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executive committee: Ismail Sabri Abdalla, Ahmed Ben Salah (co-chairman), Gamani Corea, Mohibul Haq, Enrique Iglesias, Jan Meijer (co-chairman), Marc Nerfin (president), Justinian F. Rweyemamu, Ignacy Sachs, Juan Somavia, Maurice F. Strong, Ingo Thorsson

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"In the monetary history of this decade ... Arusha, a small and pleasant Tanzanian town ... may well prove to have played a major role."

So writes Paul Fabra of Le Monde in the October 7 1980 edition of Europa, the monthly supplement published jointly by Le Monde, La Stampa, The Times and Die Welt. Fabra's speculation was inspired by two recent events in Arusha: first, the official recognition of the PLO by the Group of 77, whose repercussions were strongly felt at this year's Annual Meetings of the IMF and the "World Bank"; second, the Arusha Initiative, launched last July by a South-North Conference on the International Monetary System and the N10 which Fabra attended (see Dossier 19, pp. 91-100).

"The Arusha Initiative attracted wide media coverage", Fabra continues ...

"It was thus entirely successful in achieving its intended purpose, which was to orchestrate a vast political, diplomatic and intellectual movement with no less an aim than to instigate a fundamental overhaul of the running of the international financial institutions, where Western and especially American influence is omnipresent."

We are encouraged by such a positive assessment of the impact of the Arusha Initiative. It leads us to believe that Dossier readers may be interested in sharing our information about the follow-up of the Initiative:

- The Arusha Initiative was tabled by the delegation of Tanzania as an UNCTAD document, for consideration by a group of experts on the evolution of the international monetary system (Geneva, July/August), and by the delegations of Jamaica and Tanzania as a document of the special session on development of the UN General Assembly (New York, August/September).

- Development Dialogue 1980:2 (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala), containing the Initiative together with other papers of the South-North Conference, was circulated to participants in the General Assembly session and in the non-governmental events organized alongside it, as well as to all delegations in the Fund/Bank Annual Meetings (Washington D.C., September/October).

- A mission consisting of three South-North Conference participants (Ahmed Ben Salah, Evelyn Herfkens and Marc Nerfin) and IFDA Council member Joseph Ki-Zerbo went to Jamaica in September to present the Arusha Initiative to Prime Minister Michael Manley. This mission was mounted as a response to the resolution on Solidarity with Jamaica adopted by the Conference (see Dossier 19, p. 101). It was widely reported in the Jamaican media and was timed to precede the "IMF general elections" scheduled to be held in Jamaica late in October.

(cont. on page 12).
THE WINDS OF CHANGE - FROM AN INFORMATION EMBARGO TO A NATIONAL
SURVEY OF INFORMATION NEEDS AND RESOURCES IN EGYPT

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Abstract: This paper is an attempt at reviewing and analysing the 'development-
knowledge' nexus in Egypt during the last quarter of a century, during which a
rather dramatic change of attitude concerning information, knowledge and
development took place. It also attempts to explain what happened. It finally
points out some future trends in the building of a national intelligence capa-
bility in Egypt.

Résumé: Cet article constitue une tentative d'examen et d'analyse du complexe
'développement-connaissance' en Egypte au cours du dernier quart de siècle,
marqué par un changement d'attitude radical en ce qui concerne l'information,
la connaissance et le développement. C'est aussi une tentative d'explication.
Il envisage enfin quelques tendances dans la mise sur pied d'une capacité
nationale d'information en Egypte.

Resumen: Este informe intenta un examen y análisis del complejo 'desarrollo-
conocimiento' en Egipto durante el ultimo cuarto de siglo, época caracteri-
sada por un cambio de actitud radical en cuanto a la información, el conoci-
miento y el desarrollo. También se intenta una explicación de estos aconteci-
mientos, y se señalan algunas tendencias en el establecimiento de una capacidad
nacional de información en Egipto.

*/ Paper presented to the meeting on "The knowledge Industry and the Process of
development", held at the OECD Development Centre, Paris, 9-12 June, 1980.
Dr. Ossama A. El-Kholy (Egypt) was the Assistant Director General for
Science and Technology of the Arab League Educational, Cultural & Scientific
Organisation.
THE WINDS OF CHANGE - FROM AN INFORMATION EMBARGO TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF INFORMATION NEEDS AND RESOURCES IN EGYPT

INTRODUCTION

A movement started in Egypt towards the end of the fifties, combining the well-established state statistical organs with the "mobilisation committees" formed after the 1956 Suez War (commonly known in the Egypt as the "Tripartite Agression"). This culminated in 1964 in a presidential decree establishing a "Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics" (CAPMAS), and the appointment of an army general as its head. The following activities became punishable offences: 1) the publication of any statistical data not based on CAPMAS outputs; 2) the use, hire, or purchase of "statistical" machinery ranging from desk calculators to computers, without authorisation from CAPMAS; and 3) the implementation of market surveys or public opinion polls without its approval, nor the use or release of the results without its clearance. The embargos were strictly enforced all the way from University research students and staff in the physical sciences, to "national" reports prepared for United Nations organisations, to the activities of commercial consulting firms. The manager of a national consulting firm was jailed for failing to seek permission to collect data on imports of tomato paste canning machines. The information was said to lead to fairly accurate estimates of the strength of the armed forces. The fact that it was available abroad did not seem to be relevant.

Fifteen years later, the "Academy of Scientific Research and Technology" (ASKI) embarked - under a bilateral aid agreement - on an ambitious project for the establishment of a national scientific-technological information network. The principal goal is "to ensure maximum availability and optimum utilisation of accumulated knowledge in science, technology, and ultimately social sciences in pursuit of national development objectives" (my underlining). Phase I of the project is the execution of the first nationwide survey of existing information resources and their utilisation, as well as the current information needs as revealed by an elaborate, multi-tiered effort including exhaustive field work. The survey has started and its findings will lead to the design of the national network envisaged in the project document.

This note is an attempt at reviewing and analysing the "development-knowledge" nexus in Egypt during the last quarter of a century, that has led to this rather dramatic change in attitude concerning information, knowledge and development and, hopefully, at explaining how these two events came about. It may also point out some future trends in the building of a national intelligence capability in Egypt.

I would like, at the outset, to state clearly the limitations of this attempt. First, there has not been - to my knowledge at least - any previous attempt at tackling this problem. This note is written without the benefit of empirical evidence from the ongoing survey. This would have been a more reliable source than the personal experiences and highly subjective interpretations of the
writer - even though he has been involved in this field in one way or another for most of the period under review. Finally, this report is not strictly based on a specific and explicit theoretical framework or reference model in mind. In fact, I had originally hoped to limit myself to the confines of technological development. It soon became apparent that I must venture into more complex and abstract fields, particularly the decision-making process and social organisation - fields in which I - as an engineer by profession - confess ignorance. However, I use this narrative as a framework for highlighting some of the main points involved in the creation of social intelligence in a Third World country like Egypt. I fully realise that none of these issues is particular to Third World countries. In fact, reading the literature on the intelligence problems of industrialized countries gives me the impression of "déjà vu". However, the social context, the local complexion of these problems in a Third World country and, hence, the possible remedies are - I believe - radically different. Although the social and political systems, as well as the historical antecedents and stages of productivity, vary considerably in the Arab region, Egyptian experience in the last few decades seems to me to relate strongly to the situations in many Arab countries. Perhaps the only saving grace for this contribution is that it may prove of some relevance - as a case study.

THE USE AND MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE IN A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY

The 1952 Revolution in Egypt is still considered as the beginning of a remarkable development effort marking a clear, if not clean, break away from an undesirable past in an effort that has been sustained up till now inspite of many setbacks. It soon became clear that its two main thrusts were a land-reform programme and industrialisation. We should remember here that this was a journey into the unknown and that there was little, if any, previous experience of a country of this size and background to draw upon. The leaders were a small group of dedicated army officers - headed by a staff college instructor - who had no professional experience of socio-economic problems and who relied mainly on the expertise of indigenous bureaucrats, businessmen and academics, on the one hand, and foreign technical assistance and expertise (e.g. Point IV and Arthur D. Little) on the other. Within a few years, the concept of national planning emerged. This brought in its wake the realisation of the need for systematic data-gathering and analysis. The nucleus of an indigenous capability in the systematic compilation of national statistics based on carefully formulated classifications, and in the theory and practice of sectoral and national planning was established and has been the seed from which all later achievements have grown.

However, for various reasons - interesting in themselves but not very relevant to our discussion here - achievement fell short of expectations and the leadership was soon pressing for a national development plan. The specialists split into two factions. One group insisted that drafting such a plan is no mean task and calls for considerable time and effort, if the plan was not to boomerang and cause yet more disappointment through failure in implementation. The other dismissed this attitude as being pedantic and actually produced the first plan for industrialisation in a few weeks - basing itself on the simple logic that the needs are so obvious that you could not go wrong at this stage. This was a debate between the technocrats. By then, the leaders of the business community had dropped out of the race. The majority could not move from the micro
(project) scale to the macro (national) level, while the public at large was not involved - or even consciously informed. The result was a general loss of credibility of the technocrats on both sides and a disillusionment with their "magic" powers.

Point 1: Whom does the political leadership follow when the specialists differ?

The "Tripartite Aggression" (Suez War) created an entirely new situation in which military intervention stared us in the face, only a few months after the end of seventy years of military occupation by British military forces. Egypt had to mobilise for the first time in its modern history and it became painfully clear that we had no reliable information on the resources to be mobilised. (I remember being commissioned to take over an establishment, only to find out that it had been liquidated several years before). Furthermore, the sequestration of British, French and Belgian property (mainly in banking, insurance, trade and some industry) led almost accidentally to the creation of a "public sector" which was our first experience of state management of such relatively large scale enterprises. For the first time, there was a clearly defined "enemy" from without, who had known linkages with allies within. The distinction between the "trustworthy" (and presumably ill-informed) and the "knowledgeable" (and presumably untrustworthy) became the subject of a public debate which raged in the mass media for several years.

Point 2: How does the political leadership differentiate between the "Jonas" and the "Judas"?

Furthermore, a number of factors combined together to underscore the need for more careful handling and/or suppression of information so far freely available within the government system and essential for the proper execution of the functions of drafting of plans for national actions and the monitoring of national effort. First, there was the need not to reveal the full extent of the build-up of military force and the ambitious modernisation programme of the armed forces. By that time, Egypt was also committed to the active support of national liberation movements in a number of Third World countries. More relevant to our discussion here was the growing realisation of the need to bolster up public morale in what came to be commonly known as the "development battle" (echoes of Dedijer's methodological analogy "Development is War'"). Success stories and achievements had to be emphasised and perhaps slightly blown up, while failures had to be glossed over or even refuted. The "hanging out of dirty linen" was - and still is - socially condemned and considered destructive and defeatist (in fact, this report qualifies fully for such condemnation). The need for secrecy, in this particular sense, was exaggerated beyond reasonable limits and extended even to information relating to foreign inputs which was, by definition, freely available abroad. The absurdity of the situation had been dramatically demonstrated on many occasions to the leadership. The fact still remained, however, that the majority of the population, if not the outside world, was kept unaware of the protected or "unpalatable" information.

Against this, one should underline the fact that while there was growing realisation that information in the skilful hands of the enemy could become "knowledge" dangerous to national security, no systematic effort - other than
military intelligence - was exerted to create a national intelligence capability in the service of development.

Point 2: Who determines how secret are the "secrets" of a Third World country? How and why does he do it? How can this be reconciled with the development of social intelligence?

As more and more of the "trustworthy" took over the responsibility of heading the fast developing and proliferating government departments and public enterprises, the social norm of "doctoring" information became widespread. In particular, it served to hide mistakes and failures and to belittle problems and difficulties and, hence, the role of the "experienced", but suspect, elements in overcoming them. There were some remarkable exceptions of individuals who had the access to the leadership and the guts to warn it of impending disaster. Generally, however, there grew a silent and intimidated minority which was well-informed and highly critical of what was happening. What is most interesting, and hopeful, here is the attitude of the leadership which was not unaware of this dangerous trend. One could discern a general pattern in which a leader, be he a head of state or a cabinet minister, had his own "intelligence advisers" who served him behind the scene, collecting data, analysing it, making forecasts and reporting to the leader. Yet, this, was an unhealthy situation in which the conflicts and contradictions were not entirely objective, nor were they received within an open framework of confrontations and discussions. In fact, this was more in the nature of compiling "confidential" files on individuals and organisations, rather than of a deliberate and conscious effort to remedy faults. It is perhaps also fair to say that the situation was aggravated by the absence of political parties that might have performed the role of critics from within a recognised and open power structure.

During the period, momentous decisions were taken almost on the spur of the moment, e.g. unity with Syria or military intervention in Yemen. In neither of these cases was there a detailed analysis of the full implications of the decision, nor the ability to cope effectively with its logical and foreseen consequences 1/, nor was there - in all fairness - much time to ponder over the issues involved before taking a decision.

In an atmosphere of "decision-making by intuition" resulting from a monolithic power structure, the downgrading of expertise relating to the conscious desire for breaking away from the past, and the reliance on mobilisation of the people to bring about great achievements, it is not surprising that knowledge is not held in high esteem by the leaders of change (i.e. development) in Third World countries - at least in the early stages.

1/ It is reputed that when Syria broke away from the union a short while later, the decision to intervene by force to restore the union was rescinded after one military adviser expounded the full geopolitical implications of that decision.
The day of reckoning came in the mid-sixties when cheap imports of wheat from a foreign country - a cornerstone in the development plan - were abruptly halted. A new cabinet admitted, for the first time, that all was not well and that a process of national stock-taking was called for. This was followed within a year or so by the traumatic experience of the "Relapse" (Six Day War). The national ego was brutally deflated and heads rolled.

A new phase had started and it culminated in the October War, six years later. During this period, and in spite of even more pressing security needs and almost continuous military harassment causing substantial destruction, it was possible to maintain a viable economic system that continued the development effort, to rebuild an efficient and modern war machine, to mobilise in almost total secrecy for what is generally regarded as an original military operation in which new and indigenous technology made it possible to overrun what most foreign experts considered an unsurmountable barrier.

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN EGYPT

Next, we focus on the specific field of technological development - which is almost synonymous in this period with the building of a national industrial base within the framework of a strategy of import substitution mainly for consumer goods - later expanding into basic heavy industry. The term "technology transfer" is usually used in such contexts, yet what was in fact being transferred was not technology (know how), but the products of technology (plant and equipment). The distinction is crucial to a discussion of intelligence in technological transactions. For example, such transactions rule out by definition consideration of technological innovation - at least in the initial phase of the exercise - and tend to focus attention on the role of intelligence in the negotiating process. Even here, the emphasis is on economic, rather than technological intelligence, on inside information on the reputation of the supplier, rather than on the technology itself.

Technology transfer, in the proper sense of the word, is a "natural" and two-way process when it occurs between industrialised countries. The imported "knowledge" can be effectively and quickly transformed into an economic advantage exceeding the cost of transfer. The issues involved in a Third World country are considerably more complex. In fact, such a country is actually doing several different things at the same time:-

- It is creating a national production base (plant, equipment, raw materials, semi-finished products, processes, management systems, qualified and trained personnel) mainly through massive importations from abroad;

- This has to be integrated in the existing "body economic" and reasonably smooth working relations with older institutions established. This has, more often than not been a painful and disorderly process;
- The physical facilities acquired find great difficulty in transforming the acquired operating instruction into a product or service achieving an economic advantage;

- More often than not, the resulting product or service has to be adapted to the local physical and social environment. The source of the technology is not always willing or capable of fulfilling this task, nor could the embryonic indigenous expertise be expected to do so. It is obvious that the first two tasks are basically different. They represent an extra burden in technology transfer to a Third World country.

Within one decade, there existed in Egypt a group of fairly well-informed and skilful negotiators of technological transactions. The centralised structure established in 1957, the "General Organisation for Industrialisation" (GOFI), permitted fairly rapid accumulation of knowledge and skills. There is no doubt that a good price, in the form of inappropriate choices, unfair contracts and wrong procedures was paid, but generally one can discern a learning process. A systematic analysis of this experience is yet to be made. Perfunctory enquiries have yielded some impressions.

In transactions with Western free market enterprises, one of the common stratagems seems to have been the playing of one competitor against the other as a means of gleaning intelligence. At a later state, when dealings with the socialist bloc became more prominent, Egyptian negotiators armed themselves with alternative offers from the West. Unpackaging increased with time and local resources and capabilities became more involved in project implementation. Established procedures were formulated for calls for bids, their analysis and evaluation. Furthermore, there does not seem to have been sizeable corruption inspite of the fact that most deals were within the public sector. Even the gossip within the small social group of main actors does not hint at widespread corruption - at least in comparison with a later period when prominent personalities are on public trial for alleged corruption.

The fact still remains, however, that not enough attention was paid to the acquisition and exploitation of "know how" rather than its products or to mobilising human and material resources specifically for this purpose. This could be attributed mainly to the desire of the leadership to move rapidly and show tangible results without paying the price in time and effort needed for real transfer of technology. One cannot help feeling also that this was not resisted by the technocrats who concentrated on "managing" their enterprises and their relations with the foreign sources of "know how" rather than tackling the more challenging tasks of national involvement in design and development of plant and equipment. The one remarkable exception is the project for the design and development of military aircraft, jet engines and missiles, where a whole generation of engineers was actually involved with a reasonable degree of success in these projects. One of the more remarkable achievements at this time was the copying and batch-production of a small jet engine of unconventional design and its utilisation by the Air Force.

Concentration on the war effort in the late sixties and early seventies resulted in the national infrastructure sinking to a dangerously low level and in failure to keep up with and to introduce current developments in many fields of
technology. It was natural to try after the October War to re-orient the national effort. The era of the so-called "open door" policy started. Particular importance was attached to the role of foreign capital in revitalising the economy. It was claimed that it could play a decisive role in introducing new technologies. The "joint venture company" became the magic formula for 'catching up'. Egypt witnessed an unprecedented influx of foreign consultants who explored the way for foreign investment and new aid programmes mainly from the West.

The "opening up" eventually involved information on Egypt. Foreign consultants had to have access to such information. It turned out that they came already armed with considerable information and that they could ferret out more from within the country, with relative ease. Calling in foreign consultants became the order of the day and extended to cover fields where national expertise has so far been considered competent and adequate. It looked - at least to the leadership in many walks of life - as if a synthesis of the "trustworthy" and the "experienced" has at last been achieved in the person of the foreign expert. Old habits and attitudes concerning the sanctity of information were beginning to change. What used to be considered as sensitive information only a few years before, now circulated more freely.

The ease with which foreign investors produced intelligence on our own activities came as a mild shock to many. The value of information as a valuable resource and the new atmosphere of freedom set the fashion for the proliferation of information centres, banks, networks and exchange systems. The fashion is becoming the hallmark of modernity. It would be true to say, however, that apart from the banking system, there is little evidence that the new information units are playing any useful role or that this will do so in the near future. Interviews with top personnel in thirty leading projects in the new five-year plan, covering all sectors of the economy, have led to some particularly significant observations:-

- There is no clear comprehension of the role expected from an organised information system in decision-making;
- There is a general feeling that the information needed is in existence somewhere within the system, but that it is not accessible. Nor could a "gatekeeper" be identified in many cases;
- There is a strange misconception as to who should seek and use information in joint venture companies. In many cases, it was felt that this was the responsibility of the foreign partner!

CONCLUDING REMARK

It is now clear that taboos and restrictions on information will disappear. It is perhaps also true to say that there is an overwhelming flood of information from abroad and enough internal information in existence somewhere within the system. It is reasonable to expect in the light of current activities that fairly adequate and well organised information systems will eventually be established. The big question that will still remain will be the use made of
this wealth of information and the ability to turn it into knowledge in the service of national development.

My personal view is that it is the national business community that will most probably be the first to achieve this breakthrough. A reaction is slowly building up against the swamping of the economy by foreign investments that have been mostly short-term, non-productive and of the "hit and run" type enticed by the remarkably generous concessions by the "open-door" policy. A new class of Egyptian entrepreneur who has served his apprenticeship in the public sector in the sixties and seventies and who is knowledgeable and sophisticated is emerging and is seeking an active role in the new atmosphere in which the private sector is expanding rapidly. It appreciates the role of information and intelligence in exposing current abuses of the "open-door" policy, and in the careful planning and execution of its new activities. It should have no great difficulty in fostering the skills needed for this task. There is reason to believe that it will exploit its social relations and prestige in redressing the balance in favour of the local entrepreneur and that life will become increasingly difficult for ephemeral foreign investment. There have already been two "scandals" involving such investment and in both cases effective intelligence has forced the government to take drastic action, leading to the total abolition of one major concession at least.

Yet the decisive role in fostering an intelligence capability in the service of development will still be played by an enlightened, courageous, dedicated and incorruptible leadership. Such leadership could not emerge out of a backward illiterate and suppressed society. Social intelligence involves, if not a whole society, then at least substantial sections of its elite bureaucrats, technocrats, academics and businessmen.
Attendance at the South-North Conference by three communicators (Fabra, Mohamed Mashmoushi, Chakravarthi Raghavan), together with coverage by the Tanzanian national news agency Shihata and by Inter Press Service, resulted in several press articles devoted to the Arusha Initiative or referring to it. Other articles picked up Raghavan's story about a leaked IMF staff memorandum exposing the political motivations of the IMF staff dealing with Jamaica. A list of those articles which we have received is given on p. 26; no doubt there are more which we have not seen.

Finally, it may not be irrelevant to quote an article in the Financial Times (London, 4.10.80), commenting on the Fund/Bank meetings, which found Tanzanian Finance Minister Amir Jamal (who presided over the meetings) and his Jamaican counterpart Hugh Small to be the "most impressive" exponents of the view that the conventional remedies of the IMF are inappropriate for dealing with the financial problems of most Third World countries. This view is one of the main themes of the Arusha Initiative; both Jamal and Small participated actively in the Arusha Conference.

This political and diplomatic momentum must be maintained by pressure from the Third System. For, despite the several intergovernmental discussions on international monetary issues since the Arusha Initiative was launched, the much criticized monetary non-system remains basically unchanged. The UNCTAD expert group was boycotted by all but one (Norway) of the Western industrialized countries, at the instigation of the IMF "big five" (USA, UK, FRG, France, Japan). The UN General Assembly negotiations on procedures for negotiations ended in a stalemate, essentially because of the refusal of the USA, backed by UK and FRG, to tolerate negotiations on monetary matters elsewhere than in the IMF, where they wield veto power. And the Third World came away from the Fund/Bank meetings with a few concessions on the volume of IMF finance and with declarations of intent on the softening of conditionality. Their main demands (including that for a greater share of voting power) were remitted for study.

What can the Third System do? Given the propensity of North-South negotiating rounds to skirt the big issues, we must ensure that next year's "global round" does not forget the Arusha call for a United Nations Conference on International Money and Finance, to provide "a universal, democratic and legitimate forum for the negotiation of a new monetary system - one, moreover, which can be open to public scrutiny". Given the likelihood that the Jamaica/IMF dispute will not be the last of its kind, we must continue to press for "the establishment of a mechanism of appeal and international arbitration, independent of the Fund", to deal with disputes between the IMF and its member countries. And, in addition to exerting pressure in these areas indicated by the Arusha Initiative, the Third System has the responsibility of showing the way to governments, of demonstrating how a new monetary system and a mechanism for making the IMF accountable could work in practice.

The Arusha Conference sponsors will continue to be on the look out for opportunities to move toward these goals. We urge other supporters of the Arusha Initiative to do the same and to let us know about their plans and their actions.
Abstract: India has the third largest scientific manpower in the world, yet one observes some of the cruelest poverty and stagnation of social relationships, in this country. Signs of a serious scrutiny of the pre-suppositions of the relationship of science, technology and development have been apparent in the minds of a large number of scientists and technologists throughout India but no concrete views have emerged as an alternative. In the present understanding, a blind following of whatever goes in the name of science and technology in the industrialized countries, seems to be the only legitimate activity to be pursued in India. What is not yet clearly exposed is the frequent use of this area of science against the interests of the people in general. In this paper, some of the failures of the present day inter-relationship between science, technology and development in India are identified, and an attempt is made to arrive at an alternative approach which will be more meaningful to the Indian people.

Résumé: La communauté scientifique indienne - la troisième du monde par son effectif - vit au milieu de la pauvreté la plus cruelle et de rapports sociaux stagnants. Elle ne peut que s'interroger sur ses raisons d'être. Les signes d'un ré-examen des hypothèses courantes quant à la relation mécaniste entre la science, les techniques et le développement sont apparus chez un grand nombre de scientifiques et de techniciens dans tout le pays, mais aucune alternative concrète n'est encore apparue.

Tout se passe encore comme si la reproduction mimétique des modèles en vigueur dans les pays industrialisés était la seule activité légitime à poursuivre en Inde. Ce que l'on n'a pas encore clairement exposé, à cet égard, est l'usage fréquent de la science et des techniques à l'encontre des intérêts des masses.

Cet article - écrit sur la base des travaux d'un séminaire tenu cette année à Bangalore - s'efforce de montrer la relation entre les échecs et une vision (cont. à la page 13(25)).

*/ Paper written on the basis of the proceedings of the Workshop on An Alternate Approach to the Management of Research, Development and Education in Science and Technology.
K. Seetharam, V. Shiva and J. Bandyopadhyay

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA: AN ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE

1. INTRODUCTION

Workshops or Conferences on the question of the relationship between science, technology and development are quite common in the Indian academic circles these days. At the international level, the United Nations also held a massive Conference on science and technology for development in August 1979 in Vienna. So much of international and national concern over the failure of the Third World countries in utilizing scientific and technological knowledge towards the establishment of a more just and humane society, free from hunger, unemployment and abject poverty, however, has seen little success in evolving an alternate framework for the utilization of science and technology in development. This is because the basic approach, linking science, technology and development in a mechanistic fashion, in the line of the western model of development, has been going unchallenged. In India, the third largest scientific manpower in the world, sitting amidst the most cruel poverty and stagnating social relations, has been feeling strongly about the absurdity of its own existence. Signs of a serious scrutiny of the presuppositions of the mechanistic relationship of science, technology and development have been apparent in the minds of a large number of scientists and technologists throughout India but no concrete views, however, have yet emerged as an alternative.

In the present understanding of science and technology, a blind following of whatever goes in the name of science and technology in the industrialized countries, seems to be the only legitimate activity to be pursued in India. This view has provided the basic policy guidelines for the foundation of the present day science and technology organisation in the country. The marginality of this organisation to the growth of the Indian economy after 30 years of independence is an almost accepted fact. What is not yet clearly exposed is the frequent use of science and technology against the interest of the people in general. These shortcomings are usually attributed to various minor and peripheral factors. In this paper these failures are attempted to be identified with a totally incorrect view of the inter-relationship of science, technology and development in India, and to arrive at an alternate approach which will be more meaningful to the Indian people. This paper is a commentary-cum-report on the proceedings of a Workshop on 'An Alternate Approach to the Management of Research, Development and Education in Science and Technology' recently held in Bangalore. It was thought that all the people in the country who are seeking alternatives particularly those from rural based organisations and those in formal institutions trying to create an alternate approach to education and research in science and technology should meet to go deeper into the analysis of the present approach and into questions of forming the alternate, encompassing historical, epistemological, social, political and economic dimensions of the issues involved.
A broad analysis of the alternate development strategy for the Third World was made by Kothari in the inaugural address to the Workshop. Stressing the need for outlining the alternate approach to development Kothari deplored the present policies on Science and Technology which must be diverted from its present bias towards military research and attuned to the social and cultural matrix of the Third World countries. If the Third World countries fail to do so, and continue to follow the western model of development, it will not be possible for these countries to be free from the domination of the advanced countries and establish a more just human society.

Following the inaugural address the Workshop started with papers on History of Science and Technology in India, followed by papers on Political Economy of Science and Technology. Reports from practical experiences in using alternative approaches in science education, technology development and health care were presented and discussed in detail. Finally the Workshop ended with the development of clear guidelines on an alternate approach, and some definite resolutions on the role of science and technology in development in India were taken.

2. HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Any investigation into the history of science and technology in the Indian context must give an account of the present day differentials in science and technology between countries like India and those in the west. Two accounts for this differential were put forward in the Workshop. One view was that before the scientific and industrial revolution in Europe the economy and lifestyle was more or less uniform all over the world throughout the ancient and medieval times. Though different cultures had different science and technology systems there had been constant interaction and adoption of scientific ideas across different cultures. There are many examples of Chinese and Indian contributions to the industrial revolution in Europe. China and India however were stopped from a natural adoption of modern technologies because of military and economic restrictions associated with colonisation. The other view, in contrast, presupposed that the traditional Indian situation depicted the 'asiatic mode of production' which was very different from the traditional European situation because of the way craft or traditional technology was blended with agriculture. Hence it is this peculiarity that accounted for the existing differentials in science and technology in India and the west.

The presentation of above two theses shared two methodological slips. The first was based on confusing the issue of the existing differences in science and technology, with the question of why the industrial revolution did not occur in India. This identification of development of a society with science and technology depicts the erroneous view of a mechanistic relationship of science, technology and development. The second methodological error was based on the assumption that the combined use of quantification and observation in science was unique to the science that emerged in Europe during the 16th and 17th century. This combination is usually referred to as the 'scientific method'. Through a somewhat distorted understanding of history we tend to identify the introduction of the 'scientific method' in India with the advent of the British rule. In fact, the existence of quite a developed
scientific and technological knowledge in India goes back to the earliest records of history. A little investigation into the history of precolonial science in India, would reveal that there was no derth of reliance on experimentation and quantification in science. Aryabhatta, Bhaskara, Charaka all used sophisticated techniques of mathematical and experimental procedures in their respective fields of investigation. 6/ The assumption that the scientific method got created with modern science in Europe is a myth that has started to get eroded with serious historical studies. 7/ Nevertheless, over centuries this myth has contributed to the delegitimisation and destruction of traditional knowledge and traditional technologies by assigning to them an irrational and mystical status. The discussion in the session helped to indicate that our traditional systems have been rich resource of appropriate science and technology and it is an urgent research task in the history of science and technology to collect as much information as possible about the rationality of these systems before they are further lost. 8/

3. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The perspective that emerged in the Workshop from the history of science session also led to serious questioning of the existing views which provide the foundation for the organisation and structure of the present day science and technology establishments. The conventional viewpoint sees the present day Indian science and technology as ineffective because of factors like inadequate budget allocation, lack of proper management and the absence of an appropriate system to inculcate motivation and scientific values among Indian scientists. 9/ The discussions in the Workshop, however suggested that the problem in Indian science is not just one of ineffectiveness arising from factors external to scientific activity but Indian science and technology is crisis ridden due to the very content of the activity. Indian scientists and technologists are in paradoxical situation of being involved in an activity that is rooted and sustained in alien cultures, while at the same time subscribing to the myth of the universality of science and technology. The fact that most scientists and technologists all over the world are practicing western science and technology is in no way a confirmation of its uniqueness and universality at the level of rationality. Rather, it is an expression of the cultural domination of the advanced countries over the Third World countries. Scientific activity is basically a social and cultural activity and scientific knowledge which is a product of this activity is basically a cultural product. The social production of scientific knowledge creates values, criteria and commitments of scientific activity in specific social contexts. These criteria and standards specify which problems will be considered as legitimate scientific problems, which methods and techniques of solutions will be considered as scientifically adequate. It is in this context that the universality of science and technology is denied. Naive critics of the above view in their attempt to counter it often raise certain irrelevant questions like 'Do not Newton's Laws hold good in India?' or 'Does the earth rotate only in Europe, since Copernicus was a European?'. By posing such questions, the critics presuppose that the universality referred to above pertains to the validation of scientific knowledge at the global level. However, the universality is being questioned only at the level of legitimization and acceptance of the various knowledge systems as scientific. Universal validity is the common property of all knowledge systems. Thus, while a falling apple in China or India will be guided by Newton's
laws, a Britisher can also be cured by Acupuncture or Ayurveda. However, Newtonian mechanics or Acupuncture or Ayurveda were developed in completely isolated cultural contexts and had their own respective criteria of legitimization within the respective practicing communities. It is this element of science and technology which is not universal.

The criteria of legitimization and scientific standards are shared tacitly by members of a particular scientific community and the existence of community structure is fundamental to the effective production of scientific knowledge. While scientists in India, through various social processes, get channelised into scientific traditions of industrialized countries, the absence of a scientific community in India undermines the productivity of these scientists both in terms of their intellectual contribution to that science or their technological contributions to the satisfaction of the needs of the Indian society.

During the three decades of planned scientific research in India there has not been any success in developing a tradition of research programmes pertaining to the specialities of the Indian context. Whether such programmes of research are possible within the present organisational structure of science and technology is a question yet to be answered. In any case, significant autonomy in the criteria of scientificity has to be evolved in order to provide such research programmes.

In this perspective, breaking the myth of a unique, value free and universal science becomes the first step in creating autonomy in scientific research. Indian as well as other Third World scientists need to recognise that they are entitled to create knowledge in terms of models, metaphors and methodologies that make sense in their historical and cultural contexts and allow research to be directed to the needs of their societies and still be called scientists. The patterns of recognition and reward systems associated with western science and technology are only one among many possibilities. There is no logical or rational argument which necessitates the universal subscription to the system of the west. An alternate approach to science and technology relevant to the needs of our people has to first address itself to the task of opposing the overall foreign domination of our scientific and technological research - at the level of organisation and even more so - at the level of ideology.

At the level of scientific research, influences of the advanced countries has led to a mediocre though large scientific establishment in India and to a loss of large amounts of scientific knowledge that was available historically among our people. At the level of technological inputs into development programmes, these influences have been a major factor in the further impoverishment of the Indian people and the misutilization and depletion of our human and natural resources. Use of technology has resulted in general social, economic and cultural impoverishment of our people by replicating, at least at the micro-level, the social relations typical of western societies. In this sense the imported technologies have neither been socially neutral nor were their use inevitable and only choice for technological development. For instance the technology of the green revolution is only one choice out of an entire range of technological possibilities and has given rise to new hybrid seeds that give high yields under specific conditions. The particular green revolution
technology 'was a choice not to start by developing seeds better able to with-stand drought or pests. It was a choice not to concentrate first on improving traditional methods of increasing yields, such as mixed cropping. It was a choice not to develop technology that was productive, labour intensive, and independent of foreign input supply. It was a choice not to concentrate on reinforcing the balanced traditional diets of grains plus legumes'.

The introduction of western technologies in the Indian context is thus biased against the vast majority of Indian people. In an already polarised situation even those technologies which have had a socially progressive role elsewhere (for example, the introduction of the powerloom during the industrial revo-lution in Europe) have the danger of becoming agents for further polarisation.

This has very clearly happened in the case of handloom technology, fishing technology and forest technology in India.

Development programmes which are claimed to be for the upliftment of the people have systematically, through the use of alien technologies led to further impoverishment of the rural poor. Thus the recent introduction of mechanised fishing which was done in the name of improving the status of 6.5 million people of the fishing communities in India, has turned out to be a very serious threat to their very existence. 'Development' of the fisheries sector through technological change has in no way meant the development of fishermen.

The traditional (artisanal) fishermen of India who constitute a community of 6.5 million people fishing with 192,000 country-boats and catamarans 2.7 million gear and tackle contributing 70 per cent of the total fish catch are today facing acute economic distress due to the reckless and indiscriminate fishing activity of 16,500 mechanised fishing trawlers and purseinners in shallow inshore waters, owned by 8,000 persons employing directly and indirec-tly 165,000 persons and contributing around 30 per cent of the total fish output. Ironically the introduction of mechanised trawlers and purseinners in Indian Ocean through 'joint ventures' and 'cooperative fishing ventures' coincides with the destruction of the marine resources of the western countries and the banning, in their own seas, of techniques such as purseining which are stunningly over efficient but highly depletive, destroying marine life and aquatic ecology.

Similarly, good aspects of strict ecological legislation that the western countries apply to their own forests are completely bypassed by the forest policy makers of the Third World countries. The forest policies in India are still rooted in the colonial approach to our forest resources which evaluates and utilises these resources purely in terms of its commercial value. Forests however have a much wider and fundamental role in agricultural societies. They are the source of food, fuel, fodder and fertilizer. They are also the most effective means for soil and water conservation. These aspects of forests have neither been significantly researched by forestry scientists in India nor have they been kept in mind when technocrats and bureaucrats of the forest departments make decisions about the exploitation of forest resources. Though on papers of the working plans these factors are given lip-service, the actual state of the forests are no secret. Forestry science and technology has led to widespread monoculture of those species that are commercially
valuable (e.g. pine and eucalyptus which provide raw materials for paper, rayon and pharmaceutical industries) and the broad leaved species which provide the traditional agriculturists with their basic necessities have almost disappeared. Because of their soil building capacity and soil and water conservation capacities the disappearance of these species have led to the erosion of top soil, floods during the monsoons and drought during the rest of the year. This has resulted in severe economic and ecological crises throughout the country. 15/

These observations could be extended to other spheres of technological change. Everywhere it can be seen that the imported technology that was adopted was only one among a wide range of possibilities that could be developed. It was introduced not in favour of but at the cost of traditional technology, and had led to the very basic question of survival for a large number of Indians.

4. TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE

The above discussion laid down the perspective for an alternative science and technology structure and indicated some destructive ingredients that exist in the present day establishment of science and technology. The subsequent discussions in the Workshop focussed on what the perspective means in actual practise of evolving alternate science and technology in different spheres of social, cultural and economic life which are illustrated by various institutional and voluntary attempts across the country. These attempts have been mainly in the spheres of communication of science and technology, technology development in rural areas and alternatives in people's health care.

5. COMMUNICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Accepting that most science and technology policies at present are not satisfying the needs of the people the question arises, who initiates the change in such destructive policies. The only promising source for a pressure to change is the organised movements built up among the people, because it is they who have to gain from an alternate approach. In this respect one of the main responsibilities of scientists who think of an alternate approach, is to demystify science, to make the common man feel that he too can command science and whatever goes in the name of 'science' needs not be accepted without question. Scientists in the formal institutions need to be convinced about their duty of breaking the wall around the IITs, IISc, IIMs etc. 16/ It was clear from this session that an effective communication of scientific ideas will be possible only when the most appropriate media, the folk media is used in the rural areas. The failure of the radio - TV network method of communication or other formal attempts is not due to the fact that people do not like 'science' but these media are useless and involves one way communication. An alternate approach based on the participatory and folk methods will surely make science more attractive and more popular. In this session reports of three very successful popularization movements were presented. 17/ References were also made to other movements led by a number of voluntary agencies. 18/ The popularization of a science movement is not being led with the end of making people knowledgeable only. It forms a very important base of evolving a democratic and broad-based instrument for the alternate approach towards choice of technology and its monitoring. In Kerala these have already been manifested in the pollution
control in the Chaliyar river and on the question of the Silent Valley Project. Over and above, popularization movements will provide an alternate use of science which is of paramount need in the present political scene where linguistic, communal and caste-based parochialism is having a very undue and destructively dominant role to play.

6. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT FOR RURAL AREAS

While the people's science movements can resist the expansion of environmentally harmful and socially and economically irresponsible technologies; the task of building environmentally and economically sound technologies was accepted as a major task to be systematically undertaken by groups inside or outside formal research organisations, who want to develop the alternate approach. Unfortunately, this area of the alternate approach consists of a great amount of uncertainty and confusion. Without a much deeper clarity about the alternate - at the theoretical level - there is every possibility that the existing approach, which has considerably eroded its viability, may get a new lease of life by attaching the 'Rural' tag with its functions. The current flip of all research activities in the formal institutions towards 'Rural' projects in no way points to a rejection of the perspective of the existing approach. Whether it is at the United Nations level or at the village level, the 'Rural' tag is an assurance for easy availability of funds and not an assurance of a serious search for an alternate. Thus, throughout India while a large number of centres for such 'Rural' studies and research is functioning and a large number is on the incubation, their contribution in real terms to the technology development for rural areas remain equally marginal. This marginality has led many critics of the alternate approach to claim the uniqueness of the existing approach and argue that no alternatives to the western concept of 'modernisation' can work. Moreover, confusion has also been created around the issue of identifying all attempts to form an alternate approach as a manoeuver on the part of the west to keep the Third World 'backward'. It need hardly be stressed that genuine alternatives cannot be developed so easily by merely adding a 'Rural' tag on the existing approach; genuine alternates will only be those which have evolved historically and culturally in the local context and get their sustenance from the urge for self-reliance of the Third World. The attempts to manipulate such alternatives will not find easy success because they are based on historical awareness, philosophical enlightenment and political consciousness about the relationship of science, technology and development.

In India among the formal institutions there are instances of serious attempts to develop the alternative. Publications have started appearing totally negating the recognition criteria of western scientific and technological tradition and thus creating an autonomous base for an alternate. 19/ Reddy has delineated certain criteria for the development of alternates in technology for rural areas. 20/ Successful transfer of technology developed in formal institutions have started taking place, though in a very limited scale, to some rural areas. 21/ The technological viability and appropriateness of several small technologies can be proved in theory but their practicability as a long term alternative in real life situation depends on various complex factors including political manipulation of the big industries. Experiences of groups experimenting with alternate technologies in rural areas go to
strengthen the theoretical analysis on technological continuum presented earlier. Very often, however, rural communities have rejected certain technologies assumed to be appropriate for them by the elite technologists. The very important fact that such new technologies were either useless or destructive from the point of view of traditional knowledge system are ignored under such circumstances. 23/

7. ALTERNATES IN PEOPLE'S HEALTH CARE

The present bureaucratic manner of looking at science and technology have completely ignored the vital links between science and technology on one hand and people's health care on the other. The alternate approach must bridge this gap and orient alternate science and technology towards people's health. Thus, beyond the typical curative aspects, in an alternate approach, the preventive aspects are closely related to alternate technological developments in food production and processing, water treatment, and environmental protection etc. Inappropriate technological developments may lead to new health hazards as has been exemplified by the disease 'Enteroergotism' in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan which was a result of the introduction of high yielding varieties of bajra. Similarly the endemic 'familial arthritis' of Malnad region has been linked with the indiscriminate use of pesticides. 24/ Alternate approaches to science and technology, hence, must include the assessment of technologies on the basis of its possible impacts on health.

The present health care system in India has failed to focus on the promotive aspects of health. It has functioned mainly as a crisis response system which encourages dehumanisation of health care and unnecessary dependence on western technology and medicine. This system was introduced and legitimized in India by the British rulers through state patronage. Systematic discouragement of traditional and indigenous health care systems has eroded the base of an approach where people would largely take care of their own health through locally available materials and skills. Health systems in an alternate approach should be health generating, situation specific, culturally coherent and dependent on participant technologies. 25/ In this respect quite a few micro-level experiments have started and are giving positive results in terms of training appropriate health personnel who are part and parcel of the community and developing local resources for food and medicine. 26/ For instance, traditionally available fermented food can be used in rehabilitating the protein depleted children without depending on baby foods made by the transnationals. 27/

8. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS AN ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE

The question of developing an alternate perspective is closely related to a clearer understanding of the place of science and technology in social change and development. 'Modernisation' which stands for following the western pattern of development in the Third World countries, has helped to produce deep crises in these societies. The alternate perspective as developed in the Workshop prescribes a closer historical analysis of the societies in the Third World countries. Very relevant scientific and technical knowledge has been available to traditional communities. 'Modernisation' has however ignored
these as inefficient or irrational. Historical case studies pertaining to the Third World countries however bring out that these traditional systems in these countries did not lack rationality and they did not die a natural death but were suppressed or killed by external political forces. A recognition of the rationality of these traditional systems of knowledge indicates that they could be used as a resource for alternate scientific and technological development. Scientists in India and other Third World countries need to develop an independent alternate method of recognizing what is scientific and technological research for their social, political, and cultural environments. The blind second rate copy of scientific and technological research in advanced countries has neither led to creative intellectual activity nor has it played positive role in national development. On the contrary, such indiscriminate use of western technology has destroyed the ecological, social, and human resources and capabilities that were available. The alternate perspective laid out above is not a prescription for going back in history. The importance of a deeper historical analysis of science and technological systems lies in its fruitfulness to create a wider range of possibilities for growth and development in these societies.

FOOTNOTES

1/ A few meetings which showed signs of such awareness are:
   i) National Conference of Students and Youth on 'Education in India and the People', IIT Kanpur, September 1974.
   iii) Seminar on 'Appropriate Science and Technology' organised by West Bengal Committee on Science and Technology, Calcutta, February 1979.
   iv) National Seminar on 'Management of Indian Science and Technology for Self-Reliance' organised by Society of Young Scientists at AIIMS, New Delhi, February 1980.

2/ For more details refer to:
   ii) Rajni Kothari, IFDA Dossier No. 12, October 1979, pp. 95-106.

3/ S.N. Sen in 'Lesson from the History of Traditional Science and Technology' paper read at Workshop. See also his 'Vigyaner Ithihas' Indian Association of the Cultivation of Science, Calcutta, 1955.

4/ S. Gupta in 'Historical Perspectives of the Roots of Science and Technology in India' paper read at Workshop. See also his 'Potential of Industrial Revolution in Pre-British India' Economic and Political Weekly, 1st March 1980.

M.D. Srinivas, Comment in Workshop.

These studies also indicate that dependence on observation and quantification is not tantamount to a Scientific method.


A few isolated examples of such research do exist. Such exceptions are:

Dharampal (ed) Indian Science and Technology in the 18th Century, Impex India, Delhi, 1971.


C. Alvares, op.cit

A. Rahman in his various contributions to History of Moghul Science.

M. Moravosik, 'Towards a Creative Science and Technology', paper read at Workshop. It represented the conventional view.

S. Arunachalam made a slight departure from the conventional view in his paper, 'Creating New Communication Channels for Indian Scientists'.

V. Shiva, K. Seetharam, J. Bandyopadhyay, 'Scientists in India: A Community Still Born', paper read at the Workshop.

J. Bajaj and M.D. Srinivas, 'Appropriate Science in the Third World', paper read at the Workshop.

S. Goonatilake, 'Technology as a 'Social Gene', Examples from the Industrial and Agricultural Systems', paper read at the Workshop.


J. Bandyopadhyay and V. Shiva, 'Towards a Technological Continuum: Cases in Technological Improvement and Choice', paper read at the Workshop.

Christopher Fonseca, 'Traditional Fishermen of India Demand Appropriate Technology in the Indian Fisheries Sector', paper read at the Workshop.

Sunderlal Bahuguna, 'Impact of Technological Inputs on the People of Hill Areas: Outlines of an Alternate Approach', paper read at the Workshop.

M. Gadgil, 'Deforestation in the Sahyadris of Maharashtra', paper read at the Workshop.
16/ M.P. Parameswaran, 'Science is a Weapon in the Hands of the People', paper read at the Workshop.

17/ A. Achutan, 'Recent Experiences in the Communication of Modern Scientific Ideas in Rural Areas', paper read at the Workshop. See also KSSP Publication The Silent Valley Hydroelectric Project: a technoeconomic and socio-political assessment, Trivandrum (1979).


S. Ghosh, 'Experience of Science-Technology Museums in taking Science to the Villages', paper read at the Workshop.

18/ These include Kishore Bharati, Vigyan Shiksha Kendra etc.

19/ Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Science Section C: Engineering Sciences, September and December 1979.


S.R. Hiremath, 'Rural Artisan Improvement Programme', paper read at the Workshop.

22/ Bharatendu Prakash, 'Cement from Rice Husk: An appropriate Rural Technology', Report presented at the Workshop.

R. Kaplinsky, 'International Technical Assistance or Appropriate Technology', paper read at the Workshop.

23/ E. Opoti - Remarks at the Workshop

R. Roy - Remarks at the Workshop


24/ R.V. Bhat and K.A.V.R. Krishnamachari, 'Research Management of Food Toxic Diseases: Recent Experiences in Rural and Tribal Areas', paper read at the Workshop.

Binayak Sen - Comments made in the Workshop.

25/ R.M. Verma, Chairperson's Comments in the session on 'Alternates in People's Health Care'.

N.N. Mehrotra, 'Medical Establishment Versus Rural Health Care - Critical Appraisal for an Alternative', paper read at the Workshop.

Ravi Narayan, 'Alternatives in Health Care and Medical Education - The Indian Experience, paper read at the Workshop.
Ronald Seaton, 'Appropriate People in an Appropriate Health System - India's need', paper read at the Workshop.

V. Kalyan Ram, 'Need to introduce Management skills in Medical Education and Health System to Benefit People at the Grass Roots in India', papers read at the Workshop.

V. Ramprasad, 'The Technology of Traditional Foods and Their role in Nutrition Rehabilitation', paper read at the Workshop.

See also S. George, 'How the Other Half Dies, (1976) and Feeding the Few: Corporate Control of Food, Institute for Policy Studies, 1978.

Résumé: (suite de la page 13).

erronée des relations entre la science, les techniques et le développement et d'esquisser une autre approche qui soit davantage au service du peuple indien.

CIENCIA Y TECNOLOGIA EN LA INDIA: UNA PERSPECTIVA ALTERNATIVA

Resumen: La India, con su importante mano de obra científica que ocupa el tercer puesto en la escala mundial, es sin embargo un país en que se encuentra la miseria y el estancamiento social en sus formas más extremas.

Aunque un número importante de científicos y tecnólogos han llevado acabo un examen serio acerca de las premisas que gobiernan las relaciones entre la ciencia, la tecnología y el desarrollo en este país, no se ha logrado concretizar un programa alternativo.

Actualmente la única actividad legítima llevada acabo en la India parece ser una imitación ciega de no importa que ideas, siempre que sean aquellas que prevalezcan en cuanto a ciencia y tecnología en los países industrializados. Lo que no se expone claramente es el uso frecuente de ciertos aspectos científicos en contra de los intereses del pueblo en general.

En este informe, basado sobre trabajos presentados en un seminario que tuvo lugar este año en Bangalore, se identifican algunos de los fracasos y se muestra la relación entre estos y una visión errónea entre la ciencia, la tecnología y el desarrollo, y se intenta explorar un enfoque más significativo para el pueblo de la India.
THE ARUSHA INITIATIVE - DISSEMINATION
(see pp. 2 & 12)

The Arusha Initiative has been published in:
- IFDA Dossier 19, September/October 1980 (9,200 copies)
- Development Dialogue 1980:2, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden (20,000 copies), which also reproduced the full text of the Conference papers by Ismail-Sabri Abdalla, Norman Girvan, Justinian F. Rweyemamu.
- UNCTAD document TD/B/AC.32/L.3

Analyses of/Commentaries on the Arusha Initiative have appeared in:
- As-Safir Arabic Political Daily, Beirut, 10 and 12.7.80
- Le Monde, Paris, 15.7.80
- The Guardian, London, 10.9.80
- Europa, in Le Monde, Paris; La Stampa, Torino; The Times, London; Die Welt, Essen, 7.10.80

Other articles referring to or arising from the Arusha South-North Conference have appeared as far as we can ascertain and at least in: Daily News, Dar-es-Salaam; El Moudjahid, Algiers, 7.7.80; Jaay doole bi, Dakar, 6.8.80; International Herald Tribune, Paris, 1.7.80, 14.8.80, 9.9.80; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zurich, 19/20.7.80; Tribune de Genève, Genève, 21.7.80; The Guardian, Manchester, 5.7.80; Le Monde 5.7.80, 1.9.80, and Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris, 10.80; Sunday Telegraph, London, 27.7.80; Multinational Monitor, Washington, 6.80, 7.80; Daily News, 9.9.80 and The Gleaner, Kingston; El Dia, Mexico City, 12.7.80; Correo Economico, Mexico City; Diario de Caracas, Caracas, 23.7.80; Mainstream, New Delhi, 26.7.80; Journal of Commerce, New York, 24.7.80; New York Times, New York, 4.9.80; Institutional Investor, (USA), 9.80; and International Trade & Investment, Washington DC, 3.10.80.

The full text of the Arusha Initiative was published in Development Forum 18.8.80 (Business edition) and excerpts in September 1980 (regular edition).

Footnote: In many of the articles, the Arusha South-North Conference was mistakenly styled a "North-South" Conference: an example of unconscious acceptance that the North always comes first.
QUELLE INDUSTRIALISATION POUR LE TIERS MONDE?

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Langue originale: Français

Résumé: Même si elle n'est plus combattue dans son principe, l'industrialisation du Tiers Monde est fortement critiquée, de divers côtés, dans son orientation, ses moyens, ses résultats. Pour prendre cependant une juste mesure des choses, il convient de se demander quelle est l'ampleur et quelles sont les caractéristiques principales de l'industrialisation du Tiers Monde, quelles sont les probabilités de son développement au profit des peuples. C'est ce que s'efforce de faire Abdellatif Benachenhou dans le texte qui suit, qu'il a présenté au premier Congrès de l'Association mondiale de prospective sociale.

WHAT INDUSTRIALISATION FOR THE THIRD WORLD

Abstract: Even if it is no longer opposed in principle, Third World industrialisation is still strongly criticized in various quarters on account of its orientation, its methods and its results. However, in order to arrive at a proper appreciation of these issues, one should ask what are the scale and the principal characteristics of Third World industrialisation, what are the prospects of its benefiting Third World peoples. These are the questions which Abdellatif Benachenhou seeks to pose in the following text, which he presented to the first congress of the World Social Prospects Study Association.

CÓMO DEBE INDUSTRIALIZARSE EL TERCER MUNDO?

Resumen: Aunque ya no se opone al principio mismo de la industrialización del Tercer Mundo, se critica por todas partes su orientación, sus medios, su contenido, dirección y sus resultados. Para apreciar justamente la situación, falta preguntarse cual es el alcance y cuáles son las características principales de la industrialización del Tercer Mundo, además, cual es la probabilidad de que este proceso desarrolle al beneficio del pueblo. En este informe, que presentó su autor al primer congreso de la Asociación mundial de perspectiva social, se examinan estos aspectos de la industrialización en el Tercer Mundo.

QUELLE INDUSTRIALISATION POUR LE TIERS-MONDE?

Dans le climat politique et intellectuel créé par la crise de l'économie mondiale, l'industrialisation du Tiers-Monde est rangée parmi les causes sinon de la crise, du moins de son aggravation. 2/ Les pratiques protectionnistes et les pressions exercées sur certains pays pour réduire volontairement leurs exportations, les positions prises dans certains milieux syndicaux soucieux, à juste titre, des déplacements d'activité et du dumping social à l'échelle mondiale, renforcent l'idée que l'industrialisation du Tiers-Monde est excessive ou mal orientée. Cette industrialisation est aussi critiquée au nom des besoins essentiels de la population et on écrit, dans certaines organisations internationales, qu'elle s'est faite au détriment du développement agricole, n'a pas accru substantiellement l'emploi et a favorisé la concentration des revenus. Cette même thèse est partiellement reprise par les critiques du développement dépendant pour lesquels l'industrialisation a hâté l'urbanisation et défavorisé un développement rural authentique. Ces mouvements d'opinion, diversifiés au plan idéologique, sont renforcés par le développement de la dépendance alimentaire du Tiers-Monde qui révèle l'absence ou l'insuffisance d'intérêt accordé dans ces pays à la politique agraire et plus particulièrement à la croissance des cultures vivrières. Au total, si l'industrialisation du Tiers-Monde n'est plus combattue au plan des principes (chaque pays a le droit de s'industrialiser) le mouvement d'industrialisation est fortement critique dans son orientation, ses moyens, ses résultats.

Pour prendre une juste mesure des choses, il convient de se demander quelle est l'ampleur et quelles sont les caractéristiques principales de l'industrialisation actuelle du Tiers-Monde, quelles devraient être ses orientations et quelles sont les probabilités de son développement au profit des peuples.


2/ La part des exportations du Tiers-Monde est de 7,6% des exportations globales de produits manufacturés. Cependant ces exportations constituent 14% des exportations globales des pays du Tiers-Monde et 28% des exportations non énergétiques. Les exportations des pays du Tiers-Monde ne comptent que pour 10% des exportations totales de produits manufacturés par les pays industrialisés à économie de marché et pour 2% seulement de leur consommation de ces produits. De plus, ces importations portent sur un nombre limité de produits (textiles, calculatrices, récepteurs, articles de voyage, chaussures, transistors, tubes électroniques).
L'industrialisation actuelle dans le Tiers-Monde est une industrialisation limitée, commercialement instable, financièrement fragile et technologiquement dépendante. La part des pays du Tiers-Monde dans la production industrielle mondiale est de 7%. 

On ne peut dénombrer que 10 pays du Tiers-Monde (sur 123) dans lesquels l'activité manufacturière réalise plus de 20% du produit intérieur brut et plus de 20% des exportations globales: ce sont le Brésil, l'Argentine, le Mexique et la Colombie, l'Egypte, la Corée du Sud, Taïwan, Hong Kong, Singapour et les Philippines. On ne peut dénombrer que 17 autres pays dans lesquels cette activité manufacturière occupe entre 15% et 20% du PIB. Un nombre très réduit de pays exporte l'essentiel des produits industriels en provenance du Tiers-Monde: ce sont le Brésil, le Mexique, Hong Kong, la Corée du Sud, Taïwan, Singapour et l'Inde.

Pour la très grande majorité des pays du Tiers-Monde, l'industrialisation reste un phénomène très marginal: en Afrique Noire, par exemple, on ne peut citer que 4 pays (le Kenya, la Tanzanie, la Côte d'Ivoire et le Nigéria) dans lesquels le processus d'industrialisation a une relative importance.

Dans le Tiers-Monde, l'industrie alimentaire, les textiles et la confection, les boissons et les tabacs constituent souvent la majeure partie des productions industrielles. Dans un faible nombre de pays, la structure industrielle est effectivement diversifiée et inclut la production de biens intermédiaires et celle de biens d'équipement.

Cette industrialisation, limitée dans son ampleur, est fragile au plan de ses débouchés. Nous sommes en présence de deux types d'industrialisation même si l'un est né de la crise de l'autre: les industries tournées vers l'exportation, celles de substitution aux importations. Les industrialisations tournées vers l'exportation ont effectivement connu des taux de croissance substantiels au cours des quinze dernières années. Mais leur fragilité commerciale a été révélée par la véritable crise des débouchés qu'elles subissent, à des degrés variables, du fait de la stagnation des économies capitalistes développées et du protectionnisme qui en résulte. Le rapport de la Banque Mondiale pour 1979 met clairement en évidence ce fait puisqu'on y lit "Il y a un danger à voir les pays semi-industrialisés se rabattre sur des politiques de substitution aux importations pour maintenir leur croissance industrielle face à la plus faible croissance de l'économie mondiale". Un deuxième aspect de la fragilité de ce type d'industrialisation réside dans le fait que les firmes transnationales jouent un rôle actif dans la conduite du processus d'industrialisation.

Trois faits principaux méritent d'être rappelés ici:

a) Les firmes transnationales investissent de préférence dans les pays fortement exportateurs: la part des investissements étrangers qui se dirigent vers ces pays est croissante: elle passe de 36,5 à 40,6% du total des investisse-

1/ L'objectif de Lima (25%) est actuellement révisé en baisse dès lors que, dans les conditions actuelles du commerce international, cet objectif entraînerait des tensions insupportables (30% du commerce des produits manufacturés reviendrait au Tiers-Monde pour atteindre cet objectif).
...ments. Celle qui se dirige vers les paradis fiscaux passe de 7 à 13% entre 1967 à 1975.

b) Les firmes transnationales investissent de préférence dans les industries manufacturières: on constate que l'industrie manufacturière attire une part croissante de l'investissement étranger surtout en Asie et en Amérique Latine. Le Japon, la RFA, le Royaume Uni et les États-Unis consacrent respectivement 50,8%, 60,4%, 47,6% et 39,1% de leurs investissements dans les pays du Tiers-Monde au secteur manufacturier. La part des secteurs industriels dans les investissements étrangers en 1975-1976 est de 100% à Hong Kong, 92% en Inde, 30% en Corée du Sud, 77% au Mexique et au Brésil, 65% en Argentine et 60% à Singapour.

c) Investissement dans les secteurs exportateurs: on constate ainsi qu'en 1974, la part des firmes transnationales dans les exportations industrielles est de 31,4% et 90% pour les machines et l'appareillage électrique et les composants électroniques. En conséquence: le niveau, l'orientation et la valorisation de la production industrielle dépendent de la stratégie commerciale globale des firmes et non des potentialités et des besoins du pays d'accueil. Mais la fragilité commerciale des industries de substitution aux importations est aussi nette: dans des conditions variant évidemment avec la taille du pays, elles se heurtent en dernier lieu à l'étroitesse des marchés urbains déterminée par une croissance irrégulière des revenus et de la consommation des ménages (y compris ceux des classes moyennes) et des surcûûts industriels liés à des choix technologiques et des performances productives limitées, mais aussi à l'étroitesse des marchés ruraux en raison de la faiblesse des revenus de la majorité des ruraux liée au contrôle inégalitaire de la terre et/ou au faible niveau de la productivité de l'agriculture.

En Afrique Noire par exemple, l'accès à la consommation des produits industriels locaux (industrie alimentaire, confection, textiles, boissons, tabacs) est réservé à une couche très faible de la population urbaine de fonctionnaires et d'employés ou ouvriers qualifiés. Le revenu monétaire de l'immense majorité de la population est insuffisant pour lui permettre d'accéder aux produits laitiers, aux médicaments, aux textiles, etc... et la production industrielle est organisée pour satisfaire les besoins de la frange supérieure des fonctionnaires, des employés, des ouvriers. Cette industrialisation est le résultat de la dynamique du développement social post colonial et des rapports privilégiés entre les classes moyennes et l'État.

La dépendance technologique des industrialisations du Tiers-Monde est connue: elle est fondée sur l'importation répétitive des connaissances, des compétences, et des équipements. En 1977, les pays du Tiers-Monde ont importé 14 fois plus de produits mécaniques et électriques qu'ils n'en ont exportés, et si on exclut quatre gros exportateurs (Singapour, Corée du Sud, Hong Kong, Brésil) de ce type de biens, ce rapport s'élève à 200. 1/ Ces pays ont, en valeur importé

1/ La part des pays du Tiers-Monde dans les exportations globales de produits mécaniques et électriques est passée de 0,6 à 2,2% entre 1963 et 1977. Entre ces deux dates, leurs importations en provenance des pays à économie de marché passent de 80,7% à 92% de leurs importations globales de ces produits. Notons aussi que les performances exportatrices en biens mécaniques et électriques est souvent liée à la présence des firmes transnationales dans ces branches.
plus de machines textiles qu'ils n'ont exporté de textiles vers les pays du Nord. Certains pays sont exportateurs de biens d'équipement après avoir réalisé une politique de substitution partielle aux importations de biens d'équipement: c'est le cas du Brésil, Singapour, Taïwan, Argentine, Mexique, Inde. La dépendance technologique est d'autant plus aigüe que souvent, la circulation des équipements, des connaissances, des compétences se fait à l'intérieur des firmes transnationales lorsqu'elles conduisent le mouvement d'industrialisation. L'opacité du marché technologique est dans ce cas quasi-totale: équipements et produits intermédiaires proviennent le plus souvent du pays d'origine sinon des filiales de la firme transnationale: le commerce captif développe la pratique des prix de transfert.

Au plan financier enfin, il n'est pas certain que les pays du Tiers-Monde les plus industrialisés aient trouvé la voie de l'indépendance financière: parmi les pays du Tiers-Monde les plus endettés figurent en bonne place le Brésil, le Mexique, l'Argentine et la Corée du Sud. La dette extérieure du Brésil et du Mexique constitue 25% de la dette globale des pays du Tiers-Monde en 1977. Il s'agit là, selon les experts de la Banque Mondiale, d'un obstacle majeur au développement de leur industrialisation. Les raisons de cet endettement cumulatif sont connues:

- la détérioration des termes de l'échange;

- le mécanisme de financement des investissements étrangers: on note qu'une part croissante de ces investissements est financée par le réinvestissement des profits ou le recours aux marchés locaux. En conséquence, les entrées nettes de capitaux sont faibles lorsqu'on prend en considération les achats effectués par les firmes transnationales à l'étranger. On admet généralement que le bilan devises du fonctionnement des transnationales dans le Tiers-Monde est négatif en raison du financement local des investissements, de l'exportation des profits et des prix de transfert.

- la dépendance technologique des appareils de production.

Cet endettement excessif a eu des effets négatifs sur l'orientation de la production agricole puisque des productions exportables sont devenues nécessaires pour financer la poursuite du développement industriel dépendant. Le coût social de l'industrialisation est excessif: on admet généralement que la croissance de l'emploi industriel a été moins que proportionnelle que celle de la production dans les pays qui ont connu une croissance industrielle soutenue. Ainsi, même pour ce "type idéal" qu'est la Corée du Sud, la croissance industrielle de 17% et la croissance de l'emploi n'est que de 11%. Dans le cas de l'Inde, la croissance industrielle entre 1951 et 1975 a été de 292% tandis que celle de l'emploi industriel n'a été que de 78%. Les politiques technologiques des firmes transnationales ont accru le biais "capital using" de

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1/ Parmi les impasses de ce type d'industrialisation, on trouve le rôle contradictoire que l'agriculture doit jouer: exporter pour procurer des devises et produire pour le marché intérieur pour permettre une alimentation et un revenu plus décents pour la majorité de la population et ainsi élargir le marché intérieur.
investissements, ces formes tentant de comprimer les coûts unitaires salariaux avec un équipement identique à celui utilisé dans les pays développés.

Les niveaux de salaires sont restés faibles pour des productivités du travail souvent comparables à celles des pays développés. 1/ Dans le cas de l'Inde, on a assisté à une baisse significative des salaires réels dans l'industrie manufacturière entre 1961 et 1975. Le fameux "effet percolateur" (trickle down effect) n'a pas joué pleinement tant ont été résistantes les barrières sociales au progrès: après 15 ans de croissance industrielle rapide, des fractions importantes de la population restent pauvres sinon misérables au Brésil, au Mexique et en Corée du Sud. Les taux de croissance industrielle extrêmement rapides qu'ont connu certains pays n'ont pas été suivis par une diffusion du progrès à l'échelle nationale: on admet que la répartition des revenus est pire actuellement qu'il y a 15 ans au Brésil et au Mexique.

Au total, ni l'industrialisation de substitution aux importations, ni celle orientée vers les marchés extérieurs ne peuvent résoudre de manière durable et pour l'ensemble de la population la question de l'emploi et du revenu, c'est à dire la question de la socialisation du développement.

L'expérience industrielle des pays du Tiers-Monde révèle la vanité de la conception abstraite et trinitaire des économistes qui affirment que le développement industriel nécessite des marchés, de la technologie et des capitaux sans spécifier le dynamisme et la stabilité des marchés, le contrôle de la technologie ou la source des capitaux. C'est précisément une analyse concrète des conditions de marché, des conditions technologiques et des conditions financières de l'industrialisation qu'il faut tenter en vue de déterminer les caractéristiques d'une industrialisation au profit des peuples.

En premier lieu, l'industrialisation doit être orientée principalement vers les marchés intérieurs. Le dynamisme durable de la demande interne est lié étroitement à la croissance des revenus de la majorité de la population constituée par des ruraux. De ce fait, l'industrialisation doit contribuer à la croissance de la productivité de l'agriculture en adaptant ses produits et ses techniques dans ce sens, à condition que l'accroissement de productivité ne soit pas confisqué du fait d'un contrôle inégalitaire de la terre ou d'une politique inadéquate des prix et de la distribution. L'industrialisation conduit nécessairement à la transformation des structures agraires au profit des paysans pauvres et sans terre. 2/ La croissance des marchés est aussi liée à la demande urbaine dont la structure actuelle, fortement influencée par les classes moyennes risque d'induire des politiques d'importation puis de production locale


2/ Les experts de la Banque Mondiale reconnaissent explicitement que l'alternative réelle à la croissance industrielle d'exportation est constituée par la transformation des structures agraires.
contraires à une industrialisation populaire mais soumises à l'extension du modèle occidental de consommation centré sur les biens durables de consommation. Enfin, le dynamisme de la demande interne dépendra beaucoup de la maîtrise des coûts de l'industrialisation dont les effets sur les prix et la demande sont actuellement négatifs. Mais alors se pose la question de la technologie. Les problèmes technologiques du Tiers-Monde se posent en termes de coût et de reproduction. Sur la base d'une technologie importée en permanence, le coût de l'industrialisation ne peut être qu'excessif. De ce fait, l'ampleur des actions de développement possibles ne peut être que limitée et si modernisation il y a, elle se fera pour une fraction de la population et non pour sa totalité. Mais au-delà de la question du coût de la technologie, celle de sa reproduction est essentielle : la formation de capacités nationales d'ingénierie, le développement de la recherche industrielle, la mise en place progressive d'une industrie de biens d'équipement constituent les éléments minimaux d'une politique technologique pour contrecarrer l'abonnement à l'obsolescence. Il y a un écart considérable entre les sommes dépensées par les pays du Tiers-Monde pour acheter des connaissances, des compétences, des équipements et celles qu'ils consacrent à la recherche industrielle interne, à l'industrie des équipements, etc... Ce triomphe de la vision instrumentale de la technologie que symbolise la notion de "transfert de technologie" constitue le danger essentiel qui guette les industrialisations du Tiers-Monde, fussent-elles orientées essentiellement vers les marchés intérieurs et juridiquement contrôlées par les États. Une démarche technologique cohérente consistera alors à contrôler et à coordonner les achats de technologies à l'étranger et à promouvoir une formation technique large dans les pays. Cette démarche est malheureusement impossible pour ceux des pays dans lesquels l'industrialisation est menée et contrôlée par les firmes transnationales puisque celles-ci ont une logique propre de production, de circulation et de consommation des techniques.

La question des ressources financières pour l'industrialisation est, elle aussi, importante. Elle se pose différemment pour les pays disposant de ressources naturelles importantes et pour ceux n'en disposant pas. Pour les premiers, le

1/ C'est le noyau rationnel de la théorie des technologies intermédiaires qui insiste beaucoup sur le coût en capital d'un emploi créé mais néglige l'essentiel, c'est à dire la reproduction des technologies. De même, elle prend pour donnée naturelle la rareté du capital dans les pays du Tiers-Monde alors que cette rareté est historique comme le prouve l'expérience récente des pays de l'OPEP. Il faut marquer ici la différence essentielle qu'il y a entre une théorie de l'autonomie technologique et la théorie des technologies intermédiaires.

2/ Mais elle n'est pas la seule. On est frappé par le fait que l'ONUDI axe principalement son effort de réflexion, à propos de l'industrialisation du Tiers-Monde, sur les capacités financières à réunir pour permettre cette industrialisation alors que l'histoire prouve que l'aisance financière est une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante du développement industriel.
moyen le plus sain pour le financement de l'industrialisation est le contrôle et la valorisation des ressources naturelles dont ils disposent, selon des rythmes rendus nécessaires par le développement interne et non pas selon le rythme incontrôlé de la demande mondiale. L'industrialisation du Tiers-Monde nécessite la fin du pillage du Tiers-Monde. Pour les autres, ils devront compter sur une politique agraire dynamique et l'aide publique internationale et plus particulièrement celle du Tiers-Monde mais il convient de ne pas exagérer cette nécessité de l'aide extérieure dès lors que le processus d'industrialisation bien mené génère les ressources nécessaires à sa poursuite, dans des conditions rationnelles de choix de secteurs et de techniques.

L'énoncé sommaire de ces caractéristiques d'une industrialisation populaire et autonome indique tout ce qui la sépare d'une industrialisation insérée dans une division internationale inégal de travail. Les luttes actuelles pour le contrôle de l'accumulation du capital dans les différentes branches de l'économie mondiale (contrôle des différentes filières et technologies des branches) n'excluent pas la possibilité de croissances industrielles dans le Tiers-Monde, conduites par les firmes transnationales à la recherche de faibles coûts de production et/ou de marchés protégés ou par des bourgeoisies locales; on peut admettre la possibilité d'une nouvelle division internationale du travail industriel contrôlé directement ou indirectement par les firmes transnationales. Mais ces croissances industrielles tournées vers l'exportation ou de substitution aux importations ne permettent pas un développement social réel. De plus les premières ne sont guère possibles que pour un faible nombre de pays: l'ensemble des marchés des pays industriels peut paraître insuffisant si on le compare à la demande qui serait nécessaire pour déterminer une croissance substantielle de l'emploi et du revenu dans les pays du Tiers-Monde. De plus, cette généralisation du modèle Corée du Sud conduirait à une concurrence par les prix et donc par les salaires socialement intolérables au détriment de tous les travailleurs du Tiers-Monde.

De ce fait, le danger d'une alliance industrielle, qui n'exclut pas des conflits, entre les firmes transnationales, les bourgeoisies et les élites locales industrialistes est réel, celles-ci ayant pour les raisons évoquées un rôle nécessairement subordonné.

Dès lors, on assistera à une transformation de la géographie industrielle du monde mais non pas à un développement industriel du Tiers-Monde. Les "modernisations industrielles" qui auront lieu excluront par essence de larges fractions de la population dans les campagnes, mais aussi dans les villes, de l'accès au bien-être. La régulation politique et sociale rendue nécessaire par cette exclusion appellerait l'autoritarisme comme c'est déjà le cas dans des pays à forte croissance industrielle. 2/

1/ Il est curieux de noter que les rédacteurs du rapport de la Banque Mondiale pour 1979 admettent implicitement l'impossibilité de cette généralisation mais écrivent des paragraphes entiers pour la souhaiter.

L'industrialisation populaire et autonome, qui n'est pas au service des relations économiques extérieures mais met celles-ci à son service, nécessite, dans chaque pays, des conjonctures politiques particulières. Un rôle politique plus actif de la paysannerie pauvre, sans terre et souvent sans travail, est nécessaire pour que l'industrialisation soit mise au service de l'agriculture, économiquement et spatialement. Une émergence politique plus forte des couches populaires urbaines est nécessaire pour que l'industrialisation ne soit pas confisquée par les classes moyennes entretenues par l'État, au-dessus des peuples. C'est en définitive dans les rapports entre l'État et la société civile populaire que se joue l'avenir de l'industrialisation du Tiers-Monde, y compris dans sa dimension internationale. On doit, dans ce cadre, examiner avec beaucoup de précaution la thèse selon laquelle l'industrialisation dans le Tiers-Monde, publique ou privée, produit nécessairement les forces nécessaires à sa transformation et à son orientation au profit des peuples. Cette conception linéaire du développement historique est contredite par les faits. Dans beaucoup de cas, le développement industriel, du fait des contradictions et des difficultés qu'il a engendrées a conduit à plus d'autoritarisme politique pour assurer la docilité des travailleurs. La démocratie n'est pas un produit inévitable de l'usine.
CONSEQUENCES SOCIALES DE L'INDUSTRIALISATION DANS LES PAYS DU TIERS MONDE

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Résumé: L'industrialisation n'est pas une méthode de production mécanique, mais un processus de restructuration économique et sociale. Perçue comme un symbole de la libération du pacte colonial, la première vague d'industrialisation du Tiers Monde a été accompagnée d'une grande tolérance pour les erreurs 'inévitables' fondée sur la croyance que les erreurs se corrigeraient chemin faisant. En particulier, on l'a souvent vue comme un processus linéaire répondant à des normes invariables (par exemple les économies d'échelle). Les effets négatifs d'une telle approche, en termes de destruction sociale et de frustrations, sont désormais évidents - et pas seulement dans le Tiers Monde. L'issue à l'impasse implique d'autres techniques, et surtout une réponse préalable à la question: industrialisation pour qui? L'industrialisation doit être axée sur la satisfaction des besoins matériels et non-matériels fondamentaux, déterminés nationalement et démocratiquement.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Abstract: Industrialization must be understood, not merely as a mechanical method of production, but as a process of economic and social restructuring. Seen as a symbol of economic liberation from the colonial pact, the first wave of Third World industrialization has been carried out with great tolerance for 'inevitable' mistakes, in the belief that it was a self-generating and self-correcting process, proceeding along a linear path according to invariable norms (eg. economies of scale). The negative effects of this approach, in terms of social destruction and frustration, are now evident - and not only in the Third World. The way out of the impasse is being sought through alternative technologies and above all by addressing the question: industrialization for whom? Industrialization must be geared to the simultaneous satisfaction of basic material and immaterial needs, nationally and democratically determined.

(Resumen espanol en la pagina 11(47).)
Pierre Judet

CONSEQUENCES SOCIALES DE L'INDUSTRIALISATION DANS LES PAYS DU TIERS MONDE

1. Situer le contexte de l'industrialisation

L'examen des conséquences sociales de l'industrialisation, qu'il s'agisse d'implantations ponctuelles ou d'envergure, du résultat de l'investissement étranger ou d'initiatives nationales systématiques, appelle, pour une meilleure compréhension, l'évocation du contexte dans lequel s'est déroulé au cours de l'après guerre le processus d'industrialisation des pays du Tiers Monde: un contexte passionnel d'affrontement et de lutte.

Jusqu'à une époque fort récente, l'industrie a constitué en effet une activité pratiquement interdite dans les espaces destinés à servir de débouchés aux produits industriels des métropoles occidentales: depuis la destruction de l'industrie textile indienne naissante jusqu'à la tentative d'étouffement du projet de sidérurgie au moment où il fut relancé par l'Etat algérien indépendant.

Les schémas du pact colonial: échange de matières premières et de produits agricoles contre bien manufacturés, étaient suffisamment enracinés pour qu'on puisse encore conclure en 1955 au caractère surindustrialisé d'un pays comptant moins de 50,000 travailleurs industriels sur une population de trois millions d'habitants. 1/ Dans les années 60, un grand nombre d'experts continuaient à parler de la "vocation agricole", de la Tunisie, du Maroc, de l'Afrique, et, plus généralement de la plupart des pays du Tiers Monde. La théorie des "industries industrialisantes" développée au cours des années 60, 2/ s'opposait de face à cette affirmation; elle proposait au contraire de montrer avec rigueur non seulement que l'entreprise d'industrialisation était accessible aux pays du Tiers Monde mais qu'elle était la condition d'une restructuration harmonieuse de ces économies.

Dans ces conditions, on comprend que l'industrialisation ait été menée à la manière dont on relève un défi ou dont on conduit une bataille: dans la foulée des indépendances politiques, l'industrialisation est devenue une affaire d'Etat, symbole de libération économique. Ce caractère d'urgence militante et presque militaire, s'est traduit par une quasi impossibilité de s'intéresser au détail en même temps que par une grande tolérance par rapport aux bavures facilement qualifiées d'inévitables auxquelles on aurait tout le temps ensuite...

1/ Succession d'articles de J. Vibert dans le Bulletin Economique et Social de la Tunisie.

2/ Par G. de Bernis dans deux articles d' "Economie Appliquée" en 1966
de remédier. 1/ Cela explique qu'à la fin des années 1970, on puisse faire la constatation suivante: alors que l'industrialisation des pays du Tiers Monde demeure dans de nombreux cas un phénomène ponctuel et non déterminant (les objectifs fixés à Lima pour l'an 2000 - et jugés ambitieux - sont révélateurs du long chemin qui reste à parcourir) 2/ les retentissements sociaux de l'irruption de l'industrie, sous forme d'ensembles techniques plus ou moins complexes, dans des sociétés à dominante rurale sont en train de faire jaillir des questions dont l'acuité s'impose à travers le monde.

2. Frustrations évidentes: restructuration et déstructuration

L'Iran a donné récemment l'exemple d'un phénomène de rejet d'un processus d'industrialisation devenu étouffant et insupportable pour la majorité de la population: cela s'est traduit par le retard, le gel mais aussi l'annulation massive de projets industriels.

En Amérique Latine, les ratés de ce qu'on a appelé le miracle brésilien sont significatifs de la montée des inégalités de revenu, de l'approfondissement des distorsions régionales ou sectorielles et, plus fondamentalement, de toutes les tensions du tissu social.

En Méditerranée, le grand espoir placé dans la dynamique des pôles industriels a fait place au désenchantement et à la déception: qu'il s'agisse de la sidérurgie de Fos en France ou des ensembles sidérurgiques et chimiques en Italie du Sud, ces réalisations n'ont pas tenu leurs promesses; elles n'ont pas réussi à faire la preuve de leur capacité dynamique de restructuration économique et sociale. Le mouvement n'épargne pas l'Algérie qui, entre 1967 et 1977 a pourtant consacré l'équivalent de 25 milliards de USD à la construction de plus de 300 grands projets industriels; depuis 1977, l'Algérie marque une pause qui se prolonge et qui donne l'occasion de déballer - courageusement - au grand jour les problèmes sociaux non résolus, ou aggravés par un rythme d'industrialisation d'une intensité rarement atteinte.

L'industrialisation des pays du Tiers Monde est ainsi l'objet d'une double mise en question dans la mesure où, d'une part, son dynamisme est insuffisant pour mordre sur des zones de pauvreté qui ne cessent de s'étendre à travers l'Asie, l'Afrique, l'Amérique Latine et où d'autre part son impact, là où il s'exerce, est générateur d'insatisfactions sociales parfois explosives. C'est une invitation à relire la définition souvent citée de l'industrialisation comme processus "de restructuration économique et sociale sous l'effet d'un ensemble cohérent de machines". 3/ Certains préfèrent mettre l'accent sur "l'ensemble

1/ Il faut reconnaître que sur ce point l'ardeur des responsables locaux a souvent été mise à profit par les agents extérieurs: investisseurs et, plus encore, fournisseurs de machines et de services.

2/ 25% de la production industrielle mondiale en l'an 2000.

3/ Définition donnée par Fr. Perroux.
cohérent de machines" et donc sur toutes les conséquences négatives (pour un pays, ses travailleurs et ses habitants) de l'absence de cohérence habituellement constatée dans les systèmes de machines implantées. Cela correspond en vérité à la distorsion introduite par les intérêts des grandes firmes et des économies dominantes... La poursuite de l'investigation doit permettre de déceler une ambiguïté plus systématique qui a marqué historiquement le phénomène de l'industrialisation dans la mesure où son dynamisme conquérant et structurant procède d'abord habituellement par destructuration... De Manchester aux plaines de l'Inde; des Pouilles à Sao Paulo, les retombées les plus largement perçues - jusqu'à maintenant - ont été autrefois meurtrières; aujourd'hui encore fortement négatives et frustrantes.

Certes, les ensembles industriels nouveaux créent emplois et revenus, s'insèrent dans des villes et des circuits modernes, donnent l'occasion de promouvoir des infrastructures plus denses de santé, d'éducation, de culture; mais on sait aujourd'hui l'ampleur des besoins nouveaux non satisfaits ou aiguisés de logement, de transports, de loisirs, ainsi que la capacité dissolvante de l'impact de l'industrie sur l'agriculture et sur les populations rurales. Certes, les ensembles industriels nouveaux constituent autant de promesses de maîtrise technique et de qualifications élargies; on est en train de s'apercevoir toutefois qu'un bilan doit être dressé dans ce domaine des acquisitions et des pertes, chaque fois que des artisans disparaissent, chaque fois par exemple qu'on importe matériaux, plans et techniciens parce qu'on ne sait pas construire en utilisant les potentiels locaux de matériaux, de maçons, de modèles d'architecture... Besoins anciens aiguisés, besoins nouveaux non satisfaits; force de déstructuration multiforme dont les intéressés ont l'impression qu'elles tendent à les submerger, tout cela confine et s'exprime en vaste sentiment de frustration. Cela conduit à s'interroger sur la liaison qui existe entre "ensemble de machines" et "restructuration économique et sociale" et à se souvenir que l'auteur de cette définition a insisté à maintes reprises sur le caractère absolument pas automatique de la relation qui s'établit entre ces deux termes. F. Perroux rappelle en effet que "les effets d'entraînement" coexistent avec "des effets de stoppage" mais aussi que "la croissance est déséquilibrée... que l'implantation d'un pôle de développement suscite une suite de déséquilibres économiques et sociaux... qu'il déplace des mains-d'œuvre et les sépare de leurs unités originaires sans leur procurer nécessairement un nouvel encadrement social, qu'il concentre cumulativement, en un lieu et dans une branche, l'investissement, le trafic, l'innovation technique et économique sans en procurer nécessairement l'avantage à d'autres lieux dont la croissance et le développement peuvent être, au contraire, retardés...". 2/ La conséquence est que l'impact dynamique des machines dépend finalement de "l'aménagement du milieu dans sa totalité", c'est-à-dire "de la mise en relation dynamique des talents et des capacités", 3/ dans la recherche de la compatibilité


3/ ib. pp. 251 et 274
entre les projets des groupes sociaux, car "l'établissement des réseaux de liaison matérielle entre eux ne suffit pas à rendre une société économique progressive. Il y faut encore une transformation active des hommes par les hommes, c'est-à-dire l'établissement de formes de la communication adaptées aux sujets tels qu'ils sont". 1/

Chaque fois qu'on se contente "d'organiser la complémentarité des choses, le risque est grand de promouvoir "une économie meurtrière" dans la mesure où elle se préoccupe davantage d'enchaînements techniques que de potentiels humains à promouvoir et donc de besoins profonds à satisfaire. 2/

3. Enchaînements techniques et pseudo-dynamismes économiques

Les précautions soigneusement prises par Perroux non seulement pour équilibrer un propos mais pour se démarquer de tout automatisme n'ont probablement pas retenu suffisamment l'attention de ceux qui ont utilisé ses concepts et ses définitions et qui ont dérivé dans bien des cas vers des utilisations mécani-cistes et réductrices. Les "effets d'entraînement" sont devenus un lieu commun des pratiques de développement mais on a souvent oublié les "effets de stoppage" aussi bien que les conditions énoncées pour que ces effets apparaissent et contribuent "sans destructions massives d'hommes et d'avenirs humains à l'amé-nagement du milieu humain lui-même".

"L'activisme de l'offre" procède du même mouvement d'affirmation du caractère nécessaire et novateur d'un corps de projets cohérents projetés dans l'avenir afin de briser avec le fatalisme de la demande. L'activisme de l'offre intègre la dynamique des effets d'entraînement; il utilise, en reprenant la théorie des chaînons conducteurs, des séquences techniques qui s'articulent d'une transfor-mation à l'autre, d'une branche vers une autre branche, depuis l'amont jusqu'à l'aval. Les choses sont faussées chaque fois que l'activisme de l'offre - qui oppose sa générosité aux étroitesses et avarices du marché - tend à devenir simple système orienté d'enchaînement techniques qui, par un effet de vocabulaire, prend des allures économiques et socio-politiques: alors, les ensembles de machines engendrent des structurations économiques et sociales, tandis que l'industrie se met à "déclencher de puissantes pulsions en direction de l'ensem-ble économique et sociale".

Ainsi est mis en route une mécanique de déstructuration/structuration dans la mesure où les déséquilibres provoquée par la lame de fond se transforment à leur tour en une puissante poussée qui se met à entraîner la totalité des sec-teurs de l'économie et de la société. L'industrie acquiert de ce fait une

1/ Fr. Perroux, L'Economie du XXème siècle, op. cit., pp. 251 et 274

2/ On se rappellera à ce propos l'analyse du Capital en termes de relations sociales.
vocation universelle: comme méthode du développement harmonieux. 1/ Les conséquences en découlent normalement.

a) De par leur seule existence et, en particulier, par les bouleversements qu'elles impliquent, certaines activités - des industries de base par exemple - sont réputées se développer par leur propre poids tout en assurant l'intégration d'un monde industriel qu'elles contraignent à surgir.

b) La route est ouverte vers ce qu'on a appelé "la transformation de l'économie entière en un mécanisme unique fonctionnement automatiquement" en attendant que "se réalise la réunion de plus en plus complète des usines gigantesques en une seule chaîne de production...". 2/

c) L'industrie s'affirme dès lors comme la source de toute réanimation/réhabilitation en particulier pour l'agriculture qui constitue par contraste le lieu de toutes les arriérations et pesanteurs. "Sans l'hégémonie de l'industrie, il est impossible de venir à bout du caractère arrière barbare et misérable du village". 3/ La solution est en marche chaque fois que "les colonnes de tracteurs, ces troupes combattantes de la Révolution technique s'avancent dans les contrées les plus réculées et vraiment barbares de notre Union...". 3/ L'industrie - lumière éclairant une agriculture ténébreuse - relève d'une tradition bien enracinée qui continue à imprégner des formulations multiples: qu'il s'agisse de variations sur le thème de la lourde chape de fatalisme qui pèse sur les comportements paysans ou de la dénonciation de l'esprit "gourbi-parcelle de terrain freinant l'émergence d'un homme nouveau". 4/ Les paysans sont les constituants de deuxième zone d'un système qui ne peut assurer leur promotion qu'à condition qu'ils cessent d'être agriculteurs...

d) L'industrie s'impose dans son donné massif; la rigueur de ses enchaînements est telle qu'elle ne peut être que normative et indiscutable; aucune qualification n'est donc acquise en dehors d'une adaptation - et d'une adaptation permanente - aux exigences déroulées par les évolutions impératives de la technologie.

De l'activisme de l'offre qui tentait de rompre avec le carcan du marché jusqu'à la prosopopée de la révolution technique, le changement de registre est radical et le biais mystificateur. Les choses doivent être remises à leur place en procédant pas à pas: en commençant par mettre en cause la linéarité simplificatrice du processus.


3/ N. Boukharine, "Au début d'une nouvelle année économique", in La question paysanne en URSS, op.cit., p. 216

L'entreprise est d'actualité en un temps où la crise fait apparaître bien des failles dans les certitudes solides et les enchaînements apparemment les plus indestructibles. Il semblait clair par exemple que dans le domaine énergétique on était passé historiquement de l'ère des énergies douces (de l'eau, du vent, du bois) à l'ère du charbon, puis de l'ère du charbon à l'ère du pétrole; enfin, de l'ère du pétrole à l'ère nucléaire, jusqu'à ce qu'on s'aperçoive que le nucléaire risque de conduire à des impasses. On découvre alors rétrospectivement l'ampleur des intérêts des compagnies pétrolières engagées dans le passage du charbon au pétrole, on constate que le fil de la conquête interrompue est coupé et que les "Tout" disparaissent: Tout nucléaire, Tout pétrole, Tout électrique; on se met donc à rebrousser chemin à la recherche du charbon, du bois, de l'eau, du vent, des petits gisements et des petites chutes d'eau, etc.

Dans tous les domaines, la linearité de l'avancée technique fait place à des processus en grappe ou plurilinéaires; deux exemples choisis parmi d'autres illustrent cette évolution:

- dans la sidérurgie, d'une part, où on a constaté une évolution accélérée vers des installations de très grandes dimensions: hauts fourneaux, convertisseurs et laminiers géants; tel était le modèle japonais de référence. L'utilisation du four électrique était réservée à la production des aciers de qualité; quant au haut fourneau du charbon de bois, il ne subsistait plus qu'à titre d'organe témoin d'une époque révolue. Jusqu'à l'apparition d'une filière nouvelle qui s'accommode des petites tailles (minisidérurgie) à base de réduction directe liée au four électrique... jusqu'à ce qu'on revienne récemment au Brésil, en Malaisie (aux Philippines) aux hauts fourneaux à charbon de bois... En sidérurgie, ce qui semblait dépassé ou même relever du folklore est en train de s'intégrer ou de se réintégrer dans la panoplie des procédés modernes;

- de l'industrie à l'agriculture, par ailleurs, les effets de l'étroite sousmission de la seconde à la première ne sont pas aussi brillants que prévu. Le modèle de tracteurisation lourde préconisé a autant détruit que fécondé; la chimisation n'a pas empêché ici et là les rendements de stagner et parfois de s'effondrer: car on s'aperçoit aujourd'hui que tout ne se règle pas dans l'agriculture à coup de tracteurs, d'engrais et de plastiques; on s'aperçoit également que l'analphabétisme des paysanne ne les empêche pas d'avoir le sens d'équilibres complexes qui relèvent de la biologie, de l'écologie, autant et parfois plus que de la chimie et de la mécanique. Les paysans, quand il en reste, vont peut-être commencer à compter dans le développement de l'agriculture.

Du haut fourneau au tracteur ou à l'unité d'ammoniac de 1500 t/j., le mot d'ordre généralisé était aux économies d'échelle. Des exemples de plus en plus nombreux indiquent pourtant que la "loi" des économies d'échelle ne joue pas ou ne joue plus. Les minisidérurgistes italiens ont contraint à la défensive sinon à la fermeture plusieurs unités européennes de grandes dimensions; le
problème est posé dans d'autres activités: papeterie, chimie, raffinerie, sucrerie, etc. On sait aujourd'hui que les économies d'échelle disparaissent lorsque le taux de marche diminue sensiblement ou lorsque les retards s'accumulent au temps de la construction ou de la montée en production. Il convient de s'interroger sur ce que devient dans ces conditions la "norme internationale" dans la mesure où un des secrets de la puissance des économies les plus avancées, du Japon, de l'Allemagne et des États-Unis semble réside de plus en plus dans leur capacité à jouer sur une large gamme de techniques et de tailles. Maxi, mais aussi mini-sidérurgie, fabrication du verre plat pour l'exportation sur technologie de pointe mais aussi fabrication du verre plus ordinaire sur technique ancienne, etc... La fin du "dogme" des économies d'échelle et de la norme technique internationale unique est un heureux coup porté à une puissante barrière à l'entrée; c'est également la possibilité ouverte à des cheminement pédagogiques qui permettent à des collectifs de travail en formation de maîtriser progressivement des ensemble complexes, à partir d'instruments moins disproportionnés à leur inexpérience. Dans ce domaine, il deviendra en tout cas plus difficile pour les ingénieries et les vendeurs de matériels de continuer à fonder leurs arguments de vente sur "les grandes lois de l'économie".

Il est bon que ces tendances nouvelles mettent en cause l'avance soi-disant inéxorable - sans détour ni retour - de la révolution technique; il est bon que ces dogmes, normes et "grandes lois" perdent leur caractère intangible et presque "sacré"; c'est la condition pour que des processus dialectiques se renouent entre la modernisation de l'agriculture et les paysans, entre des systèmes de machines et des ensembles de travailleurs, entre le mouvement des techniques et de l'industrie et la satisfaction des besoins sociaux.

5. De l'importance de la consommation et de la demande: revenir aux besoins fondamentaux

On connaît les critères habituellement avancés pour évaluer la réussite d'un processus d'industrialisation: la rapidité de la construction d'ensembles industriels, l'efficacité de leur fonctionnement. Dans tel ou tel pays de l'Asie du Sud-Est asiatique, les usines s'édifient en un temps record et sortent des produits conformes aux normes internationales: on dit que leur industrialisation progresse sur un rythme rapide: produire, produire vite, produire efficacement, produire en conformité, mais produire quoi et produire pour qui? On ne s'attarde guère en général à un examen de la structure et de l'utilisation (de l'utilité!) de la production; on fait probablement l'hypothèse que ces problèmes se régleront d'eux-mêmes. Il est vrai que ces problèmes se règlent mais de manière partielle et partielle, c'est-à-dire au profit de certaines catégories sociales et au détriment d'autres catégories, par exemple:

- on produit des tracteurs et des machines tractées "modernes", mais on se soucie relativement peu de fabriquer outils à main améliorés et machines simples pour les agricultures dites traditionnelles;

- on produit des chaussures de type urbain, inspirées d'une mode parisienne ou milanaise; mais on produit rarement d'emblée des chaussures de travail et de sécurité protégeant paysans et ouvriers d'un environnement hostile;
on produit cosmétique et papiers dits "kleenex" beaucoup plus que produits d'hygiène de base, pour le filtrage de l'eau et pour la protection des aliments.

Ces distorsions, très fréquemment constatées traduisent la force de l'impact des "modèles" qui prévalent dans les pays industrialisés et qui correspondent aux stratégies de marché des grands groupes industriels et commerciaux. Ces distorsions traduisent également la distance, longue à parcourir, entre le lancement des industries de base et le développement des activités aval plus liées à la consommation du grand nombre: chaque fois que par exemple la priorité accordée aux bâtiments industriels renvoie à dix ou à vingt ans plus tard la construction de logements.

De toute façon, il est clair qu'une grande priorité accordée à la production (et à l'activisme de l'offre) ne suffit jamais à régler les problèmes de la consommation, de la demande et de la satisfaction des besoins. Il est à ce propos caractéristique de constater qu'un certain nombre de travaux actuellement menés sur l'industrialisation des pays du Tiers Monde 1/ font apparaître le caractère partial d'instruments pourtant réputés habituellement comme strictement techniques et neutres, tels que listes statistiques, nomenclatures d'activités industrielles confectionnées par et pour des économies aux industries déjà structurées. Ces instruments statistiques sont en général beaucoup plus difficilement utilisables pour les économies qui décident de construire une industrie surtout lorsque priorité est donnée à la satisfaction des besoins locaux par rapport à la reproduction d'un modèle simplement importé. Les réflexions lancées depuis quelques années sur les "besoins fondamentaux" 2/ ont le mérite d'attirer l'attention sur le domaine en général peu étudié de la demande, de la consommation... et des besoins. 3/ Une étude récente d'un économiste égyptien 4/ souligne à ce propos que l'analyse des besoins fondamentaux révèle trois éléments majeurs:

1/ En particulier dans le cadre de l'ONUDI

2/ Depuis, notamment, la conférence du BIT, Genève 1976

3/ La théorie des besoins fondamentaux fait l'objet de nombreuses critiques, ces critiques sont fondées dans la mesure où il s'agirait en effet de mettre en place une solution "misérabiliste" réservée aux plus pauvres à base de mesures d'urgence et de techniques obsolètes. La théorie des besoins fondamentaux devient par contre très intéressante lorsqu'elle prend valeur universelle, dans la mesure où elle rejoint les réflexions menées dans les pays industrialisés sur les besoins, la manière de les satisfaire, etc...

a) Les besoins fondamentaux contrairement à ce que la théorie classique affirme, ne sont ni innombrables ni illimités (à la différence des biens substituables entre eux susceptibles de les satisfaire);

b) Ces besoins comprennent à la fois des besoins matériels et des besoins immatériels; 1/

c) Ces besoins sont tous fondamentaux, c'est-à-dire qu'ils doivent être tous satisfaits, sans qu'aucune substitution ou priorité puisse intervenir sous peine de mise en cause du bien-être de l'homme. 2/

Nourriture, vêtement, habitat, santé, éducation, auto-accomplissement et convivialité: 4/ ces besoins renvoient exactement aux insatisfactions et frustrations engendrées par les expériences d'industrialisation évoquées plus haut. Les questions posées sont les suivantes: quel est en conséquence le (les) processus d'industrialisation qui correspond(ent) effectivement à une logique de satisfaction de besoins de base? Dans une telle perspective, quelle gamme de produits fabriquer, suivant quelles techniques et quelles méthodes, pour quel usage? Les réponses à ces dernières questions sont en général fournies dans le cadre de programmes, de projets et d'études préliminaires; ces projets et études préliminaires sont souvent confiés à des experts ou à des bureaux d'étude et d'ingénierie étrangers, alors qu'il s'agit d'une tâche d'importance stratégique, à réserver absolument à l'initiative nationale. Encore faut-il s'interroger sur la consistante de l'autonomie de cette initiative nationale car des choix de type bureaucratique risquent de s'inspirer davantage de modèles extérieurs que des besoins réels de l'ensemble d'une population. Une chose est claire en tout cas: aucune structuration/restructuration sociale satisfaisante n'est à attendre de l'impact d'un ensemble de machines aussi longtemps que l'agencement et la cohérence de ce système ne seront pas définis, orientés et maîtrisés par les expressions les plus directes possibles de la démocratie la plus large. On se souviendra, en effet, que la "participation" aux décisions et aux choix fait partie des besoins fondamentaux. La boucle est ainsi bouclée, lorsqu'il apparaît qu'insatisfaction et frustrations induites par l'irruption de l'industrie résultent précisément de l'exclusion de la masse des insatisfaits et des frustrés de toute participation aux discussions, aux choix et aux décisions intéressant le processus d'industrialisation.


3/ Traduction de self-fulfilment.

4/ Traduction de togetherness.
6. Conclusion: rompre, mais avec quoi?

Il fut un temps où lancer l'industrialisation constituait une rupture - difficile - avec l'économie meurtrière du pacte colonial, pilote de richesses naturelles et destructeur de capacités humaines... On sait aujourd'hui d'expérience qu'industrialiser risque de décevoir si l'on ne rompt pas avec les méthodes et les dynamiques qui dispensent de référer le processus industriel au seul objectif susceptible de le rendre socialement opérant: satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux de la population. Chaque fois que les paysans ne sont plus considérés comme des arriérés alourdis par le fatalisme ou que les talents des travailleurs industriels, lettrés ou illettrés, diplômés ou non diplômés, sont systématiquement intégrés et promus, il s'agit d'un test significatif de la bonne orientation de l'entreprise étant donné que participation et plein accomplissement 1/ font partie des besoins fondamentaux à satisfaire.

1/ Ismaïl-Sabri Abdalla, op.cit.

Travaux récents de Pierre Judet:

- Quelques problèmes d'industrialisation et de planification en république de Guinée-Bissau, mimeog., 49 pp. Déc. 1978
- Satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux et production de biens de capital dans les pays en voie de développement, Note de recherche, mimeog., 34pp. Fév. 1980
- Paradoxes et enjeux de la 'semi-industrialisation', Le Monde Diplomatique, Décembre 1979

CONSECUENCIAS SOCIALES DE LA INDUSTRIALIZACION EN LOS PAISES DEL TERCER MUNDO

Resumen: La industrialización no es un método mecánico de producción, sino más bien un proceso de reestructuración económica y social. Entendido como símbolo de la liberación del pacto colonial, la primera oleada de industrialización del Tercer Mundo fue acompañada de una gran tolerancia para los errores "inevitables" basada en la creencia de que los errores se corregirían a lo largo del camino. Especialmente, muy a menudo la industrialización se ha concebido como un proceso lineal que reacciona a normas invariables (por ejemplo las economías de escala). Los efectos negativos de un tal enfoque son evidentes - por lo que se refiere a la desestructuración social y a frustraciones, y no sólo en el Tercer Mundo. La salida de esta situación de muy difícil resolución implica el empleo de otras técnicas, y sobre todo una respuesta ante todo a la pregunta: industrialización para quién? La industrialización debe tener como base la satisfacción de necesidades fundamentales, tanto materiales como no materiales, determinando democráticamente y al nivel nacional.
THIS IS OUR LAND

(FROM A FATHER ABOUT A LOST VILLAGE
IN THE SOUTH OF THE PHILIPPINES)

i  this was a forest — uninhabitable.
   we came in search for food. We
   found it clean. today it feeds the
   third of my generations. but a rich
   man had come. the government said
   the man owns the food.
   including our land.

ii  from his ground, a son wished
    vengeance. from another
    we hear anguish unanswered. why
    did the government help the rich
    man
    to kill us
    to get our land?

iii  i am old, the rule had been simple
    for me, live honestly, in peace, in the
    sweat of the brow.
    i wish to leave this legacy to
    one more son. but the rich man
    his law is made of steel
    and powder it kills.
    my sons tell me the struggle
    'tis the deal.

iv  i could see the fire in the east
    a-borning. the sunset shall come. my
    vengeance will be my sons'. my
    anxiety their peace.
    for in truth and freedom
    our justice
    we are taking back this our LAND!

   by ~ Bugto Sa. Kaumahan
   (the other son)

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BUILDING BLOCKS

INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

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Abstract: The international division of labour between industrialized and Third World countries is subject to a process of accelerated change. This is especially true for manufactured products. It cannot a priori be assumed that these shifts in the structure of international trade and production will produce only beneficial effects in both industrialized and Third World countries. On the contrary, there are also negative effects associated with this change.

In 1976 the Development Research Institute of the Tilburg University has started a research project in this field. This project became feasible thanks to a substantial financial contribution of the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation. This research aims at providing policy makers with additional assessment elements for formulating a more adequate anticipatory re-adjustment policy, which takes into account the interests of both industrialized (in particular the Netherlands) and Third World countries.

In view of the importance and topicality of the subject, the Institute aims at making accessible the research results also to a broader public, mainly by way of publishing progress reports, articles, etc. The results, however, are not only relevant for the Dutch audience. Especially in Third World countries there is a growing need for information on developments in and policies of industrialized countries.

Other papers in this series of Occasional papers are:

- Kees Klijs, Vlisco, Evaluation of a re-adjustment subsidy
- Willy Wagemans, Hong Kong, Development and perspective of a clothing colony
- Job de Haan, The future of the Dutch clothing industry
- Gerard de Groot, Export industry in Tunisia, effects of a dependent development
- Carel de Beer, Toon van de Ven, The efficiency of production systems in developing countries, a case-study in Peruvian metal-working industry

These papers are available from the Development Research Institute, Tilburg University, Postbox 90133, N 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. Lecture delivered at the Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institut, Oslo, May 1979.
1. Introduction

The diversification of their economic structures, more specifically, the expansion of production and export of manufactures, forms an important objective of the development strategy of most Third World countries. Third World pressure on industrialized countries to facilitate the access of industrial products to the latters' markets is of long standing. In this regard demands for the lowering of import barriers, both of a tariff and non-tariff nature, and for introducing special non-reciprocal preferences for Third World countries' industrial products (GSP) spring to mind.

More recently, industrialized countries have been asked to take special steps to "assist the adaption and adjustment of industries and workers in situations where they are adversely affected or may be threatened to be adversely affected, by increased imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing countries". 1/

The relationship between industrial and trade problems of Third World countries and the respective policies of industrialized countries has been discussed of length in the debate on the establishment of a New International Economic Order (both at the U.N. General Assembly and the Specialized Agencies, in particular at UNIDO-level).

At the 7th Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly it was agreed that "developed countries should facilitate the development of new policies and strengthen existing policies, including labour market policies, which would encourage the re-deployment of their industries which are less competitive internationally to developing countries, thus leading to structural adjustments in the former and a higher degree of utilization of natural and human resources in the latter. Such policies may take into account the economic structure, and the economic, social, and security objectives of the developed countries concerned and the need for such industries to move into more viable lines of production or into other sectors of the economy". 2/

This resolution recognizes the fact that the development of the Third World is not only a matter of changing economic, social and political structures in Third World countries and of changing the structure of international relations, but is also a matter of structural change in industrialized countries.


2/ U.N. Resolution 3362 (S.VII), Section IV.
The development cooperation policy of the Netherlands is indeed based on these premises. It is recognized that Third World countries require more than just an aid programme; their problem is a structural one, rooted in the manner in which international political and economic relations are organized. Hence, the need for an integrated approach to the transfer of funds, trade, raw materials, industrial and agricultural development, the monetary system, debts and investments. 1/

In the debate on the NIEO, the Netherlands have, compared to most other industrialized countries, played a relatively prominent and progressive role. So, it is no surprise, therefore, that as early as December 1974 the Dutch Government submitted a "Memorandum on the Restructuring of the Netherlands Economy and Development Cooperation" to the Parliament. This new policy contained three main components. It proposed: firstly to widen trade opportunities for Third World countries; secondly assistance to industrialization in Third World countries; thirdly to restructure production in the Netherlands with emphasis on supporting Dutch industry in adjusting to the newly emerging trade and development patterns.

In November 1975 a Supplementary Memorandum was submitted in which more specific criteria for the granting of subsidies from the development cooperation budget to Dutch firms engaged in a process of restructuring, were formulated.

This policy could be regarded as one of the first serious efforts by an industrialized country to establish a direct and concrete link between domestic restructuring and the interests of Third World countries. As such it became widely known and internationally appreciated. It is, therefore, worthwhile to analyse whether or not this policy did realise its aspirations. Such an analysis can have many different aspects. This paper will restrict itself to the implementation aspect. However before proceeding it is necessary to shortly describe its policy context, that is define the industrial policy of the Netherlands.

2. Industrial restructuring policy in the Netherlands

Although the direct link between industrial restructuring in the Netherlands and development cooperation certainly did give the new policy an innovative character, it should at the same time be pointed out that industrial adjustment as such was not a novel concept to Dutch policymakers.

As early as 1970 a change in industrial policy had already taken place, allowing the Government somewhat more direct involvement with separate industrial sectors. Up to then, industrial policy had mainly consisted of creating the utmost favourable climate for stimulating and attracting domestic and foreign investments, in order to realize the objectives of employment, growth and balance of payments.

However, the accelerated change in the structure of the expansion process of capitalism, particularly in the EEC, (though also in the USA and Japan) and its differentiated impact on the sectoral development of Dutch industry had called for a change in policy.

In a period of accelerated structural changes, the market mechanism proved to be insufficient to guarantee the realisation of industrial policy objectives. Some sectors did benefit from the increased internationalization of investments and trade, others were forced into contracting. Industries such as textile, shipbuilding, leather and footwear, clothing and the like ran into severe difficulties that threatened to also affect viable activities. Moreover the regional impacts of expansion and contraction were quite unevenly distributed. Finally, the negative impact did hit specific groups of the working population particularly hard.

Thus, the Government proceeded to develop a more specific and pointed industrial policy.

One could speak of a change in philosophy: from "adjustment through growth" it evolved to "growth through adjustment". 1/

It should be made clear at this point that this change in policy was definitely not brought about by the increasing competition from Third World countries' industrial exports. To the contrary, the effects thereof were - rightly or wrongly - still considered to be of almost negligible importance, compared to the effects of changes in competitive power among industrialized countries.

The objectives of this new industrial policy can be summarized as follows: 2/

- removal of obstacles which obstruct the growth of industry in general or of certain industrial sectors in particular;

- promotion of the development and marketing of new products and of the development of new productive activities;

- strengthening of the competitive power of existing companies by means of structural re-adjustment of firms active in a certain sector, by which the sector or branch concerned may be re-vitalised;

- promotion of regional spreading of industrial activities in such a manner that a more balanced geographical distribution of employment opportunities emerges.


Thus, the Government would promote the expansion of internationally viable industries, supervise the adjustment of problem industries and assist at the phasing-out of internationally non-viable industries. The Government did not question the fundamental causes of problems in certain sectors. The point of departure remained that the international market is the determining factor in Dutch industrial development.

From then onwards a more specific industrial sector-policy starts to gain in importance. The objective is the optimal development of the different industrial sectors and branches, "optimal" to be understood as internationally competitive and privately profitable.

This sector-policy is based primarily on problem-oriented sector- or branch-analysis. The main purpose of these is to deepen the insight of industry itself in its own problems and to get a clearer view on future internal and external developments, in order to be able to eliminate bottlenecks in time and effect a long-term strengthening of the structure of particular sectors. However: "starting point must be, that the industry concerned takes the necessary measures commensurate with structural adjustment. Only in cases where this falls outside the scope of possibilities and where considerations of public interest - e.g. for reasons of general industrial structure or (regional) employment - justify assistance, can assistance be considered. In such cases aid is tied to explicit conditions, to wit:

- the assistance shall be of a temporary nature;
- with regard to firms or branches in difficulties, possibilities for recovery of profitability within a reasonable time should be present. Moreover attention should be paid not only to market potential but also to quality of management;
- the granting of assistance shall depend on the submission of a plan for structural re-adjustment with matching financial scheme, because experience has taught that without these, governmental assistance is of little or no effect". 1/

In order to improve conditions for a successful follow-up of the recommendations, a special institution has been founded in 1972: the Netherlands Restructuring Company: NEHEM. Government, employers organizations and (till recently) trade unions participate in NEHEM.

In 1974 (and 1975) a new element was introduced in industrial policy: linking the re-adjustment set-up to the interests of Third World countries, in particular in terms of industrial exports of the latter. The details of this policy will be the subject of the next paragraph, but it can be said - bearing in mind the phrasing of the justifications for granting public financial support to restructuring efforts by private firms - that from now on the interests of Third World countries have been accepted as a consideration of public interest in domestic industrial policymaking.

1/ Ibidem.
It is interesting to observe that this change - although resulting from a more structural and progressive approach in development cooperation policy - was not inconsistent with the traditional "open-door" policy as followed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As a matter of fact both the Ministers of Development Cooperation and of Economic Affairs were responsible for this change in policy. Even the trade-unions, although increasingly aware of the structurally deteriorating employment situation in the Netherlands, fully endorsed this policy and the underlying philosophy of a new international division of labour.

In 1976, Dutch industrial policy was revised and a policy of so-called selective growth was introduced. This new policy was not so much a replacement of the old one as a refinement. It was based on the consideration that the structural position of the Dutch economy had deteriorated considerably as regards employment and growth during the first half of the seventies. It could not be expected that this trend would change for the better of its own accord. The problems were of a structural character.

The objectives of this new policy were twofold. Firstly, the increase of employment opportunities. It was decided that providing incentives to private investments would be the most effective instrument in terms of job creation, more effective than for example subsidizing wage costs, reducing taxes or increasing government expenditure. The second objective was the provision of some orientation as to the direction of these investments, in order to comply with other societal targets. These targets could not be reached without some governmental interference in the market-mechanism. The targets were referred to as facets or aspects of the industrial policy, hence, the term selective growth. In addition to such aspects as environmental conservation, regional development, management of raw materials and energy, special mention was made of the improvement of opportunities for Third World countries.

To conclude this part: Dutch industrial policy relied, and continues to rely, primarily on decentralized decision making, that is decision at the level of the private firm. On the other hand it is gradually conceded that these decisions should be made within the framework of an orientation provided by the Government. This orientation is derived from a spectrum of social objectives. The targets of the Third World countries have formally been accepted as an internal objective in Dutch policymaking.

3. Industrial restructuring and development cooperation

The industrial restructuring and development cooperation policy as presented in the two Memoranda already mentioned, is intended as an answer to the question of "how a policy for restructuring the Dutch economy could be made to include the Third World development factor and in how far it would be right to use funds from the development cooperation budget to help finance this restructuring". 1/

1/ Memorandum on the Restructuring of the Netherlands Economy and Development Cooperation, (The Hague: 1974).
According to the official view this can be done by an active and forward looking restructuring policy, aimed at running-down industrial activities in which Third World countries have a comparative advantage, complemented by measures to promote industry in and exports from Third World countries in the same fields. Whereas the latter part belongs to the area of trade policy, and technical and financial assistance, the former is the crux of anticipatory domestic re-adjustment.

Two institutions were singled-out as having to play a crucial part in the implementation of this policy. As far as the domestic side is concerned, the already mentioned NEHEM was considered as especially suited for drawing up restructuring plans and ensuring their implementation. In as far as these plans might be of interest to Third World countries, NEHEM was expected to pass on the information to the Dutch Financing Company for Developing Countries (F.M.O.), an institution judged to be "eminently suited to pass the information on to the developing countries". The FMO was restructured; instead of primarily serving the interests of Dutch firms in Third World countries, it is now supposed to primarily serve the industrial interests of Third World countries.

Thus the implementation depended on the degree to which NEHEM, together with the social partners from the sectors concerned, would be willing to explicitly take into account the actual and potential competitive power of Third World countries, the extent to which NEHEM and FMO would succeed in establishing effective information channels and the degree to which FMO would succeed in effectively passing on the information to interested Third World investors.

In order to qualify for additional subsidies from the development cooperation budget, the restructuring plans will have to consist of three components:

a) abandonment of production in the Netherlands;

b) modification of the production structure in the Netherlands;

c) relationship with the building-up of production capacity in Third World countries.

Subsidies can only be granted for the domestic part of the restructuring plans that is for components 1 and 2. However, the third component is considered to be a conditio sine qua non. Expenditures related to this part should however be financed from other budget items (e.g. the FMO budget for the promotion of industry in and exports from Third World countries).

These three components have been defined more fully by the formulation of 10 rather specific criteria. 1/

1/ Supplementary Memorandum on the Restructuring of the Netherlands Economy and Development Cooperation, (The Hague: 1975).
General

1) Restructuring projects should be in line with the policy pursued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs for the sector concerned and with any structure plans which have already been formulated in respect of this sector. Concrete evidence must be available of the relationship between subsidy and the development factor.

Abandonment of production in the Netherlands

2) The abandonment of production should offer the Third World countries immediate or potential comparative cost advantages or other opportunities for profitable production.

3) The abandonment should, in general, coincide with or anticipate shifts in the international division of labour.

4) The more a project anticipates future shifts in production to Third World countries, the greater the development factor will be, the higher the subsidy provided.

Modification of the production structure in the Netherlands

5) An essential condition for the abandonment of production capacity in the Netherlands is, that it must be accompanied by a modification of the domestic production structure.

6) Employment levels should be maintained as far as possible, by substituting threatened jobs by alternative secure jobs. In case employment levels cannot be maintained, the budget may cover costs of retraining and other costs involved in the transfer of employees.

7) Substitute activities should take place in line with the assumed comparative advantage of the Netherlands vis-à-vis Third World countries.

Construction of production capacity in Third World countries

8) Efforts should be made to demonstrate how production capacity in Third World countries will be created.

9) If there is concrete evidence of production capacity being build-up in Third World countries, the development value of the particular project will be taken into account in granting the subsidy.

10) Where there is competition from both industrialized and Third World countries, this will be taken into account, since the danger exists that the vacuum created by abandonment of production in the Netherlands will be filled by firms from industrialized countries.
4. Development co-operation and restructuring projects

Turning now to the question what this policy did amount to in practice, one ought to undertake a rather detailed evaluation in order to do justice to it. Obviously this falls outside the scope of this paper. However, a closer look at some information, in particular on the size and approach of the programme and on some concrete re-adjustment projects should enable us to come to a general, albeit provisional, assessment.

The budget allocated to the re-adjustment-cum-development cooperation programme was fixed at Hfl 35 million a year. By way of comparison, this amounts to about 1 percent of the total development cooperation budget. Now, one might argue that the value and merits of such a programme should not, for various reasons, be exclusively or even primarily judged on the basis of the amount of money involved. Firstly, this programme had a more or less experimental character, secondly it was intended to also have a kind of exemplary impact on other industrialized countries and thirdly, if the programme had produced additional industrialization in and trade of Third World countries, the effects of the latter would have multiplied the purely budgetary impact.

However, it seems that additional industrialization was hardly or not at all realized, at least not in direct relation to this programme; a change in trade policies was outside the scope of the programme itself, since this is essentially an EEC matter; and the programme could barely realize its aspiration of being anticipatory.

Anyway, there is no point in criticizing the programme for its insignificance in terms of budget, because an interesting phenomenon occurred: even this small budget proved impossible to spend. Total disbursements during the first three years of operation (1975-1977) amounted to about Hfl 20 million of the Hfl 105 million available.

Disbursements will always lag behind due to administrative delays and the time it takes to carry out the restructuring of an industry. But then, commitments also - being a more relevant indicator - fell seriously short of the target. These amounted to only 7 million in 1975, only 16 in 1976 and about 15 million in 1977 (the provisional figures for 1978 show no improvement). Only 36 percent of the available budget was effectively committed. Thus, shortage of funds can hardly be blamed for the problems connected with this programme.

On the other hand, a comparison of these figures with the amount spent in the same years on what might be called "employment assistance to industry", at least Hfl 1,600 million, provides an additional indication of the real political priority of the programme.

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1/ The figures presented in this paragraph are taken from the National Budget, unless otherwise indicated.
If we now look at the orientation of the programme, one can observe that - in accordance with the general industrial policy, it is sector oriented also.

Of the total commitments about 65 percent can be classified as direct sector support (to wit: cotton, rayon, linen industry; clothing industry; spinning industry) against about 35 percent as support directly at the level of individual firms.

The sectoral distribution, however, is biased. About 70 percent went to the textile and clothing industry against about 25 percent to the wood and only about 5 percent to other industries (telecommunications being the biggest receiver among the last mentioned category). This distribution is not very revolutionary in terms of export performance of Third World countries and provides grounds for questioning the anticipatory character of the programme at the level of implementation.

This impression is confirmed when we examine some of the specific projects of the programme.

In the textile sector, the cotton, rayon and linen industry received a major share of the readjustment assistance from the development cooperation budget. This industry was indeed in serious trouble. Imports from Third World countries have increased rapidly, but so have imports from EEC, and Eastern European countries. Whereas the EEC as a whole was losing competitive power vis-à-vis Third World countries, the Dutch C.R.L. industry was at a disadvantage vis-à-vis EEC suppliers. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, employers and trade-unions had already agreed upon a plan to restructure this industry which included an investment programme aimed at the purchase of open-end spinning machines, energy and environmental saving investments and facilities to measure and control the dyeing on printing machines. This programme was also presented to the Ministry of Development Cooperation, which, after some hesitation, accepted it. However, it is not easy to find an argument for justifying this subsidy. Either the Ministry was having difficulties in finding suitable projects or the Ministry was subsidizing in order to prevent an increase in the pressure for more protection against Third World countries' imports. There is no evidence that the purchase of open-end spinning machines increases Third World countries' exports. To encourage Dutch spinners to move up-market, away from traditional products was necessary in view of the changes in competitive relations among industrialized countries. The benefit for Third World countries could at best only be assumed. Moreover, the Ministry had no direct control over the funds, since these were allocated to projects concerning the sector as a whole; therefore individual firms were hardly aware of the fact that part of the subsidy came from the development cooperation budget and thus, did not necessarily allow for the interests of the Third World countries. Finally, this subsidy had much more a retrospective than an anticipatory character, in view of the changes which had already taken place in the international division of labour.

An analogous situation exists concerning the subsidies to the clothing industry. Here again a restructuring plan had already been agreed upon in view of the mounting problems of this industry. As Dutch firms were unable to continue competition on the basis of cost-price, a market strategy had been
designed. Again, the development cooperation support was provided to the sector as a whole, on the assumption that upgrading would provide Third World countries with opportunities to increase the export of standardized products. As in the case mentioned above individual firms were not required to demonstrate the development dimension of their restructuring plans. As an ironical footnote, part of the competition by Third World countries' products on the Dutch market had been caused by Dutch trading houses engaged in sub-contracting activities and by Dutch industrial firms which had transferred part of their activities to Third World countries for the express purpose of exporting to the home market.

If we now scrutinize some subsidies granted to individual firms, a similar pessimistic picture unfolds.

Vlisco is a major producer and exporter of printed fabrics. Due to the establishment of an indigenous textile industry in Africa, its export position had deteriorated. It was decided to restructure the Dutch factory in order to improve Vlisco's competitive power in the markets of high-income countries. During the first year of the new re-adjustment-cum-development programme Vlisco applied for and was granted a subsidy in view of the fact that the plan purported a shift in the international division of labour in favour of Third World countries, leaving the African market to African producers, and a shift in the production structure within the Netherlands to more advanced production methods, more appropriate for the European market. Leaving aside the fact that Vlisco did provide the Ministry with very partial information, and that the Ministry exhibited a certain relaxity in examining the plan and its actual implementation, the upshot was that Vlisco (with the transnational Unilever as a large shareholder) - through the United African Company - acquired an important stake in the expansion of the African textile industry, and - even more important - through the new printing process managed to recapture part of its African market. Thus, this subsidy strengthened the position of a Dutch firm (to a certain extent part of a transnational company) on the market of Third World countries at the expense of indigenous producers. 1/

Philips, not exactly a minor among the transnationals, has also received a re-adjustment subsidy. Philips is embarking on a strategy of establishing plants for the production of telecommunication products in some Third World countries with an attractive domestic market, notably Brazil and Mexico and possibly India, Indonesia and Colombia. Competition among the relatively few suppliers in this highly research- and development-intensive industry is intense. In order to be able to support the R & D expenses Philips is trying to increase its market share, by way of establishing plants in countries that can offer government contracts. Expansion of the Mexican plant (60% of the shares are under Mexican control) would lead to a reduction of employment in the Netherlands. Philips applied for and was granted a subsidy towards the

retraining costs of the 70 to 80 employees directly affected. This was justified by the positive development impact on the Mexican economy.

An exhaustive treatment of all concrete plans falls outside the scope of this paper. Still, these examples are sufficiently representative to enable us to draw some conclusions.

5. Some lessons from the Dutch experience

Notwithstanding its shortcomings, already briefly indicated above, the Dutch anticipatory restructuring-cum-development policy cannot be discarded as merely a good public relations exercise. There are no reasons to doubt the good intentions of the programme. This, however, makes it all the more necessary to learn some lessons from its rather unfortunate start.

As regards the sector approach of the programme, it is evident that none of the restructuring plans of the sectors supported with development funds was genuinely anticipating shifts in the international division of labour. (On the other hand, one cannot imagine that development cooperation funds - even when they are of a non-ODA nature - would be used for co-financing the expansion of technology-, capital-, and knowledge intensive industries in industrialized countries, activities in which the latter are assumed to have comparative advantages already). The sector approach, at least as far as the development cooperation aspect is concerned, almost inevitably suggests a reaction to changes in comparative advantages which are already revealed by shifts in trade patterns between industrialized and Third World countries.

However, the structural problems of specific industrial sectors are seldom exclusively or even predominantly caused by imports from Third World countries. (This was not even the case in such a classical problem industry as clothing). Increased imports from low-wage countries only represent one aspect of the problem. One cannot therefore expect the sectoral restructuring plans to be predominantly "development oriented". Nonetheless, one might state that the interests of the Third World countries were rather coincidental in the Dutch experience. This is not only suggested by the circumstances that the Development Cooperation Ministry became involved in restructuring plans after they had been agreed upon, but even more so by the contents of these plans.

Their general drift can in short be described as "moving up-market". This might be a sound strategy for the Dutch firms in the sector concerned, but it does not in itself guarantee that Third World countries will benefit; this has only been assumed. Moreover one should take into consideration that such a "commercial" strategy is aimed as recapturing or safeguarding, for Dutch producers, part of the market that is lost or threatens to be lost to suppliers of cheap standardized products, and even when that part of the market is actually abandoned there is no guarantee that Third World and not competing industrialized countries will fill the gap. In the Dutch plans, no direct provisions were made for the expansion of production and export capacities in Third World countries as a result of the abandonment of products by Dutch producers (the individual firms were not even required to demonstrate the development aspect).
As regards the individual firm support, there is clearly a disparity between intentions and realizations in the Dutch programme. In the first place additional financing has been provided for projects that were not viable at all (e.g. sisal); secondly, financing was provided for restructuring plans that in the end were aimed at limiting the competitive advantages of Third World producers (e.g. knitting/hosiery, printed fabrics), thirdly financing has been granted to transnational corporations (Philips, Wessanen, and - in a certain sense - Unilever).

Besides, when interviewing entrepreneurs one gets the impression that the additional financing or restructuring plans with development cooperation money has had negligible or no effect at all on final decisions; compared to the importance of investment decisions, the amount of the subsidy has been too small to exercize a decisive influence. This is true not only for T.N.C.'s but also for the smaller firms benefitting from this programme.

The following suggestion can be made. If the development of the Third World is accepted as an internal objective of economic policy in industrialized countries, the Development Cooperation Ministry should get acquainted with sectoral restructuring plans at a very early stage; not after an agreement has been reached. It should be a partner in the discussions and negotiations from the start. Secondly, co-financing of sectoral restructuring plans should not take place on the basis of assumed but only on the basis of proven benefits to Third World countries. One possibility, next to influencing the general drift of the sectoral restructuring plans might be to introduce a direct link between the amount of subsidy drawn from the development cooperation budget and certain specified levels of imports from Third World countries (this criterium can be further refined).

Such a general criterium obviously cannot be applied at the level of individual firms. On the other hand, the relation between restructuring in the Netherlands and concrete evidence of productive- and export capacities being built-up in Third World countries is easier to control at this level. It should therefore receive much greater emphasis. This is not a plea to co-finance from development cooperation funds, Dutch industrial investments in Third World countries. To the contrary in order to avoid that development cooperation funds are used to co-finance the internationalization of Dutch productive capital, one should tie the amount of the subsidy to the firm to some specific criteria. To wit: a) productive and/or export capacity should be established or expanded in Third World countries; b) this capacity should fit into the industrial strategy of the Third World country concerned; c) it should be locally controlled; d) the Dutch firm should effectively engage in transfer of technology; e) the Dutch firm should cooperate in facilitating access to the Dutch market for the firm (in the Third World country) which will export products abandoned by the former.

In co-financing restructuring plans in industrialized countries, Ministries for Development Cooperation should make certain that additional funds produce additional benefits for Third World countries and not only serve as an additional bonus for "good behaviour". Leaving aside the circumstance that TNCs are not the most representative agents for the NIEO as envisaged by the Third World,
the fact remains that TNCs can be assumed to make investment decisions independently from the possibility of obtaining some additional subsidy. Therefore, priority should be given to smaller and medium sized companies.

We have not touched on the more fundamental question of whether or not the programme should be abandoned completely. The rather descriptive character of this paper does not allow for such a wide ranging conclusion. Still economic conditions have clearly changed rather profoundly since the days when this policy was designed. Up to the late sixties there was sufficient evidence of the fact that, structurally, industrial exports from Third World countries lagged behind. However, during the seventies, conditions changed drastically. Nowadays, a major problem for industrialized countries is how to cope with rapidly increasing industrial imports from Third World countries in a period of serious structural unemployment. From trade promoting the mood has changed in favour of trade protection. The imports concerned are originating from a relatively limited number of rapidly industrializing Third World countries, while internationally operating western productive and/or trading companies have a major stake in this trade.

It would be wishful thinking to suppose that the increased pressure for protectionism can be arrested by additional re-adjustment assistance from the development cooperation budget, because imports from Third World countries constitute one element only of the actual and future unemployment problems of industrialized countries. I could go a step further. Under actual conditions a re-adjustment-cum-development policy as implemented by the Dutch Government is doomed to loss of credibility.

However, the majority of the Third World countries is still facing the same kind of problems in terms of industrialization, technology, access to foreign markets, etc., that gave cause to introduction of a restructuring cum development policy in industrialized countries. Hence, we propose a rather drastic change in emphasis within this policy.

Instead of primarily concentrating on restructuring plans of industry in industrialized countries and then looking for the development dimension, the Ministry for Development Cooperation should primarily endorse industrialization-cum-export initiatives by firms in Third World countries (the F.M.O. being the most suitable institution). In addition to determining priorities between Third World countries, priorities can also be decided upon sectorwise. Through an institution like NEHEM and through the appropriate sectoral organisations, Dutch firms who want to cooperate directly in the expansion of productive and export capacities of Third World countries can be approached. This will probably involve restructuring the respective Dutch firms as well. Since the benefit of this restructuring directly accrues to Third World countries, the Development Cooperation Ministry can also co-finance the Dutch restructuring part.

To present worked-out details in this paper would be going too far. I am convinced however that such a change in emphasis might also be more acceptable politically particularly vis-à-vis the trade unions.
Abstract: Jute is grown by millions of farmers all over Bangladesh. It is the primary industry of the country, employing more than half of the labour force. Jute manufactures together account for about three quarters of the total foreign exchange earnings of the country. Both cultivation and manufacturing of jute and its products in Bangladesh suffer from low productivity. The importance of improving productivity by removing the sources of inefficiency cannot be over emphasised. Various deficiencies in technical, financial, managerial and policy areas have now been identified within the existing policy approach based on an essentially dependent capitalist tradition.

In the author's view the first pre-requisite for solving these and other problems that beset the jute sector of Bangladesh is to have the basic policy right. The purpose of this paper is therefore to raise some fundamental issues in the jute policy which need resolving if an effective and purposeful policy is to be evolved.

POUR UNE RÉORIENTATION DE LA POLITIQUE DU JUTE AU BANGLADESH

Résumé: Le jute est cultivé par des millions de paysans au Bangladesh. Il fournit la base de la principale industrie du pays. Il occupe plus de la moitié de la main d'œuvre du pays, et les produits qui en dérivent représentent environ les trois quarts des recettes en devises du Bangladesh.

Sa culture et sa transformation industrielle souffrent d'une basse productivité, et on ne saurait trop insister sur l'importance d'un accroissement de la productivité. Les causes d'inefficacité, ont été identifiées dans les domaines des techniques et des finances comme en ce qui concerne la gestion et l'orientation générale, mais dans les limites de la tradition du capitalisme dépendant. La condition préalable à toute amélioration réelle est, selon l'auteur, la formulation d'une politique du jute correcte. Cet article soulève quelques-unes des problèmes fondamentaux qu'il importe de résoudre à cet effet.
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REORIENTING JUTE POLICY IN BANGLADESH

I. INTRODUCTION

That both cultivation of jute and manufacturing of jute products in Bangladesh suffer from low productivity is well known. And the importance of improving productivity by removing the sources of inefficiency cannot be overemphasized. And it may be noted that various deficiencies in technical, financial, managerial and policy areas have now been identified within the existing policy approach based on an essentially dependent capitalist tradition. But in my view the first pre-requisite for solving this and other problems that beset the jute sector of Bangladesh is to have the basic jute policy right. And my purpose in this paper is to raise some fundamental issues in her jute policy which need resolution if an effective and purposeful jute policy is to be evolved.

II. DISTRIBUTION OF GAINS FROM JUTE TRADE

The crucial theme in the jute policy is, in my view, the distribution of gains from jute trade, which has both national and international aspects. Jute is a so-called cash crop. It earns cash for its growers and foreign exchange for the country. Virtually the whole of the crop is marketed by the growers; and all but a small proportion of it is exported to foreign countries in either raw or manufactured form. But there is a long chain of intermediaries, local and foreign, through whose hands jute has to pass before it can reach the final consumers. Two crucial focal points in our jute policy are therefore the proportion of the price paid by the final consumer in the importing country that accrues to Bangladesh and the proportion that accrues to the jute grower. The former has implications relating to equity in the external trade of Bangladesh in jute, and the latter will show the plight of the jute grower, without whose toil and sweat there can be no jute to trade, in the game of benefit distribution.

Export Prices

We concentrate on Bangladesh's trade with industrial countries. Not only that the bulk of her jute exports go to these countries, but her trade with these countries is also inequitous.

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1/ It may be noted that jute is grown by millions of farmers all over Bangladesh, jute manufacturing is the premier industry of the country employing more than half of the labour force engaged in the large scale industrial enterprises and exports of raw jute and jute manufactures together account for about three quarters of the total foreign exchange earnings of the country; and that exports from Bangladesh account for virtually all the world raw jute exports and about one third of the total world export of jute manufactures.
Information on the final consumer price in the industrial countries is simply not available. One recent study has shown that, in recent years, the c.i.f. (London) price of raw jute has been 14-20 per cent higher than the f.o.b. (Bangladesh) price and that the (New York) spot price of primary backing has been some 32 per cent higher than its f.o.b. (Bangladesh) price. Since both raw jute and jute manufactures are mostly transported by foreign shipping liners, these margins are largely appropriated by the foreign intermediaries. The final consumer prices are surely much higher because of the further processing involved in the consuming countries not only in the case of raw jute but also in the case of jute manufactures; and of course there are, in addition, trade and distribution margins. Hence, it can be argued that the final consumer prices are higher than the export prices received by Bangladesh by huge margins. Again, the same study has shown that the terms of trade of raw jute exports from Bangladesh to the industrial countries in relation to imports from these countries has been secularly declining - rather sharply in recent years, and that of jute manufactures has been declining since the early 1970's. All this shows that Bangladesh receives an unfair and declining share of the real gains from the jute trade.

The Grower's Price

Now what about the jute grower who is usually a small or marginal farmer? Official statistics suggest that, in recent years, the jute growers have received on an average about 70 per cent of the export prices of raw jute and about 50 per cent of the export prices of jute manufactures. But the official statistics, on which these calculations are based, are likely to overstate the prices received by the growers, particularly when they receive less than the prescribed prices, because the political and administrative expediencies tend to prevent violations of the prescribed prices getting officially reported. Moreover, exploitation is also perpetrated on the growers by the intermediaries through supply of credit to them to be repaid in terms of jute at predetermined low rates and payment of less than the face values shown in receipts which are made out to reflect the statutory minimum prices. The small jute growers, who have very little holding capacity and need cash badly to tide over bad days or to meet some unavoidable social obligation such as the marriage of a son or a daughter, cannot but allow themselves to be subjected to such exploitation. Their receipts as percentage of the realised export prices of raw jute or jute manufactures will, therefore, be in reality smaller than the above figures. And, of the final consumer prices, it is a very small proportion that they receive.

1/ Ahmad, Q.K. et. al., World Trade in a Primary Commodity: The case of Jute, (Nyon: Third World Forum, 1979); occasional paper No. 7; available from IFDA.

III. LESSONS FROM POLICIES PURSUED

Indeed, both the grower's price and export prices of raw jute and jute manufactures have always featured in policy formulation in one form or another.

In so far as the grower's price is concerned, the practice of fixing statutory minimum price of jute every year at the grower's level in order to ensure an officially perceived fair price for the grower was introduced in 1949, and it has generally remained in force ever since. In theory, this is fixed on the basis of evaluation of the demand and supply conditions, although in practice other expediencies including political and administrative considerations usually favouring vested interest pressure groups at the expense of the small unorganized and powerless jute growers scattered all over the country, are known to have worked more prominently at times. In any case, the fixation of the minimum price is carried out in an essentially ad hoc manner in the absence of an appropriate analytical framework and detailed data. But, more important thing to note is that the implementation of these prices have never been successful because of the failure of the government to institute an effective monitoring system and to create adequate facilities for buying up excess supplies forthcoming at the prescribed prices. As a result the prices received by the growers have always depended essentially on the prevailing market conditions despite the existence of the statutory minimum prices. One may note in this context that the growers are known to have received as low a price as Taka 50 or so per maund of jute in 1979, in spite of the fact that the statutory minimum price was Taka 115 per maund.

Regarding export of raw jute, Bangladesh has a virtual monopoly in it; and a large part of the raw jute export trade is in private hands. The government of Bangladesh tries to regulate the export prices by fixing a minimum price (MEP) and requiring that shipment can take place only after sales have been registered with the Bangladesh Bank and the Banks's approval secured. But the MEP is not fixed by the government unilaterally. It is based in part on the Indicative Price (IP) suggested by the FAO Inter-governmental Group on Jute, Kenaf and Allied Fibres. The group has representations from producing (including Bangladesh) and consuming countries; and the factors that are taken into consideration in fixing the IP include a just return to the exporters, fair prices to the consumers, competitiveness of jute with synthetics and price stability. But, in spite of these national and international attempts at ensuring just return to Bangladesh from raw jute export the terms of the trade of raw jute from Bangladesh to industrial countries, as noted earlier, has been secularly declining and rather steeply in recent years.

Regarding export of jute manufactures, the spectre of threat from synthetic substitutes has since mid-1960's kept any possible vigorous attempt at securing better terms under clouded conditions at best. Endeavours have been concentrated on negotiating reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Regarding tariff, substantial reduction, even complete withdrawal, has been secured. But very little success has been achieved on non-tariff front; and such barriers in the forms of quotas, product restrictions, control of shipping space, the process of trade itself etc. have continued to pose formidable obstacles so that not only that export of jute manufactures to the industrial countries has
not expanded but also these exports have been becoming worthless in terms of command over imports from these countries.

Where does it all leave us? The conventional wisdom is that a primary commodity is vulnerable since its income elasticity of demand is lower compared to manufactured goods. In this formulation, it is therefore natural that raw jute should face a secular decline in its terms of trade in relation to manufactured imports from industrial countries. But what about jute manufactures? Why should jute manufactures face vulnerability? The explanation has to be sought essentially in the inequitable world trade and economic power structure. Industrial countries have continued to support their jute mills suffering from serious cost disadvantages vis-a-vis imports from Third World countries and also facilitate the growth of synthetic substitutes by resorting to barriers of different kinds to imports of jute manufactures from the Third World countries. It is clearly indicated, therefore, that processing of jute along traditional lines for export cannot provide the escape from the economic vulnerability of jute in world market in the present inequitable trading arrangement.

IV. SUGGESTED REORIENTATION OF POLICY

It therefore seems to emerge clearly that Bangladesh's jute policy needs fundamental realignment in order that national interests are best served. The starting point in that direction is to recognize that jute cannot be looked at, as has hitherto been done, in isolation from other sectors, simply as a foreign exchange earner. Foreign exchange has an important role to play in development; but the process of acquiring it has costs associated with it; and the benefit of foreign exchange in terms of contribution to national development can be properly assessed only if these costs are correctly evaluated. And that can be done only in the context of a self-reliant development strategy.

One implication of this approach is that the jute sector has to be seen as an integral part of the national economy having linkages with other sectors so that the performance of the sector should be judged and its future planned not only in terms of its foreign exchange earnings but, more importantly, also in terms of the employment that it generates and the impact on the national development that it has directly and through linkages with other sectors. When the totality is thus taken into account, it may be found that a ruthless pursuit of foreign exchange earnings from export of jute, raw or manufactured, need not be the only, even the main, focus of the jute policy. A clear view will also emerge as to the level of production that can be meaningfully sustained in the sector.

It is however recognised, in view of the present low base, that consumption of jute goods in Bangladesh cannot expand significantly in the near future. Hence, the sector will have to continue to be focused on international markets. But a self-reliant strategy will imply that vigorous attempts are made to develop new products and that efforts are intensified to secure better terms of exchange. These are likely to be more successful through collective efforts of jute producing countries. Indeed, collective self-reliance among producing countries is a logical extension of a self-reliant approach to development. Efforts in that direction are therefore strongly advocated.
In a self-reliant approach it is crucially important that all groups of actors get their legitimate shares of the gains. In this context, efforts should be intensified towards ensuring fair returns to the jute growers, taking guidance from careful analysis of why attempts in that direction have not met with much success in the past. But it should be recognized that while it may be possible to do bits through some fiscal or administrative means or the other, it seems that unless the jute growers are themselves organized for collective action they may continue to remain deprived of their legitimate returns in the present unequal social structure in the country. This conclusion is indicated by a self-reliant approach to development.

It should be noted that only the broad outlines of the suggested approach have been given above. But once the basic choice is made, details can be worked out fairly easily.

V. KNOWLEDGE GAPS: A POST-SCRIPT

It should be noted that jute policy making is seriously handicapped because of certain knowledge gaps relating to production and distribution of jute and jute goods as well as of synthetic substitutes. Some of them are internal in Bangladesh which include internal marketing of jute, sharing of benefits by various intermediaries, socio-economic and technological linkages between jute and other sectors of the economy. Others are in industrial countries, which include distribution mechanism and final consumer prices of jute goods and their disaggregation in those countries, and operation of synthetic substitutes-making petro-chemical complexes and their marketing and commercial linkages. Studies should be undertaken to fill these gaps to facilitate effective policy formulation.

It may also be mentioned here that missions from international agencies and consultants engaged by bi-lateral donors have been regularly coming to Bangladesh to study the jute sector. Many reports have been produced by such missions and consultants covering very much the same ground, using very much the same data, and making very much the same sorts of recommendations. In many cases such reports are of little relevance except that perhaps yet another dose of foreign aid comes as a result of yet another report, thereby further increasing the country's foreign dependence. And the jute sector has continued its downward slide nonetheless.

I would like to suggest that if the donors are genuinely interested to help the jute sector their research efforts should instead concentrate on (a) how non-tariff barriers have been preventing expansion of export of jute goods to industrial countries, how the long run interests of the world jute economy are damaged in the process, and how such barriers can be removed as quickly as possible; (b) distribution mechanism and final consumer prices of jute goods and their disaggregation in the consuming industrial countries so that the extent of inequity in the distribution of gains from jute trade is known and can be used in negotiations relating to trade restructuring; (c) all aspects of production and distribution of synthetic substitutes so as to generate a solid basis for jute policy making vis-a-vis synthetic competition; etc.
Abstract: An outline of the conceptual framework and modalities of a programme of research and reflection on alternative development strategies for Africa. The research will analyse the present crisis of the world system, examine different manifestations of that crisis in Africa, assess prospects for industrialization and mining in Africa, work out an approach to a people-based agricultural strategy, formulate principles for collective African (and Afro-Arab) self-reliance, and study the required political mechanisms.

STRATEGIES POUR LE FUTUR DE L'AFRIQUE

Résuè: Esquisse du cadre conceptuel et des modalités d'un programme de recherche et de réflexion pour un autre développement en Afrique. La recherche se propose d'analyser la crise du système mondial, d'examiner l'impact de la crise sur l'Afrique, d'évaluer les perspectives de l'industrialisation du continent, de définir une stratégie de développement agricole basée sur les besoins des masses, de formuler les principes d'application de l'autonomie collective africaine et afro-arabe, et d'étudier les mécanismes politiques nécessaires. (Le texte français de cette note peut être obtenu en écrivant à Samir Amin, CODESRIA, B. P. 3304, Dakar, Sénégal).

ESTRATEGIAS PARA EL FUTURO DE AFRICA

Resumen: El informe es un esbozo del marco conceptual y de las modalidades de un programa de investigación y de reflexión sobre otro desarrollo en África. La investigación propone un análisis de la crisis del sistema mundial y el impacto de la crisis en África. Proporciona una evaluación de las perspectivas de la industrialización del continente, la definición de una estrategia de desarrollo agrícola basada en las necesidades de las masas, una formulación de los principios de aplicación de la autonomía colectiva africana y afro-arabe, y un estudio de los mecanismos políticos necesarios para su realización. (Se puede obtener el informe entero en francés del Sr. Samir Amin, CODESRIA, B. P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal).
This programme of research and reflection, which finds its place within the general framework of the UNITAR studies on the future (directed by Philippe de Seynes) was begun on June 1, 1980 at the programme headquarters at CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa) in Dakar.

The programme is seeking to stimulate systematic reflection on alternative choices of development strategies for Africa. To this end, it hopes to use the services of African researchers in the member Institutes and Centres of CODESRIA, along with those of individuals involved in development activities. It is the job of the Dakar team to organize participation, encounters, symposia and exchanges of views, and to make a synthesis of the results which will later be published and disseminated.

1. Our present era is marked by a global structural crisis of the world system which is calling into question the modalities of both the international division of labour and the national developments which have taken place within that context. The crisis, triggered in the late '60s by the international monetary crisis, continued to spread throughout the '70s, characterized by stagflation, unemployment and dwindling growth. It will probably persist through the '80s at least; it thus marks the end of a period which, between 1945 and 1970, was characterized by a considerable global upswing generated primarily by the attempts of Japan and Europe to "catch up" with the United States, thus bringing about a complementary growth in the South, which was supplying the raw materials for this development (energy, in particular). This complementary growth in the South, unequal on both the national and global levels, was the basis for the model of import substitution industrialisation.

The impact of the crisis on the three continents has varied from one region and one country to another, but it has always been telling. Asia and Africa - even more than Latin America - where capitalist development has not taken the course of an endogenous and self-reliant national economic construction and where the outward-looking, dependent and disarticulated nature of the economy was reinforced by the post-war boom, thus appear in the crisis as weak partners. This undoubtedly explains why the solution which they proposed of adopting a New International Economic Order as of 1974 was never brought into effect. This crisis will undoubtedly continue to spread to the detriment of the Third World, which contains the weakest links in the chain of the world system, particularly in Africa. Its evolution will be determined by the principal power relations between Japan and Europe on the one hand, and the United States on the other, as they have been modified over the last 30 years. The Soviet bloc countries, whatever their chronic economic problems may be, have
achieved a military par with the West and China - which itself has overcome its historical backwardness to assert itself as an autonomous nation. Even if they wished to become partially re-integrated into the international division of labour, they would be able to negotiate the terms and limit the possible negative consequences of their re-entry. This, Africa cannot do.

The shifting of the growing burden of the crisis onto the shoulders of the Third World thus necessitates a search for alternative strategies. The current political impasses and popular revolt will undoubtedly make these alternatives a burning, practical issue.

2. The crisis in the economic system has naturally shaken the foundations of the "development theory".

As recently as fifteen years ago, some people imagined that they knew the "recipe" for a "modernisation-development" strategy. This belief, which today strikes us as naïve, in the virtues of modern technology in industry and agriculture, was then very widespread. The forms of administrative organisation and output techniques, the "patterns of living" (urbanisation) and consumption, the content and forms of education and training shared by capitalist and socialist industrialized countries alike appeared, by this very fact, to be universal. The arguments were conducted within a predetermined common problematic. Some advocated a more open policy towards the rest of the world (call on foreign capital), others wanted more systematic state intervention. None challenged the validity of participating in a wider international division of labour.

The economic crisis in the industrialized West has, during the seventies, cast some doubts on the relevance of the proposed model with all its variants. At the same time, the economic, social and political situation was deteriorating in the countries of the South: a marked increase in unemployment, poverty, famine etc..., "waste" by privileged elites, regional and local inequalities in development, chaotic ideological and political environment (local wars, bloodthirsty regimes, populist revolts etc...). The World Bank Report on the outlook for the eighties paints a very gloomy picture of the Third World generally and of Africa in particular: impoverishment of peoples and weakening of nations. But in the light of political developments, it should come as no surprise that the need for a popular national development which is delinked and freed at least partially from the effects of the crisis has become a pressing issue.

It is patently clear now that there is no such thing as a satisfactory "recipe" for development. Besides, in the seventies, general dissatisfaction surfaced in various forms in the realm of ideas, opinions and theories as well in social and political practice. A few examples may be mentioned:

(a) The efforts to call attention to the neglected ecological effects of development: since the Stockholm Environment Conference and the creation of the Club of Rome, it is no longer possible to continue to ignore such important questions as the possible exhaustion of energy resources in particular, and the limited availability of farm land and water, although some neo-Malthusian
tendencies, clearly inspired by certain West-centred groups and organisations, have been rightfully rejected by many Third World governments and intellectuals and a number of conclusions and recommendations (like "zero growth") even more utterly rejected.

(b) The efforts made to reflect on certain priorities and means of development, in particular on the subject of employment ("World Employment Programme"), technology ("soft", "intermediary", the relationship between science-technology and dependency), prospects for food and agriculture (famine in the Sahel, priority to basic needs and to foodcrops in particular, the "food weapon" theme, agribusiness policies etc...). A number of organisations, in particular those working either within a national institutional framework or within the United Nations system, have produced an abundant literature in these various fields: studies and publications by the World Bank, the I.L.O., the F.A.O. for international conferences on Science and Technology, not forgetting the American, European and Japanese centres of futurology. The participation of Third World reflection centres in these debates is rather insignificant (with the honourable exception of the Bariloche Foundation), but what is more serious, the underlying effort to bolster up the intellectual infrastructure necessary for this participation is lagging very far behind.

(c) The practical efforts made by Third World countries to alter the international order: from the rise in oil prices in 1973 to the last two UNCTAD Conferences (Nairobi and Manila) with the adoption of the Charter for a New International Economic Order and the North-South Dialogue in between, these efforts have been the hallmark of the seventies. The results are generally known to be mediocre. The rise in oil prices excepted, no substantial result has been achieved with regard to the prices of raw materials, the reform of the international monetary system, foreign indebtedness, transfer of technology, the law of the sea, etc... but here again, all analytical work on the international order and its prospects as well as its crises have been carried out almost exclusively by the centres of reflection in the North.

(d) The failure of the world system to find its own equilibrium has created a trend in some Third World countries of thinking in terms of more self-reliant national development. However, the fact of proclaiming that kind of development will remain precarious as long as there are no concrete policy proposals arising from theory and practice taking into consideration the various aspects of the problems mentioned earlier (what technology? what forms of and limits to participation in the international division of labour? etc...). In these areas practically all the theoretical work has been either too abstract or too general. Concrete experiments, which are embryonic and partial, deserve to be given closer scrutiny than they have until now.

(e) The theme of "collective autonomy", intended to make up for the shortcomings of self-reliant national development on the one hand and to counteract resistance by the international order on the other, is mere rhetoric. The U.N. conferences (TCDC, ECDC...) and resolutions passed by Non-aligned countries and the Group of 77, although positive, cannot by themselves remedy the inadequacy of the comprehensive economic and political analysis, the prospects envisaged or concrete studies carried out (well-defined sectorial cooperation). Even
here, the capability to analyse these problems and make proposals appears to be surprisingly weak within the Third World.

3. "Futurology", which is becoming more and more fashionable, is the most visible symptom of this crisis. In the past twenty-five years, "surveys of the future" were more often confined to projections of past and present trends leading to "optimistic" and facile conclusions.

Current studies on the future are different, and seem to fall within one of the three following groups of methods:

(a) The tendency to formulate complex "models" integrating the whole world either as a unit or broken down into representative sub-regions, and to include a type of "new" variable (ecology, natural resources). There are about five or six famous models in existence, all, with the exception of the Bariloche model, produced by researchers in the North. The complex nature of these models has probably reduced their public impact even though their "conclusions" have been popularised by the mass media. This technical complexity does not make up for the poverty of the assumptions: by force of circumstances, because it is necessary to "quantify", the "unknown" options are avoided (technology etc...).

(b) The new trend of replacing quantified models by more qualitative "scenarios" is an attempt to provide an answer to the criticism levelled against them. Scenarios were invented for politico-military reasons of strategy introducing chains of possible action and reaction based on an initial situation and a first "action". The main feature of an "economic" scenario is a time series interacting in a less explicit way. They tend rather to describe a consistent arrival point and the moving trends necessary to reach that point.

(c) Taking it one step further, and on the basis of an ideological critique of the procedures and language of futurology, there is a propensity to emphasize the analysis of the contradictions of the present world and their immediate alternative political solutions which in turn determine the further evolution of the systems. These critical analyses are based on the assumption that all present socio-economic systems are subjected to strong internal pressure which make it impossible to predict whether they will last in their present forms. In the West, the trend towards continued increased state intervention in favour of the "Welfare State" to ensure income growth and full employment is threatened by ecological problems, world crises and other changes that could occur in the world. This threat has stoked up the flames of "neo-liberalism" which has taken hold in every field of intellectual activity (economic management, politics, vision of society) as has occurred in actual political development of many countries. The trends in the Third World are contradictory, and to a certain extent accentuate the differentiation within this group of more than 100 countries. Sometimes, with or without "economic liberalisation", the ruling regimes seem to opt for greater integration in the strategies of multinational corporations and at times there are populist type explosions of varying intensity (Iran, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Ghana...). These are all indications of the prevailing malaise. There has thus been a recrudescence of efforts to open up new avenues which are popular, national and self-reliant. An analysis of all these contradictory trends would be necessary,
transcending the conventional styles of "futurist economics" or political science, to ensure a more serious interpretation of the ideological aspects of various movements and the implicit and explicit strategies of the existing social forces.

II - Research Programme envisaged:

1. Our programme falls within the global framework of the questions raised in the preceding section. It is likewise situated within the perspective of a methodological option which, as described in paragraph 13c, is based on an analysis of the contradictions in the system as it now operates. In other words, the programme is fundamentally concerned with making a detailed assessment of the crises of the '70s, experiments in economic policy, new and positive experiences, however embryonic, fragile and controvertible they may be, and the confrontation between developments and strategies. It is to this work, which unfortunately has hitherto been largely unexplored, particularly in Africa, that the bulk of activities in the immediate phase of programme development will probably be devoted.

2. First launched in 1977, the programme remained in a relatively long preparatory stage until June 1, 1980. A Conference held in July, 1977, in Dakar, and attended by close to a hundred African researchers and individuals involved in development activities, as well as a number of foreign guests, defined the programme's objectives and guiding principles. Between August 1977 and May 1980, two researchers made contributions: a) in the area of the political economy of a few ores which were important for Africa (bauxite, copper and uranium); the results of this study were the subject of a symposium held in Addis Ababa in August, 1979, and b) in the area of new rural development strategies in which priority was given to food production. This work is currently being pursued in the area of iron ore and the iron and steel industry in Africa, on the one hand (expected to be completed in November, 1980), and with the perspective of holding a symposium on Agriculture in the Sahelian region on the other (symposium planned for fall, 1980). */

3. With the installation of the full team as of June 1, 1980, the programme entered a new phase. Consequently, the programme is being developed at a time when Africa's needs are most crying.

In fact, the criticism which we developed in the '60s and '70s of concepts vindicating externally-oriented development began to gain popularity in the mid-'70s when the crisis effectively thwarted the pursuit of conventional strategies. It was thus that the African economic summit in Lagos (April, 1980) adopted the concepts of an endogenous development which was self-reliant on both the national and continent-wide levels, borrowing from the criticism of

*/ A catalogue of results of the work carried out between 1977 and May, 1980 is available and may be obtained from the programme's administrative secretary.
of externally-oriented development down to the very language it used. There is a chance, then, that the implementation of "another development" will find its way onto the agendas for certain government actions in the years to come. Unfortunately, no preparations have been made for this eventuality, and under these circumstances the promotion of "self-reliant development", "delinking" and "South-South cooperation" is in danger of becoming a hollow rhetoric if systematic reflection is not initiated to give it tangible meaning. Yet this is far from being the case: to date, there is no African strategy which meets the challenges of our time, even on paper. In fact, the strategy for the 3rd development decade in Africa is nothing more than a blueprint for an outward-looking strategy which vainly perpetuates the tendencies of the '60s, despite the accompanying texts which make reference to the language of self-reliant development - at once thus politically naïve, contradictory and futile. In seeking to concretize the ways and means of a national and popular development, our organisation has thus assumed considerable responsibility.

4. For the coming (two-year) period, the programme has set as its target concomitantly to pursue an assessment of the crisis in Africa in the '70s and the development of alternative policies.

(a) While the outward-looking development models which were put into practice during the '50s and '60s are relatively familiar, the "transition into crisis" and the "reactions to it" during the '70s are considerably less so.

An analysis of the specific and concrete characteristics of the crisis in the various African countries is thus called for. In the light of the specific nature of African social formations and the different forms taken by their integration into the international division of labour, the shifting of the weight of the crisis onto the African countries, especially vulnerable on all levels due precisely to the lack of a self-reliant historical development, has already manifested itself through the various phenomena of a breakdown and disintegration visible on the financial, political and national levels, and in the balance of payments.

We might now a priori consider four types of crisis and evolution: (i) that of the countries which did not experience significant growth during the '60s and for which the crisis means only the aggravation of a stagnation which was already present - about twenty African countries, (ii) that of the countries which have experienced a strong growth based on petroleum and mineral exploitation. Some have seen a modification in the conditions of their growth resulting from a fall-off in foreign demand. Others (such as the petroleum countries) even seem to be benefiting from the crisis. The question is whether they have arrived at an actual stage in an ongoing process or are simply heading into an impasse. Within OPEC, the African countries on the one hand and the Arab group on the other should be studied from this particular angle; (iii) that of the countries which have experienced a strong growth based on export agriculture and light import substitution industry, but where the machinery of growth seems to have broken down, and lastly (iv) that of the countries which have tried to react to the crisis by introducing delinkage and embarking upon a national and popular development.
Furthermore, and independently of these distinctions, it would seem that in Africa growth has dropped off more sharply than elsewhere (particularly Latin America), and that the crisis has manifested itself even at very low levels of per capita income, often three times lower than those of other countries and regions which appear to have more successfully withstood the shock. Perhaps this weakness, which may be the result of the failings of the state structure, has to be countered by "regional groupings" which already have their champions, but whose role and prospects are still to be examined.

Lastly, with regard to the assessment of the crisis and the reactions which it has drawn, particular attention will be given to the region of Southern Africa, where the South African challenge has influenced current developments.

(b) An examination of industrialisation strategies and policies and the barriers to which they have led during the '70s, as well as the reactions to those barriers, will permit a more thoroughgoing analysis of the specific features of the crisis in Africa, and make it possible to determine the features of alternative options.

We are still no more than superficially acquainted with the three families of industrialisation practices in Africa, to wit: (i) import substitution, carried out by local forces which are generally weaker here than elsewhere, and therefore increasingly determined by the domination of foreign capital, (ii) the mining model, long a preserve of the foreign companies and an extension of the metropolitan industries, and (iii) experiments in independent national industrial development.

Yet these three models were overtaken by the crisis during '70s, a crisis whose solution is still a source of contention. Some advocate the implantation of light foreign export industries, based on cheap labour (yet how competitive is African when compared with other Third World regions in this area?), and others favour the dislocation of industries such as iron and steel and the petrochemical industries, rechanneling mining or petroleum revenues which are presently "recycled" for other purposes. The mining model, which far from being archaic, is gradually being resuscitated as Europe becomes dependent on foreign sources for its ores, seems to be undergoing a crisis owing to a slackening of the demand. It is a crisis to which the transnationals seem to be answering with specific strategies for the unification of the mining sector, which call into question the reforms brought about within the context of nationalisation in the '60s. As for experiments in independent national development, their inherent contradictions (state accumulation and massive technological importation) which are recognizable in the agricultural crisis and the foreign debt, should be subjected to closer scrutiny.

An assessment of the contradictory developments of the '70s might provide a firmer foundation for a study of the two following general questions:

(i) What are the prospects for the development of the different branches of African industry within the various scenarios possible of the international division of labour: alternative energy choices, mining and processing of ores, labour-intensive light industries (including the problems of industrial free zones, etc.).
What is the scope and meaning of the political economy of mining revenues? What are the relations which, beyond the direct conditions of supply and demand which determine prices, relate mining revenues to the international division of labour? How can such revenues be used for development?

By definition, these critical appreciations of developments which are either continuing or in crisis, undoubtedly invite an examination of a positive alternative which would consist of envisaging a strategy of industrialization at the service of a priority agricultural development. Given the concrete conditions in Africa, what would such a choice mean in terms of priority sectors of industrial production, global policies (relative prices, financing, salaries and agricultural prices, etc...) and adapted socio-economic forms (large and small units, central and decentralized management, technological choices, etc...)?

(c) The formulation of a systematic problematic for a development which, with the aim of satisfying the needs of the popular masses, would be agriculturally-based.

The three principal modalities of the colonial exploitation of Africa's agricultural and rural potentials are doubtless relatively familiar: (i) the colonial trade economy, predominant in West Africa, based on the insertion of a small-scale peasant production into world trade, (ii) the plantation economy of the large, concessionary companies of Central Africa and (iii) the "labour reserve" economy of Southern Africa. It is important, however, to realize that the modalities of withdrawal of a surplus of these forms, now archaic, were struck by the crisis well before the '70s; the crisis in these systems in fact came about concomitantly with the rise of the national liberation movements of the '50s. This may in fact explain the mediocre performances of African agriculture in the '60s.

On the other hand, our knowledge of the recent differentiations which have arisen during the '70s is only scanty. Indeed, the forms taken by these developments are still only in their first stirrings: the green revolution and kulakisation, the activities of agribusiness, to name only the most obvious, as the impact of strategies recommended by outside forces (the World Bank campaign for "basic needs", for example). We are still largely unacquainted with the popular policies practiced in certain countries: agrarian reforms, cooperatives, etc...

There are thus no easy answers to the question of finding the alternative options which exist on the technical (irrigation, rain-fed crops, intensification, mechanisation, etc...) and social levels (cooperatives, kulakisation, agribusiness, etc...), if food self-sufficiency for the entire African and Afro-Arab group is to be obtained. A way to reconcile the demands of economic policy (distribution of revenues, fiscal policies, price and salary policies, financing policies, delinking of local systems in relation to the pressures of international competition, etc.) with priority given to food production must be found. Consequently, we would like to go beyond the method which all too often reduces this priority to a simple question of choosing "food production projects" without considering the macro-economic policy demands which such a choice entails (method recommended by the World Bank, for example).
(d) The formulation of the major principles of a collective African autonomy. The criticism of the conventional forms of integration (common markets, etc...) the results of which are either mediocre or negative (accentuated unequal development, etc...) should induce their replacement with viable projects within the perspective of the reinforcement of a national and collective self-reliant development, and thus, of a selective delinking. With a critical examination of current developments in South-South cooperation (OPEC fund, Afro-Arab cooperation, specific bilateral agreements, etc...) the principles recommended could be made more concrete. Designed in fact to be a complement to what is commonly known as "North-South cooperation", South-South cooperation projects should be subjected to a thorough and critical study. Furthermore this cooperation, which could be reanimated within the perspective of a greater collective autonomy, should be able to face up not only to the long-term problems, but to those arising in the immediate transition period as well. Perhaps the usual policies, which generally aggravate the situation (as witnessed by interventions of the I.M.F.), could be replaced by other short-term policies, both on the national level, and within the African and Afro-Arab groups.

(e) A study of the workings of political life in Africa and the Arab World, from the point of view in particular of the problematic of the State, the Nation, ethnic groups and ideologies. The aim of this study, which should depart from the methods used in the study of conventional politicology, is to understand how the economic choices considered are translated into political reality. For each of these lines of development envisaged, specific programmes and time-tables will be drawn up by the Dakar centre and the project's main collaborators from the CODESRIA network. Publications will be envisaged within these detailed plans of action.

III - Modalities of operation and implementation of the programme

1. A research programme such as this one cannot be carried out exclusively by a small group of people. The Dakar centre must therefore engage the skills available across the continent in the fifty or so institutes and centres associated within CODESRIA. Any criticisms, comments and suggestions they may have with regard to the proposals made in this text are therefore welcome, in addition, the Dakar group is closely cooperating with other CODESRIA programmes, organized into "networks": industrialisation and technology in Africa, rural development and class formation, state and development, population and migration, agribusiness.

The African programme, which is an integral part of the whole range of UNITAR's programmes of studies on the Future, is pooling its efforts with the programme for Asia which was inaugurated at the March, 1980 conference organized in New Delhi and will be setting up similar working relations with an impending programme for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Other existing programmes have already demanded close collaboration. Among them, we shall mention: a) the programme of the Arab League and IDCAS (Industrial Development Centre for Arab States), "Arab industrial development
perspectives for the year 2000” and another concerning the prospects for Afro-Arab cooperation; b) the programmes of four regional U.N.U. (United Nations University) networks dealing with alternative development models (Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Arab world), along with certain other U.N.U. programmes; c) the UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development) programme of study of food systems and its programme on women’s role and place in development in Africa. Additional collaboration is planned with ENDA (Environment and Development in Africa) etc... In addition, relations of cooperation will be set up with research groups which, either worldwide or on the scale of the developed world in the East and West, are working on an analysis of the crisis and future perspectives. Collaboration with various programmes which have been envisaged, including one on the Mediterranean region, has been considered within this context.

Furthermore, during the 1977-1980 preparatory phase, the programme had already set up relations of cooperation with various bodies such as IFDA (International Foundation for Development Alternatives), U.N.U. (GPID-Goals, Processes, Indicators of Development - programme) IIEP (UNESCO Institute), NUFFIC (Netherlands Universities Foundation for International cooperation), etc... on the basis of which it received various financial contributions.

2. It is hoped that the combined results of this work will provide a useful contribution which will fit into the global efforts of the United Nations system aimed at working out a strategy based on the New International Economic Order, of the O.A.U. (Organisation of African Unity), which is responsible for the implementation of the programme adopted by the Lagos summit, and of the Arab League.

3. "Strategies for the Future of Africa" is a decentralized UNITAR programme whose independent budget is provided by the Swedish Agency SAREC (Swedish Agency for Research and Economic Cooperation). This budget provides the resources for operation of the Dakar centre (4 researchers, 1 administrative assistant, twice-yearly workshops, and the administrative and publishing expenses corresponding to these activities). CODESRIA houses the centre, and has responsibility for the execution of certain back-up services (typing, correspondence, etc...).

In addition to the financing of the central nucleus, as described above, the programme hopes to obtain financial support from various sources, in relation particularly to the programmes with which cooperation has been set up or is sought. These contributions may be allotted to occasional activities foreseen in the programme (symposia, workshops, publications etc...), to complementary services (detachment of personnel, experts' consultancy, etc...), or to the programme's overall financing.
WHAT'S YOUR PROBLEM?

I DON'T WISH TO INTERFERE BUT DO YOU REALISE THAT WORLD POPULATION IS GOING TO INCREASE BY NEARLY 50% IN TWENTY YEARS? WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT IT?

WHAT'S WRONG WITH PEOPLE? I LIKE PEOPLE.

WELL SO DO I, OF COURSE BUT YOU SEE THE WORLD'S RESOURCES CAN'T SUPPORT AN EVER-INCREASING POPULATION.

I SEE, SO IT'S A PROBLEM OF RESOURCES AS WELL AS PEOPLE?

SO THE ANSWER IS RESOURCE CONTROL AS WELL AS BIRTH CONTROL?

WELL THEN, I DON'T WANT TO INTERFERE BUT DO YOU REALISE THAT THE RICH 10% OF THE WORLD CONSUME ABOUT 90% OF THE RESOURCES? WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT THAT?

YES.

YE...ES.

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HUMAN RIGHTS: BASES FOR A NEW SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARD

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Abstract: The claims of many governments to be the guardians of human rights are no longer credible. A new system of promoting, protecting and safeguarding human rights is therefore proposed which would transcend the nation state, and which would base the duty to protect a life free from fear and free from want on the will and self-determination of people and their genuinely participatory organizations. The proposed system would also promote a different understanding of the international community, seeing it as a community made up of peoples, not of states. Seeking to complement existing governmental and intergovernmental safeguards of human rights and to coordinate them with extra-governmental activities, an international "central corporate body" - non-official in character - is proposed which would draw its strength from people's organizations, especially from participatory grassroots support, and from international public opinion.

DROITS DE L'HOMME: ÉLÉMENTS D'UN NOUVEAU SYSTÈME DE PROTECTION

Résumé: Il est évident que de nombreux gouvernements ne sont pas ou ne sont plus les garants des droits de l'homme. Un nouveau système de protection et de promotion de ces droits est proposé ici. Transcendant l'état-nation, il voit dans la volonté et l'auto-détermination des peuples et de leurs organisations authentiquement participatives la base de la protection d'une existence libérée de la crainte et du besoin.

Ce système contribuerait également à une meilleure compréhension de la communauté internationale, comme la communauté des peuples, et non des états. Il s'agit d'élargir le système gouvernemental et inter-gouvernemental de protection des droits de l'homme et de le coordonner avec les activités extra-gouvernementales. A cet effet, l'auteur propose un organisme central non-gouvernemental qui dériverait sa force des organisations populaires, notamment à la base, et de l'opinion publique internationale. Ses fonctions sont décrrites en détail.
1. This document embodies an attempt to offer, from the point of view of another development, a first step towards giving concrete form to the desire to institute a new system for guaranteeing and safeguarding human rights.

The system currently in operation is one of nation states. These co-exist in a world whose sharp political divisions accentuate the delays, limitations and inadequacies inherent in an apparatus of juridical safeguards which is a direct reflection of the present stage of evolution of international law. It is not uncommon for States to find themselves drawn by political contingency firstly into participating in, and actively influencing, the inception and formulation of conventions concerning human rights and later into failing to ratify them. Antagonisms between nations often lead to lengthy postponements of the coming into force of instruments which have already been drawn up, as happened with both human rights Pacts, or to obstacles being placed in the way of their effective operation, as occurred recently within the Organization of American States (OAS) through the refusal of funding for the International Court of Human Rights set up by the respective Convention. To this must be added that some of the established safeguarding mechanisms - whose intrinsic deficiencies it would take too long to expound in detail here - out of respect for the sovereignty of the signatory states, only begin to function after the resources of internal jurisdiction have been exhausted, and sometimes only in the case of those states which, besides having ratified the appropriate instruments, have accepted the binding jurisdiction of a particular body specified in the treaty or the admissibility of a particular litigant or legal recourse. All of this at a pace which bears no relation to the urgent need to give material or moral redress to the people or groups affected.

In a system of nation states, is it possible to achieve a balance between the state attribute of sovereignty and the international control of the obligations contracted by the States in the field of human rights? In a system of nation-states it is assumed as a matter of course that the representation of the people is ensured through the state apparatus and that their interests are effectively taken into account by their respective governments. The actual situation, however, is different. The gulf which in practice exists between the prosperous and the deprived nations is reproduced within the society of many countries and leads to a community of interests not between peoples as a whole but between central and peripheral élites, causing these to collaborate closely with one another. This is especially blatant at the present time in the peripheral states where the need for extraordinarily efficient forms of coercion to support the interests of the allied élites has led to a spate of intensely repressive military regimes and constant violation of human rights. In any system of nation-states whose composition reflects this imbalance it becomes more than difficult, then, to regard as genuine the claims of governments as guardians of human rights.
It has been said that in the inter-governmental system the negative element is not necessarily politicization but the fact that governments which have the legal obligation to respect human rights are often the most impotent violators of them and may be capable, for example, of condemning torture in a resolution adopted by consensus, as if many of them had nothing to do with the practice of it. But the attitude of the community of nations towards the offending governments is also motivated by the above-mentioned schism in the international world which determines hegemonies and favours the grouping of countries into large blocs. Thus the United Nations, working as a political body, has not yet managed to give a universal dimension to the bases upon which it has acted in specific situations. The line at which international action in defense of human rights begins to be necessary should be that which divides a mere isolated and circumstantial case of infringement, even a fairly extensive episode, perhaps even a recurrent one, from systematic, flagrant and massive violation of human rights. The logical consequence would seem to be that international action should not be taken in respect of episodes but of situations in which there is: systematic denial of the self-determination of peoples, the establishment of a system of "apartheid", the imposition of foreign military intervention, the introduction of a new form of fascism by military regimes, the initiation of wars of aggression, the open transgression of international law, or, in some cases, the endangering of international peace and security. In all these situations international action should be taken since internal domestic remedies are impossible and national "legality" is impotent.

In spite of its logic, it is inevitably against the background of a world which is politically split that one has to view this conclusion, which is far from being rigorously and universally applied owing to fears in some quarters that coherent and sustained international action might later lead to intervention in their own affairs, or to an inclination in other quarters to act only in accordance with the internal contingencies or strategic interest perceived in the zone in question.

The system for the defense of human rights outlined here is not based, therefore, on states but on peoples. It postulates the identification, within each of these, of all the social forces and movements which at the present time are fighting in the name of the people for human rights, so that they may shape the structure of the system through genuinely participative organizations. It next envisages world-wide co-ordination of all these organizations by a central body which should reflect the abnegation and solidarity of the work for human rights which is undertaken on an international level by non-official institutions of various kinds. It does not, of course, seek the previous demolition of the existing official system and it presents itself unprovided with juridical mechanisms for enforcement which, in fact, are not indispensable for the exercise of functions which imply a mandate from world public opinion and which tend, at the same time, to mobilize it. Its whole activity is presumed to rest upon the necessary nexus between development and human rights, seeing the latter as one and indivisible.
2. Another development, understood as an all-embracing dynamic in the lift of a society, already contains the conceptual basis upon which to erect the new system of defense. Since this concept sees the process of development springing from the very heart of each community, which thus assumes sovereignty in determining its own future, that sovereignty is exercised by all the men and women who make up that society and all vertical systems are rejected as possible sources of totalitarianism. By participating directly in decisions relating to their common destiny they favour a functional and spatial decentralization which considerably weakens what have until now been seen as the organs of central authority. It can cause no surprise, therefore, that thought about another development should consider real national societies too rich in values and aspirations for governments and institutions to be authorized fully to represent them.

The postulation of a sovereignty essentially residing in the whole community and the assertion that its exercise ought to extend beyond the forms of representation instituted within the framework of the nation state lead one to identify those societies in which another development ought to be elaborated as all those human communities in principle capable of freely undertaking the process, even if in practice they are not yet independent, sovereign communities. The representation which, in a new international order, may be achieved by each of these various types of communities, understood as autonomous social groupings, can only be based on their belonging to that order as juridical subjects endowed with various rights and capable of self-determination, besides being proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, is enshrined (and not by chance) in the Pacts on human rights, the inclusion of those societies in a more efficient apparatus for the protection of these rights should be a natural corollary. All this means placing our conception of the international community upon a different basis, that is, seeing it as a community made up of peoples, not of states.

This is not, indeed, a new idea, but it meshes naturally and logically with a tendency, which is gaining ground in modern juridical thought, to admit peoples as the subjects of international law, to associate them with juridical principles of universal validity and to recognize that they have inalienable rights. As is well known, the emergence of peoples as entities in international law manifests itself in the explosion of nationalities after the European revolutions of 1848, in the concern for minorities after the first World War and in the ferocious subjugation of European peoples by the Axis powers during the second. The principle of the self-determination of peoples is laid down in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and later in that of the United Nations. These give rise to the law of decolonization expressed in various instruments. The Pacts on Human Rights, in force since 1976, take on special importance in this respect in view of the material they specifically deal with, their recent data and their clear binding force.

The practice of the United Nations, when having recourse to the principle or right of self-determination, is to apply it to peoples occupied by foreign powers, to "dependent" peoples, that is to say, subjected to colonial domination, and to peoples who have sovereignty in theory, but who are governed by a racist minority. To this United Nations list should be added, notwithstanding the theoretical problems which their inclusion generates, peoples who
have sovereignty in theory but who are subjected to the oppression, exploitation or tyranny of a national privileged class or of governments imposed or maintained by force. All these peoples must come together to create a structure for the defense of human rights. And they should do so even if the concept of a people continues to be associated with that of the State to the advantage of the latter, even if it may be difficult to compel the State machinery to work in favour of the rights of its own people, even if the representation of peoples remains in the hands of the states, and even if international law protects the structures of states more than those of peoples (J.A. Salmon).

The concept of self-determination is applicable to decisions of diverse nature. The human rights Pacts, following the precedent of earlier instruments, apply it to the free determination of political status, the free pursuit of social, economic and cultural development and to the freedom to dispose of natural riches and resources.

It has been customary to doubt the advisability of inserting a clause on the self-determination of peoples in juridical texts concerned with individuals. The truth is that that insertion validates the intent and scope of the system of defense proposed here. That insertion is, of course, the clearest sign that respect for human dignity and an existence free from fear and want are considered bound up with the destiny of the community to which the individual belongs. It is organizations in which the community participates, then, rather than individuals, who must be in the front line of this defensive action. In the second place, the precept on self-determination links human rights with social aims beyond the scope of individuals, such as economic, social and cultural development. This link, already evident in the Charter of the United Nations, became ever more obvious in practice with the gathering momentum of decolonization. In the course of this process, real respect for human rights came to be conditional both on the width of the gulf which inadequate development opened between the rich and the poor within a nation, and on the extent of the inequality of development between one nation and another. But both these factors are unequivocally defined as the effects of the dependence of the poor nations on the rich nations. Therefore, the defense of human rights in the proposed system cannot progress in isolation from the anomalies in the objective social context in which infringement of these rights occurs. Nor can it be confined merely within the boundaries of each community but must assume an international dimension.

The wider view which is now taken of the defense of human rights is the expression of a society very different from that of two centuries ago in which the tradition of those rights was born. Nowadays there is a tendency for the line of demarcation between civil society and political state to disappear and for political life no longer to be seen as the means, and civil society as the end for which it works. The proposed defensive system, therefore, no longer sees the individual as a recluse, the natural man confined in his own cell with his private interests and whims, cut off from the rest of mankind. Liberty, equality and the other rights of men and citizens are perceived as a unity which is socially indivisible and only intellectually separable. The effect of this is to give a higher relative value to development and to promote economic, social and cultural rights to at least the same level of importance as civil and political rights.
This is the line of thinking which should govern the provisions for the defense of all these rights.

3. As we have already said, the proposed system transcends the framework of nation-states, rises above the juridical, technical and political limitations inherent in that framework and places the defense of human rights directly on the shoulders of the people, as a practical corollary to the link between rights and development.

Understood thus, the duty to protect a life free from fear (civil and political rights) and a life free from want (economic, social and cultural rights) devolves upon the will and self-determination of the community. Such protection entails, as a first step, exploring the depths of each national reality to discover in what manner and to what extent the infringement of human rights of any kind has its roots in the daily exploitation practised for the benefit of national and foreign minority interests, and to decide the most suitable method of reacting against that infringement. Recent history shows how the indiscriminate and persistent intimidation of the population, making them victims of fear, is precisely designed to favour the accumulation of capital, at the cost of the impoverishment of the majority, who are thus made victims of want. The new system must, as far as possible, direct its attack more against situations which violate human rights than against episodes. Infringements must be regarded not as the result of mere arbitrary acts of will (this would lead to a routine and hopeless battle) but as the expression and consequence of world desequilibrium, of structural anomalies in the national society in question and of aberrations and inadequacies in its development. Whatever immediate response to these violations may be decided upon must therefore be made without prejudice to recognition and recording of their value as indices of the conditions which must be changed in order to abolish or at least diminish the present massive infringement of human rights.

The proposed system does not entail denying the debt which the safeguarding of human rights owes to the official systems, universal or regional, which are responsible for their promotion and protection. The general organs of the United Nations as well as its specialized agencies, the institutions created by international organizations as well as those established by particular treaties on human rights, have since the end of the second World War, done admirable work in the establishment of norms concerned with human rights and in the promotion and protection of those rights. If much stress has hitherto been laid in this paper on the limitations and defects of the official system, it is essential also to pay tribute to its positive achievements, especially as regards the promulgation of the International Human Rights Charter, decolonization, the fight against racial discrimination, the protection of trade union freedom and many other fields. It would be senseless at the present moment to postulate the replacement of the inter-governmental system by one based on a representation other than that of nation states. The proposed system, then, does not seek to substitute the official system but to complement it and is not incompatible with it. Rather, its own structure, its methods, its activity and all the experience it may accumulate will be able to exert an influence on the apparatus of inter-governmental supervision, adapting it to new historical circumstances and favouring its reform.
The foundation stones of the inter-governmental system are the states, although in exceptional cases a particular organization may contain delegations from different sources, as is the case with the International Labour Organization (ILO), and even though there is a growing tendency for the members of certain corporate bodies to be designated on account of their personal qualities rather than their political affiliation. What foundation stones support the proposed system?

The answer must be given for both the national and the international levels. (a) Peoples form the basis of the system, which is fundamentally decentralized. For these purposes the system consists of all of them without exception.

There is no doubt that recognizing such a broad representation produces situations of considerable complexity.

We are dealing, of course, with an extremely heterogenous group, as the inclusion of all the categories of peoples already defined begins to make clear. On the political plane the gamut extends from peoples who are still subjugated to those which have been independent for centuries, passing through those which enjoy a relatively long standing formal independence and relatively liberal patterns of social life and through the vast range of those which display a false independence or where various privileges are granted, in practice or by law, to small groups of the population. On the plane of economic and social structure and the degree and type of development, the agrarian peasant societies lie at one extreme and at the other lie the societies which are highly or moderately urbanized and completely or partially industrialized. The cultural plane includes peoples of ancient, primal cultures and peoples whose culture has its origins in a recent historical period. All this produces, as happens with possible alternative forms of development, different points of departure in their manner of regarding human rights and of protecting them against all the likewise diverse forms which the violation of them can take.

This multiplicity of individual viewpoints can, in the first place, reopen the argument about whether it is possible to go on considering universally valid a catalogue of human rights which, up till now, has been regarded not just as an ethical minimum but as an unchallengeable moral and juridical requirement. The diversity of historical experience contributes to the creation of different visions, sensibilities and scales of values. It is evident that not all peoples have been nurtured in the tradition of jealously guarding the boundaries of individual liberty by means of limitations placed on the power of a legitimate and sovereign state. Peoples with a greater tradition of communitarianism whose state structure is not yet consolidated are ignorant of this constant battle between the individual and society and between the individual and the state. By historical chance, individual liberty may perhaps have more tangible meaning for those peoples who have always enjoyed it than for those who have only experienced it in periods of exceptional political good-fortune. In addition, in Third World countries intent on overcoming the enormous obstacles to development, there are those who express reservations about the unrestricted operation of certain universally accepted human rights such as liberty of work or employment, freedom of information, freedom of political
association and others. It is important that this debate should be carried on systematically by the peoples themselves and not by the states.

In the second place, it is well-known that the internal and external factors which make up a given pattern of violation of human rights are extremely diverse. The population which suffers them is the most suitable body to decide what they are and to fight against them. The rural sector, for example, more defenceless than the urban, and in some Third World countries frequently cut off from the centres which might provide some form of solidarity, is usually, through its own struggles, in the best position to identify the origin of conflicts about land ownership, the support which usurpers often receive from the government, the correlative increase in 'minifundism' as a result of the illegal seizure of land and the sort of personal persecution which the latifundist employs against indigenous groups or small landowners. Something analogous can be said about abuses committed in other contexts. The complexity of each situation therefore makes it imperative that in everything to do with human rights and their defense it should be the people, and not their formal political representatives, who systematically provide information, express their opinion and give life to the respective organizations and forms of defense.

(b) The grass-roots social and political support which can be provided to an unofficial system of protection by the great circle of the peoples of the world, although very solid and necessary, is not in itself sufficient. The universal disregard for human rights and the frequency with which in our time they are ignored in respect of entire peoples, converts their defense into a true campaign for liberation, and in many places, into a campaign for survival. This makes necessary a wide ranging campaign to arouse world public opinion which demands the bringing together of forces which are often separated from each other by social and ideological barriers and are sometimes adversaries in the spiritual field or in that of politics or trade unions. These forces introduce a qualitatively different dimension, however much the aggregate of the various communities may come to reflect the whole world's interests.

Among these forces are included those which derive their solidarity from their political militancy or from their affiliation to the international trade union movement. Then one can pick out another contingent which has more recently joined the active international struggle for eminently humanitarian reasons, prominent within it being the members of the ecumenical churches and, in general, all those who are beginning to rebel against man's cruelty to man for reasons which are above all ethical, of moral indignation. One can also identify those who join the protest movement through anger at the huge scale on which modern forms of exploitation alter the relationship of man with his environment, cause the systematic destruction of nature or the serious distortion of simple forms of coexistence through the incitement to excessive consumption, through resorting to a degree of technology not justified by any objective necessity or through an oppressive bureaucratisation. Finally, those who struggle for peace and, moreover, the immense majority of intellectuals and artists, alert to the problems which affect the human community and sensitive to the sufferings which it must daily bear, complete the tapestry of civil society, depicted this time on a world scale in order to reinforce the foundations of a new system for the defense of human rights (Schwember).
4. We must now address the question of the structure of a system which draws its support from peoples and which must therefore exhibit an appreciable degree of decentralization. This presents problems of various kinds.

In general terms it can be said that the presence of peoples in the system must be expressed in the widest possible involvement of every community. When one speaks of participation nowadays one means more than just an increase in the number of individuals who participate directly in the making and carrying out of decisions. One is referring, in fact, to those organizations in which the people daily play an active part, and not merely to those in which it has an indirect influence through the representatives which it elects from time to time. This union of forces which originate in organized sectors, and which must of course spring from the direct victims of abuse and depredation and from all the groups and social strata which express their solidarity with such victims, should include "the new arenas in which the decisions of contemporary societies are made: the educational system, the world of labour, the organizations which control mass communication" (Cardoso).

Such generalizations cannot, however, fully cover all the dissimilar realities and political traditions which it is necessary to consider. The fact is that not all Third World societies can properly be said to possess an educational system, a world of organized labour or bodies which control mass communication. Moreover, in many of them it is not possible to distinguish different categories (let alone organizations based on them) such as consumers, workers, ethnic or religious minorities, professionals, young people, poor peasants or marginal urban settlers. Furthermore, there are great divergencies in the degree of political evolution, maturity, experience and combativity of different communities. One has only to think of the abyss which, in this sphere, separates those peoples which have produced liberation movements with deep-rooted mass support from nations with an eminently rural population and a premonetary economy whose recent political independence has been due less to a struggle for liberation than to the free concession of it by their ex-colonial masters.

There is no doubt that all this leads to a great heterogeneity in the composition and nature of the committees, fronts, assemblies (or whatever name may be given to them) which at the level of the various peoples ought to constitute the nuclei of the system here proposed. In the face of this, what is most important is to reaffirm the genuinely participative character which those nuclei should exhibit, if possible right down to the local level. In an intergovernmental system it is reasonable to start by urging the authorities of the member states to set up commissions for the promotion and protection of human rights. In a system formed by peoples, on the other hand, the idea that its composing elements should be appointed from above by an act of authority is on principle unthinkable.

The concrete organization of the recommended system should at that point take into account the varied and rich experience of many national communities which have founded committees, assemblies or commissions for the defense of human rights, generally in extremely adverse conditions and often running grave risks. Social organizations of diverse nature and aims whose raison d'etre is often, in fact, not specifically the defense of human rights, have rapidly increased the ranks of their supporters. Founded for the pursuit of limited objectives
of promoting a cause, spreading information and exerting moderate pressure on
the authorities, these movements have gradually widened the range of their aims
and intensified their activity, as circumstances have dictated. The experience
thus acquired will be extremely valuable when the time comes to take part in
the system here recommended.

Once it is established that the structure of the system basically consists of
the sum of the defensive organizations devised by the communities themselves,
one might examine the possibility that peoples of a common historical past, of
similar, social, economic and political structures and of a certain cultural
homogeneity should regionally co-ordinate opinions, experiences and methods of
action in the promotion and protection of human rights. This regional co-
ordination seems possible, for instance, between the English-speaking countries
of the Caribbean, between some Arab countries and between the nations of the
southern cone of the American continent.

The comparison and co-ordination of activities and experiences among such
regional groupings could produce conclusions which would be useful for the
eventual formulation of regionally or universally applicable standards of human
rights and to the establishment of new and more effective mechanisms for their
promotion and protection. It could also, in an eventual formal institutional-
ization of the system here recommended, be instrumental in preventing the
establishment of regional mechanisms for the defense of human rights which are
tacitly subservient to the shifts in political attitude which an hegemonic
nation may find expedient, as occurred for a long time in the Organization of
American States (OAS). Finally, it could contribute opinions worthy of being
taken into account in the future decentralization of the inter-governmental
system of the United Nations and the corresponding agencies responsible for
human rights.

It remains to consider whether it is proper for the structure of the system to
be completed by the inclusion of the national communities, whether regionally
co-ordinated or not, within a world organizational framework, which would
give expression to the international grassroots support we have already
described.

It might be argued that such inclusion would introduce into the system an
extraneous factor not emanating from the sovereign will of the peoples. In
fact, it is really a question of this same will seen from a different angle.
Moreover there is nothing to prevent it being the peoples themselves who are
more or less broadly represented in this new dimension. In reality, it seems
indispensable to establish a central corporate body to give tangible form to
the system's world-wide backing to ensure the cohesion within one organism of
the nuclei or national campaigns for the defense of human rights, to co-
ordinate their activities on a world level and to make possible undertakings
which can only be decided upon and carried out centrally.

The existence of such a central corporate body would help to provide the pro-
posed system with the institutional dimension which it lacks compared with the
inter-governmental system. That institutional dimension must not, of course,
be of an official character; furthermore, its very nature must be to shun any
kind of official character and perhaps to assume in relation to the present
official bodies a status similar to that which the United Nations accords to non-governmental organizations. This institutional dimension must have its roots, not in movements whose very nature destines them for dissolution or extinction sooner or later, but in institutions which will endure and which help to confer credibility and some measure of safeguard or protection on the apparatus, at the same time as it opens up for it in the various national settings and in the international sphere an operational area in which it may remain, as far as possible, safe from the risk of being immediately crushed or immobilized. Among the large number of such institutions might be counted, for example, the International Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, the International Commission of Jurists, the Interparliamentary Union, the great international federations of trade unions and Amnesty International.

5. The functions of the proposed organizations must be seen in the light of the element which can replace the juridical compulsion of the inter-governmental system. This element is the same one which in the last analysis makes the action of that system meaningful and effective, but the new system would rely entirely on its direct use: international public opinion. Its effectiveness is recognised by internationalists in the sphere of the inter-governmental system itself. Some of them consider that the only way of getting out of the morass in which the omnipotence of the modern state seems to wish to bog down human rights is to appeal to those who appear to have a primary interest in their protection, that is to say "all of us" (K. Vasak). The persuasive or dissuasive weight of public opinion has become, especially in the last quarter of a century, a solid fact of the greatest social and political importance.

The other motivating force which must be associated with public opinion is international solidarity in all its humanitarian, spiritual and political manifestations.

This having been said, the functions of the new organization in promoting and protecting human rights can be seen to cover a wide range of activities including, inter alia, inquiry, information, vigilance, denunciation, collection of corroborative evidence, the constant analysis of the human rights situation and the maintenance and keeping up to date of a bank of current information, the formulation of standards or codes of civil, social and political conduct, the drawing-up of standards and regulations about human rights and other matters which determine or accompany their due respect and enjoyment, and, finally, to act as a tribunal of conscience. None of these activities must be invested with any political content nor be motivated by any political purposes, in order that such periodic reports, denunciation before world public opinion or whatever other enterprise is undertaken may be seen to be free of any ulterior motives which might limit or weaken its effectiveness. There is no room in the proposed system for subordinating the respect for human rights to political expediency.

Among the principal functions we may appropriately emphasize the following:

(a) The periodic publication of reports could become extremely effective and surmount all the difficulties which it presents in the inter-governmental system.
Naturally, since the information is not provided by the interested state (generally interested in appearing, by hook or by crook, to be conforming to international standards) but by authentic representatives of the interested people, all doubt about the sincerity of the information disappears. It would also be possible to issue reports much more frequently.

It likewise becomes feasible to produce the information in a pre-established format by means of a scientifically designed questionnaire which will systematically cover all the characteristics and indicators of the situation which are significant for the world struggle on behalf of human rights. This is equally valid for all human rights and, implicitly, for the process of development itself. Of course we are not implying by this that national committees or campaigns which may have their origins in neighbourhood communities or in villages, will be capable of replying to these inquiries as precisely and diligently as an expert would do. In order not to make absurd demands on such committees it is essential that these questionnaires should be drawn up in a form which is balanced, sensible and clear. The important thing, above all, is that they should induce the national committees or campaigns to provide trustworthy information on the quality of life and on equality in the distribution of goods and services (F.H. Cardoso).

Measuring well-being is notoriously a more difficult task than measuring growth, especially if the selection of the respective indicators is in itself very complex, and if social equality and inequality also stem from non-material elements which it is almost impossible, so far, to measure scientifically, such as all those upon which the disalienation or liberty of each individual depends and the extent of his real social participation in decisions about the development of his community.

So far as the so-called civil and political rights are concerned, the periodic reports could offer examples of the manner and degree in which they are respected or violated in the community, the general or discriminatory character of infringements in relation to groups of the population, the community's specific plans within the context of its own current circumstances, and, in general, any other fact or factor which, as we have said, can best be discerned and evaluated by the community itself.

The scrutiny of these periodic reports can be more free, diligent, searching, dynamic and widespread than that practised by the representatives of states. The reports must always be public and open to commentary, additions, clarifications and refutations from any quarter, an ideal always represented as utopian in the case of the periodic reports envisaged in various procedures of the inter-governmental system. Consequently they must receive profuse and diversified publicity, far greater in extent and intensity than that given to the official apparatus's decisions and the documentation which supports them.

Finally, the proposed periodic reports should not give rise to a single, predetermined course of action, as happens in the inter-state system, and can therefore lead to a wider variety of counter-activities.
To sum up, the periodic reports should be the principal source of information about, and the most solid basis for the analysis of, the state of the world, its political processes and the degree to which needs, beginning with those of the poor and exploited, are satisfied, also the conduct of governments towards the communities they rule.

(b) The judicial, or quasi-judicial, function, very limited even in the intergovernmental system for well-known technico-juridical reasons, must, a fortiori, be even more so in the proposed system. Nevertheless, the fact that the latter is not made up of States, its non-ritual character, the interweaving of the centre and the periphery in its structure and the use of methods of publicity which international solidarity can cause to echo round the world, could cause it to regain in effectiveness everything that was originally lost to it through its lack of means of juridical enforcement. This makes it especially well-suited to "try" not only the cases of individuals but those of societies in which the rights of whole peoples are infringed.

Such "trials" could take various forms:

(1) Open hearings to consider the permanent violation of the right of a people to development and of the rights of its component individuals, or a particular isolated event of great concern which violates those rights. Examples of the first are: the case of Paraguay, the case of Haiti and the case of Indonesia; a case of the second: the murder of schoolchildren by the "emperor" Bokassa.

These sessions, somewhat reminiscent of those of the ad hoc working-parties appointed by the United Nations, are, however, envisaged as quite extensive public sessions whose procedure would be predetermined by the central corporate body of the organization, in which evidence would be presented and an analysis of the world situation undertaken. Their conclusions, on the other hand, would be open, that is to say, they would not lead to predetermined courses of action. The "dossier", or its essential parts, is always primarily intended to be material for widespread publicity.

Within this category there is room for possible hearings of public accusations brought in absentia against particular people, resulting simply in a verdict of guilt or innocence, in the style of those carried out by the Russell Tribunal.

(2) The reception and handling of denunciations or summonses (the Dag Hammarskjöld Report calls them "appeals") brought by an individual or a social group, because of the violation of their material, psychological or political dignity, and seeking the recognition, respect, protection or re-establishment of their rights.

(3) Fact-finding missions of briefer duration, like those undertaken in various countries by organizations such as the International Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International. Under this heading is included the sending of observers to political trials.
(c) The formulation of standards of civil, social and political conduct by means of which a country's advance or decline in the respect of human rights may be measured and its government judged accordingly before the tribunal of the world's political conscience.

(d) The drawing up of a body of standards relating to the guaranteeing and safeguarding of human rights and to matters concerned with the close ties which unite them with development, such as, for example, the regulations dealing with the common patrimony of mankind, the preservation of the natural environment, or communications.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that any future juridical guarantee of human rights, of the diversified rather than universal nature which we have been advocating, must be closely examined by the international community itself.

In other words, in the light of the historical social and political differences which radically distinguish one people from another, it is necessary to make a special effort to formulate international standards for the guaranteeing of human rights, which instead of endorsing as universally valid those values which are held to be such in the western tradition, may make such reservations as are proper to allow for cultural and regional differences. Only free debate and the free establishment of these standards by the peoples themselves can produce a satisfactory outcome to this immensely important task.

6. The system of protection here recommended derives from the modern aspiration to make the defense of human rights the objective of a universal struggle, which should enlist all peoples, all social organisms and all individuals, as seems, moreover, to have been the design of the Universal Declaration (T. van Boven). It draws its strength from the opinions and experiences of the peoples themselves, and conscious that it is not possible to separate the progress of the rights of the individual in a society from the inequalities between nations which afflict the world order, it seeks support in the universal solidarity provided by organizations and individuals. Its mechanisms function on the basis of the indissoluble nexus between development and human rights and on the premise that the latter, by whatever means they may be defined and guaranteed, constitute a whole which it is neither conceptually nor materially possible to disintegrate.

Its lack of coercive force does not present serious difficulty. Not only are the mechanisms of enforcement in the inter-governmental system obviously weak, but such limited effectiveness as they can claim is in fact due to the operation of public opinion which, however, the proposed system, by its very nature, seems likely to stir up more widely and more deeply.
INTERACTIONS

VERS UN DEVELOPPEMENT PARTICIPE
EN MILIEU URBAIN

par Ben Mahdi CISSE 1/

Un Etat, s'il se veut au service des hommes, peut-il s'y mettre réellement ? Le développement - à la campagne et, plus encore, à la ville - peut-il se faire vraiment au service du plus grand nombre ? Une ville dans ses groupements, ses associations, ses quartiers - peut-elle se développer elle-même ? Et si elle le tente, quel pouvoir peut-elle exercer ? Et quels services peuvent-ils y aider ?

Des questions comme celles-là, on peut bien tenter d'y répondre en théorie. Ceux qui s'y emploient ne perdent pas leur temps, peut-être... Ils le perdraient cependant s'ils n'acceptaient de mettre ce qu'ils souhaitent et ce qu'ils veulent à l'épreuve des hommes tels qu'ils sont dans leur vie quotidienne ; s'ils n'acceptaient, à travers la banalité de ce qui se fait, jour après jour, ça et là, de temps en autre, de prouver que l'utopie est raisonnable.

L'utopie - c'est d'animer les hommes. Non point comme fait le maître avec ses élèves ou l'administrateur paternaliste avec ses administrés. Mais, il me semble, en aidant les hommes à s'auto-animer, à susciter d'eux-mêmes cette détermination latente qu'ils portent de réaliser, de leurs mains, ce que d'autres attendent de l'Etat ou du "patron", à gérer à travers les longues discussions des soirées, ce qu'ailleurs un administrateur impose... C'est admettre que les hommes décident, y compris ce que l'animateur n'avait point prévu ou souhaité... C'est accepter le long cheminement des maturation populaires, les flux et reflux des mouvements d'opinion, la tenacité des préjugés et les tentatives toujours renouvelées de manipulation - accepter que tout cela existe, à travers quoi l'essentiel doit progresser.

Animer, c'est accepter aussi de s'intéresser aux petites choses - à ces milliers de jeunes qui tourment en rond dans les quartiers et qui ne vont nulle part, aux scolarisés déçus qui trainent et qu'on oublie, à la chaleur trop lourde dans une baraque de bidonville, aux rats qui pullulent, aux épluchures qui pourraient servir et qu'on jette n'importe où, aux vieux bidons qu'on transforme en entonnoirs ou en fourneaux, à tout ce "menu peuple", ces petites gens dont on s'encombre point les grands esprits, et qui, les uns sur les autres, s'entassent dans les cités et à ces menus problèmes qui, au bout à bout, emplissent les vies.

1/ ENDA, B.P. 3370, Dakar, Sénégal (préface au cahier ENDA No. 28, même titre).
Animer, c'est apprendre à marcher au rythme de ceux que l'on veut servir, être attentif à ne point leur imposer les pas cadençés des défilés ou la hâte fêtée des mobilisations artificielles. C'est savoir que la confiance passée avant les connaissances et que celles-ci ne servent que si celle-là s'établit. C'est tirer l'échveau du développement à partir du fil que la population a choisi, et non d'un autre.

Animer c'est aussi s'interdire les promesses vaines, la démagogie, la chausse excitation des belles déclarations. C'est admettre de s'en aller, si ceux au service desquels on se trouve pensent qu'on ne peut plus rien leur apporter.

Et l'on se prend à rêver à toute une administration dont le rôle principal consisterait à animer, et dont le critère ne serait point d'avancement, de hiérarchie, de standing, mais plutôt d'humilité, d'acceptation des autres et de dévouement.

Non que l'utopie doive s'affaiblir en une action nécessairement humaine et imparfaite pour toujours, mais parce que les exigences du développement nous pressent de toutes parts et que quelques merveilles et quelques beaux quartiers ne peuvent nous faire oublier la morosité et le dénuement de la majorité des citadins.

Aussi bien, le problème n'est-il pas de réforme de l'administration, mais de construction d'autre chose que ce qu'est l'administration. Il faudra quelques rouages, une machinerie limitée, indispensable dans un État moderne. Cependant, entre ce minimum - qui en termes de coût et de quantité me semble déjà dépassé - et la masse des citoyens, est-il vraiment besoin de tous ces intermédiaires ? Une large part des fonctions exercées dans les quartiers et pour eux ne pourrait-elle être remise entre les mains des habitants ? N'y a-t-il pas dans les traditions d'une part, d'autre part dans les nécessités telles que les ressentent un si grand nombre de citadins, le fondement qui permettrait aux groupes de producteurs ou d'habitants identifiées les tâches à accomplir, nommé et contrôlé ceux à qui il les confie et les réunis dans la mesure où il juge leur apport satisfaisant ? Pourrons-nous, à Dakar par exemple, cesser un jour de masquer ou refouler à la périphérie la vérité de notre africainité, et de jouer à la grande métropole de style parisien ? Sommes-nous vraiment contraints de choisir l'anonymat des habitations et le mimétisme des services publics - au lieu de l'administration concertée des groupes de base ?

Dans cette brève préface, mon propos était - me semble-t-il - de m'attacher au projet que mène la population de Grand-Yoff en commun avec la Promotion Humaine et ENDA. Ai-je oublié d'en parler dans ces quelques lignes ? Je ne le crois pas.

En réalité, je n'ai fait qu'y penser. Car ce qui s'amorce là-bas, si modeste, si précaire encore - peut-être n'est-ce que vaine tentative sans lendemain. Peut-être est-ce promise des lendemains.
LE MOUVEMENT DE BASE

Jac de Bruyn et Roger Jacobs */

L'interaction qui suit est composée d'extraits d'un document publié par le Service d'appui à l'intercommunication (cf. IFDA Dossier 19). (Texte de discussion No. 113).

I

Le mouvement de base doit développer l'utopie et rendre vivante l'inspiration en se regroupant partout avec les opprimés pour mettre à nu le pouvoir, le contester, le repousser. Ils éveilleront un processus dans lequel une nouvelle conscience de soi-même et de l'ensemble se développera; dans les relations humaines, on tentera de dépasser l'oppression; on réalisera des institutions suivant d'autres schémas que ceux traditionnels à grande échelle et à monopoles, ce seront des institutions qui donneront une chance à l'autogestion.

Les groupes de base sont des lieux où des processus d'épanouissement et d'éman- cipation peuvent se réaliser et ont des chances de réussite. Là aussi il doit être possible de tester les valeurs en les confrontant et en les laissant critiquer par d'autres. C'est aussi un lieu où l'idéologie dominante est démasquée et n'aura plus le même impact.

Approche

Le mouvement ouvrier courait après la révolution, c'est-à-dire le moment précis de la prise de pouvoir par la classe opprimée, le point central à partir duquel des mesures fondamentales pouvaient être prises afin de fonder une nouvelle société.

Pour le mouvement de base, la révolution n'est pas quelque chose qu'on attend un jour. Elle se fait maintenant et de façon permanente par soi-même et avec son groupe. Elle n'est pas un moment unique et privilégié de transformation de l'ensemble de la société et de ses différents partis. Mais c'est un processus permanent qui est accessible déjà maintenant pour chacun, en rompant avec l'idéologie dominante qui dit: "C'est comme ça et pas autrement".

Par le processus de conscientisation (- via action - réflexion et organisation) par le travail sur des problèmes actuels et importants, sortir des sécurités fausses et des rapports et structures anonymes en optant pour des processus d'émancipation et d'épanouissement de soi, de son entourage et du monde.

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Dans cette optique, on ne peut pas faire la révolution pour les autres. On peut être en tant que personne ou que groupe révolutionnaire et comme ça être une invitation pour d'autres à faire de même. "Le plus important est la révolte de l'homme concret, de millions d'hommes et l'éveil de l'humain qui est présent dans chaque prochain" (De Batselier).

Le mouvement ouvrier en tant que classe a pris l'arme de l'action massive: grève générale, manifestations de masse (qui parfois ressemblaient à un défilé de troupes). L'accent se trouve maintenant plus sur des actions précises et différenciées, chaque initiative ayant sa couleur propre. C'est là que la conscience et la créativité jouent un rôle plus important.

Le mouvement de base travaille avec de nouveaux éléments pédagogiques:
- l'expérience comme élément central;
- créer une nouvelle relation entre élèves et professeurs, relation dans le dialogue, rencontre humaine à la place d'une reproduction et d'un transfert du savoir. Ce qui est typique pour une société où les puissants savent tout et pensent pouvoir déterminer les normes de ce qui est vrai, bon et beau.

Les groupes de base redécouvrent l'éducation en lien avec la vie personnelle (moi avec mon expérience) et avec le monde (les problèmes qui m'occupent) et avec les rapports humains; au lieu d'une école organisée comme une usine.

L'utopie d'une société démocratique libre d'oppression a des chances de vie ou de mort selon qu'elle développe ou non ces méthodes nouvelles d'apprentissage.

Pas de démocratie sans une pédagogie qui permet à chacun de découvrir tout cela à travers le processus que le groupe met en marche, en d'autres termes, il nous faut un mouvement pédagogique et éducatif qui nous libère de l'apprentissage scolaire aliénant et des fausses prétentions de certains hommes de sciences, des spécialistes.

Les groupes de base développeront une autre relation entre vivre et apprendre; entre réflexion et praxis; entre tête, mains et coeur. Les rapports des groupes en pouvoir sont caractérisés par le transfert et le dressage, ceux des groupes de base le sont par la créativité, la rencontre et la reconnaissance de l'originalité de chacun. Ce n'est possible que quand les groupes de base rompent avec l'établi et prennent une position marginale: c'est-à-dire, se distancer et intérieurement et extérieurement, prendre une position de résistance avec les faibles et pas une position de conquérant du pouvoirs.

Les groupes de base collaboreront dans certains points avec des organes du mouvement ouvrier mais sans laisser définir leur identité à partir de ces organisations, sans se lier de façon inconditionnelle à certains partis, sans reconnaître ces partis comme des instances directives du processus d'émancipation.
Les choix d'organisation

L'objectif et l'approche déterminent naturellement l'organisation. L'autogestion, la décentralisation et le self-reliance sont des critères fondamentaux qui doivent assurer la cohérence de notre organisation.

1° Le mouvement de base prône la conscientisation et l'expérimentation sociale.

2° Ces groupes de base refusent la pensée traditionnelle du pouvoir politique.

Si l'on veut donner une chance à la dynamique des groupes locaux, alors, on ne peut pas les structurer dans un cadre centraliste, uniformisant. On ne peut pas non plus exiger d'eux trop d'énergie pour la mise en place des structures centrales de coordination qui, à leur tour, détermineraient la dynamique en réduisant les groupes locaux à devenir des satellites sans direction propre.

Si l'on ne veut pas conquérir le pouvoir, ni se lancer dans la compétition, alors on n'exige pas de centralisation. Le mouvement de base doit développer une autre forme d'unité donnant beaucoup plus de marge à l'originalité et l'indépendance.

Chaque groupe doit aussi bien au niveau du contenu qu'au niveau de son organisation, assurer une partie de self-reliance, de production autonome (développer une action propre et une réflexion propre - analyse, etc.) et d'organisation autonome (structures - hommes et moyens).

Tous les groupes de base sont des expériences de démocratie directe, de recherche d'une échelle à partir de laquelle l'autogestion et le self-reliance sont possibles; ce qui dépasse cette limite fait l'objet d'une collaboration libre entre égaux.

Les groupes de base vivent ou meurent selon qu'ils sont capables ou non de mettre en place un réseau:

1) d'échange et de confrontation de ces expériences et conceptions, sur la base de quoi, chaque groupe soit capable de déterminer sa propre direction et de situer les problèmes auxquels il travaille dans un ensemble plus vaste;

2) de collaboration entre groupes similaires: l'organisation d'une solidarité concrète encourageante (des rapports horizontaux);

3) d'action commune temporaire qui exigerait une structure momentanée plus organisée (coordination limitée et temporaire).

Les groupes de base peuvent collaborer à la mise en place de ces formes de communications en organisant ensemble des centres de rencontre, en collaborant à une publication commune, à un service de documentation et de publication, à des initiatives de formation, de plate-formes d'action etc... Et cela aussi bien au niveau international que régional.
Donc, aussi en matière d’organisation, on ne peut que formuler quelques indications: décentralisation des réseaux de communication, des coordinations temporaires en fonction de certaines actions, échanges et collaboration libres entre égaux. Chaque groupe et chaque région concrétisera tout cela suivant ses propres possibilités.

Cela ne veut point dire que le mouvement de base doit faire opposition au mouvement ouvrier. La lutte pour assurer le minimum d’existence, pour une égalité plus grande des revenus, contre la spéculazione foncière, contre le pouvoir des établissements économiques et financiers etc… Cette lutte est également la nôtre.

Dans une conjoncture de crise, telle que nous la connaissons à l'heure actuelle, il serait d'ailleurs stupide de paralyser par une attitude sectaire toutes les forces oppositionnelles qui sont déjà si faibles.

Mais cela ne peut certainement pas signifier que nous renonçons à notre inspiration initiale ou que nous la refoulons dans les oubliettes, dans le seul but de ne pas devoir affronter le mouvement ouvrier.

Nos objectifs diffèrent qualitativement de ceux du mouvement ouvrier institutionnalisé et sont insérés dans une logique qui diffère autant de la logique propre de la gauche traditionnelle.

Jamais nous ne pouvons retomber dans le piège suivant: dans sa lutte contre le capitalisme, le mouvement ouvrier avait développé un certain nombre de catégories, qui, pourtant, se situaient dans le même cadre logique que les idées qu’ils combattaient.

En face de l'idéologie de droite, a été placée une de gauche. Face au pouvoir capitaliste civil, on a construit une contre-force travailliste. Ces deux choses semblaient former à elles deux un couple de frères-ennemis.

Dans le miroir des despotes d'aujourd'hui se reflète déjà l'image de ceux de demain.

Les chefs diffèrent seulement de la façon dont ils dominent, mais ils restent des tyrans, possesseurs d'un pouvoir exercé en tant que propriétaires.

En résumant, on pourrait dire que, sans sa propre inspiration, le mouvement de base n'a pas le droit à l'existence, le mouvement de base doit radicalement et pour ça clairement prendre position, sinon il n'a qu'à s'intégrer dans les mouvements existants.
A l'aube de l'humanité, il y a des dizaines de milliers d'années, ce ne sont pas les hommes, mais les femmes qui ont assuré la protection et la subsistance du groupe humain. Les femmes sont les premières travailleuses de l'humanité.

Si les êtres humains des deux sexes ont commencé à travailler ensemble, (à coopérer) pour satisfaire les besoins collectifs du groupe, s'ils ont commencé à s'organiser en société et à se "civiliser", c'est sous l'influence exclusive des femmes qui avaient déjà commencé à coopérer entre elles. Les femmes sont les premières civilisatrices de l'humanité.

Telle est la thèse récente, soutenue de manière convaincante par une anthropologue américaine Evelyn Reed 2/, qui contredit ainsi le point de vue couramment admis selon lequel, durant la préhistoire, les femmes avaient déjà été reléguées aux tâches ménagères, tandis que les hommes les protégeaient et les nourrissaient, elles et leurs petits.

1) Les femmes à l'origine de la civilisation

Chez presque tous les mammifères, les mâles sont essentiellement guidés par l'instinct sexuel et les femelles par l'instinct maternel.

Or, l'instinct sexuel est un facteur de division entre les mâles, qui se combattent et s'entretuent pour conquérir une femelle. Au contraire, l'instinct maternel des femelles est à l'origine de la famille animale. Cette famille consiste en une mère qui pourvoit à ses besoins propres et à ceux de ses petits. Non seulement le mâle n'y pourvoit pas, mais il dépend parfois de la femelle pour sa subsistance. "Quand un mâle rejoint un groupe de lionnes, il s'en remet entièrement à elles pour sa subsistance. Loin d'être un patriarche satisfait, il est au mieux toléré par les femelles, au pire proscrit et relégué à une vie solitaire. Les mâles ne sont pas le sexe supérieur".

1/ (Paru dans Famille et Développement, No. 23, septembre 1980, B.P. 5061, Fann, Dakar, Sénégal).

2/ Evelyn Reed: "Féminisme et Anthropologie".

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Les femmes constituent la moitié de la population mondiale, accomplissent les deux tiers du temps de travail, reçoivent le dixième du revenu global et possèdent le centième de la propriété dans le monde.
Il en est allé de même chez les "hominiens", lorsqu'ils commencèrent à se différencier des singes et à se développer en "hommes".

Les femmes ont, à cette période, assuré à la fois la subsistance des enfants et leur protection (contre les animaux, mais aussi contre les mâles livrés à leur instinct sexuel et à leurs appétits destructeurs). Elles les ont pour cela écarté (en dehors de la "saison des amours"), et ont coopéré entre elles.

Puis, les jeunes mâles, au contact de leurs mères (plus longs chez les hominiens que chez les autres mammifères) ont fait l'apprentissage de la vie sociale, et furent tolérés par les groupes de femmes qui continuaient à assurer la subsistance du groupe au moyen de végétaux. Cet apprentissage leur permit d'abord de ne plus avoir "recours aux seuls combats compétitifs pour satisfaire leurs instincts sexuels". Il leur permit d'autre part de coopérer pour vivre. "Les hominiens durent freiner et réprimer cette sexualité agressive. Leur combat pour survivre dans un environnement hostile était bien trop acharné pour laisser place à des lutttes. La coopération excluait la compétition (...). Rompant avec leur passé d'individualisme et de compétition, les hommes purent enfin s'unir et travailler ensemble à assurer leur subsistance et leur protection commune". Ils détournèrent leur combativité vers des activités toujours destructrices mais désormais profitables à leur groupe: la chasse aux animaux pour la subsistance de la collectivité, et aussi la guerre, pour sa protection.

Les femmes continuèrent non seulement à se livrer collectivement à la cueillette, mais elles inventèrent la plupart des techniques qui allaient donner naissance à la civilisation: l'agriculture, l'élevage, l'artisanat.

Le travail collectif des femmes engendra aussi la nécessité de communiquer entre elles, et contribua ainsi à la naissance de la parole et du langage. "Les femmes actives de corps et d'esprit inventèrent probablement le langage, ce nouvel outil dont elles avaient besoin".

Ainsi Evelyn Reed montre-t-elle comment "nous sommes redevables aux femmes d'avoir conduit notre espèce sur la voie de la civilisation et de l'humanisation".

2) Les premiers "travailleurs": les femmes

La subsistance de ces groupes était assurée de façon plus régulière et plus sûre par le travail de la femme que par la chasse lointaine et incertaine des hommes. L'essentiel de l'approvisionnement alimentaire du groupe reposait sur l'effort des femmes. La quête de la nourriture, sa transformation et sa conservation par les femmes furent à l'origine des grandes découvertes techniques de l'humanité.

Les premiers médecins

"Dans tous les pays du monde, et dans toutes les régions, les primitifs découvrent les vertus curatives des plantes. Les premiers guérisseurs de l'histoire furent, en réalité des femmes... En cultivant le sol et en cherchant plantes et légumes comestibles, les femmes primitives acquièrent des connaissances d'botanique extrêmement poussées. Elles apprirent à connaître les propriétés des"
Les premiers agriculteurs

Un préhistorien G. Childe écrit: "Les principales céréales (maïs, riz, mil, blé, orge) ainsi que le manioc, l'igname et d'autres plantes non céréales furent découvertes par des sociétés dont l'histoire n'a pas conservé le nom..., pour accomplir cette révolution néolithique, les hommes, ou plutôt les femmes durent non seulement découvrir les plantes et les méthodes de culture les plus appropriées, mais encore inventer les outils pour labourer, moissonner et emmagasiner les récoltes, puis les transformer en nourriture".

Les premiers éleveurs

"Les femmes s'intéressaient aussi à la vie animale. Elles attrapaient des oiseaux et de petits animaux qu'elles gardaient et nourrissaient ainsi que les jeunes animaux rapportés par les chasseurs... En épargnant les animaux, elles apprirent par degrés à les domestiquer" (E. Reed).

Les premiers architectes et ingénieurs

"Pour entreposer la nourriture, les femmes construisirent différents modèles de coffres, et même de véritables entrepôts d'une architecture soignée. Des "caches" et des "greniers" furent creusés à même le sol et garnis de paille, ou, en pays marécageux, construits sur pilotis (...). Les dômes des mosquées tirent leur origine de la forme des toits des entrepôts construits par les Africains pour emmagasiner le maïs (...) les femmes furent à l'origine et dans de nombreuses régions, des "architectes" et des "ingénieurs" (E. Reed).

Ainsi qu'on le voit, les femmes n'ont pas, à l'origine, dépendu des hommes pour leur subsistance et celle de la famille. De plus, elles n'ont pas seulement joué un rôle prédominant dans l'acquisition et la production des biens communs, mais elles ont également été à l'origine de nombreuses inventions techniques.

Possession de biens en commun

A cette époque, écrit E. Reed, "la société possédait un système de relations sociales et sexuelles égalitaires, découlant d'un mode de production collectiviste et de la possession des biens en commun". Ce n'est que bien plus tard que les femmes ont perdu les droits identiques à ceux des hommes qu'elles possédaient jusque là: à partir du moment où le perfectionnement des instruments de travail a conduit à une division de ce travail, entre des groupes sociaux (des "classes") différents. Dès lors, même lorsqu'elles continuaient à participer de façon décisive à la production des biens (ce qui est le cas dans nombre de pays africains), des droits et des devoirs inégaux leur ont été réservés.
LES FEMMES ET LES JEUNES FILLES DE M'Harza (Tunisie Centrale) FACE AU CHANGEMENT

par A. Ben Choura */

Signalons tout d'abord le caractère original des actions menées à M'Harza. Les actions essentiellement sociales furent souvent menées auprès de la population féminine qui fut le principal interlocuteur des antennes de ces projets; ces dernières étant elles-mêmes des jeunes filles de la région.

Il y a les actions proprement dites (éducation et formation), objets de notre intervention et qui commencent à donner du reste les résultats escomptés, démontrant ainsi que ces jeunes rurales se sont montrées "à la hauteur" des tâches qui leur furent confiées.

Je me propose de voir dans les lignes qui suivent les retombées de ces actions pour la population féminine en général et pour les antennes de projets en particulier. Ces retombées, qui se traduisent par des changements, intéressent en premier lieu les "messagères" pour qui, en dernière analyse, les actions auraient le plus profité (bon qualitatif).

Je tenterai de le montrer en essayant de cerner cette mutation sur deux plans: plan psychologique et plan social.

Je me baserai surtout sur l'expérience des antennes sanitaires, cas illustrant le mieux, à mon sens, les changements intervenus.

1. Activité des antennes sanitaires et éclatement au niveau des rôles

L'activité proposée à ces jeunes filles déborde le cadre des activités des femmes de ce secteur; en faisant travailler ces dernières, nous avons contribué à un éclatement de rôle; en effet, aucune jeune fille dans M'Harza avant cette expérience n'avait occupé d'autres fonctions en dehors de celles imparties à toute femme de cette zone. L'impact d'une telle innovation ne peut être mesuré à l'heure actuelle, faute de recul suffisant; cependant, ces jeunes filles sont déjà des exemples et sans doute des précurseurs pour plus jeunes qu'elles surtout.

2. Rôle de l'antenne dans sa famille et dans la communauté

Désormais, l'antenne sanitaire a son "mot à dire" dans sa famille, rapportant un "salaire"; elle occupe une place nouvelle parmi les siens; elle n'est plus perçue comme improductive. Dans la communauté, elle est conseillère auprès des femmes surtout, bien que les maris et les hommes en général fassent appel à elle lors de litiges familiaux par exemple. Mais c'est auprès des femmes,

son "groupe naturel" que je serai tentée de dire que son rôle est important: sa formation, ainsi que ses déplacements hors de M'Harza, font qu'elle est introductrice de manière d'être, de nouvelles modes; elle draine une certaine idée du progrès... elle est celle à qui l'on veut ressembler.

3. Rôle et position dans la communauté

Cette jeune fille joue véritablement le rôle d'animatrice auprès des familles; ses tâches multiples lui confèrent un assez grand prestige. Elle est une "personnalité" au même titre que l'infirmier ou l'instituteur. Depuis qu'elle occupe ce poste, elle assiste aux réunions politiques. Récemment, la section de l'UNFT 1/ de M'Harza fut créée; ce n'est sans doute pas un hasard que l'une des éducatrices en soit devenue la présidente.

4. Travail et champ d'action plus élargis.

Ayant franchi cette barrière qui est le cloisonnement des femmes dans certaines tâches strictement féminines, les animatrices vont et viennent par les pistes de l'Imada. Au départ, ce ne fut point facile pour elles, les paysans sont si peu enclins au changement surtout lorsque celui-ci regarde leurs femmes, leurs filles. L'entêtement de ces dernières a eu raison des embûches rencontrées; actuellement, le contrôle (social) ne s'exerce plus sur elles de façon aussi contraignante. Travailler pour le Hakem, leur confère, enfin, une certaine invulnérabilité maintenant. Elles ont comme alliés les Cheiks et les jeunes responsables du Parti qui les défendent, car ils ont vu et compris l'utilité de leur travail (les mentalités ne changent pas rapidement, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de femmes!).

Parlons à présent du travail des tisseuses. Nous savons qu'en milieu rural la femme accomplit toutes sortes de tâches, aussi bien à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de la maison (s'occupe du ménage, charrie l'eau s'occupe de l'entretien des animaux, tisse, laboure,...) toutes les tâches ménagères et autres reposent en grande partie sur ses épaules, mais bien que procurant à la famille un gain certain de dépenses en tissant par exemple les effets dont on a besoin (klims, burnous), son travail n'est pas perçu comme tel, car il n'est pas source de revenus. Les tisseuses d'"A.S.D.E.A.R.", en contribuant à une entrée d'argent voient leur activité valorisée et en tirent un prestige certain auprès des leurs, mais comme elles exercent une activité strictement féminine ayant pour cadre de travail la maison, cela ne revalorise en rien leurs rapports avec les autres membres de la communauté; c'est uniquement dans leur famille qu'elles seront le mieux considérées. Par contre, l'activité des antennes est porteeuse de mutations et ce à plusieurs niveaux.

5. Travail et répercussions au plan psychologique

Sur le plan psychologique, l'antenne a acquis au fil des mois de travail, une certaine assurance étant de plus en plus consultée dans sa famille et dans son

1/ Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes
entourage; elle a conscience de son importance toute nouvelle. Sa timidité d'antan est balayée; nous en avons d'ailleurs eu l'illustration lors de l'Assemblée Générale de l'an dernier. Pour les indemnités qu'elle reçoit, elle en dispose pleinement dans la plupart des cas: est-ce un signe d'autonomie? Bien sûr, celle-ci est toute relative, mais comme nous sommes à la campagne, cette liberté d'action est loin d'être négligeable. L'antenne saura utiliser l'argent gagné: étant en âge d'être mariée, elle s'en servira pour constituer son trousseau.

6. Travail et valorisation sociale

Ayant travaillé, la jeune fille est supposée être mieux dotée et à cette attraction s'ajoute une convoitise liée aux connaissances acquises, à un certain savoir faire, en un mot à une certaine "modernité" de ces filles. Jugée plus "moderne" par rapport aux autres filles de son douar, elle attirera l'attention des jeunes gens intéressés par ces aspects qui trouveront en ces dernières des époques à la hauteur de leurs aspirations: elle saura mieux gérer sa maison, s'occuper de ses enfants, recevoir. Ce sont des aspects qui ont actuellement du poids dans le choix du conjoint en milieu rural. Nous avons vu que la valeur de l'antenne sur le marché matrimonial est accrue.

7. La population féminine face au changement

Le travail d'éducation sanitaire mené depuis plus de deux années donne d'assez bons résultats. Les femmes de M'Harza ont conscience du rôle qu'elles ont à jouer en matière de prévention de leur santé et celle des leurs. Prêtons l'exemple de l'eau: l'attention qu'elles portent à son traitement, les soins qu'elles portent aussi à couvrir les jarres pour l'eau de boisson, les "cours" que j'ai pu prendre auprès d'elles quant au traitement de l'eau, témoignent de cette conscience.

L'hygiène familiale est bien "leur affaire" et elles l'assument réellement. En règle générale, elles ne remplissent plus leurs tâches de ménagère et d'éducation des enfants de façon machinale.

Aux questions-pièges que je leur ai posées, elles ne répondent pas, "c'est comme cela que mes aînées ont toujours fait". Elles appliquent les conseils donnés et sont davantage soucieuses de ce qui touche l'hygiène et la santé.

L'hygiène et la prévention des jeunes enfants contre les maladies est la préoccupation des mères de famille; plus aucun enfant dans M'Harza ne reste non touché par la vaccination; bien que l'effort dans ce domaine ne soit pas soutenu par toutes avec la même constance (négligence de faire faire les rappels), il n'en demeure pas moins qu'une étape combien importante est franchie. Nos "travailleuses" sur place se chargent quant à elles de faire franchir les autres étapes et elles le font du reste avec beaucoup de conviction.

Nous pouvons dire que nombreuses sont les femmes qui font l'association entre la maladie et l'hygiène à observer pour éviter celle-ci et l'ont intégrée au niveau de leur vécu quotidien.
Au plan curatif, le rapport à la médecine est autre: les pratiques archaïques telle que l'application de la "pisse de chamelle" pour les conjonctivites, pour prendre un exemple, sont laissées au profit de désinfectants et autres remèdes de médecine dite occidentale; au moindre problème on accourt à la salle de soins.

Passons à présent à un autre aspect de mutation, celui-ci intéressant plutôt les mentalités en général et les comportements vis-à-vis des femmes en milieu rural; cinq ans de travail de sensibilisation des familles sur ces aspects, nous amènent à des résultats plutôt timides, mais encourageants; les efforts fournis ne furent pas vains. Les changements ne sont pas notoires pour ce qui est de la vie des femmes mariées, cependant les idées et les pratiques séculaires vis-à-vis de ces dernières tombent peu à peu. Les parents sont moins réticents quant à la scolarisation de leurs filles et je suis persuadée que l'exemple du travail possible des filles et de leur contribution à l'amélioration des conditions de vie dans la zone donnée avec l'expérience antennes familiales militera davantage en faveur d'une ouverture.

Toutefois, à ce propos, un indicateur assez parlant pour ce qui est du changement vis-à-vis des filles est le suivant: à la question posée "Enverrez-vous votre grande fille au Centre de la Jeune Fille rurale de Sidi Amor Bouhajla?", près de la moitié des familles concernées ont répondu par l'affirmative. Sachant que cette localité est à 35 Kms de M'Harza, je mesure le pas franchi depuis; nous sommes loin des tout premiers pas où les familles hésitantes avaient confié leurs filles à mes collègues et ce pour un apprentissage sur place! Aucune, à l'époque, n'acceptait l'idée d'envoyer leur fille dans le Centre de la Jeune Fille Rurale.

Cependant, il est bien évident que, malgré ces signes positifs, c'est chez les jeunes - et très progressivement - que les mentalités évoluent et que l'on peut espérer une ouverture réelle face au changement.

PUGWASH AND THE THIRD SYSTEM

by Kwee Swan-Liat

The circle of major actors on the contemporary scene is no longer confined to nation-states, their governments and populations. A growing number of increasingly important international organizations, multiregional religious groupings, and transnational business corporations have emerged and taken their place among the important decision-makers. Decision-making is only a phase - not even a definitive phase - in the continuing process of communication, consultation, deliberation, opinion-making, critical assessment of the pressing problems of our time. In this process of communication, opinion-making and assessment intellectuals, scientists, philosophers, artists, journalists, politicians are involved. This process is only partially rationalized. Rational

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decisions and resolutions, according to generally accepted political rules and procedures, are interspersed with less rational actions and clashes as expressions of some form of collective will and determination.

"Democracy" is the outcome of a historic endeavour to systematize a general will ('volonté générale') in qualitative and quantitative procedures of explanation and implementation. As far as the "generality" of this will can be formally expressed and accounted for in the process of political decision-making, the system can be called "democratic". As these systems of democracy evolve in history, both their contents and their boundaries reflect the changes and fixations of the historic constellation. The contents refer to the goals and ideals represented in the "general will". They are "democratic" insofar as they represent the will of the majority of the people. The boundaries are involved in the assignment of what should be understood by "the people". With respect to both the contents and boundaries of democratic systems historical fictions and fixations occur. "Democracy" is the expression of a "general will" only in so far as this general will can be politically ascertained as the will of sovereign nation-states. This concept of the "sovereign nation-state" is the basic fiction enabling some form of "international decision-making".

Within the organization of the United Nations, the historic fictions and fixations of the participating members are perpetuated in the restricted and sometimes contradictory procedures to translate the general will of the world community of nations into international and transnational decisions and strategies. The fictions of the existing variants of "parliamentary democracies" and "people's democracies" are accepted as real and the votes of the national representatives are counted as the expression of the "general will" of the nations represented. To account for the differences among small and big nations, resulting from the non-rational process of historic fixation of boundaries, additional procedures are formulated to distinguish superpowers and combine common interests in transnational regions in the world.

One critical issue was looming large at the time when the United Nations Organization was erected: the problem of world security in face of nuclear armaments. This dominant issue is reflected in the disputed procedure of "weighing the general will" within the Security Council, a special UN organ designed for that purpose. In spite of persisting attempts and campaigns to curb and control the problem of world armaments and security, the situation is continuously aggravating. Campaigns for nuclear disarmament and arms control are not only pursued by political organizations of nation-states, their governments and representatives. Disarmament and world security has increasingly become a common concern of political organizations transcending the boundaries of nation-states. Scientists and religious leaders in particular have more and more been active in organizations irrespective of national fictions and fixations.

One such group of concerned scientists is Pugwash. Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs have carried weight by the sincerity and expert authority of the scientists involved. While unofficial, Pugwash meetings have often heralded several years in advance what were to become official national policies and international agreements. It soon became evident that while arms
control aiming at nuclear disarmament must continue as the priority objective, Pugwash should concern itself with other questions closely related to world security and an enduring peace: sources of conflict and international tension, such as the technological development of new weapons of mass destruction; the enormous and increasing economic disparity between industrialized and Third World countries; environmental deterioration; energy; depletion of natural resources; and problems of population growth.

All these problems are closely interconnected. One can discern some specific clusters. Sometimes the emphasis is centred on the problem of security and disarmament, sometimes on the ideal of a more equitable world-wide development. Animated and searching public discussions, consciousness-raising campaigns, manifestations and urgent pleas are indicative of a movement which on this scale is a relatively new phenomenon in the world's history.

Obviously, Pugwash is only one out of many groups and organizations, growing in number and range, which are active in this world-wide movement. Undoubtedly we may characterize this movement as the true expression of a general will, irresistibly breaking through over a wide front. It is a movement starting on various points, directed towards various, gradually converging goals. At the centers of the movement the determinate effort is strongest. Separately, each strand represents only a small minority, and nowhere yet has reached the majority of the people. One of the most striking features, however, is that similar positions are defended and claimed all over the world, and that the issues raised are obviously universal. Ervin Laszlo and his co-workers have mapped out an atlas and inventory of Goals for mankind: A report to the Club of Rome on the new horizons of global community (1977).

Together with the listing of global goals, it is possible to map the various groups and organizations, both within the context of the United Nations and other international and transnational organizations, such as the ILO, the World Council of Churches, the International Council of Scientific Unions. The inventory of world goals include: world security and disarmament, human rights, development assistance and cooperation, world food, world health and basic well-being, world population (children, women, minorities, refugees), world environment, world law, labour conditions and employment, technologies for basic needs, alternative technologies and alternative life-styles, world science, education and culture.

"Alternative cultures emerge in many parts of the world as a response - often a radical one - to the problems of life and alienation experienced in modern "establishment" society ... The mentality of persons who have opted out of the mainstream society to search for more desirable alternatives shows some striking common features, especially when contrasted with the typical mind set of advanced industrial societies. Their emphasis is on service rather than achievement, communication rather than prestige, fulfillment of social tasks rather than career-making, and life in the here-and-now rather than preoccupation with the future ... The alternative cultures recognize the finiteness and vulnerability of Earth. They are rediscovering a consciousness that mankind has all but lost in its obsession with material-technological progress: the consciousness of being one with Nature ... The communities of the alternative cultures strive to be self-organizing. Self-actualization becomes a
major goal. The alternative cultures grow and spread with great rapidity. They evolve their own lifestyles and modes of existence... The influence of modern world views on the minds of contemporary people is considerable. This influence could do much to further the transcendence of inner limits and by raising the level of mutual solidarity among the world's people... The achievement of world solidarity is the great imperative of our era. We are moving towards a World Solidarity Revolution."

This Third System is rapidly becoming an important reality. It is the manifestation of what Laszlo has termed the World Solidarity Revolution. In the international field of policy-making the Third System operates as a third force dialectically related to the First System of intergovernmental organizations and representative groups of sovereign nation-states and their governments, and the Second System of transnational corporations which, by the influence and power of their common interests based on profit and utility, are capable of transcending the fictions and fixations of nation-states. For the same reason as the multinational corporations constituting the Second System are capable of transcending the barriers and boundaries of nation-states, so the transnational organizations constituting the Third System may also extend their radius of action beyond the limitations and fixations of sovereign nation-states.

Pugwash actually belongs to the Third System and has contributed substantially to its strengthening. It would be reasonable to promote a closer contact and cooperation between Pugwash and IFDA, and bring some coordination between the activities and objectives of both organizations. Contacts and cooperation between Pugwash and IFDA can be arranged in a similar way as between Pugwash and Peace Research Institutes. Views and proposals of IFDA may be introduced and discussed on Pugwash conferences, particularly in the sections dealing with problems of development and development alternatives. Likewise, Pugwash scientists may contribute to discussions and proposals of IFDA published in the IFDA Dossiers. Especially where the crucial issue of world security and disarmament is interwoven with development alternatives and alternative lifestyles, a dialogue of Pugwash scientists and IFDA may be fruitful and inspiring. Though there is a general agreement that "there is a close connection between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and the economic development of countries, so that any progress towards any of those objectives will constitute progress towards all of them" (UN General Assembly Resolution 2734 XXV, 16 December 1970), it is difficult to reach agreement on actual policies effectuating progress in both directions together.

Disarmament and development are issues that have most preoccupied the attention of the international community since World War II. Yet attempts to establish a positive feedback between policies toward both aims have not been very successful. This might be due fundamentally to the very structures and workings of the First and Second Systems. Consolidation and strengthening of the Third System might induce a political breakthrough. The Third System must not be considered as a counter-system against the First System and the Second System. It may be more effective in those realms where "development" is hampered by dominant interests of national security and corporative profit which are mutually antagonistic and contradictory. The Third System may become a more
representative expression of the "general will" of people of all nations. The explicitation and implementation of this "general will" through the Third System might complement and correct the decisions and policies of the First and Second Systems.

In countries where "development" has not proceeded to advanced levels, both the First and the Second Systems are weak. Third World countries do not have states and transnational corporations strong enough to withstand the military and economic aggression of industrial countries. At present about 95 per cent of all scientists are living and working in those highly industrialized countries. When they feel a true solidarity with the underprivileged people everywhere in the world, they can manifest this solidarity most effectively through the Third System. The Third System is itself an integration of development alternatives both within the industrialized and Third World countries.

Presentation and discussion of lofty ideals must have their consequent effectuation in practical attitudes and actions. Alternative developments are manifest in alternative lifestyles and social groups which are truly living towards their ideals. Scientists must become more alert of alternative developments. They become aware of what is actually happening in the world as expressions of a "general will" by participating in action-research, both in the industrialized and Third World countries, transcending the limitations and barriers, the fictions and fixations of the First and Second systems. Science must have more of public involvement, public opinion-making, decision-making and policy-making. Scientists do not "belong" to separate nation-states or exclusive organizations. Science evolved as a determinate and rational effort of man to understand the world and himself in a process of planned development. Nation-states and transnational corporations are stages within this process of development. Wars and economic exploitation are excessive forms of unequal development. It is a mistake to ascribe them to the decision of states and multinational corporations. The disproportional power and influence of national states and transnational corporations are themselves expressions of one-sided overdevelopment. A well-balanced strategy with development alternatives may contribute to disarmament and equitable development.

THE VALUE OF ENERGY DECISIONS

by Laszlo Bodnar *

1. What are the decisions about?

Life and civilization are based on the use of the radiating and stored solar energy. Thus energy-related decisions deal with life and civilisation.

A high-energy civilization, like ours, is characterized by the extremely vigorous use of stored solar energy. The continued existence of this civilization depends on the continuous supply of energy. An alternative source, the nuclear
option, would reduce our dependence by creating solar processes in non-solar conditions. This option could provide a basis for both a further growth of material wealth and also, either by design or by accident, for a complete collapse of civilized life.

2. Criteria

Energy decisions affect life and civilization and should meet two basic criteriae:

- slowdown in the increase of entropy, and
- recognition of birth-rights of all human beings (global solidarity)

3. Entropy

Population growth and a substantial improvement in living conditions require increased economic activities, increasing demand for resources.

Georgescu-Roegen, one of the leading economists of our time, professor of economics at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, believes that economic activity must not simply cease to grow, but should eventually decline. In his classic book "The Entropy Law and the Economic Process" [1], he applies the entropy law (Second Law of Thermodynamics) to all economic processes. Central to this law is the notion of irreversibility that certain processes go in one direction only and can never be repeated except at far greater cost on the whole. Entropy is a measure of the dissipated energy. The entropy of a closed system always increases, the change being from free energy to dissipated, not the other way around. Entropy is also a measure of disorderliness, dissipated energy in the heat, smoke and ashes represents a more chaotic situation than that before a lump of coal was burned. (An ingot of cooper has low entropy because its atoms are disposed in a more orderly state than they were in the original copper ore. Did the refiner create low entropy in making the ingot? No, because in the smelting he produced far more high entropy).

Economic activities, says Georgescu-Roegen, consist of the continuous and irreversible transportation of low entropy into high. The material output is high entropy in the form of pollution, dissipated matter and heat. Economic development is definitely against the interest of the human species as a whole if its interest is to have a life span as long as it is compatible with its dowry of low entropy. Our present high level of consumption can be only maintained at the expense of the future generations.

For this reason, he has proposed a "minimal bioeconomic program". The main points of this program are as follows:

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- Production of all instruments of war should be prohibited completely.

- Consumption for the sake of fashion, waste of energy and materials in general, should be considered and dealt with as bioeconomic crimes.

- With the productive forces thereby released, industrial nations should help the developing nations to arrive as quickly as possible to a reasonably acceptable level of material well-being.

Global solidarity

According to IBRD estimates, in 1977, the world population was about four billion. Approximately one billion people lived in the high-income, industrialized countries, with $5,000 GNP per capita and 4,000 kg of coal equivalent energy consumption. Another 1.2 billion lived in low-income countries, with $150 income and 52 kg coal equivalent energy consumption per capita. The balance, 1.7 billion was made up by the middle income countries with some $590 GNP and 500 kg coal equivalent energy consumption per capita.

Table 1 sums up the situation as it prevailed in 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>GNP/Cap.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-Income Countries</td>
<td>1,038.1 Million</td>
<td>5,301.0 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle &amp; Low-Income Countries</td>
<td>2,854.1 Million</td>
<td>1,211.3 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,892.2 Million</td>
<td>6,512.3 Billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ratio of GNP per capita: 12.5 industrialized high-income countries; 1.0 middle and low-income countries; and between rich and poor countries is 34:1.

Or to describe the situation in another way, in terms of use of resources: 10 million additional persons in the rich countries are equivalent to 350 million persons in the poor countries of the world. This ratio puts the problem of population explosion in a somewhat different light.

According to World Bank projections by the year 2000 the world population will reach 6.2 billion and of this 1.4 billion will live in high-income countries.
Table 2 illustrates the implications of the assumption that by the year 2000 GNP per capita would only moderately increase (35 per cent) in the high-income countries and the rest of the world would experience a substantial rise in GNP, from $410 in 1977 to $2,290 in 2000. The gap in GNP per capita between high-income countries and the rest of the world would be reduced from 12.5 in 1977 to 3 in 2000.

### Table 2

**Population and Income by 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th></th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th></th>
<th>GNP/Cap.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Million</td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>Billion</td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Income Countries</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>9,618</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>6,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium &amp; Low-Income Countries</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>10,992</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>2,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>20,610</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows that if a substantial increase in GNP per capita in the low and middle-income countries takes place without reducing GNP per capita in the high-income countries the total global product would have to be increased from the present $6,512 billion to $20,610 billion, i.e. by 316 per cent by 2000.

It is safe to assume that a growth of this magnitude would be technologically, economically and ecologically unfeasible.

**Is there any solution?**

The future depends on the positive accommodation of the following two considerations:

- the maximum reduction that rich nations are willing to take in their material well being, including use of energy, and
- the minimum improvement that poor nations are willing to accept on behalf of a common effort to prolong the time span of the human race facing finite resources, or put in a more positive form: to establish and maintain an ecological balance with nature.
The increase and redistribution of material wealth is closely related to energy. Therefore, as long as solar energy stocks and viable energy options are in the hands of power and profit seekers, any attempt to reach a reasonable compromise between the poor and rich nations of the world is doomed to failure.

What is required is the establishment of a World Energy Bank in control of all major energy sources. The operation of the World Energy Bank would be based on the following principles:

1. Unconditional supply of agreed minimum energy needs of all human beings regardless of their ability to pay.

2. A progressively increasing share of poor and middle-income countries to meet their negotiated and agreed population and economic targets.

3. A progressively declining conventional energy quota for industrialized countries with re-assessed social-economic targets and increasing dependence on safe, non-conventional energy sources.

A World Energy Bank operating with these basic considerations would be in the best interests of both energy suppliers and users.

If these considerations appear to be naive or preposterous, then what are the options?

PESTICIDE DUMPING PROGRESS REPORT

Millions of pounds of pesticides banned or severely restricted in the United States are exported to the Third World. Concern is growing about the damage to people in the Third World and the hazards posed to Americans who eat imported food sprayed with these poisons. But nowhere is there a comprehensive, documented analysis of global pesticide dumping and what we can do.

To meet this need, David Weir and Mark Schapiro of the Oakland-based Center for Investigative Reporting are writing a book for the Institute, 'Circle of Poison: Pesticides in the Hungry World', to be published this fall. They have interviewed over 100 chemical workers, government officials and chemical manufacturers' representatives and compiled a list of all pesticides manufactured for export, including the names and addresses of the manufacturers. In addition to uncovering the industry's role, they will present the first systematic explanation of how our tax dollars help to facilitate dangerous pesticide trade.

Their article, together with others documenting the dumping by American corporations of contraceptives, drugs, toys and other products in the Third World, has received two national awards, including the National Magazine Award for reporting excellence. For copies of the 24-page reprint of "The Corporate Crime of the Century", send $.85 to Mother Jones Reprint Service, 625 Third Street, 4th floor, San Francisco, CA 94107.
AID THAT DOESN'T

by Frances Moore Lappe, Joseph Collins and David Kinley

The report of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger was issued in December 1979. A synopsis of that document might read:

The basic cause of hunger is poverty. The solution lies in the greater political will of government officials and vastly increased foreign assistance, particularly from the United States. The actors are nations and government officials; the recipients are the poor.

The series of assumptions underlying these conclusions cohere into a world view that is shared by millions. In this short space we cannot hope to supplant it; we hope only to challenge it.

According to the Commission: "Poverty is the root cause of hunger today." Although the report mentions the "inequitable distribution of resources and income" as one "condition of poverty," the roots of such inequality are not central to its diagnosis of hunger, nor in any way related to the solutions proposed by the Commission. The Commission's analysis focuses on poverty, but poverty, like hunger, is an effect. To get to the cause of hunger one must ask why people are poor. The answer is that some people are poor because they lack the power to secure the income, food and housing they need. This difference in phrasing is not a semantic quibble. To speak of power is to focus on the relationships among people. Only in so doing can we get to the roots of social problems.

So many go hungry where adequate and even plentiful food resources exist because a relative few have the power to monopolize control over those resources. Such concentration of economic and political power is tightening in many countries on the village and national levels as well as on the level of international trade.

By contrast, identifying poverty as the cause of hunger leads to a focus on the provision of things to alleviate poverty - inputs and capital works to increase productivity and production. But unless the more basic issue of power is first confronted, gain from such improvements will invariably be appropriated by those already in advantaged positions.

We can identify this pattern in country after country. In a Bangladesh village, tubewells designed to benefit the poorest farmers become the property of the village's richest landlord. In Haiti, food-for-work projects intended to help

1/ Published in Christianity and Crisis, Vol. 40, No. 5, March 31, 1980. Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins are co-founders of the Institute for Food and Development Policy and authors of Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity (Ballantine). David Kinley is a member of the staff of the Institute. (2588 Mission Str., San Francisco, CA 94110, U.S.A.).
the landless poor end up as a boon to the village elite. In Indonesia, rural electrification justified as a prerequisite to jobs in rural industries results in the elimination of the jobs of thousands of poor rural women.

If, then, power is the underlying issue, how can we confront it?

The answer is that we cannot address the issue of power for other people. We do, however, have the responsibility to address the growing concentration of economic power in our own society. Moreover, while as outsiders we cannot empower people who are now oppressed abroad, we can and should help to remove the mighty obstacles in their way, particularly those obstacles that are being reinforced with our tax dollars and in our name.

ROADBLOCKS MADE IN U.S.A.

Those obstacles include 1) official US foreign aid that concentrates its support on some of the world's most repressive regimes; 2) military assistance and sales that amount to four times the development project aid to the Third World, and also that are used to entrench elite-dominated and repressive regimes (our military aid to the Philippines, for example, is expected to more than double in 1980); and 3) US Government-aided corporate interventions in the economies of the Third World (again, such investments, subsidized by our tax dollars, give ruling elites a greater-than-ever stake both in resisting redistribution of control and in expanding their hold over local resources). These are some of the key obstacles in the way of the hungry abroad as they organize for power over their country's resources. Our responsibility is to expose these obstacles and help remove them.

In contrast, the Commission prescribes greater-than-ever US foreign assistance as our contribution to solving world hunger. In calling for a tripling of US foreign assistance (as a percentage of GNP), the Commission appears to accept the claims of aid policymakers that aid is now oriented toward meeting the basic needs of the poor and toward countries where poverty is the worst and to governments most concerned about the poor.

We challenge these claims. US bilateral assistance is highly concentrated on a few countries, with 10 countries receiving well over half the total. Israel and Egypt alone receive a full 40 percent. Of the top 10 recipients, only four are considered low income. Among the top 10 are the Governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh. In each of these countries vast increases in foreign assistance in the last decade have gone hand in hand with the increasing impoverishment and repression of the majority of the people.

In the Philippines, for example, while rice production increased by two-thirds over the 15 years prior to 1976 and the Government now encourages rice exports, the Government's anti-people policies have made the Filipino people, with the exception of Cambodians, the poorest fed in all of Asia.

The basic fallacy embodied in the Commission's "more US aid" prescription is the assumption that aid can be designed to reach the powerless even though channeled through the powerful. Official foreign assistance necessarily flows through recipient governments and these governments (particularly those the US chooses to aid) represent narrow, elitist economic interests. Foreign aid has
not played a transforming role - transforming an anti-democratic economic control by a few into a participatory, democratic process of change. It cannot. Rather, official foreign aid reinforces the power relationships that already exist. Certainly this is the case with government-to-government aid. Only with great care can the infection of resources through private ("voluntary") agencies avoid these same dynamics.

ILLUSION AND REALITY

The actors in the tragic drama of world hunger are seen by the Commission as "developing nations" or the "developing world". National leaders are put forth as the initiators of change. "Hunger," we are told, "reflects lack of sufficient political will." And the problem of hunger will only get worse "unless the indifference of many national leaders is replaced by concern and commitment".

Such formulations obscure a basic truth. Nations do not exist as entities that will end hunger; nations are made up of many competing interests, not a community of interests. Whether hunger can be eliminated will largely depend on the outcome of the struggle among those competing interests. This has been the experience of every country where hunger has been eliminated. To call for change in the political will of those now in power in most countries is to ask for those benefiting from the current distribution of control over productive resources to take the initiative for change. Not only is such a call naive; it contributes to policies that shore up repressive regimes and diverts attention from the true responsibilities of Americans.

The responsibility of Americans does not lie in intervening to make the elite classes help "their poor". Hunger will never be ended by the poor becoming recipients of the largesse of the well-off. Just as it is by the sweat and blood of the poor that much of the food and luxuries of the well-off are produced, so it is the poor who must organize themselves to overcome their powerlessness.

With this understanding and with the knowledge that in every country where many go hungry there is already movement for change, the appropriate role of Americans is to help remove the obstacles in the way of those working for change, particularly those, like the three outlined above, for which US citizens bear direct responsibility. In some countries, like the Philippines and El Salvador, the resistance and drive for greater justice is increasingly well organized; in others, like Haiti, it appears just to be beginning. Yet in either case, a prime responsibility for us is to stop supporting the enemies of such efforts.

By contrast, the two key recommendations of the Presidential Commission - increased US foreign aid and stronger political will - add greater material help and legitimacy to the very forces of concentrated economic and political power that stand directly, and in many instances brutally, opposed to change. Those ready to address the outrage of needless hunger should work to end such support for the adversaries of the poor and their allies - beginning with exposing the true uses and impact of foreign economic and military aid.
THE LESSON FROM OPEC

Hazel Henderson had this to say in an interview to Omni (May 1980):

Omni: How has our experience with OPEC been a lesson?

Henderson: I think it was the only shock that could make us realize how far out of line with the rest of the world our energy consumption has been. At the outset OPEC was vilified as a dreadful cartel. Now some of us realize that it was the best thing that could have happened to help us adapt. Now that the cartel has broken on the upside and there's petroleum selling at forty dollars a barrel on the spot market, we're going to be praying for OPEC to hold the line. We may even realize how much of the OPEC price increase has been simply an attempt to compensate for the dollar's declining value.

In another interview (to the East West Journal, March 1980) Hazel commented on 'economics as a form of brain damage':

EWJ: You describe economics in your book, "Creating Alternative Futures", as a "pseudoscience" and as "a form of brain damage". Why are economists so myopic?

HH: It's because they have a very neat linear model of the world. It's totally divorced from the basic laws of physics, biology, bioproductivity - the real world of nature. Economists have their little models of supply and demand, input and output, and all of those fairly simplistic ways of viewing the world so that anything else that goes on will be an "external" variable. So if you have a nonlinear system that is jumping around all over the place and you're using such an inadequate map, it's like using a little flashlight to light up the situation. The economists have a flashlight stabbing away at the dark, and there's no way that any kind of policy directions can flow out of that sort of approach.

It's a great danger to let those people stay in charge. That's why I have personally felt so missionary the past ten years of my life about the need to defrock that particular priesthood which bestrides the resource allocations process in most industrial countries. The economists have to be exposed as charlatans. We have to have much more complex interdisciplinary policy models, and those will not emerge as long as we have the economists telling us that they know what to do.

A LETTER FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF WORK COOPERATIVES OF NEW SOUTH WALES (AUSTRALIA) 1/

The above Association is presently in the planning stage. It will consist of about twenty small workers co-operatives in New South Wales, Australia, with a total membership of about 250. The Co-operatives are the beginnings of a growing movement happening simultaneously in widely scattered locations throughout the State (population about 5 million) both urban and country. The industrial services provided are mostly in the manufacturing sector with fibreglass products, metal fabrication and woodworking predominating. There are some service sector business ranging from retailing, catering, rubbish recycling, home maintenance etc. to labour contracting.

Our special interests lie in the fields of:-

a) the decentralization of industry (and decision making)

b) technology appropriate to small scale production

c) new markets in energy alternatives, transport and waste recycling

d) a more informed approach to local ownership

e) worker self management

f) jobs created through viable Co-operative businesses

g) learning by doing and developing new skills

One of the major reasons for writing is that we feel so out of touch down here to much of what we hear is happening in Europe. Successes in the above fields are gleaned from European and North American publications, discussed, theorised, transferred into the Australian context and attempts made at putting it all into practice. With a bit of struggle, we seem to be getting somewhere, though three of our members have had to close down recently (in, 1) fish marketing, 2) bicycle repair, renovation and accessory manufacture and 3) contract cleaning). Skills and markets are the main problems as finance has been available for two years from the N.S.W. State Labour Government which, while not being fully attuned to our objectives, has been very supportive.

We are really looking for contacts, information exchanges and technical sources which may help us and others here (and you too - feedback!) in practically examining our processes and structures in order to ensure better management and potential.

1/ c/o Alan Greig, Strivettes Lane, Balmain, N.S.W., Australia 204.
INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING ETHICS PROJECT

A research project - to identify and examine the ethical conflicts and dilemmas facing engineers practicing in a culture other than their own - is currently being undertaken by an engineer/philosopher team. Although international business ethics and public policy concerning technology transfer have received some discussion, this project will concentrate on the ethical problems confronting the individual engineer engaged in some particular engineering project in another culture.

It is believed that this study is the first of its kind. The co-directors, Dr. E. C. Jones of Iowa State University, an engineer with international experience, and Dr. C. A. Smith of the University of Missouri-Rolla, a philosopher working in the area of engineering ethics, say that, to their knowledge, "almost no attention has been paid to the ethical problems confronting individual engineers who find themselves at the interface with another culture and who must cope."

Conflicts can arise for anyone working in another culture with alternative customs and with alternative conceptions of justice, welfare, public interest, the good life, treatment of minorities, etc. But in addition to such general concerns, this project will address specifically the ethical dilemmas that arise within all areas of engineering work: design, implementation, management, worker relations and interaction with local institutions such as political, legal, regulatory, economic, religious or educational.

The design and implementation of a technological system for another culture may reinforce or conflict with the values and way of life of that culture, the project culture. Design of the workplace provides a situation illustrating such effects; the workplace can be designed to accommodate or violate the social relations, roles, status and stratification in the project culture. The engineer's conviction that social stratification of workers in inefficient and/or reprehensible may have to be balanced against worker dissatisfaction with any arrangements that violate such stratification. In like manner, a project culture that has a different valuation of safety and health can present design conflicts, as can alternative attitudes toward the environment, resources, and getting one's hands dirty in "hands-on" work.

A second area of conflict concerns management styles - the management expectations of the project culture may hold many surprises for the engineer. Leadership styles necessary for acceptance can be personally or morally repugnant to the engineer. Alternative conceptions and values of the project culture can present ethical dilemmas in labor relations; when equal treatment of all violates the social roles of the project culture: when petty thievery is regarded as a fringe benefit or is the result of alternative views of property; when hiring and firing practices conflict with cultural practices. Alternative conceptions of "who is a worker" can also present problems; for example, local exclusion of certain individuals or groups because of taboo or prejudice, or a high valuation of total group participation including those who are inefficient or present safety problems.
Engineers must interact professionally with local institutions. Alternative laws, legal institutions and enforcement mechanisms can obviously raise ethical questions for the engineer. But conflicts may also arise where there are alternative economic assumptions and practices: haggling, "just price" assumptions, bribery, or the belief that buying and selling are personal relations involving introductions and paid go-betweens. Similarly, alternative political practices can present problems; for example, in relations with local political leaders, in gaining approval for plans and procedures, in handling political pressures, etc. (Areas of political instability obviously create another set of special problems.) Dealing with regulatory agencies having unfamiliar procedures and/or alternative sets of regulations is another area of potential conflict for the engineer, particularly if the regulations are weaker than those the engineer is used to, or if the rationale for the regulations is not understood or is judged to be reprehensible, or if the regulations are commonly ignored in the project culture.

Engineers will experience culture shock involving alternative lifestyles and customs in the project culture. Some of these cultural differences may be judged personally or morally repugnant. In similar fashion, the engineer's actions may raise questions in the project culture. The social interactions of the engineer with local groups can also raise questions concerning the apparent (or real) identification with a particular social class or group. A different set of questions may be raised if the engineer remains aloof in an enclave of his or her own nationality. Experience of cultural differences can effect the engineer's perceptions of the project culture and the culture's perceptions of him or her, and lead to "professional culture shock" that can create ethical conflicts on the job or exacerbate the conflicts already noted.

The co-directors of this project are currently engaged in collecting more detailed information and establishing a network of contacts. It is expected that an analysis of these situations will aid in the identification and anticipation of such difficulties, will aid engineers in handling such situations, and will help to minimize stress for both the engineer and the project culture. Individuals who can contribute to this study, particularly those with first-hand experiences, are asked to contact either Professor E. C. Jones, Department of Electrical Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, or Professor C. A. Smith, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri 65401. All information received will be treated confidentially.

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MÉDITERRANÉE: VISION, DRAME, ESPoir
par Mahdi Elmandjra

La Méditerranée c'est 21 pays, 310 millions d'habitants et un Produit Intérieur Brut de près de 1,000 milliards de dollars. Cette région se résume en trois mots qui caractérisent son passé et son présent et peut-être son avenir: VISION, DRAME et ESPoir.

VISION

Berceau de plusieurs civilisations et des trois grandes religions monotheistes, la Méditerranée est une terre de visions où l'homme occupe une position centrale soit en tant qu'individu soit en tant qu'élément de groupe qu'il s'agisse de la famille ou de la tribu ou de la région. Le colloque qui vient de s'achever a longuement traité de cette question lors de l'examen des points concernant la famille, la condition féminine comme lors de celui ayant trait aux valeurs socio-culturelles. Pour chaque affirmation il y avait au moins deux contre-affirmations et plusieurs interrogations sans réponse. Le fait est que malgré une certaine unité dans le temps et dans l'espace, la Méditerranée présente de grandes diversités entre le Nord et le Sud, l'Est et l'Ouest. C'est peut-être pour cela que Fernand Braudel parle de "destins collectifs" au pluriel. Pour ce qui est de la condition féminine, tout le monde s'accorde à constater qu'elle laissait beaucoup à désirer sur la rive Sud et qu'elle était loin d'être parfaite sur la rive Nord. Certains ont établi un lien direct entre les structures de la famille qui n'avaient pas évolué particulièrement dans le Sud et la condition de la femme qui est encore trop asservie. On a aussi remarqué que l'image de la femme dans le Nord que ce soit à travers le contenu des mass média ou des manuels scolaires n'est pas à la hauteur des principes d'égalité qu'affichent ses sociétés.

La famille en tant qu'institution n'est pas mise en cause car c'est un des grands acquis de la société méditerranéenne, mais c'est son archaïsme et ses mécanismes de reproduction excessivement conservateurs qui constituent de sérieux obstacles à l'amélioration de la condition féminine. C'est à travers l'éducation - une éducation qui stimule l'imagination, favorise la création et l'innovation - que l'on pourra espérer de véritables changements. L'action au niveau de la législation est également efficace mais son respect est assez lent car il requiert une transformation des structures mentales.

La réflexion sur la condition féminine et sur la famille même nécessairement à l'analyse du changement social et du contexte économique qui le conditionne. On a indiqué que l'unité de la Méditerranée ressortait d'abord du fait qu'elle

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a été mise à l'écart des fruits de la révolution industrielle, tels que le travail salarié de la femme. On a aussi dit que sans l'émancipation de l'homme il n'y aurait pas d'émancipation de la femme.

La discussion sur les valeurs socio-culturelles a mis en lumière le contraste, en Méditerranée, entre une vision humaniste, généreuse et solidaire d'une part, et la non-homogénéité dans les faits et la situation d'infériorité par rapport au monde industrialisé d'autre part. La spécificité de la Méditerranée se réduit-elle aujourd'hui à sa marginalité dans la préparation du monde post-industriel qui est déjà à nos portes? Pour certains, la réponse est oui; pour d'autres, le constat est plus nuancé. La civilisation de la Méditerranée n'a pas perdu la bataille - elle est seulement distanciée car si l'Europe industrielle s'est acharnée à maîtriser la matière, la Méditerranée a toujours essayé de maîtriser l'esprit et favoriser l'élément humain et spirituel. La tradition joue encore un rôle primordial en Méditerranée mais il s'agit d'une tradition statique et figée qui n'évolue que par mimétisme et où le regard est sans cesse orienté vers l'extérieur. D'où la crise d'identité culturelle quand il ne s'agit d'aliénation tout court. Permettez-moi de me référer une fois encore à Braudel qui a dit qu'on "reconnait une civilisation à ce qu'elle refuse d'emprunter".

La sensibilité, l'amour, le sens du beau et les valeurs humaines qui caractérisent encore la Méditerranée pourraient contribuer à une véritable relance s'ils pouvaient s'appuyer sur un modèle de développement endogène. Un modèle qui dépasserait le "Know How" pour se préoccuper du "Know Why" qui a toujours été le point fort de la Méditerranée. Sans une remise en cause des modèles de développement - surtout sur la rive Sud - aucun espoir n'est permis. Bien plus que de remise en cause c'est de "ruptures" qu'il faut parler car comme l'a dit un des participants "le regard sur l'avenir est toujours un acte de foi qui implique à la fois continuité et rupture". Entretemps les valeurs du passé sont exploitées par les forces dominantes à des fins politiques qui empêchent ces valeurs d'évoluer et d'assurer les transformations socio-culturelles requises pour la satisfaction des aspirations des populations.

LE DRAME

Le drame de la Méditerranée est d'abord son sous-développement économique qui est bien plus accentué dans le Sud. Ce sous-développement est à la fois la cause et la conséquence d'inégalités excessives à l'intérieur des pays et entre les pays. Le revenu per capita en 1978 variait de $400 en Egypte, à $8,300 en France - un rapport de 1 à 20 mais à l'intérieur de l'Egypte comme dans beaucoup de pays de la rive Sud, l'écart entre les plus nantis et les plus pauvres atteint souvent le ratio de 1 à 60. D'où le problème de la redistribution qui dépasse les formalités diplomatiques du soi-disant "dialogue" Nord-Sud ou de la "charité" bilatérale mais qui requiert une véritable restructuration du système économique international.

L'autre volet du drame méditerranéen est les conflits armés qui n'ont cessé de miner ce bassin. Il est pertinent de constater qu'à l'exception de la crise Chypriote, tous les conflits armés depuis la fin de la 2ème guerre mondiale se sont passés dans les pays non-Européens de la Méditerranée - aucun de ces 9 pays n'y a échappé.
Le drame est que la Méditerranée est un territoire constamment agressé politiquement, militairement, économiquement, comme sur les plans culturel et écologique. Comme l'a encore dit un des intervenants "La Méditerranée est un volcan et non un lac". Un volcan qui explosera encore plus souvent au cours de la présente décennie et qui verra une accentuation de confrontations et de conflits dont les causes seront essentiellement d'ordre culturel.

L'ESPOIR

Oui, mais la Méditerranée est aussi espoir et espérance. Le pessimisme pour l'immédiat est la justification de l'espoir pour le long terme. La Méditerranée doit surmonter le poids des hégémonismes politiques, économiques et culturels qui l'étouffent pour retrouver la richesse de sa diversité et de son pluralisme. L'espoir réside dans la place qu'occupe le facteur humain dans toute démarche méditerranéenne même si encore trop de pays de la région bafouent actuellement les droits de l'homme les plus élémentaires. L'espoir c'est aussi les nouvelles générations qui sont et seront de moins en moins complexées à l'égard du modèle de civilisation industrielle qui a joué son rôle, fait son temps et se prépare à rejoindre soit le garage soit le musée. L'espoir c'est l'affaiblissement du rôle de l'Etat-Nation et la formation de grands ensembles économiques régionaux de 200 à 300 millions de personnes sans lesquelles aucun véritable développement ne pourra se faire dans l'avenir. L'espoir et le rêve ce sont la mise sur pied d'ensembles africains et arabes qui, avec la Communauté économique européenne, pourraient mener à un ensemble méditerranéen inter-communautaire.

La réalisation d'un tel ensemble inter-communautaire devra cependant attendre l'intégration économique de l'Afrique et celle des pays arabes pour permettre des discussions un peu plus équilibrées. Entretemps les pays du Nord de la Méditerranée devraient faire preuve de pudeur politique, économique et culturelle et ne pas précipiter un "trilogue" qui risquerait de n'être qu'un "monologue" néocolonialiste.

L'espoir c'est l'établissement d'un système de communication à double sens qui favoriserait la mobilité des hommes, des idées et des biens dans la meilleure des traditions méditerranéennes qui s'est trop altérée par un esprit mercantile où les hommes sont soit des touristes qu'on manipule soit des travailleurs migrants qu'on exploite. L'espoir, c'est l'identité et l'enracinement.

Ceux-ci ne représentent pas une démarche purement affective et sentimentale qui regarde uniquement vers le passé. Il s'agit à partir de ce passé toujours fertile de faire face aux défis et ruptures que confronte la Société méditerranéenne et d'arrêter les chocs et défigurations qui harcèlent la région et d'inventer ensemble des solutions à la problématique de crise qui est également une crise de civilisation. La fausse dichotomie tradition-avenir est dépassée. Il est question de transformation pour survivre selon des modèles librement choisis au lieu de subir pour survivre dans le mimétisme.

Ce qui est spécifiquement méditerranéen et commun à toutes les cultures de cette région, c'est une interrogation sans cesse renouvelée qui fonde sa vision de l'être humain et de son devenir. Cette vision est humaniste et universelle.
Elle est la clé de la compréhension des systèmes de valeurs socio-culturels méditerranéens.

Ce colloque a confirmé - au cas où il y aurait eu un doute - que la Méditerranée existe toujours et que même si elle est actuellement malade, les valeurs qui la sous-tendent et la diversité de ses cultures lui assureront de meilleurs jours dans un avenir qui valorisera l'esprit et l'homme et sans lesquels il ne saurait y avoir d'avenir pour personne.

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**PERIODICALS**

*Public Enterprise*, Vol. 1 No. 1: a new journal quarterly published by the International Center for public enterprises in developing countries. It replaces the 'Bulletin' which ICPE has been publishing for the past five years (P.O. Box 92, 61109 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia).

*Crítica y utopía*. El número 2. Continua con la publicación de textos preparados originariamente para la primera conferencia regional de CLACSO sobre 'Condiciones Sociales de la democracia', realizado en Costa Rica, entre el 16 y el 20 de octubre de 1978 y del que se dio cuenta en el número anterior de Crítica & Utopía. (Alsina 500, Piso 20, 1087 Buenos Aires, Argentina).

*Economía de América Latina*, es una Revista semestral, editada en español desde 1978 por el Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), de México. Su objetivo es contribuir al conocimiento actualizado y a la comprensión de la realidad latinoamericana. A esos efectos, brinda información y análisis de los principales fenómenos y las tendencias más relevantes, tanto a nivel global como de las situaciones nacionales específicas. La Revista pretende ser cuna de inquietudes y constituir un medio de expresión de diversas líneas de pensamiento de todos aquellos que aspiran a un destino autónomo, libre y pleno de los países latinoamericanos, respetando su diversidad y su contexto. La publicación está principalmente destinada a centros académicos, científicos sociales, estudiantes, instituciones y, en general, a personas interesadas en la economía de América Latina. (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Ap. Postal 41-655, Mexico 10 DF, Mexico).
This volume is the product of several seminars jointly organized by the Centre for Research on the New International Economic Order, Oxford and the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen as part of the IFDA Third System project. The seminars brought together both academics and practitioners in the field of international economic diplomacy; the papers, and the extracts from the discussion contained in the volume are therefore an unevenly blended cocktail. Arjun Sengupta in an excellent and extensive Introduction, however, provides the right aperitif.

The commodities section in the volume appear the more interesting although its strength lies more in its analysis than in the policy conclusions. There is still no consensus as to the right thing to be done in relation to international trade in commodities. Is price stabilization the major objective or the stabilization of earnings or both? Or are they alternatives? Are compensatory financing schemes adequate to deal with the cyclical problems? The significance of the Common Fund depends on the window through which we peep.

The problem is that the entire commodity issue is looked upon from a "mutual interest" angle increasingly becoming the fashion of the "moderates" and the central figures in the North-South negotiating process. The danger is that such a perspective might now be largely irrelevant. Changes in the power structure and that includes international trade in commodities will not be brought about by the goodwill of Western or Eastern governments. The role of producer associate and a rationale for the mobilization of unilateral, countervailing action by producing countries to obtain an improved bargain are not mentioned. Prof. Helleiner in the course of the discussion urges the need to question "some of these deeply rooted orthodoxies" and "to work on the theoretical and empirical foundations of economic and political analysis". This is exactly what should be done in the commodities sector and bearing particularly in mind the not so ineffective strength of commodity producing countries.

The sections on Finance and Trade are useful but lack comprehensive coverage of the salient issues. Of the 400 pages the latter 150 pages of the volume constitute extracts from the discussion and some really good pickings are to be found. The extracts are superbly organized and in these pages one feels the vibrations of the political reality of North-South relations. One finds at last a discussion of whether the strategies of the South were right or wrong, adequate or inadequate. The discussion is probably inadequate, but it is a good start and hopefully the search for alternatives should now be on. (L.de S).
THE IFDA DOSSIER IN 1981

The IFDA Dossier, which appeared twenty times during the last three years will become, next year, a quarterly. And we are asking those who can afford it to contribute to its financing.

As indicated in Dossier 1 (January 1978), the IFDA Dossier was to be published 'whenever there is material available'. We did not intend originally to publish it so often. However, the third system project, which absorbed most of IFDA energies between 1978 and last summer, provided so many papers that we had to carry the burden of a monthly and later a bi-monthly publication.

Whilst continuing to attempt to help the third system and in particular the unheard voices to express themselves and to facilitate the exchange of ideas and information on alternatives, the time has now come for IFDA to work in a less hectic manner. As part of our consolidation and our adopting our own 'cruising speed', we will prepare four Dossiers a year and mail them, in principle, in January, April, July and October.

The new pace will make it possible to mail it by surface, which will mean substantial savings. Some time may thus elapse between your receipt of this present issue (mailed directly to 8,500 addresses in all regions) and that of Dossier 21.

Further, we receive so many requests for subscriptions that it has been decided to ask a price from those who can afford to pay it and are prepared to participate in our effort towards autonomy. They should hopefully include most of our readers in the industrialized countries. The subscription prices will be as follows:

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