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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The people of Jamaica may vote in October. May: that is, if international solidarity and vigilance are strong enough to avoid the repetition of the 1973 Chilean scenario. Jamaicans may decide whether they want to pursue the people-oriented course of development they have democratically opted for most recently in 1976, or whether, the conservative opposition, supported by the International Monetary Fund and its anti-development and illegitimate policies, will have the upper hand. The crisis of Jamaica typifies the crisis of the South.

In the North, the crisis is deepening. The OECD foresees that unemployment will affect 23 million people by mid-1980 (7% of the active population) and especially the youth (13%) and, in Italy and France, young women (40%). Inflation continues unabated, resulting in a massive transfer of resources from the people (South and North alike) to the economic power structure. The hegemony of its vested interests and the shortsightedness of most governments further reduce the space for genuine development, nationally as well as internationally.

Six years after the launching of the NIEO, things are getting worse. These years have witnessed many North-South 'negotiations' and a number of inter-governmental South-South meetings. Still, with the modest exception of the UNCTAD Common Fund for the integrated programme for commodities, there is no progress. The United Nations Committee on the Whole, supposed to organize the New Round of Global Negotiations, ended its last meeting without any result. The preparations for the New International Development Strategy appear to be in a stalemate, and the prospects for the August-September UN General Assembly Special Session on development and international cooperation look very dim indeed.

Contrasting with this, unusual meetings took place in Arusha, Tanzania, in July during a South-North Conference on the International Monetary System and the N10. Hugh Small, Jamaican Finance Minister, and Amir Jamal, Tanzanian Finance Minister, not only participated in the Conference, but had private talks. So did Tanzanian Trade Minister Ibrahim Kaduma and Tunisian former Trade Minister Ahmed Ben Salah. Informal discussions took place between policy makers from the South and progressive parliamentarians and political militants from the North.

What is still unusual should become usual. To face the crisis, like-minded people from both the South and the North should get together systematically to discuss and formulate solutions, exchange experiences and strengthen their solidarity. Arusha should be the forerunner of a new type of direct, non-diplomatic, links among Third World countries and between progressive forces from both South and North. This is the way out of the present predicament, whether it affects one country, like Jamaica today, the Third World, or all the world’s people.

(See Markings, pp. 91-102 below, for the texts adopted by the Arusha South-North Conference).
Abstract: Despite almost universal endorsement of human rights and democratic rule, the majority of humankind is currently governed in a repressive militarized manner. Authoritarian rule is especially prevalent throughout the Third World.

For many reasons, there is an international authoritarian structure that interacts and complements various national structures. Its stability is sustained, to the extent possible, by ideological forms of hegemony. Appeals to nationalism or to dynastic and political myths are made to rationalize what is happening, especially to obscure the dominance of outsiders in relation to processes of capital formation and distribution. Persuasive techniques generally are insufficient in national situations of manifest dependency. Hence, the reliance on para-military and military instruments of power to maintain stability.

One of the purposes of this project has been to discover whether economic and political "space" exists within Third World countries to propose and promote non-authoritarian images of development. A normative postulate of this inquiry is to regard the question "development for what?" to be answered as follows: "production to meet basic human needs" for the overwhelming majority of the population, as well as an economic process guided by autonomous national forces.

AUTORITARISME ET DEVELOPPEMENT: UNE PERSPECTIVE GLOBALE

Résumé: En dépit de l'adhésion quasi universelle aux principes des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie, la majorité de l'humanité est à l'heure actuelle gouvernée par des régimes militaires répressifs. L'autoritarisme est particulièrement répandu dans le Tiers Monde.

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Une structure autoritaire internationale est le complément de diverses structures nationales. Sa stabilité est maintenue, dans la mesure du possible, par les formes idéologiques de l'hégémonie. On utilise le nationalisme ou des mythes dynastiques ou politiques pour justifier ce qui se passe réellement, notamment pour obscurer la domination extérieure dans les processus de l'accumulation du capital et de la distribution. Les techniques de persuasion sont généralement insuffisantes dans des situations de dépendance manifeste. D'où le recours à des instruments de pouvoir militaires ou paramilitaires.

L'un des objectifs de ce projet a été de découvrir s'il existe un espace économique et politique, dans les pays du Tiers Monde, pour formuler et proposer une vision non autoritaire du développement. Un postulat normatif de cette enquête a été de répondre de la façon suivante à la question 'Développement pour quoi?': pour satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux de la grande majorité de la population par le moyen d'un processus économique guidé par des forces nationales autonomes.

AUTORITARISMO Y DESARROLLO: UNA PERSPECTIVE GLOBAL

Resumen: A pesar del aval casi universal del principio de derechos humanos y de la doctrina política democrática, la gran mayoría de la humanidad queda actualmente bajo gobiernos repressivos y militares. El autoritarismo predomina en las formas de gobierno en el Tercer Mundo.

Por varias razones, existe una estructura autoritaria internacional que obra reciprocamente y como complemento de las estructuras nacionales. En gran parte las formas ideológicas de hegemonía sostienen su estabilidad. Se recurre al nacionalismo o a mitos dinásticos y políticos para racionalizar lo que ocurre, y especialmente para ofuscar el papel dominante de forasteros en relación a los procesos para la formación de capital y la distribución. Por lo general la persuasiva no es suficiente en situaciones nacionales de dependencia manifiesta. Por lo tanto es necesario depender de los instrumentos militares para mantener la estabilidad.

Un fin de este proyecto ha sido de descubrir si existe dentro de los países del Tercer Mundo un espacio político y económico para promover y proponer conceptos no autoritarios de desarrollo. El postulado normativo es de preguntarse 'desarrollo para qué?' y la respuesta debe ser la siguiente: 'producción para cumplir con las necesidades humanas básicas para la gran mayoría del pueblo dentro de un proceso económico dirigido por fuerzas nacionales autónomas'. 
The overwhelming majority of humankind is currently governed in a repressive militarized manner. Authoritarian rule is especially prevalent throughout the Third World.

Two types of general analyses exist to explain this prevalence of authoritarian rule. The first type concentrates on domestic factors, especially the political economy of state-building. There are many variations among such explanations, but their common feature is a stress on the mode of capital accumulation process relied upon to achieve economic priorities. One feature of these explanations concerns the fairness of income distribution patterns and policies, as well as the degree of progress achieved in relation to the elimination of mass poverty. Political awareness is steadily increasing in Third World societies, and is closely associated with rapidly rising rates of urbanization. In these circumstances economic unfairness or inefficiency generates popular unrest on a scale that can usually be inhibited only through repressive techniques of government - hence, it is not surprising that authoritarian rule emerges, nor is it surprising that it assumes many forms. The political center, expressed through moderate forms of governance including a constrained state and a balance between the public and private sector, does not respond to either the cultural or economic imperatives of the Third World. Both the weight of tradition and the gravity of the economic situation polarize the political context. At present, additional exceptional pressures on the governing process, regardless of its ideological identity, also arise from demographic trends (an unprecedented period of explosive population increase and rapid rural-urban migration patterns) and from aroused psycho-political expectations. One thing the right and left have in common is an underdeveloped sensitivity to abuses of state power. Hence, it is virtually inevitable, at least at this historical stage, that polarized politics produces authoritarian rule in some form. In time, through the negative experience of authoritarian rule, a wider appreciation of democratic values is emerging and influencing thought and action across the entire political spectrum. But, by and large, the turn away from authoritarianism in the Third World remains a hope for the future.

As matters currently stand, domestic explanations of authoritarian rule hold for ideological fixes on the left, as well as for those on the right. Governing processes taking their inspiration from the left stress the expansion of production and the building up of self-reliant national capabilities. The private sector is eliminated or marginalized, and all economic and political power passed to the state. The left-oriented state tends to impose a fairly uniform level of austerity, aggravated by an insistence on ideological conformity generally justified as an aspect of healthy and efficient collective spirit, and as necessary to defend against counterrevolutionary danger.

The ideological right also inclines toward authoritarian solutions. Rightist
leadership often reflects an underlying coalition that includes traditional elites, the military, technocrats, and managers of corporate and banking activities. The right has the distinctive problem of governing an impoverished mass in the face of a manifestly privileged elite, often aligned with and dependent upon outsiders. Such alignment and dependency generally introduces corruption as a pervasive feature, is tied to non-productive and aristocratic land tenure systems and erodes the legitimacy of claims to rule on behalf of the whole society. That is, the misery of the poor can be generally associated in capitalist Third World polities with the manifest abuses of the rich, including deference to foreign interests and cultural values. Given widespread sentiments of resentment among Third World masses, such a structure is not acceptable and can be only sustained through the workings of an efficient bureaucratic machine of repression, backed up to the extent possible by efforts to mystify and mislead public opinion.

These domestic analyses of repression are complemented by international structural analyses of various types: Marxist-Leninist international class analysis, as supplemented by the dependencia school and by post-Marxist structuralism stressing the hierarchical dynamics of core, semi-periphery, and periphery state actors. In effect, the authoritarian internal politics of periphery and semi-periphery (intermediate industrialized states - Brazil, Argentina, South Korea; resource rich states, especially OPEC) states is a highly conditioned, if not virtually inevitable outcome of their dependent integration into the world economic system. A situation of prolonged economic dependency (or imperial control if looked upon from a North-to-South direction) also has cultural effects, including the repression of indigenous social, economic and political patterns.

For many reasons, then, there is an international authoritarian structure that interacts and complements various national structures. Its stability is sustained, to the extent possible, by ideological forms of hegemony. Appeals to nationalism or to dynastic and political myths are made to rationalize what is happening, especially to obscure the dominance of outsiders in relation to processes of capital formation and distribution. Persuasive techniques generally are insufficient in national situations of manifest dependency. Hence, the reliance on para-military and military instruments of power to maintain stability. The international system imposes this requirement of stability as an essential precondition for the attraction of capital from public and private overseas sources, and without such outside capital plans for economic growth are likely to be thwarted. Hence, it is the domestic shortage of capital that underlies the paradox of formal independence being rapidly supplanted by economic dependence throughout the Third World. One expression of this dependence is the existence of high levels of public indebtedness to foreign creditors. Patterns of indebtedness at any level of social organization express a reality of dependence. The other side of dependence is the impulse to control via the exertion of discipline. In essence, this means suppressing the demands and claims of the poor, especially where a large labour reserve exists, as it does, in the Third World. In effect, then, maintaining capital flows requires Third World governments to provide assurance of stability which leads almost inevitably in these circumstances to authoritarianism in some form. These economic elements are reinforced by geopolitical patterns, especially superpower rivalry, in which leading First World states seek to maintain "control" over the internal political life of Third World countries, especially to assure the control of the governing process by sympathetic and stable rulers.
In the present world setting, Third World governments are unable to avoid issues of values as embedded in "development" policy. The liberal fix that has allowed a distribution of benefits such that secures the willing acquiescence of the great majority of populations in the democracies of the North is not generally available to leaders of the South. First of all, the North had available to it the extra wealth and income arising from its exploitation of the South, expressed especially in terms of cheap raw materials, especially energy. Secondly, the working classes of the North, with some notable exceptions, did not assert their demands in any effective form during the early buildup of industrial capitalism. Thirdly, high rates of population growth in the last two decades have added further to escalating demands on governmental capacities, especially for public welfare goods. Fourthly, an altered view of the role of government and the character of human rights such as to confer upon governments the duty to provide and the right of individuals to receive what is needed by way of food, clothing, shelter, health, and education.

It should also be noticed that with the increased assertiveness of the Third World, via OPEC and elsewhere, it is increasingly doubtful whether the liberal option will persist much longer in the North. Increasingly, inflation, unemployment, falling rates of growth are undermining economic policies that depend upon a sufficient surplus to achieve high rates of savings and investment and a rising standard of living for all social classes. In the face of this "crisis", there are predictions from conservative circles (e.g., The Tri-lateral Commission) of "a crisis of democracy" and from progressive circles of an emergent polarization between "left" and "right" in late capitalist polities. That is, the threat of authoritarian rule has clearly become a global problem, engulfing all sectors. Concern cannot be properly confined to the actualities of widespread repression in the Third World. As such, authoritarianism appears to be a world order problem, its character associated with the overall structure of global relations.

What seems evident is that Third World countries will not have an easy time "developing" in non-authoritarian, humane ways. Yet, at the same time, prevailing justification for authoritarian rule, by way of efficiency and growth, are losing their empirical support. One of our purposes in this project has been to discover whether economic and political "space" exists within Third World countries to propose and promote non-authoritarian images of development. A normative postulate of this inquiry is to regard the question "development for what?" to be answered as follows: "production to meet basic human needs" for the overwhelming majority of the population, as well as an economic process guided by autonomous national forces.

In this project, it has been our conviction that the positive possibility of non-authoritarian rule cannot be understood by looking only at the domestic level of economic/political choice and structure. It requires also careful consideration of the biasing pressures that derive from "outside" of the state and are manipulated by external actors in distinctive, obscure, and only partly understood ways. In this regard the interaction of the international economic and political order with that of domestic society becomes a crucial focus of inquiry. In part, this interaction involves grasping the role of transnational corporations and banks, as well as international financial institutions.
in the development process of particular countries (see below summary of Robin Broad's study of transnational impact on Philippines development). This emphasis challenges the conventional wisdom, admittedly questioned more and more from a variety of directions, as to whether foreign investment or even "multilateral aid" is an unmitigated benefit for a poor or debt-burdened country. Such questioning is even more insistent with respect to the development effects of "foreign aid" of a conventional bilateral variety.

With the falling away of formal colonial structures, there had been an orthodox view that the problems of "imperialism" were matters of history. Now, it is evident that the very structure of the international economic, political, and cultural order enables the persistence, although in altered form, of earlier patterns of domination and dependence. New forms emerge to discharge the functions of the old forms, but the continuities are notable, requiring exposure and further struggle. In that sense, the post-colonial nationalism of the Cuban, Nicaraguan, or Iranian Revolutions are of paramount interest (see below for summary of John Cavanagh's Iran study) as are the post-colonial counterrevolutions of such countries as Chile since 1973.

"Geopolitics" in the restricted sense of superpower rivalry, interventionary diplomacy, and spheres of influence plays an important part in imposing the kind of ruling process that is disinclined to non-authoritarian rule. Some new tendencies are evident here too. The use of "surrogate" actors to carry out Third World policing and paramilitary (recruited generally from the semi-periphery) missions is one dimension of this new geopolitics. Covert operations - staging coups, stabilizing "friends", destabilizing "enemies" - is another way by which invisible, or semi-visible, control over the discretionary politics of Third World polities is maintained.

More subtle, perhaps more sinister, are the spread of governing and consumption "needs" that induce an emphasis on militarization (arms purchases) and luxury goods. Sometimes, the interaction is crude and self-evident; the socialization of the Shah included building up his exorbitant appetite for modern armaments, helping to make arms exporters into a growth industry as well as earning dollars to pay the increased costs of oil imports and building manifest links of dependency. At the end of the Shah's rule, as many as 45,000 Americans were in Iran, mainly associated with hyper-modern weapons systems that Iranians could not use or repair on their own. Given that kind of foreign-induced militarization, it is almost inevitable that domestic governance will find itself isolated from the people. In these circumstances, it is inevitable that the political process will grow militarized. In Iran's case, neither the oil cushion, nor the liberalizing tactics of "land reform" and "White Revolution" were able to neutralize any significant element of the social order. In part, the remarkable strength of popular resistance to imperial strategy in Iran reveals the importance of the non-material dimensions of nationalism, especially cultural and religious motivation, but it also suggests the obsolescence of certain "new" forms of imperialism.

After Iran, we are on the verge of a dangerous period of neo-neo imperial "experimentation". The push for "quick reaction" military forces, buttressed by "over-the-horizon" naval forces, a revival of Cold War rhetoric and mood, and a resource-oriented ideology of interventionary diplomacy are elements in the new approach. In the American case, this suggests a new readiness for Vietnam-type enterprises to assure the maintenance of vital zones of control.
over Third World political/economic self-determination. In the Soviet case, it suggests a catching up phase, exemplified by its Vietnam-type intervention in Afghanistan; the Soviet Union tends to be a tactical tempo behind the United States in the persisting superpower "geopolitical race". The effects of such vigorous interventionary capabilities and ventures is certainly to move the Third World target polities in the direction of reliable governing process, which almost certainly entails authoritarian rule of some kind. At best, a defensive outlook by Third World governments worried about the prospect of interventions of any sort will undoubtedly continue to serve as a rationale/rationalization for building up surveillance and anti-subversion bureaucracies, that is, the modern infrastructure of authoritarianism.

In this global setting it is also essential to be aware of the extent to which economic/political/cultural choices in the North affect the extent of needs-oriented development space in the South. The case of "conservation" and "alternate energy" sources, lessened dependence on imported energy, is obviously relevant. To the extent that such dependence is reduced, it correspondingly lessens the impulse to control (and distort) the autonomous politics/economics of Third World countries. It allows for more relaxed, moderate foreign policies to emerge in the North.

But the issues of Northern choice are far more extensive. Export-led growth in armaments production necessarily turns key countries in the North into "pushers", "merchants of death". Conversion plans involving a more productive, needs-oriented deployment of capital in the North would again reduce the pressure on the South to produce needs-oriented exports. This is the time to study this set of interactions as extensively and systematically as possible. For this reason, our project has worked closely with and extended the results of the very ambitious, longer term UNITAR project that examines, especially, the interactive effects of technological choice in various domains of activity in both North and South to assess their effects on development constraints and choices. In the IFDA context, our attempt has been to use the UNITAR data to examine political consequences of technological choice, specifically impacts on the degree and variety of authoritarianism. (Also, IFDA studies have gathered data that has, in turn, influenced the elaboration and sophistication of the UNITAR model, achieving a genuine reciprocity of results.)

III

To illustrate more fully the direction taken in one part of our project, we present here three summaries of country studies. Each study is designed to illuminate a special aspect of the relationship between the global setting and authoritarianism in a Third World national setting. Each illustrates our basic contention: global and national setting mutually reinforce tendencies toward some form of authoritarian politics. The three studies here are a sample of the work so far completed.
The traditional arguments for the emergence of overt authoritarianism (in the guise of Martial Law) in the Philippines in 1972 fail to delve into the neo-colonial system to discover the international roots. Through its domination of the multilateral and bilateral assistance institutions, the United States imposed its power on the Philippine system, constraining the economic, social and political development of its former colony.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) played the strategic role in the evolution of this relationship in the period between the granting of Philippine independence and the declaration of Martial Law through calculated moves to open the economy and achieve discipline. The World Bank and US economic assistance prepared the Philippines for increased exploitation by American interests, both through projects that directly benefited US transnational corporations and through programmes that developed a controlling domestic elite whose concerns meshed with those of the American corporate mind. The key component of force was contributed by US military assistance which gave to the Philippines an understanding of how to control its people, as well as the men and machines to do so.

Together, these international actors played a paramount role both in the transition from import substitution development strategy of the 1950s to export-oriented growth, and, as the requirements of the international system evolved, in the gradual post-World War II transformation towards overt authoritarianism. From that point, these US-backed international institutions worked to hasten the institutionalization of the Martial Law regime, retaining and augmenting privileges for the transnational corporate interests they represented.

Even if Martial Law were officially lifted, little would change for the Philippines. On one level, this observation results from the domestic institutionalization of the Marcos regime, which leaves all Martial Law decrees, general orders and letters of instruction as laws of the land. Yet, such institutions are merely symbols of the international links and, as long as the links remain, there can be no true development for the majority of Filipinos. Marcos himself is not special. His position could be held by any one of a number of the Philippine elite, as he well realizes - which is why he reacts with more alarm over "subversive" actions by members of the political elite than by radical segments of the population.

The old society elite - who had stood in opposition to Marcos and are beginning to stand in opposition again - continue to look (as they were taught many years back) to the US for assistance in putting one of them in Ferdinand Marcos’s place. Until now, the international actors have opted for the uninterrupted stability offered by supporting the Marcos dictatorship. Yet, as the voices of the villagers are raised, the international actors, learning from mistakes in Iran, Nicaragua and South Korea, may well decide that minimizing instability - and avoiding revolution - requires abandoning Marcos and turning to one of the other elites who could cover the iron fist of Martial Law, yet continue to rule in American interests.
The point here is that the subordination of Filipino development policy to the priorities of an external imperial actor is the primary force shaping the national governing process. Authoritarianism emerged as a result of the neo-colonial economic system. Over the past thirty years, the Philippine economic system has become so intimately integrated with these international institutions that formal authoritarianism means much less than in many other countries or, indeed, than it meant in 1972. The Philippines' fate is that of a semi-colonial feudal economy supplying raw materials to the US through transnational corporations backed by international actors who, with an ever stronger grip, lend support and credibility to social and political stability. As long as the Philippines remains an underling in that system, cosmetic changes at the top will bring no real change for the Filipino people.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

by John Cavanagh

The study on Iran examines a thesis, which has several variants, that has been expounded by defenders of the recent Shah's regime: Iran's authoritarian political system allowed, and was indeed essential for, the rigid modernization of the nation's agriculture and industry. Proponents of this thesis encouraged the widespread perception that a mullah-led opposition to "modernization" would have sabotaged the Shah's efforts had they not been kept under firm authoritarian control. It is true that during the most recent stage of authoritarian rule (1953-79), rapid shifts (call them "modernization" if you will) were achieved in agriculture and industry. It is equally true that the shifts were carried through via the regime's suppression of dissenting voices (e.g., the Majlis - Iran's "parliament" - was simply dissolved at the onset of the land reform). This much the evidence does not contest.

The more revealing task, however, is to examine the nature of the "modernization" in both agriculture and industry and to assess who benefitted and by how much, and what brand of overall development was promoted. It is the thesis of this work that the Shah's "modernization" exacerbated income disparities (leaving substantial numbers absolutely worse off), accelerated an urbanization characterized by poverty, reduced many persons' access to food, established an industrial shell completely inappropriate for Iran's long-term needs, and ill-adapted to Iran's capabilities.

With respect to agriculture, first, the reforms left a highly unequal imprint on different classes of the peasantry, failing to improve the economic condition of a large fraction in the countryside. Second, the reforms have failed in production terms, with respect to both yields and agricultural self-sufficiency. Iran dove from a situation of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs in the early 1960s to importing food valued at nearly $1.6 billion in 1976. Finally, increasing numbers of landless peasants and lack of improvement in conditions for certain rural sectors motivated one of the most rapid rural-to-urban migrations in history.

Further, this distorted development was orchestrated by, and benefitted most, the internal and external class groupings that supported authoritarianism. In
this sense, the "modernizations" helped strengthen the very structure of authoritarianism itself. These findings lead to the general proposition that in the case of resource-abundant underdeveloped capitalist countries (Iran's oil reaped over $20 billion annually by the later 1970s), authoritarianism can nurture and accelerate a "modernization" which benefits a relatively small domestic and international elite. In Iran's case, authoritarianism certainly did not promote economic or social development for the majority.

This paper's three sections chart first the groups and institutions that formed the roots and provided the maintenance and nurturing of authoritarianism in Iran. Second, the motivations and execution of agricultural "modernization" are studied with the intent to pinpoint those who promoted and benefitted from the developments under the authoritarian Shah. Finally, the Shah's rapid yet inefficient and heavy industrialization is examined - an industrial scheme built on high tariffs, corruption and external dependence.

The spectacular result in Iran's case is that even its vast oil wealth did not allow it to avoid an authoritarian political evolution that isolated the rulers from the people and undermined claims to exercise legitimate authority. The hyper-modern development strategy, despite impressive GNP growth rates, relied on technology and assistance that revealed Iran's dependence, especially in the security sphere, on the United States. Thus, even without any capital shortage, the dynamics of a development strategy oriented around First World thinking on "modernization" resulted in a dependence/hegemony relationship between Iran and the USA.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA

by Shantabai Metelits

The case study on Malaysia consists of two separate sections on the political economy of a country characterized by ethnic diversity and export-led growth. Authoritarianism, aided by major international actors, has deepened in the Federation of Malaysia despite the existence of three ethnic groups each contending for national political supremacy; indeed, authoritarian control by the elite of the majority Malays has flourished in part through the exacerbation of ethnic cleavages with the minority Chinese and Indians. The first portion of the case study attempts to unravel the evolution and the mechanisms of authoritarian rule in ethnically diverse nations of which Malaysia is a primary example.

The major characteristics of authoritarianism in Malaysia are a lack of constitutionalized access to the avenues of civil disobedience as a means of effecting political change, a powerless judiciary that stifles dissent, emasculated trade unions, an elite-dominated military trained and armed by Malaysia's trading partners and the total suppression of speech and action even in the House of the Malaysian Parliament. Policies of the Malaysian government, such as the Rukunegara Ideology and The New Economic Policy instituted without dissent in their passage, serve to further exploit the cleavages of a multiracial society without interrupting the flow of international commodities trade in rubber and tin. A national identity, the subject of much rhetoric, is neither in the
process of formation nor is it encouraged by the international interferences in the Malaysian political economy.

Historically, the formation of the Malaysian polity into one that serves Malaysian needs and not international balance of power has been suppressed. Hence, the Malaysian Communist Party, a national party which grew out of the opposition to the annexation of Malaysia by the Japanese, was outlawed by the British. At a later period, the Australians entered a war of independence of Sarawak and Borneo which, as a result, became part of Greater Malaysia. With the support of Great Britain, Malaysia expelled Singapore from the Greater Malaysia pact, thus retaining a racial split in its population pattern that could more easily be exploited. The United States, Malaysia’s major trading partner, trains and supplies the military, with the concurrence of the Malay elite.

Projects of international organizations, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have had a direct impact on modernizing the Malaysian economy to strengthen its international export links while retaining the skewed pattern of distribution of income along historical divisions. The Malaysian government relies on the total suppression of national debate to proceed with modernization. But, while the GNP of Malaysia has increased, the gap in income between the elite and the masses has also increased. Steps towards an autonomous Malaysian political system have strong counteracting links to international actors. The pattern of Malaysian development is similar to that of the Philippines and Iran, with increasing authoritarianism that keeps pace with exploitive economic policies.

The importance of this case study rests on the links between poverty and equitable income distribution and the ability of a small country to proceed with national integration and identity formation without the interference of more powerful members of the global community. The increasing growth of authoritarianism within Malaysia appears to be the result of its increasing links with its trading partners, thereby reflecting on the national level the influence of hegemonial global pressures.

**CONCLUSION**

We suggest, in a tentative spirit, several conclusions:

1. Each national 'case' of authoritarian rule is distinctive and it is linked to certain common structural aspects of the international political order or system. Therefore, the subject-matter of authoritarianism and development needs to be studied at the global and the country levels.

2. The presence of authoritarian rule, however objectionable, does not preclude various steps that can be taken to promote needs-oriented development policies and approaches. The alliance between authoritarian rulers and economic plunderers may be more or less close (compare, for instance, Brazil and Shah's Iran on this). The important point here is to consider the empirical situation so as to discover the creative political space that exists to move development policy in more humane directions in a given country.
3. Such a development-oriented perspective should be balanced against political and moral considerations. Under what conditions is it acceptable to promote economic solutions that "stabilize" a brutal regime? Again, the particularities of the national case must be assessed and studied.

4. International models and images are helpful in sorting out links between policies in the North and their effects in the South. For instance, to what degree do inhibitions on foreign investment weaken the pressures in countries in the South to impose wage repression or labour discipline? How do technology choices in the North constrain development options in the South? The IFDA work here builds on the creative achievements of the UNITAR model, especially to draw out the authoritarian implications for the South of economic policies pursued in the North. Such an emphasis overcomes the liberal insistence that authoritarian politics in the South is a reflection of anti-democratic tendencies in the given country and that aid or support should be withheld until a given Third World country "gets its house in order".

5. The increasing arms flow from North to South is both a special case of 4, shaping and distorting development planning (e.g., to pay for arms imports) and also a lever (via training programmes, spare parts supply, advisors) of influence that encourages repressive governance. Also, the relative upgrading of the military sector in the Third World countries, making it relatively more modernized and efficient than other aspects of the governing/political process, encourages militarized politics (coup, takeovers, para-military police reform, and the like). Therefore, arms sales and transfers need to be understood as having an integral bearing on the development process.

6. New roles for international financial institutions (IFIs) suggest their contribution in general and in specific cases to authoritarian political outcomes (perhaps against the will of a given set of leaders). Considering the identity and ideology of those controlling IFIs, this pattern of transnational influence, enjoying considerable legitimacy as benevolent force in the world, requires careful scrutiny to differentiate positive and negative effects in specific countries. Also, it will be important to distinguish among IFIs with regard to their sensitivity on these matters.

7. The objectives and power of transnational corporations contribute, also, to a domestic and international setting disposed toward the adoption of authoritarian political solutions. Often in the adopted name of "growth", "efficiency", and "stability". The economistic case for authoritarianism can be refuted by specific explanations of such phenomena as changes in GNP and inflation trends.

8. Aside from economic and geopolitical considerations, the steady growth of population adds pressures to the governing processes, especially in an era of perceived ecological constraint and depleted resources. These pressures work against forms of humane governance based on respect for individual and group rights. A global human rights movement is an important counter to these authoritarian tendencies.
THE NEO-FASCIST STATE: NOTES ON THE PATHOLOGY OF POWER IN THE THIRD WORLD

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Abstract: Neo-fascism in the Third World has usually grown out of reformist or populist systems, in reaction to popular demands for social change or to threats to foreign economic interests. Unlike European fascism of the 1920s and 1930s, Third World neo-fascism is economically and politically dependent rather than nationalistic; it is characterized by an externally-oriented model of unequal growth. The doctrine of national security is its ideology, the armed forces its instrument, and systematic terror its defence against internal opposition. The instability of the neo-fascist system lies in its tendency to narrow its power base, eventually alienating even the national commercial bourgeoisie, and in its incapacity to respond to the material demands of society. The neo-fascist regime, with its foreign allies, thus becomes a highly visible target for mass discontent.
The Neo-Fascist State: Notes on the Pathology of Power in the Third World

Through the 1960s and 1970s, while our attention was focused on the Indo-Chinese war, there was occurring in the Third World an ominous development. These two decades witnessed the emergence and/or maturing of regimes which one may describe, for lack of a better term, as neo-fascism or perhaps developmental fascism. Some of these countries - for example South Korea, Iran, and Nicaragua - were already in the 1950s authoritarian states, whose survival required widespread repression of political opposition and social institutions - such as religious, educational and professional associations, and labour and peasant organizations - outside state control. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the hardening of the authoritarian arteries of these states, the systematization of terror, the 'modernization' and 'rationalization' of their repressive institutions. Other states - for example Brazil, Indonesia, Greece, the Philippines, Uganda, Zaire, Uruguay, and Chile - changed in the mid-1960s and early 1970s from being democratic, proto-democratic, or radical authoritarian regimes to becoming militarist states. In the second half of the 1970s the ranks of these states continued to be swelled: Argentina and Thailand were among the new members. However, with the possible exception of Brazil, none of these states had consolidated their tyrannies; that is, they had not acquired the economic wherewithall to sustain themselves without continued external support, and they had not forged meaningful political links with significant sectors of the civil society.

At the same time the second half of the 1970s revealed, first in Greece, then in Iran and Nicaragua, these neo-fascist regimes to be extremely vulnerable and brittle; when faced with a major challenge they collapsed totally and with a speed which surprised most observers. This paper attempts to summarize (I) the characteristics of this type of regime in the Third World; (II) the roots of neo-fascism; and (III) the vulnerability of these regimes and the sources of resistance to them.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NEO-FASCIST STATES

Some variations among them notwithstanding, the following are the common characteristics of the neo-fascist state.

A fundamental shift in the use of organized terror: they are by far the most blatant contemporary violators of human rights in both substantive and procedural matters. Most of them have developed highly sophisticated and complex machineries of repression. They are ever experimenting with new methods of terrorizing the people and eliminating their opposition while reducing the 'visibility' of their excesses. Increasingly, people are tortured in 'safe houses', in civilian quarters rather than identifiable prisons or concentration camps. Actual and potential dissenters disappear more often than they are imprisoned. The lucky prisoner who, because of international pressures in his behalf, gets released from captivity often becomes unusually and fatally accident-prone. Thus in 1976-77 there were in Argentina some 8,500 members of
the opposition and independent bodies such as labour unions who were officially acknowledged to be missing; officially too 600 were killed and 15 wounded in 'combat'. Amnesty International, on the other hand, established some 15,000 persons to have disappeared; 8,000 to 10,000 were in known, official prisons, that is, the figure did not include the secret detention camps. Argentinians and foreign journalists widely believed that some 15,000 people had been killed between the coup d'état of March 1976 and early 1978. Similar figures - and discrepancies between official and independent body-counts - can be cited for the other countries in this category. The scales of violence exercise credulity. Some 350,000 people are established to have gone through the torture chambers of the Shah of Iran. An estimated 500,000 to one million alleged communists were killed in Indonesia after the coup of 1965; 750,000 people were arrested by official count; of these not one was brought to trial, and Amnesty International did not find a single case of acquittal. Martin Ennals, the head of Amnesty International, reported that "about 30,000 people have disappeared in the last ten years in Latin America after being seized by official security forces or their sympathizers".

What is striking about these gruesome violations of human rights is not only the increase in their scale but a qualitative shift in their administration and purpose. As Amnesty International's Report on Torture of 1974 put it, "there is a marked difference between traditional brutality stemming from historical conditions, and the systematic torture which has spread to many Latin American countries within the past decade". More importantly, the purpose of governmental coercion appears to have shifted from punishment to prevention. For example, torture is increasingly administered not so much to obtain information or punish a member of the opposition but literally to discourage people from linking with each other politically and socially; its purpose is to prevent a political process and the formation of relationships among people.

There is an historical irony to the emergency of these regimes; it occurred in a period when elsewhere in the world the margins of procedural freedoms and of substantive human rights had started to widen. In Spain and Portugal, for example, the fascist states had begun since the early 1960s to experience a process of liberalization, and by the mid-1970s they had changed into social democratic polities. Since the start of de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, too, the margins of procedural freedom had been widening significantly - although not enough to warrant satisfaction. For example, the 1974 Amnesty International Report on Torture noted that "although prison conditions and the rights of the prisoners detained on political charges in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may still be in many cases unsatisfactory, torture as a government-sanctioned, Stalinist practice, has ceased". By contrast, the same report noted that torture had "shown phenomenal growth in Latin America"; it explained further that "institutional violence and high incidence of political assassinations has tended to overshadow the problem of torture".

It is noteworthy also that the neo-fascist states mark a qualitative as well as a quantitative shift towards the worse in the area of human rights. Violations of human rights had been occurring - and still occur - in the other

Third World systems of power discussed in an earlier paper\(^1\).

Yet in these other countries the practice of terror is neither as systematized nor as wide-spread, nor does repression constitute the mainstay of the regime. Furthermore, in some of those states (e.g., in the radical authoritarian, and the Marxist-socialist systems) the margins of substantive freedoms (e.g., improvement of health, education and nutrition) have widened for the population at large; hence these regimes enjoy a measure of legitimacy which correspondingly diminishes the need for repression. Similarly the regimes that belong in the ascriptive-palace or the pragmatic-authoritarian systems enjoy a measure of ascriptive and/or historical legitimacy, and a lingering traditional style of government and conflict resolution. They too violate human rights, sometimes excessively, but repression has not quite become the mainstay of these regimes. By contrast, the neo-fascist states command, at best, the support of a microscopic, generally praetorian, minority. As such, they enjoy no title to authority and must depend on organized state terror as the primary means of staying in power.

Fascism and neo-fascism: the neo-fascist state shares several characteristics with conventional fascism as witnessed in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. These include: a repressive terrorist state apparatus; state control over the economy and labour; and its origins in petit bourgeois and properties classes. But it differs from the classic model in many ways: unlike conventional fascism, the neo-fascist state in the Third World evinces but little ideological nationalism. To the contrary, it appears largely as a product of dependence and is sustained by its symbiotic relationship to the external metropolis. Unlike Nazism, neo-fascism is not anti-semitic; the only exception is Argentina where the junta's pronouncements were explicitly anti-semitic during its most brutal years. To the contrary, almost all the neo-fascist states, including Argentina, maintain close links to Israel - a phenomenon which underlines their common links with imperialism and the United States. Neo-fascist states are remarkable also for their inability to produce the 'charismatic leader' capable of achieving any degree of mass mobilization, or of invoking popular support. Furthermore, while the neo-fascist state exercises totalitarian powers, unlike the historical fascist system, it is unable to perform the political functions of aggregation, communication, and socialization. Above all, unlike Germany

\(^1\) These were:

- i) The elective-parliamentary system (e.g., India, Ceylon, Malaysia, Jamaica, Singapore).
- ii) The ascriptive-palace system (e.g., Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait).
- iii) The dynastic-oligarchic system (e.g., Nicaragua (Samoza), Haiti, Paraguay).
- iv) The pragmatic-authoritarian system (e.g., Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tunisia, Zambia, Cameroon, Egypt under Sadat).
- v) The radical-authoritarian system (e.g., Algeria, Tanzania, Mexico, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya).
- vi) The Marxist-socialist system (Cuba, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Vietnam).
- vii) The neo-fascist system (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Iran under the Shah, Zaire).
and Japan - where low wages, combined with restraint on consumption, produced high rates of gross national investment and industrialization - the economies of the neo-fascist states are based primarily on extraction, and are characterized by growing dependence on the multi-national corporations. As such, these states are not the instruments of 'modernization' which liberal social scientists often describe them to be. It is true that they produce a measure of uneven industrialization; but at the same time they dislocate and disinherit the majority rural population, lower the living standards of the working classes, mortgage the country's future to foreign investors and debtors, and generally produce economic ruin; Iran under the Shah, Brazil since 1964, and Indonesia since 1965 are examples.

Ideological base of the neo-fascist state: while the neo-fascist state lacks a consistent and pronounced ideology, its origins lie in, and its existence is defined by, a pervasive ideological environment which favours the national security state. The doctrine of national security has its roots in the ideas, institutions and policies associated with the Cold War. Ironically, it is nourished at the same time by the seemingly opposing heritage of modern nationalism and colonialism. It views the state as absolute, the individual as unimportant. It emphasizes a continual war between communism and freedom, stability and subversion, national security and anarchy. Instead of seeking mass manipulation and public control through political institutions such as parties, youth and labour organizations, it posits the armed forces to be, as Nelson Rockefeller put it, "a major force for constructive social change". Next to the armed forces, secret police organizations - SAVAK, DINA, KCIA, etc.- permeate the society. Their highest officials rank among the country's most powerful men.

The ideological underpinnings of these states lie in the ideas and institutions associated with the Cold War. What A.J. Langguth says of Latin America holds true of practically every neo-fascist state:

... the main exporter of Cold-War ideas, the principal source of the belief that dissent must be crushed by every means and by any means, has been the United States. Our indoctrination of foreign troops provided a justification for torture in the jail cells of Latin America. First in the Inter-American Police Academy in Panama, then at the more ambitious International Police Academy in Washington, foreign policemen were taught that in the war against international communism they were the 'first line of defense'... the US training turned already conservative men into reactionaries.1/

Predominant among the leaders of the neo-fascist system are military officers who have been trained in the counterinsurgency academies and programmes run by the United States Government; Generals Papadopoulos of Greece, Pinochet and Leigh of Chile, Geisel of Brazil, Massera of Argentina, Zia ul Haq of Pakistan, are among the many examples. These training programmes invariably steeped the officers under training in the anti-communist dogma that subversives and

infiltrators could be anywhere, and these latter undermine national security in a variety of ways, through student protest, labour strikes, and peasant demands. Deep fear of and hostility to populist movements and expressions of popular demands is, therefore, basic to the national security outlook\(^1\). The concept of national security, then, completely transcends military considerations; it is enmeshed with political, economic and social issues, and constitutes the basis for the armed forces' broad, all-pervasive mission. Furthermore, there exists a negative correlation between the perceived security problems of a country and its actual power and privileges on an international scale, to wit: the more powerful and the richer the state, the less secure it is believed to be by the ruling elite.

A 'model' of development: Closely related to the idea of national security are the ideologically rigged notions of 'development' and 'modernization'. Typically, the neo-fascist state is deeply committed to economic development; this is the reason for suggesting at the beginning of this essay that alternatively we might describe this system as 'developmental fascism'. It views 'development' in terms of rates of growth. 'Growth' involves the concentration of wealth and of power, for both are necessary to the required rate of capital formation. Thus, profit equals investment-equals growth-equals power. The preferred development model favours return to the 'free market'. But the return is always selective; it does not involve curtailment of monopoly power or of untrammelled investment incentives, but it does entail strict controls over wages, labour unions, and prohibition of strikes. A cheap labour force is offered as a primary incentive to capital; the internal market does not expand except for luxury goods. The economy becomes increasingly export-oriented; raw materials, including fancy food products, become the primary export items.\(^2\) Income inequality multiplies. Any resistance to corporate and foreign interests is treated ipso facto as a police problem; anyone questioning this model of development is viewed as a subversive, a terrorist.

Hunger stalks the impoverished people while Western economic experts and institutions extol the 'economic miracles' of their allies and clients. Thus a decade after coming to power the government of Suharto had turned Indonesia, formerly self-sustaining in rice, into the world's number one rice importer; and famine broke out only a few miles from Jakarta, the capital. Similarly, in Brazil the real incomes of the lowest 80 percent of the Brazilian population had dropped steadily during the decade following the coup d'état of 1964, despite "the tripling of the GNP to $80 billion"\(^3\). In May 1973, eighteen Catholic Bishops of north-east Brazil issued a heart-rending statement which informed,

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2/ See Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, Food First: Beyond the myth of scarcity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), especially chapters 5, 6, 8.

among other things, that "hunger in the north-east has taken on the characteristics of an epidemic"; the statement noted that infants (that is, the half who survived mortality before age five) and children were the primary victims of malnutrition which had contributed to an alarming rate of feeblemindedness among those who lived.1/ Social services seriously declined while prestige projects - such as communications satellites and domestic communications networks, to which Indonesia allocated $840 million in 1978 alone - are added on to the benefit of foreign contractors and native contractors. Poor peasants are hurt or wiped out by agribusiness and large landed proprietors. State monopolies provide fiefdoms for the powerful; in every neo-fascist state a dozen or so family names become hated household words signifying the corruption, the callousness, and the brutality of the system. If there exists in a country an excludable minority people (e.g., Amazon Indians, Baluchis, the Aches, Timouris, etc.) the regime follows a policy of dispossession, and even genocide.2/ These realities add up to a sordid picture of substantive denials and violations of human rights, in comparison to which the better publicized procedural violations appear insignificant.

Symbiotic external ties: almost without exception these regimes began as clients of the United States and, with the exception of Uganda and Ethiopia, remain tied to the Western metropolis economically, strategically, and psychologically. The largest and the richest of them (e.g., Iran, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea), were among the Nixon/Kissinger doctrine's original choices for leading the regional constellations of pro-Western power - a strategy and preference which remained, with minor adjustments, United States policy under the Carter administration. They are also the objects of corporate concentration as 'export-platform countries' of the Third World. They are attractive to American policy makers and international corporations for obvious reasons. Their strategic locations and natural resources are highly valued. More to the point is the fact that these economic-growth seeking tyrannies tend to be extremely hospitable to foreign capital. The denial of distributive justice under these regimes secures a high rate of profit. Their repressiveness assures stable, low wages for a quiescent labour force. By enriching a small but highly consumptive indigenous bourgeoisie, they provide lucrative markets for Western consumer products as well as the transfer of 'excess capital' to the financial institutions of the West.

There exists, then, as Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have pointed out, a "systematic positive relationship between United States aid and human rights violations". Using ten selected countries as examples, Chomsky and Herman show a remarkable correlation in this regard. A typical example is Brazil where, "overall aid and credits by the United States and multinational lending organizations went up 112% ... in the three years following the coup (1964) as compared with the three years preceding the coup". From the ten examples they rightly conclude that "for most of the sample countries United States-controlled aid has been positively related to investment climate and inversely related to

1/ I have heard the cry of my people (unpublished, 6 May 1973).

2/ Shelton H. Davis, Victims of the Miracle (Cambridge University Press), and N. Chomsky and E. Herman, op. cit., pp.109-118.
the maintenance of a democratic order and human rights".1/ Similarly, Michael Klare has shown that during 1973-78 the ten worst violators at the top of the list of human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, were the primary recipients of US economic and military aid. During this period they received economic aid of over $2 billion, and military aid and credits of $2.3 billion; they were sold armaments in excess of $18 billion, and 12,723 military officers from these countries had been trained in American schools and programmes. In his well-documented study, Klare concluded that the United States stood "at the supply end of the pipeline of repressive technology".2/

II. THE ROOTS OF NEO-FASCISM

A longer and, hopefully, clearer discussion of the roots of neo-fascism shall follow in a revised draft of this paper. Here, I note the basic points.

First, almost all the neo-fascist states have succeeded populist and reformist governments, most of them belonging in the radical authoritarian category discussed in an earlier paper.3/ The emergence of the neo-fascist regimes was premised on the nature of the post-colonial state, its symbiotic relationship to a national bourgeoisie which was predominantly a state bourgeoisie, and the expansion of this bourgeoisie under populist and reformist slogans. In the previous paper I argued that:

i) The contemporary Third World state was a colonial creation designed to serve the imperial metropolis. In it the process of modern state formation was reversed: far from being the creation of an ascendant national bourgeoisie, the colonially-created state gave birth to a native class of civil servants and soldiers - the national bourgeoisie. From the beginning the development of the modern state in the Third World involved the imposition of a well-developed military bureaucratic superstructure of power over an under-developed infrastructure of participation.

ii) After formal decolonization the less developed civic political class tended to be overthrown or bypassed by the state bourgeoisie when it become an impediment to oligarchic growth, and/or sought the reinforcement of popular institutions and the exercise of popular power.

iii) The overthrow of the civic, generally parliamentary, system was effected by the state-related power elite which legitimized itself on the basis of populist, reformist and nationalist slogans. Yet it was in the nature of these regimes that they should vastly expand the powers and the membership of their class (state employees) without being able to improve the welfare of the masses. Ultimately, it had to face a disillusioned and expectant mass. And when that moment of truth 

1/ N. Chomsky and E. Herman, op.cit., p.44. See especially tables I, II, pp. 43, 45.
2/ M. Klare, op. cit., p.9
3/ Eqbal Ahmad, "Post colonial systems of power", second of three summary essays for IFDA.
arrived, the most powerful and privileged group within that class carried out the proto-fascist 'counter-revolution'.

Hence, in almost all cases, the neo-fascist system emerged in reaction to organized popular demands for fundamental economic and social change. In Iran, Guatemala, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Zaire, and Indonesia, for example, the counterrevolutionary coup d'état occurred at a time when popular discontent was becoming vocal and visible. These coups also followed a trend towards the institution of desired reforms concerning taxes, profit repatriation, and nationalization of national resources - steps taken in response to popular pressures. In some cases the praetorian reaction occurred after expressions of institutional threats against international vested interests. For example, the 1972 coup d'état in the Philippines followed the Supreme Court's ruling against foreign ownership of land; the Brazilian coup of 1964 coincided with a major dispute over mineral concessions to the Hanna Mining Company; the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1953 was followed by the overthrow of Mohamed Mossadegh; and, of course, the story of Allende's Chile is well-known.

It is noteworthy that the neo-fascist system has emerged in societies which have developed a measure of economic stratification and class consciousness. The initial move of the praetorian putschists was often successful because it was able to rally the forces of order - particularly among the petit bourgeoisie, the conservative landed and the foreign corporate sectors - against the working class, peasants, and their progressive political allies. In this respect the neo-fascist states bear some resemblance to European fascism. Yet its differences with European fascism are more significant: the Third World non-state bourgeoisie which initially supports the praetorian reaction is more commercial than industrial, more comprador than indigenous, and thus different in character from its European counterpart. Similarly the state bourgeoisie is somewhat more autonomous of the civil society because it is linked with and sustained by the foreign metropolis; as such, it is less dependent on the civil society and has fewer incentives to maintain meaningful links with any part of it; and in fact tends ultimately to lose its erstwhile allies. At the same time, in conjunction with foreign corporations, it exercises greater control over the nation's economic resources. Thus it becomes easily and completely isolated from the civil society while it becomes symbiotically linked and identified with foreign vested interests.

The ascension of the neo-fascist system then does not involve the re-establishment of the power of a pre-colonial, indigenous class which, under colonialism, was either destroyed or weakened and reduced to a peripheral status. Nor does it mean the accession to power of an indigenous entrepreneurial class, for the dependent and underdeveloped economy remains dominated by the metropolis and subject to continued penetration by the transnational corporations. The advent of neo-fascism entails merely an enlargement of the colonial, national-security bourgeoisie whose power was based on its control over the modern state, and its managerial and military skills. In other words, the social roots of the neo-fascist states are quite different from those of European fascism. To the contrary, it is correct to say that European fascism was produced by severe limitations on colonial expansion while the neo-fascist of the Third World is a product of colonialism and neo-colonialism.
III. RESISTANCE AND INSTABILITY

In the United States and Europe the neo-fascist state was generally viewed as promising stability in an unstable Third World. By the end of the 1970s this myth of stability had exploded. During the Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus the remarkably quick collapse of the US-supported Greek junta should have led to a closer examination of the extreme vulnerabilities of these regimes. But the event was ignored and no examination of the assumed stability of these regimes was undertaken until after the Shah went down in Iran. The Nicaraguan revolution followed closely on the heels of Iran; the regimes in South Korea and El Salvador are badly shaken. A more detailed analysis underlying the weaknesses of these regimes is needed; here we briefly mention the possible lines of inquiry.

First, the neo-fascist state, more than any other in the Third World, is characterized by what A. Sivanandan has aptly described as "disorganic development". The economic model which it follows superimposes on a Third World country a capitalist economy "unaccompanied by capitalist culture or capitalist democracy". The result is an economic system "at odds with the cultural and political institutions of the people it exploits", a system "not mediated by culture or legitimized by politics".1/ Political power and civil society, far from complementing and linking with each other, exist in a relationship of fundamental conflict. Since political institutions are severely repressed, culture and religion provide the strongest expressions of resistance. Hence the revolutions that emerge in such societies, as in Iran, are not necessarily class-oriented revolutions. They are mass movements that cut across class lines, and contain within them elements of cultural and religious affirmations.

Secondly, the apparatus of the state in the neo-fascist system grows more rapidly than the society's capability to sustain it. Since the superstructure of the state bears little logical, much less organic, relationship to the infrastructure of the society, it has no capacity to serve society's needs, accommodate its demands, or even keep pace with the changes within it. It was thus that the Pahlevi state became too heavy and dry a burden for the Iranian people to carry; hence Khomeini's call for overturning it obtained a national consensus quite unparalleled in history.

Thirdly, the specific contradictions of the neo-fascist model of development should be noted:

1) Being highly centralized and involving the state as the link between foreign corporations and a microscopic local elite, it focuses mass discontent on the state and the governing elite.

ii) The economic model which favours collaboration of state and international capital relegates the local business class to a secondary position in times of expansion; it produces their socio-economic deterioration in periods of economic downturn. Thus the increasingly marginalized indigenous business class joins in the forefront of the

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1/ A. Sivanandan, "Imperialism and disorganic development in the Silicon Age". (Race and Class, V-1. XXI, no.2, Autumn 1979).
opposition's demand for democracy - a phenomenon observable both in Iran and Nicaragua.

iii) The ruling elites in these states are remarkable for narrowing, rather than broadening, their base; an increasingly clannish exercise of power and concentration of privileges ultimately alienates a broad array of even the propertied classes. These, too, end up abandoning their erstwhile allies when the latter are faced with a serious challenge.

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EL ESTADO NEOFACISTA: OBSERVACIONES ACERCA DE LA PATOLOGIA DEL PODER EN EL TERCER MUNDO

Resumen: Por regla general el neofacismo en el Tercer Mundo ha resultado de sistemas reformistas y populistas, como reacción a la exigencia popular para cambios sociales o a amenazas para intereses económicos extranjeros. En contraste con el fasismo europeo de los años 1920 y 1930, el neofacismo del Tercer Mundo se caracteriza por una dependencia económica y política más bien que por un nacionalismo; se distingue por un modelo de desarrollo desigual aperturista. Tiene por ideología la doctrina de seguridad nacional, las fuerzas armadas son su instrumento y el terror sistemático es su defensa contra la oposición interna. La instabilidad del sistema neofacista está en su tendencia a estrechar su propio base de poder, finalmente alienando a la burguesía comercial nacional, y en su incapacidad de responder a las demandas materiales de la sociedad. El gobierno neofacista, con sus aliados en el extranjero, así llega a ser un objetivo altamente visible para el descontento de las masas.
Countries outside US sphere of influence that practice torture on an administrative basis:

- Burundi
- Guinea
- Iraq
- Malawi
- Rhodesia
- South Africa
- Soviet Union
- Syria
- Uganda

No. of U.S.-trained military personnel 1950-1975 (in circles)
Total U.S. military aid 1946-1975 (on lines)
Gray tone indicates U.S. aid or training to police.

* These countries underwent a significant political change during the 1970s, and are included here because they fit the classification - used torture on and administrative basis - for some part of the period.

+ Figure applies from 1950-1963.

MATERIAUX

POUR UNE EVALUATION DU PROJET DES JOURNEES INTERNATIONALES
POURQUOI EST-IL NECESSAIRE DE LE CONTINUER?

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Une des caracteristiques principales du projet des Journees Internationales, lorsqu'il fut lance, etait sans doute, la préoccupation par ses organisateurs de ne pas l'institutionaliser, ni de le transformer en un nouveau mouvement. Cette préoccupation etait due, d'une part, au sentiment que la recherche a laquelle le projet nous con-viait serait incompatible avec la rigidite a laquelle pres-tigue toujours les processus d'institutionalisation condui-sent, et avec la tendance a perdre de vue ses objectifs, qui marque en general les institutions. Et d'autre part, le fait que, pretendant se mettre au service de l'echange d'expériences et de réflexions entre les mouvements existants, le projet ne pourrait pas realiser d'une maniere adequate cette tache, si lui aussi devenait un mouvement parce que tout mouvement, au sein de la culture de do-mination dans laquelle nous vivons, a tendance a entrer en compétition avec les autres mouvements.

En arrivant cependant a la troisieme etape du projet, d'un cote nous vivons un principe d'institutionalisation par la stabilite qu'il acquiert - de l'autre, nous pouvons être amenés a la constitution d'un mouvement par l'approfondissement naturel des liens qui unissent ses participants et les rendent pour ainsi dire porteurs d'un message commun. Mais les raisons de la double préoccupa-tion initiale des organisateurs du projet paraissent être toujours valables. Alors, comment nous defendre de ces tendances ?

La meilleure maniere de le faire, a mon avis, considé-rant le fait que les objectifs initiaux du projet contin-nuent aussi a etre valables, est de le réanalyser, sous sa forme actuelle, par rapport a ces objectifs, c'est-à-dire, a la lutte pour une societé depassant les dominations. Ou, plus precisément, verifier quelle est l'utilite reelle, pour le depassement des dominations, que peut avoir le dé-veloppement du systeme d'intercommunication dans lequel le projet s'est transformé. Pourquoi chercher son élargisse-ment, son expansion - ou meme, simplement, pourquoi continuer ? Considérant bien clairement le fait que ce n'est
pas par l'intercommunication, ni par aucune autre activité auxiliaire qu'on va arriver à dépasser les dominations, mais par l'action concrète de ceux pour qui ce dépassement est vital. Et en essayant de répondre à ces questions avec le courage nécessaire pour tout stopper ou changer entièrement l'orientation, si les objectifs définis l'exigent.

* * *

Lorsqu'il a été lancé, en réalité notre projet nous proposait avant tout, et à travers la formule même de son titre, un défi fondamental : peut-on dépasser une domination sans avoir à en exercer une autre ? La libération d'une domination n'entraîne-t-elle pas toujours le surgissement d'une autre domination ? Comme en vérité, c'est face à ce défi que se bloquent ou s'épuisent pratiquement toutes les luttes de libération de tous les temps, c'est à mon avis à partir de la réponse que nous pouvons lui donner, que sera déterminée l'utilité la plus profonde du projet.

Dans cette perspective, mon analyse m'amène à la conclusion que le projet a un rôle très utile à accomplir, qu'il vaut de continuer et chercher à le développer au maximum et que la logique même de son développement peut constituer un contre poison permanent aux tendances que nous voulons éviter.

Une telle conclusion peut très bien être fausse, car nous savons que ce sont toujours les "fonctionnaires" des institutions, à cause des intérêts qui se créent pour eux, qui s'efforcent le plus de les maintenir ou les développer - et je fais partie du bureau de Paris qui est le seul groupe de participants au projet qui se trouve à un certain point "professionalisé" dans sa réalisation. Comme je peux aussi être amené à des impressions dûes au fait de travailler au projet tous les jours et intensément. Mais je me base - espérant avoir suffisamment tenu compte de ces risques - sur les découvertes que nous avons faites au cours du développement même du projet. Parce qu'en vérité, le défi qu'il nous lançait nous obligeait aussi, automatiquement, à déjà chercher une réponse dans la manière même de le réaliser. Et les règles et méthodes de travail qui ont été adoptées par tous ceux qui y ont participé, ont effectivement constitué une tentative de réponse à cette exigence, et de ce fait, au défi fondamental du projet.

* * *

Après avoir présenté les principales découvertes qu'à mon avis, nous avons faites jusqu'à présent, j'indiquerai les deux niveaux d'utilité que je vois dans le projet :
celui en tant que réseau d'aide mutuelle et celui en tant que processus de "rééducation" pour l'intercommunication effective.

1. Les premières orientations

Au début, il s'agissait de préparer une rencontre internationale, avec un objectif bien déterminé. Mais l'aiguillon du défi lancé par le projet, obligea ses responsables à prétendre déjà à une rencontre d'un type différent. Parce qu'habituellement, les rencontres internationales échappent rarement à une pratique de domination : elles se réduisent en général à des réunions de "spécialistes" disposant de moyens pour se rencontrer et servent avant tout à renforcer les liens et permettre des échanges de favours entre les membres de ces "clubs" de privilégiés. Et ceci, même lorsque le thème choisi est l'injustice dans le monde. Ce qui a pour résultat final de permettre l'échange d'idées très sérieuses sur les pauvres et les opprimés, sans pour cela avancer beaucoup dans la lutte contre la pauvreté et l'oppression.

La méthode employée pour préparer la rencontre fut ainsi une première tentative d'échapper à cette pratique : il a été fait en sorte que les invités principaux à participer à cette réunion seraient ceux qui auraient le plus d'intérêt au dépassement des dominations, c'est-à-dire, ceux qui les subissent. Il a été proposé alors, qu'ils commencent à préparer la réunion, à travers l'analyse de leurs propres situations et de la lutte qu'ils développaient pour se libérer de la domination. En même temps, furent mis à la disposition de cette préparation deux "secrétariats", chargés des traductions de ces études et de leur envoi à tous ceux qui étaient disposés à y participer. Grace à cela, la préparation même de la rencontre a gagné déjà une utilité équivalente à celle qu'aurait éventuellement la rencontre : il s'est créé au niveau international un instrument d'entraide pour la réflexion de ceux qui y participeraient. Comme aussi été mise en marche une pédagogie qui amenait ceux qui étaient engagés dans des actions concrètes à réfléchir plus systématiquement sur leur propre action, leurs objectifs et leurs méthodes.

En vérité, ce travail préparatoire a atteint d'une façon très limitée ceux qui sont effectivement les plus opprimés, pour leur donner cette occasion de parole et d'échange. Mais il s'est révélé être une pratique suffisamment riche pour devenir progressivement l'activité essentielle développée dans le cadre du projet. On a commencé à découvrir les possibilités de l'intercommunication. A tel point que les
pressions pour que la CNBB - initiatrice du projet - se dé-siste de la réunion, ne sont pas arrivées à interrompre la "dynamique" ainsi amorcée. Au contraire : le projet s'est transformé lui-même en une pratique de libération concrète d'une domination spécifique - celle qui cherche à éviter le développement de liens libres et directs entre dominés, seul moyen pouvant neutraliser l'arme fondamentale des dominants, c'est-à-dire, la division des dominés.

Notre projet qui était celui d'une rencontre internatio-nale en préparation, s'est transformé ainsi en un système d'intercommunication. Si nous voulons, la réunion de João Pessoa peut être considérée, en fait, comme la rencontre internationale initialement prévue, qui s'est réalisée avec une année de retard. Mais elle a été vécue déjà comme un mo-ment - qualitativement différent - d'une intercommunication en cours.

2. La découverte de l'intercommunication

Les "secrétariats" du projet ont alors fonctionné, pen-dant la première étape, comme centres de diffusion des docu-ments qui leur étaient envoyés pour publication.

Toute communication et toute diffusion sont utiles et im-portantes pour ceux qui luttent pour un changement social ; elles coupent de l'isolement et favorisent de nouveaux con-tacts, proportionnent des données et des connaissances, stimulent l'action, la comparaison et la réflexion, permettent la consolidation d'une "mémoire" collective. Nous pourrions ainsi nous limiter à ce service et assurerions déjà une cer-taine utilité au projet, même s'il restait - face à d'autres initiatives du même type mais ayant plus de moyens et d'ex-périences - au niveau plus proprement modeste qui le carac-térisait. Mais l'aiguillon du défi qu'il nous lançait nous avait obligés à adopter des règles de travail peu communes aux "centres" de diffusion; ni les secrétariats, ni la "coordination" ne devaient juger sur la valeur des docu-ments envoyés pour publication, ni les sélectionner, ni les hiérarchiser, mais publier tout ce qui leur était envoyé, strictement selon l'ordre chronologique de réception, sans rien ajouter ni retirer, respectant évidemment les critères acceptés par tous. De même que nous ne devions envoyer les documents publiés qu'à ceux qui nous indiqueraient expressé-ment leur intérêt à les recevoir; et tous les documents pu-bliés à tous ceux qui s'inscriraient de n'importe où dans le monde, indépendamment de leur branche de travail ou niveau de responsabilité.

Ces règles et le caractère international du projet, lui ont alors donné des utilités supplémentaires : il permettait
de disposer d'informations non manipulées et sans intermédiaires, il brisait les barrières sectorielles, géographiques et hiérarchiques pouvant bloquer la connaissance et l'action, permettait la découverte de situations non divulguées volontairement par les systèmes dirigés d'information, dénonçait des mythes existants sur les différences entre les situations vécues dans les pays développés et sous-développés, et découvrait aussi les mécanismes de domination communs aux uns et aux autres et leurs inter-relations.

Mais la conséquence la plus importante de l'adoption de ces règles a été la découverte des différences entre un service de diffusion de documents et un service qui prétendait développer l'intercommunication - comme cela était envisagée avec le projet. En fait, tout "centre" de diffusion est obligé de choisir ce qu'il publie, soit parce que les ressources pour la diffusion sont toujours limitées, soit parce qu'il faut toujours prouver, pour ne pas perdre "l'audience" de ceux qu'il prétend servir, que ce qu'il divulgue est réellement ce qu'il y a de plus important, de réellement utile à savoir. Mais, s'il ne communique que ce qu'il considère important et utile, il finit par exercer un contrôle et une maîtrise sur ce qui est divulgué. Alors que, dans l'intercommunication, de telles décisions doivent être du ressort, uniquement et exclusivement, de ceux qui prétendent communiquer entre eux. Soit, alors que pour la diffusion la relation s'établit entre les nécessités de diffusion définies par un "centre" et la clientèle qu'il prétend servir, dans un système d'intercommunication tout doit dépendre strictement de la nécessité de communication entre les membres qui en font partie. Il doit disparaître si personne ne veut communiquer et se développer si l'intercommunication devient encore plus nécessaire. Une fois le processus amorcé par un "centre" - une initiative devra toujours exister - il ne doit réellement plus dépendre des décisions du "centre", afin de devenir absolument dépendant des décisions de ceux qui l'utilisent. Ce qui se répercute dans sa propre forme d'existence. (1)

A partir de là, et sans nier évidemment l'importance et la nécessité des "centres de diffusion" - préoccupés normalement et naturellement de la divulgation et la recherche d'adhésions aux idées et orientations de ceux qui les font fonctionner - nous avons découvert combien étaient rares les moyens et occasions dont on disposait pour "l'intercommuni-

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(1)[A cause du manque d'espace, les notes ne seront pas publiées, mais sont à la disposition des intéressés.]
cation". Découverte que nous vérifions, de plus, dans notre propre pratique, par la continuelle résistance que nous devions opposer à la pression des habitudes et des expectatives traditionnelles, qui supposaient ou attendaient toujours un contrôle de notre part sur ce que nous divulguerions. Et c'est en résistant de cette manière que nous avons pu faire un pas en avant dans nos découvertes : le pas qui nous a permis d'identifier plus clairement les conditions pour que l'intercommunication, une fois nécessaire et souhaitée devienne réelle et effective.

3. Les exigences de l'intercommunication effective

Je citerais huit des conditions qu'il serait nécessaire de respecter pour obtenir une intercommunication réelle et effective.

D'abord, la liberté d'expression, qui constitue ce qui est effectivement en jeu dans tout contrôle de diffusion. En vérité, pour que l'intercommunication soit effective - une fois qu'elle est nécessaire et souhaitée, et à partir d'un objectif commun que tous prétendent réaliser - ni les "services" qui la rendent matériellement possible, ni aucun de ceux qui y participent, ne peuvent assumer un pouvoir de censure sur ce que les uns veulent communiquer aux autres. Si une censure commence à exister, l'intercommunication cessera automatiquement, et tout se réduira à un simple moyen de "communication" au service de ceux qui ont le pouvoir sur les ressources utilisées. La seule limitation pouvant exister est celle de l'obéissance aux critères adoptés par tous les participants, comme règle de jeu - critères qui peuvent être, évidemment, plus ou moins limitatifs, selon les objectifs de l'intercommunication et les ressources dont on dispose pour la réaliser, mais dont l'observance doit aussi rester sous la responsabilité de tous.

A la liberté d'expression, suivrait, presque comme corollaire, une seconde exigence : la liberté d'information. C'est-à-dire que tous doivent avoir accès à tout ce que les autres veulent leur communiquer et qui sert à la réalisation de l'objectif qu'ils partagent. Soit, pour que l'intercommunication ne se bloque pas, il est nécessaire que tous aient aussi le droit de savoir tout ce qui se situe dans le contexte de la lutte commune. Exigence qu'il n'est pas toujours facile de respecter.

Ensemble, la liberté d'expression et la liberté de communication sont en fait des conditions pour la recherche de la vérité. Mais celle-ci exige aussi que ces libertés soient exercées à égalité des chances.

En fait, les conditions effectives d'intercommunication impliquent le refus de toute préférence ou privilège entre
ceux qui y participent, quelques soient les critères qu'on prétend adopter. Toute communication doit valoir par son contenu et non par la position de celui qui la fait. Tous peuvent parler et être écoutés équitablement, indépendamment de la position hiérarchique, du niveau d'instruction ou d'expérience, de la fonction ou de la position sociale, de l'autorité morale, intellectuelle ou politique de chacun. Dans le cas contraire, certains jouiraient de plus de liberté que d'autres et pour certains la liberté serait même inexistant.

Mais ces conditions réunies nous amèneront plus avant: ceux qui se disposent à les adopter doivent nécessairement s'exercer au respect mutuel et à l'ouverture vis-à-vis des autres.

Car tout ce que nous devrons entendre ne sera pas forcément en accord avec ce que nous pensons, et ne correspondra pas à ce que nous considérons comme vrai, ou important, ou opportun ou valable, pouvant même devenir gênant. Mais pour que nous soyons respectés dans nos positions et options, nous devons de même respecter les positions et options des autres: le respect de ce que pense ou fait l'autre, du rythme de chacun et de son niveau dans le processus de lutte dans lequel nous sommes engagés; la réceptivité au nouveau et à l'inespéré, à ce qui peut nous poser des questions ou nous interpeller, ou à des perspectives et préoccupations que nous aurions pu laisser de côté parce qu'elles sont difficiles à accepter. Comme dans un dialogue vraiment fraternel.

Deux nouvelles conditions surgissent alors, pour pouvoir respecter les précédentes: la confiance mutuelle et la responsabilité active.

On ne peut en effet, sans la confiance mutuelle, assumer les risques d'une telle liberté, de l'égalité, du respect et de la réceptivité. Nous devons croire au fait que l'autre assume aussi ces risques, qu'il correspond à la confiance que nous déposons en lui et qu'il assume la responsabilité de cette confiance. C'est-à-dire, que l'autre est effectivement uni à nous pour la réalisation de notre objectif commun et qu'à cause de cela, il cherche à respecter sincèrement et réciproquement notre liberté, il nous respecte et est ouvert à ce que nous lui disons.(5)

La confiance mutuelle va nécessairement de pair avec la co-responsabilité active : l'intercommunication vécue de cette manière est en vérité un service que les uns rendent aux autres, mutuellement, pour réaliser l'objectif qui leur est commun. Les conséquences du choix de ce qui va ou doit être dit, doivent tenir compte de celui qui écoutera et doivent être assumées en toute responsabilité par celui qui
le dira. Les ressources pour l'intercommunication, qui sont communes à tous, doivent mériter de la part de chacun la même préoccupation d'efficacité et d'économie, et tous doivent vraiment essayer d'assurer la disponibilité de ressources. Tous peuvent et doivent prendre l'initiative de réagir à tout ce qui leur semble aller contre l'intercommunication effective et la réalisation des objectifs communs, et doivent de même prendre toute initiative aidant à l'intercommunication ou directement à la réalisation de ces objectifs communs, sans dépendre d'aucun "centre" et sans l'intermédiaire d'aucun "centre". (6)

Cet ensemble d'exigences de l'intercommunication effective ne se réduirait pas, cependant, à de simples critères choisis parmi d'autres également possibles : elles seraient déterminées par une caractéristique fondamentale à tout travail collectif, qui est la diversité naturelle et l'hétérogénéité de ceux qui y participent et la "dynamique" de conflits en découlant.

En réalité, aucune histoire personnelle n'est égale à l'autre, aucun passé, aucun tempérament ne sont identiques, aucune expérience ou événement ne marquent différentes personnes de la même manière, et de même les ressources dont les uns et les autres disposent sont toujours différentes. C'est ainsi que lorsque plusieurs personnes se réunissent autour d'un objectif commun, même si cet objectif est très particulier ou restreint, la diversité surgit nécessairement comme une condition même de l'existence humaine. Et de ce fait surgissent les conflits. Il ne s'agit pas d'oppositions irrémediables comme celle entre dominateurs et dominés, mais de conflits irrémediables même entre personnes unies autour d'un objectif commun.

La dernière exigence que j'identifierais pour l'intercommunication effective serait alors l'acceptation de l'hétérogénéité et de la "dynamique" de conflits qui l'accompagne, une condition qui nous reporte aux exigences déjà énumérées. Car la seule façon d'éviter que ces conflits ne soient résolus que par l'écrasement de ceux qui se trouvent en position d'inégalité - ce qui détruit bien sûr l'unité et détermine le gaspillage des forces - est d'assurer, en permanence à tous : la liberté d'expression et d'information, l'égalité des chances, le respect et la confiance mutuels, l'ouverture et la co-responsabilité active. (7)

4. Vers une pratique du "pouvoir-service"

En cherchant à ce que les relations entre les participants du projet se fassent dans des termes d'intercommunication réelle et effective, nous avons vu aussi qu'une
intercommunication de ce type peut constituer une base concrète pour une forme d'exercice de pouvoir, différente de la pratique habituelle: le "pouvoir-service". C'est-à-dire, l'usage du propre pouvoir, non pour le maintenir ou l'augmenter, mais pour renforcer le pouvoir de ceux qu'il veut servir.

En vérité, la CNBB dès le départ, et tous ceux qui prenaient des responsabilités spécifiques dans le projet, faisaient déjà, dans la pratique même du projet, une expérience de ce type : en ne faisant pas un usage exclusif du "pouvoir de communication" que le projet nous offrait, pour qu'il devienne un "système d'intercommunication", nous partagions automatiquement ce pouvoir avec tous ceux disposés à intégrer notre "réseau d'intercommunication".

Nous avons découvert alors qu'à travers des réseaux d'intercommunication réelle et effective que nous essayons de créer, tous les participants pourraient aussi faire ce même genre d'expérience, c'est-à-dire, partager avec les autres les divers types de pouvoir sur lesquels chacun compte - en expérience, en connaissances, en information, en ressources matérielles et en possibilités d'action. Et nous avons découvert aussi que cette forme d'exercice du pouvoir même, paradoxalement, au renforcement du pouvoir de chaque personne qui ainsi l'exerce. Car ce pouvoir ne sera pas un pouvoir isolé mais une partie du pouvoir resultant de l'union de tous dans la diversité presque infinie de besoins et de possibilités caractérisant les êtres humains.

Ainsi, c'était toute la problématique du pouvoir qui devenait plus claire, par la découverte du caractère systématiquement opposé du "pouvoir-service" par rapport à l'usage du pouvoir auquel nous sommes habitués, c'est-à-dire, le "pouvoir-domination".

Ce que nous appelons le "pouvoir-domination" est le type d'exercice du pouvoir visant à s'assurer le contrôle des ressources disponibles. Celui qui exerce le pouvoir de cette façon est donc en lutte permanente contre tout et tous ceux qui peuvent lui arracher ce contrôle. Même les simples délégations du pouvoir sont dangereuses pour lui, car tout ce qui n'est pas concentré entre ses mains, se trouve entre d'autres mains, entre les mains d'autres qu'il considère nécessairement en compétition avec lui, pour pouvoir, dès que possible, dominer à sa place. Il s'agit donc d'un exercice de pouvoir ne permettant "l'intercommunication" avec quiconque, car même si un objectif final déterminé est partagé avec d'autres, tout passe d'abord par le maintien et l'augmentation de son propre pouvoir.
Le "pouvoir-domination" est ainsi, essentiellement compétitif, tendant à la concentration et l'exclusivité. Il est fatalement impitoyable, sans respect pour les autres et isolé. Il ne recherche jamais l'union et ne s'y soumet qu'en terme d'alliances tactiques. Il écrase et si besoin est élimine - même physiquement - quiconque s'oppose à lui.

Alors que dans le "pouvoir-service" tout se passe d'une manière totalement opposée. Au contraire de la compétition du pouvoir-domination - où tout semblable constitue avant tout un ennemi en puissance - dans l'exercice du pouvoir-service, la base est la coopération. Au contraire de la lutte pour l'hégémonie - élément essentiel de la "dynamique" de la concentration du pouvoir - dans le pouvoir-service, l'objectif est la décentralisation, tout en ayant confiance en la capacité de celui qu'on veut aider à assumer ses propres responsabilités. Au lieu d'approfondir et profiter de la dépendance, comme le fait le pouvoir-domination, le pouvoir-service cherche à développer l'auto-responsabilité et l'auto-initiative. Au lieu d'être, comme le pouvoir-domination, nécessairement limité par les possibilités de contrôle, ayant donc forcément des limites, le pouvoir-service ouvre les immenses perspectives d'un pouvoir qui s'accroît indéfiniment grâce au partage et à l'aide mutuelle.

5. Le premier niveau d'utilité du projet

C'est dans cette perspective qu'apparaît alors, à mon avis, le premier niveau d'utilité du projet : en tant qu'instrument de développement du seul ciment effectif pour établir l'union entre les dominés, qui est l'exercice du pouvoir-service entre tous ces dominés - à un niveau local, sectoriel, ou intersectoriel, national et international - avec la liberté d'expression et d'information, l'égalité, la confiance et le respect mutuels, l'ouverture et la co-responsabilité, tirant parti de l'hétérogénéité.

Cette utilité pourra être encore plus ample si nous tisons parti aussi du fait que notre réseau actuel d'intercommunication compte encore plus sur la participation d'"intermédiaires" que sur celle des gens effectivement dominés et opprimés. C'est-à-dire que si la préoccupation primordiale de ces "intermédiaires" était exactement la réalisation d'une des aspirations de ceux qui ont participé à la rencontre de João Pessoa : obtenir que le maximum de groupes et personnes du monde des opprimés - pour lesquels le dépassement de la domination est un besoin vraiment vital - commencent à se servir des réseaux d'intercommunication que nous avons créés et pouvons encore créer avec le projet.
Car, en développant leur aide mutuelle et leur pouvoir d'ensemble dans les conditions d'intercommunication recherchées dans notre projet, ils pourront d'une part se libérer aussi de tous les types d'"intermédiaires" qui orientent, censurent, contrôlent, dirigent et enfin dominent et bloquent la libération; (8) et d'autre part, les "intermédiaires" mêmes - à qui sera réservée l'invitation permanente d'exercer tout le pouvoir dont ils disposent en des termes de pouvoir-service, au service de l'intercommunication entre opprimés - auront la possibilité d'une pratique les aidant aussi à se libérer, eux-mêmes, des vanités et des valeurs du monde des dominants, dans lequel ils ont été éduqués et où ils vivent. En vérité, il est possible que nous soyons déjà passés, dans de nombreux pays, de l'époque de la "conscientisation" avec des intermédiaires, à celle de l'"inter-conscientisation" entre les opprimés. (9)

Mais ces possibilités que le développement de notre projet - et de toute autre initiative du même genre - ouvre à tous ceux qui luttent contre les dominations, poussent aussi vers de nouvelles stratégies dans la manière même de faire face au dominants. Des stratégies qui peuvent nous faire échapper à la tendance à avancer en substituant une domination par une autre. C'est là que nous retrouvons le défi fondamental de notre projet.

6. Le piège de la lutte contre la domination

De fait, pour la lutte contre la domination, nous tombons presque toujours dans un véritable piège.

D'un côté, en tant que dominés, nous exerçons toujours en vérité le pouvoir dont nous disposons au service de ceux qui nous dominent, et qui nous obligent à cela pour pouvoir bénéficier au maximum des résultats de ce que nous faisons. Pour nous défendre de cette extorsion, nous essayons de la réduire au minimum et d'obtenir le maximum de ce que ceux qui nous dominent se disposent à nous céder en échange de ce que nous leur fournissons. Dans une société où les relations de domination prévalent, nous sommes donc conditionnés par la "dynamique" du pouvoir-domination dans la manière même par laquelle nous nous défendons de celui-ci. "Dynamique", qui est incompatible évidemment avec une relation sans domination : le pouvoir-service la caractérisant est nécessairement gratuit en relation avec ce qui en bénéficie directement, et suppose une réciprocité volontaire dans l'ensemble des relations entre tous ceux qui l'exercent.

D'autre part, étant donné que le dépassement de la domination dépend du passage du pouvoir sur les ressources contrôlées par les dominants - celles dont ont besoin les
dominés - aux mains de ces derniers, toute lutte de libération finit par se formuler en termes de prise d'un pouvoir déterminé - ou"du" pouvoir , quand il s'agit de l'appareil de l'Etat. Alors de même dans notre lutte contre le pouvoir des dominants, nous sommes entraînés vers la "dynamique" de leur univers, car du fait qu'ils sont dominants, nous sommes amenés à utiliser contre eux leurs armes mêmes - les armes du pouvoir-domination.

Cette double attirance vers l'univers des dominants a alors comme résultat que la dynamique de la domination envahit aussi nos relations avec nos propres alliés. C'est le piège. Pris dans ce piège, nous nous divisons et nous nous affaiblissons. C'est-à-dire que nous ne vivons pas avec nos alliés - malgré notre objectif commun - les conditions d'une intercommunication réelle et effective, et à cause de cela nos relations avec eux ne se font pas en termes de pouvoir-service, alors que ce serait ce dernier qui nous permettrait d'accumuler les forces nécessaires pour vaincre la domination. Au lieu de cela, nous recherchons au sein de notre propre camp la même efficacité que celle des dominants, c'est-à-dire, celle qui sert à dominer.

Les difficultés pour construire l'union entre ceux qui luttent de nos jours pour se libérer de la domination, dans le domaine politique, est le résultat le plus flagrant de l'action de ces mécanismes. C'est-à-dire que là exactement où nous devons le plus grandir, pour faire face à ceux qui contrôlent l'immense pouvoir matériel, technologique et militaire que détiennent ou tendent de détenir les modernes appareils d'Etat, nous nous divisions, entrant en compétition les uns avec les autres pour le contrôle du pouvoir dont nous disposons.

Les organisations politiques qui se proposent de prendre le pouvoir "pour le peuple" semblent s'affronter avec plus de vigueur qu'elles ne le furent contre ceux à la tête du pouvoir qu'elles veulent prendre. Et au sein de chacune de ces organisations, la plupart des énergies sont consommées en une lutte également impitoyable pour le pouvoir de les contrôler. Tous perdent donc de vue leur réel ennemi et finissent par se détruire mutuellement. Pendant que le peuple, qu'on prétend servir, continue à être exploité, en "attendant" indéfiniment sa "libération" - quand il ne fait pas lui-même les frais de ces luttes internes aux organisations : en servant d'instrument comme masse de manœuvre - ou chair à canon - ou, encore plus tragiquement, en étant massacré par les dominants. D'autant plus violemment que ces derniers se voient acculés, et veulent, par la démonstration de leur propre force, effrayer le peuple et le
dissuader de suivre ceux qui se proposent à le défendre mais n'en ont pas la force.

L'affaiblissement de ces organisations multiplie en conséquence les occasions dans lesquelles le "peuple uni" finit par être vaincu, car en réalité il ne constitue pas un peuple et il n'est pas uni : il n'est que l'ensemble des organisations politiques qui prétendent le représenter et qui luttent entre elles pour le conquérir et conquérir de façon hégémonique le pouvoir des dominants. Leurs victoires n'étant souvent possibles que lorsque les erreurs des dominants s'accumulent au point d'affaiblir ceux-ci, à tel point qu'une union éphémère de ceux qui les combattent peut suffire à les vaincre. Sans que pour autant en cas de victoire, on échappe à l'instauration de nouveaux types d'oppression, alimentés par la dynamique du pouvoir-domination.

7. Les conditions pour un nouveau type d'affrontement

Il semble difficile d'échapper à l'extorsion exercée par les dominants sans agir dans une perspective de "relation de forces", propre aux relations de domination. Mais en ce qui concerne la lutte directe pour le pouvoir sur les ressources avec lesquelles on nous domine, ne serait-il pas possible d'affronter les dominants au moyen d'armes qui ne se retournent pas contre ceux qui les utilisent ? Les réflexions et expériences publiées dans le cadre du projet et les découvertes faites au cours de l'intercommunication, m'amèneraient à identifier deux manières d'exercer le pouvoir qui ouvriraient cette possibilité.

Tout d'abord, l'exercice du pouvoir dont chacun de nous dispose en termes de contre-pouvoir, qui est celui qui vise à neutraliser le pouvoir des dominants sur les ressources dont ils disposent - comme par l'arrêt d'une usine ou la dénonciation d'un mensonge. En second lieu, l'exercice d'un pouvoir-alternatif, qui est celui qui vise à éliminer notre dépendance vis-à-vis des dominants - lorsque par exemple, nous découvrons des façons de satisfaire un besoin déterminé sans utiliser les ressources que possèdent et contrôlent les dominants.

Par l'utilisation de ces deux moyens, la victoire sur le dominant deviendrait viable si notre pouvoir-alternatif nous rendait suffisamment indépendants vis-à-vis des ressources sous le contrôle du dominant, et nous permettait d'utiliser notre contre-pouvoir pour l'immobiliser entièrement. Elle deviendrait donc viable si au lieu de "prendre le pouvoir" des dominants, nous avions un autre "pouvoir".

Il est certain qu'avec cette forme de lutte, nous ne serions pas nécessairement condamnés à exercer aussi en termes
de pouvoir-domination, cet autre pouvoir. Mais l'antidote
la plus efficace contre cette tendance se trouverait dans
la condition même qu'il faut respecter pour que le contrepouvoir et le pouvoir-alternatif puissent augmenter suffisamment pour vaincre réellement la domination affrontée :
c'est-à-dire que tous ceux engagés dans la lutte cherchent
t'à s'unir par l'intermédiaire du ciment du pouvoir-service. Vivant ainsi, dans le processus même de lutte, ce nouveau
type de pouvoir d'ensemble de telle sorte qu'après la victoire, la dynamique qui prévaudrait serait celle de la
relation sans domination.

Il est évident que pour parvenir effectivement à la victoire, ces trois types de pouvoir - contre-pouvoir, pouvoiralternatif et pouvoir-service - devraient être exercés de
mani ère totalement indissoluble.(10)

Mais d'autre part, pour pouvoir se développer ensemble,
ces trois formes d'exercice de pouvoir exigeraient une nou-
velle stratégie d'action politique : celle cherchant à multi-
plier les initiatives de tous genres qui amènent, d'une
part à résoudre "alternativement" tous les types de problèmes, d'autre part, à immobiliser le dominant chaque fois
que c'est possible et à tous les niveaux et aspects; ces
initiatives s'unissant et s'articulant, aux niveaux national et international, à travers des réseaux d'intercommunica-
tion réelle qui permettent l'exercice permanent et crois-
sant du pouvoir-service, vers tous les types de solidarité
entre tous ceux qui, au sein de l'immense masse des dominés
dauf jourd'hui luttent contre la domination. De sorte que
tout l'ensemble rende effective la force incommensurable
que peut avoir cette masse, grâce à l'avancement continu

de chacun de ses éléments.

Une stratégie de ce genre menerait sans aucun doute à
la constitution d'un mouvement social qui pourrait être
beaucoup plus puissant que n'importe quelle forme de domi-
nation : un mouvement social multiforme, multi-sectoriel,
auto-géré, décentralisé et non hégémonisé, libre, dynami-
que, en augmentation permanente et difficile à réprimer.
Un mouvement social cimenté par le pouvoir-service qui, en
n'écrasant pas les minorités, transforme l'hétérogénéité
en richesse de ressources; et qui, en permettant que les
plus avancés aident ceux qui sont derrière ou qui commen-
cent, fait en sorte que personne ne limite sa marche aux
frontières de son action particulière. Avec une diversité
croissante d'initiatives et l'union autour des objectifs
communs amenant à une complexité d'interdépendances crois-
sante, un mouvement de ce genre pourrait échapper au besoin
- et aux risques - d'une "direction" unique de "spécialistes"
en leadership. Car il aurait des conditions d'appuyer son avancée sur une succession de "coordinations" mises en place selon les objectifs à atteindre à chaque moment. Chaque "coordination" étant capable de s'effacer au terme de sa tâche, pour faire place à une autre coordination mieux préparée à la tâche suivante. Ou bien, en résistant à la tentation de l'efficacité, pour céder sa place à d'autres moins expérimentées, dont cependant la progression ferait accroître l'efficacité globale. En résumé, il s'agirait du type de mouvement social qui pourrait effectivement constituer une base sociale concrète et solide pour la naissance d'une culture de la non-domination.

8. L'utilité la plus profonde du projet

On peut imaginer le fonctionnement d'un mouvement social de ce type et sa force, comptant sur l'ensemble des forces d'une myriade articulée de groupes aptes à contrôler les grands ou petits systèmes chargés de répondre à leurs besoins, aptes à arrêter tout ce qui est inhumain et à commencer à vivre, appuyée sur "l'inventivité" et la créativité que la base révèle toujours selon des styles de vie et travail qui n'engendreraient pas forcément l'oppression et la mort.

Mais il est aussi possible de vérifier qu'il s'agit d'une progression difficile, car un mouvement social de ce genre exigerait une profonde rééducation de nos comportements politiques - formés, depuis le début de l'histoire de l'humanité, par une continuelle succession de structures de domination et de luttes pour le pouvoir - domination par ceux qui sont dominés à chaque phase historique.

Nous pourrions cependant dire qu'il y a comme une force intuitive qui semble émerger dans le monde entier, à la recherche d'alternatives à la dynamique du pouvoir-domination. Il est évident que la stratégie que nous trouverons enfin pourra différer totalement de celle identifiée dans les pages précédentes. Mais toute nouvelle stratégie devra affronter un long processus de rééducation - avec d'autant plus d'urgence que la logique du pouvoir-domination nous amène de plus en plus vite à un monde entièrement dominé par l'affrontement entre le développement-suicide du capitalisme et l'immense pouvoir croissant des Etats bureaucratiques. Et il est certain qu'au cours de cette rééducation, l'élément essentiel sera d'apprendre à vivre une intercommunication réelle et effective avec ses semblables.

Or, c'est dans un processus rééducatif de ce genre que notre projet pourra trouver son utilité la plus profonde
- en plus de servir de réseau concret pour l'entraide. Et surtout en multipliant les rencontres - plus difficiles mais nous touchant plus profondément que l'intercommunication par écrit, comme il l'a été vérifié à João Pessoa - aux niveaux nationaux, régionaux et internationaux. Des rencontres dans lesquelles personne ne se voit obligé de se défendre mais que tous soient conviés à s'ouvrir; dans lesquelles on n'essayera pas de chercher directement à programmer des actions concrètes; dans lesquelles nous serons toujours employés dans nos engagements respectifs - mais en nous exerçant effectivement à une intercommunication réelle vers l'échange d'expériences, de réflexions et ressources et vers la découverte de nouvelles possibilités de solidarité. Comme nous nous sommes proposés de le faire à partir de la rencontre de João Pessoa.

Si nous y réussissons, notre projet deviendra une école permanente, sans maîtres ni élèves, multi-présente, faisant des expériences et se recomposant continuellement, sur l'initiative de ceux qui en ont besoin, où et chaque fois qu'ils en ont besoin, sous la responsabilité de ceux qui veulent assumer cette tâche et s'auto-rééduquer mutuellement, avec tous ceux qui acceptent le défi lancé par le projet.

Et c'est dans cette perspective qu'il sera d'autant plus utile et qu'il se développera. Et il pourra connaître cette expansion sans crainte de s'institutionnaliser ni de se transformer en mouvement, grâce à sa propre manière d'exister et de se développer. Si les occasions d'intercommunication effective, de ce type que nous recherchons, se répètent au maximum dans le cadre de notre projet mais aussi indépendamment de celui-ci, parallèlement à l'action libératrice de chacun des participants; - si ces occasions permettent réellement, dans une pratique de véritable aide mutuelle, que tous puissent tirer les leçons nécessaires des victoires comme des échecs vécus, des coups, guerres et mensonges par lesquels les dominants tenteront de maintenir la domination, des changements produits et de la forme par laquelle ils se sont effectués, c'est alors, en même temps que s'accumuleront les bonnes ou mauvaises victoires des luttes politiques actuelles, qu'il sera possible de préparer la grande et durable victoire du peuple, celle d'un peuple qui sera alors réellement uni et qui ne sera de ce fait effectivement jamais vaincu. Vers la société fraternelle que nous voulons tous construire. (11)

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Abstract: The study traces the transition of Norway from a small, poor, peripheral subsistence economy to a modern industrial welfare state characterized by "egalitarian capitalism". Growth and development in the open economy of the 19th century have led to crises and transformation through which Norway began to master the cultural conflicts of modernization and to distribute the costs and benefits of change equitably. Two features are especially relevant to contemporary peripheral development: (i) the ability to control and to absorb imported technology and capital, and (ii) the establishment of state control over access to natural resources.

CROISSANCE ET DEVELOPPEMENT: L'EXPERIENCE NORVEGIENNE, 1830-1980

Résumé: Cette étude retrace l'évolution de la Norvège d'une économie de subsistance modeste, pauvre et périphérique vers un État industriel de bien-être moderne caractérisé par le 'capitalisme égalitaire'. La croissance et le développement dans l'économie ouverte du 19e siècle ont conduit à des crises et à des transformations à travers lesquelles la Norvège a commencé à maîtriser les conflits culturels de la modernisation et à distribuer équitablement les coûts et les bénéfices du changement. Deux traits principaux paraissent particulièrement pertinents pour le développement contemporain de la périphérie: (i) la capacité de maîtriser et d'absorber les techniques et le capital importés, et (ii) la maîtrise par l'État de l'accès aux ressources naturelles.

CRECIMIENTO Y DESARROLLO: LA EXPERIENCIA DE NORUEGA 1830-1980

Resumen: La investigación se remonta del pequeño país de Noruega desde sus pobres contextos económicos de subsistencia en la periferia hasta su transición en un estado moderno social industrial distinguido por un capitalismo egalitario. El crecimiento y desarrollo dentro de la economía abierta del siglo 19 ha resultado en crisis y en transformaciones por medio de las cuales Noruega pudo empezar a dominar los conflictos de modernización y distribuir de manera equitativa el costo y los beneficios de estos cambios. Dos aspectos son de (cont. en la página 14(56))
INTRODUCTION

Around 1830 a decisive change took place in the economic history of Norway. Per capita production started growing noticeably and continuously after 2-300 years of negligible growth. Since then growth has continued virtually without interruption and during these 150 years the country has developed from a rather poor, primary producing one to an advanced industrial and welfare society. The nation that went through this transformation was small (1.1 million inhabitants in 1830, 4.1 million in 1980), and politically insignificant. In this article, we will concentrate on a number of aspects of Norway's development which may also be of relevance today. We do not pretend to give a broad treatment of the causal relationships. Our intention is to present some results from an enquiry into the development path followed by Norway.

From subsistence economy to abundance

Gross National Product, as measured today, has increased nearly 15-fold per capita since growth began around 1830. Until this turning point a considerable proportion of the population lived near subsistence level, and famines occurred at intervals (1765, 1788, 1812-1813). Since then Norway has not been hit by famine. The general mortality rate has been reduced by 50 per cent, and the infant mortality rate fallen from 134 to 11/1000. Furthermore, Norway is today a more egalitarian society than in 1830, even though periods of increasing inequality have occurred during the last 150 years.

During this period the structure of the Norwegian economy has been completely transformed. At the beginning of the 19th century 80 per cent of the population belonged to the primary sector; today less than 10 per cent are employed within agriculture, fishing and forestry, while more than 50 per cent are employed in the service industries. In addition a pronounced specialization has taken place within the different industries.

It is today generally accepted that Norway's economic development has had mainly beneficial consequences for the majority of the population. This has not always been so. Resistance to change has at times been considerable. But it has never taken on a form which could prevent further growth-inducing changes.

The relevance of historical experience

Before examining the dramatic changes in Norwegian society, it seems appropriate to discuss briefly the question of how Norway's historical experience may be relevant for contemporary problems of economic development.

We all know that history does not repeat itself in the sense that a sequence of events can be copied in its totality at a later point in time. Circumstances will always differ, and it is trivial to point out that the world of
today is substantially different from that of the 19th century. Circumstances also vary strongly from one country to the other even at the same point in time. Accordingly, we do not intend to present Norway's experience as a model for other countries. History does not furnish any recipes for the resolution of present problems.

We do, however, assume that the Norwegian experience may be useful. It is possible to learn something from history and from the development of other countries. Similar kinds of relationships may recur in different historical circumstances. Acquaintance with different types of situations and relationships will enrich the store of knowledge which we consult when we try to solve new problems. Experience is useful also when it represents a situation which is not identical with the one at hand.

Furthermore, a number of the difficulties which Norway faced were not dissimilar from present-day problems as one would be inclined to think, and present-day problems are far from identical for all countries. Clearly, the difference between Norway and the most advanced countries of the mid-19th century was smaller, both economically and technologically, than the corresponding differences between the richest and poorest countries today. It is also important to note that Norway at its point of departure belonged to a common European culture, through race, religion and system of government. This does not imply, however, that economic growth and development in the case of Norway may be considered a matter of course, or was a frictionless or uncontroversial process, either in the initial phase or later on.

A forward leap and a break with the past

Until 1814 Norway was a dependency of Denmark, and subject to Danish administration for some 400 years. A greater part of officialdom and the old merchant aristocracy that profited from extensive privileges were of foreign extraction. In the period 1814 to 1905 Norway was the junior partner in a union with Sweden which controlled foreign policies and established limits for policies within other fields as well.

In spite of economic growth, demographic pressure created increasing problems from around 1850. Agricultural resources were more intensively exploited than previously, and by mid-century very few people saw an industrial future for Norway.

Both external trade and domestic economic activity were of a preponderantly "backward" character. Extensive contacts with world markets were of long standing. Since the early middle ages Norway depended upon the import of cereals in exchange for fish and timber. Up to 1850 raw materials such as fish, timber and crude metals still made up the bulk of foreign exports. During the 18th century Norway became a leading supplier of semi-finished timber products to Britain and Holland. Domestic merchants also gradually entered shipping and foreign trade. The production of industrial goods for sale, however, was quite insignificant. Farmers and fishermen were to a large extent self-sufficient, while officials and the numerically small bourgeoisie had to import a considerable portion of their consumer goods from abroad. Some even sent their laundry to England for proper starch and washing! In addition, Norway had no strong urban tradition - by 1830 there were only two or three towns exceeding a population of 10,000, and none of 20,000 or more.
The leap from this traditional order of society into a modern industrial society was quite considerable, and it implied abrupt changes in a number of fields. It is often maintained that technological change is more rapid today than ever before. To a degree this means comparing the incomparable. There is no doubt, however, that Norwegians during the second half of the last century were faced with technological upheavals of tremendous consequence. The railway, telegraph, steam engine, electricity both for lighting and as a motive power, were only the most important of the innovations which had to be absorbed within a period of some 50 years.

A number of factors which enabled Norway to deal with these and other challenges will have to be left out in this exposition. The educational system, demography, health conditions, the domestic capital market and political culture will be given only peripheral treatment, in spite of their obvious importance. We have selected three main themes for concentrated discussion: the role of the state and the market, the importance of depressions and crises for economic growth, and the importance of foreign influence.

II. THE STATE AND THE MARKET

The merging of national and international markets

There seems no doubt that the opening, expansion and liberalization of both domestic and foreign markets constitute basic preconditions for Norway's strong economic development since the middle of the 19th century. This holds true not only for manufacturing industry, but for agriculture and fisheries as well during the first half of our period. National self-sufficiency was not sought by either politicians or the economic élite. The inter-war crisis strengthened autarkic tendencies in a number of countries, and socialist-planned economies did likewise for a certain period. However, Social Democratic governments in the inter- and post-war periods have emphasized the advantages that Norway derives from extensive trade within a liberal international system.

Various regional Nordic solutions that were considered politically desirable after the 1939-45 war did not gain sufficient industrial backing. The more far-reaching liberalizing endeavours of the post-war years, OEEC and EFTA, generated more widespread and substantial support.

The repeal of the British Navigation Acts in 1849, the common customs area with Sweden during the greater part of the 19th century, and the trend towards general international liberalization, contributed both to establishing a basis for Norwegian exports, and to attracting foreign capital and technology to the country. The export-oriented development of Norwegian industry, whereupon much of our economic growth after the 1939-45 war was founded, could hardly have taken place without the international trade liberalization under the Bretton Woods system, GATT and OEEC. The further development of the latest twenty years, which builds on the integration of export and domestic industries, must also be considered a consequence of liberalization.2/

2/ Up to 1870 the export share of GNP increased significantly. Between 1870 and 1950 it fluctuated between 25% and 35%. After 1950 the export share has been nearly 40%. 
But competition in international markets and easy access for external influence has also had undesirable consequences for Norway. This is most strikingly demonstrated by the tendency to enclave development in the highly capital-intensive electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical industries from 1890 until about 1930. There is considerable evidence that the serious social problems of the inter-war years were aggravated by the rapid and relatively lopsided growth that took place in the export industries from the turn of the century.

Domestic liberalization

Just as international liberalization turned out to be a major growth-inducing factor, another basic precondition for later development was created through the abolition of domestic monopolies, privileges and general restraints on trade and industrial development in the years 1830-1860. These changes offered opportunities for the development of industry and commerce in new areas, and invited the introduction of new technology. At the same time these measures were met by considerable opposition from those who lost their privileges, from craftsmen, fish traders, owners of saw mills and from the chartered towns. The changes certainly caused relative or even absolute economic decline for certain groups and towns.

A number of problems and conflicts followed in the train of liberalization. But the process also contributed to creating growth and development in fisheries as well as in agriculture. During the second half of the 19th century, the rapid increase in the imports of cheap overseas grain decisively influenced the transition from cereals to dairy farming. Dairy farming meant increasing production for sale, and a simultaneous development of farm-based manufacturing, in particular in the dairy industry. This again widened the basis for Norwegian industrial development. We see then that external impulses to a large extent contributed to integrating the agricultural sector in the money economy.

Norwegian fisheries have always aimed at foreign markets. Immediately after the Napoleonic wars, fish products contributed 50 per cent or more of total export earnings, and for the major part of the century fish exports amounted to 40-50 per cent of total export earnings, shipping excluded. Throughout the entire period 70-90 per cent of the total catch has been exported. Fish traders (in the privileged towns) had freed themselves from foreign control well before the beginning of the 19th century. In that century participation in the fisheries increased considerably. With increasing competition and the abolition of privileges and monopolies, catches increased while local fish merchants strengthened their position in relation to the merchants from the formerly privileged towns, and fishermen in fact improved their bargaining power vis-à-vis the fish traders.

There is no doubt that liberalization and the extension of markets, domestically as well as abroad, served to create a new and more broadly-based Norwegian merchant class, which no longer was dominated by the few great merchant houses. The economy had a much wider supply of entrepreneurial talent, and new sources of capital developed, such as the local savings banks and joint ownership of merchant vessels. Locally based trade and industry grew up in competition with, and partly replacing, that of the old dominant towns. The removal of monopolies and privileges in particular served to reduce the enclave orientation of the old export-oriented industries of fishing, timber and mining. It seems reasonable to conclude that 19th century liberalism functioned mainly as intended.
A strong liberal State

The State has endeavoured to encourage greater speed of change and greater efficiency in the primary sector, e.g., through financial support for the enclosure movement from the mid-19th century, and through financial aid for mechanization of fishing boats in the inter-war period. To a certain extent, such financial support must be considered part of a larger programme that aimed at consolidating the existing property and settlement structure.

This serves to illustrate a basic feature of 19th century liberalism, in Norway and in several other countries, namely liberalism in harness with a strong State. The State played a decisive role by abolishing the old privileges and monopolies and by establishing the framework for the new system. The introduction of new means of communication such as steamboat lines and a railroad system was managed by the State, as was the establishment of a regulated money and stock market. From this strong liberal State the leap to new regulations was not a big one, even though it raised political turmoil.

We particularly want to emphasize the Concession laws which were passed just after the turn of the century. At that time it proved possible to fulfill the need for more extensive regulations, through a very rapid strengthening of the control functions of the State (see below, p. 12(54).

With increasing mechanization and more capital intensive methods both in fishing and farming, coinciding with the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the need for new regulations and protective measures arose both in fishing and farming. The regulations have grown partly out of the cooperative organizations of the primary producers themselves, partly through new legislation, in response to the problems created by liberalization, larger markets and modernization. The combination of cooperative and state initiatives has created an elaborate system of regulation and protection where farmer and fishermen organizations largely control processing and distribution.

We may thus conclude that the quantitatively rather limited Norwegian State for long periods was willing and able to take on considerable tasks in establishing the framework for the liberal system, in introducing incentives for growth and development, and in working actively to alleviate unacceptable social consequences of the system. This does not, of course, imply that the system functioned to everyone's satisfaction, as is most clearly shown by the growth of the labour movement from the beginning of the 20th century.

On the other hand, we know that a quantitatively large state is not necessarily strong. A large state apparatus in many cases invites manipulations from within the bureaucracy and from outside interests. Detailed regulations have at times turned the entrepreneur away from the market towards the bureaucracy, to which has been delegated the power of making decisions. It seems that possibilities of promoting change have suffered as a consequence. The economic regulations in Norway during the five years following the last war contributed precisely to freezing and strengthening an industrial structure which the government actually wanted to change.

Growth and development in an open economy

It seems natural today to ask how such substantial growth and development could take place in Norway, within a relatively open economy, and from a modest point
of departure, without resulting in permanent domination by foreigners. As regards the period after 1900 it seems reasonable to find the cause in the very pronounced willingness to use the State apparatus for control and regulation purposes.

In addition it seems reasonable to assume that the economic growth which had already taken place by the turn of the century had in fact created a national economic structure and an entrepreneurial class which on its own was able to solve quite a few of the problems inherent in the industrialization of Norway.

There remains, however, the question of why foreign predominance did not occur as a result of the first wave of liberalization around the middle of the 19th century. At that time growth was in its infancy, old regulations were removed and new ones were hardly thought of. This is a question which can hardly be answered in a satisfactory manner. It does seem probable, however, that the absence of foreign dominance was on the one hand due to lack of foreign interest during this period, compared with the later period of hydro-electric expansion. In some industries, such as fisheries, it is doubtful whether large-scale and capital-intensive technology would offer any competitive advantage at the then-existing technological level. First-hand sales and exports had at any rate been under Norwegian control for a considerable period of time. On the other hand, the problems of development at the time were not of a magnitude demanding massive foreign intervention. In shipping, joint ownership proved to be an efficient organizational set-up during the era of sails, which permitted a rapid development of this trade under national control. The capital requirements in industries like shipbuilding and wood pulp grinding could be met even by a small country. And a relative newcomer to industrialism, Norway proved able to adapt to technological changes in a very satisfactory manner.

There is no doubt that the opening and liberalization of the Norwegian market took place under far more favourable conditions than we can normally expect to find in countries which are going through a comparable process today. Large countries and large companies seem to have found very few attractive investment objects until the turn of the century, technology was significantly less exclusive, and easily exploitable natural resources would give large foreign companies only limited advantages. When foreign interests did come in earnest, Norway already had experienced significant growth.

III. CRISIS AND GROWTH

Business cycles and structural change

It is a salient fact that the Norwegian economy has not been characterized by smooth and even growth from some kind of a "take-off" around 1830. Spurts and relaxations probably have been more important than in major industrial countries. This is presumably one consequence of a very open economy.

We may roughly distinguish between five separate periods: a rather long period of economic growth until 1875; a period of stagnation and crisis from 1875 to 1905; an almost continuous boom period until 1920; the inter-war years with large-scale unemployment, but also with significant economic growth and, finally, the very favourable post-war period.
In addition the centre of gravity in the economy has been in continuous movement between different sectors of the economy and between different regions. Until about 1850 fishing and agriculture held dominant positions in the economy. In the period 1850-75 shipping was the leading sector followed by forestry. After 1875 shipping stagnated, while no new growth industry was ready to take its place. This probably constituted the real problem of the Norwegian economy of that period. In the years 1900-20 the development of hydro-electric power and power-consuming large-scale industry played a dominant part.

Simultaneously with the movement between sectors there were considerable regional shifts. In the period 1830-75 the economy grew mainly in the western and then in the southern parts of the country. After 1875 the south-eastern region gained a lead which it kept until the present time. The North Sea oil seems, however, to cause the centre of gravity to be moved westwards again.

Crisis, pivot of transformation

Lack of growth in a sector of the economy, in a region or even in the entire economy, does not necessarily mean that no development takes place. On the contrary, there is much to be said for the theory that fundamental changes typically occur during periods of depression. Norwegian agriculture was in fact in the period 1860-1900 rather crisis-ridden and stagnating. Profits seem to have been low, growth in production stagnated, employment declined steeply and a large number of farms were abandoned. This was still a period of great qualitative change in agriculture. There was a massive transfer from cereals to dairy farming, and from self-sufficiency to production for the market. In addition, new machines were introduced, e.g., the iron plow, the reaper and the steam-powered thresher. The processing of farm products was generally transferred from the farm to modern food and beverage industries, particularly dairies. This period marked the decisive phase in the enclosure movement. The old system, still prevalent in Western and Northern Norway, where the farmer owned a number of widely scattered strips, was replaced by one of consolidated holdings.

We may choose another example in the development of the paper and pulp industry, Norway's first large-scale modern industry. From the late 1860s Norwegian timber trade and saw mill industry met increasingly stiff competition from the Baltic states and from Canada. The export of sawn wood, which had grown rapidly from 1850, stagnated and then declined after 1873. It was during this period and under the pressure of difficult market conditions that Norwegian producers turned to the development of a new product, namely mechanical wood pulp which they succeeded in making a suitable material for paper production. In this way the basis was laid for a new growth industry, which was to hold an important position in economic development during the next 50 years.

The transformation of the 1930s

In the years up to 1930 the Norwegian economy was heavily export-oriented. Growth in export industries exceeded by far growth in the domestic industries, and the international depression of the 1930s accordingly had grave consequences. It is interesting to note that the crisis induced a radical shift from export to domestic market industries. Old and well established export
industries like chemicals and paper and pulp stagnated, while textile, clothing, food and beverages and, not least, metalware and machine industries grew noticeably. Sawing and planing of wood, a traditional export industry, was largely oriented towards the home market, while more advanced wood manufacturing like furniture and building equipment mushroomed. The volume of wood manufacturing export was reduced to 1/3, while employment increased by 35 per cent from 1930 to 1939. Quite a few of the new plants were set up by workers who had lost their jobs in the export industries.

These changes also implied a transition from rather capital-intensive methods, from large-scale industry to smaller plants, with a much more even geographical distribution. The changes signal a transition from the production of raw materials and semi-finished products for export, to the production of finished goods for the domestic market. Total employment in manufacturing industries grew by more than 25 per cent from 1930 to 1939, while there was no increase at all in the 1920s when a comparable growth in the volume of production had been obtained by exports.

It may be mentioned that the depression of the 1930s also provoked a radical change in the theoretical approach to economic policy. Ragnar Frisch and the "Oslo School" were in the forefront of the development of new methods for a more active political steering of the economy. On the whole, decisive qualitative changes in the Norwegian economy frequently seem to have taken place during periods of depression.

The cost of change

There is no doubt that transformation also took place during growth periods, even though our material indicates that companies are inclined to stay with old technologies and proven organizational setups as long as they yield a satisfactory profit. On the other hand, there are several examples that challenges raised by crises have not always been met by adequate response.

The introduction of steamships created a depression in the Norwegian shipping industry in the latter quarter of the 19th century. The southern part of the country in particular experienced serious problems in finding a satisfactory solution, and considerable areas were in fact depopulated for lack of alternative employment. The crisis in shipping and shipbuilding during this period, together with stagnation in farming, forestry and the herring fisheries, combined to cause a very serious depression. It did not prove possible to find employment for the rapidly increasing population. Norway experienced a demographic crisis which might have had even more serious social consequences but for the outlet provided by immigration to America. In the 1880s, 200,000 people (or 10% of the population) chose to leave the country. With the exception of Ireland, Norway had the largest relative number of emigrants of any European country.

It is indeed a salient fact that the Norwegian economy during these 150 years has been continually faced with new problems demanding new adjustments and restructuring. This lack of balanced development implies, among other things, that the fruits of growth may have been unevenly distributed in the short run. At every point in time there have been losers. Some lose old rights or
privileges, others lose their jobs or are forced to close their plants, and others again have to change their occupations, or even have to move. This happens not the least in periods when aggregate welfare seems to be increasing considerably.

IV. FOREIGN IMPULSES

Modernization - A process of cultural conflict

We have pointed out that Norway's integration into an international market economy had beneficial effects both during the industrial breakthrough and later. But the foreign impulses go farther than mere market extension. Industrialization and a number of its basic preconditions were essentially a kind of cultural import. The ideas and concepts of industrial change, as well as the practical insights it demanded, had to be found abroad. Although Norway was a European nation and geographically close to the pacemakers of the industrial revolution, the idea of Norway as an industrial nation was not easily accepted. Skepticism was partly based on the assumption that the industrialization of Norway would be impossible because the country was deficient in basic natural resources such as coal and iron, and was a stranger to industrial technology. Furthermore, there was widespread fear of the negative social and economic consequences of industrialization, such as social distress and the growth of a proletariat. At the same time romantic attachment to agriculture, as the happy and real creator of value, persisted.

Industrialism and the idea of progress were for a long time a "surface culture" nourished by a small and outward-looking élite within officialdom and the bourgeoisie. It was an alien element in the population at large. This was especially so within the peasant community, where we find considerable resistance to modernization of farming as well. But even within the political élite, large groups felt deeply uneasy about industrial society until well into the 20th century. Such attitudes have in general been married to a similar coolness towards the "commercial spirit". Important segments of Norwegian 19th century society were skeptical towards the spirit of capitalism.

The skepticism has also been expressed through negative attitudes towards the related ideas of free competition and international division of labour. The notion that integration into the world economy means giving up a valiantly fought-for national independence has been strongly held. Norway's economic growth indicates, however, that fear of foreign domination has been exaggerated.

Norway's road to industrialization was thus neither harmonious, simple nor unproblematic. The nation experienced profound conflicts between the home-grown and the alien, between tradition and change. When viewed in the perspective it is striking how smooth the process of social and cultural change after all was. We assume that the progress following from the early economic growth must be partly responsible for this.

Foreign technology - Norway's most important import

Norway's dependence upon imports has probably been most pronounced in the field of technology. Virtually all important technology was imported. When new industries were established and developed, machinery, workers and engineers
were as a rule brought from abroad. Both the textile industry, which was established from around 1840, and railroad construction, from around 1850, were dependent on British machinery and technical personnel. Even traditional and long established industries such as agriculture and fisheries depended upon technological imports. Pulp and paper, which expanded vigorously at the end of the 19th century, had to go to Germany, France and America for the basic innovations. But this industry demonstrates a strong ability both to adapt to imported technology to develop it further and eventually to export the originally imported technology in a new version. Foreign technology was particularly important during the breakthrough for large-scale industry at the turn of the century, the hydro-electric sector being established through Swedish, German, Swiss, American, French and British capital and technology.

Dependence upon foreign technology has been characteristic of Norwegian economic development to the present day. From this starting point, Norway has been capable of absorbing and assimilating quite heavy doses of foreign technology, while adjusting the imports to Norwegian conditions. This capacity for importing, adapting and spreading foreign technology is partly due to the fact that Norway is a small country with a traditionally outward-looking economic élite. Equally important, mechanical and technical skills that had been developed in traditional industries enabled Norwegians to absorb the new technology with little or no formal training. We must finally emphasize that technological innovation and diffusion have been stimulated by expectations of individual gain. Those who introduced innovations did themselves reap the benefit. A business structure characterized by a large number of small and independent units probably facilitated such adaptations.

Besides importing machinery and specialists of all categories, the Norwegian economy has profited greatly by exploiting foreign centres of knowledge and education; Norwegian specialists of various kinds and Norwegian industrial leaders had to go abroad for their education. Until 1910 Norway had no advanced engineering school. A number of ideas for fundamental institutional changes were also imported. Thus, the concept of agricultural cooperatives, which acquired remarkable strength in Norway, was brought in from Denmark.

Foreign capital - important and controllable

The import of foreign technology has frequently been allied with the import of foreign capital. Historically foreign capital has played an important part mainly in three ways. The oldest from is commercial credit, whereby merchant houses e.g., in Hamburg, largely financed the development of Norwegian merchant capitalism as early as the 18th century. During the 19th century the State borrowed large sums abroad for infrastructure development. From the 1850s up to the first World War, 90 per cent of the Norwegian railroad system was financed in this manner. From the turn of the century direct foreign investments acquired considerable proportions. These investments were then and later characteristically concentrated in the industrial manufacturing sector, and particularly engaged in the development of capital-intensive large-scale industry (electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical). The industrial breakthrough after 1875 occurred within the less capital-intensive sectors, such as mechanical wood pulp, textile, food and engineering. The development of large-scale industry, however, coincided with, and was totally dependent upon, the importation of foreign capital and technology. By 1909 foreign-owned
shares constituted 39 per cent of the total share capital of Norwegian industrial firms. In mining and in chemical industry the percentages were 80 and 85, respectively.

During the inter-war period and until the mid-1950s the proportion of foreign-owned shares was largely stable. From 1956 on, however, foreign ownership again expanded drastically. It doubled between 1962 and 1968. In the aggregate foreign ownership has been particularly important because of its role in developing key large-scale manufacturing industries. Firms of 20 per cent or more foreign capital in 1962 contributed 13 per cent of total product in manufacturing industries, with 9 per cent of total employment. In the chemical industry the corresponding figures were 46 per cent and 44 per cent.

In a contemporary perspective the need for foreign capital seems only to a negligible degree to have been a retarding factor because industrial plants in the 19th century were considerably less capital-intensive than those of the present day. On the other hand, improving terms of trade, at least to 1875, stimulated the inflow of foreign currency. Furthermore, as the demand for capital increased, Norway profited from very favourable international monetary conditions. Through the gold standard the Norwegian crown was freely convertible into major currencies, and the international capital market was thus easily accessible for both public and private loans.

Private borrowing abroad has been of particular importance for the development of Norwegian shipping. In the era of sailing vessels the demand for fixed capital was met through joint ownership, while working capital was obtained in places such as London and Hamburg. From around 1914 a considerable portion of the fixed capital was obtained through credits from shipyards and oil companies.

The wave of foreign investments around the turn of the century, particularly for the acquisition of waterfalls, forests and mining rights, created apprehension that Norway was on the point of losing national control of foreign investments. As a consequence concession laws were passed. By this legislation the government was enabled to impose a wide range of conditions on all limited liability ventures exploiting Norwegian natural resources, thereby securing national control of industrial development. Lack of domestic capital and expertise, however, led to the laws being very liberally practised.

Even though foreign capital has frequently been a matter of political conflict, it has nevertheless been admitted on a large scale mainly because the Storting at an early date enacted strict company laws and social security legislation. In addition, the foreign capital problem has been diminished by large scale transfers of industrial shares to Norwegians during the First World War, and by nationalization of all German holdings (including some former French) after the Second World War. Norway furnishes in fact an example of a country where foreign capital has played a very important role, while still being subject to domestic political control.
V. GROWTH, EQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

Egalitarian capitalism

The relationship between growth and equality constitutes one of the main subjects in modern discussions on economic development. It is a widely held opinion that industrialization pre-supposes a very uneven distribution of wealth, mainly because the poor do not save.

The Norwegian experience seems to demonstrate that this is not necessarily so. Norwegian society was initially fairly egalitarian compared to other European countries at the time, and compared to most present-day poor countries as well. Important segments of the economic upper class, moreover, came out of the post-Napoleonic war crisis in a seriously weakened position. Economic modernization was largely based on groups that were only moderately better off than the rest of the population. Economic transformation could still take place on a relatively wide front because various institutions, such as joint ownership, state banks, and local savings banks, involved comparatively large parts of the population in the process of accumulation.

At least from the turn of the century, the state has consciously worked for a more egalitarian structure of Norwegian society. We assume that this has in fact had a beneficial effect upon economic growth as well, because it has contributed to breaking down resistance to change as its fruits were more evenly distributed. Obviously, the fairly egalitarian structure has had the added advantage of making possible a broadly recruited economic and financial leadership. Equality stimulated by state initiatives has coincided with relatively free access for entrepreneurs to a capitalist system.

Growing pains - the reverse side of the medal

During several periods of time growth has in the short run led to greater inequality between different groups of society and between different regions. If one were to predict the future of Norway on the basis of its economic development in the last quarter of the 19th century - the period of the most important qualitative changes towards industrialism - the future would indeed have looked bleak for large areas of the country as well as for large groups of the population. Even with the relatively egalitarian and non-violent social conditions in Norway, there were always rather sombre undercurrents to be seen.

Certainly Norwegian society has suffered many painful consequences of growth on its road to affluence and greater need satisfaction for the vast majority. Before the turn of the century modernization caused large migration from the hardships of the countryside into growing towns with slum areas and social distress. There were long periods of very large unemployment - the figures for unionized industrial workers never crept below 15 percent during the period 1925-40. As a result bitter class struggles and other symptoms of economic and social dislocations erupted. The various parties of the labour movement, which in principle rejected the entire fabric of existing society, gained 30-40 percent of electoral votes throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Within the present Norwegian society there are significant groups, particularly in peripheral districts and among young people, who consider economic growth very problematic or undesirable.
The importance of economic growth

It has taken time to find measures against the unwanted consequences of economic growth, even though the problems may be considered insignificant in comparison with those of many other countries. Our study indicates that solutions have largely been based on further economic growth. Growth combined with political determination has made it possible to reduce or remove undesirable consequences of previous development. Even though the more recent growth periods have created problems of their own, these have as a rule been smaller than those they contributed to solve. We should in particular emphasize that growth created the basis for a modern public sector with large public consumption and a policy of public redistribution between social groups and industries, in order to make incomes more equal.

Our approach to the economic development of Norway is that of the historian. This implies that we have focussed on what actually took place. Our approach does not imply that the road followed was the only or best way for Norway. There will always be better solutions for the problems consequent upon growth. We still believe that Norway's experience, even in this way, may serve as a basis for reflection upon "development alternatives".

interés especial para el desarrollo contemporáneo de la periferia: (i) la capacidad para controlar y absorber capital y tecnología importada y (ii) el establecimiento del control estatal en cuanto al acceso a recursos naturales.
Abstract: In 1978 a study was undertaken in Norway to learn how private households can succeed in lowering their consumption habits. The study took the social experimental group "Future in Our Hands" (20,000 members) dedicated to a new lifestyle in rich countries as a basis and compared its reduced levels of consumption with a sample of the Norwegian population at large. The freedom to change is investigated, beginning with processed foods, clothing and luxuries, actual changes are evaluated, and public attitudes toward official measures encouraging change are analysed. The study concludes that the beginning of another development in Norway may be found in the middle classes; their shattered illusions can be a powerful force of change. On the other hand, as long as the majority of people still look upon a higher material standard of living as their highest aim, neither social nor political change in favour of new lifestyles is likely to be realized.

LES POSSIBILITÉS DE LA RÉDUCTION VOLONTAIRE DE LA CONSOMMATION PRIVÉE ET LES CHANGEMENTS DES STYLES DE VIE

Résumé: Une enquête a été entreprise en Norvège, en 1978, pour déterminer comment les ménages privés peuvent modérer leurs habitudes de consommation. L'étude prit comme point de départ le groupe d'expérimentation sociale "L'avenir est à nous!" (20 000 membres), qui se consacre à de nouveaux styles de vie dans les pays industrialisés et a comparé ses niveaux de consommation avec ceux d'un échantillon de la population norvégienne en général. On a examiné la liberté de changer, à partir des produits alimentaires industriels, de l'habillement et des biens de luxe; les changements réels ont été examinés, de même que les attitudes du public à l'égard des mesures officielles d'encouragement au changement. L'étude conclut que le début d'un autre développement en Norvège est le fait des classes moyennes; leurs illusions perdues peuvent être une puissante force de changement. En revanche, tant que la majorité considère un niveau de vie matériel supérieur comme son objectif majeur, le changement social ou politique vers d'autres styles de vie demeure peu probable.

(Resumen espanol en la página 10(66).)
POSSIBILITIES FOR VOLUNTARY REDUCTION OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND CHANGE IN LIFESTYLES

In the spring of 1978, a somewhat unusual empirical study was conducted in Norway. The objective was to find out to what extent private households succeed in changing their habits in such a way as to lead to reduced consumption, when one or more members of the household are so motivated.

The study was administered by Professor Leif Holbaek Hanssen of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen. The author of this article has functioned as scientific assistant for the project.

The study was financed by the Norwegian Fund for Market and Distribution Research. Our plan was to base the investigation on a group of people that formed a social experimental group, and then compare it with the Norwegian population - a method that has many similarities to controlled experiments within the natural sciences. This has been possible due to a phenomenon which has no comparison elsewhere in Europe, at least not as far as its relative size is concerned, namely the popular movement "Fremtiden i våre hender" (The Future in Our Hands).

A short presentation of "The Future in Our Hands"

The main objective of the movement is:

To work for global justice and to find a solution to the problems of the poor countries of the world, so that it will be possible for all people in the world to live as dignified human beings.

The movement maintains that there are three necessary conditions for achieving this objective:

1. That the rich countries themselves manage to create a new lifestyle and a social development where greater weight is attached to human than to material values.

2. That the rich countries manage to reduce their level of consumption, and that this is combined with an internal process of equalization.

3. That members of the movement themselves desire to take part in this process of change.

The movement started in spring 1974 as a response to a book by the author, Erik Dammann. The book took as its starting point the glaring injustice prevailing in the world, and concluded that ordinary people must take the future into their own hands. The movement has inherited its name from the book.

When this study was conducted four years after the start of the movement, membership in the movement had reached about 20,000. In Norway, with four million inhabitants, this is a high figure. Since then the movement has spread to Denmark and Sweden. It is independent of all groups, organizations, political parties and authorities. However, the movement's information centre
receives financial support annually from the Norwegian State. In 1978, this support amounted to about one-eighth of the total budget of the information centre, which is financed mainly by membership subscriptions.

The very fact that "The Future in Our Hands" has chosen to encourage people to reduce their consumption as one of the ways of working for the main objective makes its members relevant material for this study.

It must be emphasized, however, that a changeover to a new life style is not a prerequisite for membership. It is enough to want to change one's habits. Also, the study was not directed at the individual member, but at the household of which the member was a part.

Why a new life-style and reduced consumption?

For a full understanding it is also necessary to take a look at the motives for the choice of a "new life-style" as an instrument for change:

1. It is considered realistic that in the long run the majority of people will want to emancipate themselves from a one-sided, materialistically-oriented life style characterized by competition for goods and by substitutes for the real values in life.

2. Reduced consumption by means of an alternative life-style can release resources amongst individuals and groups of individuals so that these resources may be transferred to the most badly-off in the poor countries. (This does not imply a belief in any positive or automatic relation between reduced consumption in the rich countries and an improvement of conditions in the poor countries, but in the possibility to create such a relation).

3. By trying to change to a new life-style it is possible to create closeness, fellowship with others and an involvement which gives a feeling that one is at least doing something to combine theory with practice.

4. Attempts to change can make one aware of the social conditions which impede such change, and create a motive for altering these conditions.

5. Trends in the pattern of consumption can function as signals to politicians.

6. Last, but not least, developments in the consumption pattern represent a strategic variable for the future of a society based on industrial growth - not to mention for the future of the whole world.

How great is our freedom of action?

Is it at all possible for us to change our life-style - as established as we are in our habits, our instalment payments, our housing situation, our work etc.?

We who were to carry out the investigation addressed ourselves to the members of "The Future in Our Hands" through its Information Centre, on the assumption that they ought to have gained some experience concerning the possibilities of changing their life-style. Every tenth person was selected from a list of members arranged chronologically according to the date when they joined the
Movement. It added up to 2,025 persons. To each of these persons we mailed a questionnaire.

The forms were tested at an earlier stage by sending a draft questionnaire to 100 members, selected by the same method. Using the answers received to this draft, and also follow-up interviews and comments from experts, we compiled the final questionnaire that was used in the investigation.

The forms were fairly comprehensive and complicated. This may have discouraged certain groups of members. The forms also allowed for the possibility for comparison with the annual studies of consumption for the whole population, conducted by the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics.

The percentage replying was well over 60, but after having excluded questionnaires that were poorly filled in, we ended up with 1,195 answers, or about 59 per cent. This is a very good result compared with results achieved by the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics in comparable studies.

What is the life situation of the members?

As previously mentioned, this was not a study primarily of the individual members of the "Future in Our Hands" movement, but the household in which they live. In fact very few questions were related to the member as such.

We know beforehand that the majority of the members are women. As far as the type of household the members live in is concerned, 48 per cent consist of either one or two adults, 36 per cent consist of two adults with from 1 - 3 children, and 13 per cent of households of other types. Among the single persons, 18 per cent are in the age group 20 - 29 years. It is assumed that a large number of these are students.

As far as the age of the prime supporter is concerned, the younger age groups are heavily over-represented. But it is also worth noting that the age group over 60 years is not completely absent. This group is represented by 9.7 per cent. 32.8 per cent of the prime supporters are women. This is 6 per cent above the average for Norway as a whole.

As for the education of the prime supporter of the household, there is an exceptionally large proportion with higher education. 50 per cent have attended an educational institution for more than 15 years 77.2 per cent for more than 13 years.

This also has an effect on the level of income of the households. In relation to the rest of the population, there are fewer in the low-income group and more in the high-income group. This unbalanced distribution of income also probably results from the households often having more than one income. But it should be adequate to place the average household in the upper middle class.

The households are spread more or less evenly geographically in relation to the population in general. An exception is Western Norway, which is mainly rural and under-represented. The capital of the country with its suburbs is on the other side over-represented.

With regard to place of dwelling our sample of people is also biased compared with the average Norwegian family. The share living in flats and detached houses is larger than the average.
An evaluation of changes in consumption

When it comes to the possession of durable consumer goods such as car, boat, freezer, TV etc., it looks as though in this connection the households studied to a certain extent is below the average Norwegian family. Since the group concerned has an income higher than average, part of the income must thus have been used for things other than durable consumer goods.

There was a decrease in purchases of new clothes and shoes, and more clothes were sewn at home. Evidently this is an area where a reduced consumption is achievable. The changes refer to consumption in 1977 seen in relation to 1974. Real income rose by 13 per cent in Norway during that period. The results are based on qualitative assessments by those who filled in the questionnaire.

The changes also show a move towards less ready-processed foodstuffs 50.9 per cent bake more bread themselves. Nearly 40 per cent avoid using prefabricated dinners. Furthermore, it seems that food habits have turned in a decidedly more healthy direction with less fat, meat and sugar, and more fish, vegetables and grain products.

As many as 70 per cent are non-smokers, and there was also a tendency to reduce the consumption of tobacco among smokers. 37 per cent did not drink alcohol, which is expensive in Norway. Another reason may be that a large number (about 25 per cent) are apparently teetotalers.

An objection to a subjective evaluation of this type might be that one has a tendency to answer what may be expected to be "right". According to our assessment, the questionnaires do not give the impression that this was the case. We often find a surprising self-examination, and not unimportant changes in the consumption of the "wrong" type of goods. Furthermore, we promised to treat the answers with complete discretion.

In order to test the honesty of the personal evaluations in the answers, we sent out three versions of the accompanying letter. 1/4 received an accompanying letter with a positive tone ("many have managed to accomplish a good deal"), 1/4 with a negative tone ("many others have also met with considerable difficulties") and 1/2 received a neutral accompanying letter. This did not seem to have any significant effect on the replies.

What has been achieved?

The conclusion from the subjective evaluations of the personal experiments in changing the life-style, is that most of the households have made a try and managed very well or quite well in at least one area. The percentage which had no success in any area or had not tries at all, is below nine. But concurrently almost 25 per cent managed very well in more than one area.

Table 1 shows what the members believe they have achieved in their households in different areas:
Table 1: Personal evaluation of areas or measures for possible changes in life-style. (Percentage of total replies).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of measures</th>
<th>Do not want to, and have not thought of</th>
<th>Want to, but does not work with no success</th>
<th>Have tried and managed a little</th>
<th>and managed quite well</th>
<th>and managed very well</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily food</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of social gatherings</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking habits</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoking habits</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy saving (at home)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (car, bus, bicycle etc)</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of holiday and travel</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure activities</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own food-production</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berry picking etc</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More &quot;do it yourself&quot; in the home</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More exercise</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note the areas where there is the greatest degree of freedom to change the life-style: making food and gathering food, "do it yourself" in the home, exercise and transport. Energy saving in the home also seems to be possible to some extent. From the table we can see that the households concerned have made the most drastic efforts with regard to reducing smoking (17.4 per cent "very well") and with regard to increased gathering of food (berry picking etc. reaches 51 per cent in the categories "quite well" and "very well" added). In these areas there are about 60 per cent (± 10 per cent) who have achieved something.

On the basis of the replies, it seems that there are more who have managed to change their life-style than who have managed to reduce total expenses as a result of this change. An important factor in this connection is that in the same period inflation made it uneconomic to save by placing money in the bank.
Nevertheless, about 1/4 of the households have managed to save about 10 per cent from 1974 to 1977. (In this case, households with two or three members score highest). This figure would probably have been higher if the movement had put more emphasis on creating its own channels for such savings. At present, consideration is being given to arrangements for a "voluntary development tax" among members.

What has an encouraging, and what a restricting effect?

Table 2: Question: Have any of the following had an encouraging, or restricting, effect on the thought or on the attempt to change life style?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encouraging</th>
<th>Restricting</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All - most of - the members of the household</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few of the household members</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours (most of them)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family outside the household</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The old circle of acquaintances</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newer acquaintances</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiors at work</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other colleagues at work</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;My own habits&quot;</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social developments as a whole</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One important conclusion which may be drawn from Table 2 is that the participants in "The Future in Our Hands" do not consider themselves an "outsider group" in the society. Strategically, this is propitious for creating changes. That is to say, changes in life style may also be felt to be relevant by other people, and in this way become infectious.

The high percentage who replied that "my own habits" have had an encouraging effect seems to imply that a large number lived relatively frugally even before "The Future in Our Hands" was initiated.

Owing to the fact that up to 60 per cent have to some extent shifted their circle of acquaintances, it is interesting to note that 49 per cent find newer acquaintances encouraging when it comes to changing their life-style.

Finally, we note that the social development in general is what people feel as most restricting.
Another part of the study shows that 12.5 per cent have changed work, have altered their working hours or changed over to other activities in order to be better able to determine their own life-style. A further 39.2 per cent have thought about doing the same.

Political attitude towards certain public measures

The study shows that there was extensive support for public measures which might help a change of life-style, even if these were to imply an element of "voluntary coercion". This is illustrated in Table 3.

Table 4 shows, in addition, a distinct shift of attitude among members in regard to the same questions. The same measures have received increasing support in recent years. This seems to indicate that the movement has made its members more politically conscious. They are able to see the relation between personal and political problems.

Table 3: Question: What measures do you yourself support, which do you object to - and to which do you have a neutral attitude?

Table 4: Question: Have you yourself, in the course of recent years, become a stronger supporter or a stronger opponent of certain of these measures - or has your attitude remained unchanged?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporter</td>
<td>Opponent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict product control</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levelling of incomes</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public encouragement for private saving</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving in the public budgets</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- limit advertising</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- limit payment by instalment</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- provide public support for a change of life-style</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus far the figures themselves.
Focus on "the ones who have succeeded"

If we take a closer look at the people who have managed to make changes in their consumption, we find an interesting point which may be described as the main conclusion of the study. - For this group of people in the study, it seems as though external conditions do not play any part in the changeover. Correlation, factor and discrimination analyses have been carried out in all relevant ways. Neither the level of income, social status, education, housing or age seems to play any significant part in this respect.

What is decisive for these people is their own attitudes, as well as the existence of the movement, "The Future in Our Hands". Apparently these are people who believe in themselves and who dare to stand up for their ideas in the face of others. In their own field they are in the forefront, and try out the future in practice.

It has been said that future growth will be in the social perspective a qualitative and human development. Just as companies, under present conditions of material growth, try out their products beforehand, social experiments of the type "The Future in Our Hands" should be conducted in order to test future development beforehand. This would appear to be sensible in this "age of uncertainty".

Who knows? It may be that those who go into the breach towards a new lifestyle are the entrepreneurs of tomorrow. Should it not be public policy to ensure the proper conditions for a social development of this type in the years to come in the same way as the right conditions have been ensured for material growth in the last 150 years?

Does the embryo of an alternative development lie in the middle class?

We noted that the prime supporter in the households was a person with strong resources both as regards to income and education. One may wonder whether the somewhat upper middle class, who have historically preserved the traditional values, now want to turn development upside down.

Part of the explanation is, of course, that the middle class has become quite large in our welfare society. But more interesting is the fact that this may be a question of shattered illusions. People feel themselves fooled. It seems that the traditional values will not be able to be preserved by the present trend of development, as was once hoped. If this is correct, the movement contains elements of a value-conservative character, at the same time as it represents a revolutionary force within the welfare society.

But the whole is related to the strategy of "The Future in Our Hands".

It is maintained that as long as the majority of people in the rich countries still look upon a higher material standard of living as their highest aim, no political change in the direction of the objectives outlined above can be realized. Therefore it is very important to influence the general objective and priority of values among people, so that they can quit themselves of their habitual-growth attitude. To be able to help the poor parts of the world must be the desired policy of the majority, and in this connection, the populations of the rich countries must be prepared to accept and endure the changes this implies.
An important focus group will therefore be those who set standards, those who have a relatively high income, those who everyone else tries to imitate, the leaders of opinion. There is bound to be an effect when these people, who have been used to eating caviar with the rich, stand in the forefront and say: This did not make us any happier. All our status symbols have come between us and the real values in life, such as sympathy for one's fellow human beings, a spirit of community, and solidarity. For our own part, we intend to return to a lower level of consumption.

If this were to become a general trend - something which "The Future in Our Hands" naturally hopes for - it will considerably help to subdue the forces in the rich countries still advocating material growth.

This is one of the main reasons why many of the participants in the movement belong to the higher income groups. It would be somewhat odd, even almost immoral, to turn to the poorly paid and badly off with this message. People with a higher than average income are those who should most easily be able to reduce consumption, and if they were to do this out of motives of solidarity, it would be even better.

"The rich lands' leaders must have the courage to tell their people that they are rich enough"

Julius Nyerere

cont. de la p. 57

POSIBILIDADES PARA EFECTUAR REDUCCIONES VOLUNTARIAS EN EL CONSUMO PRIVADO Y CAMBIOS EN ESTilos DE VIDA

Resumen: En 1980 se llevaron a cabo investigaciones para averiguar cómo familias privadas pudieran llegar a disminuir sus hábitos de consumo. Como base se usó el grupo social experimental 'Future in Our Hands' (50 000 miembros) grupo que se dedica al desarrollo de nuevos estilos de vida en países ricos, y se comparó sus niveles reducidos de consumo con los de una porción muestra de la población noruega en general. Se investigó la libertad para iniciar cambios, empezando con alimentos industrialmente confeccionados, vestidos y artículos de lujo. Se evalúan cambios efectivos y se analiza la actitud del público hacia las medidas oficiales para fomentar cambios. Se concluye que los comienzos de otro desarrollo en Noruega ya se encuentran en la clase media; la consecuencia de ver sus ilusiones en años les ha transformado en fuente poderosa para efectuar cambios sociales. Sin embargo, siempre que la mayoría continua a considerar que la aspiración a un nivel de vida material más alto es su más importante anhelo, no se realizarán cambios políticos y sociales que favorecen nuevos estilos de vida.
BUILDING BLOCKS

TOWARD ALTERNATIVE TOURISM IN KENYA

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Original language: English

Abstract: This study demonstrates the declining importance of tourism, especially transnationalized mass-tourism, as a foreign exchange earner. Based on the evolution of tourism in Kenya since independence, an attempt is made to steer away from Northern-controlled tourism patterns with their negative cultural impact on local communities and to draw up alternative conclusions for tourism policies.

VERS UN AUTRE TOURISME AU KENYA

Résument: Cette étude montre le déclin de l'importance du tourisme, notamment du tourisme de masse transnational, en tant que source de devises étrangères. Sur la base de l'évolution du tourisme au Kenya depuis l'indépendance, on s'efforce de s'écartérer de modèles touristiques dominés par le Nord et de leur impact culturel négatif sur les communautés locales et de tirer des conclusions pour d'autres politiques touristiques.

HACIA ALTERNATIVAS PARA EL TURISMO EN KENIA

Resumen: Este informe demuestra que el turismo es de importancia menguante, especialmente el turismo transnacionalizado para el consumo de las masas que se consideraba como fuente de divisas. Basado en la evolución del turismo en 'enia después de la independencia, se trata de evitar los modelos turísticos controlados por el norte que aportan un impacto cultural negativo sobre las comunidades locales, y de ordenar conclusiones alternativas para la política del turismo.
Introduction

In recent years, tourism has almost achieved the status of a "sacred cow" in established thinking on development in the Third World. Regarded as a dependable source of foreign exchange, tourism is vigorously promoted by international financial interests, bilateral agencies and overoptimistic government planners. An important rationale behind the promotion of tourism by many Third World governments is the assumption that it is a very efficient way of earning badly needed foreign exchange. This is predicated on the belief that tropical tourism is relatively easy to develop since it relies on resources which are available in abundance: sunshine, strangely different (exotic) cultures, and remnants of indigenous flora and fauna in their state of nature.

Although not all tropical countries have benefitted from the tourist bonanza, holiday travelling has become big business to astute investors. And in spite of the energy crisis, tourism continues to expand in response to increasing demand for leisure activity by many people in the industrialized countries of the West seeking temporary refuge from the machine age society to indulge in organized fun, food, frolic and exotica.

Not surprisingly, tourism has become the latest "numbers game", where benefit to the host country is reckoned by volume of air traffic to the nation's airports, hotel beds available, bed occupancy rates, length of stay of visitors and their local expenditures. But the usual tourist statistics can be very deceptive. Often public investment in tourist infrastructures and services are omitted; a practice which may suggest heavy subsidy to the industry at the taxpayer's expense. Thus, although several Third World countries may have made some economic gains from international holiday travelling, it is not clear at what social and political costs such gains are made. For, as one observer has rightly concluded, typical decisions about the social effects of tourism cannot be guided by economic analysis. They require pure value judgement.

Tourism in perspective

Unlike many industries, the tourist industry is somewhat disjointed. It is difficult therefore to analyse neatly in economic or sociological terms since it divides into many different activities including travel, hotel accommodation, catering, car hire, etc. In addition, tourism requires considerable investment in public infrastructure and services such as airports, roads, electricity, water and telephones, which do not normally enter into the cost and benefit analysis of tourism. Given the unequal trading relations between the centre and periphery, it should be evident that a high proportion of the money paid by tourists to Third World destinations accrues in the countries of tourist origin. This is explained largely by the monopoly of air travel to the tourist destinations by airlines from the metropolitan countries for, as distance to the host country increases, the cost of air travel becomes an increasingly larger part (50-60 per cent) of the final cost of the package. To illustrate,
out of about 18,600 seats per week available in airlines operating in Kenya, only 2,000 (or about 11 per cent) belong to Kenya Airways, while more than 60 per cent belong to airlines from Europe.

But perhaps even more significant are foreign exchange "leakages" in the form of imports of hotel fixtures, kitchen and air-conditioning equipments, buses, cars and some items of food and drink which are necessary in the creation of the total tourist product. This suggests that the magnitude of such "leakages" tends to be inversely correlated with the general level of industrial development and the level of integration of tourism into the national economy of the host country. Generally, net earnings seem to be highest in the least poor countries with rationally integrated and less dependent economies. The World Bank estimates that about 55 per cent of gross earnings from tourism in most Third World countries, including Kenya, was ultimately repatriated from the host country. The estimate for some Pacific and Caribbean islands with sizeable imports of food were much higher while in the peripheral countries of Europe (e.g. Spain) it was less than 15 per cent.

Apart from the "import component", additional foreign exchange losses take the form of financial transfers in respect of profits to multinational corporations which directly participate in equity in hotels or tour operation in the host countries, management service, franchise payments, and salaries to expatriate staff who always hold the highest paid positions. The magnitude of such transfers often vary from country to country depending on the "incentives" which the host governments may offer to foreign investors. Generally, it is the case that such transfers increase in magnitude with the level of involvement of transnational corporations. This in turn tends to be positively correlated with the volume of tourist traffic and, therefore, the profitability of touristic enterprises to the TNCs. It is no accident, therefore, that as the tourist traffic increases "vertical integration", in which large foreign tour operations, airlines and international hotel chains seek to diversify their activities in order to control as many as possible of the ancillary enterprises associated with the tourist industry in the host country, also takes place. In Kenya, this trend may be illustrated by the investment by British Airways in Serena Hotels or the recent take over of two of the most profitable game lodges by a subsidiary of a transnational firm: the United Touring Company.

One characteristic of vertical integration is that it encourages purchases between the partner companies. Thus, where an international hotel chain is involved, it facilitates purchases from the parent company and hence tends to increase foreign expenditure by the host country. A recent study on TNCs in tourism in Kenya, for instance, concludes that "foreign expenditure of hotel operation increases by 50 per cent when it is entrusted to a multinational chain".

These leakages and transfers of foreign exchange may be considered justifiable costs only if on balance it can be shown that the host country has made significant economic gains from tourism. Such gains may comprise tax revenues, earnings by local operators, employment generation and other indirect effects, such as the stimulation of agricultural and light industrial production to meet the demands of the tourist sector for food and other consumer goods. It
cannot be denied that such benefits may accrue to some Third World countries, it is still a moot question if, indeed, tourism is the most efficient way to raise business taxes or generate employment, even if its negative social and cultural effects were to be discounted.

Given the size of demand for food and other goods by tourist firms in quantitative terms (volume), expectations of quality or standards and promptness of delivery, it is imperative that small scale producers would be excluded from supplying the tourist sector. Not surprisingly, goods and services to the tourist industry are supplied by relatively larger and well established entrepreneurs. Clearly, this pattern of distribution does not facilitate the so-called trickle down effect; instead it tends to aggravate existing patterns of inequality. It fails to ensure that the local populations, whose land and other resources may have been expropriated to allow for the creation of tourist facilities, are in a position to benefit directly from tourism. It has been suggested that such alienating effects of tourism in some Caribbean islands may have aggravated some of the observed hostility by the local people toward tourists, although this may also be related to the volume of tourism and feelings of relative deprivation by the local population.

Evolution of tourism in Kenya

Starting in the early 1930s, holiday travelling in Kenya remained for a long time a movement of the rich and privileged. Early travellers to the hinterland were rich adventurers who could afford the cost of numerous guides, porters and camping gear to undertake hunting or photographic expeditions. Beach holidaying in the areas around Mombasa and Malindi were organised primarily to serve the white settlers from the Kenya Highlands and Southern Rhodesia, and occasional adventurers from Europe. The facilities, which were owned exclusively by white settlers and later by a few Asians, generally consisted of small family-operated hotels and beach cottages. Some of these expanded in size and ownership during the 1940s and 1950s. The biggest expansion, however, came during the late 1960s and early 1970s, mainly in response to the high demand resulting from the organization of cheap package tours following the development of long-haul and wide-bodied jet planes. Table 1, illustrating the growth in Kenyan touristic traffic since 1967, indicates that although the number of tourists has generally increased, it has fluctuated quite markedly from a peak of 428,400 in 1972 to 333,300 in 1978, which nearly compares to the 1970 figure. But the length of stay has nearly doubled since 1967, hence the increase in expenditure. The sharp increase in expenditure since 1975 is probably a reflection of increase in prices rather than purchases.

Overall, there has been an annual growth rate in bed capacity between 1967 and 1977 of slightly more than 10 per cent per annum. The fastest growth, has been in the coastal beach hotels. This is explained largely by the demand for beach holidays by visitors from Continental Europe, particularly West Germany, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. In addition to its wildlife, of which perhaps only Tanzania has a greater abundance and variety, an increasingly important tourist attraction in Kenya is the Indian Ocean coast. A special characteristic of the Kenya coast that distinguishes it from rival destinations elsewhere is its close proximity to areas of wildlife conservation - which offers the possibility of combining beach holiday and game
Table 1: Kenya Tourist Traffic, Length of Stay and Expenditure 1964-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Visits '000</th>
<th>Total Days Stayed '000</th>
<th>Average Days Stayed (Days)</th>
<th>Average Length of Stay (K.£.m)</th>
<th>Average Expenditure per Day (K.£.)</th>
<th>Average Expenditure per Person (K.£.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>120.8</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>147.4</td>
<td>1372</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>188.7</td>
<td>2079</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>225.5</td>
<td>2327</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>257.1</td>
<td>2440</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>276.0</td>
<td>2352</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>338.8</td>
<td>2973</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>399.7</td>
<td>3734</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>428.4</td>
<td>4768</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>388.1</td>
<td>4335</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>379.6</td>
<td>4406</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>386.1</td>
<td>4963</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>424.2</td>
<td>5308</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>344.4</td>
<td>5101</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>140.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>333.3</td>
<td>4745</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>180.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


viewing. This perhaps accounts for the rather dramatic growth in bed capacity at the Kenya coast, as we have already indicated. But it is very important to point out that most of the expanded capacity is accounted for mainly by new beds in the new and larger hotels in which TNCs are significantly involved.

In general, bed occupancy rates indicate a moderate decline except in the coastal beach areas where occupancy rates have increased from 47 per cent in 1967 to 68 per cent in 1977. Other areas registering an improvement are the lodges in the wildlife conservation areas in Masailand. City hotels in Nairobi, however, have experienced a significant decline, particularly since 1977. The decline in occupancy rates in Nairobi hotels is probably due to the rapid expansion of capacity in the preceding five years in anticipation of increased demand resulting from the conferences and conventions, particularly after the completion of the Kenyatta Conference Centre and the location of a number of United Nations and other international agencies in Nairobi. Between 1973 and 1977, hotel bed capacity in Nairobi nearly doubled.

But perhaps a more significant proportion of the decline in occupancy rates for Nairobi and other up-country hotels resulted from the banning by Tanzania of tourist arrivals from Kenya and the virtual closure of Uganda to tourists due to gross insecurity during Idi Amin's reign of terror. Hitherto, because of the relative dominance of Nairobi as a regional centre within the periphery, most tourists to the East African region would first stop in Nairobi to purchase or hire personal and other gear before continuing their tours overland to Tanzania or Uganda. It is also the case that, with the extension of the Mombasa
Airport to take bigger planes, the majority of visitors coming for beach holidays no longer have to spend some time in Nairobi.

Although data on hotel ownership is neither readily available nor comprehensive, it is generally the case that the largest number of hotels are privately owned. While some smaller and older hotels are still family owned, the newer and larger hotels are owned by public corporations, local private companies and transnational firms, often as joint ventures. The extent of involvement in hotel investment is indirectly indicated by the proportion of issued capital in tourist enterprises, which has increased from about 2 per cent in 1966 to 26 per cent in 1976. In absolute terms, this represents foreign investment of K£13,181 in 1966 and K£2,017,287 in 1976, an increase of more than 1,530 per cent per annum!6/ The growth both in the number of firms and size of investment in tourist enterprises also marks one of the most significant changes in the Kenyan economy during this period.

In attempting to deal with the disjunction between the large, foreign controlled hotels and the small locally owned hotels, the Kenya Government has adopted three approaches aimed at transferring ownership from foreign to local capital. First, there has been a gradual replacement of expatriate managers with trained Kenyans. Second, the government participates through public corporations in equity holding. Third, the public corporation directly involved in tourism grants loans to selected locally-owned tour companies and hotels. But in pursuing these goals, the Government has been very careful to point out that it does not intend to displace private initiative - foreign or local. By 1977, the Kenya Tourist Development Corporation held equity in some 25 projects - among which its equity holding in ten enterprises exceeded 50 per cent.

On first consideration, the data on ownership suggests that Kenya may be deriving a larger share of benefits from the tourist trade. But ownership in itself does not reveal the patterns of control, nor the relative size of benefits to the owners, as is shown in the case of a large international hotel in Nairobi. In this case, the Government is the majority shareholder, with 46.8 per cent of equity. Other shareholders include the international chain which also manages the hotel (33.8 per cent), an international credit organization (16.5 per cent) and a subsidiary of a foreign bank (2.9 per cent). But since the management (hotel) is also guaranteed handsome fees and royalties before tax, there is no doubt that the hotel chain is not only in control, but also derives the largest benefits from the enterprise. In 1975, for instance, the hotel declared a profit of only K£8,048, yet a remittance of K£434,800 in respect of services was made to the parent firm. And although no profit was declared in 1976 and 1977, service payments amounting to K£474,800 were made in both years.7/ On the basis of fairly narrow financial cost and benefit analysis, a recent analysis of TNCs' role in tourism in Kenya concluded that "while cooperation of transnational hotel companies has brought impressive results, the Kenyan economy has borne its cost in several ways"8/. In addition to economic costs, some of which have already been enumerated, the more imperceptible and more damaging of such costs relate to social and cultural aspects of tourism.

Social and cultural dimensions

In the last few years the recognition has been made that international tourism may have some deleterious social and cultural effects in Third World countries.
In the 1974-78 Development Plan, the Kenya Government emphasized that:

"... the impact of tourism is not all beneficial. Large-scale tourism brings serious social and cultural problems to a country whose people suddenly come into contact ... with large numbers of persons whose standard of living is significantly higher than their own."\footnote{21}

It was announced in the Plan that the Government would be prepared to limit the growth of tourism if too much of the industry is entrusted to non-citizens, or if consumption and other habits change so drastically as to damage the local cultural traditions.

There is so far no acceptable method for measuring the social and cultural impact of tourism. Although qualitative observations can be made, it would be very difficult to derive from these generally agreed quantitative weights that would be included in conventional cost and benefit calculations. Typically, the interaction between tourists and the local population is assymmetrical in that only a small number of local people establish contact with a large number of transient foreigners. Such locals may acquire some specialized knowledge on tourists, but generally contact with tourists remains somewhat ambiguous and superficial. It has been suggested that contact with tourists may lead to a change of tastes and consumption habits, leading to increased imports of luxury goods. But in Kenya, it is more likely that the more pervasive and important change in taste comes with the large number of international civil servants, expatriates in government and private service, and with locals returning from visits abroad, rather than tourists.

Since tourists travelling abroad are not often constrained by the norms of behaviour obtaining in their home societies, the tourist environment tends to be more tolerant of morally permissive behaviour. And even though the impact of such behaviour may be very marginal, it is often fairly conspicuous and dramatic in many Third World societies - as the following brief account illustrates.

**Watamu Village**

Although the tourist hotels in Watamu Beach have been in operation only since the late 1960s, a fairly sizeable, bustling rural slum had already mushroomed there by the early 1970s. Before tourism was established in the area, Watamu was a small, tranquil fishing village inhabited by no more than 100 families. By 1973 it had an estimated population of more than 1,000 persons and probably closer to 2,000 today. Fishing, which was the original mainstay of the village, has today declined in importance. Only 3 per cent of the respondents derived their livelihood from fishing. Most of the residents of the village thus worked in tourist-related activities. About 60 per cent of our respondents were migrants from other places far afield and it was observed that they tended to be employed in relatively better-paid positions in the tourist hotels. This corroborates an earlier study on employment in tourism at the Kenya coast, which showed that the local people were employed at relatively lower levels. This may be explained by the generally low levels of education in the rural districts of the Kenya coast, although the phenomenon appears to be true in other areas of tourist concentration, such as Masailand.
The location of tourist facilities in small isolated communities, with little alternative opportunities for earning a livelihood, also tends to encourage patron-client relationships in which locals may not only make profit but also "escape" from their objective social position - even if only temporarily. Such relationships range from simple begging by rural youth, traditionally-clad pastoralists posing for photographs or performing simple dance routines for pay, to casual sexual unions. The more lasting of these interactions tend to give social status to the local "clients" and may lead to delusions, particularly among the youth who see their associations with tourists as providing a channel for their escape to the affluence represented by the tourists' lifestyles and images of their countries of origin. Such delusions have also been described among Israeli Arabs and also some youth in Agadir, Morocco. In Watamu Village, as indeed in other resort areas, such wish-fulfilment is dramatized by the increasing number of young school drop-outs and the ubiquitous "beach boys" (dragueurs), as well as pimps and prostitutes. In a study of attitudes toward tourism, an overwhelming proportion of respondents around Watamu mentioning negative effects of tourism on local culture have specified prostitution, embarrassing dress styles and homosexuality, in addition to loss of fishing ground and access to the beach.

While Watamu Village may represent a gross caricature of the range of negative social and cultural effects of tourism in poor and isolated communities, it dramatizes the potential for social injustice and structural violence of large-scale international tourism in Third World countries. In addition to the more deep-seated psychological and cultural challenges are the more immediate economic issues of expropriation of land and other resources to create tourist facilities. In one case along the Kenya coast, some 650 acres of tribal land was expropriated for the development of a grandiose resort which was later shelved. In accordance with Government regulation, the displaced 257 families were compensated. Although the rate of compensation was grossly inadequate, no attempt was made to provide alternative settlement to the original land owners, many of whom still occupy their land today as squatters.

But perhaps the more severe, if imperceptible, conflict over resource utilization between tourism and local economic activities is that arising from the establishment of wild animal parks in areas hitherto used by nomadic pastoralists or at the margins of farming areas. An on-going study by this author reveals intense feelings by local populations as a result of severe damages by wildlife to crops, livestock and even human life. Although the Government has initiated a programme of compensation for wild animal damage, this remains at best ineffective and tends to work against the interests of illiterate small-scale producers at the political and economic margins of the Kenyan society, as indeed inhabitants of these areas are.

Although wildlife remains an important tourist attraction, it has often been argued that wildlife conservation is an international responsibility justifiable for more than its immediate economic benefits. In national terms, Kenya's wildlife sanctuaries constitute less than 5 per cent of the total land area. But as we have already indicated, conflict with wildlife obtains in a much wider area since wildlife cannot easily be confined within park boundaries. Given the fast rate of population growth in Kenya, it is a moot point how long wildlife will remain free to inflict damages on pastoralists and farmers before
it is hunted to extinction - unless, of course, the international community shares in bearing the costs of conservation as Kenyan peasants and pastoralists already do. For it is doubtful if the Kenya Government will be able to offer a just compensation to the local people which will give them the necessary incentives to tolerate wildlife.

Another important effect of mass tourism in Third World countries without a clear cultural policy is that it tends to undermine national artistic expression. Under pressure of commercialization, cultural performances and traditional handicrafts become tawdry presentations of the "curious" and "primitive". Dance routines may be selected to portray culture as if it was a museum display. For instance, the demonstration of the purported potency of Giriama love potions or Luhya circumcision rituals by the dancing troupe sponsored by the Kenya Tourist Development Corporation, clearly designed to pander to the stereotyped conceptions of tourists about Africa, cannot but lead to the debasement of the living culture. It is conceivable, though, that given a clear cultural policy, tourism may provide an important incentive for more enlightened cultural and artistic development.

Toward policy alternatives

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to outline some of the more important characteristics of the international tourist trade in Kenya. Sufficient evidence has been given to suggest that tourism as presently conceived is more of a pandora's box than the cornucopia its professional promoters would have us believe it is. In spite of all its other reputed benefits, Third World governments undertake the promotion of tourism primarily because of its expected economic returns. Yet because of the dominance in the trade by companies in the countries of tourism origin, expansion of the industry tends to undermine the process of economic independence. But this is not peculiar to tourism. The main thrust of the development debate today revolves around structural imbalances in the world economy which negate meaningful development in the Third World. To this extent, then, tourism cannot be treated in isolation.15

It cannot be overemphasized that it is impossible to operate a tourist sector which in its strategy and assumptions stands in contradistinction to the basic socio-political and economic setting obtaining in Third World countries. Thus in Kenya, for instance, it is important to recognise that although tourism, like any other industry, may tend to operate against the national interest, it also tends to reinforce the local ruling alliances. A crucial assumption underlying proposals for alternative tourism policy is, therefore, that the local bourgeoisie who would oversee the implementation of such alternative strategies would adopt a more truly national perspective.

The major objectives of any tourist policy must of necessity respond to the need to maximise net foreign exchange earnings and to minimize the industry's adverse socio-cultural and political effects. Since it is recognized that these tend to be aggravated by large-scale mass tourism, it is tempting to argue in favour of the more individualistic, least institutionalized, type of tourism.16 Paradoxically, the youthful "drifters" and other lone travellers who most engage in this kind of tourism have in the last few years provoked fairly drastic moral panic among the officialdom in Kenya and other Third World
countries. In any case, even barring official harassment, it is most unlikely that this self-reliant "drifter" tourism can become more than a minor aspect of international tourism. Thus, the conclusion cannot be avoided that organized mass tourism will remain the dominant trend in the foreseeable future.

At least a few policy alternatives which could significantly alter the social benefits arising from tourism are suggested by the foregoing analysis. So long as the Kenyan tourist industry continues to rely on large luxury hotels, it is more than likely that ownership will be dominated by foreign companies. To redress this, public ownership of small and medium hotels which can be run by local managers should be encouraged. A beginning toward this end has already been started by the nearly total takeover of a hotel management company. But this effort should be pushed further and complemented by a policy discouraging the building of new large hotels owned and managed by foreign companies. An immediate effect of such a strategy is that it would lead to more indigenization of the purchasing policy. For instance, it would be relatively easy to make a systematic requirement of indigenous hotels that they utilize locally-produced food, beverages, textiles, crockery, furnishings, etc. This would not only save foreign exchange but it would also contribute significantly to plugging some of the channels for "leakages" such as over-invoicing of purchases from foreign parent or related companies.

Since tourism is such a deceptively enticing industry, there is a tendency to expand the facilities catering for mass (package) tourists too quickly, sometimes with very adverse effects on the aesthetic and physical quality of the environment and hence the total tourist product. Although the intensity of tourists in Kenya - either as a measure of absolute number of tourists or as a proportion of tourists to locals within the resort areas is still very low compared to Bermuda, Jamaica or Monaco, one cannot be too complacent. While it is already realized that the rapid expansion of tourism at the Kenya coast is likely to lead to deterioration of the "product", no decisive measures have so far been undertaken to slow the rate of growth. One strategy toward this end would be to price the general infrastructure at such a rate as would ensure adequate social returns. Since investors are likely to object to such a measure it would, if implemented, lead to a lower rate of growth of tourism. But this in itself may not be bad, for by preserving the unique quality of the Kenyan tourist product it would also be possible to maximize its value at a time when most world beaches are rapidly being transformed into Acapulco or Florida-like concrete monotonies. It seems advisable that the guiding principle should not be "how many tourists want to come?", but rather "how many do we want to welcome?"

We have already suggested that any radical reorientation of tourism in Kenya is unrealistic given the existing local economic and political structural set up. Thus, a socialist alternative in which the tourist sector is entirely publicly owned, and quite tightly segregated from the general public as in Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, would be impossible. And since Kenya will still welcome private foreign investment, it is perhaps advisable that this be directed away from low price, mass tourism to high charge, limited number speciality tourism. Conceivably such speciality tourism is likely to yield high rates of local expenditure per tourist. In addition, such high cost tourism concentrated in isolated areas of natural attraction is likely to have more significant backward linkage effects in the local economies and minimise socio-political
stresses. Although no comprehensive evaluation has been carried out to illustrate this, this point is clearly borne out in the case of the exclusive Mount Kenya Safari Club.

It should be recognized though that in the attempt to implement these policy alternatives it is crucial to rely on indigenous people who are knowledgeable and experienced enough to negotiate fruitfully with TNCs and other international agencies with vested interests in tourism. In addition, then, to applying careful pressure on all elements of the tourist industry to indigenize, it is crucial that government ministries responsible for tourism recruit and train competent locals. It is only then that the assessment of incentives such as "tax holidays", and management fees to TNCs can be undertaken from a truly national perspective. (For instance, management fees should be calculated on the basis of gross profits rather than sales, as is the case in Kenya at the moment.)

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FOOTNOTES


4/ World Bank, op.cit., p.13

5/ UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, op.cit., p.62

6/ R. Kaplinsky, "Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery: Kenyan case re-examined" (mimeo, unpublished, 1979), Table 9

7/ R. Kaplinsky, "Report on Foreign Exchange Leakages, with particular reference to Transfer Pricing" (mimeo, restricted circulation, June 1978)

8/ UN Centre for Transnational Corporations, op.cit., p.77


11/ S.E. Migot-Adholla (Team Leader), 1974 Socio Impact Study, Diani Beach Resort Complex Study, Working Paper no.32/3.2.6 (Nairobi: Kenya Coast
For an even more dramatic exposé of social degradation and structural violence associated with tourism along Mexican towns along the US border, from Tijuana to Matamoros, see Orid Damaris, Poso del Mundo (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970).

For a more exhaustive discussion, see Muga Apondi, "Compulsory Land Acquisition at the Coast: A comparative study", An undergraduate dissertation in the Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi, 1978.

The author is the leader of a team studying local socio-economic attitudes towards wildlife and tourism as part of a wider study on conflict in land use between wildlife and human activities. This is a confidential study undertaken on behalf of the Kenya Government.


This type of tourism, also called drifter tourism, and identified with youthful followers of bohemian subcultures, sometimes inappropriately called "hippies", has been strongly advocated by Herbert L. Hiller, in "Selling the Idea and the Facts of Small Scale Hotels in the Caribbean: The role of government", paper presented at the 21st Annual General Meeting of the Caribbean Travel Association, Haiti, 14 September 1972 (mimeo).

As a crude measure, the intensity of tourism is calculated as the number of nights spent by tourists divided by the number of nights spent by local residents. The intensity for Watamu village works out to be roughly 10:1 while that for the tourist resort areas in Gambia is 42:1. See Tord Hoivik and Turid Heiberg, "Tourism, Self Reliance and Structural Violence", PRI0 Publication no. S-14/77 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1977).
Abstract: The question of agrarian transformation from feudal production relations and land tenures to relations based on principles of equality, justice and cooperative/collective organization is not only a complex, but also an explosive political matter. The politics of agrarian change has to be seen in the gross inequalities present in the structure of agrarian systems; the paucity of highly skewed land ownership patterns and, in spite of various pronouncements about the need for peasants to be organized, the actual suppression of genuine peasant organizations.

In part II, the author provides three examples from India, Thailand and the Philippines which illustrate how peasants' response to their oppression is countered by repression from various agencies of the State.

Résumé: La question de la transformation de rapports de production et de structures agraires féodaux vers des rapports basés sur l'égalité, la justice et une organisation coopérative ou collective n'est pas seulement une question politique complexe mais elle est également extrêmement explosive. L'aspect politique des transformations agraires se trouve dans les inégalités flagrantes qui sont le résultat des structures actuelles; dans la rareté des terres en raison de structures de propriété inégalitaires et, malgré les nombreuses déclarations sur le droit des paysans à l'organisation, dans la suppression concrète des véritables organisations paysannes.

Dans la seconde partie, l'auteur donne trois exemples (Inde, Thaïlande et Philippines) qui illustrent comment le réponse des paysans à l'oppression est battue en brèche par la répression émanant de diverses organismes d'Etat.

Resumen: La cuestión de cómo efectuar una transformación en la esfera agraria para cambiar las relaciones de producción y de latifundios feudales en relaciones basadas en los principios de igualdad, justicia, y organización cooperativa/colectiva, es un problema complejo y además políticamente explosivo. El aspecto político de cambios agrarios debe verse temiendo en cuenta las enormes (cont. en la pagina 11(89).
Almost every U.N. agency, which feels it has something to do or say about rural development, has made pronouncements lately about the need to organise the rural poor to enable their participation in development programmes. The FAO, ILO and World Bank in particular have made the most noise in recent years about the rural poor, and how until now they have been made the victims rather than the beneficiaries of development.

It is interesting to note that in U.N. forums, many governments with an otherwise despicable record of anti-peasant policies, do not shy away from endorsing certain radical-sounding resolutions and conventions.

This tendency was recently referred to in an article in the Bombay based Economic and Political Weekly by an Indian expert in land reform studies, P.C. Joshi. He made an interesting observation concerning the apparent general interest these days in studies of poverty and anti-poverty programmes, but Joshi noted that while the issue of poverty had been politicised, politicisation to the same extent had not occurred among the poor, or had not been allowed to occur.

Thus it is more in the spirit of politicisation at the conference level than anything more organic or meaningful that the 1975 ILO Convention on Rural Workers' Organisations must be seen as also the FAO World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development.

The question of agrarian transformation from feudal production relations and land tenures to relations based on principles of equality, justice and cooperative/collective organisation is not only a complex, but also an explosive political matter. The politics of agrarian change has to be seen in the gross inequalities present in the structure of agrarian systems; the paucity of resources available to peasants to increase production and consumption, the highly skewed land ownership pattern, and inspite of various pronouncements about the need for peasants to be organised, the actual suppression of genuine peasant organisations.

There is one major difficulty in any discussion of peasant organisations. This is one of perception. For most governments to organise peasants means either to control them in settlements, or organise the more economically viable amongst them in cooperatives or through various community development programmes. Both these types of efforts have usually been imposed from above with very little peasant participation. Moreover, it is now a well known fact that most cooperatives or representative bodies like 'panchayats' at the village level in India have been dominated by the rural rich who have stolen the lion's share of the inputs and outputs of most development programmes for their own benefit.

On the other hand a peasant organisation in the perception of poor, exploited peasants can mean something entirely different. For them it is not so much a means to securing loans for buying seeds and fertilizer, but a rallying point to build solidarity and to plan a strategy for struggle against the injustice and exploitation rampant in their daily fight for survival. This
is understandable for they know that the loans and agricultural inputs will only be concerned by the politically and economically powerful farming classes. The immediate priorities of landless labourers and marginal peasants are to demand better wages, to protect their land and to grab more of it when possible, to prevent money lenders from charging usurious rates of interest and stand up against harassment from landlords, local officials and police agencies.

The most vital everyday need of poor peasants is of course food. They have learnt from bitter experience, however, that even if more food is produced in a country, it does not follow that they will get it.

The poor do not necessarily starve because there is no food around, but because they simply do not have the buying power to acquire it. So, hunger and poverty cannot ipso facto be eliminated by producing more. What needs greater attention is how to empower the poor so that they may get their due share; for when the chips are down those who have power (land and other assets) survive, those who are powerless, perish.

According to a study edited by Keith Griffin and Aziz-ur-Rehman, Poverty and Landlessness in Asia (ILO 1975) in six out of seven countries that were studied (India, Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia) only in one (Bangladesh) did population increase faster than food production. Moreover, the increasing poverty of the poor segments in Asia's population is not due to general stagnation in Asia, or, worse, economic decline. In fact "all but one of the seven countries surveyed have enjoyed a rise in average incomes in recent years, and in some instances the rise has been quite rapid."

The oppression of peasants in Asia is endemic not only in exploitive land tenure systems, but in the international economic order which makes particular demands on the supply of certain products from the Third World to the Industrialized countries. These demands end up by making big holes in any plans that Third World countries may have to transform their agrarian structures along lines of social and economic equity. In the Philippines, for example, the land reform programme does not extend to the sugar plantation sector where workers have to live more or less under police guard and wages are pitifully low; in the case of casual migrant workers as low as 1 peso a day (8 pesos to the dollar).

In India, even today, after a little more than 30 years of independence, there is an academic debate going on in planning circles over the question of whether adequate land is at all available for redistribution. In the meantime the government's own reports point out that landlessness, bonded labour and rural debt are showing a steadily alarming increase.

In Thailand something of the magnitude of the land problem may be gauged from the fact that in 1968, a group of 129 landowners possessed between them a total of 60,500 hectares, or 11 per cent of the total farm area in the four provinces near Bangkok - (Chaiyong Chuchchart in the ILO Report as above). If the ceiling of 18 hectares in the law were to be applied, then 3,300 tenants could become beneficiaries by sharing the 60,500 hectares. But as a sop to the possibilities for capitalist farming provided by the Green Revolution, the law also provides exception for properties which are "run by modern farming methods and have active projects to assist farmers in increasing production." A perfect example of the Green Revolution being used 'legally' to subvert the possibilities of land reform.
Given the anti-peasant perspective from which most land reform programmes tend to be seen, it becomes obvious that if peasants want any redemption of their pauperised condition, they cannot look to the state to provide it. They need to organise themselves and to understand the politics of agrarian societies if they are to challenge the political will of the classes and interests which seek to keep them politically powerless and economically crippled.

In part II of this paper three examples are provided from India, Thailand and the Philippines which illustrate how peasant response to their oppression is countered by repression from various agencies of the State.

PART II
The Politics of Peasant Oppression in India

One of the most glaring examples of the credibility gap between precept and practice in the sphere of organisations of rural workers has been the record of the Central and State governments in India during the recent Emergency from June 1975-77. Side by side with Indira Gandhi's attempt to centralize and personalise all political power in her hands, a Twenty Point Programme was announced to tackle various economic problems. One of the twenty points was the declaration that the accumulated debts of all bonded labourers would be written off and that all such persons would be freed from the shackles of a form of feudal slavery that could not be tolerated in a modern democratic and socialist state. Yet, in blatant contravention of its own programme, the government found itself incapable of tolerating the efforts of peasants to give muscle to officially prescribed policies. The same situation continues under the present Janata government.

Murder of a Peasant Leader in Bihar

Under cover of the Emergency in Bihar, in flagrant violation of the 'paper spirit' of the Twenty Point Programme, any form of peasant resistance or protest was ruthlessly suppressed. As reported by the Economic Times of Bombay on July 5, 1977, "barbarous assaults on the lives of peasants were perpetrated by such measures as liberalization of gun licenses and organisation of shooting camps to train landowners." There are innumerable examples of acts of intolerance and outright brutality in India against attempts by low caste and other poor classes to organise themselves in order to resist their exploitation and improve their living conditions. But it should be enough to give a summarised account here of two particular cases of revolt and counter-repression in Bihar and Maharashtra to illustrate the nature of the forces that are ranged against the emergence of genuine organisations of the rural poor.

The story that follows is the story of a peasant leader, Gambhira by name. The area under description is Chaundadane in Bihar's East Champaran District. Chaundadane is feudal, dominated as it has been by gun-wielding, blood thirsty zamindars for over a century. "There still exist zamindars with many hundreds of acres of land, employing hundreds of sharecroppers, fleecing them and flourishing. The zamindar can, whenever he wants to, beat up any peasant and seize his land; rob the peasant or take away his wife, sister or daughter. All zamindars have guns. Each of them has a regular 'army' equipped with guns and other weapons. These 'regulars' are settled in separate busties by the
zamindars; they are given land and all facilities. It is this 'army' that fights for the zamindar in times of conflict with the peasants and labourers." (Frontier, Calcutta)

It was to fight this highly organised feudal set up of the landowners that Gambhira and his friends organised the peasants into the Kisan Khetihar Mazadoor Sang (KKMS). The KKMS covered an area of more than five hundred villages and fought the zamindars on various economic issues such as tenancy rights and wages. The struggle was carried on well within the law on such matters. But the greatest success was achieved in the struggle against social oppression. The zamindars became particularly alarmed by the new-found self-confidence of the Harijan peasants. They spread the propaganda that the KKMS peasants were communist terrorists (Naxalites) and decided to take retaliatory action. In collusion with the police, the landlords had Gambhira and his close colleagues arrested, and in the course of interrogation, brutally tortured and murdered. Such was the fate of one who dared to give the peasants their own organisation to further their social and economic prospects and to resist brutal exploitation at the hands of landlords who had exploited them relentlessly for generations.

A Tribal Movement in Maharashtra

The fate of adivasi (tribal) peasants in different parts of India has been equally wretched as that of low caste Harijan labourers and sharecroppers. There is a recent example from the state of Maharashtra of how the adivasis, acting in solidarity with outside but sympathetic change-agents got organized to protect themselves and to combat the powerful landlords... but only to find the agencies of the state and the local vested interests ranged against them.

In the Shahada area of Dhulia district in North Maharashtra, in a context of increased agricultural production and technology, a group of tribal (Bhil) agricultural labourers has been involved in a struggle against the high caste landlords of the region. Land in this area until about 1830 was mostly owned by members of the Bhil tribe. But with the construction of railways and roads and the introduction of cotton farming on a capitalist basis, the land-owning pattern has undergone a dramatic change. Through a process of legal and/or illegal transfer spread over a period from 1830 till 1970, most lands formerly cultivated by adivasis have come to be occupied by non-adivasi migrant farmers from Gujarat known as Gujars. Thus the adivasis have become casual labourers on lands that had once been their own. With increased ownership of land in the area, the non-adivasis began to harass the adivasi in various ways. It became fairly common for labourers to be flogged, for adivasi women to be raped and for adivasi homes to be burnt down. And since the non-adivasis practically controlled the elected local and higher legislative bodies, their crimes against the Bhils went unnoticed and unpunished.

The first outside change-agents to move into the area and to bring the injustices being committed against the tribals to the notice of a wider public were the workers of the Gandhian Sarvodaya Movement. In fact, it was a worker in a Gandhian ashram in the area, a Bhil, who provided the leadership for the peasant organisation and for the Bhil movement that was to spread across Dhulia district. The 'Gambhira of Shahda' was this poor peasant by the name of Amber Singh Surwanti. Contact with Sarvodaya workers had induced him to do something for his people, and in 1971 he and some Sarvodaya workers formed a Gram Swaraj Samiti (Village Liberation Committee). Amber Singh, gradually found that it
was futile to plead with the Gujars and the administration for the cause of the adivasis; that it was really necessary to develop a militant movement and to struggle to make a dent in the power of the landlords. In course of time he radicalised the local Sarvodaya Sangh and became the leader of a spontaneous though unorganised resistance movement. The movement used simple logic to advance the argument that as the adivasis constituted about 60% of the population, they should own 60% of the land and 60% of the expenditure of the district should be for the welfare of the adivasis.

In January 1972, with the organisation of a Bhoo Mukti (Land Freedom) conference, and in May 1972 with Ekta Parishad (Unity conference), the adivasi movement entered a new phase. Outside change agents in the form of politicised youth workers from Bombay, Poona and Belgaum came into Dhulia and expressed their solidarity with the tribal movement. A new peasant organisation, the Sramik Sangathan, was born.

Besides fighting against the evil of liquor consumption and starting night schools for women and youth, the Sramik Sangathan took up various issues of economic importance to the adivasi peasants. A 50% increase in wages of Saldars (agricultural labourers), a weekly holiday and fixed hours of work were demanded. The landlords refused the demands in May 1972; a strike covering 70 villages was organised.

The response of the landlords to the work of the Sramik Sangathan took the usual predictable course. They set up a para-military organisation under the garb of a crop protection force on which they spent a sum equal to about US$ 50,000. Then there followed the typical collusion of the police with the landlords.

But as the Shramik Sangathan had adopted the 'mass line' approach of democratic struggle, it was able to withstand a fair amount of the repression unleashed on it. Its members tested their solidarity and enhanced their strength by resorting to various means of protest, and agitation: strike, boycott, satyagraha, gherao, processions and bundhs. In this way the landless labourers became a force to reckon with and managed to extract certain concessions from the landlords. "All this increased their self-confidence (undoubtedly a great gain, given their background of half-slave status), their militancy and their will to fight". In fact, "the quick development of the movement" was an "indicator of the fact that so-called ignorant, 'apathetic' peasants can be mobilised and politicised in a short time when they are organised and see a realistic chance to get out of their centuries-old bondage and misery". - (Maria Mies - The Shahada Movement, The Journal of Peasant Studies).

Eventually Indira Gandhi's Emergency came down with a heavy hand on the Shahada Movement as well, but not before the peasants had given themselves a viable organisation to protect their longer-term interests.

Those two examples from Bihar and Maharashtra are in no way isolated cases of extreme situations. They are very real indeed for large parts of India and only go to show how efforts to organise peasants are ruthlessly opposed by the local elites acting in collusion with the agents of the state. It also becomes plain that even though the law may favour the peasants by stipulating minimum wage levels and preventions of land alienation, the custodians of such laws usually have scant regard for legalities that go against their class interest.
Fate of Peasant Organisations in Thailand

However, it would be wrong to single out India for its non-tolerance of peasant organisations that seek to enable potentially powerful, though presently powerless, peasants to become more powerful. Peasants, and cadres who work with them, face a similar dilemma in S.E. Asian countries. For instance there is the grim example of the fate of peasant organisations in Thailand. The land problem in Thailand, with some local peculiarities notwithstanding, is typical of the problem as it exists in large parts of Asia. Landlessness and tenancy are on the increase in the north, north-east and the Central Plains. Rents exceed 50% of total production; credit is usually available only at usurious rates which keep the farmers always in debt and marketing is in the hands of merchants who manage to buy up the harvest at cheap prices.

The need for land reform and other agricultural reforms is obviously an urgent one. Yet, since the Military Coup of October 6, 1976, very little has been heard of land reform: even at government level. The Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) appears to have taken a back seat and there is not much talk (as there used to be prior to the Coup) of buying up large estates and redistributing the land to tenants and landless labourers.

Farmers Federation of Thailand

Landlessness has been the most acute in the North and it is here that a powerful and popular peasant organisation the Northern Farmers Federation: NFF (a chapter of the Farmers Federation of Thailand - FFT) emerged in 1974-75. It was the NFF's aim to press for land reform, fair rents and security of tenure. Interviewed by a Bangkok journal, "The Investor", one villager remarked: "If you own 10 rai, there is no need for you to join the Federation. If you don't, there is."

Planners, economists, civil servants and politicians in power have a habit of maintaining that the problems of poverty, land hunger and development at large should not be articulated politically and should be tackled at an official level through administrative and technical measures. Yet, under their very noses even the existing (inadequate) laws continue to be flouted. Thus the government's own Farm Rent Control Act was not able to keep rents to a level of the produce, with landlords continuing to demand half the crop. So, in the circumstance the NFF - FFT sought to organise villagers in order to protect their interests and demand their rights.

However, the Kukrit Pramoj government decided to ignore the NFF - FFT and to regard its demands as illegal. In return the peasants and small farmers pressed on with their campaign to recruit more members, to educate peasants about their rights under the Farm Rent Control Act and to expose corrupt officials.

It was not long before the heavy hand of the State came down on the NFF - FFT. From April to August 1975, altogether twenty two peasant leaders were murdered, fourteen of them belonging to the Northern chapter of FFT. Among those killed was Intha Sribunruang, Vice-President of FFT and President of NFF.

Strangely enough, no investigations were carried out to book the murderers and all the murders were quickly allowed to skip the official pages of recent Thai history.
No, the FFT was not the government's cup of tea precisely because it represented the landless peasants and small farmers. The government had its own version of peasant organisations on which to bestow its patronage. These were the Agricultural Cooperatives, the Union of Farmers' Group and the Peasant League (Gluum Chaona). All three were created not by peasants themselves but by the governments' bureaucracy with membership largely consisting of owner-cultivators. Thus except for middlemen, these organisations posed no threat to local vested interests.

It should be fairly clear from Thailand's experience that despite the ILO's high sounding Convention on Rural Workers Organisations, the government does not have much interest in it: except to the extent of using U.N. aid and indeed the ILO Convention itself to prop up its own organisations to support the exponents of landlord based capitalist farming.

**Government Action Against the Mountain People in the Philippines**

Known as Igorot in the Philippines or Adivasasi in India, tribal people, who often live in mountain areas or along the fringes of forests, usually face more threats than other deprived groups when rural development programmes come along to impinge on their lives.

Tribals everywhere have a common history of being told by others that they are primitive savages, their religion is animistic and backward, or in other words they are not a good example of human civilisation. They are also accused of destroying forests by their harmful slash and burn methods of cultivation and holding up progress by their general attitude of resistance to change. Moreover, they have also been the victims of outright land-grabbing by non-tribal outsiders from the plains who have over the years driven them from their family plots of land and self-sufficient agrarian systems to become landless labourers on what used to be their own land.

The phenomenon briefly sketched above is dramatically evident in the struggle now going on between Philippine government authorities and the Igorot people who live in the Cordillera mountains of Northern Luzon. The Igorot people here consist of the Kalingas, Bontoks, Ifugaos, Benguets and Apayaos; in total 500,000 of them.

For centuries the Bontoks and Kalingas have ingeniously carved terraces into the mountainsides for growing their fragrant mountain rice and vegetables. From the forest they have collected beeswax, honey, fruit, resin and lumber, and from the hillsides copper, silver and gold, which they have exchanged with the lowland people for cattle and clothing.

Now the Igorots are threatened with the World Bank financed Chico River Basin Development Project. The project entails the construction of 4 huge dams along the Chico and Pasil rivers, covering a catchment area of 3,149 square kilometers and will submerge 27,53 square kilometers of land.

Chico II will destroy 500 house making 3000 Bontoks homeless and flood 120 hectares of fertile rice lands. Chico IV will displace 672 families and flood 315 million worth of rice lands. In all, this project will uproot 1000 Bontok and Kalinga families in 16 villages.
The World Bank has approved a loan of 50 million to finance the project, a further 74,415,000 coming from the West German Government.

But the Igorots do not want the project. The reasons for their reluctance are obvious. The Government wants to go ahead because it believes the project will reduce import expenditures for crude oil used in power irrigation.

According to a report from the American journalist Bernard Wideman:

"The government had been considering the dams since the 1960's, but the high cost of construction made them economically unfeasible until 1973 when the increased price of oil revised the cost/benefit equation for the dams, according to the government. However, an independent economist who has gone over the economic analysis of the project says that the government economists did not bother to calculate costs for the lost production of the lands to be flooded, nor for the expenses of purchasing the village lands and the resettlement area lands, let alone the social costs. He claims that if these costs are included, the cost-benefit equation does not justify construction, given the current price of crude oil."

The government, however, is not sensitive to either Igorot opposition or economic analysis, which does not vindicate its viewpoint. In order to press ahead with the project and to win local support for it, the government has established PANAVIN, a para-military organisation to 'persuade' Igorots to accept the project. How PANAVIN functions and local response to it is described in Wideman's report as follows:

"The director of PANAVIN told me that the agency accepted the assignment in Chico River because they realized that the dams would likely destroy the Bontok and Kalinga culture, and PANAVIN wanted to minimize this destruction. The PANAVIN idea, according to Director Oscar Trinidad, is to resettle the people by village so that their culture based on communalism, ancestor worship, and the peace pact would remain mostly intact. The agency is currently developing a resettlement area near the downstream town of Tabuk. The resettlement program is already two years behind schedule because of opposition from the tribespeople, none of whom have yet moved to the reservation.

The head of the resettlement area told me that PANAVIN would not actually be able to resettle people by village. His particular area will accommodate only 55 families, and they will be chosen from three different villages. The families will be given house lots and farm lands (in what is currently a bare hillside with some patches of trees). In addition, PANAVIN is constructing a school and a clinic.

The cost of PANAVIN operations at Chico is running at 20 million pesos annually, not including the cost of purchasing the village lands or the resettlement lands. To gain Kalinga support, PANAVIN has offered scholarships to all Kalinga high school or college students. The scholarships range in value from 260 pesos per month for high school students to 400 pesos per month for post-graduate students. (A school teacher in the province normally earns only 300 pesos per month.)"
In addition to the economic benefit approach, PANAMIN also uses armed strength. According to the provincial military commander in Kalinga Province, he has trained 70 tribesmen as PANAMIN guards. A PANAMIN staffer confided to me that the agency at one point brought up 20 of its armed T'boli soldiers from the Mindanao settlement. The head of the PANAMIN headquarters in Lubuagan carries a 45 automatic tucked in his waistband.

However, the PANAMIN approach has not been successful. Children stand at the site of the road when PANAMIN vehicles go by and yell: "PANAMIN get out!" PANAMIN personnel are not allowed in most of the affected villages, and when PANAMIN officials visit a village to plead for support, it is usually a quick trip by helicopter. Night travel is discouraged, and when undertaken must have armed guards.

Having been deceived by the government in mid-1975 when the palace said it was dropping its plans for the dams, the tribes people have since taken to armed struggle in place of passive resistance. Following the government's deception, various villages began discussing how they could acquire weapons to match those of PANAMIN and the provincial military forces. Some villages even considered re-learning the art of making poison darts, which their forefathers had practiced.

The need for weapons and organized resistance became more acute in mid-1976 when the government moved a 700-men battalion into the area to beef-up the provincial forces numbering 150. In response to the situation, the armed force of the Communist Party of the Philippines - the New People's Army (NPA) - sent four cadres into the Chico area. Two years later, the four had become 115, and ambushes of government troops had become a weekly occurrence.

The most powerful of the Kalinga elders, Macliing Dulag, told me that he was offered a large sum of money by a cabinet minister (no doubt Elizalde) if he would agree to convince his people to accede to the dam project. With his powerful body bent into a human boulder, Macliing leaned towards me and said very quietly: "I told him finally that if he kept insisting that I take the money, he should just shoot me because I would never accept."

Conclusion

From these three glimpses of the oppression being caused to the poor peasantry in India, Thailand and the Philippines it becomes plain that there are serious contradictions in all the talk that is going on about organisations of the rural poor. All the ostensible concern for poor peasants is without exception more than offset by the harm done by international agency programmes in the name of development. While capital-intensive, inappropriate 'development' projects are imposed from above, it hardly makes sense to pay lip-service to the need for peasant organisations; not unless such organisations are seen as being necessary to 'educate' peasants into 'accepting' policies which are not in their interest.

As far as governments in the Third World countries are concerned, it is difficult to detect how policy measures at the official level can redress the power balance in favour of the peasantry. Yet 'progressive' governments, which have
not completely isolated themselves from the people, can perhaps show a minimum of their 'commitment' to social justice by restraining the kind of intolerance that has come down so heavily on peasant movements.

A helpful supporting move at the official level could be the passing of progressive legislation to protect peasant interests. Although legislation in itself has never known to have been effective as a cure in itself, it could be helpful for providing a legal basis for the redressal of peasant grievances. Not unless there is simply no medicine to heal their wounds with, will peasants embark on a course of 'amputative surgery'.

But, medicine or no medicine, peasants will of course continue to find their own ways of empowering themselves, of creating their own organisations and launching movements to exert their group interests. And should governments prove themselves incapable of providing even limited or reluctant support to such efforts, there would then be little left for the peasantry to do except take its own measures to defend itself and ultimately capture state power.

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desigualdades dentro de la estructura actual de los sistemas agrarios. La distribución de la propiedad en tierras es altamente desigual, y a pesar de varias declaraciones acerca de la organización de campesinos, aún dura la opresión en contra de este movimiento.

En la segunda parte, el autor presenta ejemplos de la India, Tailandia y las Filipinas para ilustrar cómo la reacción de los campesinos frente a la opresión es contrarrestado por la represión departamento de las organizaciones del Estado.
THE SIPRI YEARBOOK 1980

SHOWS, WITH FACTS AND FIGURES, THAT

- World military expenditure is predicted to run by 1980 to over $500 000 million per year. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization together account for about 70% of this total. The Third World accounts for about 15%.
- The level and trend of military spending in the two great-power blocs are most disturbing because experience has shown that increases by either side are used as rationalization for increases by the other.
- Other groups of states have during the 1970s increased their military spending particularly rapidly. The Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) group has increased its military expenditures by 15% and Southern Africa by 16% a year.
- Official development aid to Third World countries - only one-twentieth of the value of military expenditures - has lagged far behind this upward trend in resources devoted to military purposes.
- The total value of imports of major arms during the decade of the seventies was about three and a half times as much as in the previous decade. The yearly rate of increase ran at 25% for the latter half of the decade, as compared to 15% for the first half.
- Two-thirds of the global arms trade involves transfers of weapons to the Third World, a good part of which suffers from underdevelopment, starvation and disease. The largest arms-importing regions in the 1970s were the Middle East, the Far East and Africa.
- The nuclear arsenals of the world today contain more than 60 000 nuclear weapons. The threat that these weapons may be used through accident, miscalculation or just folly is increasing with the continual accumulation of these weapons.
- Most ominous are the sophisticated weapon systems emerging with distinct nuclear war-fighting capabilities, such as the US land-based MX missile and the Trident II submarine-based missile, as well as the new Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.
- The SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979, but is still not in force, a deplorable fact in light of the pledge by the USA and the USSR to continue efforts towards significant reductions and qualitative limitations of strategic offensive arms.
- The risk of a nuclear war breaking out in Europe is becoming greater due to the development of new types of 'Eurostrategic weapons' - aircraft and missiles located in or targeted on Europe and not covered in any of the current international arms control negotiations.
- By the end of 1979, 75% of all satellites orbited were for military purposes. In 1979, 84 military satellites were launched by the USSR and 10 by the USA. Satellites capable of 'killing' other satellites are being developed.
- Nuclear weapon testing also continues unabated. In 1979, 53 nuclear weapon test explosions were carried out - 28 by the USSR, 15 by the USA, 9 by France and 1 by the UK.
- The world community relies on the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. But the continuing arms race poses a great threat to the existing non-proliferation regime.

From 30 June to 3 July, a South-North Conference on the International Monetary System and the New International Order took place in Arusha, Tanzania. It was organized by IFDA in cooperation with six sister organizations. The Conference launched the Arusha Initiative, a call for a United Nations Conference on International Money and Finance as well as a resolution expressing its solidarity with Jamaica. These two documents are reproduced below and are followed by the full list of participants. These and the working papers of the Conference, prepared by Ismail-Sabri Abdalla, Norman Girvan, Justinian Rweyemamu and Michael Zammit Cutajar, will be published in the August issue of Development Dialogue, the journal of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.

1. The post-1945 international monetary system has broken down. The ensuing inflationary and speculative disorders inflict serious damage on the majority of peoples and countries. It is imperative to conceive and negotiate new monetary structures and procedures. The international community has given little attention up to now to this major component of a new international order. This ARUSHA INITIATIVE is a contribution to the development of the necessary debate and action.

Mutual interest in ending monetary disarray

2. There is today a common interest, shared alike by the countries of the OECD, Eastern Europe and the Third World, to articulate a new monetary system that would reflect the employment and development needs of people living in different material conditions.

* This document represents the broad consensus of the participants though none of them necessarily agrees with all points in the analysis or recommendations. It should also be noted that most participants attended in their personal capacities, i.e. without committing the organizations or governments to which they belong. Affiliations are mentioned for identification purposes only (see list of participants below). Communicators and one observer also contributed to the discussion.

/ Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Institute of Policy Studies (Washington), Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales, ILET (Mexico), the Third World Forum, the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Dar es Salaam and the Jamaican National Planning Agency.
social systems and cultural environments. Inflation, protectionist tendencies, competitive deflationary policies, unstable exchange markets, unregulated Euro-currency transactions, recurrent and growing balance-of-payments disequilibria and the "conditionality" of the International Monetary Fund: these are problems which affect us all, though in different ways. If there is an area in which interdependence has almost immediate effect, it is that of money and finance.

3. The present monetary disarray does no credit to human rationality and ingenuity. Inaction is increasingly costly and dangerous. Policy initiatives for a new monetary order and public debate on them are needed now. The necessary political decisions must be taken urgently by governments acting in a collective and democratic manner.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system

4. Money is power. This simple truth is valid for national and international relations. Those who wield power control money. Those who manage and control money wield power. An international monetary system is both a function and an instrument of prevailing power structures.

5. The monetary system devised at Bretton Woods in 1944 reflected the historical conditions of the time, particularly the domination of the United States of America within the capitalist world and the persistence of colonial empires. The Third World as we know it today did not exist then. Moreover, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist countries refrained or withdrew from participation in the system, which thus came to lack universality. The monetary results of such a structural situation were inevitable: the United States dollar became the de facto international currency and the policy prescriptions on international monetary and financial affairs were designed to provide a stable basis for economic relations within the capitalist world. The International Monetary Fund is the institutional expression of these aims and conditions.

6. The world has been dramatically transformed since the Bretton Woods conference, while the formal monetary framework and the values it expresses remain unchanged. Third World countries have insistently questioned the adequacy and legitimacy of monetary rules and mechanisms in whose design the majority of them did not participate. Moreover, there was an inherent contradiction in the system itself: between the role of the US dollar as the main source of international liquidity and its function as a stable international store of value. The prolonged payments deficits of the USA led to the suspension by that country in 1971 of the
convertibility of the dollar into gold and to the termination of the system of fixed exchange parities. These evaluations reflected a crisis in the capitalist system. More specifically, they represented the erosion of the conceptual foundations on which the Bretton Woods system was built and the consequent loss of legitimacy on the part of the IMF. For all practical purposes, the monetary system agreed upon at Bretton Woods collapsed. It had proven unacceptable to the South, inefficient for the North and anachronistic for all.

The inadequacies and inequities of IMF prescriptions

7. The package of "stabilization" measures prescribed by the IMF for countries with balance-of-payments deficits required these to accept a credit squeeze to reduce the money supply, reduced public spending particularly on welfare services, reduced real wages, liberalized price controls, the encouragement of private foreign investment, and the substitution of devaluation for tariffs and direct controls over trade.

8. The IMF claims to have a "scientific" basis for these policies and to be an objective and neutral institution charged with the "technical" function of "helping" countries overcome their financial difficulties. Available evidence, including internal Fund documentation, points the other way. This contradiction is particularly clear when the Fund addresses Third World countries' balance of payments problems. What does the record show?

a) The IMF is not "scientific" because its analytical approach and policy prescriptions ignore the structural and inevitable nature of payments disequilibria that result from the development process. Its instruments were never designed to cope adequately with the development-deficit problems of Third World countries, or with "shock" deficits arising out of sudden and unforeseen adverse turns in their import costs or export incomes. These phenomena are now qualitatively and quantitatively different from when the IMF was set up. To continue considering them as temporary situations, susceptible of correction through monetary mechanisms, highlights the analytical irrelevance of the Fund's policy approaches. The resulting performance tests which the Fund imposes upon deficit countries lack scientific basis. Yet, failure to comply with these tests, and the consequent penalties, disrupt economic life and politically discredit governments in Third World countries.

b) The IMF is not objective in the application of its own criteria. Double standards have been applied to similar situations. Examples show that certain countries, because of their geo-political situation, international weight or political orientation, receive more lenient treatment than others, whose development strategies do not gain the sympathy of the Fund and who are thus subjected to
extremely harsh conditions. The attitudes of the International Monetary Fund have ranged from the passive acceptance of the unilateral abrogation of US-dollar convertibility to the draconian prescriptions applied to certain small Third World countries.

c) The IMF is not neutral because it systematically bases its prescriptions on market ideology, giving the preponderant role to local private enterprises and transnational investment. It envisages the State in a restrained and subsidiary role, promoting the free play of national and international market forces. The principle of State participation and intervention, involving a significant presence of public enterprises, is anathema to it. Alternative development patterns that reduce or control the space for private market logic are labelled as inefficient in economic terms and considered inadequate in political terms.

9. The IMF has proven to be a basically political institution. It tends to reproduce colonial relationships by constraining national efforts which promote basic structural transformations in favour of the majorities. Its orientation is fundamentally incompatible with an equitable conception of structural change, self-reliance and endogenous development. The IMF medicine systematically favours the more conservative sectors of society and traditional centres of power. Worse still, when these sectors constitute real national power alternatives, the Fund prescriptions and its manner of dispensing them become an unabashed form of external political intervention in their favour. The Fund's policies, conceived to achieve "stabilization", have in fact contributed to destabilization and to the limitation of democratic processes.

10. At the centre of all these issues lie the questions of national responsibilities, consciousness and discipline. Structural change generates imbalances and new policies may produce understandable mistakes as part of the development process. Under such conditions, self-discipline and coherent economic management, including efficient planning and tight administrative controls, become particularly crucial for the survival of policies of change. More over, democratic communication and consultation between the government and the people are essential to counter destabilizing forces. Such basic questions as how to reconcile social consensus with basic accumulation and how to harmonize revolutionary expectations with actual possibilities, or productive efficiency with popular participation, need to be adequately resolved in both technical and political terms.

11. For all these reasons, we wish to highlight our solidarity with Jamaica, Tanzania and other countries in similar situations. Their chosen development paths and their confrontation with the Fund deserve international backing. It is morally and politically unacceptable that their efforts at independent and equitable
development be blocked by the IMF. The demands made by these countries and the priorities they wish to pursue have the full legitimacy of their popular representation, national sovereignty and right to self-determination. We call upon progressive forces, groups and institutions, in both industrialized and Third World countries, to express in practical terms their support for the right to determine autonomously national development objectives. This should constitute a rallying point around which to generate a massive international movement of public opinion in favour of Jamaica and Tanzania. What happens to them now will constitute a warning signal for others in the future. These, and other countries attempting social transformations, are in the front line of an international power struggle to assert autonomy and independence.

The impact of monetary disorder and the impotence of the IMF

12. The current monetary disorder is neither inevitable nor accidental. It is truly man-made and can consequently be redressed by political decisiveness and action. Creeping inflation was a characteristic of the international economy during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, this situation worsened as a result of a series of successive and interrelated events, namely, the continuous balance-of-payments deficits of the United States, the devaluation of the US dollar, strong price increases in certain commodities and the capacity of large transnational enterprises to increase prices above current costs and inflation levels. The compounded effect of these and related phenomena was to push inflation into double digit figures. Western governments overreacted by applying deflationary measures which - under present conditions of monopoly and concentration of big business - have stimulated leading firms to increase prices in order to compensate for fallen sales and to maintain and improve their cash flow. Such policies have actually aggravated rather than reduced recessionary tendencies in industrialized countries, without really affecting the pricing and profits of large firms. The real burden has been borne by workers and weaker social groups through unemployment and the reduction of real wage levels.

13. Such a situation serves those very institutions - the transnational enterprises and banks - which have dominated monetary reform efforts since the demise of the Bretton Woods system. Only they have the information and the capacity to profit from instability in currency markets. Ironically, even the transnational banks are now seeking to establish a private "safety-net" to protect themselves from possible collapse. Yet, where is the safety-net for the peoples who bear the burdens of the current disorder?

14. Instead of relieving these burdens, the IMF has perversely combined a policy of deflation for the weak and inaction for the strong. The Fund has allowed the principal deficit country, the
United States, to escape blame for much of the current inflation by taking no action in response to its chronic deficits and to its unilateral abrogation of the Bretton Woods obligations in 1971. The Fund has not sought to regulate the creation of international money, fuelled by the US deficits, which takes place through the transnational commercial banks and the Euro-currency markets. It has done nothing to bring about adjustment by the chronic surplus countries, which contribute as much as deficit countries to payments imbalances.

15. The severity of the Fund's treatment of most deficit countries must indeed be contrasted with the complete freedom of action of those industrialized countries which have been in surplus for most of the last three decades. Thus, while the deficit countries are forced to open up their markets to imports in exchange for the relatively limited credit flows whose provision is dependent on agreement with the IMF, surplus countries are free to solve their own short-term problems by exporting deflation and unemployment, and even to adopt protectionist measures against Third World exports.

A United Nations Conference on International Money and Finance

16. The experience of world development has demonstrated with increasing force that it is impossible to implement a genuine international development strategy without fundamental restructuring of the international monetary system. It is imperative that a new monetary system be constructed with the agreement of the international community. If this is not done, the current non-system will continue to evolve through the ad hoc arrangements made in their own interests by a few industrialized countries and the transnational corporations and banks, under the constant threat of an international financial catastrophe.

17. We therefore call for a United Nations Conference on International Money and Finance. This will provide a universal, democratic and legitimate forum for the negotiation of a new monetary system - one, moreover, which can be open to public scrutiny. We also urge that the drafting of a charter for a new system should start now and we call upon the extragovernmental community ("third system") to take the lead in this endeavour, so as to show the way to governments.

Characteristics of a new international monetary system

18. A new international monetary order must serve two fundamental objectives. First, it must be capable of achieving monetary stability, restoring acceptable levels of employment and sustainable growth, and checking the present strong inflationary and stagflationary policies and tendencies in the world economy.
Second, it must be supportive of a process of global development, especially for the countries of the Third World, which contain the majority of the world's poor.

19. The main attributes of a new monetary system must be:

a) **Democratic management and control**: While it may be inevitable that significant influence will be wielded by economically powerful countries, the interests of the majority of the world must be clearly reflected.

b) **Universality**: As trade and payments have become increasingly internationalized, global interdependence demands that all countries should participate in the institutional arrangements for international monetary management.

c) **The establishment of an international currency unit**, as the international means of exchange and primary reserve asset: The world cannot continue to afford a situation where one country imposes its own currency to play this role, and uncontrolled international money creation and transnational speculative movements are allowed to occur.

d) A certain degree of **automaticity in transfer of resources** through reserve asset creation by the international community.

20. A new international monetary authority would need to be established to manage the monetary system. Universal and democratic, it would be capable of accommodating the needs of different development patterns and economic and social systems. Such an authority would have to control the supply of international money and be capable of redistributing national payment surpluses and existing exchange reserves. To prevent manipulation, firm rules and adequate mechanisms governing the creation and distribution of the international currency would be required. The existence of an international currency unit must serve to re-introduce in the international payments system the principle of asset settlement, the abandonment of which in the late 1960s was both a symptom of past contradictions and a cause of further disorder. Observance of this principle would imply convertibility of national currencies into the international currency unit. However, provision would have to be made by international agreement for the limitation and suspension of convertibility to meet special circumstances, such as those of some Third World countries and socialist countries.

**Urgent transitional measures**

21. As the process of building a new international monetary order will undoubtedly be long and difficult, there are a number of urgent steps which must be taken in the meantime to deal with the
immediate problems, while supporting the transition to a fundamentally new system. Most of these short-term steps have to be taken within the framework of the IMF.

22. First, the IMF should be equipped and prepared to finance those deficits which are the natural consequence of serious and disciplined efforts at development and structural change. The conditionality of such financing must reflect the sovereign right of States to choose their own social and economic models and development paths. In particular, there must be no penalization of countries which opt for strategies which emphasize national planning, systems of administrative budgeting (of foreign exchange, imports, investment and credit), the reform of traditional institutions and an active role for the public sector. Rather, assistance needs to be provided to help these countries to overcome the difficulties and obstacles which such a development model necessarily encounters, and to help improve the efficiency of their planning, economic management and allocation of resources. In this context, the use of quarterly performance tests, based on a small number of narrowly-defined monetary variables, is highly inappropriate to the conditions of a Third World country.

23. Secondly, Third World countries' access to the higher credit tranches of the IMF must be guided by an unambiguous recognition that a large part of the deficits they now experience is attributable to factors for which they are in no way responsible. These include high international inflation, weak and fluctuating export prices, low demand for their exports, deterioration of their terms of trade and high interest rates: all symptoms of the present international monetary disorder and more generally of an unjust international system. Financing such deficits by the IMF must be much more flexible and automatic; it must not be guided by present conditionality criteria.

24. To this end, the compensatory financing facility should be expanded and a new low-conditionality facility established to deal with external shock deficits (like the former Oil Facility). Access to these facilities should be related to the size of externally-caused deficits, not tied to quotas. Repayment should be related to recovery of the balance of payments from export deterioration or external shocks, instead of being tied to arbitrary time periods.

25. Next, further decisions need to be taken to make the SDR the principal reserve asset in international payments and to ensure that the role of national currencies in international settlements is effectively reduced. For that purpose, the SDR should be made more attractive. The allocation of SDR's and proceeds from sales of IMF gold should be made according to criteria separate from the IMF quota structure and should be based on relative need, economic vulnerability and development deficits.
26. Finally, there is an urgent need for the establishment of a mechanism of appeal and international arbitration, independent of the Fund, to deal with cases of dispute between the Fund and member countries applying for the use of Fund resources. The enormous power wielded by the staff and management of the Fund in negotiations with these countries provides the justification for a mechanism which would ensure the equitable resolution of such disputes.

New financial mechanisms

27. Besides the above-mentioned measures, the financing of Third World development deficits and acute needs calls for a massively-increased and qualitatively-improved resource transfer that goes beyond the capacity of the IMF. The industrialized countries, both East and West, must recognize their obligations in this respect. The principle of international redistributive taxation must be pushed toward acceptance, since an international tax (for example on oil consumption in industrialized countries) could be used to mobilize funds for resource transfers.

28. Third World countries must develop strategies of collective self-reliance in the financial and monetary fields, backed by specific mechanisms. Initiatives should be strengthened to channel resources from capital-surplus oil-producing Third World countries directly to other Third World countries in need of resources. The OPEC Special Fund should be augmented and expanded into a genuine development bank. The establishment of regional monetary systems within the Third World should be actively pursued.

The thrust of the Arusha Initiative

29. Success in building a new international monetary system in the 1980s requires that the issues on the monetary agenda be demystified and exposed to public debate and scrutiny. Those who hold power derived from money must be made publicly accountable for the consequences of its exercise. We hope that this ARUSHA INITIATIVE will help people to launch debates in their different national contexts, putting pressure on their governments to engage in serious study and preparation for intergovernmental negotiations on a new monetary system under the auspices of the United Nations.

30. We therefore call upon the people of the industrialized countries, and their organizations, including unions, parties and churches, to be aware of the costs of the present monetary non-system to themselves as well as to the Third World. They must recognize their interest in a stable system which would help them to fight inflation and would lead the way out of the present era of unemployment and recession. We urge the governments of East and
West to pursue together their common interest in a universal and
democratic monetary system. We appeal for tangible manifesta-
tions of international support for the people of Third World
countries, and their governments, seeking to preserve their
sovereignty and dignity through self-discipline in face of
external financial threats. We entreat the Third World to reduce
its dependence on Western-dominated financial institutions and
to express its solidarity through institutions of its own making
for monetary and financial cooperation. Finally, we invoke the
community of nations to respond promptly to our call for a United
Nations Conference on International Money and Finance and to make
this one of its major commitments for the decade ahead.
SOLIDARITY WITH JAMAICA

Resolution adopted by the South-North Conference on The International Monetary System and the New International Order, Arusha, Tanzania, 30 June – 3 July 1980

The South-North Conference on the International Monetary System and the New International Order considered the situation created by the termination of the International Monetary Fund programme with Jamaica owing to the attitude adopted by the IMF. This revealed clear political motivation and calculation within the power structure of that organisation. The IMF prescriptions for Jamaica would have involved punishing the people of Jamaica for the consequences of world inflation, and increases in oil prices and in interest rates.

The Conference viewed with concern that several other Third World countries - which like Jamaica are striving courageously to restructure their economies to satisfy the needs of their peoples as agreed to by other sectors of the United Nations system - are either on the verge of a breakdown in relation with the IMF or forced to change progressive policies to fit the immutable, unattainable and doubtful technical criteria of the IMF and its entrenched power structure, and their politically motivated multiple standards of treatment.

The Conference welcomed the remarkable efforts of the people of Jamaica and its political leadership in the field of development and the participants expressed their warm solidarity with them in their struggle.

The participants believe that a high-level task force nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations including experts from the Third World, should meet with experts from the IMF and the Jamaican Government to review the situation of Jamaica so as to enable a settlement of the dispute.

The participants also appeal to governments and financial institutions in the Third World and in the industrialized countries to take urgent measures NOW to assist Jamaica in its efforts to further development and maintain a genuine democratic framework. The participants also appeal to the peoples of the South and the North, and specially trade unions, church groups and other people's institutions, to persuade their governments and institutions to show in words and deeds solidarity with the people of Jamaica and countries in a similar plight.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Ismail-Sabri Abdalla, Egypt, Chairman, Third World Forum; Carlos Amat, Peru, Research Economist; Ahmed Ben Salah, Tunisia, Co-chairman, IFDA; Abdelatif Benachenhou, Algeria, Secretary-General, Association of Third World Economists; Robert L. Borosage, USA, Director, Institute for Policy Studies; José Maria Brandao de Brito, Portugal, Research Economist; E. A. Brett, UK, Lecturer in Political Science, University of Sussex, England; Norman Girvan, Jamaica, Chief Technical Director, National Planning Agency; Reginald Herbold Green, USA, Professor, Adviser to the Treasury of Tanzania; Toma Gudac, Yugoslavia, Senior Adviser, Federal Secretariat for Finance; Sven Hamrell, Sweden, Executive Director, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation; Evelyn Herfkens, The Netherlands, Chairperson, Evert Vermeer Foundation; Stuart Holland, UK, Member of Parliament; Kamal Hossain, Bangladesh, Director, Centre for Research on the New International Economic Order; Amir H. Jamal, Tanzania, Minister for Finance; Ibrahim Kaduma, Tanzania, Minister for Trade; Lennart Klackenberg, Sweden, Adviser on International Affairs, Swedish Social Democratic Party; Samuel Lichtensztejn, Uruguay, Fellow, Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies (ILET); Justin Maeda, Tanzania, Director, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam; Julius K. Malima, Tanzania, Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs; Simon Mbilinyi, Tanzania, Personal Assistant to the President (Economic Affairs); Michael Moffit, USA, Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies; M. Narasimhan, India, Executive Director for India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, IBRD; Marc Nerfin, Switzerland, President, International Foundation for Development Alternatives; Olle Nordberg, Sweden, Associate Director, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation; Amon J. Nsekela, Tanzania, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom; Charles M. Nyirabu, Tanzania, Governor, Bank of Tanzania; Jozef Pajestka, Poland, Chairman of Polish Economic Association; Oscar Pino Santos, Cuba, President of the Association of Third World Economists; Wolfgang Roth, Federal Republic of Germany, Member of Parliament; Delphin Rwegasira, Tanzania, Director of Economic Research and Policy, Bank of Tanzania; Hugh Small, Jamaica, Minister for Finance and Planning, Ministry of Finance; Juan Somavia, Chile, Executive Director, Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies (ILET); Luigi Spaventa, Italy, Member of Parliament; Michael Zammit Cutajar, Malta, International Foundation for Development Alternatives.

COMMUNICATORS: Paul Fabra, France, Le Monde and Europa; Mohamed Mashmoushi, Lebanon, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, As-Safir Daily; Chakravarthi Raghavan, India, Inter Press Service, Third World News Agency.

OBSERVER: Dudley Seers, United Kingdom, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.
Dear Friends,

The National Forum for Catamaran & Countryboat Fishermen's Rights appeals to you and the concerned authorities of your country to take note of the distress of 6.5 million traditional fishermen of India and to take appropriate measures to alleviate our miseries.

In recent years, the coastal waters of the Indian Ocean, where we have been fishing most effectively for centuries through our traditional, labour-intensive and ecologically-safe method of fishing, has been invaded by oversophisticated fishing trawlers and purseiners. They have been recklessly scraping the seabed, resulting in depletion of fish resources and destruction of fish ecology. These trawlers and purseiners, which were supposed to undertake deep-sea fishing, are shamelessly fishing in coastal waters, sometimes hardly 200 meters from the shore; thus driving away the fish from the coastal waters by the turbulence of the waters as well as destroying the valuable nets and boats of our fishermen, which has led to violent clashes in the sea between the mechanized boat-owners and our traditional fishermen, resulting in the loss of life.

The so-called 'mechanization' of our fishing industry has not really benefited the traditional fishermen. Fifty per cent of our fish lies in the coastal waters near our shores. Since 50 per cent of the prawn resources, which our country is exporting, is in these coastal waters, the mechanized trawlers and purseiners, whose main interest is to catch prawns for export, will always tend to fish in these coastal waters, where our traditional fishermen fish, thus bringing untold misery to our fishermen. It is this craze to export prawns and fish at whatever cost, to foreign countries in order to earn foreign exchange, that has been the cause of our sufferings and hardships.

But the greatest fraud of all, instead of catching fish in the deep sea, these so-called deep-sea companies having trawlers and purseiners, charter smaller mechanized boats to fish in shallow waters and send their trucks around the Indian coast to collect the fish, then freeze and pack it under their label, export the fish, and then collect the deep-sea export cash incentives which should have gone to the smaller fishermen who caught the fish. In this process

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the deep-sea trawling business encourages the smaller trawlers to violate and deplete the shallow fishing grounds of our traditional fishermen. Besides, once the fish in the sea is over, as has happened in many over-fished countries, the few rich deep-sea fishing companies and businessmen will easily give up fishing as a profitable venture, whilst all that we may get is a few feet of earth to bury our dead.

The burning of trawlers, destruction of fish nets and boats, violent clashes and the cutting of legs of our fishermen around the coast of India, provides grim evidence of the current economic genocide of the 6.5 million traditional fishermen now being committed by the trawler and purseiner industry with the knowledge of our New Delhi planners.

We appeal to you therefore:

1. To stop the imports of prawns and other varieties of seafoods from our country by Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and other European countries.

2. To stop all aid to our country for the purchase of more trawlers and purseiners, as there is an over-saturation of these vessels in our seas.

Thank you.

MATANHY SALDANHA
Chairman

THE APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY OF FOOD PROTEIN

by N.W. Pirie*/

International conferences twenty years ago tended to focus attention too exclusively on dietary protein, and various unrealistically elaborate projects for making protein concentrates were advocated and supported. These may have a place in the economies of wealthy countries; they would do little to improve nutrition in poor countries. Ten years ago, as a natural reaction to this, proteins began to be disparaged. Many authorities argued that, if more food could be produced of the type already used, all would be well in most countries where food is now scarce. Recently, a more traditional point of view has been gaining acceptance. The primary need of the body is for energy; if that need is not being met, little is gained by supplying protein concentrates. There are, however, large populations which depend on roots such as manioc, and fruits such as banana, which contain so little protein that there would be protein deficiency even if the energy needs were being amply covered. These populations need protein concentrates in addition to their staple food, and so do those who add much fat or sugar to a staple, such as rice, which contains less than the desirable amount of protein.

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Animal products and beans are the traditional protein concentrates. Meat, milk and eggs are scarce in almost all poor countries, and it is unlikely that the supply can quickly be increased unless animals, instead of depending on household wastes and agricultural by-products, are wastefully fed on material that people could have eaten, or on material grown on land that could have grown food. The merits of fish are so well known that publicity and reliable advice on fishing, and on the cultivation of fish in ponds, emanates from many organizations. Traditional methods for cooking, extracting, or fermenting beans so as to make them more palatable, and to destroy the harmful factors that many contain, are well known. Beans could therefore be more extensively used except in regions where it rains nearly every day. In such climates they tend to rot rather than ripen.

In the more humid parts of the world, dark green leafy vegetables (DGLV) were at one time an important component of the diet. The amount eaten is tending to diminish and, even where they are still eaten on a modest scale, it is not generally recognized that they are of a valuable source of protein. Fortunately, their value as sources of carotene (pro-vitamin A) is gaining recognition. DGLV contain from 3 to 5 per cent of nitrogen (expressed on the dry matter) and 70 to 80 per cent of this nitrogen is present as protein. They are therefore as rich in protein as the beans and, in suitable climates, give 3 or 4 times as large an annual yield of protein per hectare. Their cultivation is labour-intensive and well adapted to small and irregularly shaped pieces of land. DGLV deserves much more active promotion; few communities eat half as much as is nutritionally desirable, and some eat less than a tenth.

It is unlikely that any community eats, or could eat, more than 3g of protein daily in the form of DGLV, i.e., 150 to 250g of leaf as prepared for cooking. That quantity would amply cover the vitamin A needs of an adult. The vitamin A needs of a young child would be met by 30 to 40g (wet weight) of DGLV daily—rather a large quantity for a small stomach. Most of the protein and carotene in many species of leaf is in the juice that can be pressed out after they have been pulped. The leaf protein+carotene (LP) coagulates when the juice is heated and can be collected as a moist cake with the texture of cheese or yeast. By separating LP from the leaf fibre in this way, adults can use it to supply a larger fraction of the day's protein requirement, and infants can use it to supply all their vitamin A. Furthermore, LP can be extracted from many forage species that are too fibrous, or too strongly flavoured, to be used as DGLV, but that give very large annual yields. For that reason, LP is potentially the most abundant of all the edible protein concentrates. As soon as increased population makes it impossible to meet protein needs by hunting and gathering, the production of LP is probably the only means by which protein self-sufficiency can be attained in the wetter parts of the world.

Amino acid analysis and animal feeding trials demonstrated twenty years ago that LP, which had not been damaged by unskilled preparation or drying, had a similar nutritive value to fish or meat: it is better than the proteins in the seeds that are usually eaten, but not as good as milk or egg. More recent feeding trials on infants and adolescents in India, Nigeria and Pakistan have confirmed that conclusion. They also show that LP is acceptable. I have described these trials elsewhere (N.W. Pirie, Leaf Protein and other Aspects of Fodder Fractionation (Cambridge University Press, 1978)).
Dried samples of the fibrous leaf residue after protein extraction contains 1.5 to 2.5 per cent nitrogen, and the process of extraction removes most of the water that was present in the fresh crop. The residue is therefore a valuable ruminant feed that can be used as it is made, or it can be economically dried if conservation is necessary. Because of the diminution in the amount of energy needed to make dry fodder, the residue is thought of as the primary product, with LP as a by-product, in several industrialized countries where there is no protein shortage and winter feed for cattle is needed. Large-scale equipment of standard types is used for the extraction, and there is active research on modifications that will make the equipment more suitable for this job. Large-scale extraction units will soon be on sale.

In countries where there is a protein shortage, the more obvious need is for simple and robust equipment to make from local crops 5 to 10kg of LP daily, i.e., enough to give a 10g protein supplement to 500 to 1000 people. We have made extraction units which an interrupted auger, running at 10 to 15 r.p.m., disintegrates the leaf and then moves the pulp into a section of the unit in which juice is pressed from the pulp. As experience accumulates, the design is being improved. These units are at present driven by electric motors: they take 300 to 500 watts and could therefore easily be adapted so as to be driven by an animal.

It would be difficult to make still smaller units, for family use, that would pulp and separate juice in one operation. Where labour is abundant and electric power absent or intermittent, a pedal driven pulper could be used and the pulp could then be put on to a hand-operated press. A possible form would consist of a wheel, like a bicycle wheel but heavier, with three radial prongs on its periphery; these would engage a prong on the long vertical handle, running in guides, of a pestle. As the wheel was pedalled, the pestle would be lifted until the prongs disengaged; it would then drop on to a grid forming the bottom of a mortar. Another operator would feed leaf into the mortar as the pulp was driven through the grid. A hand-operated press could have the form of a horizontal, weighted platen, hinged on one edge. Pulp on a strip of perforated metal would be pressed by the platen for a few seconds; when the platen was lifted, the strip would be moved so as to bring a new section of pulp under the platen. The whole process would involve team-work by 4 or 5 people.

The basic principles involved in fractionating leafy crops or by-products are essentially the same regardless of the scale on which the process will be performed; but scale greatly affects the problems that must be solved before extensive use is made of the process. Machinery for large-scale extraction, with either the fibrous residue or the LP as the primary product, exists and will be used when it is made efficient enough for the process to be economically attractive. It will be particularly attractive when leaves are used that are the by-product of some other crop, e.g., cassava, potato or sugar beet. Production on the intermediate scale will, for several years, be undertaken mainly by institutions that have realised that LP is a potentially valuable food, and that need a regular supply with which to demonstrate the ability of LP to improve growth, alleviate the signs of vitamin A deficiency, and also to test various ways for presenting it on the table. Small-scale production will depend on decisions by individuals. In these circumstances, acceptance depends as much on the appearance of the equipment, and the ease with which it can be
used and cleaned, as on the merits of the product. Experience with other pieces of Appropriate Technology should therefore be made use of in designing and testing, in the laboratory and in villages, many different models before effort is put into encouraging the use of any particular design. At this level, the style of the process is more important than economics or nutrition: it is here that the need for research is greatest.

LETTUCE: 1. FOOD 2. MONEY 3. ENERGY

by Donald S. Leeper* /

Fifty-five million heads of iceberg lettuce from California were unloaded in New York City during the Northeastern growing season in 1978, according to the latest figures from the Department of Agriculture. More than 7,900 truckloads of lettuce and other vegetables that could have been produced locally made the 3,000-mile trip using up to 6 million gallons, or 140,000 barrels, of diesel fuel.

This year, the New York City consumer is paying 15 cents just for the delivery of each head of California lettuce.

If the quantity of lettuce unloaded from May to October 1978 had been produced within 200 miles of New York City, the savings would have been almost 130,000 barrels of fuel and 14 cents per head of lettuce for the consumer. There are further opportunities for energy savings.

My own calculations, based on a 1974 study by the California Department of Food and Agriculture - the only study of its kind that I know about - found that the equivalent of one gallon of crude oil in fuel and electrical energy is needed to grow four crates of lettuce, or 96 heads, on large-scale California farms; this amounted to 560,000 gallons for New York's lettuce in 1978. Energy requirements for the production of other vegetables is comparable. Small farmers use substantially less fossil fuel; they do not need the huge machines for planting and harvesting that the big California operations do. If the small farmers produced the vegetables for New Yorkers, up to a third, or even half, of the oil could be saved.

The production of vegetables in California - which is reportedly 45 per cent of United States consumption - together with the patterns of distribution nationwide do not fit today's realities. Clearly, the era of cheap unlimited energy is over.

To the degree that agronomic conditions permit, we must return to the earlier time of the local truck gardeners. Fresh vegetables do not have to be shipped from California the year round. Of the 60 listed in Agriculture Department statistics, 75 per cent are, have been or can be grown near New York, or at least much closer than California, during six months of the year or longer.

* / Donald S. Leeper is a consultant on food production and marketing. This paper originally appeared in the New York Times of 14 May 1980.
Starting seeds indoors and transplanting when the weather permits can provide earlier production; storage can extend the marketing period for some crops. Controlled environment production - that is, production indoors - can provide supply throughout the year and may now be economic.

Much of the prime agricultural land used for vegetables before the advent of the current food system has been converted to housing and other non-agricultural uses. But even today there is more than enough to satisfy the New York demand, particularly if we think in terms of small farmers. How many unused 1- to 10-acre plots exist within a couple of hundred miles of New York City?

Limited access to markets is the major problem of the small farmer. Distribution is geared to California production; distributors are unable to deal with small quantities, not graded or appropriately packaged. Roadside stands, farm "you-pick-the-crop" operations and local farmers' markets are his only marketing outlets. Such approaches are limited to satisfying only local demands, waste our scarce energy resources and require that the farmer spend his time selling rather than producing.

A multifaceted West Virginia programme has successfully provided the marketing link between the small producer and the regional market, assisting in the sale of more than $24 million of produce in 1978. The state's agriculture department operates six markets and a fruit-packing facility. Farmers can sell their fruits and vegetables at the markets or, if they wish, the market organization will sell it on a commission-agent basis, combining the small quantities into lots of interest to wholesalers and retailers.

A similar programme in the New York area, public or private and economically self-sustaining, would not only make an important contribution to our energy situation but also would promote local and regional development, provide a new source of supplemental income for small producers feeling the inflation pinch, and diminish the drain on the consumer's pocketbook.

LABOUR MOVEMENT TOURISM WON'T STOP MULTINATIONALS

At an International Motor Workers' Consultation held in Rome in mid-1979, the welcome address was made by Alberto Tridente, Secretary of the Federation of Metal Workers (FLM), which unites Italian engineering workers across traditional ideological divides. John Bennington, Coventry Workshop, Coventry, UK, reports:

In his welcome address, Alberto Tridente spoke of the way in which transnational corporations (TNCs) are, in effect, 'drawing a new map of development and underdevelopment' around the globe, and creating a new international division of labour. They attempt this through their manipulation of 'the technological and financial resources controlling the three elements which are essential to the future of entire continents: energy, food and, precisely, technology'.

He spoke of the huge problems this created for states, governments and social and democratic forces, and pointed out the limitations of trying to challenge transnational power through legal regulation, codes of conduct, etc.
He concluded that there was no alternative to painstakingly building up international contact and coordination between trade union delegates from different subsidiaries of the same transnational firm. If this is to go beyond general statements of solidarity it will need detailed exchanges of information and realistic plans for joint action between workers:

"... without the organised contribution and the coordinated participation of the workers both inside and outside the factories, any attempt at controlling the MNCs would be meaningless and end up with fostering a merely formal and mystifying participation while maintaining unchanged the real power of the management. There is still hard work to be done so that the first painstaking initiatives of international coordination among delegates from the same multinational reach some results in terms of concrete initiatives of struggle.

In more concrete terms, this means to launch a long and uninterrupted work of organisation in the countries where various branches of one same multinational operate. In spite of the differing conditions in which this multinational operates according to the countries, this common factor among workers from various countries will finally allow the launching of a process which, through the establishment of closer international relationships, will lead to concerted actions of workers and labour unions towards the same corporations."

In the period for questions and discussion after his talk, the following points were raised:

i) How do we create the kind of international/European solidarity and action which is needed? Do we need European unions to combat the TNCs, or are the solutions to be found on a national basis, in the conditions which national governments should impose on the operations of the TNCs in their countries?

ii) Government action in France made it very costly for Massey Ferguson to consider closing its plants there. De Gaulle threatened that the whole French market would be closed to Massey Ferguson if they stopped production, i.e., if they did not manufacture in France, they would not sell in France.

iii) This was limited as a strategy because it depended too much upon the personal whims of state leaders (e.g., De Gaulle). The problem was not how to defend one subsidiary of a TNC in one country, but to gain control over their corporate global strategy.

iv) Would the EEC help or hinder the development of international trade union solidarity? The employers seemed to be seeing a lot of gains for themselves out of the EEC, but what was there to be achieved for the unions? Was there a danger of a new European trade union bureaucracy emerging, contributing to nothing more than an increase in labour movement tourism?

v) It is no good thinking of trade union links and solidarity on a Euro-
pean basis alone, when the power centre of many of the TNCs lies in North America and Canada. American unions and workers are often very protectionist, but without their support we will not be able to combat the TNCs.

vi) The American unions themselves are already paying a high price for their national chauvinism. The absence of a class solidarity with Latin America means that USA-based TNCs are able to take advantage of the low wages and shift their investment there. This, again, re-emphasizes the need for organizing direct international solidarity action and fighting to eliminate disparities in wages and conditions in different countries. The FLM managed to organize strikes against the arms trade in support of the struggle in Iran.

vii) A key set of questions is: how are these kinds of direct 'grass-roots' links between workers to be organized; how are they to be supported by research which is detailed and relevant to their needs; how are they to be actively involved in discussing what they discover collectively about the corporations which control, exploit and divide them; how are their findings and experiences to be shared more widely within the labour movement; and how will the existing international trade union machinery react to these shop-floor links?

SOURCE: Transnationals Information Exchange, Transnational Institute, Paulus Potterstraat 20, 1071 DA Amsterdam, Netherlands. Reproduced from the Newsletter of the International Labour Studies, no.6, April 1980 (Galileistraat 130, 2581 TK The Hague, Netherlands).

EXPERIENCES

Les expériences qui suivent concernant la consommation, la santé, l'éducation et la formation, issues du projet DEMAIN-AUJOURD'HUI*, font suite à celles touchant aux techniques appropriées, à l'habitat, à l'aménagement urbain et régional, à la qualité de la vie au travail présentées dans les Dossiers FIPAD précédents.

LA CONSOMMATION

Sur le champ de la consommation, le mouvement consumériste a certainement occupé le devant de la scène dans la plupart des pays. Le rôle des grandes associations de consommation visant davantage à accroître la rationalité des

choix à l'intérieur du marché, plutôt qu'à s'interroger sur les styles de la consommation marchande, a déjà été évoqué. En outre, comme il a été montré, ces associations sont généralement peu représentatives de la population, en particulier des catégories les plus défavorisées.

Mais une remarque générale s'impose si, comme nous le recommandons, on considère de façon la plus large la consommation, incluant l'ensemble des biens et services marchands et celui lié aux activités hors marché, domestiques ou collectives; toutes les expérimentations sociales touchant aux différents aspects des styles de vie et de développement, qu'il s'agisse des technologies, de l'habitat ou des services collectifs, affectent les styles de consommation et sont ainsi, à des niveaux divers, agents de leur transformation. Nombreuses sont cependant les actions collectives à la base sur la consommation strictement marchande, en particulier pour les produits alimentaires.

Parmi l'ensemble des pays qui ont connu des exemples semblables, on peut se référer plus spécialement aux États-Unis, où une gamme d'actions peut être observée. On peut les regrouper en deux catégories: la création des réseaux de distribution et les actions sur les prix entreprises à l'échelle locale.

a) Les réseaux de distribution

C'est sous des formes diverses que des groupes locaux en de nombreux endroits se sont dotés de structures d'approvisionnement et de vente leur permettant à la fois de contrôler directement leur alimentation, sur le plan qualitatif - notamment en faveur des produits naturels - ou leurs sources d'approvisionnement, et de réduire les prix de vente globaux de leurs produits, abusivement gonflés par les supermarchés; qu'il s'agisse du plus simple au plus complexe, des clubs d'achats (preorders co-ops) réunissant plusieurs ménages pour bénéficier de prix de gros; des ententes de consommateurs (food conspiracies) qui constituent de véritables groupes d'action locaux, réunissant de cent à cinq cents personnes, pour agir localement dans les domaines divers, économiques, politiques et sociaux, en se "finançant" à partir des réductions de prix obtenues par l'organisation d'un approvisionnement collectif de produits de consommation; les magasins coopératifs (food co-ops) restent cependant la forme la plus élaborée. Ils regroupent jusqu'à 3,000 personnes. Tout acheteur est à la fois propriétaire et doit y consacrer un temps de travail, en moyenne trois heures par mois. Le personnel permanent est réduit au minimum. À ce niveau, ces institutions sont à même de fournir l'ensemble des produits vendus dans les supermarchés et leur sont réellement concurrentes, leur prix moyen correspondant au prix de gros plus 10%. Achetés pour la plupart en vrac, les co-ops en assurent l'emballage.

1/ Par exemple, dans l'ouvrage de Michel Viewiokka, L'Etat, le Patronat et les Consommateurs (Paris: 1977)

Le magasin coopératif local s'ouvre très souvent à d'autres activités pour devenir un véritable centre communautaire, où se développent aussi bien des services collectifs comme la garde d'enfants, que des activités culturelles ou des programmes de formation en matière de nutrition, beaucoup plus féconds pour maîtriser son style de consommation que les grandes campagnes nationales à la télévision.

De surcroît, elles se sont élargies, pour beaucoup, en s'organisant en fédérations qui rassemblent de multiples coopératives alimentaires avec des producteurs eux-mêmes organisés en coopératives (petits producteurs agricoles, fermiers, artisans, ...). Ces fédérations peuvent prendre en charge des achats massifs de certains produits et établir en même temps des contrats à moyen et long termes avec les producteurs.

b) Les actions sur les prix

Plus spécifiquement sur les prix des produits, l'opération récente "les consommateurs opposés à l'inflation pour les produits de première nécessité" (Coin: Consumers opposed to inflation in the necessities) apparaît un type d'action entreprise à la base et d'envergure nationale.

Cette action est menée en opposition au plan anti-inflation du gouvernement, pour montrer que les responsabilités de l'inflation n'incombent pas à la demande ou aux hausses de salaires, mais plutôt à la pratique des grandes corporations. L'opération vise à multiplier les mobilisations locales à partir d'enquêtes, d'information et de larges débats publics pour inciter l'Etat à assurer un contrôle des prix sur quatre catégories de produits essentiels: le logement, la nourriture, l'énergie et la santé.

LA SANTE

La santé apparaît comme un domaine très privilégié de la consommation. Toutefois, le secteur de la santé ne relève que partiellement, et à des degrés divers selon le pays, du marché, davantage des services publics. En même temps, il est un secteur privilégié de la qualité de la vie.

Il est important d'observer qu'alors que le débat sur de nouvelles politiques de la santé semble, au niveau international, porter davantage sur les pays du Tiers Monde, la critique des systèmes de santé est fortement engagée dans la plupart des pays occidentaux, qu'il s'agisse de la dénonciation de la pratique des trusts médicamenteux et de l'abus des médicaments, ou bien de la pratique médicale en général, qui privilégie notamment l'action curative à la prévention.

La situation est, bien sûr, très différente selon les pays, la Suède ou la Grande-Bretagne semblant bénéficier des systèmes de santé les plus avancés. Les Etats-Unis, dont le système apparaît sans doute le plus coûteux, étant sans doute un des plus inégalitaires, dans ce domaine.

3/ D'après divers documents de travail communiqués par Gar Alperovitz, Exploratory Project for Economic Alternatives, Washington, D.C., qui participe à cette action et que nous remercions.
Cependant, dans presque tous les pays, se développent des expériences locales très intéressantes pour la recherche de nouvelles formes d'organisation de la santé, axées sur les actions préventives d'information qui convergent vers une meilleure prise en charge individuelle et collective et dont les maîtres-mots semblent être la "déprofessionalisation", la "désectorialisation", et la "démédicalisation" des problèmes de santé.

Ces expériences traversent le milieu médical, mais elles impliquent très largement les groupes d'usagers, "les consommateurs".

La France, elle-même, où la rigidité du corps médical et du système institutionnel de santé est pourtant connue, voit se multiplier les expérimentations sociales, pour promouvoir la médecine de quartier axée sur la prévention, à l'intérieur de certaines institutions médicales ou à l'extérieur. Le Centre mutualiste de santé de Grenoble a certainement joué un rôle pilote. Depuis, selon les contextes, c'est sous les formes les plus variées que se développent des initiatives locales sous la forme de maisons de santé, de boutiques de santé, de centres communautaires, d'unités de santé de base (USB) ou, plus simplement, de cabinets médicaux. Certaines d'entre elles ne font pas de prestations médicales, simplement de l'information.

Aux États-Unis, la santé a certainement été un champ privilégié d'expérimentations sociales, comme en témoigne la multiplication des "cliniques libres" (free clinics) ou de "centres de soin de quartier" (neighbourhood health centers) créés par des groupes locaux4/, avec comme objectif de développer l'action préventive et de détection, en se rendant accessible à tous, financièrement et géographiquement, mais aussi aux personnes répugnant au recours au système traditionnel de santé, comme les drogués. Autonomes, ces institutions travaillent cependant en liaison avec les hôpitaux pour les soins graves. Elles sont composées d'une faible proportion de médecins et d'une majorité de bénévoles formés, "paramédicaux". Autogérées et gratuites pour la majorité des usagers, elles restent forcément tributaires, pour leur financement, de fondations privées.

Malgré leur développement au niveau local, les efforts pour organiser une stratégie nationale des "cliniques libres" pour réformer, au niveau national, le système médical US, se heurtent cependant à une structure très rigide de la profession et de l'Administration fédérale.

Deux expériences locales paraissent, à des niveaux différents, particulièrement riches: la première concerne une action de médecine préventive fondée sur une participation des habitants, dont les résultats mesurés se sont avérés particulièrement probants. Dans la deuxième, l'action préventive de la santé a permis d'engager un processus de développement d'une communauté au-delà même du champ de la santé.

a) La province de Karélie du Nord, en Finlande

Peuplée de 180,000 habitants, la province de Karélie du Nord, en Finlande, connaissait un taux exceptionnellement élevé de crises cardiaques5/. À l'initiative de la population, un projet est mis en œuvre en 1972, avec un soutien du gouvernement. Une première phase d'études mettait en évidence trois facteurs: l'hypertension, le tabac et un taux élevé de cholestérol dans le sang. Trois campagnes spécifiques furent engagées. L'hypertension a été le plus facilement régulée, de manière curative, par une réorganisation décentralisée des services publics de santé. Le plus grand succès semble avoir été obtenu à travers la campagne contre le tabac, qui a appelé une participation très active de la population.

La question qui s'avérerait la plus délicate concernait le cholestérol. Il résultaient, en effet, d'un mode de consommation local très dépendant d'une forte spécialisation de la région sur les produits laitiers. Une transformation de la diète alimentaire risquait de bouleverser les structures de production, ce qui n'est évidemment ni simple ni fortement avantageux du point de vue économique.

C'est pour cette action que s'avérerait surtout nécessaire le recours aux organisations locales pour mener une action en profondeur à la base. L'Association des ménagères de Martha, en particulier, qui regroupe environ 10,000 femmes à travers 276 associations locales, a mené une campagne, village après village, pour changer les habitudes alimentaires. Aidées par le gouvernement, les femmes ont également pris en charge une action de formation pour développer une certaine diversification des cultures, notamment en faveur des légumes et des compositions culinaires compensatoires.


Les économies réalisées sur les soins classiques dépassaient, dès cette période, l'ensemble des coûts pourtant élevés du projet.

b) Dans un quartier de Chicago, aux États-Unis

La santé peut aussi constituer un champ privilégié de pénétration pour engager un processus de développement local fondé sur la participation de la population et promouvoir une action politique prenant en charge les multiples aspects de dénuement des habitants. C'est ce qu'illustre l'expérience d'un quartier pauvre de l'ouest de Chicago 6/.


Elle concerne une communauté noire de 60,000 habitants qui vit, pour une grande part, de l'assistance publique. Au cours des années 1960, une action avait consisté à ouvrir l'accès des deux hôpitaux qui existaient dans le quartier, à la communauté qui en était exclue. Elle fut victorieuse. Pourtant, plusieurs années plus tard, on constatait que la santé des habitants n'était pas pour autant améliorée.

Mettant en question la médicalisation de la santé, l'organisation de la communauté s'engageait dans l'identification des causes d'hospitalisation. Sept causes principales étaient décélées, contre lesquelles sont progressivement engagées certaines actions à la base. D'abord, la plus simple, le ramassage des chiens errants pour freiner les morsures. Une deuxième apparaît très spectaculaire et concerne l'action contre les accidents automobiles. Après une difficile enquête, il apparaît qu'une des causes importantes des accidents, mais aussi d'agressions, réside dans le fait qu'une fonction de passage du centre ville à la banlieue a été donnée aux principales voies de circulation du quartier. Une action difficile est alors menée avec le soutien d'organisations extérieures à la communauté, pour modifier le système de circulation de la ville et donner aux voies du quartier une priorité aux relations de voisinage.

Une autre action concernait l'alimentation qui, dans beaucoup de familles, était défectueuse, en particulier en raison d'un manque, saisonnier ou permanent, de fruits et légumes. Sur des maisons disposant de toits plats, furent installés des potagers. Cette solution est très favorable sur le plan de la gestion des ressources, puisqu'elle profitait d'un espace disponible, mais aussi de l'énergie des maisons, qui, comme on le sait, s'échappe toujours pour l'essentiel par le toit. Motivée pour des raisons de santé, cette activité devenait une production économique, vendue. De plus, la communauté s'organisait pour associer les personnes âgées à cette tâche; les rendant productifs, elle renforçait leur fonction sociale à l'intérieur du groupe. Les résultats sur le plan de la santé sont très nets, en particulier dans la diminution des coûts d'hospitalisation pour la communauté. Mais ces actions à partir de la santé ont surtout permis à la communauté de se doter d'une organisation capable d'apporter des solutions nouvelles aux problèmes sociaux, économiques et politiques des habitants.

**L'ÉDUCATION ET LA FORMATION**

L'éducation et la formation constituent enfin un champ très privilégié de l'expérimentation sociale. Nous ne pouvons ici que citer quelques exemples pour rappeler leur diversité.

Nombreuses ont été les tentatives de la société civile pour organiser en dehors des institutions existantes de nouvelles formes d'éducation des enfants, pour changer les rapports enseignants-enfants, ouvrir davantage les enfants à des activités de création, à la responsabilité, et plus généralement à la vie concrète.

Variant selon les contextes institutionnels propres à chaque pays, ces initiatives ont donné lieu, par exemple en France, à ce que l'on dénomme des "écoles parallèles". Exemplaire est à cet égard le Lycée expérimental d'Oslo, en
Norvège, où a été tentée l'organisation autogérée des élèves.

Aux Etats-Unis, on dénombre en 1973 huit cents "écoles libres" (free schools), donnant la plus grande place à l'organisation collective de l'enseignement.

Nombreuses sont également les tentatives pour ouvrir l'enseignement universitaire, que ce soit au niveau de l'ouverture sociale, comme dans les expériences d'université ouverte, notamment en Angleterre, comme la Milton Keynes Open University à Buchs, ou même sur le plan de l'ouverture géographique, par la création d'universités itinérantes. C'est par exemple le sens de l'opération de l'Université de printemps à l'initiative du Collège coopératif à Paris (en France) qui organise ses sessions par rotation dans différentes parties du monde.

On a déjà cité la tentative du Tvind, au Danemark (Dossier FIPAD 15), où l'expérience d'enseignement est directement couplée à une recherche globale de nouveau styles de vie et de production.

Enfin, à travers ce rappel très partiel, on peut citer comme innovation institutionnelle particulièrement intéressante la loi sur les cent cinquante heures en Italie qui prévoit non seulement l'octroi d'un temps de formation disponible pour les travailleurs, mais en délègue la gestion aux syndicats, ce qui constitue une ouverture considérable pour une plus grande maîtrise par la société civile, de la formation, pilier de la recherche de nouveaux styles de vie et de développement.

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REACTIONS TO PREVIOUS DOSSIERS: EXCERPTS FROM LETTERS
from Anil K. Gupta */

I was disappointed to hear that the IFDA Dossier will be reaching us less after Nothing pains one more than hearing that the voice of "Heard Nots" have to wait, maybe for good. I am always excited by the variety of contents in your Dossier.

I must hasten to contribute my bit to correct an erroneous impression which might be created by the note of Soedjatmoko (Dossier 15) that there can be a 'good policy and bad implementation'. This is really vulgarisation of the entire debate on development in the Third (or 4th, 5th, etc.) World countries. I do not intend to offend him by saying that the 'basic needs' approach inherently constituted an effort to stifle the simmering rural discontent just enough to not to cross a threshold level beyond which the 'discontent' would have

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to be characterized as 'consciousness'. And this 'consciousness' would have made the process of pauperization setting in our societies - not inspite of, but because of, the very development policies adopted.

If one refuses to accept the word 'subsistence', one can as well do without 'basic needs', because it is hard to accept that some development planners envisage satisfaction of 'basic' needs, while for others its realization aims at satisfying 'higher' needs.

Organization of 'have-nots' has become a fashionable phrase today. It is often overlooked that state planning (in the public sector, as in India) has by design reinforced the market preferences of the allocation of resources, exploitation of their potential and distribution of gains. The economies of scale which market theorists talk of are arrived at precisely by often not accounted for social investments (I am deliberately not using the words - public investment).

The dependency between the poorest and their benefactors (gainers of new technology, ideology, etc.) almost obliterates the possibility of polarization of either side. Thus the homeostasis which is achieved keeps absolute capitalism in check while effectively preventing the conscientization of the rural disadvantaged above a certain level.

The poor spaces are not poorly endowed. Vertical distances are converted into horizontal distances through the exploitation of the natural diversity into market disparity.

The 'Basic Needs approaches I and II' refuse, somehow, to acknowledge the basic tenets of the market mechanism (through the demand-oriented institutions, and not the supply ones):

. that the ecology which enabled humanity to survive before modernization set in, in so-called poor regions, has its own energy reserve to sustain them - if only the disproportionate, short-term exploitation of resources is corrected.

. The ecological mix of the enterprises which the farming system encompasses need to be tackled at once, in totality (and not through "operation floods I & II" where, to meet urban milk needs, some subsidies go to farmers using irrigation who can grow green fodder to maintain cross-bred instead of reinforcing the occupational heterogeneity of rainfed farmers in terms of cattle, camel, sheep and goats and forest produce etc.)

. Our studies mapping the human, livestock, mechanization and irrigation resources of all 717 villages of a rainfed district of a fast-growing state (a region where the problem of absolute poverty is thought to have been overcome!), Haryana, reveals the above characteristics quite strikingly when compared with institutional finance made available to each village for varying purposes by each bank.

. The stages of development, if irrelevant to nations, are also irrelevant to states and states within states, regions, sub-regions, etc also. Historical diversities of the exploitative process through which natural endowment is characterized as 'rich' or 'poor' are manifestations of market 'abecis'.
Diverting major state investments from labour absorptive enterprises to the capital-intensive, growth-oriented enterprises which might help the hinterland (but never do).

Growth centre and pole approach was sequel to community development suggesting that an administrative area cannot substitute the 'economic spaces'. Thus, basic needs approaches do not evolve much higher from the earlier approaches because the dualism of development is accepted as a fait accompli.

Dossier 16: The editorial comment, "... or should people's organizations throughout the world take the matter into their own hands and set up processes - national, regional and international - to put pressure on tyrants, not only after they lose power but also while they exercise it?" is full of potentialities; it unveils dreams and, perhaps, an urge that echoes from unheard voices the world around. Yet, I wonder, if the antithesis of this proposition - what prevents people to organise at different levels - has been thought over, i.e., can anybody voluntarily relinquish his share of the pie, and all the comforts that go with it - Do we ever eat less so that some hungry ones may eat more - Can the 'trusteeship' concept of Gandhi ever be realized? (in fact I always feel that one singular disservice that apostle of peace did to humanity was to infuse a vain hope that the 'haves' will voluntarily share with 'have-nots'). And if it cannot be, then what are we waiting for?

Perhaps the answers to these questions will emanate in the form of another question that the editorial raises.

However, why should we presume that the people's organizations that somehow came about in different parts for different reasons, with different objectives, motivations, etc., will not counteract each other? At least this is what the monopolies, state power and market mechanism strive to achieve.

The discussions on Accountability of those who wield power and those who merely contribute towards it voluntarily or otherwise, cannot take place dispassionately unless we study the micro level dimensions of the equations that prevent people from organizing. The possibility of these organizations monitoring the performance of power wielders will arise only later.

The Shah symbolises, not an individual, but a system that has not yet been uprooted. Even if one Shah has been dethroned, many more Shahs will dominate the scene in Third World societies in different garbs. The signs of such possibilities are already becoming apparent to discerning viewers of the international scene. Thus, let us not side-track the issue by raising debate on the mechanism of bringing a culprit (who has proved who is the real culprit: the symptoms or the factors leading to the appearance of symptoms...) to book, instead, as the editorial mentions, - "to put pressure on tyrants not only after they lose power but also while they exercise it"! I would like to add that power of the people need not be granted (one should not nurture such a wish), because it will not be.
The rights are not bestowed, they are snatched. Gandhism has often been blown out of proportion. It is generally overlooked that it was not the Gandhian movement alone that got us freedom, though it did contribute towards it. The international scene at that time had not left many other options for the Empire. (Anybody needing empirical evidence may have a look at debates going on at that time in the House of Commons and around). Thus, in Third World societies, we have to ask ourselves:

i) Which type of organizations service the onslaught of various annihilating forces?

ii) Which organizations are supported by the state, the market, and the TNCs?

iii) Which organizations, even if they do exist at the grass-root level in various forms, do not collectivise to gain identifiable form, shape or power?

iv) Which organizations can really provide for the type of dependencies that really prevent labourers and marginal farmers in irrigated, dry and marginal lands, to unionise?

Obviously, this issue will need understanding of the mechanism of immiserisation itself, about which we know so little.

Therefore, let us hope that before we start attempting solutions to the problems that are urgent but, at the same time, offshoots of some still more urgent but not so easily perceptible ones, we do not deliberately help those (players of the old game of imperialism) that the middle-class intellectuals often fall prey to.

It is interesting to note that Abdalla (Dossier 16) makes a forceful plea for a non-market governed strategy of development, citing the studies of other Third World countries. I would only like to caution him on the remedy - state intervention - suggested so far by many on this side without specifying the restrictions which, inter alia, will be imposed on the private sector and really may misfire. The author rightly rejects state bureaucracies or technocracy. However, talking of endowment and cost, etc., he falls into the trap of market definitions.

No region can be categorised as resource rich or poor. This 'richness' or 'poverty' is an interpretation by the market of the potential of exploitation of certain resources through available technologies with maximum profit. The cost also may be more to the market, but less to the society and thus one may choose a location or a sector, or growth pole theories.

The paper on Bangladesh (Dossier 16) is absorbing, though full of wishful thinking. It might interest the author to know that after 30 years of independence, India still does not have up-dated, systematised, land records in all the regions, and so to suggest that Bangladesh's first need is to up-date and revise the records and then take up reforms would be as good as not beginning at all. The question of "marketable surplus" is dubious and misleading in the context of Bangladesh. Who has surplus, who trades the surplus and who purchases, at what cost, are some of the considerations that normally should
arise in this context. When we talk of non-market exchange mechanisms, the state may benefit more if fewer people sell, not because they have surplus, but because they cannot afford to consume what they produce (a phenomenon very common in Purulia and other districts of West Bengal, Bihar and other Indian states). Thus, marketable surplus needs to be cautiously viewed and analysed. Unfortunately, the matter ends at the level of 'political will'; if we cannot move further, why begin at all?

The concluding remarks of Cardoso (Dossier 16) in the context of Latin America are almost prophetic. Samuel Lichtensztejn and José Quijano provide an interesting discussion of an issue that is increasingly becoming important. In fact the investments in irrigation in regions where in the long run it might have harmful sociological and ecological effects are being advocated by many of the international banking organizations.

Overall, Dossier 16 is interesting, absorbing and, like all earlier issues, quite thought-provoking.

A PROPOSAL FOR RESEARCH ON DESTABILIZATION

by André Gunder Frank* /

The research problem that I wish to suggest may be summarized by the single word 'DESTABILIZATION'.

The word 'destabilization' was introduced into common parlance by the US Congress and other related revelations of - and the subsequent world-wide scandal about - the CIA, ITT and Mr. Kissinger's deliberations intentionally and organizedly to 'destabilize' the Chilean economy during the years 1970-73. However, there have also been other recent but less heralded cases of destabilization - deliberate or otherwise - and perhaps some more remote and even historic ones as well.

In our time, Third World countries that embark on economic and political reform, and especially those that aspire to greater self-reliance, but indeed even some European countries - as the recent official threats by the US and West German highest official spokesmen against Italy and even France, or the IMF demands from Britain and Italy suggest - now expose themselves to the serious threat of destabilization of their development efforts or other reform programmes. This threat, and indeed reality, of destabilization now makes it into a problem of the most vital importance, and its timely analysis into one of the greatest urgency for many people in the Third World and elsewhere.

The study of past and present experiences with destabilization could be of invaluable help to other countries that must still attempt to avoid or to defend themselves against destabilization and/or to minimize its negative consequences as far as possible in the near future, for "those who do not know history are condemned to repeat it".

* / University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, England
I therefore suggest a comparative study of destabilization, which very preliminarily might be conceived along the following lines:

Suggestions for a comparative study of destabilization:

**Country Case Studies: Some possible cases (? means optional or questionable case)**

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Comparisons and analysis:

**Destabilization through 'world market' by 'metropolis' and others**

Deliberate and possibly coordinated destabilization:

. by some governments, embargoes, boycotts, etc.
. by international institutions (e.g., withdrawal of credit by IMF, World Bank, on 'technical' grounds)
. by some firms (e.g., petroleum firms, ITT, etc.)

'Automatic market force determined undeliberate' policy:

Capital flight
Credit restrictions
Demand and supply restrictions

External military and/or political interference, pressure or threats
Destabilization through domestic action - coordinated or not with foreigners

**Economic:** capital flight, investment stop, production slow down, speculation, etc.
**Political:** policies, practices and groups responsible.

**Defense against destabilization**

**Friendly external support**
**Friendly external opposition to external destabilization**
**Internal economic mobilization, self-reliance, etc.**
**Internal political mobilization**

**Relative success and failure in defense against destabilization.**

Such a comparative study of destabilization - and possibly its combination with a similar study of the experience with self-reliance - would require coordination of research teams and individual researchers in or for each of the case study countries (although for some cases, e.g., Chile, much of the primary research and analysis may already be completed, and for some historical cases 'library work' by single researchers might be adequate for purposes of comparison), of research in or on the metropolitan countries and international institutions, and of the analysis of the comparative experience.

I am not aware of any already existing initiative for a comparative study of destabilization; and I certainly do not myself propose to take such initiative in any organized fashion, nor am I in my personal capacity in any position to do so. I would, however, of course welcome any such initiative from elsewhere.

THE MURDER OF WALTER RODNEY: "DON'T MOURNE"

by Roy Preiswerk */

On June 13, Dr. Walter Rodney was killed in Georgetown, Guyana, after a device he had obtained from a former army sergeant exploded.

Walter Rodney was, first of all, a gentle concerned human being, committed to struggle against all forms of exploitation and to stand on the side of the underprivileged, the poor and the victims of racism. As all those who worked with him in 1978 at a Workshop in Frankfurt on a book on racism in children's literature (now published by the World Council of Churches in Geneva) can witness, he did everything humanly possible to overcome racial hatred, which has marked the political life of his own country. At 37, Rodney was renowned as a brilliant historian, having taught at the Universities of the West Indies and Dar-es-Salaam. Four major works had already appeared when he began a 3-volume publication on the history of the working class in Guyana. Only the first volume was finished before his death.

*/ Professor, Institute of Development Studies, 24, rue Rothschild, 1202 Geneva and Graduate Institute of International Studies, 132 rue de Lausanne, 1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland.
Why was Walter Rodney killed? Anyone who calls him an extremist displays lack of honesty. In his country, he had to his extreme left the party of Dr. Jagan, a pro-Soviet Marxist who was brought down by the CIA in 1966, and on his extreme right the present ruler, Mr. Forbes Burnham, who managed to give Guyana the image of a progressive socialist country while introducing a system of increasing repression and persecution of dissidents. Rodney could have been in the comfortable chair of a professor anywhere in the English-speaking world, but he preferred to return home. The Government harrassed him in every possible way, notably by preventing him from teaching and by taking away his passport. He then founded the Working People's Alliance and was in and out of court ever since. But Rodney was killed mainly because he was emerging as one of the major political thinkers of the Third World and as the recognized alternative to the oppressed people of Guyana against the present regime.

Over the past few years, it has become clear that the Third World often kills its best sons. Whether this happens in a conspiracy with imperialist and neo-colonialist forces from outside is not the crucial question here: it is done by many rulers to preserve their privileged position and to stay in power whether or not they are capable of delivering the goods to the people. They sometimes use outside forces to wipe out internal opposition, then turn around and denounce the action of "imperialists" as a rallying-cry to strengthen their own positions again.

The Commonwealth Caribbean has no tradition of eliminating political opponents in this fashion. It is one of the last bastions of relative fairness. If this is to change, it is both sad and frightening for the entire Third World.

The day after the assassination, Mrs. Rodney said: "Don't mourn". So we ought to do something. What we definitely need is an international investigation into the internal situation of Guyana, including the continued activities of North-American religious sects of the type that led to the Jonestown collective suicide of 1978. But we need more: action to stop the massacre of those who bring some hope to the absolutely poor, oppressed masses of the Third World. Leaders should not only be accountable to other governments and international organizations, but to their (own?) people.

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L'ÉVICTION DE JOSEPH KI-ZERBO
par Jean Ziegler */


*/ Professeur à l'Université de Genève
(Afrique Asie, 23 Juin 1980)
Ki-Zerbo avait fondé le Conseil africain et malgache pour l'Enseignement supérieur en 1964. Il y avait consacré jusqu'à ce jour une grande partie de son intelligence et de son énergie. Le Conseil était l'embryon d'une future organisation universitaire panafricaine qui devait libérer les étudiants du continent de l'emprise de l'impérialisme culturel européen. Mais sans doute ne lui pardonnerait-on pas sa liberté d'expression et la netteté de ses positions anti-impérialistes.

L'éviction de Ki-Zerbo est dramatique. Non seulement pour les intellectuels africains, mais aussi, et surtout, pour nous, universitaires européens qui possédions en Joseph Ki-Zerbo, placé à un poste stratégique du système d'enseignement supérieur en Afrique, un interlocuteur d'une probité intellectuelle, d'une érudition scientifique et d'une force de caractère exceptionnelle.

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**QUE FAIRE - UN AUTRE DéVELOPPEMENT**

En 1973, pour la première fois depuis que les Occidentaux appellent les "grande découvertes", pour la première fois depuis Vasco de Gama et Christophe Colomb, une décision fondamentale de politique économique n'a pas été prise par les pays du centre, mais par ceux de la périphérie: les pays de l'OPEAC ont multiplié unilatéralement le prix du pétrole. D'un coup, les règles d'un jeu vieux de près de cinq siècles ont été modifiées.

Sur cette lancée, le Tiers Monde, animé par le pays-président des Non-Alignés, l'Algérie, a entrepris la bataille, à la Sixième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, pour le Nouvel Ordre Économique International.

La Septième session extraordinaire devait lui donner un contenu plus précis. À cette occasion, un groupe de militants du Sud et du Nord — dont Ahmed Ben Salah, Marc Nerfin, Ignacy Sachs, Juan Samavia — ont animé une tentative de remise en cause des postulats de la sagesse conventionnelle en matière de développement et proposé un autre développement. Le texte qui en a résumé les traits principaux a été publié par la Fondation Dag Hammarskjöld sous le titre Que faire — un autre développement. Depuis lors, plus de 70 000 exemplaires — en allemand, anglais, espagnol et français — ont été diffusés. Une édition arabe est en préparation. La demande est toujours telle qu'une réédition en français s'est avérée nécessaire. Elle doit être expédiée, avant la fin de l'été, à tous ceux qui figurent sur la liste d'adresse de la PIPAD en Afrique francophone.

Que ceux qui ne l'auraient pas reçue et désirent un exemplaire s'adressent directement à la Fondation Dag Hammarskjöld, Övre Slottsgatan 5, S-752 30, Uppsala, Suède.
MATERIALS RECEIVED

As mentioned in IFDA Dossier 18 (pp. 122-124), we will from now on list materials received for possible publication in the Dossier. Listing does not exclude publication at a later stage, but we feel that in the meantime readers may find such a service useful. Interested readers are advised to write directly to the author. IFDA may also provide copies at cost (SR 0.50 per page). Request will be processed only if accompanied by payment.

LOCAL SPACE

- Gruppo Futuro, The political implications of child participation: steps toward a participatory society (Piazza d'Ovidio 6, I-80134 Napoli, Italy), 11 pp.


- D.B. Ray, Health significance of hindu sacraments (samskapas) (Charutar Arogya Mandal Hospital and Medical Complex, Vallabh Vidyanagar 388 120, Dist. Kaira (Gujarat), India), 10 pp.

- Leonard J. Duhl, MD, Socio-psychological aspects of energy (University of California School of public health, Berkeley, California 94720, USA), 9 pp.

- Act of Tepoztlan, Redistribution and participation: Keys to a solution of human settlements problems in Latin America (Y Eduardo Terrazos, Apartado 49, Tepoztlan, Morelos, Mexico), 7 pp.

- Brian Mac Call, The transition toward self-reliance, Some thoughts on the role of people's organizations(c/o FAO, Rome), 11 pp.

- John Knesl, Alternative development project for an urban community with special emphasis on its spatial development and construction and Diapraktic Urban Space (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12181, USA), 11 and 15 pp.

- Karina Constantino-David, Issues in community organization (Third World Studies, Room 428, University of the Philippines System, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines), 14 pp.

- Anil K. Gupta, Issues in labour mobility and development in arid regions - a village scene (or why people can't organize!) (Indian Institute of Public Administration, Indraprastha Estate, Ring Road, New Delhi 110002, India), 11 pp.

- Claude Schnaidt, L'âge de la pierre (11 rue Emile Dubois, Paris XIV, France), 27 pp.
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NATIONAL SPACE

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GLOBAL SPACE


. Angelos Angelopoulos, A neo-keynesian policy to face the economic recession (32 Parthenonos Street, Athens 402, Greece), 12 pp.

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. Giampaolo Busso, Under-development, technology, self-reliance (Instituto agronomico mediterraneeo, Via Ceglie, Valenzano (Bari), Italy), 23 pp.

. Frank Long, Reverse technology transfer, Some new issues (National Science Research Council Guyana, P.O. Box 689, Georgetown, Guyana), 9 pp.
LOCAL SPACE


2. Jacob Bomann-Larsen, A preliminary list of international contacts on alternative production (i.e. conversion to peaceful and socially useful production) (the compiler, Schous Plass 3, Oslo 5, Norway).


4. The Nordic Alternative Group, Education for Self Reliance (Stockholm: FN-förbundet, Box 150 50, S-104 65 Stockholm, 1980). The magazine points up the relevance for rich countries of education to strengthen self-reliant attitudes in the face of escalating demands unrelated to real human needs or the requirements of a healthy society. It goes on to demonstrate how the Cameroon experience and efforts in that country to promote basic needs and knowledge can be related to the situation in industrialized countries and applied in Northern school classrooms.

NATIONAL SPACE

1. Edward Said, The question of Palestine (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). 'The fact of the matter is that today Palestine does not exist, except as a memory, or - more importantly - as an idea, a political and human experience, and as an act of sustained popular will. My subject is all those things about Palestine... Four million Muslim and Christian Arabs are known to themselves and to others as Palestinians. They make up the question of Palestine, and if there is no country called Palestine it is not because there are no Palestinians. There are, and this book is an attempt to put their reality before the reader' Edward Said.


Jorge Varcia-Bouza, A basic-needs analytical bibliography (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1980).


Mike Cooley, Architect of bee, The human/technology relationship (Slough: Langley Technical Services, 1980) (95 Sussex Place, Slough, SL1 INN, UK).

A rich bunch of papers from the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project (GPID) of the United Nations University directed by Johan Galtung. Among them:
- Johan Galtung et al, On the decline and fall of empires: the Roman empire and Western imperialism compared.
- Mohammed Taghi Farvar, Aspects of the Iranian Revolution.
- Herb Addo, Approaching the peculiarity of the Caribbean plight within the paradox of the representative state in the contemporary world-system.
- Peter Ester, Attitudes of the Dutch Population on alternative life styles and environmental deterioration.
- Andrzej Sicinski, Dominant and alternative lifestyles in Poland: an outline.
Lore Scheer and Fred Prager, Austria in the year 1979: How Austria weathered the economic storm of the seventies.

David C. Pitt, The nature and future of development in New Zealand.

Barbara J.P. Ross, Ways of life in Finland: a preliminary discussion.

(UNU-GFID, c/o UNITAR, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland).

GLOBAL SPACE

Saul Mendlovitz writes:

Since its founding some twenty years ago, the Institute for World Order 1/ has engaged in research and education which promote the development of progressive political and social structures throughout the globe. To this end we have worked with a transnational network of scholars, universities and institutes to produce appropriate materials to guide study and political action.

Enclosed we bring to your attention some newly published work by participants in the World Order Models Project: The National Interest and the Human Interest, by Robert C. Johansen, examines the values underlying recent U.S. foreign policy behaviour 2/, The True Worlds, by Johan Galtung, analyses the potential which present and possible social structures hold for limiting or increasing the well-being of the majority of the world's people 3/. Both studies offer specific proposals for reorienting contemporary power structures.

ALTERNATIVES, A Journal of World Policy, is addressed to scholars and policy makers engaged in systems analysis, future modeling, and peace and policy studies. It also publishes essays and articles on science and technology, appropriate development and demilitarization. We hope you will find these materials interesting and invite your comments and contributions.

1. Patrick Engellau and Brigitta Nygren, Lending without limits - on international lending and developing countries (Stockholm: Secretariat for Future Studies, 1979) (P.O. Box 7502, S-103 92, Stockholm).

2. Tamas Szentes, 'Crisis and internal inequalities of the world capitalist economy and the Third Development Decade', Development and Peace (Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1980). This is a new semi-annual journal devoted to economic, political and social aspects of development and international relations published by the Hungarian Peace Council and the World Peace Council (c/o Istvan Dobosi, Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 36, H-1531 Budapest, Hungary).

1/ Institute for World Order, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA.


. Organisation de solidarité des peuples afro-asiatiques, La Conférence internationale sur le rôle des transnationales et les stratégies de développement économique (Le Caire: Publications afro-asiatiques, 1980) 89 rue Abdel Aziz Al-Saoud, Manial, Le Caire (also available in English and Arabic).


. Toivo Miljan (ed.), Food and agriculture in global perspective.

. Ervin Laszlo et al., The objectives of the New International Economic Order.

. id, The structure of the world economy and prospects for a new international economic order.

. id, Eastern Europe and the new international economic order.

. id, The obstacles to the new international economic orders.

Four more books by the CEESTM-UNITAR team headed by Lazlo. Ten other volumes are expected to be published this year (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980).

. Oswaldo de Rivero B., New Economic Order and International Development Law (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980). The author, who is now minister in the Embassy of Peru in London, participated in the IFDA Third System Project (cf. IFDA Dossier 6, Peru y el otro desarrollo). He shows in his book that through 12 years of negotiations, Third World countries have contributed to a new branch of international law, the purpose of which being to legitimize more equal relations between the North and the South. He also insists that the only way to reach the NIO is through development alternatives. He is now working on a project on the contemporary global crisis to which IFDA Dossier will return in due course.


. ISIS International Bulletin. No.14: "Migrant Women". (ISIS, Via della Pelliccia 31, 00153 Rome, Italy, or Case postale 301, 1227 Carouge (GE), Switzerland.)


. Quête d'avenirs, Rapport d'activité du CRDI en 1979 (Centre de recherche pour le développement international, BP 8500, Ottawa, Canada).

. Searching, Review of IDRC activities, 1979 (International Development Research Centre, P.O. Box 8500, Ottawa, Canada).

. Marga Institute, Progress Report 3. The activities of the Sri Lanka Institute of Development Studies (P.O. Box 601, Colombo, Sri Lanka).

. Vienna Institute for Development, General information and summary report of activities 1975-79 (Kaerntnerstrasse 257/6, Vienna, Austria).


COMMONWEALTH TRADE UNION COUNCIL ESTABLISHED

A new organization aimed at strengthening links between trade union centres in the Commonwealth came into being on 1 March this year. Membership of the Commonwealth Trade Union Council, which will be based in London, consists of the 25 million workers who belong to trade unions in over 40 Commonwealth countries.

Close ties between Commonwealth trade union organizations have existed for many years and regular meetings have been held during the International Labour Conference each year in Geneva. It was at the 1978 meeting that it was agreed in principle to establish a new Commonwealth trade union body and a special working party was set up to examine the form such a body should take. Last year the Commonwealth unions agreed to establish the new Council and at a meeting in Madrid in November Dennis McDermott, President of the Canadian Labour Congress, was elected President, and Carl Wilms Wright, former Secretary, Economic and Social Committee of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, was appointed the full time Director of the CTUC.

The aims of the CTUC are to promote the interests of workers in the Commonwealth through enhanced cooperation between national trade union centres; to influence Commonwealth institutions and decisions; and to promote acceptance of, and respect for, trade unionism and for the Commonwealth Declaration of Principles of 1971 which sets out the basic relationship between the Commonwealth countries.

The top priority for the new Council will be to establish relations with Commonwealth institutions and governments; (and contacts have already been established between the Director and the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shridath S. Ramphal). Such contacts will be aimed at assessing how the CTUC can best be involved in the follow-up to the Lusaka Heads of Government Meeting and the Valetta Finance Ministers Meeting which took place last year, with a view to ensuring that trade union views are taken into account by Commonwealth governments and institutions.

(For further information: Carl Wilms Wright, Trade Union Congress, Congress House, Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3LS, England)

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