students from universities, colleges and schools. Foreign participants included Frederick Clairmonte from UNCTAD, Susan George from Transnational Institute, Colin Tudge and Ziauddin Sardar from New Scientist, Dexter Tiranti from New Internationalist, and representatives of ILO, ESCAP and several Third World community-based organisations.

Altogether, there were 100 papers presented at the Seminar sessions. The main theme of the Seminar was the Satisfaction of Basic Needs, and most of the papers revolved around this theme. The topics discussed included poverty and social inequalities; Malaysia's over-dependence on foreign trade; basic needs problems of food, nutrition, health, housing and transport; problems of indebtedness and credit faced by the poor; a critique of present industrialisation policies; how farmers and consumers are cheated through food marketing; occupational health hazards faced by workers; the need for an open bureaucracy; corporations and the public interest; appropriate technology and habitat; and education and communications for development.

Due to the topical nature of the papers, the Seminar received exceptionally good coverage in the newspapers of four languages (Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English) in our country. Some papers devoted two entire pages per day to the Seminar proceedings. Because of this, it was possible to bring the papers of the Seminar to public light, for the benefit of the general population.

At the last session of the Seminar, a 46-page resolution was discussed and passed by the participants. The resolution called for various steps to be taken to improve the economic well-being of the people and country.

GREETINGS AND COMMENTS

from Anil K. Gupta */

I am sure the new year will see IFDA Dossier creating newer milestones in its journey towards more interactions vis-à-vis the Third World from the first and the second world who "often" know more about the Third World than about their own world.

Firstly, let me pen a note of uneasiness that I felt on reading El-Kholy's (Dossier 20) note on Egyptian information survey etc. some of the crucial points made are:-

*/ Indian Institute of Public Administration, Indraprastha Estate, Ring Road, New Delhi-110002, India.
i) A new class of Egyptian entrepreneur 'trained' by public sector with 'knowledge and sophistication' is emerging to achieve a breakthrough regarding collecting, compiling, processing and using (and also disseminating) information on national resources and potentialities.

ii) Decisive role in developing intelligence capability for national good will be played by a leadership that is 'enlightened, courageous, dedicated and incorruptible'.

iii) Such a leadership could not emerge out of a "backward, illiterate and suppressed society".

iv) National and internal 'entrepreneur' are preferable over foreigners consultants etc...

I am afraid the implication of these contentions are not only serious but also extremely dangerous for a Third World country like Egypt - if the Indian experience is any guide, my submission is:-

d) The capitalism lead by native 'entrepreneurs' who are always from a class which has maximum access to economic, political and regional power, whether emerging within a country or imported from out, doesn't have a different future as long as the theoretical paradigm of infallibility of market forces operate.

In India Ghandian movement, when he gave a call for 'Swadeshi' and simultaneously mooted 'trusteeship' principle of entrepreneurial leadership etc., exactly a similar philosophy was at work. The foreign trained/educated and well endowed privileged class of society sends its children to public school, but in the public sector they occupy the executive positions. If they only are being also asked to provide leadership, which an 'illiterate and suppressed society supposedly can't provide, I am sure then the seeds of further suppression of society are being sown.

I have no hesitation in saying so because our unfortunate experience is no different. Indeed 'selective closure' as Mabogunje, a Nigerian intellectual advocates in his recent book 'The development process' is laudable.

Perhaps the solitude which is essential, as he argues, for even a nation to fully realize and exploit its potentialities, then foreign aid (armaments of internal destruction or death from within) must be cautiously looked at. But then let us not be naive to assume national market dominated by local but 'elite' entrepreneur will have less negative implications for equity or growth than markets penetrated by TNCs or foreign interests because invariably it is found; local elite develops rather axiomatically, links with TNCs or foreign Capital.

Secondly regarding science and technology in India (Dossier 20), I think only a short reference to a study 'communicating with farmers' that I had also sent to you, would be relevant: we had shown, how perception of environment by farmers is highly risky and uncertain. To devise such unique associations between different ecological variables like, weeds, insect attacks, expectation of onset of rains, the yield prospects from different crops water, table performance
etc, etc, that despite technological 'failure' they had succeeded so far in surviving. If they are poorer, it is because the state had helped the already better endowed irrigated farmers to grow richer through foreign inspired and internationally arranged Green Revolution'.

We have documented several precise and testable 'crude' methods of illiterate and suppressed farmers which can beat any sophisticated technology in their infallibility.

Thirdly and most importantly AID that Doesn't (Dossier 20), or can not, I was reading recently 'Food First' by Lappé and Collins and was impressed by both their breadth and depth. The issue indeed is Power which doesn't naturally evolve, which is seldom shared and which doesn't percolate down, which is dynamically related with attributes like "the intelligence and rationality" and which will not be granted by elite foreign or indigenous either.

One has to agree with the author's view that official foreign aid reinforces the power relationships that already exist (except, if I am not taken amiss, in 'some cases by an Eastern super power'). Only difficulty with the thesis of Lappé et al is, while addressing Americans, they plead for something that their 'system' can't afford to grant. Thus, without challenging the system that provides profitability and power to American interest, to hope American individuals will press their leadership for changing (or reforming) is a little far-fetched. I have not much disagreement with what they report, but the implication of their suggested methodology are:

a) The 'seeds' of change in the Third World would be sown by the First World.

b) First World can be persuaded by the socially conscious 'elite' who are beneficiaries of present unequal exchange to part with some of their privileges so that the hungry in the Third World can eat. (An example of this mentality was provided by Lappé in their book also!)

I am afraid both the premises are weak; if not totally incongruent. While certainly those who want to, must address themselves to the problems of reform in their nation's context but then let this process not raise undue hopes in the Third World.

I have heard many 'intelligent' and 'knowledgeable' colleagues of mine here saying that if the top 20% who consume the majority of the world's resources and own maximum power can be persuaded to dispense with a fraction of it, it would bring about greater "development" in the Third World than their collective internal mobilization etc. (it is too well known to need any elaborate repudiation).

It doesn't need comment: I am very clear of one thing however: the fight against 'hunger' will have to be fought by the 'hungry' only; no matter whether Marx without being a proletariat himself wrote such a wonderful treatise, the moral of the discussion is:

Let us not dilute the definition of development that each Third World country will have to evolve through its own genius by placing too much hope in reformist attempts. 'Aid' or 'No Aid' is not always the decision taken by a recipient. This truth is difficult to accept but an unfortunate reality even after taking
cognizance of the conflicts of interest within nation states, as Lappé talks about (Arusha Conference (Dossier 19), in this regard was a bold step).

Anyway, our best wishes with Lappé. It will be worthwhile, if Lappé and his colleagues made their objectives more explicity and at the same time underline that they are merely collaborating in the fight from the fence, against hunger. The leadership will have to emerge from "illiterate and suppressed societies only". I wish, somebody could prove Marx wrong that revolutions are led not by labourers but the conscientious elite.

Wishing you once again a very happy New Year. Please convey my greetings to all your colleagues.

A NEW WORLD EMPLOYMENT PLAN

An alternative Dutch view

Having received the following letter from Theo Ruyter:

10(86)

Having seen the summary of the proposal on "a new world employment plan" by Tinbergen and three other Dutchmen in the April issue of Development Forum, I would like to return to the IFDA Dossier 21 where the complete proposal was printed, followed by a rather mild commentary by Ignacy Sachs. Thinking of the progress report from the Third System Project (IFDA Dossier 17), I am surprised the proposal has not met stronger international criticism until now. So let me raise some objections against it.

1) Before entering into the proposal I want to stress the omission in the IFDA Dossier as well as Development Forum of any information about the academic and political background of the four authors. Mr. Tinbergen may be internationally known as an economist, but the prominent role of the three others in especially Dutch politics may be less well-known and seems to me relevant in the case of such a highly political proposal.

2) The background of the authors, as economists and prominent social democrats, may explain to a certain extent why they adhere to the ideas of interdependence and mutual interests, which got their most eloquent advocates so far in the Brandt Commission. Although these ideas are conceived by some as a necessary instrument to make the (Western) industrialized nations agree upon certain concessions to Third World nations, I consider them primarily a way to divert attention from the major contrasts in the present world economy.

---

Theo Ruyter, De Perponcherstraat 102, 2518 SZ The Hague, The Netherlands.
Pleas for large-scale international income transfers to Third World countries are more often dictated by the need in the West of new markets than by the need to alleviate the massive poverty in those countries. In that manner Third World interests are once again subordinated to Western interests, which implies present production structures and consumption patterns in the West remain unchanged. Likewise it seems to me reactionary to advocate the increase of exports by Third World countries, in so far as the main argument is that these countries have to compensate the oil price rise. This way one loses sight of the fundamental causes of that rise and pressure on the West to end its waste of energy is reduced.

3) The other policy the proposal provides for, in combination with the income transfers to Third World countries, is "positive anticipatory structural readjustment of industries in industrialized countries". Applying it to the market economies of the North, I think this policy is in conflict with the way these economies work. An anticipatory policy of readjustment requires a government that really steers the economy. Even if the governments involved would be willing to do so - and most of them are not - they are just unable to implement such a policy as their role in the economy is a secondary one. However, the authors don't basically question the system of the Western market economy, which makes it difficult for this proposal to be taken seriously. Moreover the degree of international integration on the level of governments is so limited that a national re-adjustment policy in the sense of the proposal is doomed to failure.

Especially Dutch social democratic politicians should know better in this respect. In the Dutch government which was headed by Mr. Den Uyl and in which Mr. Pronk was the Minister for development co-operation (1973-77), an experiment was started in anticipatory re-adjustment policy. The idea was to offer government support to entrepreneurs who would be willing to re-adjust their production in the Netherlands in such a way that Third World countries would get more opportunities to process their raw materials themselves. The program became a complete flop. Very few companies took up the offer and the ones that did generally considered the government money as a way to facilitate a re-adjustment process they were planning for their own reasons anyhow.

4) An important indication that the authors don't question the prevailing market economy system is their emphasis on an international division of labour on the basis of "comparative advantages". Though it has been modernized by such people as Ohlin, the doctrine of comparative cost remains an essential element of classical liberalism, that is still propping up the continuing incorporation of parts of the Third World in the system of international capitalism.

I don't see how the gap between North and South can be narrowed by the North specializing in knowledge-intensive activities and the South in labour-intensive activities, but maybe the proposal doesn't aim at narrowing the gap, maybe the authors just accept the gap is going to widen. Whatever the intentions of the authors may be, I hope they are aware their proposal can very well be used as a justification of the present international division of labour, as it develops on the basis of in particular private transnational corporations. As producers of raw materials, Third World countries are still the "farmers" of the world, being underpaid in comparison with the producers of finished pro-
products. The proposal doesn't alter that fact. It only moves the contrast to the level, where the producers of sophisticated products oppose those of (semi-) finished simpler products. In this way it runs parallel with a shift that is taking place within the existing system anyhow and opposes those who want the North to really share its technology and know-how with the South. It looks like the authors want Third World countries to do the dirty badly paid work in the world, like foreign legal and often illegal workers are doing the dirty jobs within the western industrialized countries.

5) Of course it is commendable that the authors are concerned about the employment all over the world. However, they tend to shift the problem of growing unemployment in many capitalist countries of the North on to the Third World, for they clearly aim at a considerable increase of imports from the West by Third World countries. To a large extent the causes of this unemployment have to do with the western society itself: the market for certain products having reached its saturation point, inability of the government to re-allocate means of production to provide products and services that are still needed, automation as a result of high labour cost, environment problems etcetera. That's why I think the solutions are to be found primarily within that same society.

6) Although the four authors include highly experienced politicians, their proposal bears a rather one-sided economic character. This finds expression in a striking simplicity about international decision making. How is it for instance possible to expect the New World Employment Plan, that still has to be formulated, will be ready for implementation in the middle of 1983?

Mainly dealing with economic realities, the proposal barely enters into political realities. The relations between North and South are treated as an economic issue and almost any political refinement is lacking. The South or the Third World is no homogenous entity nor is the North or the West and within individual countries distinctions are to be made as well. As a result there is a myriad of interests involved. The political and military relations for instance between the United States and Western Europe are not irrelevant for the interests of governments and people in Third World countries and should be taken into account, if one wants to talk about an essential thing like World Employment. One cannot take out one problem - in this case employment - and look for an answer, while leaving aside the rest. If one does, the effort risks to be fruitless.

(Theo Ruyter working in a research project of Osaci, Amsterdam, on Dutch agribusiness and the Third World, but writing this out of personal interest).
'NO WOMAN NO CRY'
by Ann R. Mattis

"United States calling for Miss Ann Mattis"
"Yes this is she" .... 2:00 a.m.
"Go ahead please"
"Hm hmm. Yu hear seh The Man dead"
"Cio. Which man?"
"Marley dead today."

They got so much things to say right now, they got so much things to say and certainly at least inside Jamaica, enough will be said about this 'great Jamaican' in the days to come that I hesitate to add to the songs of praise to the inimitable Bob Marley. In addition I subscribe to the tenet that talk is cheap. No surfeit of accolades could render adequate homage to this personification of excellence, to this articulation of a nation. Far be it for me to try to deify a 'star' to invest Marley and his work with things which were not and are not there or were perhaps never intended - to lend 'social significance' to the work of a man who practised his craft and who, quite simply, did so beautifully and well. However, a small celebration may be permitted to say thanks for the experience.

Die ya music, reggae music he presaged would grow and set the people free from their burdens and bondage. Some might be tempted to moot this perspective and may even propose any numerous alternative functions of reggae, from a medium of culture, to music by which to make love, through to, in the case of many Europeans - who don't know A from Rastafari - music to wriggle to and shout RASTAFARI.

Nevertheless, for anyone who believes in the power of ideas, there is no doubt that the words and music such as Bob Marley was capable of living, could well serve in unschackling a people. Truculent in lyrics uttered amazingly in the most dulcet of tones against a basic pulsating rhythm, Marley has sustained, united, strengthened, lent hope to and caused numerous Jamaicans to dream.

But a walk through the street of cities such as Dakar, New York, Rome serves to disabuse my initial conviction that one has to be Jamaican to comprehend the ineffable being which is Marley. Marley belongs to the oppressed universally and especially to the Third World. Marley belongs to anyone who has ever felt pain, who has ever found themselves talkin' blues, who has ever felt the hand of the oppressor, who has ever felt like bombing a church now that you know that the preacher is lying. In this great future you can't forget

1/ Ann Mattis of Jamaica was a member of the Secretariat team during the first three years of IFDA. She now works with the Society for International Development (Palazzo delle Civiltà del Lavoro, 00144 Rome, Italy).
your past and too often in the absence of history books it is to those pristine
rhythms of Bob The Man Marley that many Jamaicans owe their knowledge and
recognition of their past. It is that knowledge and recognition which made
a Michael Manley victory possible in Jamaica. That is what made even moment-
tary unity possible in a period of intense political strife when he called for
one love, one heart, let’s get together and feel alright because we know
how we and them a go work this out ... but we Jah people can make it work,
come together and make it work.

Some grew up with Marcus Garvey, we grew up with Bob Marley. We are the ge-
neration whoрод the tribulation who check out the real situation, nation war
against nation and ask where did it all begin when will it end - well it seems
total destruction the only solution.

Not always, but with help from people such as Marley, we know where we’re
going, we know where we’re from ... too thousand years of history could not
be wiped away so easily. In the Third World our exodus into truly independent
nations begins when we manage to emancipate (ourselves) from mental slavery,
when we accept that none but ourselves can free our minds ... when you don’t
let them fool you or even try to school you, when we stand firm and assert
we’ve got a mind of our own.

If Third World children were taught naught else in school they would do well
to be informed of the basic truths of Marley - to somehow be infected with
his energies, his prescience, his hope, they could indeed proclaim, we have
been schooled. Among his cries: children get your culture and don’t stay
there and gesture ... don’t you forget who you are and where you stand in the
struggle, and remember, what has been hidden from the wise and prudent, been
revealed to the babe and wailing and even though so much have been said, so
little been done (and) they still killing the people, though there is too
much confusion, so much frustration, be assured that the day shall come when
not one of my needs shall sit on a sidewalk and beg your bread. Never let a
politician grant you a favour, he will always want to control you forever and
even though you might not have no friends in high society and so, we no know
how we and then a go work it out, remember even the biggest man you ever did
see was once a baby ... so get up stand up, stand up for your rights. While
they fight you down, stand firm ... for someone will have to pay for the in-
nocent blood that they shed everyday and when the rain fall it don’t fall on
one man’s house-top, remember that. Further, even though down there in the
ghetto, they suffer ... I and I hang on in there and I and I now leggo. Many
more will have to suffer, many more will have to die - don’t ask me why. Pity
the living that Marley’s unctions will no longer ease the sufferation.

But these are words - sterile and lifeless without the rhythm which is Marley,
diminished without its indomitable source. However, confident that while I’m
gone, everything’s gonna be alright, ... we won’t shed no tears, we found a
way to cast away the fears. Won’t you help to sing those songs of freedom,
redemption songs.

We’ll never be blue, no matter what rages, changes we’ll be forever.


(All the words in italics are taken from the works of Bob Marley, except for
‘Dis ya music’ which is from Peter Tosh).
MATERIALS RECEIVED

LOCAL SPACE


. Wench Barth Eide and Dr. Filomina Steady, Evaluation in an African context: special emphasis on the woman producer and reproducer - some theoretical considerations (Institute for Nutrition Research, University of Oslo, Norway), 17 pp.

. Hari Mohan Mathur, Rural development in traditional societies: an anthropological perspective (Government of India, Department of Personnel, Training Division, New Delhi 110001, India), 14 pp.


NATIONAL SPACE

. Ernesto M. Valencia, The debate on transnationals in the Philippines: A review (Third World Studies Center, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines), 6 pp.

. Eduardo C. Tadg, A critique of development patterns in Mindanao (Third World Studies Center, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines), 4 pp.


. A.K. Ventura, Parameters of underdevelopment (Scientific Research Council, P.O. Box 350, Kingston 6, Jamaica, W.I.), 16 pp.

. Ajit Roy, Government and big business in India (Centre for Education & Documentation, 3 Suleman Chambers, 4 Battery Street, Behind Regal Cinema, Bombay 400 039, India), 10 pp.
GLOBAL SPACE


H. Leo Theuns and Amina Rasheed, Alternative approaches to tertiary tourism education with special reference to developing countries (Development Research Institute, Tilburg University, The Netherlands), (Centro di Studi Turistici, Florence, Italy), 16 pp.


Jean-Louis Troupin, La Belgique face à l'industrialisation du tiers-monde, esquisse d'une stratégie alternative d'adaptation (Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut d'étude des pays en développement, 19, rue des Wallons, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique), 10 pp.

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This copy represents my own subscription and one further one so that a Third World subscriber may receive your Dossier free for one year. Why don't you try to promote this type of jumelage?

Mr. Benjamin
International Drivers' Behaviour Research Association

EXCELLENT IDEA. WHO WILL EMULATE MR. BENJAMIN?
LOCAL SPACE


10. World Health Forum, a new quarterly international journal of health development published by the WHO (1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland). Published in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, this new quarterly, intended for a broad audience, will 'encourage discussion on highly controversial topics'.


NATIONAL SPACE


. Edberto M. Villegas, Notes on the labor code and the condition of the industrial working class in the Philippines, mimeog., 21 pp., and

. Roberto Tiglao, The political economy of the Philippines Coconut industry, mimeog., 63 pp., Third World Studies, Rm 428, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines System, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines.

. From the Institute of labor studies at the National University of Lesotho, Maseru Campus, Private Bag, Maseru 100, Lesotho):

. Hazel Henderson, The politics of solar age (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1981) The new book of Hazel Henderson outlines the needed reconceptualizing of major political issues in the industrialized nations during the 1980s and beyond. This new politics lies beyond all the old economic formulas and must deal with the massive transition now underway as these societies, both market-oriented and centrally-planned, shift from unsustainable non renewable resource use and the confrontations of the dying Age of Petroleum, to the renewable energy and resource-based economies managed for long-term, sustained-yield productivity of the dawning Solar Age.

THIRD WORLD SPACE


GLOBAL SPACE


Sound environmental management will only be possible if competing and sometimes conflicting claims on natural resources can clearly be defined and brought into better harmony. Improved performance in conservation and management requires insight into the complex interaction between man and environment to be accompanied by mechanisms and instruments with which to enhance capacity for action. The main domains of concern of the report is the natural and man-made environments, particularly in rural areas. The report focuses on three areas considered relevant for analysis and action, 1) the structure and dimension of Dutch aid; 2) methodological guides to a functionally-integrated analysis of the state of, and trends in the environment in Third World countries, guides which are tested out in country-specific inventories (Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Upper Volta) included in the annex of the report; 3) discussions on the concept and issues of the problems of the environment in relation to development.
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ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT IN GRENADA

(cont. from page 2)

The revolution is also a cultural one. Change bears on people's mentality. On the basis of endogenous values - black power is an important ideological source of the New Jewel Movement - and traditions of peoples' struggle, a new sense of self confidence and dignity is being enhanced.

That self-reliance - especially in food production - is a cornerstone of the process does not imply autarchy. On the contrary, Grenada has established cooperative links with a number of Third World countries, Cuba to start with, and also Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, as well as with the European community. The New Jewel Movement is a member of the Socialist International.

This is highly disturbing for those who benefit from the old international order, and the most powerful country of the planet does not find it shameful to try and prevent European countries to help the construction of the airport, nor to mount a vicious disinformation campaign on one major TV network.

We will have much more to say on Grenada. What we wanted to share immediately with our readers is our conviction that Grenada is moving towards another development in the most hostile geopolitical environment; that it deserves the understanding and support of all those, individuals, organizations and governments, who are committed, or are prepared to give a chance, to a genuine, people-oriented process of development. Marc Nerfin