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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The paper by Professor Silviu Brucan which appears in this issue provides, in addition to its intrinsic interest, a welcome opportunity, through a brief 'interaction' with him, to make explicit a point of semantics which is a critical one from both conceptual and political points of view.

It has been systematically attempted in these Dossiers, to use the expressions 'Third World' and 'industrialized countries' and not 'developing' and 'developed' countries. Why?

Words are never innocent. They transmit concepts and values. And since one thinks mainly through words, they should be used with precaution.

The development debate has been obscured, among others, by the confusion between 'development' and 'economic growth' (however measured). This may be more true in English than in French, which has two words (two concepts): développement and mise en valeur. The first refers to human beings, the second to things, or resources.

Development cannot be reduced to economic growth or accumulation. Development is not another chapter in the discipline called 'economics'. Development is usually based on growth (but not on any growth); it encompasses political, socio-economic and cultural factors; it has historical, spatial and environmental dimensions.

Development as (re) defined, for instance, in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report\(^1\), is not a condition. It is a total, comprehensive process, informed by a value-loaded vision shaped around five pillars:

- the satisfaction of human needs, both material and, in a wide sense, political;
- self-reliance;
- endogenous;
- in harmony with the environment; and
- based on structural transformation, in the economy, the society and the polity.

If this is development, then the usual phraseology of 'developed' and 'developing' countries is wrong and misleading since it implies, and makes people believe, that development is a linear process in which those lagging behind have only to imitate, 'catch up' and possibly 'overtake', as both Stalin and Rostow saw it. As a matter of fact, we have only under-developed or mal-developed social systems, and the challenge is precisely to develop them in the process of humanization of human beings by and for themselves.

\(^1\) What Now - Another Development (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1975) with French, German and Spanish editions.
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THE SCHEVENIENGEN REPORT


The "Interactions" section of this issue of the IFDA Dossier also includes three discussion papers presented at the Symposium. Further papers will appear in subsequent issues of the Dossier.

TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
(SCHEVENIENGEN SYMPOSIUM, 25-28 JULY 1979)

REPORT ON THE SYMPOSIUM

Chairman: Wilbert K. Chagula
Vice-chairman: Luis Matos Azocar
Rapporteur: Rajni Kothari

PERSPECTIVE

The Symposium, which was held at the initiative of the United Nations Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, organized by the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA), hosted by the Netherlands Government and attended by concerned representatives of the

1/ This is a report on the Scheveningen Symposium, the participants in which entrusted Rajni Kothari with the task of being its Rapporteur. Its aim, as understood by the participants, is to present the Rapporteur's own perception of the breadth and depth of the discussion at the Symposium and of the main points emerging therefrom. The report reflects the wide-ranging character of the agenda proposed to the Symposium by the IFDA secretariat (Annex I), the contributions of the resource persons whose introductions to and summaries of the respective agenda items constituted the backbone of the debate, and comments and suggestions received from some other participants. Yet it remains essentially the Rapporteur's report and does not purport to represent a consensus of all participants on every issue discussed. Moreover, it should be noted that most participants intervened in a personal capacity, without committing the governments or institutions to which they belong; the latter are mentioned in the list of participants (Annex II) only for the purpose of facilitating identification.

2/ In cooperation with Béat Alexander Jenny and Michael Zammit-Cutajar.
governmental, inter-governmental and extra-governmental sectors, had before it a critical and timely, even if difficult and ambitious, task. Frankly admitting that the national and international development strategies pursued in the first two development decades had led to an "absence of development and the prevalence of mal-development in many parts of the world", the agenda notes prepared by the Symposium secretariat recognized that

"the present political context is very different from that of ten years ago. Traditional options for action are foreclosed by failures of the past; the attitudes of governments and other actors have hardened, and it is now much more difficult to mobilize political forces in favour of development. This situation calls for much greater responsibility and for more statesmanship on the part of the inter-governmental community. It calls for bolder solutions in terms of both substance and political process, if we truly wish to avoid the now obvious road to more gloom, misery and wastage - the road to an unprecedented global crisis that may take its cruel toll in all parts of the world".

Discussion at the Symposium confirmed this perspective. It underscored the point that the search for a new development strategy for the 1980s and beyond - both national and international, both for the South and for the North - had to be pursued against the background of a drastically altered world situation and a new global human problématique. This problématique is rooted in a number of interrelated phenomena. Among these are:

- the pervasive dualism of the world along the North-South axis;
- a fundamental disequilibrium in the world economy arising out of underlying structural maladjustments and affecting all regions of the world;
- a state of instability in the world political process arising from continuing asymmetry between the world's regions, together with a growing challenge from less-privileged regions to the centres of economic and political power and intensifying pressures for a new international order;
- enveloping all other sources of conflict, the conflict over resources and lifestyles, with the North wanting to preserve and even enhance its standard of living, and the South wanting to achieve minimum living standards for which it would need access to resources and institutions - many of which are located in the South - over which the North has acquired control and hegemony;
penetration into the Third World of the alien lifestyles of the industrially-advanced societies and their concomitant structures of production and technology, producing in its wake a structural crisis, growing disenchantment among the people with their elites and new sources of conflict within and between Third World countries;

new dimensions in the increasing militarization of the world political process with (a) some countries of the North responding to the perceived threat from the South to their economic and political power and their lifestyles by new doctrines of military hegemony and pre-emptive warfare against the Third World, and (b) the élites in many countries of the South making up for their economic and political failure by resorting to military aggrandisement which, incidentally, can also be used for repressive measures at home - the two aspects together making for an endemic state of insecurity at all levels, and a complete distortion of the development process;

as a result of these various phenomena, a growing confrontation waged in defence of the global status quo, at both national and international levels, but essentially triggered by policies pursued by major Northern powers against the South through protectionism, resource diplomacy, doctrines of 'defence' against the Third World, and attempts to sow the seeds of fragmentation in the Third World through aggressive salesmanship of military hardware, technology and models of lifestyle and development;

fragmentation and turmoil in the Third World arising out of mass awakening and frequent shifts and turnover of élites.

The Symposium considered the formulation of a new international development strategy against this broad historical and geopolitical context. It was realized that this was not an easy task. For such a strategy has to reckon with the reality of a deeply divided world, and the threat of an inimical confrontation born out of despair that is likely to emerge from the failure of the Western paradigm, the disequilibrium in the world economy and the general defensiveness of the global establishment. Seen in this light, the strategy that is called for, if it has to have any chance of success, cannot follow the lines defined - mostly by economists - during the last 20 or 25 years; it must be an essentially political mechanism, involving a major intervention in the historical process to halt and reverse the trends underway on the basis of a completely new approach to the development process.
Alongside a feeling of disillusion at the past record, there was a recognition of an impasse in North-South negotiations and also a widely felt scepticism about the present capacity of the United Nations system, and of a United Nations "strategy" conceived in the conventional framework, to deliver the goods.

This sentiment was expressed at two levels of consideration:

First, the actual Western stance of resistance to any major proposal for change in the present structure of North-South arrangements, the preoccupation of the socialist segment of the North with short-term conflicts bearing on East-West rivalry and its tendency to disclaim responsibility for major sources of inequity and disparities in the world, go largely unchallenged at the present time and thus vitiate the effectiveness of the United Nations as a negotiating instrument.

Second, it may in any case be unrealistic to expect the United Nations system to carry the whole burden of the agenda facing humanity, asking it to undertake tasks that ought first to be undertaken within individual societies in the North and in the South, by Third World countries working collectively and enhancing their effectiveness at regional and global levels - seizing control of their own destinies at the international level as they had done in the past at the national level - and by the forces of change everywhere engaging in structural transformation and promoting local, national and collective self-reliance. Lacking such transformation and its outward reach to the international order through determined intervention in the global political process, it is futile to expect to make the strategy an instrument of structural change and reconstruction.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: REDEFINING DEVELOPMENT

The strategy for the second development decade has failed not only as regards the implementation of its targets and policy measures and its lack of operational coherence and power to
compel compliance from the various actors; it also suffers from conceptual inadequacies in its basic premises. This point was stressed by the Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation of the United Nations, who said that, underlying that strategy, there had been an unrealistic conception of the world economy according to which growth in the industrialized countries was more or less automatically transmitted to Third World countries through the mechanisms of trade, technology transfer and development finance. Most Third World countries themselves seem to have paid less than adequate attention to the need for qualitative and structural changes in their societies, preferring to rely on the logic of the GNP model whereby a certain course of growth and expansion would necessarily raise production and hence also living standards. In point of fact, the very pursuit of such strategies has increased imbalances, disparities and absolute as well as relative poverty in the world.

There was general recognition, too, that just as the strategy itself had not worked, so had there been little progress in restructuring the existing international order. The present rules of the game - particularly the trade, financial and monetary systems - continue to maintain the historical pattern of Northern command over the resources of the Third World and ensure a disproportionately large consumption of the world's resources by industrialized countries.

Indeed, in the absence of restructuring, the development strategy has failed to bring about the stipulated qualitative and structural changes in the society which were expected to accompany economic growth and, conversely, because the strategy lacked a clear conceptual guidance in respect of qualitative and structural change, it has failed to bring about the necessary redistribution of economic and political power and consequent changes in the international order. It is not surprising, therefore, that international discussion over the past few years (certainly
since the events of 1973) has focussed on the need to restructure the international order, as embodied in the concept of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). There was broad agreement that this concept encompasses both economic and political dimensions and that it implies a redefinition of the development process.

The Symposium dwelt at some length on this matter of redefining the concept of development and re-assessing the development problématique. Aside from stressing the need to move away from aggregate growth as an end in itself and to reject the assumption of some automatic transmission of growth and expansion to all regions of the world and all classes of people, four other aspects were emphasized as necessary ingredients of a new development strategy.

The political process

Stress was laid on the need to explicitly recognize the inter-linkage between development and the political process. The current notion of "interdependence" in fact entails highly asymmetric relationships between the South and the North, corresponding to the imbalances in relative influence and bargaining power. This underscores the prior necessity of restructuring the international political and decision-making system, as an end in itself, but more particularly as a means to a more equitable and just development process. And the same necessity applies to restructuring the domestic social and political orders. Without decentralization and participation of large sections of the people and of suppressed and exploited regions of the world, it is not going to be possible, merely through directives and exhortations from above, to restructure the socio-economic order; this is basically a political task.
Demilitarization

Closely related to this political aspect is the military-strategic dimension. Most of the discussion on development, or even on science and technology, has on the whole avoided the issue of militarization. Militarization has become not just a drag on the development process but, in a very basic way, an instrument for the maintenance of dependence/dominance relationships, and a means of co-opting new secondary centres of power and involving them in a wider sub-militarization process to which Third World élites have tended to succumb. This process is eating into the very fabric of development and, unless demilitarization is perceived as a development objective and built into the body of the development strategy, the achievement either of medium term development targets or of the larger goal of restructuring the international order will prove very difficult.

Culture

No less important is the cultural context of the development process. Development is not merely an economic and political concept; it is more fundamentally a process of culture and civilization. This insight has dawned on development thinkers and planners in recent years, especially in the Third World. The search for modernization and a homogeneous process of development over the last two decades has been accompanied by an erosion of cultural identities—a process which is in some ways much more corrosive of political integrity and independence, as well as of confidence and self-regard, than either political colonialism or economic neo-colonialism. However, this is not just a question of a confrontation of values between the North and the South; it is rather that the world needs cultural alternatives to the dominant Western paradigm of development. This need has acquired added force from the incipient erosion of the cultural backdrop and integrity of the North itself. The sweep and momentum generated by a highly technocratic and technology-oriented
model of development is undermining the individual, undermining group identities, and undermining the wholeness of self-definition of entire civilizations - hence the reassertion of the religious, spiritual and aesthetic components of being, in all parts of the world, and the widely felt need for providing the concept of development with new and different cultural roots by drawing upon alternative civilizational modes.

Sustainability

Related to the cultural context are those aspects of development usually described as environmental or ecological, but which lie at the very heart of human survival and are best considered in terms of the notion of a sustained and sustainable development process. Current mechanisms of development are not only impairing the harmony between man and nature, but are undermining the productive process itself. As was mentioned repeatedly, there are tendencies at work which are likely to erode the balance between man, nature and technology, and in turn make it impossible to maintain a process of development that could be sustainable over time. Even in the North - in the so-called food baskets of the world - there are indications that imprudent recourse to technological inputs, unless reversed, will greatly contribute by the end of the century to a major soil erosion, leading to diminishing marginal productivity of land and reducing production capacities. The tropical regions of the world face even greater danger given their much greater vulnerability. Technology-induced development, therefore, has to be replaced by an alternative process of development based on sustainability and restraint - a process that is planned less by experts than by the people themselves, drawing upon their local environment and their diverse and almost infinite possibilities. Such a model of development is better adapted to deal with problems of poverty and maldevelopment and inequities all around the world. As regards the prospects of growth and productivity, there was no pessimism at the Symposium: rather, there was a recognition of
the need for turning away from the dominant Western model of
development based on rapacious technology to one that drew con-
tinued sustenance and power from various ecosystems and the laws
of nature - both in the North and in the South.

THRUST OF THE NEW STRATEGY

The basic thrust of the new approach came from an alternative
conception of development which gives due regard to political
and cultural factors - as well as to alternative attitudes and
values. It was stressed, for instance, that there can be no
real autonomy or self-reliance without a measure of self-
control. And unless there is restraint on the degree of compe-
tition, acquisitiveness and greed accompanying development,
societies will always be subject to external forces. Similarly,
unless some notion of restraint and even sacrifice is built into
the thinking on development, the objective of collective self-
reliance among Third World countries that are at different vant-
age points in their command over resources and skills will never
be realized.

As regards the countries of the North which are materially better
off than those of the South, it should be remembered that this
difference is to no small extent due to the processes of colonia-
lism and exploitation. In a fundamental sense, however, the
exploiters themselves are no less victims of the process than
the exploited, because they are the encapsulated prisoners of a
pervasive culture giving rise to acute maldevelopment.

This maldevelopment is characterized by waste of resources,
degradation of the environment, institutionalized consumerism,
total dependence on external sources of life support, growing
unemployment and recession, persistence of substantial pockets
of poverty and a deep crisis of values and cultural identity.
This is a structural phenomenon, rooted in the processes of
industrialization and societal organization which have been
pursued in the North. Its eradication calls for structural remedies; it must be recognized in the North that a policy of "more of the same" cannot lead the way out of an impasse.

A global strategy against a global crisis

There is thus a crisis in the North, which is no less basic than that in the South. And therefore the new development strategy should be a global strategy which is addressed to the South, the North and the institutions and processes that relate the two. The strategy should encompass what is basically wrong with the North, as with the South, as well as the relationship between the maldevelopment in the North and the inadequate, unjust and unbalanced development patterns in the South - phenomena which incidentally provide the context for the universal revolt of the younger generation and its alienation, cutting across both North and South. The new development strategy must relate itself to this large global context of structural and cultural change.

As regards the relationship of commitments to be undertaken in the context of the new strategy by Third World and industrialized countries, respectively, policy prescriptions must be addressed to both industrialized and Third World countries. Such prescriptions could relate to a variety of desiderata and could include, in particular, measures to ensure a constant increase in the well-being of the entire population. This approach would not require that the commitments of industrialized and Third World countries should be conditional upon each other: one can achieve balance without symmetry. Still less would it mean that the goals and objectives of the strategy should be anything other than the shared goals and shared objectives of the entire international community, consistent with the spirit of internationalism and universal responsibility that underlies the United Nations Charter itself.

The strategic objective

The Symposium deliberately focussed on the larger historical
perspective and on the goals and objectives of development that should inspire the new international development strategy. It was felt that this focus has been generally lacking in deliberations on the strategy and on specific policy measures. And yet, without clarity on these basic matters a "strategy" would either remain a pious declaration of intent or get distorted in the course of its implementation, or both. This is precisely what has happened in the past. On the other hand, such an approach and method as were advanced in the Symposium would not only highlight the basic thrust of the strategy but also define its policy content.

Thus, in summary, there emerged from the Symposium a succinct formulation, radically different from previous ones, of the goals and objectives of a new international development strategy: the primary objective, according to this formulation, is to manifest the firm commitment of all the members of the international community to promote genuine development of Third World countries and arrest the maldevelopment of both Third World and industrialized countries. In order to remove the obstacles to the attainment of this objective, structural changes must be pursued at both domestic and international levels, the latter within the broad framework of the New International Economic Order and the negotiating processes aimed at its advancement, on the basis of collective self-reliance of the Third World and the creation of an international environment conducive to alternative processes of development in both the North and the South.

FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY

The discussion at the Symposium brought forth the basic policy implications of such a strategy.

Collective global responsibility

First, a strategy for development along these lines has to be global in scope, that is to say, it should be simultaneously
pursued at domestic (local and national), regional and international levels, in both the South and the North. The development strategy must be conceived as a collective responsibility of the entire international community and as involving a constantly interactive relationship between industrialized and Third World countries, i.e. between national (including local) development policies pursued by each set of actors, and their international impacts and implications. The development of Third World countries will remain an unfulfilled goal if they remain unable to secure a share of resources commensurate with their development needs, due to unfair competition from industrialized countries. Conversely, Western lifestyles and their demonstration effect on the South must be restrained if maldevelopment is not to become totally globalized.

Accountability

Second, and this follows directly from the first, there is need for a system of international accountability of each state for the impact of its national development, or maldevelopment, on the development of other nations. This again is especially relevant to rich and powerful countries having disproportionate access to, and use of, world resources and pursuing a lifestyle and technology that produces the bulk of environmental hazards for the world. Such a concept of accountability is no less relevant to the richer classes within societies.

Removal of international stumbling blocks

Third, there emerged from this ethical perspective for development an appreciation of the international obstacles to an alternative development strategy. These obstacles are largely institutional in respect of financial transactions, trade barriers, technology transfers and control of communication and information channels. In each of these areas the responsibility and accountability of the industrialized countries must be stressed.
Confrontation/negotiation dialectic

Fourth, implicit in this emphasis on undoing the effects of mal-development, reversing policies that promote global disparities and dependences and creating conditions for collective self-reliance among Third World countries is the question of process: how does one get there? The formulation that emerged in this context was one of a dialectic between confrontation and negotiation. As already indicated, major elements of the North have moved along the path of confrontation by resorting to protectionism, resource diplomacy and doctrines of defensive warfare against the South, as well as through attempts to fragment the South through its sub-militarization. In response, the South is left with no option but to match this confrontation by internationalizing collective self-reliance, engaging in its own version of resource diplomacy and trying to work out new global coalitions of interest that derive strength from divergences of interest within the North and its incipient fragmentation.

Approach to negotiations and time-frame

Within this overall context of confrontation, and indeed as an instrument of global structural transformation (which is also the aim of the confrontation), it should also be possible to enter into negotiations with the North. The principal aim of these negotiations should be to change the rules governing international flows of trade, money, finance and technology. The effective functioning of international institutions dealing with economic transactions should also be demonstrated, and collective self-reliance should emerge as a forceful determinant of the new development strategy. In short, the principal raison d'être of a new international development strategy should be the creation of a new international economic and political order.

Bearing in mind that such a strategy may not embody a settlement of all outstanding issues, particularly those relative to the
restructuring of the existing international economic order, it should provide for negotiations on such issues, set out principles to guide these negotiations and establish deadlines for their completion. Such negotiations should be global and integrated in character and be closely meshed with other on-going negotiations; they should concentrate on a range of carefully selected key issues of the North-South dialogue, including energy, and should have a scope which would be so defined as to maximize the impact of the leverage of the Third World and afford mutually advantageous opportunities for trade-offs.

The implementation of key targets as operational components of the new strategy - and hence also of the process of negotiation - may be conceived in the time frame of a decade but only in the form of a dynamic process, with different time frames for different components, and with an in-built and effective mechanism for review and reappraisal, leading to adjustments and correctives whenever the strategy is seen to deflect from the goals and objectives of development for which it was devised. It should be in the form not of a "plan of action" document, devised and adopted at the start of the decade, but rather of a manifesto, which provides the framework of a sustained commitment to, and implementation of, development goals and their operational components, and embodies institutional mechanisms for continuous negotiation, monitoring, appraisal, criticism and modification.

KEY POLICY AND NEGOTIATING TARGETS

The new international development strategy and its framework of negotiations should aim at a few key issues and adopt them as its priority policy and negotiating targets.

1. It should above all aim at two key elements of national self-reliance in the Third World and eradicate the obstacles facing them: sustainable production of domestic food supplies and endogenous capacities of developing, acquiring and adapting technology.
2. It should provide the concept of development with new and different cultural roots by drawing upon alternative modes of civilization; in particular, it should push forward the eradication of illiteracy and racism, and should move toward a fully worked out code of conduct on control of international mass media and information networks.

3. It should incorporate demilitarization as a development objective and should initiate moves toward a step-wise and time-bound programme of disarmament and demilitarization, for without progress on this front progress on economic and political aspects of development, the environment, the achievement of collective self-reliance and transformation towards the NIEO will always remain problematic.

4. It should pay much greater attention to the present waste and maldistribution of development resources — especially food, technology and energy — and should aim at effective means to increase the command of Third World countries over such resources.

5. It should aim at full participation by the Third World in the management of all global commons which are outside the scope of national sovereignty over resources, all of them to be dealt with under the comprehensive framework of the "common heritage of mankind" at the present historical juncture.

6. Within the context of the policy priorities outlined above, the strategy should promote negotiations — made meaningful by the increased collective countervailing power of the Third World — to complete the unfinished agenda of UNCTAD V: namely, to establish a restructured international framework for trade, monetary and financial cooperation which should accommodate the different economic and social systems and patterns of development prevalent in the world community and which would be based upon institutionalized democratic processes of consultation and decision-making. This framework should include:
international measures to regulate the activities of transnational corporations in the fields of trade, money, finance and technology, including effective codes of conduct, backed up by comprehensive national legislation in both home and host countries;

a trading system which makes room for the growing industrial capacity of the Third World and which also provides a sound base for the world commodity economy;

a monetary system which ensures greater stability, helps to control inflation, provides for better and more equitable methods of creating and distributing reserves and of adjusting to both deficits and surpluses, and promotes resource flows to the Third World;

a system of financial transfers for development based increasingly on automaticity and operating according to universally acceptable and socially responsible criteria, as is the case within nations;

as part of the latter, a system of international taxation, which should be universal, progressive and start at low rates, and which could be initially applied to the use of the global commons and also levied on internationally undesirable activities, e.g. arms expenditure or trade, pollution, accumulation of destabilizing exchange reserves.

MEANS FOR ACTION

There is, finally, the key question: how does one ensure effective action to implement the new strategy, and the goals and objectives which it is designed to serve? And how can an international development strategy be "new" while the political context of the world and the various relationships between regions, in international institutions, within nations, and in respect of goal-setting by governments continues to be "old"?
Nothing by way of fundamental change by and for the people of all countries can be expected without struggle, without a bold application of levers of power and collective bargaining, and without setting bold targets and going after them within the stipulated time.

Collectively, the Third World is capable of applying such levers and setting such targets which, even if they seem unrealistic today, can be made effective and indeed inevitable by the end of the decade - if only the necessary commitment and resilience were forthcoming in particular from the leaders of the Third World, informed by a courage of conviction and vision of the future, and liberated from conventional thinking on development.

Moreover, this leverage and pressure can be complemented by building relevant linkages between foci of interest and power that could engage others outside the Third World in the collective effort for global change. The more powerful actors in the North interested in preserving the status quo have for some time now been talking of a process of "differentiation" in the South and making it a basis for impairing the solidarity of the South and for co-opting important Third World centres into the global power structure. In reality, however, the real differentiation that is taking place is in the North, largely under the impact of Third World pressures but also independently thereof, and often on the basis of genuine ethical considerations. The conciliatory negotiating posture of the "like-minded" countries towards the South, the growing conflict of interest within the "trilateral club" itself, the increasing pressure on some of the Western governments from domestic intellectual and political movements in their regions (anti-nuclear, anti-military, secessionist), and the growing salience of various grass-root movements aiming at alternative patterns of development and lifestyles in the context of the growing maldevelopment crisis and the "energy crunch" show the vitality of forces of change in the North, while also providing elements of differentiation from
which new North-South coalitions can emerge.

The potentially strongest allies of the Third World in the confrontation with the international structures of Northern economic power are the Northern working classes and their labour unions. But most of these are presently conservative and immobilized by fears of declining employment. Although it has been demonstrated in several industrialized countries that increased trade with the Third World has been creating jobs at home, imports from the Third World, as well as immigration, loom large - even if irrationally - in these fears. These could be allayed through democratically planned industrial adjustment.

Moreover, if the labour unions of the North were to relax their defensive postures, they could explore the vast possibilities of common action together with Third World unions, for example, within the transnational corporate system. Whereas at present individual corporations are able to play off against each other the interests of unions in their different host countries and in their home country, a common front among all these could reverse the balance of power and benefit the workers in all the countries involved.

The need was expressed for mass political conscientization at the national level, both in the North and the South, to generate increased awareness of maldevelopment and to stimulate positive action. The new strategy itself should become an important instrument of such political education.

Finally, in the struggle for global structural change, a number of allies could eventually emerge even among the more powerful actors of the North themselves, who may finally understand that genuine and accelerated development of the Third World could indeed be in their own interest. For instance, proposals of massive transfer of development resources from the North to the South (which have been discussed from time to time) could - if launched and implemented prudently so as to avoid the pitfalls
of maldevelopment - make the South into a healthy and indispensable engine of growth for the world economy, on which the prosperity of many powerful countries in the North depends so much.

How could the "North-South dialogue" be led into a new, more productive and truly cooperative phase? The major effort for change in international cooperation will have to come from the countries seeking change, that is essentially from the Third World. Collectively, the Third World is capable of overcoming the current weaknesses of the United Nations system by making it part of a renewed approach to negotiations from positions of strength. However, the negotiating positions of the Third World have in the past been weakened by internal policy divergencies and by doubts about the objectives of many negotiations. Effective South-South negotiations should therefore be initiated as necessary preparations for stronger Third World participation in negotiations with industrialized countries. A useful complementary step would be the creation of a Third World supporting team for policy analysis and preparation of effective negotiations.

Collective strength in negotiations is dependent on the commitment to them of individual governments. In order to carry full conviction, Third World governments must recognize their multilateral diplomacy as a genuinely important part of their overall development effort - perhaps signalling this by appointing a cabinet minister for multilateral affairs - and insert their international concerns into their domestic political processes, so that the impact of the international order on people's daily lives and welfare may be understood by all and the efforts to change it will attract the support of the masses.

Renewed strength of the Third World may bring about positive changes in negotiating styles and performances; above all, it could convince the international community that there is indeed a shared need, which must be met, among the people of both industrialized and Third World countries for structural changes in the present international order.
Third World countries, acting collectively, can exercise "negative" leverage by withholding access to their resources, their markets, their finance and their labour. In other words, they can use the strike weapon against the North (or parts of it). The present international economic crisis may provide them with opportunities to do so. For instance, until they are reasonably satisfied that progress is being made at the negotiating table, Third World countries could withhold payments, including the servicing of debts, walk out of the IMF, respond with their own counter-measures to Northern protectionism, withhold support for transport and tourism. In exercise of "positive" leverage, they could organize purchasing consortia (rather than undergo bilateral Northern salesmanship); they could buy their way into private corporations, both national and transnational, to establish control of key sectors directly affecting their own economic interests (including banking, engineering, commodity trading, transport).

* * *

All these elements provide a scenario of considerable potential for all-round mobilization for structural change at both domestic and international levels. It is a scenario of coalition-building between progressive governments and progressive movements in both the North and the South, as well as elements in the United Nations system, who are convinced of both the necessity and the inevitability of structural change in the international order. As the Symposium drew to a close, the conviction had clearly emerged in the minds of a large number of participants that without building such leverages and new coalitions of collective power, and without bringing grass-root and intellectual pressures to bear upon the prevailing order, the new development strategy for the 1980s and beyond would fail to make any significant dent in the present international order - a necessary pre-requisite for a new era of development and for any hope for a human and just world, indeed for survival itself.
AGENDA

1. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT: ISSUES AND OVERVIEW

Limits and opportunities of the present geo-political situation; heterogeneity and "differentiation" of the Third World; the state of play in North/South relations after UNCTAD V.
(Resource persons: F.H. Cardoso; S. Mendlovitz)

2. WHAT DEVELOPMENT?

Objectives: the need for effective response to increasing problems of maldevelopment both in the North and in the South.
Ways and means: participation of social actors in the development process; structural transformations.
Identification of international stumbling blocks.
(Resource persons: I.S. Abdalla; Ch. Jeanncret-Grosjean)

3. RENEWING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Positive and negative aspects of North/South interdependence; international cooperation in support of self-reliant development. (Resource person: I. Sachs)
Identification of positive international measures to overcome the stumbling blocks, in particular with regard to the following key global issues:
- resources, food, global commons, industrialization and technology; (Resource persons: M. Baqai; M.F. Strong)
- trade, money, mobilization and transfer of financial resources; (Resource persons: G. Gunatilleke; J.F. Rweyemamu)
- culture and communication. (Resource person: J. Ki-Zerbo)

4. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Summary of key issues and their ramifications in national development, international cooperation and the New International Development Strategy.

Suggestions with regard to objectives, measures, commitments and timetable for their implementation.
TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
(SCHEVENINGEN SYMPOSIUM, 25-28 JULY 1979)

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MARINE RESOURCES, OCEAN MANAGEMENT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

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Abstract: For a variety of reasons, marine resources and ocean management have been neglected by the planners for a new development strategy. In view of recent technological developments, however, these resources could make a significant contribution to development. At this particular historic juncture, furthermore, the institutions required for effective ocean management could constitute break-through points for the building of a new international order.

The paper examines some of the areas where the integration of planning for land uses and planning for water uses, based on sound principles of water management, would benefit both land-based and marine-based development: aquaculture as complementary to agriculture, mineral mining, energy production, the development and transfer of technology, regional cooperation, the establishment of international systems of taxation.

The fundamental new principle on which the new order in the seas is based, is the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind. Its expansion to other areas such as outer space and its resources, the resources of Antarctica, and a growing number of other resources and technologies will be crucial for the building of a new international economic order.

(NB: This paper was prepared under the auspices of the International Ocean Institute, Malta, which plans to publish the technical annexes.)

LES RESSOURCES DE LA MER, LA GESTION DE L'OCEAN ET LA NOUVELLE STRATEGIE INTERNATIONALE DE DEVELOPPEMENT

Résumé: Pour diverses raisons, les ressources de la mer et la gestion de l'océan ont été négligées par les planificateurs d'une nouvelle stratégie de développement. De récents progrès techniques, cependant, font que ces
Resouces pourraient contribuer au développement de manière significative. En outre, à ce stade de l'histoire, les institutions qu'exige une gestion effective de l'Océan pourraient marquer un tournant vers l'établissement d'un nouvel ordre international.

Cet article examine quelques-uns des domaines où l'intégration de l'aménagement du territoire et l'aménagement des eaux, sur la base de principes sains de gestion des eaux, serait utile à la mise en valeur marine: l'aquaculture comme complément de l'agriculture, l'extraction minière, la production d'énergie, le développement et le transfert des techniques, la coopération régionale, la mise sur pied d'un système international de taxation.

Le nouveau principe fondamental sur lequel repose le nouvel ordre de la mer est le principe du Patrimoine commun de l'humanité. Son extension à d'autres domaines, par exemple l'espace extra-terrestre et ses ressources, l'Antarctique et un nombre croissant d'autres ressources et techniques, seront cruciaux pour l'établissement du nouvel ordre international.

LOS RECURSOS DEL MAR, LA GESTION DEL OCEANO Y LA NUEVA ESTRATEGIA DE DESARROLLO INTERNACIONAL

Resumen: Por varias razones, los recursos del mar y la gestión del océano han sido problemas tratados con cierta negligencia por los planificadores de la nueva estrategia de desarrollo. Sin embargo, nuevos adelantos técnicos posibilitan de manera significativa la contribución que pueden hacer estos recursos al desarrollo. Además en esta fase de la historia, las instituciones necesarias para la gestión eficaz del océano pueden servir como puntos de cambio para el establecimiento de un nuevo orden económico internacional.

Este informe examina algunos campos en donde la integración de la planificación para el uso de terrenos y de las aguas se basa en principios sano de la gestión de las aguas, sería útil por el desarrollo territorial tanto como por el marino. La aquacultura como complemento de la agricultura, la explotación de minas, la producción de energía y el desarrollo del traslado de técnicas, la cooperación regional y el establecimiento de un sistema internacional de impuestos.

El nuevo principio fundamental sobre el cual se basa el nuevo orden de los mares es el principio de la patrimonio común de la humanidad. Su extensión a otros dominios, por ejemplo al espacio extra terrestre y a sus recursos, al Antártico y a un número creciente de otros recursos y otras técnicas, sería imprescindible para el establecimiento del nuevo orden económico internacional.
Introduction

It is remarkable that despite the broad approach and long-term goals set out in the United Nations resolutions and reports on which the preparatory work for the new international development strategy is based, references to ocean space -- the surface of the sea, the water column, the seabed and its subsoil -- are sparse in connection with the strategy. In the forums where this strategy is debated, ocean space and activities in the marine environment are seldom seen as having more than marginal relevance either to the formulation of an international development strategy or to the goals of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

This relative lack of attention may be due to several factors: failure to understand the implications of the extension to ocean space of the modern technological revolution; compartmentalization and specialization of national and international bureaucracies; and, finally, the fact that activities in ocean space and their regulation are often perceived as being potentially divisive issues by both Third World and industrialized countries.

Yet it can be asserted with only slight exaggeration that there can be no global development strategy which does not incorporate ocean space, covering more than two-thirds of our planet and rich in living and nonliving resources. Marine resources and ocean management are an essential component of a new international development strategy and of the NIEO for three main reasons:

1. Ocean space resources can make a major contribution to development which must be fully utilized;

2. The relative flexibility of State practice, law and custom relating to these resources provides a realistic opportunity to develop in ocean space new forms of international cooperation and institutions of economic management which could serve as models for the management of land-based or land-and-sea-based activities (e.g., the management of energy);

3. If this unique opportunity to implement the principle of equity and a more equitable distribution of resources at the international level is not seized, a new form of imperialism will arise in the seas.

Any effort to integrate ocean management in the international development strategy must take into account the nature of the marine environment and its resources, the emerging law of the sea as developed by the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the present pattern of United Nations system activities dealing with marine affairs.

**Marine environment:** Ocean space is an ecological whole: fish migrate, water masses move from one pole to the other; pollution does not recognize national boundaries; water and atmosphere interact, influencing the world's climates; land uses interact with water uses, and different uses of the seas interact and compete with one another. The contribution of ocean space resources to the world economy consists, at present, above all in hydrocarbons and fish and in providing a medium for navigation and sea-borne trade. The situation, however, is changing rapidly because advancing technology is making possible the intensive exploitation of ocean space resources and the use of the seas for an increasing variety of purposes. It is entirely possible that before the end of the century the incredibly vast resources of ocean space will have begun to be exploited on a scale comparable to that of land-based resources.

**UNCLOS:** The emerging law of the sea as reflected in the work of UNCLOS represents a major change in the legal framework within which man's activities in ocean space are undertaken. On the one hand, national jurisdiction in the marine environment expands enormously. While bringing actual or potential benefits to some developing coastal States, this change basically reinforces the status quo and dangerously threatens to aggravate inequalities between States. Beyond the still uncertain limits of national jurisdiction, the surface and water column of the oceans remain under the traditional regime of freedom of the high seas, which always has been the freedom of the stronger. The seabed, on the other hand, acquires the new status of an area under the regime of the Common Heritage of Mankind.

**UN activities:** Developments in the law of the sea in turn necessarily affect the present pattern of activities of the United Nations system. On the one hand it becomes urgent to eliminate the overlaps and the sectoral approach of many of these activities to marine affairs through improved coordination. On the other hand, the United Nations system for the first time acquires the competence to manage substantial resources through the creation of the International Seabed Authority.

Thus the policies required to integrate marine resources and ocean management into international development strategy far exceed the scope of the present Law of the Sea Conference. They involve an expansion of the revolutionary concept of Common Heritage, a rethinking and development of the role of the United Nations system, and greatly increased efforts in scientific research and in the development and transfer of technologies which can provide Third World countries with a key to the intensive exploitation, management, and preservation of ocean space.

**Fisheries, aquaculture and water management**

Although the living resources of the sea are a very important source of food to many poor countries, they contribute only very little (never more than 2-3 percent) to the satisfaction of the world's protein requirements. Moreover, catches have stabilized and we may be approaching maximum sustainable yields of most commercially significant stocks under present conditions of exploitation. Science and technology, however, are transforming the fish-
ery industry. With proper management methods within the wider perspective of food production and distribution, aquatic living resources could make a major contribution to international development strategy. Production could be multiplied tenfold or more during the next twenty-five years if due consideration were given to

1. the development of nonconventional and underused resources such as Antarctic krill, which should be declared to be a Common Heritage of Mankind, as well as squid, lantern fish, etc.;

2. the systematic development of aquaculture, that is, the farming of seaweeds, molluscs, crustaceans and fin fish in fresh, brackish, and sea water;

3. improved processing and conservation methods, avoiding waste and spoilage;

4. increased processing for direct human consumption rather than for fishmeal and cattle feed;

5. reversal of the direction of trade flows from South to North so that aquatic resources can be increasingly used for the satisfaction of the nutritional needs of poor countries.

Modern aquaculture is based on scientific research and technology. It also constitutes a link between capture fisheries -- with capture becoming merely a phase of culture -- and agriculture. The matrix, common to agriculture and aquaculture is water management, that is, the conservation and development of rivers, lakes, canals, ponds, reservoirs, and sea water.

The oceans contain more than 97 percent of the world's water. Expanding populations and economic development require enormous quantities of water which natural rainfall, rivers and lakes are often unable to supply. Coastal Third World countries may increasingly find that desalination of sea water, already increasing worldwide at an annual rate of 30 percent, may become in some cases the most practical source of water required by their expanding industries and agriculture, particularly when desalination is combined with utilization of the extracted salts and minerals. Virtually all known elements are dissolved in sea water, but only a few -- sodium chloride (salt), bromine, magnesium, potassium and calcium compounds and heavy water -- are, at this time, commercially extracted. The commercial recovery of additional minerals from sea water will depend on technological advance and market conditions. It is known, however, that some marine organisms and plants can concentrate in their bodies trace elements in sea water by a factor of 10,000 to 100,000. The cultivation and harvesting of such organisms could provide before the end of the century a way of concentrating uranium and certain other trace elements dissolved in sea water to the point where they can become economically recoverable. Thus we may see the development of an interesting synthesis between marine farming and marine mining.

The development strategy should appropriately expand the concept of water conservation and management to include sea water. The vital role of water and water management in all aspects of development must be comprehensively taken into account and stressed, as suggested by the 1977 United Nations Water Conference. This would facilitate the integration of land
and water uses as a major factor in the development of agriculture, industrialization, including the production of hydro-electric power, and aquaculture, including fisheries. It would have a beneficial impact in many other fields, from improved health to improved inland navigation.

Seabed mining

Ocean space, both within and outside national jurisdiction, is a vast storehouse of minerals and of abundant energy. In money terms, hydrocarbons are at present by far the most valuable resource recovered from ocean space. Present production, entirely in areas under coastal State jurisdiction, is between 15 and 20 percent of world hydrocarbon output and is expanding rapidly. It is believed that approximately 50 percent of ultimately recoverable hydrocarbon resources are located in ocean space.

However, the present focus of international negotiations concerning seabed mining is on manganese nodules, from which nickel, copper, cobalt, and perhaps other metals, besides manganese, can be extracted. The commercial exploitation of the vast deposits of the abyss beyond national jurisdiction will become a reality by the middle of the 1980s. There may be delays, due to the depression of the metal market, but, taking into consideration also strategic considerations, it is clear that this development cannot be stopped. It will have a significant impact on industry, on world prices of some minerals, and on the economies of some Third World countries.

The place of seabed mining, i.e., the mining and processing of manganese nodules, in the development strategy is controversial.

In 1970 the United Nations General Assembly declared the seabed and its resources beyond national jurisdiction a Common Heritage of Mankind and UNCLOS has proposed the creation of an International Seabed Authority ("the Authority") to administer the mineral resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction ("the Area") in the name, and for the benefit, of mankind. Ideally, the Authority could become a part of, and perhaps a model for, the institutional framework of the New International Economic Order.

It has been observed, however, that (a) seabed mining will compete with land-based production of the categories of minerals contained in manganese nodules and therefore will adversely affect the export earnings of some Third World countries; (b) the sophisticated, capital-intensive technologies required for seabed mining are, and are likely to remain for the foreseeable future, the monopoly of a few industrialized countries; (c) Third World countries have priorities which are far more urgent than seabed mining; (d) the income of the future Authority, as presently conceived, will be too small to bring significant financial benefits to Third World countries.

Although these points may be valid to some extent, it is vital to include seabed mining in the development strategy for the coming decade and to assure the full participation of developing countries, first because of the increasing impact which it will have on patterns of trade, prices of minerals and industrial development; secondly, because the effective exclusion of Third World countries from seabed mining would result in their exclusion from an aspect of the technological revolution which is propelling the industrial-
The system of exploitation of manganese nodule deposits is one of the main unresolved issues at UNCLOS. Most of the industrialized countries initially preferred a licensing system, while most of the Third World countries preferred that exploitation should be undertaken by the Authority through a monopolistic Enterprise. Three years ago it was tentatively and conditionally agreed that, as a compromise, a parallel system of exploitation should be instituted under which the Authority through the Enterprise would exploit half the Area directly while the other half would be exploited by States or private companies under license or contract from the Authority. Negotiations on important aspects of the parallel system have encountered serious difficulties, and several States have suggested that a "unitary joint venture system" would be preferable. In such a system, the Enterprise and contractors (State or private) would enter into joint ventures with each other in their respective areas. The most recent, and perhaps most practical suggestion in this connection (made by the Netherlands at the 1979 Spring session of UNCLOS) would give the Enterprise the option of entering into a joint venture with any contractor in the area open to States and private companies ("nonreserved area"). If the Enterprise exercises this option, the contractor, in turn, acquires the corresponding option to enter into a joint venture with the Enterprise in the "reserved area." Participation of the "foreign" party, in each case is limited to 20 percent. The Netherlands' proposal might be amended to provide for an increase of participation over time to 50%, thus replacing a system of concessions by one of true participation. The joint-venture system would have the additional merit of bringing transnational corporation activities under structured, institutionalized, international control.

The foreseeable decline, as a result of seabed mining, in the prices of cobalt, nickel and manganese and perhaps of other metals will adversely affect the export earnings of countries such as Zaire or Zambia, Chile or Indonesia which are now major exporters of these minerals. Compensation may be necessary for a transition period, but this, by itself, would not be conducive to development. Seabed mining may have the positive result of providing a powerful impetus to industrial development and diversification by forcing a diminished reliance on a post-colonial extraction economy which has proved not to be conducive to development. Seabed mining could provide financial resources to activate the process of diversification. Under extremely optimistic assumptions the International Seabed Authority could receive an annual income of U.S.$1.5 billion (more probably one quarter of this figure) by the end of the century. Whatever the actual figure, it is virtually certain that the Authority's revenues could make little impact if they were distributed to Third World countries on a per capita basis. If, on the other hand, these revenues were employed to create a fund for development and diversification for Third World economies, particularly those of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged countries and those most affected by seabed mining, much could be done to assure the Third World a full share of the benefits of the marine revolution.

The Draft Treaty provides that "the Authority shall have the right to

\[\text{Natural text here.}\]
participate in any commodity conference dealing with the categories of minerals produced in the Area." Without such commodity agreements production limitations envisaged for the international seabed area are bound to be ineffective and could undermine the Authority, since commercially exploitable manganese nodule deposits are also found within the new limits of national jurisdiction recommended by UNCLOS. Commodity agreements covering the main minerals found in manganese nodules must therefore become part of the International Development Strategy for the 80s and Beyond.

Full participation by Third-World countries in the activities of the International Seabed Authority thus must be included among the goals of the new international development strategy; for such participation will permit enhanced participation and influence in global economic decisions; facilitate industrial diversification; and accelerate transfer of management skills and training in marine science and technology.

Shipping

Navigation is, together with fisheries, the most ancient use of the marine environment. It is vital to international trade, and it is probably still the most valuable use of the sea in terms of the value of goods transported. Several UN institutions (in particular IMCO and UNCTAD) are concerned with different aspects of navigation. However, more needs to be done to make their activities more effective and the Strategy could promote this by recommending:

1. improved coordination of all United Nations activities relating to shipping and navigation, through designation of a lead-agency and the establishment of an Inter-Agency Advisory and Coordinating Committee comprising all institutions concerned;

2. ratification, by major shipping countries, of the Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, drawn up by UNCTAD, which aims to promote the full participation of Third World countries in liner shipping;

3. establishment of an international licensing system for merchant ships;

4. strengthening of the operational aspects of IMCO activities, including the establishment of an International Sea Service for the training of shipboard personnel and the rendering of public services in the marine environment, including rescue and disaster relief.

Marine science and technology

The contribution of the oceans to the development of Third World countries depends upon scientific research and on the development and wide dissemination of advanced marine technologies. It is astonishing, therefore, that there is scarcely a reference to marine science and technology in the papers and documents of the 1979 United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development.

Marine science and technology are dealt with in the UNCLOS Draft Treaty. Particularly significant are the provisions concerning cooperation between
States, the dissemination of knowledge, the transfer of marine technology, coordination of international programmes in the transfer of marine technologies and the creation of marine scientific and technological centres; the development strategy should endorse these recommendations.

This, however, hardly appears adequate in view of the importance of science and technology in the development process and in the building of a New International Economic Order.

Lack of marine science capability is at the root of the inability of most Third World coastal States to make intensive and rational multi-purpose use of the substantial marine areas which will pass under their jurisdiction as a result of the work of UNCLLOS. The deficiencies are political (governmental appreciation of the importance of marine scientific research is often lacking), financial (very limited funds), material (lack of laboratories, vessels, equipment, etc.) and human (lack of competent personnel with training appropriate to the needs of the country).

External assistance cannot replace national effort. Nevertheless it must be noted that assistance in the field of marine scientific research, from oceanography to fishery research, constitutes a minimal proportion of both bilateral and United Nations system programs of technical cooperation and financial aid.

Marine technology may be defined in general as the body of knowledge and hardware required in order to apply to practical purposes in ocean space the results of scientific investigation. Third World coastal States are probably more immediately interested in the acquisition of marine technologies suited to their needs than in marine science: hence the insistence on the transfer of skills and technology in the UNCLLOS Draft Convention. There is comparatively little exchange and transfer of marine technologies in existing bilateral and regional programs. Within the United Nations system, several organizations are interested in some aspects of marine training and technology transfer. Coordination, however, is not optimal; financial resources are small, and the impact of the present U.N. system activities varies largely in accordance with the funds available and the interest of the organizations concerned. The lack of a coordinated approach to marine technology and training has led to serious imbalances, aggravated by institutional deficiencies in the approach of many Third World coastal States to the use of the marine environment and the exploitation of its resources for economic development. The situation becomes even more serious in the context of the rapid advance of many technologies, some of which could be of supreme importance to these countries.

One of these technologies is ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC), involving the utilization of the difference in temperature between surface and deep water which is particularly marked in tropical areas. Investigations have been proceeding for some time on different methods for economically extracting energy from the seas, and the most immediately promising of these appears to be OTEC. Present work on the subject indicates that OTEC could be proved practical in the next decade and could become a major source of energy and of a number of industrial products before the end of the century.
Marine science and technology comprise a spectrum of sciences and technologies many of which, such as plate tectonics (that is, the theory of the drifting of continents and the genesis of ocean basins, which has a direct bearing on oil exploration), aquaculture, OTEC, ports, etc., have a direct impact on economic development on land. Indeed many ocean space activities are vital parts of systems which comprise both land and sea and encompass national, regional, and global elements. In short, marine science and technology cannot be neglected in the consideration of science and technology for development or in the elaboration of a new international development strategy. The latter should stress the continuum between land and sea and the need to provide for a balanced development of the sciences and technologies required for the most efficient utilization of both sea and land. In this connection the strengthening of national scientific and technological capabilities, often including a restructuring of national institutions, is essential. Equally essential is improved cooperation in the balanced development and exchange of technologies appropriate to the regions concerned. Finally a comprehensive rethinking of the entire United Nations system approach to marine science and technology has become urgent. The rapidly advancing marine sciences and technologies are no longer exotic and marginal to the development process; on the contrary, they have become an essential element of an economic development which must become truly global if the needs of poor countries are to be met. While some of the present programs which have little relevance to development in the foreseeable future could be de-emphasized, the coordination of the whole system must be greatly improved and efforts of the United Nations system in the field of marine technologies, at present fragmented and inadequate, must be substantially strengthened.

Economic Cooperation Among Third World Countries

Global, regional and subregional economic cooperation among Third World countries has been repeatedly stressed in a variety of international forums, both within and outside the United Nations system, and in particular in connection with the strategy of collective self-reliance for development encompassing the restructuring of international economic relations. Seldom, however, are ocean space activities, apart from shipping, mentioned in the pertinent documents, statements and programs.

The UNCLUS Draft Treaty recommends specific forms of cooperation to States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas; cooperation in a variety of matters relating to ocean space is also recommended generally to States by this text. Organizations within the United Nations system undertake a variety of regional, inter-regional and global ocean space programs for Third World countries. Nevertheless certain areas of cooperation with considerable importance for development strategy appear to have been neglected, or are so novel that they could not yet have been duly considered.

One of these is cooperation in the surveillance of the marine areas which are passing under coastal State control and in respect of which coastal States are assuming a number of responsibilities, from management of living resources to control of pollution. The effective implementation of these responsibilities will tax the resources of rich countries and may become an intolerable burden for many poor countries. Organization of surveillance services on a regional basis could offer a useful way of alleviating the burden, which could be further reduced if the multi-purpose po-
potential of modern surveillance and monitoring technology, including satellites, were fully exploited.

Regionalization and multi-purpose use of surveillance and monitoring technology would enhance both land-based and ocean-based development and thus facilitate the integration of ocean space in general development strategy. The inextricable overlapping between "military technologies" and "civilian technologies" in this sector could be utilized to apply multi-purpose surveillance and monitoring systems to the establishment and monitoring of "zones of peace," the creation of which was recommended by the tenth special session of the UN General Assembly.

It is in the context of economic cooperation among developing countries, particularly in the framework of regional economic communities, that many of the problems of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged countries related to the sea, can be solved. The development requirements of these countries are well known: assured access to ports and improved communications — best achieved in regions with customs unions; participation in the exploitation of living and nonliving resources of the exclusive economic zone of neighboring coastal States — best achieved in the context of economic communities and regionally-pooled exclusive economic zones. Here again special emphasis should be given to regional cooperation in water management which would enhance communications (river and canal shipping), agriculture (irrigation), fisheries (with particular emphasis on aquaculture), industrialization, energy, and better provide for the water needs of growing urban populations.

Economic cooperation is equally important for small Third World island States with their need for improved communications and access to regional or world markets. Many of these States have few land-based resources but they have now acquired jurisdictional rights over very large marine areas containing vast and almost unexploited resources. Their development will depend primarily on the full utilization of the potential of the seas. In view of their relatively small populations and lack of human and technical resources, it would appear that this potential can be realized only in a framework of close regional cooperation. The new development strategy could recommend the appropriate re-orientation of national development strategies to this end.

Ocean Development Tax

Third World countries must be enabled to participate fully in the benefits to be derived from marine scientific and technological advance.

Intensive ocean development together with expanding populations and progressively global industrialization must necessarily be accompanied by more stringent environmental protection at the national, regional and global level if irreparable harm to the biosphere, which sustains mankind, is to be avoided. Furthermore, environmental problems must be considered in a broad context: the use of new technologies, the potential effects of which extend over wide areas, require not only further development of international law but also thorough study of the most appropriate forms of international cooperation. In this, also, Third World countries must fully participate.
Substantial expansion of the present United Nations system and bilateral programs relating to ocean space is therefore urgently required. This, however, is difficult under current methods of financing, in view of competition for the limited available funds and the many demands upon United Nations organizations and donor governments in other areas. A new, secure source of funds, which would not be a heavy burden on the world economy or on States, is therefore needed.

Among the many possible proposals which could be made in this respect it is suggested that perhaps the most practical could be the adoption, on the basis of international agreement, of an *Ocean Development Tax*.

Adoption of such a tax was proposed by the International Ocean Institute (Malta) in 1970. As then proposed, a small levy (one percent) would be collected by States on the value of all major uses of ocean space, whether within or outside national jurisdiction. This would apply to commercial fisheries (value of landed catch); hydrocarbon production (wellhead value); shipping (value of cargoes); use of cables (per word); etc. The sums collected by States would be paid to the International Seabed Authority or to other intergovernmental organizations whose major activities are focused on the marine environment, in agreed proportions and for clearly specified purposes.

The idea of some form of international tax is not new. Revenue sharing in the so-called trusteeship zone was proposed by the United States in their Seabed Draft Treaty in 1971. An international tax or payment with regard to seabed minerals (including oil), beyond the limits of the territorial sea, was proposed by Canada in the United Nations Seabed Committee. The UNCLOS Draft Treaty states that "the coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of the nonliving resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles . . . ." At the Seventh Session of UNCLOS, Nepal introduced a proposal for revenue sharing and the establishment of a Common Heritage Fund to be financed in large part through a form of international taxation on offshore oil production. The United Nations Environment Programme has initiated a study on the possibility of introducing an international tax. There are many supporters of a New International Economic Order who advocate forms of international taxation as a means to achieve income redistribution and automaticity of transfers at the international level (cf. the RIO report).

An Ocean Development or Use Tax could be an important tool in development strategy. It could be used to compensate land-locked and geographically disadvantaged countries for their loss of rights in areas of formerly high seas; provide for the automaticity of financial transfers (a goal of development strategy for two decades); assist the International Seabed Authority through its inevitably difficult initial stages; and, last but not least, to provide a secure source of significant funds to international organizations for needed ocean infrastructure (charting, marking of reefs, construction of lighthouses, etc.) and for activities of technical cooperation with and among developing countries.

The adoption of an Ocean Development Tax could be a pilot experiment for the establishment of systems to finance needed international public services in other areas. The new international development strategy should recommend the establishment of a Group of Experts to study the modalities
for the establishment of such a system of payments.

**The Common Heritage of Mankind**

The penetration of ocean space by the technological/industrial revolution has undermined the traditional law of the sea. Neither coastal State sovereignty nor the freedom of the seas -- the two principles on which traditional law of the sea was based -- can solve the problems created by the intensifying exploitation and diversified use of ocean space made possible by modern technology.

Ocean space can no longer remain a global commons. Exercise of recognized authority is a necessary condition of intensive ocean space development, to protect investments, conserve living resources, control marine pollution, reconcile competing uses and, most importantly, to facilitate the participation, as equals, of poor and technologically-less-advanced countries in the coming era of ocean development.

At the same time, the excessive extension of insufficiently constrained coastal State sovereignty over ocean space exacerbates inequalities between States and could hamper vital transnational uses of the marine environment, from navigation to scientific research and pollution abatement.

In 1967 the Government of Malta proposed that the traditional freedom of the high seas should be replaced by the principle that ocean space and its resources beyond national jurisdiction are the Common Heritage of Mankind; initially applied to the seabed, this proposal was expanded in 1971 to embrace the high seas. This concept had five major implications:

(a) the Common Heritage cannot be appropriated: it can be used but not owned;

(b) the Common Heritage requires a system of management in which all users share;

(c) the use of the Common Heritage requires a sharing both of financial benefits and of benefits derived from shared management and technologies, on a basis yet to be specified (the latter two implications -- shared management and benefit sharing -- change the structural relationship between rich and poor countries and the traditional concept of development aid);

(d) the Common Heritage must be used for peaceful purposes only (disarmament implications); and

(e) the Common Heritage must be preserved for future generations (environmental implications).

From ocean space, the concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind may be expanded to other areas. Some legal experts, for instance, now consider outer space and the resources of the moon and other celestial bodies to be a Common Heritage of Mankind. More broadly, many proponents of a New International Economic Order have stressed that the NIEO as a whole must be based on the Common Heritage principle.
The concept of territorial sovereignty over ocean space within national jurisdiction, on the other hand, was to be replaced by the concept of functional sovereignty, i.e., coastal State control over determined uses of ocean space as distinguished from sovereignty over geographic space. Adoption of the concept of functional sovereignty would permit secure accommodation of inclusive and exclusive uses of the sea and the interweaving of national and international jurisdiction within the same territorial space. In an era of increasing economic and technological interdependence and cooperation, the principle of functional sovereignty may be applied to areas other than the oceans.

As a consequence of the introduction of this new legal order in ocean space, Malta proposed that not merely a seabed agency but a balanced international system for ocean space be created with wide powers of administration and resource management beyond national jurisdiction. The purpose of the system was to fill the jurisdictional vacuum in the high seas, to ensure that all States would equitably benefit from the new international order and to deal effectively and flexibly with the problems deriving from intensified ocean use, including environmental protection.

The development of the institutional aspects of the new Law of the Sea is taking a course different from the one proposed by Malta in 1967 and 1971. But the technological and political imperatives which gave rise to the concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, including its institutional implications, remain. A system of ocean space institutions, with operational and managerial capacity, must eventually emerge from a restructuring of the U.N. institutions during the post-UNCLOS period, unless the Common Heritage and the new law of the Sea are to remain dead letter.

The Strategy should stress the importance of the concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind as the basis of a New International Economic Order and should, accordingly, urge its expansion and application to Outer Space and the Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, to the resources of Antarctica, and to a growing number of technologies with transnational implications.

Conclusion

Science and technology are opening a new world to the productive activities of man: the world of ocean space. Consequently a new international development strategy for the 1980s and beyond, to achieve its objectives, must encompass a new dimension: the dimension of ocean space. Many economic activities form part of systems comprising both land and sea components. Neglecting vital links in these systems can lead to serious political, economic, social and environmental problems which can retard development.

Acceptance, even partial, of the principle of Common Heritage and of the other concepts on which the New International Economic Order is based, place new responsibilities on the international community and on the United Nations family of organizations. The task for ocean-related organizations is effectively and successfully to integrate the management of ocean space, its multiplying uses and the development of marine resources into an international development strategy which is multifaceted and comprehensively global. The task is of vital importance: the long-term goal of reducing
Inequalities between countries was at the heart of the Maltese proposal twelve years ago. Perceptions and perspectives have changed and will keep changing. The law of the sea, as it is emerging now, could aggravate inequalities rather than reducing them. Only the integration of ocean management and ocean space resources in a broad international development strategy can avert this danger. Thus the merging of exclusive economic zones and legal continental shelves within the framework of regional or sub-regional economic communities and international acceptance of a tax on major uses of ocean space would be useful measures of equalization. A properly constituted International Seabed Authority could be a model for "the further development and strengthening of institutions of international economic management . . . especially to provide a continuing and orderly process of structural adjustment" (UN Committee on Development Planning, 1978). The integration of marine resources and ocean management into the Strategy -- while vital to development -- could also be highly beneficial for the continuing evolution of the Law of the Sea.
Here, Señor Carter, is the statue of Simón Bolívar, who liberated Latin America from foreign domination!

(From Struggling for the Sharing of Wealth and Power, Programme on Transnational Corporations, World Council of Churches, 150 Route de Ferney, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland)
L'ALIMENTATION MONDIALE: L'ECHEC DES SOLUTIONS PRODUCTIVISTES

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Résumé: La crise alimentaire de 1972 - résultat de maigres récoltes de céréales et de réduction de la production, aggravé par l'utilisation abusive de céréales comme fourrage pour répondre à la demande de viande des pays industrialisés - a frappé d'abord les masses déshéritées du Tiers Monde. La réponse de la communauté internationale - exprimée par la Conférence mondiale de l'alimentation de 1974 - fut de tenter de débarrasser le monde de la faim avant 1985, principalement par l'accroissement de l'appui financier et technologique à l'agriculture du Tiers Monde sur la base d'un système destiné à assurer la sécurité alimentaire mondiale. Pourtant, malgré une certaine augmentation, depuis lors, des investissements dans l'agriculture du Tiers Monde comme de la production et des réserves dans certaines régions, la faim et la malnutrition se sont aggravées et touchent désormais (selon la Banque mondiale) un milliard d'êtres humains, et les objectifs de la Conférence ont été remis à plus tard.

La leçon à tirer de cet échec est que la faim ne disparaîtra pas si l'on s'en tient à des politiques qui exagèrent l'importance de la production, de l'investissement et de l'aide. Même quand la production s'accroît, l'offre alimentaire pour les pauvres peut décroître en raison d'une orientation excessive vers l'exportation, la production pour satisfaire les goûts importés et onéreux des minorités privilégiées, les pertes après récolte, et un système de distribution insuffisant. Du côté de la demande, ce sont les déséquilibres fondamentaux que constituent la basse viande et la distribution inégale des revenus, le chômage et le sous-emploi qui sont les obstacles principaux à la satisfaction des besoins alimentaires essentiels. Une politique alimentaire doit, pour avoir une chance de réussir, reconnaître la complexité, les particularités et le caractère endogène des systèmes alimentaires; elle doit tenir à satisfaire les besoins alimentaires dans des situations locales ou nationales spécifiques, tenant compte des facteurs écologiques et culturels. Elle doit être partie intégrante d'une stratégie d'accroissement de l'emploi et du revenu rural et, enfin, elle doit être appuyée par un cadre international qui empêche les riches pays industrialisés de prélever une partie importante de la production alimentaire mondiale au profit de sa surconsommation et de son gaspillage.
FEEDING THE WORLD: THE FAILURE OF PRODUCTIVIST SOLUTIONS

Abstract: The 1972 food crisis - result of poor cereal harvests and production cut-backs, aggravated by the disproportionate use of cereals as fodder to satisfy Northern demand for meat - hit hardest at the poor masses of the Third World. The response of the international community - expressed by the 1974 World Food Conference - was to aim to rid the world of hunger by 1985, essentially through increased financial and technological inputs for Third World agriculture, supported by a system of world food security. Yet despite increases since 1974 in investments in Third World agriculture and in the production and stocks of some regions, Third World cereal deficits have been increasing, hunger and malnutrition have spread to affect (according to World bank estimates) a billion people, and the aim of the Conference has receded into the future.

The lesson to be drawn from this failure is that hunger will not be eradicated by policies which give under importance to production, investment and aid. Even in the context of production increases, food supplies for the hungry may be diminished by excessive export-orientation, production for imported and expensive minority tastes, post-harvest losses and poor distribution facilities. On the demand side, it is the fundamental disequilibria of low and mal-distributed incomes, unemployment and underemployment, which are the main obstacles to satisfying basic nutritional needs. A successful food policy must recognize the complexity, particularity and endogeneity of food systems; it must aim at satisfying food needs within specific local or national situations, taking account of ecological and cultural factors. It must be part of a strategy for increasing rural employment and income and, finally, supported by an international framework which prevents the rich industrialized countries from draining away a large part of world food production in wasteful over-consumption.

LA ALIMENTACIÓN MUNDIAL: EL FRACASO DE SOLUCIONES PRODUCTIVISTAS

Resumen: La crisis alimentaria de 1972 -el resultado de pobres cosechas de cereales y de reducciones en la producción, agravado por el uso desproporcionado de cereales como forraje en el esfuerzo de satisfacer la demanda por carne de los países industrializados - afectó duramente las masas pobres del Tercer Mundo. La respuesta de la comunidad internacional - expresada por la Conferencia Mundial de la Alimentación en 1974 - fue de tratar de liberar el mundo del hambre antes de 1985, principalmente por medio de un aumento en apoyos financieros y tecnológicos para la agricultura del Tercer Mundo y por medio de un sistema mundial para asegurar la provisión de alimentos. Sin embargo, a pesar de algunos aumentos después de 1974 en inversiones en la agricultura del Tercer Mundo y aumentos en la producción y reservas en ciertas regiones, el hambre y la desnutrición han crecido y afectan hoy en día (según el Banco Mundial) un billón de seres humanos. Los objetivos de la conferencia han sufrido un aplazamiento.

(este resumen sigue en la p. 44)
Jacques Chonchol

L’ALIMENTATION MONDIALE : L’ECHEC DES SOLUTIONS PRODUCTIVISTES

I. La situation alimentaire du Tiers Monde avant la Conférence de Rome

En 1972, une grave crise alimentaire fut révélée devant l’opinion publique internationale. La production d’aliments diminua pour la première fois depuis le début des années 50. La production de céréales baissa de 33 millions de tonnes alors que l’accroissement annuel des besoins était de 25 millions. Cette brusque chute créa un grave déficit au moment même où de grands pays exportateurs de céréales comme les U.S.A. appliquaient des politiques de contrôle de la production pour éviter la chute des cours mondiaux.


L’ensemble de ces faits amena la communauté internationale à réexaminer la situation alimentaire mondiale, particulièrement en ce qui concernait les pays du Tiers Monde. Cet examen mit en évidence une conjonction de faits négatifs pour les perspectives alimentaires de ces populations, particulièrement pour les groupes économiquement les plus défavorisés.

On observa, par exemple, que si entre 1952 et 1962, le taux moyen annuel d’accroissement de la production alimentaire par habitant avait été de 0,7% pour l’ensemble des pays du Tiers Monde, ce taux avait baissé à 0,3 pendant la période 1962-72.1/ Sur 97 pays du Tiers Monde dont on a étudié la situation alimentaire en 1970, 61 avaient un déficit global par rapport à leurs besoins. Dans l’ensemble des pays du Tiers Monde à économie capitaliste, la sous-alimentation calculée sur des critères très modérés touchait plus de 400 millions de per-

Un facteur très important dans l'augmentation des prix des céréales était leur demande rapidement croissante en vue de satisfaire les besoins de consommation en viande des pays industrialisés. Ces pays, où vivait 30% de la population mondiale, consommait en 1969-71 51% de toutes les céréales utilisées dans le monde. Les 370 millions de tonnes de céréales utilisées dans ces pays comme fourrages dépassaient la consommation des populations de la Chine et de l'Inde ensemble, c'est-à-dire 1 milliard et demi de personnes représentant 40% de la population mondiale.


II. La Conférence de Rome et ses principales résolutions

Les objectifs de cette Conférence peuvent se regrouper autour de quatre principaux types de mesures:

- mesures pour augmenter la production d'aliments dans les pays dits "en voie de développement";
- politiques et programmes pour améliorer la situation alimentaire de leurs populations;
- actions pour renforcer la sécurité alimentaire mondiale;
- politiques de commerce, de stabilisation et d'ajustement.

Les résultats de la Conférence s'expriment dans une Déclaration pour "l'élimination définitive de la faim et de la malnutrition" suivie de 22 résolutions. La Déclaration, très générale, constitue un résumé d'intentions que personne ne peut refuser, mais non d'engagements fermes.


Parmi les résolutions, une dizaine concernent les actions à mener sur le plan national et international pour accroître la production alimentaire dans le Tiers Monde et pour améliorer le niveau nutritionnel de ses populations. Elles définissent des objectifs et des stratégies pour la production alimentaire, les priorités à donner à l'agriculture et au développement rural, le besoin d'augmenter l'aide et la production d'engrais, les programmes de recherche et de vulgarisation alimentaire et agricole, la nécessité d'établir une carte mondiale des sols et du potentiel de production des terres, l'expansion des systèmes d'irrigation et l'aménagement scientifique des eaux, les facilités pour l'obtention de pesticides et de semences, etc.

De plus, la Conférence accorda la création ou le renforcement d'un ensemble d'institutions devant assurer l'action dans le domaine de la sécurité alimentaire, d'une meilleure aide alimentaire, ou destinées à favoriser les investissements agricoles dans le Tiers Monde. Huit furent les institutions ainsi créées ou renforcées :

- le Conseil Alimentaire Mondial, pour intégrer et coordonner la suite à donner aux résolutions de la Conférence;
- le Fonds International pour le Développement Agricole, pour aider au financement des projets de développement agricole et de production alimentaire dans le Tiers Monde;
- le Comité pour la Sécurité Alimentaire Mondiale, pour évaluer les perspectives de la demande, de l'offre et des réserves des principaux produits alimentaires et pour recommander des solutions aux situations critiques pouvant se présenter;
- le Comité d'Aide et de Programmes Alimentaires, pour les consultations intergouvernementales à propos des programmes d'aide alimentaire bilatéraux ou multilatéraux;
- le Groupe Consultatif sur la Production et l'Investissement Alimentaire, pour encourager un flux accru de ressources externes destinées à renforcer la production alimentaire;
- le Système Mondial d'Information et d'Alerte sur l'Alimentation et l'Agriculture, pour surveiller les activités des différents organismes nationaux et internationaux et faciliter l'établissement d'un système d'information sur les conditions climatiques pouvant affecter la situation alimentaire mondiale;
- le Groupe Consultatif sur la Recherche Agricole Internationale, pour appuyer les activités de recherche des centres de recherche agricole localisés dans le Tiers Monde;
- et l'Engagement International sur la Sécurité Alimentaire Mondiale, pour l'établissement d'une coopération au sujet des réserves permettant d'assurer les aliments de base, surtout les céréales, afin de faire face à d'éventuelles difficultés d'approvisionnement et réduire les fluctuations de la production et des prix.
III. Les développements après la Conférence et l'évolution de la situation alimentaire mondiale entre 1975 et 1978

La mise en place de ce plan d'action destiné à améliorer la situation et la sécurité alimentaire mondiales dépendaient évidemment pour ses résultats de la volonté politique des gouvernements. Volonté, d'une part, des gouvernements du Tiers Monde pour mener à bien les actions nécessaires afin d'augmenter la production alimentaire et d'améliorer la situation nutritionnelle des groupes les plus pauvres de leur population. Volonté, d'autre part, des pays industrialisés de les aider, par l'investissement et le transfert technologique, à réaliser leurs objectifs. Il était bien évident que le problème essentiel, plutôt que du domaine technique ou scientifique, relevait de la volonté politique pour la mise en pratique des recommandations et des résolutions approuvées.

Il ne s'agit pas ici de faire une évaluation détaillée des suites de la Conférence. Cela pourra être retrouvé en détail dans divers documents1/. Notre propos est d'analyser dans ses grandes lignes l'évolution de la situation alimentaire entre 1975 et 1978 et de vérifier dans quelle mesure l'évolution de cette situation a été influencée par les résolutions de la Conférence.

Dans les apparences, la situation alimentaire pour les pays du Tiers Monde s'est beaucoup améliorée à partir de 1974 par rapport aux années immédiatement précédentes. En effet, l'indice de la fluctuation de la production alimentaire annuelle calculé par la FAO, pour l'ensemble du Tiers Monde est passé de - 0,8% par personne (pour la moyenne annuelle des années 1970-74) à + 0,6% (pour les années 1974-78). L'accroissement de cette production a été particulièrement important en Extrême-Orient (de - 1,0 à + 1,5) et en Amérique Latine (de - 0,3 à + 0,7) tandis que la situation ne s'est pas améliorée d'une façon significative en Afrique (de - 1,8 à - 1,4) et a rétrogradée au Moyen-Orient (de + 0,2 à -0,4). Dans les pays socialistes d'Asie, la croissance de la production alimentaire par personne a ralenti son rythme d'accroissement (de + 1,1 à + 0,9).

D'autre part, plusieurs bonnes récoltes généralisées ont permis de reconstituer les stocks alimentaires, lesquels, sans inclure ceux détenus par la Chine et l'U.R.S.S., sont remontés de 107 millions de tonnes en 1973-74 à 178 millions de tonnes en 1977-78, l'équivalent de presque 20% de la consommation mondiale.

En troisième lieu, le flux des investissements destinés à appuyer la crois-

1/ Voir à ce sujet FAO, La Situation Mondiale de l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture en 1978 (74e session, Rome : 27 novembre - 8 décembre 1978) et Conseil Alimentaire Mondial, Toward a World without Hunger: Progress and prospects for completing the unfinished agenda of the World Food Conference, Report by the Executive Director (Fifth Ministerial Session, Ottawa, 4-7 September 1979).
sance de l'agriculture dans le Tiers Monde a augmenté considérablement, en passant d'un montant total de 2,5 milliards de dollars en 1973 à près de 4,3 milliards en 1977, spécialement par l'action des organisations financières internationales.

Mais, parallèlement à ces signes positifs, d'autres sont négatifs. En effet, d'une part, pour satisfaire leurs besoins alimentaires les pays du Tiers Monde ont dû continuer à accroître d'une façon très rapide leurs importations. En considérant seulement le blé et les céréales secondaires, ces importations sont passées de 28 millions de tonnes par an (moyenne 1969-71) à 48 millions de tonnes en 1974 et à 68 millions de tonnes en 1977-78, dont l'aide alimentaire n'en représente que 9 millions.

D'autre part, même en considérant les très bonnes récoltes de ces dernières années et l'accroissement des importations, la situation alimentaire des groupes les plus pauvres des populations du Tiers Monde a continué de se dégrader. Selon la FAO, en utilisant des critères très modérés pour mesurer la malnutrition, le nombre des mal nourris dans ces pays est passé de 400 millions en 1969-71 à 455 millions en 1972-74. Ces chiffres représentaient près de 30% de la population totale en Afrique et en Extrême-Orient et plus de 15% en Amérique Latine et au Proche-Orient.

Selon la Banque Mondiale, qui utilise d'autres critères pour mesurer la malnutrition, celle-ci atteindrait aujourd'hui plus d'un milliard de personnes dans les pays du Tiers Monde.

Donc, même en considérant que les bonnes récoltes des dernières années ont permis une reprise favorable de la production alimentaire dans le Tiers Monde et que les importations alimentaires augmentent, l'objectif que s'était fixé la Conférence de Rome de libérer le monde de la faim et de la malnutrition en dix ans (objectif pour 1985), au lieu de se rapprocher, semble s'éloigner.

D'autre part, obtenir un taux de croissance moyen annuel de la production alimentaire de 4% semble un objectif encore lointain. Entre 1974 et 1978, la production alimentaire dans le Tiers Monde a augmenté à un taux global de 3,1% et à un taux moyen par personne de 0,6%.

Nous pouvons donc conclure, quant aux suites de la Conférence, même en considérant que certains progrès ont été réalisés du point de vue de la production alimentaire1/ et des investissements pour l'agriculture, que ceux-ci n'ont pas permis d'assurer une amélioration de la situation alimentaire mondiale. Celle-ci continue à se dégrader pour un secteur considérable de la population : les plus pauvres des campagnes et des villes des pays du Tiers Monde. L'examen de cette situation nous mène à nous poser la question de savoir si les résolutions de la Conférence étaient les meilleures et suffisantes pour atteindre leur objectif : la suppression de la faim et de la malnutrition dans le monde.

1/ Dus surtout à des facteurs indépendants de la volonté des hommes, et non permanents, comme les bonnes conditions climatiques.
IV. Les conditions d'une politique alimentaire

La réponse à la question antérieure ne peut être que négative. Les résolutions trop exclusivement centrées sur les problèmes de l'augmentation de la production, de l'accroissement des investissements agricoles, de l'aide alimentaire et des ajustements entre l'offre et la demande au niveau du marché, n'ont pas assez pris en compte le problème de la consommation alimentaire qui dépend aussi de beaucoup d'autres facteurs, peut-être plus importants encore que ceux de la production et du commerce. Cela mêne à la question fondamentale : de quoi dépendent les systèmes alimentaires et quels sont les facteurs qui les déterminent? Quelles sont les composantes d'un système alimentaire pour un pays donné? Et, pour définir une politique alimentaire correcte il est absolument nécessaire de partir de cette analyse1/.

Disons d'abord que l'approche globalisante par pays ne semble pas la meilleure pour commencer cette analyse. Elle empêche de voir les grandes différences qui existent entre les divers groupes de population d'un même pays. Et ceci est d'autant plus vrai pour les pays du Tiers Monde que pour les pays industrialisés. Dans ces derniers, les systèmes alimentaires ont tendance à devenir beaucoup plus homogènes pour l'ensemble de la population tandis que dans les premiers, on trouve d'énormes différences dans la situation alimentaire selon le niveau de revenu et l'habitat physique urbain ou rural.

Il faudrait plutôt commencer à faire cette analyse à partir du concept d'une population donnée, soit au niveau national, régional ou local. Ceci permettrait de mieux saisir l'ensemble des composants du système alimentaire de cette population.

En regardant les choses ainsi, il est nécessaire de confronter d'une part, les facteurs qui influencent la disponibilité alimentaire de cette population et, d'autre part, ceux qui influencent sa consommation alimentaire.

Parmi les facteurs qui influencent la disponibilité, nous trouvons les suivants : la production alimentaire du territoire où habite cette population, le stockage et la conservation de cette production durant l'année, les exportations et les importations de produits alimentaires de la région, et les systèmes de distribution aussi bien pour la production régionale que pour les produits alimentaires importés.

A leur tour, parmi les facteurs qui déterminent la consommation alimentaire, en plus de la disponibilité, il faut tenir compte d'un ensemble assez complexe d'éléments, parmi lesquels l'on peut signaler : le taux d'accroissement de la population, le niveau de revenus et sa distribution (par classes

1/ Pour une bonne analyse de la complexité des systèmes alimentaires, voir UNRISD, Systèmes Alimentaires et Société (16ème session du Conseil d'Administration, Genève, 10-11 juillet 1978).
sociales et par zones urbaines ou rurales), la culture alimentaire et les changements des habitudes induites par l'influence culturelle, financière et commerciale des pays dominants et, finalement, le rapport entre les variations des coûts de l'alimentation et les variations du niveau de revenu de la majorité de la population.

C'est seulement la considération de tout cet ensemble de facteurs pour une population donnée et non le simple accroissement de la disponibilité de certains produits de préférence consommés par les populations des pays riches de l'Occident, qui permettra de résoudre effectivement le problème de la sous-alimentation et de la faim.

Si nous observons, en fonction de ce qui précède la réalité spécifique de la plupart des pays du Tiers Monde, nous voyons qu'est en train d'agir chez eux un ensemble de facteurs qui empêche la satisfaction des besoins alimentaires des groupes les plus démunis de leurs populations. Si l'on veut donc résoudre le problème alimentaire de ces populations c'est sur ces facteurs qu'il faut agir. Ici se trouvent les véritables obstacles qu'il faut aborder.

Nous signalons à continuation ceux qui semblent les plus importants.

Obstacles à la disponibilité alimentaire

Agissant négativement sur les disponibilités alimentaires pour les populations de ces pays, l'on trouve quatre obstacles qui sont les plus redoutables.

Premièrement, le système de production établi pendant la domination coloniale et maintenu en grande partie, sinon renforcé pendant la période post-coloniale, dans lequel on donne la priorité aux produits agricoles d'exportation par rapport aux productions vivrières traditionnelles consommées par la majorité de la population nationale. Cette priorité implique l'utilisation des meilleures terres, la sécurité de l'irrigation, l'utilisation de la plus grande partie du capital disponible, des ressources technologiques et de l'appui de l'état pour les produits d'exportation au détriment de l'agriculture vivrière.

Même quand les gouvernements mettent l'accent sur l'autonomie nationale et prennent des dispositions très fermes contre l'impérialisme des grandes puissances, quand ils cherchent à réaliser leur développement, ils le font par un effort croissant d'intégration aux exigences du marché mondial, ce qui implique essayer d'exporter le plus possible et au moindre prix pour être compétitif, soit de leurs produits d'exportation agricoles traditionnels établis durant la période coloniale, soit des nouveaux produits agricoles promus aujourd'hui par l'agro-industrie des pays industrialisés.

Cela conduit à l'insuffisance de la production vivrière interne face à l'accroissement des besoins et à la couverture des déficits par des importations accrues de produits vivriers qui pèsent d'une façon de plus en plus lourde sur la balance commerciale et qui augmentent la fragilité des systèmes alimentaires globaux.
Un deuxième obstacle apparaît là où dominent les systèmes d'économie capitalistes, c'est-à-dire orientés par le pouvoir d'achat des groupes minoritaires de la population qui pèsent le plus sur le marché, le manque d'appui à la production alimentaire interne, sauf quand il s'agit d'un marché urbain important par le poids monétaire des classes moyennes privilégiées. On produit alors pour ces marchés internes avec des techniques modernes importées de l'Ocident qui sont très coûteuses du point de vue de la combinaison des ressources disponibles. Au même temps, on augmente considérablement le coût de cette alimentation par sa transformation à travers une industrie agro-alimentaire calquée sur celle des pays industrialisés, et dont l'objectif essentiel est d'augmenter de plus en plus la valeur ajoutée industrielle et de services par rapport à la valeur agricole de ces produits. Le type de production alimentaire ainsi élaboré à un prix de marché qui t'éloigne de plus en plus du pouvoir d'achat des groupes les plus pauvres, au même temps qu'il voit diminuer son apport nutritionnel.

Un troisième obstacle est celui des pertes très importantes après récolte, par l'insuffisance des moyens appropriés de stockage, de conservation et par les mauvaises conditions de la distribution. Ces pertes varient selon les experts d'un minimum de 10% de la récolte pour les céréales et légumineuses à un minimum de 20% ou plus pour les autres cultures de base et les différentes denrées périssables. Des estimations plutôt modérées évaluaient ces pertes pour l'ensemble du Tiers Monde à 107 millions de tonnes de produits alimentaires en 1976. Les pertes en céréales et légumineuses seules permettraient de satisfaire les besoins alimentaires de 168 millions de personnes 1/.

Finalement, un quatrième obstacle agissant sur les disponibilités alimentaires dans la plupart des pays du Tiers Monde est celui des facilités physiques pour la distribution. Même là où il n'y a pas trop de difficultés financières pour couvrir les déficits alimentaires par l'importation (cas des pays de l'OPEP), l'insuffisance notable du système portuaire, de stockage et de transport font grandement obstacle aux problèmes de la distribution à l'ensemble de la population, particulièrement à la population rurale vivant plus éloignée des ports.

Influences sur la consommation

Quant aux facteurs agissant sur la consommation et qui empêchent la satisfaction généralisée des besoins alimentaires minima, spécialement des groupes les plus pauvres de la population, il faut signaler les suivants :

Tout d'abord l'insuffisance du revenu et les très fortes inégalités dans sa distribution, ce qui est lié d'une façon très étroite au problème du sous-emploi et de la faible productivité des postes de travail disponibles pour une grande majorité de la population active. On peut affirmer sans aucun

doute qu'ici se trouve, et non au plan de l'insuffisance de la production alimentaire, l'obstacle essentiel à l'amélioration de la situation alimentaire mondiale.

Le sous-emploi et la sous-productivité de la majorité de la population active des pays du Tiers Monde sont la conséquence, à leur tour, de l'extension et de la pénétration dans la plupart de ces économies du modèle de croissance capitaliste. Celui-ci se développe aujourd'hui dans un contexte socio-économique fort différent de celui qui caractérisa les pays capitalistes industrialisés à des étapes similaires du processus d'accumulation du capital. Les principales différences étant l'accroissement beaucoup plus rapide de la population et de la force de travail et la disponibilité de technologies très intensives dans l'utilisation du capital et cherchant à employer un nombre réduit de travailleurs hautement qualifiés.

Cela implique l'absorption dans le secteur productif moderne d'une faible proportion de la population active et la marginalisation du plus grand nombre qui deviennent soit des travailleurs sans terre à l'emploi incertain et instable, soit des producteurs agricoles réfugiés dans des toutes petites parcelles de terrain incapables de satisfaire leurs besoins minima, soit des sous-prolétaires urbains travaillant quand ils le peuvent dans ce que quelques-uns appellent le "secteur informel urbain", soit dans les services personnels ou le petit commerce. Pour ces majorités de pauvres, les bas niveaux et l'insécurité de leurs revenus les empêchent de satisfaire leurs besoins alimentaires essentiels et c'est parmi eux et leurs familles que se trouvent les mal nourris et les sous-alimentés.

Un seul exemple, celui de l'Inde : elle peut être considérée à la fois le pays ayant le dixième produit national du monde, où vivent 100 millions d'hommes modernes, fondamentalement urbains, à des niveaux de productivité aussi avancés que les plus industrialisés du monde, et simultanément, le pays où vivent 540 millions de pauvres dans une situation qui a peu changé depuis des siècles. L'agriculture indienne a fait d'enormes progrès ces dernières années. La récolte de 1978 fut une récolte record de 125 millions de tonnes de céréales, plus que nécessaire pour satisfaire convenablement les besoins alimentaires de sa population. Le pays produit 4 fois plus d'engrais qu'il y a dix ans et a augmenté sa surface irriguée de 50%. Mais, même avec tous ces progrès, des millions d'Indiens continuent de se trouver dans une situation de sous-alimentation. En 1971-72, 15% des unités familiales indiennes urbaines et rurales disposaient de moins de 2,000 calories par jour et par personne à cause de l'insuffisance de leurs revenus.

1/ Entreprises constituées par des travailleurs indépendants, de petite taille, disposant de peu de capital, utilisant des technologies traditionnelles, etc. Voir à ce sujet Dagmar Raczynski, El Sector Informal Urbano : interrogantes y controversias (Santiago de Chile : Convenio PREALC-CIEPLAN, OIT, 1977).

Des différences considérables dans la consommation alimentaire existent aussi à l'intérieur d'un même pays selon le niveau de développement des différentes régions et l'emplacement rural ou urbain de la population.

Si nous prenons par exemple le cas du Brésil et nous comparons la situation alimentaire des habitants du Nord-Est avec celle des habitants du Sud du pays, nous voyons que dans le Nord-Est urbain, 48% des unités familiales disposaient en moyenne de moins de 2.000 calories par jour et par personne et dans le Nord-Est rural, 57% des unités familiales disposaient de moins de 2.140 calories. Dans le Sud du Brésil par contre, seulement 15% des unités familiales urbaines disposaient de moins de 2.000 calories par jour et par personne et, apparemment selon les statistiques, toutes les unités familiales rurales dans le Sud dépassaient la disponibilité des 2.000 calories. De nouveau, tout ceci est lié au niveau et à la distribution du revenu parmi la population de ces régions. Il est donc erroné, si ce problème essentiel n'est pas abordé dans les politiques de développement, de penser que le simple accroissement de la production alimentaire, même au taux de 4% annuel recommandé par la Conférence de Rome, résoudra le problème de la malnutrition parmi les pauvres du Tiers Monde à économie de marché.

Un autre facteur essentiel agissant sur la consommation alimentaire et renforçant les effets qui viennent d'être analysés est celui de la pénétration et l'extension du système ou du modèle alimentaire des pays industrialisés dans les pays du Tiers Monde. Dans cette pénétration, les sociétés agro-industrielles multinationales tiennent une place de choix. Comme l'a démontré d'une façon très documentée Susan George, le système alimentaire dont sont propagent ces sociétés et qui connaît sa forme la plus avancée aux États-Unis d'Amérique, s'est introduit et se développe, avec des degrés divers de succès, dans les systèmes alimentaires du Tiers Monde. Il utilise toute sa puissance financière, idéologique et technique pour essayer de devenir universel, en utilisant pour cela un ensemble de moyens complémentaires. D'une part, la propagation de certaines pratiques culturelles, comme celles de la "révolution verte". Liée à celle-ci, la création de nouveaux marchés pour les inputs technologiques produits directement ou sous contrôle des transnationales. D'autre part, le changement des habitudes alimentaires des populations des pays périphériques par la publicité et aussi par l'aide alimentaire. En rapport avec ceci, l'élaboration de plus en plus sophistiquée de la production alimentaire pour augmenter sa valeur ajoutée industrielle et en services, où l'on fait le gros du profit, ce qui

1/ Quoique les maxima ne soient pas strictement comparables étant donné la façon dont sont présentées les statistiques, ils sont assez proches. Voir document cité en note 2, page 11.

2/ Voir sa thèse de doctorat intitulée Stratégies d'Intervention des Pays industrialisés dans les Systèmes Alimentaires des Pays Périphériques présentée à l'Université de Paris XIII en décembre 1978.
conduit à la production d'un type d'alimentation de plus en plus coûteux, très en-dessus du pouvoir d'achat des masses populaires. Dans la mesure où ce type d'alimentation se développe dans le Tiers Monde, la situation des masses pauvres, au lieu de s'améliorer, se dégrade. Maints exemples pourraient être cités, desquels peut être l'un des plus connus est celui de la substitution du lait maternel pour l'allaitement des enfants par du lait en poudre donné au biberon. Nombreux sont aussi les exemples dans lesquels on voit que la substitution d'aliments ou de boissons traditionnels par des produits appelés "modernes" ont impliqué une baisse de la situation alimentaire précédente des populations du Tiers Monde. On peut donc affirmer que la pénétration parmi les pauvres de ces habitudes alimentaires conduit à les faire payer plus cher pour les faire manger moins bien. Cela est très grave quand on vit, de par son revenu, à la limite de la subsistance et constitue aujourd'hui un facteur essentiel dans l'augmentation du nombre des mal nourris.

L'analyse qui précède permet, pour conclure, de signaler quelles seraient les actions à mener dans le Tiers Monde pour arriver à une situation d'autosuffisance alimentaire.

V. Une politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire

Celle-ci n'implique pas, comme certains peuvent le penser, l'objectif de produire au niveau national, régional ou local toute l'alimentation dont a besoin la population vivant sur ce territoire. Ce renfermement absolu dans des frontières déterminées pour satisfaire tous les besoins alimentaires serait trop coûteux et n'est pas envisageable qu'en situations exceptionnelles (cas de guerre ou impossibilité physique de tout échange avec l'extérieur), ou pour des populations isolées vivant dans des systèmes de totale auto-subsistance.

Par contre, une politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire implique la recherche d'un équilibre approprié entre plusieurs variables qui doivent être intégrées et coordonnées en fonction de la situation spécifique de chaque population.

Ces variables sont les suivantes :

a) un système de production alimentaire et de développement rural qui n'implique pas la marginalisation croissante des masses paysannes en tant que producteurs et consommateurs. Est-ce dire un système capable de produire les aliments en créant les emplois productifs nécessaires pour assurer un revenu satisfaisant à l'ensemble de la population rurale. Cela mène à une révision très profonde dans les pays du Tiers Monde des rapports actuels entre : terres disponibles - emplois à assurer - technologies à utiliser - et types de productivité à maximiser.

b) Un système de production alimentaire qui cherche à faire la meilleure utilisation des ressources disponibles du point de vue des aliments à produire. Il faut tenir compte ici de la qualité des terres, de leurs aptitudes pour les différentes productions, de l'influence des facteurs climatiques et des facilités existantes (irrigation par exemple). Il
faut étudier quel est l'ensemble de produits alimentaires capable de fournir le maximum de calories et de protéines pour une population donnée, au moindre coût, étant donné les différentes alternatives de production possibles, les habitudes alimentaires de la population et son revenu moyen au niveau de la majorité des masses populaires. Ceci conduit à ne pas rechercher per sé ou parce que c'est considéré moderne, le type actuel de production alimentaire des pays industrialisés et tempérés de l'Occident, surtout quand il s'agit de populations vivant au milieu tropical.

c) Un système de consommation et de distribution des aliments qui cherche à éviter au maximum les pertes après récolte par des méthodes économiquement compatibles avec le niveau de développement du pays. Système qui assure, d'autre part, le contrôle de ces récoltes par les producteurs eux-mêmes et par les associations de consommateurs, et non par des puissants intermédiaires exploitant producteurs et consommateurs.

d) Un système de rapports entre variations des niveaux de revenus de la population et variations des coûts de production et de distribution qui rende possible la satisfaction au niveau du revenu existant pour la majorité, des besoins alimentaires essentiels.

e) Finalement, un système d'échange international qui ne draine pas vers les populations des pays industrialisés, à cause de leur niveau beaucoup plus élevé de richesse, le gros de la production physique alimentaire mondiale, en fonction d'un type d'alimentation terriblement gaspillant les ressources existantes et conduisant à une malnutrition par excès (cas des céréales utilisées de plus en plus pour être transformées en viandes pour les peuples les plus riches).

Nous pensons que c'est seulement en fonction de l'analyse du fonctionnement de ces variables qu'on pourra élaborer pour chaque situation concrète une politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire à la hauteur du défi qui se pose aujourd'hui pour la majorité de la population mondiale.

(cont. resumen en Español)

La lección que se saca de este fracaso es que el hambre no desaparecerá si guardamos políticas que exageran la importancia de la producción, de las inversiones y de la ayuda económica. Aún con aumentos en la producción de alimentos las provisiones alimentarias para los pobres pueden disminuir debido a una orientación excesiva hacia la exportación, la producción para satisfacer los gastos importados, costosos y onerosos de una minoría privilegiada, las pérdidas después de la cosecha, y un sistema ineficaz de distribución. En cuanto a la demanda, son las desigualdades fundamentales el bajo nivel de ingresos y su mala distribución, el desempleo y el subdesempleo, los que constituyen las obstáculos principales en la satisfacción de necesidades alimentarias básicas. Para tener éxito, una política alimentaria debe reconocer la complejidad, particularidad y el carácter endémico de las estructuras alimentarias; debe tratar de satisfacer las necesidades alimentarias dentro de situaciones específicas, sean locales o nacionales, tomando en cuenta los factores ecológicos y culturales. Debe formar parte íntegra de una estrategia para aumentar el empleo y el ingreso rural, y finalmente debe tener el apoyo de una estructura internacional que impida que los países ricos e industrializados agoten una gran porción de la producción mundial de alimentos de manera desperdiciosa y despilfarradora.
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

PREAMBLE

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

Whereas the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Whereas the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.

Whereas the need for such special safeguards has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, and recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the statutes of specialized agencies and international organizations concerned with the welfare of children.

Whereas mankind owes to the child the best it has to give.

Now therefore.

The General Assembly

Proclaims this Declaration of the Rights of the Child to the end that he may have a happy childhood and enjoy for his own good and for the good of society the rights and freedoms herein set forth, and calls upon parents, upon men and women as individuals and upon voluntary organizations, local authorities and national Governments to recognize these rights and strive for their observance by legislative and other measures progressively taken in accordance with the following principles:

PRINCIPLE 1

The child shall enjoy all the rights set forth in this Declaration. All children, without any exception whatsoever, shall be entitled to these rights, without distinction or discrimination on account of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, whether of himself or of his family.

PRINCIPLE 2

The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.

PRINCIPLE 3

The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality.
PRINCIPLE 4
The child shall enjoy the benefits of social security. He shall be entitled to grow and develop in health; to this end special care and protection shall be provided both to him and to his mother, including adequate pre-natal and post-natal care. The child shall have the right to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation and medical services.

PRINCIPLE 5
The child who is physically, mentally or socially handicapped shall be given the special treatment, education and care required by his particular condition.

PRINCIPLE 6
The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and in any case in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society and the public authorities shall have the duty to extend particular care to children without a family and to those without adequate means of support. Payment of State and other assistance towards the maintenance of children of large families is desirable.

PRINCIPLE 7
The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages. He shall be given an education which will promote his general culture, and enable him on a basis of equal opportunity to develop his abilities, his individual judgement, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to become a useful member of society.

The best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those responsible for his education and guidance; that responsibility lies in the first place with his parents.

The child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation, which should be directed to the same purposes as education; society and the public authorities shall endeavour to promote the enjoyment of this right.

PRINCIPLE 8
The child shall in all circumstances be among the first to receive protection and relief.

PRINCIPLE 9
The child shall be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation. He shall not be the subject of traffic in any form.

The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere with his physical, mental or moral development.

PRINCIPLE 10
The child shall be protected from practices which may foster racial, religious and any other form of discrimination. He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood and in full consciousness that his energy and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow men.

Publicity to be given to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child

The General Assembly.

Considering that the Declaration of the Rights of the Child calls upon parents, upon men and women as individuals, and upon voluntary organizations, local authorities and national Governments to recognize the rights set forth therein and strive for their observance,

1. Recommends Governments of Member States, the specialized agencies concerned and the appropriate non-governmental organizations to publicize as widely as possible the text of this Declaration:

2. Requests the Secretary-General to have this Declaration widely disseminated and, to that end, to use every means at his disposal to publish and distribute texts in all languages possible.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS OF THE BRAZILIAN FUTURE

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Abstract: Three scenarios are presented, as different outcomes of present political dispute in Brazil: a militarist-technocratic scenario assumes that the present structure of political power and social dominance, mainly of monopolistic capital, goes on during the next decades. As a result incomes become even more concentrated, economic growth gets highest priority but in fact is slow, Brazil's integration in the capitalist world economy gets more pronounced. A populist-nationalist scenario is the outcome of the proponents of this type of ideology coming to power. As a consequence, the incomes of better-organised workers improve, Brazilian capitalists get more protection from the State and import substitution becomes once again the main growth strategy. A socialist scenario results from the coming to power of those favouring a participatory and egalitarian type of society. In this scenario enterprises and other institutions are self-managed, planning decisions are submitted to popular vote and Brazil joins a bloc of nations with similar regimes.

SCÉNARIOS ALTERNATIFS POUR L'AVENIR DU BRÉSIL

Résumé: Cet article présente trois scénarios possibles à partir de la situation politique brésilienne présente. Un scénario militaire-technocratique part de l'hypothèse que la structure actuelle du pouvoir politique et de la domination sociale se maintiendra pendant les décennies qui viennent. Résultat: le revenu sera encore plus concentré; la croissance économique a la priorité la plus élevée mais en fait demeure lente, et l'intégration du Brésil dans l'économie capitalistique mondiale s'accroît. Un scénario populist-nationaliste résulte de l'arrivée au pouvoir de ceux qui partagent cette idéologie. Résultat: le revenu des travailleurs les mieux organisés s'améliore, les capitalistes brésiliens sont mieux protégés par l'État et la substitution des importations redevient la principale stratégie de croissance. Enfin, un scénario socialiste, produit de l'arrivée au pouvoir de ceux qui sont en faveur d'une société participative et égalitaire. Les entreprises et autres organisations sont auto-gérées, les décisions du plan sont soumises au vote populaire et le Brésil s'allie à un groupe de nations aux régimes similaires.
ESCENARIOS ALTERNATIVOS PARA EL FUTURO DEL BRASIL

Resumen: Son presentados tres escenarios, como resultados diferentes de las actuales luchas políticas en el Brasil. El escenario militar tecnocrático presupone que la actual estructura de poder político y dominación social, principalmente referida al capital monopolista, continúa vigente en las próximas décadas. En consecuencia los ingresos se concentran todavía más, el crecimiento económico es prioritario - pero en realidad se desenvuelve lentamente - y la integración del Brasil en la economía capitalista mundial se acentúa en mayor medida. El escenario nacional populista, es el resultado del ascenso al poder de quienes sustentan este tipo de ideología. En consecuencia los ingresos de los trabajadores mejor organizados evolucionan, los capitalistas brasileños reciben mayor protección del Estado, y la substitución de importaciones vuelve a ser la principal estrategia de desarrollo. El escenario socialista es producto del ascenso al poder de quienes favorecen una sociedad de tipo igualitaria y participacionista. En este escenario, las empresas y otras instituciones son autogestionadas, las decisiones de planificación son sometidas al voto popular y el Brasil se une a un colectivo de naciones de regímenes similares.
There is now, in Brazil, a large number of differing ideological streams and political groupings. Although each of them has its own program, explicit or implicit, they are usually grouped into three large sectors of the political spectrum:

a) right - Which is now represented by the groups in power since 1964; these groups are mainly old-style liberals and modern technocrats (civil and military);

b) center - which is occupied by the democratic, nationalist and populist oppositions to the present government and regime;

c) left - in which there are several groups, all of which have in common an allegiance to socialism.

Of course, not all of these groups spell out what they intend to do if they come to power. This is particularly true of the groups on the left, due to the repressive nature of the present regime. Although repression is being reduced, no up-to-date socialist program has been presented for Brazil until now by any group. We choose from the on-going debate a vision of socialism as an egalitarian free society, based on participatory democracy and self-management.

In that way, three alternative scenarios of the Brazilian future will be painted: 1. a military technocratic scenario, as the probable outcome if the groups on the right keep themselves in power; 2. a democratic-populist
scenario, which would result if the groups on the center come to power; and 3. a socialist scenario, which would come about if groups on the left (which share the above mentioned vision) come to power. All scenarios are conceived as happening some 20 years from now, if the correspondent change in the power structure would take place in the near future.

The scenarios are not conceived in abstract, for any country, but take into consideration the constraints arising from the historical situation of Brazil today. This means that each scenario is painted as the outcome of the aims and priorities of the block in power, limited externally by the nature of the international division of labour and the role Brazil plays in it, and internally by the relative backwardness of productive forces in Brazil, its patterns of available human and natural resources and so on.

The scenarios cover the following topics:

- political power structure: which groups are in power and what scope there is for opposition;
- structure of social dominance: which groups exercise social dominance, how they relate to dominated groups, how income is distributed;
- economic policy: chief priorities and secondary aims and the means used to achieve them;
- patterns of domestic and external demand: given the distribution of income, what is the composition of internal demand and, given relative costs and political arrangements, which external demands Brazil can supply;
- structure of output and employment: what is produced, where and by whom; degree of unemployment, urbanization, internal migrations;
- population: fertility, mortality and natural increase; underlying factors, like changes in family structure;
- external policy: Brazil's position in relation to world power blocks, foreign trade policy and structure;
- Education, science, technology and culture: demand and supply of schooling services and social consequences; scientific research and technological development; imports and exports of technology; cultural activities.

2. The military-technocratic scenario

2.1. Political power structure

The block in power is composed of technocratic officers and state entrepreneurs allied to multinational and national monopolistic capital.
The military leadership prevails in the choice of the highest state executives and has veto power on any policies; the opposition has voice but no power; all legislators and lesser executives (state, municipal) depend on the federal presidency.

2.2. Structure of social dominance

Monopoly capital -- state, multinational and private Brazilian -- is the dominating power. Workers are severely restrained in bargaining power. The income distribution becomes ever more concentrated; high-income groups (owners and managers) keep growing; highly skilled workers and technicians improve their incomes. Small entrepreneurs (including peasants) have their earnings fluctuating with the business cycle -- in recessions they become the main victims of credit restrictions aimed at combating inflation. The lowly skilled workers (including day labourers and self-employed services providers) have their incomes reduced in relative (if not absolute) terms. There are large wage income differentials among discriminated groups: women, youngsters, older workers, blacks.

2.3. Economic Policy

Chief aims: maximize growth, price stability, balance of payments equilibrium, private capital accumulation.

Means: State regulation of prices (including wages and exchange rates), public investment to expand overhead capital, joint ventures, subsidies for private investments (in priority areas or branches) and for exports, social investments to subsidize the reproduction of labour power (housing, sanitary facilities, education, health). Large-scale imports of foreign capital and technology.

2.4 Patterns of domestic and external demand

Domestic demand: more than half originate from high-income groups, for durables and services (health, travel, domestic services etc.). Limited growth (conditioned by the increase of the size of low income groups) of demand for food and other non-durables and services (health, schooling, urban transport).

External demand: maintenance of Brazil's share in "traditional" primary goods markets (coffee, sugar etc.), increase of this share in "non-traditional" primary goods (soya beans, corn, meat) and manufactured goods markets. Growing exports of technology (engineering, planning consultants) to Third World countries. Multinationals based in Brazil export mostly components to plants in First World countries and finished goods to Third World countries.

2.5. Structure of output and employment

The output of luxury consumer goods (cars, domestic appliances, gadgets) as well as export goods expand to the detriment of wage goods. High-class
services (tourism, health, post-graduate courses, restaurants) grow much more than "basic" services (urban transport, water and drainage etc.). Agriculture is largely mechanized and provides decreasing occupation. Large-scale urbanization and metropolization. High inflation rates require strong stabilization policies, halting economic expansion and slowing down overall growth. Hidden more than open unemployment grows.

2.6. Regional development

New growth poles around natural resources (minerals) and strategic sites (Amazon). Brazilian capital (mainly from S. Paulo) and multinational capital enclaves in low-income areas (Northeast). Mechanization of agriculture occasions a steady drift from rural areas to regional urban centers. Large rural-to-rural migrations of day labourers (bôias frias) attracted by commercial crops. Except a few industrial centers, most cities are plagued by large amounts of low-level service activities: prostitution, street vendors, car washes etc.

2.7. Population

Mortality stagnates while fertility declines with urbanization and schooling. Population grows at a diminishing rate, coming close to 200 million at the end of the century.

2.8. External policy

Brazil belongs to most Third World institutions but follows a conciliatory policy towards the First World. Protectionism against consumer goods imports is steadily reduced, imports of machinery are subsidized and exports promoted. Brazilian capital exports to Latin American, Middle East and African countries are sizable and Brazilian multinationals begin to take shape around the export of financial (banking) and technical services.

2.9. Education, science, technology and culture

Schooling, producing skills demanded by the market, grows. Expansion of private colleges multiply the number of graduates, reducing most to a "skilled worker" income level. The managerial and technical elite originates from "closed number" universities. Average school level of urban workers is comparatively high, working class organizations become more "intellectual" and "ideological". "Pure" scientific research is ample, financed by foreign foundations, to take advantage of low salaries paid to scientists. Applied research is nearly absent. New technology is imported and adapted, mostly by multinationals and Brazilian associates. "Western" culture is "brazilianized" by imitation (e.g. cinema).

3. The democratic-populist scenario

3.1. Political power structure

The block in power: an amalgam of parties, trade-unions, intellectuals and
technocrats (including military) representing all types of monopolistic capital, competitive capital (owner managed enterprises), workers and peasants. The hegemony in this interclass alliance may well be with managers of state enterprises, nationalist technocrats (conspicuously military) and Brazilian-owned competitive capital (the mass of which is in agriculture). Power will be based on electoral majorities and armed forces. Regional and local interests have some autonomy and more bargaining power (than in the previous scenario).

3.2. Structure of social dominance

Capital, in its several forms, is the dominating power, checked, however, by unionized wage-workers in "modern" branches: heavy industry, engineering, transports, schools, hospitals, etc. The income distribution becomes somewhat less concentrated to the benefit of these workers -- possibly the quintile below the decile of highest incomes. Small entrepreneurs get more protection from the State, but this only attenuates the effects of business fluctuations. Lowly skilled workers have their incomes increased in absolute but decreased in relative terms. The discriminated groups improve somewhat their incomes, to the degree they are able to organize themselves (e.g.: women more than old workers).

3.3. Economic policy

Chief aims: reinforce Brazilian capital in the face of multinational competition, redistribute income, maximize growth. Price stability and balance of payments equilibrium are secondary aims, unless inflation and/or balance of payments deficits get out of hand.

Means: State regulation and control of foreign capital, an "active" labour policy, granting new rights to organized workers, extension of frequent indexing to wages, expansion of investments by state enterprises. Foreign investment will be increasingly forced to take the form of joint ventures, formally controlled by Brazilian capital. Heavy subsidies for Brazilian private capital. Export promotion to the extent necessary only to equilibrate the Balance of Payments. Return to import substitution as the main industrialization strategy.

3.4. Patterns of domestic and external demand

Domestic demand: a sizable part of it originates from middle income groups, for durables (cheap cars, domestic appliances) and mass services (schooling, health assistance, domestic tourism etc.). Demand for food, clothes, cheap housing, urban mass transport grows at a lesser scale.

External demand: the steady rise of the cost of rural and urban labour forces Brazil out of "traditional" primary goods markets and restrains the growth of its share in "non-traditional" primary goods as well as manufactured goods markets. Restrictions on multinationals occasions the loss of foreign markets of manufactures.
As a whole, external demand grows less than domestic demand, making import substitution a top priority.

3.5. Structure of output and employment

Expansion of the production of mass-produced durables and services (health, schools, urban transport, water and drainage). Agricultural output grows less due to smaller exports and limited increase of domestic demand for food (except animal products). The production of luxury consumer goods grows less, except new import substituting branches. The growth of rural wages hastens agricultural mechanization, halting the growth of employment in this sector. As a consequence, large rural to urban migration. Acute inflationary pressures impose stabilization policies, which limit growth of output and employment. When unemployment becomes unbearable, it is alleviated by public works. A dole system becomes operative.

3.6. Regional development

Some investments are made by the State, State enterprises and private capital (moved by special incentives) in less developed areas, particularly in the Northeast. Creation of a few growth poles, which attract unemployed migrants from the surrounding areas. Long distance migrations diminish, except for school leavers (high schools). By and large regional unevenness remains at approximately present levels, due to continuing concentration of investments in a few privileged metropolitan areas, except "run-away" plants expelled by the pressure of organized labour, but which settle nearby (from S. Paulo to Minas, for instance).

3.7. Population

Mortality declines but fertility diminishes at a quicker pace. Population growth falls less than in the military-technocratic scenario because mortality -- due to income redistribution -- is lower. Population will be over 200 million at the end of the century.

3.8. External policy

External policy is militantly pro-Third World. Close alliance with other leading Third World nations, demanding opening of First World markets for Third World manufactures and primary exports price guarantees. Attempts at economic integration with other (preferably Latin American) countries, largely failing due to the resistance of affected interests in Brazil as well as in the other countries. Multinationalization of state enterprises (Petrobras, Banco do Brasil) by branching-out in Third World countries.

3.9. Education, science, technology and culture

Growing demand for education by working class families, as the chief channel of social upgrading, elicits the expansion of the schooling system, in which public schools, providing free education, prevail over private (paid) ones. As a consequence, income differentials resulting from academic
degrees tend to narrow. Unemployed and lowly paid school leavers engage in militant actions, radicalizing the political scene. Applied research and autonomous technological development replaces some technology imports, as state firms replace some multinationals in "strategic" areas like that of energy. "Native" culture is promoted by state funds: subsidies for film makers, theatre producers, publishers.

4. The socialist scenario

4.1. Political power structure

The block in power is formed by several working-class parties and non-party groups -- religious movements, unions, cooperatives and so on, representing different sections of the working population: industrial and service workers, peasants, intellectuals, self-employed etc. besides discriminated groups (negroes, women, etc). Hegemony is exercised by the largest urban-based workers party (or parties front). Most central decision-making is done by directly elected councils. Local power is, whenever feasible, exercised by direct participation in assemblies. Far reaching descentralization of power: self-management of communes, enterprises, schools, hospitals, churches. Officers of the armed forces are elected and advised by appointed experts.

Government functions are performed by majority representation, while the minority performs the usual functions of opposition in all councils.

4.2. Structure of social dominance

Thoroughly democratic procedures minimize the dominance of those in authority: intellectuals, political leaders and administration officials. Incomes are determined by a mixed system of basic wages, aiming at needs satisfaction, supplemented by incentive payments to reward performance. Inequalities are held in check through rules arrived at by common consent. Self-employed workers are free to engage in any activity and may hire helpers as long as they share with them the income derived from their common activity. Only individual means of production may be held in private property. The same applies to land: peasants are free to remain independent or join cooperatives. They may hold land in private property to the extent that may be adequately cultivated by family labour power.

4.3. Economic policy

Priorities: increase general consumption patterns, reduce the time spent in non-creative work, enable all working people to perform intellectual tasks and to participate in decision-making at all levels. Subordinate aims: avoid unemployment, idle capacity and the waste of resources; reduce external dependency, not in the sense of pulling out of the international division of labour but of liquidating external debts.

Means: planning at all levels -- national, regional and local -- coupled with the limited use of the market mechanism, mainly in the distribution of goods and services to final consumers; foreign trade is centrally con-
trolled to assure that scarce foreign resources are used according to dem-
ocratically established priorities. To implement national planning targets,
investments in physical production capacity and human resources are promoted
by means of sectoral investment funds. Enterprises are self-managed and
controlled by consumers through the market and financial bodies that manage
investment funds. Major issues are decided, after thorough debate, by di-
rect vote of all concerned.

4.4. Patterns of domestic and external demand

Domestic demand: a large part is for social services (schools, health
assistance, entertainment, sports, etc.); basic needs are paramount: nutri-
tion, housing, sanitary services, transport and communications. Works of
art are mostly devoted to collective consumption. Instead of luxury goods,
new products, locally created or brought from abroad, are made available
to "avant-garde" groups of consumers -- youngsters, artists, intellectuals.
Former new products are continuously introduced into general consumption
by means of mass production. External demand: Brazil exports primary goods
and manufactures, according to long-run trade agreements which harmonize
national economic plans of several countries. Similar agreements are made
also with multinationals of capitalist countries and any suitable trade
partner which can be trusted. Such treaties regulate also Brazil's role in
the international division of scientific work and technological development.
This role determines which productive sectors are developed in Brazil in
order to fulfill external demands.

4.5. Structure of output and employment

A large part of the available social labour time is devoted to social ser-
vices and the satisfaction of basic needs. As a result of technological
advances, employment in material production is relatively small. Most
employment is in services, a sizable part of it in non-productive activities:
scientific and artistic work, political and ideological activities, the
creation and resolution of conflicts at all social levels: family, enter-
prise, school, church, commune, state, country. Democratic procedures are
very time demanding and, beyond a certain limit, this has to be social la-
bour time. In order that all be able to participate meaningfully in po-
litical life, some must spend a sizable part of their labour time in po-
litical activity. There remains residual unemployment of "unemployables":
people too old or otherwise unable to adapt to new conditions of work
and social interaction; people that don't possess needed skills and aren't,
for some reason, getting them through training or work.

4.6. Regional development

Investments are distributed throughout the national urban net and adjoining
rural areas, according to objective criteria -- availability of human and
natural resources, linkages to existing productive activities etc. -- and
to subjective criteria -- preferences of regional populations, assessed by
vote. Each major location decision is negotiated in representative planning
councils. The location of smaller investments is decided by "bundles" for
each region, in which final decisions, for each project, are made by ne-
gotiation and vote. Regional differences remain, however, not in the form of large differentials in consumption but in the quality of services. Areas that were developed first (Rio, S. Paulo) have more skilled professionals, like physicians, teachers, artists, cooks etc., and it takes a long time until such inequalities are overcome. Interregional migrations are very small, mainly to areas where new discoveries of natural resources are exploited. Rural to town and town to metropolis migration continues; its main motivation is the larger availability of services -- from schools and hospitals to entertainment -- in urban centers and their better quality in metropoles.

4.7. Population

Mortality and fertility are at "modern" low levels. Liberated women have few or no children but traditional women have more children now because of greater social support for motherhood. Fertility differentials are large and seem not to vanish. Part of the population has abolished the domestic economy, living in "communes" with socialized consumption services. Their children are raised by specialists in children's communes and keep only affective contacts with their parents. Another part of the population keeps the traditional home economy with the division of domestic labour shifting from strictly sexual (women have the main responsibility for home chores) to egalitarian. Part of the women are full-time housewives, getting payment for performing social duties (like raising children or taking care of old or ailing relatives). Such payments correspond to the expenses that would be made if such care were provided by social institutions. Fathers of traditional families receive a wage supplement for each not-working dependent.

4.8. External policy

Brazil is closely related to countries that adopt similar regimes. They form a political and military alliance to balance the power of other capitalist and so-called "socialist" blocks. Inside the block to which Brazil belongs, economic integration is in process, but progress is slow since each step is subjected to a cost-benefit calculation by each member-country. A gradual opening of national borders -- free movements of citizen for travel or migration, free exchange of news, ideas and non-economic goods (gifts) -- is scheduled. The whole process is slowed down each time a new country enters the alliance and that happens often. Relations with capitalist and "socialist" countries are based on reciprocity: trade agreements are limited in scope and time, financial dealings are made only to finance the exchange of "real goods" (commodities and transport, insurance and technical services).

4.9. Education, science, technology and culture

Schooling is free and open for all in every degree, including university undergraduate and graduate courses. This is meant to obliterate the difference between manual and intellectual work. Access to higher levels of schooling, above the obligatory years of primary and secondary, is limited
by minimal work-time requirements. Every candidate must have worked a
number of years before being allowed into the next stage. In that way
the number of students is adjusted to the capacity of higher schooling
facilities. Schools are self-managed and in institutions of higher learn-
ing the distinction between teacher and student is fading out.

An increasing part of the scientific work is done by part-time workers, who
also perform routine tasks in production. Loss of time and effort by spe-
cialists is compensated by closer binding of theory to practice. There
are many experiments of combining scientific and productive work. The
evaluation of these experiments occasions much debate and some political
fight.

Technological development is closely related to the needs of productive
activities. The choice among technological alternatives is made according
not only to economic efficiency but also to the quality of work each one
requires, to environmental consequences and other factors relevant for the
population. Evaluation procedures and results are hotly debated and fought
over.

Artists, writers and other cultural producers are divided into two groups:
one of social producers -- their works are consumed in large scale and they
are paid from social funds; another of individual producers -- they try to
sell their products themselves and live from what they get. Many of the
last are part-time productive workers. Entrance in the first group is de-
cided by representative councils and formally the main criterium should be
acceptance of the work by the public. Any producer that has enough sup-
porters has the right to have his works industrially produced or reproduced,
but quite a number of them prefer handicraft production, in order to keep
their freedom and independence.
Abstract: The paper starts from the assumption that development comes first, socialism only afterwards; hence the major transformations that have taken place since 1917 in Russia, and subsequently in Eastern Europe, can be described more accurately as a model of development strategy, rather than one of socialism. The relevance of this model to the debate on development derives from the fact that it informs about the non-capitalist path to industrialism of a backward peasant country - the issues, obstacles, and choices, it faces.

The model is built on two basic principles (economic planning and state ownership of means of production); its crucial elements are: all-out mobilization of national potential, high investment ratio to ensure rapid industrialization, cultural revolution - all assembled into one single long-term plan. The paper recalls that on major issues like investment ration, sources of accumulation, cooperatives or collective farms, there was a clash of forces and viewpoints, revealing the choices available in a development strategy and the implications, particularly social and political, which one choice or another may have in individual cases. A sober assessment of the successes in industrialization, planning, education is accompanied by an analysis of the weakest point - agriculture - probing deeply into the causes of its failure. Finally, the paper points out that the model has now reached its limits; the very political system that enabled the USSR to become a major industrial power and the other Eastern countries to industrialize so rapidly is now the single greatest barrier to the future development of their society into the new stage of socialist transformation.

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LA ESTRATEGIA DE DESARROLLO EN LA EUROPA ORIENTAL

Resumen: Este artículo está basado en la hipótesis de que el desarrollo viene d'abord, el socialismo es la clave. Así, las transformaciones fundamentales que han tenido lugar a finales del siglo XIX en Rusia y, más tarde, en Europa oriental, pueden mejor ser analizadas en términos de estrategia de desarrollo que en términos de socialismo. El enfoque de este artículo busca profundizar en el debate sobre el desarrollo en Europa oriental y sus implicaciones para los países del Este. Se analizan los modelos de desarrollo existentes y las implicaciones sociales y políticas que pueden surgir. El artículo concluye que el modelo de desarrollo debe ser flexible y adaptable a las necesidades específicas de cada país.
THE STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT
IN EASTERN EUROPE

by Prof. Silviu Brucan
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Development comes first, socialism only afterwards — is the starting assumption of this paper. Hence, the major transformations that have taken place since 1917 in Russia, and subsequently in Eastern Europe, can be described more accurately as a model of development strategy rather than one of socialism.

However, it is only in recent years that people in this part of the world have reluctantly accepted the idea that the concept of development also applies to their societies. As far back as 1960, a statement of Communist Parties in Moscow was asserting that the content and direction of human society and world politics are determined principally by the world socialist system. Such an assessment could only originate in an overestimation of the politico-military successes after World War II, while ignoring altogether the development criterion in the analysis of international affairs. A world in which the gap between the rich nations and the poor keeps widening, in which the international division of labor consistently operates in favor of the capitalist industrial nations and in which the socialist countries are lagging behind the former with regard to all major economic indicators, thus increasing their debts to Western banks and feeling the tremors of the capitalist economy — such a world can hardly be described as socialist-oriented. Small wonder that this ambitious claim had to be discarded.

It is high time to get rid of the apologetic ideological verbiage that has dominated too long the self-portrait in Eastern European countries and remember some basic tenets of Marx. In his celebrated preface to the first edition of Das Kapital, Marx pointed out to German readers that he chose the model of England to elaborate his theory on capitalism because "the country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future". What is more, in Marx's paradigm it is the level of productive forces that requires a change in the relations of production, thus creating objective conditions for revolution. Nevertheless, since history advances in a contradictory way, there may be historical circumstances in which the impetus of the class struggle allows for a big political leap forward, that is a revolution, in a backward country, as was the case in Russia. But not before long, the lagging productive forces will tend to reassert their primacy compelling the political vanguard to fill the economic gap. This was precisely what Lenin had in mind when he started his New Economic Policy (NEP). Ever since, the catching up with central capitalism economically has been the fundamental strategic task of the USSR.

Indeed, to understand the complexity of the East-West conflict one must go back to the very inception of the modern international system when the vigorous expansion of capitalism and the formation of nation-states in Europe gave the Western part of the continent a strong edge over the Eastern part.
It was the Renaissance with its merger of antiquity and feudalism that produced the breakthroughs in science and the historical turning point at each Europe outdistanced the other continents. And since the Renaissance was an Western European phenomenon par excellence, it was there that both the early start of the absolutist state, as the maker of modern nations, and the capitalist expansionist thrust established the core of the international system. Such were the historical conditions that allowed the Western nations fully to benefit from the industrial revolution, to acquire vast colonial empires, and to establish a century-long international division of labor between central capitalism in the west and the peripheries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In the process, the former became highly industrialized and rich, the latter underdeveloped and poor.

In Eastern Europe, peoples and nationalities (most of them still struggling for nationhood) remained predominantly agricultural, their strong feudal structures lasting until the twentieth century. Though controlling a vast empire, Tsarist Russia was only beginning to build industries in several centers when the revolution broke out. The country was backward, the people mostly illiterate, and even agriculture was archaic. In short, the Bolsheviks were faced with the enormous task of industrializing and modernizing the economy as rapidly as possible under adverse conditions dictated by central capitalism with its commanding positions on the world market. This task proved so formidable that the whole social, economic, and political fabric of the Soviet society bear its imprint. After World War II similar conditions existed in Eastern Europe, though the military imperialist threat was receding.

Even now, in spite of the tremendous achievements of Eastern Europe in industrialism, there is a great discrepancy in the structure of trade, financial potential, and technology between the two parts of Europe. The share of manufactured goods in Eastern exports to the West is relatively small, whereas machinery imported from the West accounts for over 40 percent of the West-East flow. This highly unfavorable structure of trade is compounded by the privileged position of Western currencies in financial transactions. The best evidence that Eastern Europe is also subjected to the unequal exchange that dominates the North-South system is the growing debt incurred by the former with Western banks.

This is why, the concept of development seems to me a much more adequate tool in the analysis of these societies than Marx's model of socialism that was conceived for highly industrialized societies. Indeed, Marx postulated socialism as a postcapitalist, and implicitly postindustrial society, for industrialization belongs to the capitalist epoch of history and has proved to be totally impervious to the emergence of socialist values. Industrialization, therefore, is a prerequisite of socialism, never its goal.

Thus, what is usually called the Eastern European model is essentially a development strategy model. It is noteworthy that the moment Communist parties in the West came to grips with the specific tasks of revolution in an industrial country, they found the Eastern European model thoroughly inadequate.
Lenin was aware of the limits of revolution in an underdeveloped country as he wrote: "After the triumph of the proletarian revolution even in only one of the advanced countries, it is highly probable that a radical change will occur, namely very soon Russia will no longer be a model nation, but will be again a backward country both from a "Soviet" and "Socialist" viewpoint."

Actually, stripped of the Stalinist ideological robe, the Russian Revolution was the first in history when a backward country embarked on a non-capitalist path to industrialism. It is from this angle that the Eastern European model becomes relevant to the current debate on development.

Having said this, I only need to add that while this model deals with basic problems confronting all underdeveloped nations, each and everyone of these nations presents a wide spectrum of economic, social, cultural, and political configurations and traditions that require special attention. Therefore, I propose to show that in the formative stage of the model there was a clash between competing forces and viewpoints on various facets of development, some of which may prove more adequate to individual nations than the one that eventually prevailed under particular contingencies in Eastern Europe.

I am aware that there is a large body of Western historians and political scientists who maintain that forced industrialization and collectivization with all that went with them under Stalin's rule was the logical, irresistible outcome of revolution in a backward country. This is a deterministic view (I do not share), which paradoxically, but not without explanation, had been advocated by Stalin himself. In fact, there is today plenty of evidence that opposite platforms and programs clashed out in public, in the columns of Pravda and at Party congresses; moreover, an alternative strategy formulated by Bukharin and supported by Rykov (premier), Tomskii (leader of trade-unions) etc. was predominant for almost a decade in the Party. In general, the Bolshevik Party up to 1936 was far more diverse in character than is often imagined.

1. THE MODEL

Two basic principles underlie the Eastern European development strategy: (a) to achieve rapid economic development, comprehensive economic planning is indispensable, and (b) real and effective planning is possible only in a society in which the means of production and resources are owned and controlled by the State.

The crucial elements of the model are: the all-out mobilization of national potential, material and human, a regular allocation of a high percentage of the national income for development with a view of ensuring rapid industrialization; a cultural revolution, starting with eradication of illiteracy, training of manpower, engineers and scientists; all these elements are assembled into a single long-term plan elaborated and directed by the State.

1a. The Investment Ratio. In his study on the Future of
the world Economy, W. Leontief confirms the proposition that there is no way an economy can develop at any substantial rate without rapid industrialization and calculates that growth rates of 4-6 percent can be accomplished with an investment ratio of 20 percent or less, 7-8 percent with 30 percent investment ratio, while sustained growth rates of 9-10 percent require an investment ratio as high as 35-40 percent.  

If one applies these correlations to Eastern European countries, one finds the growth rates in the fifties, sixties, and early seventies somewhat higher, betraying the forced acceleration in the tempo of industrialization.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.7*</td>
<td>27.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>23.9</td>
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*average industrial growth of the five-year-plan

Source: CMEA Bulletins

The achievements over the years have been impressive. Suffice it to mention that the rates of growth of Soviet industrial production from the thirties up to the Second World War were over 18 percent per year, while aggregate output increased at the rate of 16 percent annually - nearly twice as great as that found during exceptional boom periods in the capitalist world, such as the United States in the second half of the 1880s (8.6%), Russia in the 1890s (8%), or Japan between 1907 and 1913 (8.6%). The USSR is now the leading world producer in oil, pig iron and steel, iron and manganese ore, commercial coal, coke, mineral fertilizers, tractors, cement, timber, cotton, wool, etc. The other Eastern European countries have also recorded spectacular successes, scoring constantly for three decades a rate of growth almost twice as high as that in Western Europe.

The crux of the matter is what Marx used to call "capital accumulation" - the transformation of part of the economic surplus in additional capital indispensable to enlarge production, i.e. to build industry. How and where from to get it when there was very little surplus - that was the question that sharply divided the Party.

Ib. The sources of accumulation. Preobrazhenskii, a leading economist, was the first to attack head-on this sensitive issue. Arguing that in a socialist country neither colonialist loot nor big loans were available, he formulated the law of primitive socialist accumulation, suggesting rather bluntly the need to expand state industrial capital rapidly at the expense of the peasant sector. Eventually, Stalin based his policy on this law.
without ever acknowledging it. Since Marx had described primitive accumulation as "systematic plundering" of noncapitalist economic forms, acquiring surplus capital by "compulsion and robbery"[1] Stalin coined a formula more convenient ideologically "the socialist method of industrialization", claiming that it is different from the capitalist method.[12]

Bukharin rejected from the very beginning Preobrazhenskii's theory not only on economic grounds, but politically and morally as well. He argued that such a program would alienate the peasantry, undermine the semychka (the historic alliance between the working class and the peasantry), thus endangering the regime. The issue— he went on—is relevant to all backward peasant countries; industrialization based on the exploitation of peasantry is therefore wrong also from the viewpoint of world revolution. Though Bukharin agreed that Soviet industrialization would have to rely mainly on internal resources and partly from a transfer from the agrarian sector (a limited and carefully conducted transfer—he insisted), his emphasis was on making industrial growth dependent on an expanding consumer market. Briefly, the situation in industry cannot be independent from the growth of productive forces in agriculture; accumulation in socialist industry cannot occur for long without accumulation in the peasant economy.

The issue of accumulation has thus vast implications regarding both the distribution of investments in heavy industry versus agriculture and consumer goods and the method, how to go about it. Whereas Stalin was to accompany his program of heavy industrialization funded by tribute-like extractions from the peasantry by an intensified class war, recurrent "extraordinary measures" and growing repression, Bukharin was aware of the potential tyranny latent in such a system. He emphasized instead economic means to influence the workers and attract the cooperation of peasants; he advocated revolutionary legality against arbitrariness and coercion. The party was to abandon force as its modus operandi and henceforth stand for persuasion in dealing with the masses—he insisted. In other words, this fundamental division on economics opened up a major conflict on politics.

lc. Collective farms or cooperatives. Already in the second half of the twenties a striking imbalance emerged in the development of industry and agriculture. This imbalance has remained to this day the weakest point of that development strategy. Whereas from 1928 (the year preceding the first five-year-plan) to 1978, industrial production increased 128 times, farm output increased only 3.4 times; steel grew more than 35 times, electric power more than 240 times, cement more than 70 times, while grain output only 3.1 times, milk 3.2 times, and meat 3.5 times. Thus, if one considers that during those fifty years the urban population has grown four or five times over, the chronic shortage of meat, vegetables, and fruits becomes easy to explain.

I submit that neither the ruthless and coercive methods used in grain procurement and in collectivization, nor the lack of adequate investments and incentives in agriculture may explain an imbalance of such magnitude. After all, over all those years tens of plenary meetings of the Central Committee and of Government decisions have dealt with such abuses or mistakes in agriculture, each time prescribing measures to eliminate the former and remedy the latter. There must be something more, something going to the
very roots of farm production that must explain why a country with such a vast arable land (250 million hectares compared with 185 million hectares in the USA) should be compelled to devote billions of dollars annually to import grains, butter, and meat at a time when quite a few industrial nations have succeeded to become self-sufficient on such vital items.

That a significant increase in agricultural output is predicated upon the utilization on modern farming techniques most of which are applicable only on large-scale farming constitutes a safe assumption for any developing nation. The subsistence peasant in backward areas has neither the means for acquiring such techniques nor would he be able to employ them on his dwarf plots. Therefore, large-scale farming is a must. How to arrive at it—that was again a much disputed issue in the Bolshevik party.

Although the discussion was marred by peasant resistance, threat of famine, kulak uprisings and the whole class warfare climate fomented by Stalin and his "forced marches", the initial choice was between cooperatives functioning on the basis of economic incentives and market relations, and collective farms in which the emphasis was on organizing production on the basis of quasi-military mobilization and socialist emulation directed "from above".

Lenin advocated collective farms as the final aim but insisted on the need to rely on cooperatives for at least two decades, describing them as a way more simple, more easy and more accessible for the peasant to come to socialism. He emphasized that modern farming presupposes a complete cultural revolution in the village and in his political Testament said that party policy must center on "peaceful, organizational, cultural work" on conciliating peasant interests; capital accumulation and industrialization must proceed on the "healthy base" of expanding market relations with prospering farmers joining into market-oriented cooperatives.

Stalin, though often quoting Lenin, carried out a policy dominated by his impatience drive of rapid and forced collectivization, his belief in administrative fiat and in mobilization of the party on the "agricultural front" to eliminate the kulaks and destroy them as a class. He presented it as a military offensive: "Different rates of collectivization were established; accordingly, the Central Committee divided the regions of the USSR into three groups". Bukharin opposed such a policy and maintained that collective farming is not the main highway by which the peasantry will come to socialism. Instead, he argued, the peasant would come to socialism through ordinary cooperatives based on marketing, buying, credit. Circulation and not production is the highroad of agriculture to socialism. Through the struggle on the market, through competition, state and cooperative enterprises will oust their private competitors; in the end, the development of market relations will destroy itself—this was the dialectical strategy advocated by Bukharin. If I had to catch in one single key-word Bukharin's approach to agriculture, I would settle for economic means as opposed to Stalin's fanatical belief in organization; every season the party must organize campaigns to determine collective farms to sow, to weed, and to harvest.
with regard to the other two essential elements of the development strategy—planning and the vast educational program—there was no serious controversy, and it is perhaps the planning of the economy and the cultural thrust that resulted in the efficient training of a vast number of engineers and scientists that constitute the crucial factors of success in the Eastern European development strategy. Therefore, good planning and a sustained attack on the educational front are essential prerequisites of a rapid rate of development.

To sum-up: although personal resentments and the struggle for power at times obscured or compounded the issues, a real alternative development strategy to Stalinism emerged in the twenties within the Bolshevik Party and lasted until the late thirties when Stalin eliminated its chief proponents. Stalin's became the party-line, the strategy of industrialization and collectivization, eventually the Eastern European model.

1d. The Political Tradition and System. A legitimate question arises: Why did Stalin's strategy prevail?

I submit that a satisfactory answer could be found not so much in the socioeconomic conditions of backwardness (which did not prevent the alternative strategy to shape up) but rather in the harsh political climate of the civil war and foreign intervention, in the traumatic years of "war communism" and capitalist encirclement that established in the party a tradition of martial defiance in the face of formidable odds. Under such conditions, the party's democratic norms and its almost libertarian profile (Lenin was twice in minority in the Central Committee) gave way to a rigid authoritarianism and pervasive militarization of life on every level; in the process, all the forms of popular power—from the local soviets to factory committees—were transformed into bureaucratic appendages of the central power. The perennial threat of imperialism that became increasingly perceptible with the advent to power of Hitler in Germany generated in the party a propensity for willful and energetic courses of action rather than for the kind of rational, calm, and painstaking approach advocated by Bukharin.

It was on the basis of this heroic tradition that Stalin, in control of the Party Secretariat, gradually built his tremendous power base and skilfully manipulated the party machinery to defeat and destroy every opposition, every challenger to his authority, ultimately leaving his mark on the whole political system.

Then, he proceeded to theorize, presenting his political system as an organic component of a socialist society and establishing a sort of mechanical relationship between political system and social formation. It is extremely important to examine carefully such a theoretical claim since its persistent reiteration all over Eastern Europe purports to turn it into an absolute truth.

To begin with, Marx spoke very often of the autonomy of ideology and politics vis-a-vis the economic base. Engels went even further and pointed out that such autonomy may develop with regard to the class structure; dealing with the centralized monarchies of France, England, and Spain, Engels, in a famous dictum, pronounced them to be the product of a class equilibrium between
the old feudal nobility and the new urban bourgeoisie with "the State power, as ostensible mediator, acquiring for the moment a certain degree of independence of both." 19

Indeed, starting with ancient Greece whose slave-system informed, both the democracy of Athens and the military dictatorship of Sparta, all social formations throughout history afforded a diversity of political systems. Capitalism has tried the greatest variety of political systems— from the monarchical, presidential, and parliamentary pluralistic systems to military dictatorship and fascism— without the slightest challenge to its ruling class, the bourgeoisie, always in power. The only question that may arise is which political system serves better a particular social formation? It is this question that Stalin ordered strenuously to keep in a socialist society. And this is precisely the question that is now coming to the fore in Western Europe.

2. THE LIMITS OF THE MODEL

The very political system that enabled the Soviet Union to become a major industrial power and the other Western European countries to industrialize so rapidly is now the single greatest barrier to the further development of their economy and society into the new stage of socialist transformation.

Let us examine the facts, starting with the USSR. Compared with the achievements of the fifties, Soviet growth is experiencing a continuous decline. The safest indicator—industrial production—reveals a striking trend in that direction.

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<tr>
<td>Industrial Growth (percentage)</td>
<td>13.09</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>5.1*</td>
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*During the current five-year-plan, although the target was 6.3 per cent, the performance was even lower: 4.8% in 1976, 5.7 in 1977, and 4.86 in 1978.

Source: CMEA Bulletins

The decline in the rate of growth is occurring at a time when the Soviet Union has embarked on a large-scale implantation of modern technology in its industry. The 24th Congress of the CPRU put forward the task of fusing the scientific-technological revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system. Now, this particular stage was marked in all industrial nations by a considerable development of productive forces, starting with the USA in the fourties and fifties, all through the 'West-German and Italian"miracles" in the sixties, and the record-breaking Japanese miracle reaching 20 per cent growth annually. Even less industrialized countries, like Spain and Greece, jumped to 8-10 percent growth once they entered the new technological era. Why then should the Soviet Union now experience such a sluggish rate of growth?
There is but one inescapable answer: something is impeding the socialist economic system to fully assert its potentialities, and that is the political superstructure. The political system that was set up to deal with the enormous task of industrializing and modernizing a huge backward country in a hostile international environment proves totally inept to cope with the management requirements of a developed industrial society. Apparently, a conflict has grown between the emerging socio-economic system and the old political system. The latter appears too rigid, over-centralized, and anachronic to provide for an efficient management of the economy based on the new scientific methods of cybernetics, information, and decision-making.

Indeed, in the early sixties a number of Soviet factories experimented a more flexible system of management involving the introduction of profit-incentives calculated to encourage factory managers to set and attain higher output targets, to introduce technological innovations and new products, and to improve the overall quality of production. The new system of management was initiated by Prof. Yevsey G. Liberman, and supported by leading economists including Academicians V.A. Trapeznikov and Lev A. Leontyev. Although the results reported in the press surpassed the most optimistic predictions, the reform was rejected by the leadership. Surely, the reason could not be economic, but rather political; the reform was perceived by the leadership as a threat to its decision-making power. The old Stalinist suspicion with regard to economic means and incentives (Stalin used to label them "capitalist devices") has remained to this day a serious obstacle on the way toward scientific management, thus explaining the low status of economists in policy-making and the lag in the socialist science of economics.

The same remarks apply to all Eastern European countries. Gone are the years when a happy outcome prevailed over the relationship between the investment ratio and industrial growth.

### Eastern Europe: Development Fund's Share of National Income and Industrial Growth (in percentages)

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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>31-33</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.D.R.</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>25.8-25.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>11.9</td>
<td>33-34</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>25-27</td>
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Source: CMEA Bulletins

Apparently, despite the higher investment ratio in the current five-year-plan, the rate of industrial growth in 1978 was lower and there are serious grounds to predict an even lower performance this year.

The series of price increases last summer have provided the strongest evidence thus far that Eastern Europe is not as insulated from the fluctuations on the world market as one liked to think over here. For one thing, the socialist countries dropped out of the capitalist system but could not drop out of the world
market, where capitalist principles and forces are still dominant. This is reflected in the structure of world trade in 1978: while the share of developed capitalist countries in world trade is 67 percent, the share of socialist countries in world trade is only 9.5 percent. 20 Secondly, the era of industrialization based on cheap oil is finished not only in the West, but in the East as well, requiring a "tragic reappraisal" of the whole future economic development.

In other words, the world economic crisis is compounding the internal structural problem, making the solution of the latter even more difficult. For while in the West the capacity of governments to deal effectively with the crisis is limited by the anarchic laws of the market, in the East most of the levers of the economy being in the hands of the state, the responsibility of the political leadership for the economic situation is much greater.

NOTES
8. "Succession of Five-Year Plans" in *International Affairs*, Moscow, Nr. 7/1979, p. 130
10. E. Preobrazhenskii, *Osnovnoi zakon sotsialistichestkogo nakkopleniya*. VKa, VIII, 1924 (Moskva)
16. Ibidem
17. *History of the C.P.S.U. (b)* op. cit. p. 475
20. O. Fjodorov "CMFA and the Developing World" in *International Affairs*, Moscow, Nr. 7/1979, p. 27
INTRODUCTION

Ugandans have just been liberated from one of the most repressive regimes Africa, and indeed the world, has ever known. During the 8½ years of Amin's rule, the country was turned into a garrison state where the specialists in violence - the soldiers - wielded their deadly tools to the maximum in the management of affairs of state. The substitution of political institutions, rule of law and established administrative and business management practices with a series of military fiats enforced by violence reduced the country to ruins. Not only was the country's economy in shambles but the amount of fear which the military dictatorship's institutionalized organs of torture and murder instilled among the people had turned them into helpless objects of pity. With their mental and physical abilities so afflicted, Ugandans had long since lost the will to fight for anything good for their country, leave alone their own lives. The overthrow of the Amin regime by the Ugandan anti-Amin armed groups with the help of the Tanzania Armed Forces has presented Ugandans with a new situation which, if well managed, could enable them to establish the stability necessary in the reconstruction of a new Uganda. For this to happen, a new political order has to be established under which relevant development policies and strategies can be devised and implemented.

FRAGILITY OF UGANDA'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Uganda is a small country but quite difficult to administer as colonial administrators, post-independence Ugandan leaders and now our Tanzanian liberators have come to discover, much to their chagrin. What has eluded Uganda all along is the establishment of a stable political system under which the country could be governed. A brief discussion as to why all political systems tried on Uganda - federal, unitary and military - have been so fragile might be necessary before suggestions for a new political order can be made. Many factors have been responsible for the fragility of the political systems in Uganda and, although many of them are interlinked, for analytical purposes it is better to deal with the most important of them individually.
i) Anthropological: Ethnic and tribal differences are not unique to Uganda, but one can rightly say that the problems attendant to tribal and ethnic politics in Uganda today are largely a product of British colonialism and the type of élite that colonialism bequeathed to Uganda. As part of their "divide and rule" strategy, the British never fostered national consciousness in Uganda. Instead, it was one's pride in and sentimental attachment to a tribe that were some of the values inculcated among the people. As a result, when nationalist movements were founded, they produced more tribal political barons than true nationalists. The majority of these political barons were mere self-seekers and egoists who did not hesitate to use tribal/ethnic differences for personal ends. That is why after independence one finds that, in almost every case where tribal and ethnic differences have been brought into play, the political conflicts that result from the tensions generated and cleavages created by these differences have initially had very little to do with the well-being of the country in general and the masses in particular. For example in mid-1960s, the conflict arising from tribal and ethnic differences acquired a national character only when tribal political barons intent on disrupting the political system started to use these differences for political and military recruitment of supporters. Even then, because the recruitment was not grass-root-based but confined to interest groups among the élite, the alliances that were made were so artificial and brittle that, after the 1966 crisis, it was only political cranks and people out of touch with the political realities of Uganda who continued to use tribal and ethnic differences as a means to achieve political ends.

ii) Economic: Partly due to colonial policy and partly due to differences in natural endowment some areas, particularly in Central and Eastern Uganda, are more economically developed than the rest. Not only does one find the best of the country's economic and social infrastructure in these areas but also Uganda's industrial belt (stretching from Mbale to Masaka) and most of the best rewarding cash crop production (peasant and estate) are to be found in these areas. The result is that not only is unskilled labour drawn from the less-developed to those areas but also the best brains from the former have to move to the latter to find employment fitting their qualifications and to enjoy the benefits of modern facilities existing in developed areas. The same is true of resources. The less-developed areas have become hinterlands of the developed areas, which in itself is not bad were it not that there are much fewer "spread effects" from the developed to the less-developed areas than are "backwash" effects vice-versa. The feeling of dejection by those Ugandans from the less-developed areas has not been helped by the fact that colonial administrative units, which in most cases were drawn on ethnic and tribal lines, were supposed to be economically viable, providing basic social and economic amenities - roads, dispensaries, schools, etc. Needless to say, those administrative units in the developed areas provided more and better facilities. The ill-feelings such economic disparities generate between Ugandans from those economically polarized areas helps to fuel ethnic and tribal tensions both at work places and in residential areas.

iii) Historic: British colonialism in Uganda introduced, and where there already existed accentuated, areas of conflict that have had a self-perpetuating effect on the politics of Uganda. Imported to Uganda was the centuries-old religious conflict between Canterbury and Rome. This led to religious
civil wars in Buganda in the 1890s, the effects of which are still felt today. The other area of conflict was introduced by the use of Baganda/soldiers, chiefs and evangelists in other parts of Uganda. During the early days of conquest, the British used Baganda soldiers to crush Bunyoro's resistance to colonialism. Given to collaborators as war booty were the then famous "Lost Counties" Bunyoro lost to Buganda. These were later to be one of the immediate causes of the 1966 political crisis.

I/ Editorial note: Baganda are the people of the province (formerly kingdom) of Buganda; they speak Luganda. "Ganda" is the ethnic root of these words and the source of "Uganda" - which is, of course, a name of colonialist fabrication, reflecting the privileged place of Buganda in the administration of the Protectorate.

Baganda soldiers under Semei Kakungulu were also used to bring under the British flag most of the areas in Northern and Eastern Uganda. To add insult to injury, Baganda chiefs were sent to rule most of the conquered areas under the colonial policy of indirect rule. The acts of brutality and extortion perpetrated by many of these chiefs did not endear them to the ruled. In fact, colonial white administrators were viewed by the ruled in these areas as saviours, for it was only when white administrators visited these areas that the ruled got a chance to air their grievances against their tormentors. Today, not only do we have survivors of these experiences but stories of brutality and extortion, and the animosity towards Baganda chiefs have also been passed on to later generations. That is why it is very easy nowadays to arouse anti-Ganda feelings in other parts of the country.

As a way of rewarding Baganda earlier collaboration, the British took certain measures to entrench Buganda's dominant position in Uganda. For example, it was deliberate British policy to weaken traditionalism in some areas (Bunyoro) while in Buganda traditionalism was strengthened. This elevated Ganda traditionalism to a special status well above that of the other kingdoms, leave alone the districts where traditionalism was either suppressed (Busoga) or ignored (Acholi). The problem was later compounded when in the late 1930s the British, on Buganda's insistence, abolished the teaching of Swahili in Ugandan schools, replacing it with the Luganda language in Buganda and in all those areas administered by Baganda chiefs. Unlike Swahili, Luganda could not act as a unifying factor because in other parts of Uganda it was associated with the Ganda colonialism, so much detested in those areas. This was not helped by the pride and arrogance which Baganda traditionalists displayed amidst other Ugandans. In fact, many of the problems to which these traditionalists have subjected the whole of Uganda are a direct result of the superiority complex inculcated in them by British colonialism.

iv) Religious: Religious conflicts in Uganda are not based on doctrinal differences between Islam, Protestantism or Catholicism, but on the history behind their introduction. The religious rivalries perpetuated by the Arab, English and French missionaries in Buganda in their bid to dominate the Kabaka of Buganda were the core of Buganda's religious conflicts which led to vicious religious civil wars and animosity between religious factions. This animosity has been handed down to later generations by each of the factions. In fact, hardly does one find differences of doctrine between religious sects being
explained to followers and converts, but the hatred for each other is gene-
rously passed on to the same. The explanation of all this is again found in
what happened in Buganda. The religious differences that continued to mani-
fest themselves after the religious civil wars in Buganda were due to the fact
that the “war lords” who survived the wars became the most important chiefs
during peace. The appointment of the big chiefs and the allotment of free-
hold land to them were done on a religious basis. Because the big chiefs were
responsible for appointments below them and the allocation of land to smaller
chiefs, they also made these appointments and allocations on a religious
basis as a way of strengthening their positions. This, more than anything
else, is what kept religious rivalries alive in Buganda.

Elsewhere in Uganda, it was the Buganda chiefs and evangelists sent there
under indirect rule who brought with them Buganda’s religious conflicts. Even
then it is doubtful whether modern Ugandan politics would have borne such
heavy religious overtones were it not for the politics of Mengo. At Mengo,
the seat of the Kabaka (= king) of Buganda and bastion of Ganda traditiona-
ism, the Establishment was so dominantly Protestant and anti-Catholic that
the frustrated Catholic politicians were forced to find a vent through which
they could right past injustices. Knowing that Mengo was totally opposed to
political parties, Matayo Mugwanya, the leading Catholic politician who had
suffered the brunt of Mengo discrimination, founded the Democratic Party (DP)
(1956). The DP became a national party but found it difficult to completely
dissociate itself from what turned out to be a divisive objective — namely,
to capture state power for use in redressing past injustices perpetrated by
Mengo with the apparent tacit approval of the Anglican colonial administra-
tion. Meanwhile the Uganda National Congress, the first national political
party (1952), had broken up giving birth to the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC)
(1960). There was nothing religious about either the UNC or UPC, but the
latter’s image as a purely secular party was fairly tarnished when Kabaka
Yekka (= King Only), a party formed as Mengo’s response to DP’s successes in
elections to the Lukiko (= Buganda “parliament”), entered an alliance with
UPC. The result was that religion became a major factor in the 1962 elections.
It was only during the Amin regime, when Christians of all denominations were
persecuted indiscriminately, that they were all united in their dislike for
the regime. However, recent events seem to suggest that with the exit of
Amin and the recent fall of Lule from power, old political battle lines are
gradually being redrawn.

v) The Mengo Establishment: The one factor that has contributed much to the
fragility of the political system in Uganda is the political activity of the
Mengo Establishment. Until the eve of independence, members of the Buganda
local government and Lukiko at Mengo were pushing very hard for secession
from the rest of Uganda. They were also very hostile to national political
parties and the idea of direct authority. When they found that secession was
out of question and that national political parties and elections had come to
stay, they formed Kabaka Yekka as a political party for Buganda and only
accepted to participate in elections at national level when they won the con-
cession that Buganda’s participation in elections would be through indirect
rather than direct elections. This meant that Buganda’s representatives to
the national parliament were chosen by the Lukiko while the rest of the
country sent theirs through direct election. This concession ensured that only members of Kabaka Yekka trusted by the Establishment represented Buganda. True to form, most of the 22 Buganda members of Parliament sent by Lukiko were more interested in the preservation of Buganda's dominant position under traditionalism than in the unity and development of the whole country. Since Buganda constituted a very important part of the country, both politically and economically, the parochial excesses of the Mengo Establishment and its parliamentary representatives did much to contribute to the fragility of the political systems in Uganda. Unfortunately for Uganda, Ganda traditionalism is still a major problem 13 years after the Mengo Establishment was dismantled during the 1966 crisis.

iv) Self-interest and ambition of the élite: A British friend of mine once made a joke that very appropriately describes Uganda's élite. He said, "send three Britons to the moon and they will form two social clubs, but if you send two Ugandans to the moon they will form three political parties". A phenomenon that is characteristic of members of the Uganda élite is that hardly does one find them united on political issues. Whatever modicum of unity one finds has such a superficial base that it hardly stands against the simplest of tests. The main factor behind disunity is the insatiable appetite for power by the individual members of the élite. In pursuit of power and/or status, members of Uganda's élite more often than not put self-interest well above the well-being of the masses and the nation as a whole. It is the fierce power struggles between individuals - rather than parties or ideologically polarised factions - that created the conditions and events that led to the 1971 coup. The political vacuum created by Dr. Obote's exit revived the power struggles that led to the survival of Amin until his invasion of Tanzania. Amin's exit has now given way to yet another wave of power struggles, the end of which is far from sight. All these waves have one common result - the destabilization of the political systems.

vii) Foreign interests and influence: Uganda's political problems have been compounded by the excessive interest some foreign countries show in the country's political developments. Looking at Uganda's stock of resources - both existing and potential - and taking as granted that foreign countries have vested interests in Uganda, one is still at a loss to explain the extensive involvement of some of these countries in attempts to influence political events in Uganda. What complicated matters more was the fact that between 1962 and 1971, the leading capitalist countries which were flexing the heaviest muscle of influence in Uganda identified themselves mainly either with elements opposed to government policies or with those within the ruling party who were known to be weak supporters of those policies. The support these foreign countries gave (financial, organizational and diplomatic) to these elements played a leading role in their activities that finally undermined the system.

For example, it is now known that the CIA and British intelligence had a hand in the replacement as Secretary-General of the UPC at the 1964 UPC conference at Gulu of John Kakonge, a progressive, by the right-wing Grace Ibingira. The take-over of the UPC secretariat by the right-wingers did a lot to galvanize other events leading to the 1966 crisis. It is also now common knowledge
that British and Israeli intelligence were heavily involved in the 1971 coup that brought Amin to power. More recently, even the most disinterested observer could not fail to detect the British hand in the coming to power of Yusufu Lule and in the subsequent events that led to his downfall.

It is such facts that have led some Ugandans to blame the fragility of Uganda's political systems solely on foreign manipulations. Their point of view, which is quite credible, is that were it not for the foreign support the Baganda traditionalists and other right-wing elements got during the 1966 and 1971 crises, they would not on their own have been strong enough to destabilize the system. Kenya and, to a lesser extent, Zambia, are quoted as examples of countries which have similar problems to Uganda's but whose systems have survived tensions for lack of sufficient external support for anti-government elements.

viii) **Ideology**: Up to 1968, Uganda not only had an incoherent society but it also had no well-organized, ideologically polarized political factions advocating well-defined policies. Because of the nature of the country's colonial history, not only was capitalism as an ideology taken for granted but the closest Uganda's politicians had come to ideological polarization was when there were clashes (both rhetorical and military) between exponents of feudalism/traditionalism and republicanism/modernism. Otherwise, among those Ugandans who were in a position to comprehend and articulate ideological lines - the clerics and their literate followers, the chiefs, the rich and the majority of the educated, i.e., the élite - communism/socialism were words which (like popery in Elizabeth I's England) spelled political suicide for anyone holding positive views about them. It was not until 1969 (two years after the introduction of the republican constitution) that some UPC leaders, and Obote in particular, openly advocated and introduced definite leftist policies. The Amin coup of 1971 not only exposed the superficiality of the political base of progressives among the élite, but also the lip-service characteristic of their rhetoric. Except for a handful, the most vocal of the leftists were in the forefront soliciting political sinecures from a regime that from the beginning never hid its reactionary and fascist nature. Since I have mentioned above the role Uganda traditionalists have played in destabilizing the system, a word or two about Uganda's progressives is necessary.

The tragedy of the history of Uganda's progressive nationalists is that each one of them would like to be at the top even when this would mean leading a faction of three people only. What Ugandans have come to learn to live with is that progressives spend more time conspiring against each other and multiplying their factions than in organizing themselves into a united strong force in readiness for the expected clash with the small but apparently well-disciplined and externally generously supported conservatives. This was well demonstrated by the flurry with which political factions sprouted among progressive nationalists just before independence and more recently by the numerous factions of groups and individual progressives that sprang up during the later days of the Amin regime. The tragedy of it all is that many of the progressive factions are happier in alliance with conservatives in order to destroy fellow progressives than vice-versa. They do this with the theoretical proposition that at the end of the first round, there will be enough
ammunition left for them to turn their guns on their conservative allies. In practice, they not only end up weaker but they graduate into professional intriguers perpetually enmeshed in survival conspiracies - a factor that demonstrates not only their ideological bankruptcy and political immaturity but also their lack of sensitivity to the sufferings of the masses they claim to lead - even though they are so eager to tear each other's throats in order to do so. The permanent state of conspiracies that ensues gives birth to political crises, the settlement of which has never resolved irrevocably any major contradictions in any of the political systems Uganda has had so far.

STEPS TOWARD STABILITY

Today no developing country can hope to make progress in tackling its development problems when instability is in-built in its political system. This is more true of a land-locked country like Uganda, which has had its full share of the consequences of instability. The way things stand in Uganda today, it is only through stability of the political system that organs of government and other institutions can be resurrected and put to full use. The same is true with the country's relations with the rest of the world. Uganda's present and future economic needs are so great that it can neither afford to have wary neighbours nor a disinterested international community. The country urgently needs the establishment of a more systematic and durable working relationship with its neighbours and the external world to replace the ad hoc one that existed during the Amin regime. Again this will best be achieved under a stable political system through established and time-tested diplomatic and business practices. The point at issue, therefore, is how this badly needed political stability can be brought about.

A point that should be made from the start is that Uganda's political problems need a solution made by Ugandans with as little external interference as possible. An externally imposed solution, irrespective of where it comes from, will at best postpone but at worst prolong the sufferings of ordinary Ugandans. It should be remembered that the 1966 and 1971 political crises resulted from misreadings, or less than complete understanding, of Uganda's political problems by the foreign supporters of internal dissent. Not only did their actions bring more sufferings to ordinary Ugandans but in the long run most of those involved ended up burning their fingers without attaining much of what they set out to achieve. It would therefore be presumptuous for anyone to fail to take into stock this historical trend and assume that the story will be different today. As events since the overthrow of Amin have shown, Ugandans are still the same despite what happened to them during the terrible days of Amin's rule.

Constitution: First and foremost, Ugandans should adopt a constitution acceptable to the majority of the people under which the country will be governed. Since each of the three constitutions under which Uganda has been governed before has had its own history behind it, there might be difficulties in adopting any one of them in its entirety under the new circumstances. There is therefore an urgent need for a Constituent Assembly composed of people of different shades of opinion to resolve the Issue of a new or revised constitution for Uganda.
The composition of the present interim government and the National Consultative Council is so dominated by returning exiles, most of whom made no contribution to the removal of Amin and many of whom represent themselves rather than any particular credible political faction with a political base in the country, that it would be impolitic to entrust them with deciding what constitution Ugandans must have. A more representative body, composed of people's representatives and representatives of national organizations and professional bodies, is therefore required. The procedure on how members of the proposed Constituent Assembly are selected should preclude appointments by either the government or the Consultative Council or both. A more acceptable method would be to get people's representatives by having district councils, composed of elected representatives at the parish (Muluka) level, constitute electoral colleges. Then the other organizations and professional bodies, e.g. government, Consultative Council, trade unions, Makerere University, Law Society, Liberation Army, etc., could find their own ways of selecting their representatives.

It should not be difficult for the government, in consultation with the Council, to agree on the number of representatives from each of the above. Since elections at parish level do not need an electoral roll, they are not difficult to hold under the present circumstances. With Tanzanian forces maintaining the security they have been providing all along, people would just stand behind candidates of their choice, a practice familiar to Ugandans as it was used during the colonial period and after independence. It is my view that the process of choosing people's representatives would not take more than 2 months. Allowing for a month of preparations, Uganda could have a Constituent Assembly by end of December 1979.1/

One of the things that should be in the minds of the constitutionalists is how to produce a constitution that will minimise chances of a return to past political instability. They should therefore see to it that the constitution is specific about how best to establish, among other things:

a) a mechanism acceptable to the majority of the people under which authority will be legitimized;

b) a mechanism through which the operation of organs of government and their supportive institutions will be rid of Aminism and how a return to normal functioning of government will be effected;

c) bodies or committees, accountable to democratically constituted authority to carry out the recruitment and/or appointment of leaders and senior operatives in the civil service and other public bodies;

d) written or unwritten code of conduct based on agreed-upon national ethics to guide public servants in their day-to-day service to the nation;

e) a mechanism for accountability at all levels of authority;

f) a system of checks and balances on the exercise of authority by different organs of authority and how best the separation of powers between the executive, judicial and legislative arms of government should be effected.

1/ Editorial note: This paper was written in August, 1979.
Legitimacy of authority: Although few Ugandans would now come out openly in opposition to elections based on universal suffrage as the basis for legitimacy of authority, many would go to any lengths to stop an election being held because they are not sure of victory. It will be remembered that three of the major political crises Uganda has gone through took place when plans for elections were at hand. General elections were due in 1966, 1971 and, according to some sources, Yusufu Lule, the recently deposed Chairman of the Uganda National Liberation Front wanted early elections - well before the end of the Tanzanian backed two-year period during which politics and political parties are banned. Although it is known that in all the three cases external forces were behind the moves to prevent elections, the fact that many Ugandans actively collaborated in precipitating the crises is enough proof to show that some would rather disrupt the smooth functioning of the political system, even to the extent of being traitors to their own people and country, than subject themselves to elections they were not sure to win.

One of the things that the Constituent Assembly should do therefore is to establish the principle of representation as the basis for legitimacy. It must not only make the provision for elections an entrenched clause in the Constitution to which every Ugandan of voting age takes an oath, but should also devise ways and means by which Ugandans would in future be educated to accept with grace either of the two consequences of elections - victory and defeat.

Political parties: The question many Ugandologists have been posing is whether, after Amin, Ugandans would opt for multi-party or uniparty politics. Since the trend in most civilian-led governments in Africa is to go "one-party", and since in some of these uniparty politics has greatly helped to minimise some of the tensions that are responsible for disrupting political systems, one would recommend that Ugandans opt for uniparty politics as one of the solutions to political instability. The question is, how does one get all the political groups and factions to agree on common policy and one leadership for that party?

To answer that question, two problems have to be tackled. One is the intransigence of some of the leaders. Some Ugandan leaders would rather die than voluntarily sacrifice what they believe in for the sake of unity with opponents. It is this streak of intransigence among some Ugandans that produced martyrs (now saints) in the 19th century. The other problem is that almost every member of the Uganda élite wants to be a leader, which might be natural, but many of these people are so selfish in pushing their ambitions for leadership that they will not accept unity with others unless they are assured of emerging at the top. There have nevertheless been two occasions when these two problems could have been surmounted, but both chances were missed. The first chance was in 1971, had the general election been held as planned. By that time, not only had the leadership struggles within the UPC abated, leaving Obote without serious challenge, but the party had also got down to grass-root organization and recruitment with remarkable success. On the other hand, Obote's firm hand on traditionalists had driven much of the Kabaka Yekka leadership either into exile or into involuntary submission to republicanism while defections from and poor leadership within the second and only other national party, the DP, had driven the demoralized party members into despair. Amin's coup ended that chance.
The second chance was at the fall of Amin in April 1979, had it been, like in Nicaragua, that the fighting force was dominantly Ugandan and/or had the different anti-Amin military groups fought together under one leadership. As it happened, although trained and armed from Tanzania, the four groups with military wings not only remained separate and independent of each other but the intrigues that preceded the formation of government produced a government that was dominated by exiles who had contributed little or nothing at all in the struggle against Amin. It is the manner in which Yusufu Lule rose to and fell from power that has not only reduced the chances of successfully introducing uniparty politics in Uganda in the near future, but also returned Ugandans to pre-1966 fractricidal politics.

What you now have in Uganda are two ideologically antagonistic groups, one the progressives, composed of an assortment of leftists, radicals and liberals most of whom are either members of or have had previous connections with the UPC and, second, the conservatives composed of traditionalists and other rightists most of whom are or were former members of KY and DP. Of the two, the conservatives are more organized, rich and united in their dislike of all progressives. Lule has emerged as their unchallenged leader. The progressives, on the other hand, are disorganized, poor and as factious as ever, with each leader of a faction wanting to be the over-all leader. The alliance that some of the weaker progressive factions formed with the conservatives at Moshi in order to defeat the strongest of the progressive factions led by Obote is all gone with the wind that blew Lule out of office. Those who know Ugandan politics well agree that it would not only be folly but very dangerous indeed for anyone to think that he has the capability to single-handedly rein-in the flurry of political intrigues unleashed by events since March 1979 and that by the end of the said two-year period the necessary and sufficient conditions would have been created for uniparty politics without the prior agreement of the parties and groups involved in the political tussles.

One is therefore led to recommend a cautious approach towards the problem of deciding whether Uganda should go one-party. One way of going about it is for the Constituent Assembly to decide which of the following Uganda should opt for:

a) a multi-party system with either "winner-take-all" or proportional representation as the system of elections; or

b) a one-party system where all political activities are carried out under one political party and leadership; or

c) a system similar to Yugoslavia's, where you have multi-party politics but all parties operating under one unifying umbrella - in this case the UNLF. When forming the government, parties could be represented on their electoral strength at the polls.

If (b) is opted for, then rules should be drawn up and scrupulously followed under which the party would be established. No party or group should be permitted to swallow or stampede others into submission by force. On the other hand should (c), which is easier to adopt but more difficult to operate, be chosen, then negotiations should be carried out between representatives of all the groups to agree on a framework under which all the parties and groups could operate under one umbrella party. This would necessitate agreement on
basic principles and policies, changes to which could be made only with agreement by all parties and groups. In fact the successful operation of (c) could offer Uganda the best chance of establishing a one-party state in future. Whatever decision is made by the Assembly should be put to the people in a referendum which, under present circumstances, would be the only credible way of legitimizing a political system.

Meanwhile, as the Constituent Assembly settles down to its business, which should not take more than 6 months, the caretaker government and the Council should concentrate on creating conditions under which a referendum and general elections could be held. The referendum should take place not more than 3 months after the Assembly completes its work, and general elections not more than 6 months after the referendum. Four months after the referendum should be enough for the party, or parties, to organize themselves, with candidates standing for elections being allowed 2 months for their campaigns. Unless strictly regulated, a longer period for campaigns could be counter-productive.

For the referendum and elections to be held, there must be security. The government's most important task in the months ahead should be to provide security for every citizen. A solution must therefore be found to the daily killings, robberies and harrassments to which innocent citizens are being subjected today. Secondly ways and means should be found to stock the country with at least a bare minimum of essential goods for the citizen to buy at reasonable prices and urgent steps should be taken to provide such basic amenities as transport, medical and educational facilities, etc. which were previously taken for granted before the Amin coup. It is only when Ugandans have security and access to these amenities that they will believe that they truly are liberated and will positively respond to the exhortations of UNITY, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, etc. which are presently being lavished on them without relevance to the concrete situation in the country.

What are the chances of the above recommendations being adopted? Before an answer can be found to that question, a brief look at the Moshi Conference, which produced the interim government, is necessary.

THE MOSHI CONFERENCE AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

Uganda's future well-being now depends very much on the outcome of the meeting of Ugandan exile political groups and individuals who gathered in the town of Moshi, Tanzania from 23 to 26 March 1979. In a conference which lasted four days, those groups and individuals founded the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). Within three weeks from the end of the Conference, a Provisional Government was sworn in at Parliament Building, Kampala.

The above events were by all standards a most impressive performance which gave hope that Ugandans, or at least a body of their leaders, had at last found a concrete and broad-based political formula for stability through unity, which would generate the fullest support of the people for the new government's policies of economic and social reconstruction. Never before in post-colonial Africa had groups of divergent exiles from any African country met (as Ugandan exiles did at Moshi) and within such a short time assumed state power in their country, virtually with many of them not having done anything to attain that goal.
Sixty-eight days from the formation of the UNLF government, the head of the UNLF who had also become the President of Uganda, Yusufu K. Lule, was removed from his two offices by the UNLF's National Consultative Council and replaced by Godfrey L. Binaisa Q.C. The change was immediately followed by demonstrations in and around Kampala and, although the demonstrations were confined to areas around the capital involving a very small group of people - mainly traditionalists, some lives were lost and the image of the UNLF as a unifying political organ was both shaken and tarnished.

Before Moshi, Uganda's well-wishers bemoaned the lack or absence of unity amongst the many Ugandan groups opposed to Amin and his regime. To the world at large and particularly to those who knew nothing or little about Uganda but harboured genuine feelings of concern about the country, the results of the Moshi Conference were a superb achievement. The institutions founded at Moshi and the policy decisions taken there all gave grounds for confidence in the future of Uganda. At the end of the conference the participants at the Moshi Conference announced boldly that they had "brought together many Ugandans and 28 Ugandan organisations from different countries and from within Uganda". They had also resolved "to leave the door open for fellow Ugandans who were unable to attend the Conference because of circumstances beyond their control to join and contribute to the objectives of the UNLF".

That is where the problem begins. The conveners and participants at the Moshi meeting knew very well that the resolution on leaving the "door open ..." was a fraud; because as they were passing it there were a total of 80 Ugandans inside a Conference hall that could seat over 300 people, while 156 fellow Ugandans who had come to Moshi specifically to attend the meeting were languishing at the gate outside the hall. Those locked out included Godfrey Binaisa, James Zikusoka, Shafiq Arain, Peter Otai, Sam Tewungwa, Jack Wamai, Charles Kafuba and Gurdial Singh, who had spent their savings to travel all the way from the USA and Europe, and others like Vincent Rwamwaro, George Magezi and several liberators returning fresh from the Tororo Battle who had to walk miles in the bush in order to make it to Moshi. Paulo Muwanga, the man who had left the battle front, where he was busy recruiting fighters and setting up local administration in the liberated areas, to come to attend the meeting was temporarily kept out and only called in when two delegations walked out in protest against the locking out of other Ugandans. But his internationally known Action Group was excluded. Milton Obote, whom the conveners invited to the Conference as an individual who could take 5 delegations along with him, sent a delegation led by Dr. Ado Tiberendwa but the delegation was also locked out. Sheikh Ali Senyonga, a distinguished Islamic scholar, who had earlier left his job in Cairo to come and join the Luganda Programme on Radio Tanzania that kept Ugandans at home informed about the war, and the only leading Moslem present, was kept out.

The original list of groups and individuals invited to the Moshi "Unity" Conference shows quite clearly that the conveners of the conference used the word "Unity" in vain. The list contains names of groups and individuals who, except for one minor (Nairobi) group, had made no contribution whatsoever to the war efforts. The minor group was the Uganda Nationalist Organisation (UNO) whose thirty or so men came to Tanzania in November 1978, but by the middle of January 1979, owing to adventurous activities and desertions, its fighting wing
had ceased to exist. Three days before the Conference, invitations were sent to some of the groups then fighting. Milton Obote, who was chairman of nine groups that had come together and were engaged in the war efforts, got his invitation two days before the Conference. None of those nine groups had been invited. Yoweli Museveni and Ateker Ejalu, also leaders of known fighting groups were, like Obote, invited as individuals to bring along with them 5 delegates. The same right was bestowed on Dan Nabudere and Yash Tandon, who until Moshi, were not leading any group at all.

The Conference was to start on 23 March, but it did not. Instead it started on the 24th. The whole of the 23rd was spent by the conveners in inventing one excuse after another to prevent from attending the Conference groups and individuals whose presence they did not want. It seems clear that the conveners had hoped that only their "friends" would go to the Conference. They therefore made no rules as to which organisation or group qualified to attend and the number of delegates each organisation would send to the conference. Two "friendly" organisations, one from the USA and the other from Nairobi, were to send six delegates each. Another "friendly" organisation, the Uganda National Movement (UNM) was allowed to send two separate delegations - UNM (Zambia) three delegates and UNM (Kenya) two delegates. The Democratic Party (DP), one of the two biggest parties in Uganda, sent two delegates only. The Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), the other of the two biggest parties, was not even invited, though later a UPC delegation from Zambia was allowed into the Conference.

In their desperation, the conveners resorted to some startling manoeuvres. They abandoned the "Final List of Delegates" they submitted to the Government of Tanzania and drew up a new list which split delegates who had originally been in one organisation or group into two or more delegations. In addition persons who on 23 March appeared on the "Final List" as individuals were allowed by the conveners to invent fictitious organisations or groups right at Moshi, under which they appeared as delegates on 24 March. Thus Grace Ibingira who lived and came from the USA and Mathias Ngobi who lived in Kenya, both of whom had been invited as individuals, combined to form the "Muthaiga Discussion Group" under which they became delegates. Dr. Matin Aliker formed "Free Uganda" and became a delegation. Nine other such organisations were formed at Moshi on the night of 23 March and all sent delegations. But delegations from organisations based in Geneva, USA, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, Zambia and the majority of those from Tanzania were locked out. Since there was another category "Special Delegates" under which 2 people (Y. Lule and P. Muwanga) became delegates, what prevented other distinguished Ugandans from being admitted under that category?

In short, Moshi was not a "Unity" conference. As it transpired later, it was originally called to bring together all the anti-UPC, anti-Obote and anti-war groups to form a united front to oppose the return of Obote to power, because some Ugandans - and indeed foreign powers with vested interests in Uganda - erroneously believed that Tanzania was fighting to impose Obote as President of Uganda. In fact, a draft constitution of the proposed political party "The Uganda National Democratic Front" was circulated at Moshi on the eve of the Conference. But when delegates were assembling in Moshi the conveners learned
that Tanzania would actually accept the leadership to emerge from the Conference, as the war situation in Uganda (Kampala was about to fall) militated against the proliferation of political parties. This made the conveners abandon plans for forming a party and immediately embark on moves to lock-out all those Ugandans they feared would not vote for a leadership previously agreed upon in other caucuses.

That is what the Moshi Conference was all about. It began and ended with a very large number of Ugandans extremely bitter at being excluded from a meeting that was to decide on their future, while a minority were equally extremely jubilant because the leadership of Uganda had so easily been thrust upon them. As fate has it, the Moshi farce was dramatically highlighted on 20 June 1979, when the UNLF's Consultative Council voted Y.K. Lule out of office and "elected" Godfrey Binaisa by 11 votes to 7 to be Chairman of the Front and President of Uganda. Three months earlier at Moshi, Binaisa was considered unfit to attend the "Unity" Conference and he was amongst the 156 Ugandans who were physically present in Moshi but were locked-out of the Conference hall.

What is now going on in Uganda is a continuation of what the architects of Moshi enthusiastically announced to Ugandans as the "Moshi Spirit". Only this time new conspiratorial alliances are being forged because one of the factions that formed the original alliance at Moshi and actually provided the first leader of UNLF has lost to the other in the political in-fighting that followed Moshi. The scheming and jockeying for positions that one finds in Kampala now has never been experienced in the country's history. It has more than overshadowed the real problems facing the country. In the process, the chances of a rational decision being arrived at to tackle Uganda's immense development problems recede every passing day. In fact some Ugandologists are wondering whether with the fall of Lule, and his refusal to date to renounce his claim to the presidency of Uganda, Moshi can any longer be seriously claimed to be the basis of legitimacy for the present government of Uganda.

One way the mistakes and irregularities at Moshi can be rectified to the satisfaction of the majority of Ugandans - the millions who were in Uganda and those locked out at Moshi - is for immediate steps to be taken to have a Constituent Assembly constituted as proposed above and for some of the other recommendations made above to be considered seriously. But this is not going to be possible if what is going on in Kampala is allowed to continue.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that some people with influence in the interim government and the Council are bent on preventing the early evolution of the democratic processes that would lead the country to normality and would like to hold on to the power they acquired through conspiratorial means by yet more intrigues. Events since the fall of Lule suggest that not only are some members of the government and Council in Uganda frightened of elections, but that a decision has already been made to force one-party politics down the throats of Ugandans. When one forces medicine down the throat of a child, the assumption is that the child does not know what is good for its health and that there will be neither vomiting nor purging thereafter. In Uganda, one is not only dealing with a stubborn and fairly literate group of people who have substantial influence over one of the most stubborn peasantry in Africa - thanks to the peasants being self-sufficient in subsistence - but also with people who have amply demonstrated on several previous occasions that they can choose to choke rather than swallow something which they do not like and which they have not decided for themselves.
Reports from Kampala have it that, for fear of defeat at the hands of either the conservatives led by Lule or those progressives who were locked out at Moshi led by Obote, the same influential clique is trying to influence a decision to renege on a commitment made earlier by the Council to have the 60 extra members of the Consultative Council elected. Instead they would either be nominated or, if elections were to be held as proposed, then candidates would be vetted by the Council. Apart from the difficulties involved in vetting candidates from among several people representing the 28 different groups that constitute the front, this suggestion presupposes that the former exiles who now dominate government and the Council are in a better position to know who could best represent the interests of Ugandans than the 12 million who remained and suffered under Amin! In any case who vetted these people in order for them to qualify for the posts they now hold? Ironically, most of the advocates of vetting and their supporters are people who faithfully served Amin as political appointees until, for one reason or another, they fell out with Amin and/or they had made enough money to live comfortably in exile. No, the vetting exercise suggested now smacks too much of the "Moshi Spirit" of locking the majority out!

In April 1979, the UNLF Secretariat circulated a document entitled "To All Ugandans Abroad" in which Section A, para. 3, reads: "UNLF is not a political party of any particular orientation. It is a political front (both emphasis theirs) of all Ugandans with no claim to substitute existing parties as an organisational forum. Its sole function is to facilitate particular tasks which would create the preconditions for a stable, free Uganda in which all political diversity can express itself in a truly free election". It is this position, more than anything else, which prevented many Ugandans from dis-associating themselves from Moshi because of what happened there. What is going on now suggest that this position no longer holds. A recent statement by the new Chairman of the UNLF announcing a ban on all political parties and their activities (Daily News 15/8/79) was an affirmation that the UNLF position stated in the circular cited above has since changed. What is startling is that the change has been made without consultations with the different groups that constitute the front. Ugandans have not been told whether the UNLF has ceased to be a front and if so how this has come about and by whose authority.

Unless force is envisaged, those two decisions, nomination rather than election of the extra Council members and a ban on all political parties, could only be smoothly and effectively implemented with the cooperation of the majority and/or the largest and most influential (among the masses) of the political groups that constitute UNLF. Since none of the 28 groups constituting the front has to date dissolved itself, the only way one could get such cooperation is for representatives of all the groups to meet and agree on the formula. But should these decisions be imposed by a clique, then they would be throwing a lighted match in a powder keg.

A few questions need to be posed at this juncture. What would happen if, because of the manner in which the two decisions were made, one or both of the two parties with the largest mass following (the UPC and DP) refused to go along with the decisions? Already the activities of a small group of traditionalists around Kampala has not only completely paralysed government but has made it impossible for ministers to leave the Nile Hotel, in which they have all been housed for fear of their security for all the five months the
government has been in power. After the experience of Iran, is one still entertaining the idea that a military solution against mass resistance could be the answer? If Lule was removed for acting dictatorially, is refusing twelve million Ugandans their democratic right to elect their representatives to the Council and banning for two years all political activities for everybody except individuals in government and the Council any more democratic? What would the answer be to a query by the masses as to who gave these individuals the mandate to make such far-reaching decisions on behalf of all Ugandans? I hope the answers to all the questions posed above do not revolve around the overwhelming presence of Tanzanian troops in Uganda.

CONCLUSION

With the collapse of the economy and administrative machinery, absence of transport and other social services, acute shortage of essential commodities and the dangerous security situation existing in the country, it is not meaningful to talk about development strategies and policies for Uganda. The establishment of a new political order under which a popular government can be formed is a pre-requisite. A democratically elected government will have a better chance of successfully tackling the present political and economic problems. I believe that the implementation of the recommendations above—from Constituent Assembly all the way through a general election—offer a reasonably good chance of attaining that goal.

As for Moshi and its consequences, it is opportune to remind Ugandans that it was through political instability that the country ended up with Amin, and that it is in the interests of Uganda's detractors and exploiters that the country has a weak leadership that is incapable of safeguarding its political and economic independence. If some of the beneficiaries of Moshi feel that they are too weak to face an election, that is no excuse for arrogating to themselves the right to refuse Ugandans their democratic right to choose their leaders. The security cover provided by Tanzanian troops should be used for the benefit of the masses and not to perpetuate in power those frightened of the people's power.

Lastly, because of the divisions among their ranks, it might be a positive development for Uganda if the progressives were thrashed at the elections. For the shock from such a defeat, and the subsequent threat of vengeance to which they will most likely be subjected by the conservatives, might not only sober them up but might also provide one of the cures to the endemic intrigues and divisions that plague their ranks. I can foresee the unity of the progressives being born out of such defeat, which would not only be a dynamic process but also a healthy development towards establishing a stable political system in Uganda.
When the dust and din of political controversies raised at the Sixth Summit of Non-aligned countries (3-9 September, 1979) settles down, Havana will be remembered for the concrete steps it took towards Third World collective self-reliance.

The Havana meeting was undoubtedly a political meeting, and even the economic issues were considered from a broader political perspective. The recommendations and decisions flowing therefrom acquire significance because of the political imprimatur of a conference attended by 53 Heads of State/Governments or other high level government representatives.

Apart from the Economic Declaration, the major outcome of the Havana meeting is the resolution adopted providing policy guidelines on reinforcement of collective self-reliance among Non-aligned and other Third World countries, aimed at finding speedy solutions to some of the immediate problems faced by some Non-aligned countries, and to reinforce the solidarity of the South for a renewed round of global negotiations with the North.

If implemented, in letter and spirit, the decisions would enable use of oil to strengthen economic and technical cooperation among Non-aligned and other Third World countries and as a weapon in the negotiations with the North to restructure global relations for a New International Economic and Political Order. Though involving many 'ifs', the decisions at Havana do provide a new framework and concrete steps to be implemented without any further dilatory studies and reports.

The energy, or rather oil issue, that came up as a divisive one among the Group of 77 at Manila, had figured at the Colombo meeting of the Non-aligned coordinating bureau and shaped up as a major issue at the Havana summit. It was to the credit of the Non-aligned, oil-importing and oil-exporting, to have tackled it at Havana, instead of avoiding it or adopting the usual tactic of mumbo-jumbo declaration and calling for further studies and reports.

Prior to Havana, a group of experts had met in Georgetown, Guyana, to discuss mutual solidarity measures, and had given a report, not mentioning oil, but suggesting a series of measures in the field of essential raw materials

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and commodities.

At the outset in Havana, the OPEC were reluctant to discuss these recommendations or consider oil as a separate issue. However, almost every oil-importing country raised the issue, and while supporting the OPEC attempts to safeguard the fast dwindling non-renewable patrimony and pricing policies to safeguard the terms of exchange with the North, they made a strong plea for meaningful and preferential steps by OPEC to other Non-aligned and Third World countries to meet their short-term difficulties and the catastrophic situation facing some of them. The Algerian proposal for a new round of global negotiations, within the United Nations, embracing North-South issues -- energy, trade, money and finance, technology and development -- was viewed in this light. Mutual assistance in energy was presented as an essential pre-requisite for global negotiations if the South was to maintain a united front and not become divided.

After considerable consultations and negotiations among some of the OPEC and non-OPEC members (in which Algeria played an important role), the Havana summit agreed on concrete guidelines in the short-term to find speedy solutions to the immediate problems faced by some Non-aligned countries and on a framework of North-South negotiations in which oil could be used as a strategic weapon.

The short-term measures were viewed in the context of the present instability in the world economy, characterised by double-digit inflation, monetary disorder, and persistence of reverse transfer of resources specially through TNCs which adversely affect the economies of the Third World countries.

The guidelines do not mention oil at all but only "exportable primary products and commodities" and are not specifically addressed to OPEC but "to the competent authorities in countries members of the Non-aligned movement, in the broader context of reinforcement of their collective self-reliance". But there was little doubt that the immediate thrust was in respect of oil, though other commodities that may be in short supply in the future would also be covered.

Before the resolution was tabled and adopted in the economic commission, its contents, according to OPEC sources, were put to and agreed to at the topmost level by the individual OPEC members present at Havana. But Saudi Arabia was absent at Havana. However, the fact that the guidelines got the support of the other conservative OPEC members would suggest that it stands a good measure of getting support from Saudi Arabia too.

The guidelines provide that:

- Non-aligned countries would give each other priority of supply for their exportable primary products and commodities to meet their respective minimum needs on a planned and assured basis and to the extent possible their emergency needs in the event of dislocation of supplies;

- this will be achieved through direct government-to-government contracts
(thus bypassing the mediation of the TNCs) and will be on annual or pluri-annual basis;

- Non-aligned countries will undertake joint projects in petrochemicals, fertilizers, agricultural production, pharmaceuticals, transport, communication, shipping and insurance, within the framework of generally accepted strategic roles to be elaborated at an early date for such joint enterprises. The idea is to use existing Third World resources of raw materials, technology, skills, finance, and markets to establish productive capacities in the Third World without the mediation of TNCs.

- Non-aligned countries to undertake collective R and D efforts, with assured financing and participation in benefits, in such priority areas as new and renewable sources of energy and food production. Currently some of the OPEC funds are used in industrialized countries for this end. Instead the efforts should be within the Third World so that no new individual or collective dependency arises;

- existing resources of inter-governmental development financing institutions of Non-aligned and other Third World countries should be more fully and efficiently used, concentrating in areas of priority to the recipients and areas not traditionally covered by existing international financial institutions controlled by industrialised countries. In the distribution of funds, the urgent needs of the "least developed and most seriously affected countries" should be considered;

- Non-aligned countries in a position to do so should increase their assistance to "least developed and most seriously affected countries". (The last two are intended to meet the criticism that existing funds devote undue proportion of their aid to other Arab or some Islamic countries only);

- Non-aligned countries, investing surplus funds abroad, are urged to channel such funds increasingly to other Non-aligned countries. Recipients are urged to ensure security of such investments and to grant specially favourable treatment to them.

The idea is that the petro-dollars, now recycled through Western Banks in the industrialised countries or lent at enormous interest to Third World countries, should be directly made available to the Non-aligned and other Third World countries.

The recommendations are merely guidelines and will need national decisions by governments, instructions by the heads of government to their appropriate authorities, and bilateral agreements to become effective.

But if implemented in letter and spirit, it would go some way to make meaningful in the next few months the hitherto rhetorical talk among the Non-aligned of mutual solidarity and collective self-reliance.

For the long-term, the Summit renewed its call and determination to work
for a restructured international political and economic order with democra-
tised decision-making. The Algerian proposal for a new global round of
negotiations was endorsed in this behalf. The proposal, tabled in the
Committee of the Whole on behalf of the Group of 77, is now before the UN
General Assembly and is to be launched at the Special Session in 1980.

In the beginning several non-OPEC members were hesitant at Havana for a new
round of negotiations that they were afraid would merely repeat the Paris
experience and might merely stall even the limited and fitful negotiations
in other fora, specially in UNCTAD. Some even saw it as a diversionary
move by the OPEC. But the agreement on short-term measures persuaded many
of them to put their weight behind the global negotiations in the hope and
belief that oil, no longer a short-term problem but a long-term one, could
be used as a collective weapon by the South. How far some of the conserva-
tive OPEC members, specially the absent Saudis and some of the Gulf states,
reportedly planning a dialogue with the EEC, will go along with this new
strategy remains to be seen.

The global negotiations on international economic cooperation for develop-
ment envisaged at Havana call for:

1. action-oriented negotiations with an integrated approach to the main
issues and proceeding simultaneously on various issues;

2. negotiations to take place within the United Nations and with full par-
ticipation of all states and within a specified time frame;

3. include major issues in the field of raw materials, energy, trade, de-
velopment, money and finance;

4. the global negotiations should not involve any interruption of negotia-
tions in other United Nations bodies (such as the IPC and Common Fund
or technology in UNCTAD) but reinforce and draw upon them.

The G77 are to hold a ministerial meeting early in 1980 to prepare them-
ves for the negotiations, harmonise their positions, and evolve a common
strategy and agree on tactics.

As in 1973-74, the Third World is once again poised to exercise collective
leverage on the North to bring about the NIEO. But as in the past, much is
dependent on the individual and collective determination to be shown by
the Third World countries. The way the short-term measures are implemented
in the next few months will give an indication of how serious the Third
World is.

Besides these decisions, the Havana summit recognised that there had been
insufficient progress in the implementation of the Colombo programme of
Action, and called for monitoring of its implementation at a high political
level through ministerial meetings of the Coordinating Bureau at regular
intervals. The Arusha programme for collective self-reliance and the G77
decision at Manila an Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee on mutual economic
cooperation was noted in this connection.

Among other recommendations and decisions, the Havana Summit called for:

- early action to bring into force the statutes of the Council of Producers' Associations (even OPEC, the most successful, has not ratified the statutes nor any of the producers associations. Governments have been asked to prod them into action);

- early action to bring Non-aligned mutual solidarity fund into being. The minimum contribution has held up enough ratifications and the proposal is that either the poorest countries should be assisted to make these contributions or the statutes suitably amended or both;

- study of and early negotiations on measures to increase trade amongst each other, including preferential tariff reductions;

- other supportive ECDC and TCDC measures in a wide variety of fields including transport, money and finance, industrialisation, communications, technology, nuclear energy;

- setting up of a food security system of their own by the Non-aligned and other Third World countries in view of the failure of the global efforts. Experts from the coordinating countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, North Korea, Morocco, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Tanzania) have been asked to meet for a comprehensive study, including institutional arrangements, to establish such a food security system. India is already reported to have done some preliminary studies.

The panorama is big, promises are large. But the movement and leaders will be judged by their actions.

THE THIRD WORLD SHOULD EXERCISE MORE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MUSCLE

An interview with Gamani Corea*

In an exclusive interview with IPS Third World News Agency the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Gamani Corea, has urged Third World countries to exercise their political and economic muscle and to put more pressure on the industrialised nations to achieve structural changes in the world economy.

Gamani Corea called for greater south unity and regretted the lack of ac-

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tivism among Third World countries particularly in their relations with the industrialised world at a bilateral level.

He placed emphasis on the bilateral level in his call for more muscle by Third World countries. Gamani Corea observed that while at international fora Third World countries put weight behind their demands for more equitable trade relations and economic re-structuring, in their individual bilateral relations with the industrialised world they did not maintain the same pressure.

Pointing out that with their hold on primary commodities and their expanding consumer markets Third World countries were more powerful than ever before, the Secretary-General felt that "if they mobilised their entire strength, they could achieve everything on the present North-South dialogue agenda".

According to Gamani Corea, one of the principal obstacles to the North-South dialogue at present is the lack of perception on the part of the industrialised countries of the importance of changes in the international economic framework, particularly in North-South relations.

On the other hand, Corea continued, Third World countries have not adjusted fully to the new phase of the North-South dialogue -- the shift in emphasis from the general to more specific negotiations.

Before continuing the dialogue, Gamani Corea said, the 'Group of 77' countries should meet, iron out their differences and close their ranks. Otherwise they run the risk of frustration as in the past.

Although the Group of 77 was not homogenous, these countries had a common interest in attaining a better life for their people, and also a common experience, Corea pointed out.

The UNCTAD Secretary-General reaffirmed that the North-South dialogue should be conducted within the United Nations system. One reason why the Paris North-South conference had failed was that it had been confined to a select number of countries who had not been invited on the basis of UN identification, he pointed out.

He favoured the creation of a Third World secretariat or support institution to provide technical assistance to the Group of 77 in the complex negotiations with the industrialised world, and also the strengthening of UNCTAD as the main negotiating forum of the North-South dialogue.

The present tough position of the group B Western industrialised countries, Corea said, could be altered significantly if the Group of 77 applied serious pressure.

Corea observed that certain progressive industrialised countries who were more sympathetic toward Southern problems, had not been as active lately as at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi.
The UNCTAD Secretary-General did not agree that the increases in the price of oil had been a basic cause of the world economic difficulties, but said that OPEC economic power should be harnessed to strengthen the position of the Third World. The energy issue should not be allowed to divide the South, he stressed, and warned that unless a dialogue was not begun between oil producing and non-oil producing Third World countries, the present cohesion of the Third World was threatened.

The main theme for the international development strategy for the 1980's should be the need to bring about structural change in the world economy, according to the UNCTAD Secretary-General.

The "un-finished agenda of UNCTAD V" will be a main pre-occupation of the world in the 80's he concluded.

WHAT DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTH? SOME INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

by Charles A. Jeanneret-Grosjean (A Scheveningen discussion paper)

The issue of "What Development in the North?" has not received much attention in the past, certainly not in the last two International Development Strategies. Maybe this is due to the fact that "development" has simply been defined, traditionally, by the state of affairs in the industrialized countries.

But today, there is a general recognition that over and under-development are part of the same process at the world level, hence intimately linked. And this is the reason why, in order to change one aspect, one has necessarily also to consider the other one.

The following three points are relevant in regard to the question of "What Development in the North?" in the context of a new international development strategy:

I. One has to realize that the North is in the midst of a development crisis which is shown, among other things, by simply the absence, despite high growth rates in the past, of generalized prosperity, continuing impoverishment of a large number of people, mostly among the young; unsustainable waste of resources (material as well as human), progressive destruction of the environment and natural resource base, alienation and a sense of impossibility to influence meaningfully one's life, growing evidence of negative effects of consumerism, growing number of mental illnesses (maybe due to the lack of a perceived purpose in life), signs pointing to some state of prefascism, growing disenchantment with the official paradigm and values.

These phenomena have been summarized by the term "maldevelopment"; they are in fact major characteristics of the industrialized western paradigm, and have resulted in problems called "stagflation", growth which generates un-
employment, fear of resource scarcity, sociopolitical turmoil, "ungovernability of democracies", etc. Many of these terms are in obvious contradiction with the traditional wisdom of economic theories, political behaviour, having been the quintessence of past development thinking. What has become clear is that the development crisis of the North is not merely a "crisis in accumulation", but a crisis of the very civilization and value systems to which the particular western industrial path has led. It is therefore part of a global crisis and cannot be dissociated from what is going on elsewhere in the world, where the imposed linear, imitative, mimetic growth pattern has been adopted.

This global crisis has to be linked also to what has been called the "environmental" crisis - not so much in terms of "pollution" or lack of "integrated management of resources", but as the result of an evolution which was antithetical, antagonist to the concept of harmony between man and nature, and which prevented, among other things, development in solidarity with future generations, fraternity with other societies, and a self-sustained accumulation which does not threaten anybody.

In this context, one has to remember that the unprecedented rapid accumulation of wealth in the North of this globe was mainly possible thanks to the "old order": an international economic system shaped through the past two to three centuries by the interests of the capitalist center economies, giving them privileged access to cheap human and natural resources, especially energy, and allowing them to use the periphery as residual markets for national production, hence enabling them to overcome the built-in contradictory fluctuations between over and under capacity of production/consumption.

And this is precisely no longer possible, if a "new order" has to be devised and implemented. One would even be tempted to suggest that the North's past accumulation process may just have been a historical parenthesis; it is no longer possible to maintain the present international economic structure unless one would consider the possibility of a world apartheid induced by the superior military power of a privileged minority - a possibility which is not yet excluded.

Hence, the crisis is fundamental and goes beyond the particular elements of the past accumulation process; it challenges the very essence of the present paradigm of evolution in the North.

II. If, indeed, there is such a developmental crisis in the North as an integral part of a global phenomenon (meaning concretely the impossibility of the continuation of the accumulation process of the past and the rejection of such a mode of development on the obvious grounds of the maldevelopment it has produced), an NIDS must recognize it explicitly.

This means that "recipes" of the past will no longer work. More of the same will not be enough although most present policies of Northern governments, while showing signs of exhaustion and paralysis, still try to "manage the crisis" by sticking to defend, in practice, an old order and by delaying indispensable structural changes.
Such policies are indeed becoming more and more obviously self-defeating.

For instance, industrialization policies, as actually continued to be pursued, reduce, in reality, employment opportunities through technological advances (e.g. micro electronics); they deepen social inequalities and create growing masses of people useless from a production as well as consumption point of view. Furthermore, while promoting a consumption and production pattern biased against socially useful goods, the underlying technologies increasingly destroy the natural environment and the very resource base of the planet by using the stock of capital of natural resources (rather than their flow) without preoccupation of its maintenance in the future. The results of the ecological degradation of the globe are well known, particularly in the Third World.

Other examples of such policies, which are self-defeating in the long run and, in the final analysis, detrimental to the achievement of a new international order, are those actually pursued in order to address one of the more obvious problems felt in the North - growing unemployment - and which add to the problems of North/South relations rather than solve them. These include the promotion of traditional growth rates as being sufficient to achieve full employment, by trying to stimulate the faltering demand (due to domestic demand saturation, technological development) through further conquest of markets in the Third World countries. This is mainly the way in which the North defines its notion of "mutual interests", exports "unemployment" and forestalls the very structural changes needed in order to achieve a new order.

One could even argue that in the context of a "new order" the notion of "full employment", as currently defined in the North, must be questioned. A truly new international strategy must recognize the fallacies of traditional approaches in the North, as they will become even more detrimental to the South (as well as the North).

III. The consequences of points I and II would be that another development is needed also in the North. One could even argue that such an alternative development in the North is almost a prerequisite for enabling a fundamental change of the present world order toward good development.

One of the reasons for this is of a psychological nature: the danger of the arrogant assumption prevalent in the North that there is no need to challenge the conventional definition of development, an arrogance which may be seen as the counterpart of the cultural dependence syndrome in the South. Other reasons stem from the obvious implications of the policies pursued by the North for the international order and therefore for the possibility for the Third World to pursue its own desired development paths.

If one accepts this, wide ranging implications emerge with regard to the ways and means for the industrialized countries to redefine their development.

The general thrust is that this will have to lead to much more self-reliance in the North, as an indispensable step on the way to achieve in the long run...
a truly global interdependence.

General policies at the national level to promote advocated structural changes would mean: converting industries to socially useful production (which should ultimately lead to new "production ethics"), eliminating wasteful production schemes (which should ultimately lead to a new consumption ethics) by using renewable energies and resources, focusing on smaller economic cycles (which would lead to much more involvement of people, generating new activities, etc., favouring decentralization of decision making and economic and human activities, promoting local self-reliance). The alternative utilization of gains in productivities of the national economies will require much attention: translating them into a surplus of time, rather than a surplus of goods services (through increased purchasing power) may well have a profound, long lasting impact on change, favouring non-economic values and behaviour and activities not destined to the market economy.

Another development in the North will have important implications on the way international economic and human relations will be renewed as part of a new international development strategy.

There is no doubt that the path toward less maldevelopment in the North requires considerable change in life-styles, value systems and social relations, and that it will be challenged by those who benefit from the present order. It will then be essential to identify the major obstacles for internal change (legal, attitudinal, educational, political, informational, etc.); and means to reduce them should be devised, essentially by giving highest priority to people's involvement and participation, by acknowledgment of the ongoing changes in attitudes and values, and by releasing the tremendous inventiveness of people to device visions of alternative futures for their societies.

In this regard, "legitimization" of alternative development experiences (ADE) and more active contribution to alliances of people and communities engaged in ADE (which are much more promising, profound and widespread than is generally known) are indispensible first steps for changing the North's present paradigm.

In conclusion, the question of "What development in the North?" must become an integrated part of the negotiation process of a New International Development Strategy, as it appears to be a condition sine qua for peaceful change toward a new international order.
WHAT DEVELOPMENT? A THIRD WORLD VIEWPOINT

by Ismail-Sabri Abdalla (A Scheveningen discussion paper)

I. Development is not always good

A positive value judgement has been attached to the term "development" ever since Third World countries have started to change the inherited conditions of their economies. One can hardly find two authors in full agreement on what development really means. Yet almost all of them admit, often implicitly or as something that goes without saying, that development is always good. Critical assessment of some patterns of development led some authors to qualify. Maybe the best known try in this respect was "another development" coined by the authors of the rightly famous Dag Hammarskjöld Report. It has given to IFDA its name, as well as the title of many exercises it has so far launched. In the early 1960s Charles Bettelheim, speaking about underdevelopment, explained that in fact it was a distorted "déformé" development. Other authors describe what they call "maldevelopment" with the obvious intention to distinguish "bad" from "good" development.

At the root of this persistent high regard that the term enjoys, notwithstanding all the recent critique, may well lie the fact that it has been borrowed from biology. For more than a century, economists have been fond of mechanistic approaches and tools. Neoclassical economics, in its claim for timeless universality, is built with tools borrowed from physics; since laws of theoretical physics were reputed to be universal and eternal (at least before Einstein's General Relativity Theory). The so-called "development economists" departed from this much-honoured attitude and reverted to biological analogies reminiscent of those of the physiocrats. This deserves reflection. How did it happen that an old style has been exhumed? The explanation is almost purely ideological. Unlike developed market economies, those of the former colonies were not without recalling images from the "young years" of Western capitalism. Paradoxically the role of world capitalism in shaping them was completely overlooked in favour of the more superficial view of simply impeded evolution that can be remedied within a reasonable time span, provided adequate medicine is ably administered. The treatment of such a pathological situation amounted in practice

Even before the widespread use of the term, when J. Schumpeter, some fifty years ago, introduced into economic jargon for the first time the German equivalent of development ("Entwicklung"), he bestowed onto it a positive value judgement. It meant for his analysis "innovation" that from time to time imprints a "leap forward" on the curve of economic growth. To him, only those capable of bringing in innovations entailing changes in the structure of the economy deserved to be called entrepreneurs. The others are just managers.
- and this was quite logical - to the build-up of a set of more or less sophisticated recipes and techniques outside the main body of "economic theory", which remained concerned with normal situations. The concept of "equilibrium", the central piece of economics, implies only incremental changes, while the "developing economies" have to undergo mutations similar to those that occur during the passage from childhood to the adult state. An adult may be more or less well built; yet he will definitely be more able to cope with the difficulties of life than a child. Only adults are citizens of the realm of economics. The handicapped "young nations" have to "develop" into adult nations at the price of great sufferings and with the help and the tuition of already "developed" ones.

Nothing is more remote from this "imagerie" than the hard socio-political realities of our concrete world. Societies, unlike living beings, do not follow a unique and pre-programmed life cycle. If it were otherwise, why not continue the analogy and consider the maturity and then the decay of "developed" societies? Every social formation exists in specific concrete conditions of time and space. Similarities in the evolution of human communities have been less striking than the differences; and this is still true in spite of uniformization and standardization processes engendered by the expansion of modern capitalism. History never repeats itself, nor is there any possibility to "remake" historical events and processes. On the other hand, change is the essence of existence. All societies have been and remain subject to evolution; the "stationary state" is a pure abstraction. This evolution, be it to the best or to the worst, is always a possibility and often a value judgement. Let us then demystify the term "development" and make it a professional code name for change or evolution without any predetermined positive (or negative) content. Keeping in mind that modern capitalist expansion and power structure have left no people out - not even the Australian aborigines or the Indians of the Amazon - we can safely state that all nations develop. Then, the concrete development of a nation may be good or bad, according to the yard-stick used: the interests of the people concerned and/or the ideological stand of the analyst.

II. Underdevelopment is a bad development

Proceeding accordingly, we can better grasp the quintessence of underdevelopment and, by the same token, resolve an apparent contradiction on its analysis. It would have sufficed to dismiss the "historical gap" theory to notice that those who hold this view are unable to provide a satisfactory and generally acceptable explanation for such a delay. Had we to stick to biological images, we would have said that former colonies are not children, but adults suffering from very severe malformations. But we need not follow the wrong track. The facts (and not the images) can explain the phenomenon in a more realistic and coherent manner. Colonial powers did so, needless to say, with a view to their own interests. Therefore, those sectors and aspects that deserved their concern overgrew in comparison with the other sectors and aspects, and became very much linked to industries in the colonizing nations. The outcome has been distorted, extroverted and dependent societies.
My own country, Egypt, is a good illustration in this respect. During the first decades of the 19th century, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali, the country embarked on a "modernization and industrialization" effort, not without similarity to what Japan did in the 1870s. The experience was smashed by a coalition of European powers which intervened militarily against Egypt. Then came the British occupation in 1882. The colonial power decided that a cotton mono-culture was the best use it could make of the new colony, given its historical agricultural tradition and the "comparative advantage" of the long staple cotton it could produce. Hence, nothing was spared to promote cotton. Irrigation and drainage projects figured at the top in public investment. Ginning and pressing industries were introduced. Egypt built its first railway as early as the 1850s, because cotton had to be gathered from all over the country and carried to the port of Alexandria where it used to be shipped to Lancashire textile mills. A modern banking system was established to finance the cotton trade. Alexandria Cotton Exchange was as well organized as that of Liverpool. Scientific and technological research was financed in order to develop new varieties of cotton as the current ones started to deteriorate. Judging that plantation systems would be inadequate, the colonial authorities decided to rely on nationally-owned latifundia; the new civil code promulgated in 1883 recognized, for the first time in our history, exclusive private ownership of agricultural land. Later, the 1923 Constitution made of landed property one of the conditions to qualify for membership in the Senate. The other side of the coin was its shameful neglect of education (the first modern university was financed by donations and public subscription), of health and, of course, industry, since Egypt had to import cotton textiles from England. Even in this agricultural country, cereals and other food staples were not duly cared for.

Thus, there is no contradiction between our overall negative evaluation of development under colonial rule and the "achievements" that in fact took place. Almost everywhere the colonial authorities built roads, railways, harbours and also some schools and hospitals. They even initiated a few young people into the "mysteries of modern civilization". Yet this led to a hypertrophy of some sectors and activities side by side with the decline and dislocation of others and greater class differentiations. Even in the rare cases where the net result was not more impoverishment of the majority, it is permitted to suppose that a more balanced and self-centered development would have yielded radically better results. The main characteristics of underdevelopment being distortion, extroversion and dependency, economic growth (measured in terms of GNP), and even some industrialization, can be recorded while the country remains underdeveloped. Moreover, if such growth is geared outward and aggravates the distortions of the economy and the society, it leads to greater dependency. Thus, the underdevelopment characteristics become more pronounced. That is precisely what was meant by the authors who diagnosed the evolution in certain countries considered conventionally good development performers as "development of under-development"[1].

[1] G. Frank; Samir Amin, etc.
III. Good development is economic and cultural decolonization

It follows from this conception of underdevelopment, without any further demonstration, that good development consists essentially in undoing the ties of dependency, correcting distortions and achieving the internal integration of national economies. In other terms, a country will be considered developing well only in so far as the changes introduced into the economy and the society as a whole lead to a balanced, self-centered and independent development. Indeed, the biggest mystification of the post-colonial era has been the dissociation of development from liberation. While the latter cannot be imagined but as a struggle against the foreign oppressor and his local agents, the former was presented as the result against the foreign oppressor and his local agents, the former was presented as the result of close cooperation with the adversaries of yesterday. This view is obviously highly ideological since it masks the real nature of imperialism, i.e. economic exploitation through foreign appropriation of the economic surplus, and reduces it only to its most visible and humiliating features: occupation armies and colonial officialdom. Withdrawal, more or less forced and total, of troops and colonial civil servants, was thus considered enough to wash all the sins of imperialism. After accomplishing this act of repentance (or redemption), the former colonial powers become the indispensable andels providing aid and assistance to the "newly born" nations in their endeavour to attain full, adult nationhood. Once more the idyllic image reflects nothing of the sordid realities of subtle, but ever-increasing domination and exploitation. Imperialism is, in the first place, an enterprise of exploitation. It is true that exploitation cannot continue without domination. But military occupation and direct foreign rule are not the unique ways to insure control over the decisions of governments and people supposed to enjoy full sovereignty. With the upsurge of the national liberation movements, in particular in the mid-fifties after Bandung and the successful nationalization of the Suez Canal, traditional colonialism became more and more expensive and even - in some cases at least - counterproductive. Neo-colonialism spread as occupation troops retreated. It is exploitation backed by all the "power structures" that still encroach heavily on the newly acquired independence. These power structures are: military might, factors of economic strength (industry, technology, money and finance) and cultural dominance (education, information, communication). The forms of exploitation are multiple: adverse terms of trade, transfer of profits and interest, costs of shipping and insurance and marketing, depletion of natural resources, brain drain, cheap labour - on the spot or in migration.

1/ When P. Mendes-France signed the peace treaty in Vietnam, in 1954, he declared that the Indo-China war had cost France much more than what it had received as aid out of the Marshall Plan. Aware of the costs of the Algerian war of liberation, de Gaulle decided to recognize en bloc the independence of almost all France's African colonies. The same happened, in a less spectacular way and on a longer time span, with the British colonies in Asia and Africa.

2/ For more detailed analyses of power structures, see I.S. Abdalla, "Heterogeneity and differentiation - the end for the Third World?", Development Dialogue (1978:2), pp. 3-21.
The remarkable fact in this respect is that, in almost all cases, development efforts - especially those undertaken with the assistance and under the aegis of Western powers - have deepened the dominance/dependence relationships with, as a natural corollary, growing exploitation. The characteristic features of underdevelopment: distortion, extroversion, increasing income inequalities, become more marked even though the rates of growth of GNP and industrial output and exports of manufactures seem sometimes spectacular, at least at first glance.

IV. Self-reliance is the path to good development

Since, objectively, industrialized nations cannot take care of our development, we have to rely on our own means; hence the call for self-reliance. One need not repeat once more that self-reliance is not autarchy. But a concept should be defined positively and not negatively: by what it does mean and not by what it does not mean. Definitions are always hard to formulate accurately, especially in social sciences. We have no intention to provide here an elaborate definition of self-reliance. We candidly keep in mind only what terms convey etymologically: for a nation to rely on its own means in its multiform efforts aimed at getting rid of the stigma of bad development.

What does a nation have in the first place? The answer is so obvious, but too often overlooked: the energy of its people. Hence self-reliance is, before everything else, reliance on the people. Thus, man relegated for a long time in the shadow of things springs up to fill the centre of the scene. Man reconquers his legitimate place in development, both as agent and as beneficiary. Thereby the slicing of development into economic, social, cultural, etc. (Which has so far helped only to emphasize economic growth as the engine for change) loses every ground since man cannot be divided. Furthermore, reliance on man enhances the development software: health as well-being, education as free access to knowledge and information, useful employment as a means of self-fulfilment. Development hardware (i.e. machinery, factories, vehicles) is important because it helps in promoting the software, and should be shaped accordingly.

On the other hand, since reliance on the energy of the people is that central, the question of motivation comes naturally to the fore. Why should people work hard or leave their country? Or, otherwise, how can they feel concerned and get involved? The answer once more is self-evident: if and when they believe that the fruits of their endeavours belong to them, and when it is actually so. It is now the new conventional wisdom to stress the desirability of reducing income inequalities. But such a target cannot be achieved through the combination of free profit maximization and corrective state measures (taxation, social security). In Third World countries the crucial issue is the availability and accessibility of goods and services that satisfy the needs of the majority.

Thus, self-reliance leads necessarily to reshaping the economy and the society in order to meet the basic needs. This concept, highjacked by the international aid establishment, sounds almost like a dirty word in the ears of many Third World people. The fact of the matter is that all needs are basic pro-
vided we make the necessary distinction between the need per se and desire or fixation on some of the objects considered as satisfying that need. Inflated purchasing mania is a pathological phenomenon created by big business. In most Third World countries, levels of satisfying human needs will be close to the subsistence line. Of course, things have to improve, but consumption growth will have to be rational.

This reshaping of the economy and the society will gear most activities toward the "home market", at the expense of the present patterns of foreign trade. In other words, it will produce the famous "selective delinking" from the Centre of the World Order. This in turn will further the internal integration of the national economy by liquidating "enclaves", "dual economies" and the like. Development becomes self-centered instead of being extroverted.

But man does not live on bread alone; he does not only have needs but also rights. The human rights issue in most of our countries is dramatically crucial. Almost everywhere basic freedoms are denied at various degrees. Yet it is insufficient - and often unrealistic - to imagine that democracy by representation can be the solution. Without expanding on the fate of experiences of this type in the Third World, we want to emphasize that development as described above needs more than freedom of opinion and universal suffrage. It needs participation in the process of decision-making at all levels and in every area: the family, the village community, the urban neighbourhood, the enterprise, the cooperative, the school and the hospital. Self-reliance cannot be effectively implemented without radical change both in mentalities (cultural revolution) and in socio-political structures.

We have deliberately insisted on the "people's energy" as the driving force for good development. Now one should add that man lives within a physical environment that conditions his activities to a great extent. Self-reliance implies that the nation should draw on this environment in a rational way. It should avoid as far as possible depletion of non-renewable resources and use the renewable ones in such a manner that sustainability is guaranteed. Relying on its own resources makes a national more attentive and prepares the ground for practising eco-development.

Last, but not least, national self-reliance can be enhanced by collective self-reliance on sub-regional, regional and all-Third World levels. Nationalism as an anti-imperialist drive is objectively progressive. Rejecting collective self-reliance in the name of national sovereignty is a misuse of the concept since its outcome is certainly the weakening of the anti-imperialist position. On the contrary, collective self-reliance is the only way for Third World countries to reinforce national development efforts and to face the tentacular web of transnational corporations.

V. Collective self-reliance and global interdependence

At this point one can ask what are the consequences for the world order of what has just been said. Are we calling for the dismantling of international relations? On the contrary.
Firstly, collective self-reliance will provide a new dimension to world trade and, more generally, international relations through the intensification of South-South exchanges. It seems unavoidable that such intensification will not go for a certain period without a certain decline in North-South exchanges. But we believe that the real development in the South will later "relink" with the North after due equilibration and adjustments.

Secondly, we are convinced that the strategies we advocate for Third World countries are, in the final analysis, beneficial to all mankind. The change in the world order is already taking place. Being aware of the need for it as well as of the right directions it ought to take will minimize the social costs for everybody. Development being a process of cultural and economic decolonization, there is no reason why we could never win it as we have triumphed against military occupation and direct colonial rule. The only problem is the price we have to pay in terms of sacrifices of all kinds. But this time, more than in guerilla warfare, casualties could be very high on both sides.

Thirdly, collective self-reliance, by enhancing the position of Third World countries, can give its real meaning to the concept of interdependence. So far it has meant dominance on one side and dependence on the other. Like citizens within a nation, nations in the international community must enjoy equal rights. Solemn declarations are not enough in this regard. Only structural changes resulting in the reduction of inequalities among nations and the redistribution of elements of strength (wealth, productive capacities, organized numbers, checks on the use of military forces) can make global interdependence beneficial and desirable to all partners. Then, and only then, will the world community be formed by truly united nations.

LOOKING INTO INTERDEPENDENCE
by Ignacy Sachs (A Scheveningen discussion paper)

The meaning of words is loaded with past uses, misuses and cooptions. The term "interdependence" entered into the diplomatic vocabulary as a misnomer for asymmetric and irreversible relations between an imperial power and some dependent countries belonging to its sphere of influence. It then resurfaced after 1973, this time denoting the anxiety of the oil importing industrialised countries to set up a privileged commercial and financial relationship with OPEC countries: OPEC oil could be traded against Northern technology, industrial hardware and weaponry; moreover, Northern banks would gladly engage their expertise in recycling petrodollars.

Two corollaries of this call for an exclusive "interdependence" (between a handful of oil importers and exporters) are the hardening of Northern attitudes towards the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and repeated attempts at disrupting the common front of the Third World countries (hence the recent preoccupation with their "differentiation"). No wonder that the word "interdependence" arouses suspicion, mostly after UNCTAD V at Manila.
Yet, an international development strategy must address itself not only to the problématique of linkages between North and South, but at a more fundamental level consider the two-way relationship between the local and national development, on the one hand, and the international environment resulting from the national developments of all countries, on the other. We are thus faced by the twin problems of responsibility for the international implications of national development (or maldevelopment) and of international obstacles to the national development efforts.

International accountability

We live, for good and for evil, on "only one earth". This is not to say that poor countries and poor people all over the world should stop growing in order to offset the negative environmental impacts of our wasteful life-styles and energy-intensive technologies. On the contrary, those who consume the bulk of potentially scarce non-renewable resources, use directly and indirectly a disproportionately high fraction of arable land and biological resources of the sea, while producing most of the world pollution and heat dissipation must, at last, think about a measure of self-restraint. Unless this happens, the sustainability of economic life on the planet may become endangered. At any rate, an accelerated development of the Third World countries will remain highly problematical if they will have to compete with industrialised countries for scarce resources, while struggling at the same time against the perverse demonstration effects of Northern life-styles and labour-displacing technologies.

An international development strategy cannot assume away the maldevelopment crises of the North and their often devastating economic, environmental, social and cultural effects in the South. How to address them is essentially a national question although consultations, exchanges of experiences and concrete forms of international cooperation might be required. But the impacts are bound to be world-wide and, in this sense, the international accountability for national development should be recognized as a tenet of development ethics. Furthermore, all countries from North and South should be accountable to some UN forum and, of course, the Third System as far as the international impacts of their national strategies are concerned, which is not at all contradictory with the principle of national sovereignty.

The UN Secretariat might also envisage, in collaboration with the Third System, to monitor these impacts through special studies aimed at advancing our knowledge about the access to economic and environmental resources, the mechanisms of distribution of economic, social and environmental costs and gains, the progressing depletion of the stock of the capital of nature, the role of communications in fostering imitative growth, etc.

The larger and the richer a country, the bigger are the economic and environmental impacts of its national development (maldevelopment) on the world scene and, therefore, its responsibility for exercising self-restraint as far as the use of scarce resources is concerned. At the same time, national strategies of industrialised countries should strive to create a far larger and more remunerative niche for Third World exports, devising for this pur-
pose more or less demanding adjustment policies. It is only natural that their cost, if any, should be borne by the industrialised countries. In most cases, the moral imperative will coincide with self-enlightened long-term interest.

The principle of international accountability for national development, when applied to Third World countries, should focus on the way in which they foster genuine, socially responsive and environmentally sound development as contrasted with maldevelopment. In the special case of oil exporters with high per capita revenues, an important criterion might be the degree to which their resources contribute to the strengthening of collective self-reliance and, in this way, to the development of the Third World at large.

Changing the rules of the game

However, even far-reaching adjustments at the national strategy level may prove ineffective, or self-defeating for the South, so long as it must rely in its dealings with the North on the present linkage mechanisms in finance, trade, science and technology and communications. The dismal record of international development cooperation is due to the fact that piecemeal positive measures (such as concessional finance) are more than offset by the working of institutional obstacles, discriminatory policies and obsolete rules of the game. For most Third World countries which are "import-sensitive" and constantly exposed to the perverse demonstration effect of Northern maldevelopment, the international environment has been a stumbling block on the way to development if not as a propelling agent of maldevelopment.

That is why the new international development strategy cannot harbor anymore the illusions and the wishful thinking so conspicuously present in the first two development decades. In order to be meaningful, it must address itself in depth to all the institutions (in the broadest sense of the term) which act as linkages between the South and the North and, more generally, jointly constitute the international environment for each developing (or maldeveloping) country.

The task is urgent, enormous and the interests involved are highly conflicting. Hence, the only sensible thing to do is to agree on an agenda, a setting and a timetable for a negotiation package that would address itself to ways of removing existing obstacles, setting up new rules of game in trade, finance, industrial, technical and scientific co-operation and communications, as well as establishing a system for the management of the international commons. We need Bretton Woods II, Havana II, Stockholm II, Lima II and Vienna II combined in one.

To the extent to which development is a process, an international strategy might well address itself, as a first priority, to ways and means of smoothing this process by improving the institutional linkages between individual countries, groups of countries and the world at large, while realistically recognizing that this task can only be achieved through painful negotiations aimed at resolving the conflicts of interest at present separating the North and the South. It may well be that the North-South confrontation will only
enter into a more constructive phase when the South will demonstrate in deeds the ability to go ahead by itself. That is why collective self-reliance should become the center-piece of the international development strategy.

Mutatis mutandis we are again confronted with the problem of linkages, institutions and rules of the game. Hopefully, the conflicts of interest among Third World countries will prove weaker, the political will to succeed stronger, so that collective self-reliance will become a reality in the eighties, changing the whole picture drastically.
Le séminaire a été très riche par la diversité des participants : économistes, sociologues, éducateurs, géographes et médecins, tous intéressés aux problèmes du développement rural et dont beaucoup d'entre eux étaient à la fois chercheurs et enseignants, avec une bonne expérience du terrain en Afrique, en Amérique Latine et en Asie.

On a analysé aussi bien des expériences nationales en matière de réforme agraire et de développement rural, comme celles du Portugal et de la Tanzanie, que des problématiques plus générales. Ces dernières ont été centrées sur les liens entre le développement global et celui du secteur rural, sur les articulations entre le pouvoir central et le pouvoir local, entre les paysans et les cadres, entre la planification socio-économique et l'aménagement de l'espace. On a insisté aussi sur les formes de participation des paysans à leur propre développement et finalement, on a proposé un certain nombre de sujets sur lesquels les participants ont considéré qu'il serait très important d'approfondir les recherches.1/

Nous allons essayer de résumer les idées essentielles qui se sont dégagées du séminaire, en les organisant autour des points suivants :

A. Liens entre le développement général et le développement rural
B. Le problème des articulations (y compris celle de l'espace)
C. La participation des paysans
D. Les recherches à approfondir

A. Liens entre le développement général et le développement rural

Selon certains participants, ce qui est recherché sous l'expression "un autre développement rural" est plutôt une composante rurale authentique à un "autre développement global". Le problème n'est pas de remplacer une priorité donnée à l'agriculture, mais de substituer un modèle général de développement, caractérisé par la dépendance qui a des effets négatifs sur l'agriculture et sur l'industrie. Dans ce modèle de croissance dépendante, l'agriculture subit une rapide déstruction, non pas tellement parce qu'elle reçoit peu d'investissements (le cas de certains pays pétro-

liers montre qu'elle peut en recevoir beaucoup) mais parce qu'elle devient très conditionnée par le marché extérieur, aussi bien par la priorité donnée aux cultures d'exportation, traditionnelles ou nouvelles, que par les consommations intermédiaires et d'équipements importés.

Le résultat de ce modèle, aussi bien pour l'industrie que pour l'agriculture est la multiplication d'activités isolées, non intégrées, ni en amont ni en aval, constituant des segments séparés beaucoup plus fortement reliés aux centres dominants de l'extérieur qu'entre eux à l'intérieur même du pays.

C'est à une telle situation que doit s'attaquer une stratégie cherchant un autre développement, autonome, autocentré, qui aura pour objectif la diminution de la dépendance. Un autre développement, qui n'est pas synonyme d'un retour nostalgique à l'économie primitive et à la société traditionnelle. Son impératif n'est pas de remplacer la priorité donnée à l'industrie par celle donnée à l'agriculture, mais de répondre à la question : quelle agriculture? quelle industrie? et comment doivent se produire les liens entre elles?

L'agriculture devra être réorientée en fonction des besoins alimentaires et autres, des zones rurales elles-mêmes sous forme d'autoconsommation directe et de fourniture d"'inputs" aux industries locales de transformation satisfaisant les besoins locaux. L'augmentation de la "self-reliance" au niveau du village et de la région est une composante essentielle d'un autre développement, tout en soulignant qu'une autosuffisance complète n'est pas possible. Des courants d'échange entre la ville et la campagne sont toujours indispensables à condition qu'ils se fassent sous des formes moins déséquilibrées que celles d'aujourd'hui. C'est de la campagne que viendrait la fourniture aux villes d'aliments et de matières premières pour l'industrie et aussi, au moins au début, le surplus nécessaire aux premières phases de l'accumulation.

L'industrie urbaine, celle des grandes villes et des villes moyennes, sera d'abord orientée en fonction de la consommation interne des ménages et de la fourniture des "inputs" nécessaires à l'agriculture et à l'industrie rurale de transformation. Les unités industrielles seraient reliées entre elles et à l'agriculture, en amont et en aval, visant à former progressivement un tissu industriel complet.

Il est clair que pour passer de la situation actuelle à un autre développement, la première étape sera inévitablement une réorientation radicale de l'économie, de l'extérieur vers l'intérieur. Sans prétendre à une autarcie complète, manifestement impossible, surtout pour les pays de petite taille, la coupure des liens actuels existant avec l'extérieur sera en grande partie indispensable, quitte à leur substituer des relations d'un type nouveau. En tout état de cause, et à chaque étape, ce seront les impératifs du développement intérieur qui détermineront les relations extérieures à établir et non pas les relations extérieures qui auront la priorité avec leurs effets destructeurs et même destructeurs de l'économie interne, des relations sociales et de l'identité culturelle.
B. Le problème des articulations

Une deuxième problématique qui a été soulevée par divers participants a été celle des articulations pour lesquelles on a insisté sur plusieurs charnières particulièrement significatives : l'articulation entre le pouvoir central et le pouvoir local, entre la planification économique et sociale au niveau global et l'aménagement du territoire, entre les marchés et l'espace, entre les divers éléments du Tiers Système, entre le Sud et le Sud.

Nous résumons ici quelques-unes des observations formulées à cet égard.

Sur l'articulation entre le pouvoir central et le pouvoir local, on a insisté sur l'influence et les conséquences de ce qui se décide, se passe ou se fait dans les pays du centre dans les pays du Tiers Monde. Pour savoir ce qui allait se passer dans les systèmes agricoles et alimentaires du Tiers Monde, il faut analyser ce qui est en train de se passer aujourd'hui dans les systèmes agricoles et alimentaires des pays industrialisés. C'est en effet au centre que se prennent les décisions qui déterminent ce qui se passe à la périphérie du système économique et social.

La pauvreté rurale actuelle est le résultat d'un processus d'accumulation déterminé par le centre qui reproduit cette pauvreté en fonction de ses besoins, sous une double forme : la prolétarisation croissante d'une partie de la population rurale (sa dépeasantisation) et la création d'une nouvelle classe minifondière sur des terres marginales (la repaysantisation) et que ces deux formes, de dépeasantisation et de repaysantisation, qui aggravent la misère du monde rural, sont des fonctions de l'accumulation capitaliste dans le centre et dans ses sous-centres à la périphérie. D'autre part, le secteur rural n'est pas homogène et qu'à son intérieur se produit une polarisation croissante. Une partie de ce secteur rural, la moderne, accumule et devient un moteur de la croissance économique tandis que l'autre s'appauvrit. La question est donc : que peut-on faire et qu'y a-t-il à faire à l'intérieur de cette dynamique? ou est-il nécessaire de la changer radicalement?

Un participant a répondu à cette question en signalant le besoin d'établir des contre-pouvoirs. Que face aux forces externes et internes qui jouent pour cette désintégration, il faut faire jouer des contre-forces; le problème consiste à définir des stratégies pour faire agir les contre-forces (celles du tiers système, en l'occurrence).

Le problème essentiel du monde rural actuel est celui de la désintégration de la masse paysanne. Cette paysannerie désintégrée doit être organisée, mais la solution n'est pas la même pour tous les pays. Au Brésil, l'organisation syndicale de cette masse est très importante. Ce n'est peut-être pas le cas pour la Tanzanie? Il faut donc bien étudier et connaître les différents groupes constituant la population paysanne. Au Brésil aujourd'hui, par exemple, une partie de la population rurale a été urbanisée. Elle vit dans la périphérie des villes (les "bôias frias"), ce qui conduit à ne pas trop séparer le milieu urbain du milieu rural du point de vue de ses rapports avec le travail agricole.
A propos des problèmes des technologies appropriées, on a insisté sur le fait que celles-ci n'étaient pas diffusées dans le Tiers Monde en raison des intérêts contraires des transnationales. Cela implique le besoin de trouver des réseaux alternatifs pour la recherche et la diffusion de ces technologies. Ces technologies devraient récompenser plus l'effort que le capital; elles devraient augmenter l'intérêt pour le travail indépendant.

D'autre part, il est nécessaire d'étudier comment pouvait s'articuler, à l'intérieur de leur économie, les techniques plus modernes avec celles plus traditionnelles; il faut être capable d'intégrer au niveau des paysans des technologies modernes avec d'autres du 19ème siècle ou antérieures et le savoir-faire populaire.

Tous les participants ont insisté sur le besoin de donner plus de place au problème de l'espace physique dans les efforts de développement, particulièrement du développement rural. D'autre part, on a insisté sur le fait que les espaces n'étaient pas homogènes, que l'on pouvait définir différents types d'espaces selon les objectifs poursuivis. Qu'il pouvait y avoir une superposition de différents espaces selon qu'il s'agissait du marché pour un produit déterminé, de l'utilisation d'une ressource, hydraulique par exemple, etc.

On a signalé que dans les modèles actuels de développement, par la non-prise en considération des coûts sociaux, on avait gaspillé considérablement l'espace. Souvent, on l'avait détruit sans le ménager pour l'avenir. Qu'on n'avait pas voulu regarder les différentes alternatives d'utilisation d'un espace donné. Qu'encore le concept d'économie industrielle était trop centré sur le 19ème siècle où le coût du transport était essentiel, lorsque nous rentrons dans une époque où de plus en plus le transport peut être substitué par la communication. Ceci donne de nouvelles possibilités d'aménagement de l'espace. Qu'on continuait à accepter comme un dogme inébranlable les économies d'échelle, quant il fallait les examiner cas par cas, en considérant leurs coûts sociaux. On cherchait une spécialisation à outrance, croyant abaisser le coût sans tenir compte de l'importance des complémentarités.

Finalement, on a insisté sur le besoin de déterminer où se trouve le pouvoir pour organiser l'espace et qui a la maîtrise de ce pouvoir.

C. La participation des paysans

Un chapitre sur lequel il y a eu de nombreux commentaires et observations a été celui de la participation des paysans dans le développement rural, puisque celui-ci suppose le bien-être, tout d'abord, des paysans eux-mêmes. De nombreuses questions ont été posées : qu'est-ce que l'on entend par le bien-être des paysans? Qui le définit? Comment éviter l'imposition d'un concept de bien-être venant de l'extérieur? Comment peuvent participer les paysans à une définition de leur bien-être?

On a signalé l'importance dans le développement rural, d'accorder la priorité au bien-vivre collectif dans des espaces de "self-reliance" sur les politiques de produire plus pour les centres et chercher à consommer plus
selon des besoins provoqués. On a signalé aussi qu'un des problèmes majeur
d'une stratégie correcte de développement rural est celui de l'accès des
paysans à l'exercice réel et reconnu d'un pouvoir politique.

L'influence des politiques de formation sur le monde paysan a été analysée.
Quelques-uns ont dit que celles-ci apportaient souvent le désir d'imposer
un savoir, au lieu d'établir un dialogue avec les paysans. Qu'on parlait
trop de méthodes et de systèmes, en laissant de côté le fait que les popu-
lations sont différentes entre elles et que nous les connaissions mal.
Nous ignorons souvent les aspirations des personnes sur lesquelles nous
voulons imposer une stratégie de l'extérieur de leur réalité sociale. Que l'important dans le développement c'était la prise en charge des communau-
tés rurales par elles-mêmes et qu'il serait très utile de faire un inventa-
taire des situations et des cas d'expériences réussies de développement
rural, pour voir pourquoi et comment ces communautés avaient assumé leur
propre développement.

A plusieurs reprises, à propos de la Tanzanie par exemple, on a parlé des
contradicions entre l'influence des bureaucrates et la participation des
paysans et que l'un des obstacles à la plus grande participation des paysans
eur propre développement était le manque de connaissances. Que la par-
ticipation effective des paysans ne dépendait pas seulement de l'existence
de structures favorables à cette participation, mais aussi de la capacité
des hommes à participer et que pour cela il était nécessaire de changer
l'attitude des bureaucrates, ce qui n'était pas du tout facile et dé-
mandait du temps.

Pour l'Afrique, en général on a souligné que dans beaucoup de pays, l'ad-
ministration actuelle, même aux mains d'Africains, n'était qu'une re-
production de l'ancienne administration coloniale, anglaise, française ou
portugaise, et que chaque fonctionnaire se sentait un maître supérieur
aux paysans.

Dans la discussion sur les stratégies pour la participation paysanne, on
a signalé avec force qu'il était nécessaire de prendre comme point de dé-
part ce que pensaient les paysans du développement, de la recherche, de la
formation et que, partant de là, il fallait surtout renforcer l'économie
paysanne par l'articulation des techniques avec leur savoir-faire.

Qu'il y avait des situations différentes pour des groupes différents et
qu'il fallait étudier quel était le meilleur ensemble technique pour ré-
pondre à ces situations afin de produire plus, produire mieux et produire
pour tous.

Qu'il fallait avant tout écouter les paysans sur les succès et les échecs
des divers projets de développement rural et quel était leur jugement sur
les différentes méthodes possibles d'aide à la recherche, en partant du
savoir paysan lui-même. Qu'il était important aussi de connaître le point
de vue des paysans sur les cadres qui les entourent afin de mieux définir
le profil nécessaire pour ces cadres.
Qu'il était fondamental de connaître à l'intérieur des groupes paysans le rôle des élites et la place des plus pauvres, ainsi que les formes de résistance et de révolte et leurs causes.

A propos des pays en transition, on a remarqué que le mot paysan ne comprend toute la problématique rurale et que celle-ci est plus large que ce que l'on considère traditionnellement comme la paysannerie.

D. Recherches pour un autre développement rural

La dernière partie du séminaire a été consacrée à des suggestions sur des sujets de recherche à approfondir en vue d'un autre développement rural. Voici les principales :

. Faire un inventaire circonstancié des cas où des projets de développement rural ont été un succès et étudier les raisons de ce succès. Cela doit être fait dans des contextes géographiquement différents et avec des densités démographiques diverses où l'on trouve néanmoins des économies locales prospères. L'important est d'arriver à déterminer les raisons du pourquoi et du comment du succès pour influencer les méthodes d'action qui sont aujourd'hui appliquées;

. Faire aussi une étude approfondie des échecs des réformes agraires des différents pays du Tiers Monde et des raisons de ces échecs, avec la finalité de tirer des leçons pour définir les meilleures stratégies d'action dans l'application des réformes agraires;

. Étudier les différentes formes d'organisation du monde paysan capables de le faire participer à la définition et à l'application des stratégies de développement rural. On a signalé à ce propos, la nécessité d'étudier les solutions possibles en les groupant par catégories de situations ayant des caractéristiques plus ou moins similaires;

. Étudier les formes d'action et de comportement des techniciens dans différentes expériences de développement rural. Quels types de liens s'établissent entre les paysans et les techniciens dans ces expériences et avec quels résultats?

. Analyser quelles sont les formes par lesquelles l'information et la connaissance arrivent aux paysans. Déterminer à partir de cette analyse comment est-ce qu'elles doivent être transmises pour qu'elles soient vraiment maîtrisées par le monde paysan;

. Étudier les formes possibles d'articulation à l'intérieur des économies paysannes des ensembles techniques utilisant différentes technologies. Quels sont les liens possibles entre ces ensembles et le système social, économique et culturel des groupes paysans qui devraient les appliquer;

. Analyser des méthodes d'action, sur la base d'expérience concrètes, capables d'aider les paysans sans terre, à l'intérieur de l'économie rurale, à obtenir des sources de travail et de revenu leur permettant de satisfaire sur place leurs besoins essentiels;

. Étudier finalement les formes d'action possible des organisations du tiers
système pour appuyer une stratégie de développement qui tienne compte des besoins et des aspirations des masses paysannes du Tiers Monde.

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INTERFUTURES’ ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: THE QUEST FOR A NEW IMPROVED CESARE BORGIA

by Reginald Herbold Green

Overall objectives of importance to all advanced industrial societies ... reduction of inequalities in the distribution of incomes and power, precisely to the extent that these inequalities call into question the dominant value systems in the developed countries and possibly compromising their long-term security. (pp. 405-6)

Strenuous action should continue to be taken against ... growth of wages and interest wage costs in real terms ... (p. 418)

The main objective must be to preserve the mechanisms of the market economy by cushioning excessively abrupt consequences that might give rise to governmental measures which jeopardize those mechanisms. (p. 385)

Scenarios then and now

A few centuries ago the world - as seen from Florence, one of its great centers - was falling apart. The Magnificence of Lorenzo (the embodiment of imperial outreach, intellectual patronage, and bread for the masses - the Lyndon Johnson of his day) had turned to tarnished brass. The moral authority of the Pope (spiritual certainty of the rightness of material gain) had been squandered. Prophets like Savonarola (depending on one's taste or prejudice the Paulo Freire or Ivan Ilyich, the Robert Mugabe or Pol Pot, the Janani Luwum or Ayatollah Khomeini of his day) called out the bitter, despairing masses with a heady mixed appeal to principles and passions. Bands of mercenaries (the Selous Scouts, the Meo "Secret" Army, the Foreign Legion, the UNITA banditti of Italy) roamed the land leaving tracks of fire and blood, repression and anarchy.

A cold, brilliant, cynical man - an intellectual advisor to states - looked on in agony. Committed to order and stability, to the unity of his land, to mastery of the probable and management of the unpredictable he sought to save the future of his own career, of the people of his nation, of the ideals in which he believed. For him the end transformed the means - he was very frank and open in advising in what circumstances it was prudent and necessary to lie, to betray, to repress, to kill to serve the greater good. He sought a vehicle for his message - to win a post of advisor but even more to shape the future. And so he wrote a handbook for the guidance of his chosen leader. True to his own principles, he chose a leader with

1/ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, INTERFUTURES, FINAL REPORT - Facing the Future: mastering the probable and managing the unpredictable (Paris; OECD, June 1979) vii + 425 pages.

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power and ruthlessness, the will to win and the determination to beat down his foes. Even though he doubted that leader's vision and commitment to the "true goals" and though his cold contempt for Cesare Borgia is ill concealed in *The Prince*, Nicola Machiavelli placed his hopes on him as the least bad scenario at hand.

And so it would seem it is with OECD's Interfutures team in 1979. They too face a world in which "the center cannot hold", the old verities are crumbling, the outlands threaten to invade or hold to ransom. They believe in growth, in interdependence, in rational management - above all in preserving the OECD way of life and achieving a new Golden Age of Capitalism. They too have doubts as to who their prince should be (more cautious than their predecessor they do not venture to name one) - both the Trilaterists and the Bilderbergers have in practice proved vacillating, feeble and paralyzed of will if weighed against the demands of this call to action and manifesto for acting.

II. A capitalist manifesto

The three quotations do give a feel for the bottom line in the Interfutures teams' structure of values. Perhaps too stark a feel, perhaps not. Post-materialist values are dealt with in a less than totally unsympathetic manner - but apparently because they are believed to lead to less pressure for employment and higher incomes. Basic needs (once called basic human needs) receive several favourable mentions - precisely for the economies which the authors (quite probably correctly) believe "cannot make the grade" in a competitive capitalist system. Anton Rupert of Rembrandt-Carreras-Rothmans, probably the richest and ablest business backer of the Afrikaaner Nationalists said of the Basotho of Lesotho "If they do not eat we will not sleep" - Interfutures would applaud that sentiment.

This is a serious study - a serious attempt to define the parameters and policies for a "last best chance" to create a new Golden Age of OECD Capitalism with a human face. As such it is a coherent, sometimes incisive, usually interesting piece of work. It is not 200,000 words long because the authors were lazy - it is on the whole a taught document whose repetitions are deliberate attempts to emphasize, not failures to edit.

Change for continuity

It is also an intelligent study - the reality of change is accepted. Interfutures believes the way to survival for the OECD members (to all intents and purposes minus Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal who clearly are not among its advanced industrial economies) is to take the initiative "Mastering the Probable and Managing the Unpredictable". This means accepting a new international economic geography - 15-20% of world manufacturing in Third World countries other than China by 2000 is a target they accept. It means adjusting power structures too - the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) are to be brought into the OECD club precisely because otherwise it will be too small and vulnerable a minority in a world in which too many other economies have some substance and autonomy. For the same reason, also to
reduce intergenerational value clashes and to avoid the need to raise public spending as a share of output, advanced industrial economies are urged to adopt natalist policies to get population growing again.

The one central fuzziness is what precisely Interfutures means by "market" and "competition". The statement (p. 375):

nine European, seven United States and four Japanese companies together produce almost 65% of world output (excluding centrally-planned economies), and the Nippon Steel Corporation and the US Steel Corporation each produce more steel than all the Third World countries put together, which shows the continuing importance of competition in the North in the iron and steel market.

...certainly suggests that market and competition do not mean what they meant to Adam Smith. Indeed while the general rule for state intervention in market's is Occam's Razor there are a host of exceptions - intriguingly including international trade and exchange rates. Similarly while TNC's are viewed as effective agents of mutually beneficial change and construction of interdependency, the danger that they will be too efficient for the socio-political systems of the advanced industrial countries is seen as a real one. In fact a code is sought - to make transnationals safe for the world and the world safe for transnationals.

Interfutures' team most certainly does not view itself as writing a tract for reactionaries or a rearguard defense of privilege. Again and again it attacks policies - of states and pressure groups (whom it heartily detests whether they be workers, consumers, minorities or industries) - which it sees as blocking change in the quest of preserving a doomed status quo. This report, on the contrary, is presented as a manifesto for maximum bargained mutual interest solutions within advanced industrial economies, among them, between them and centrally planned economies, between them and developing economies. It is quite serious in its emphasis on increased food production by and for the poor and on the unsatisfactory pace at which absolute poverty will fall even on its more optimistic scenarios. This is a humane Eurocentric capitalist call to arms in the tradition of British 19th century reformism.

An uncertain trumpet?

This particular worldview and set of convictions does seem to lead to certain misreadings. Algeria (PP. 219-220) is presented as a pure model of an up and coming NIC firmly and single mindedly driving for OECD membership "and the devil take the hindmost" at home or abroad. The notes on social tensions and agriculture read as if the authors saw it as another Iran - the Team evidently mourns the Shah's regime, but views it as having sinned against the precept of not allowing inequalities so gross as to call the system into question (pp. 220-221).

More seriously the North-South disengagement scenario (pp. 314-421) is rather peculiarly handled. First, it uses a quite extreme variant of disengagement and apparently one beginning with a standing start breakdown not
a phased reduction of North-South parallel to South-South and domestic build-up. It is doubtful that Chairman Mao (who raised China's External Trade to GDP ratio) or Bariloche who are cited as the intellectual authors of this schema would fully accept parentage. Second, the model is built in a way showing that reduction of aid to Africa and South Asia would reduce growth of food output more than other policy changes (e.g. reduced export crop production, shifts in state spending) would raise it - on the face of it a most implausible result. No less odd is the view that export crop producers are among the poorest in their countries and that aid usually benefits the poor disproportionately. Third, the report notes that better income distribution results and that investment and growth recover by 2000 (in the Third World). It would be interesting to know at what point the estimated large 1980-90 disruption and 1980-1995 low growth losses would be clawed back and what the numbers in absolute poverty are for this scenario as compared to others. Finally, by positing an extreme disengagement alternative to incorporation with no scenario based on a hard bargaining/selective link reduction/South-South coordination build-up, Interfutures is hardly giving a chance to look at the least unlikely alternative to incorporation. As it says, its fullblooded North-South breakdown scenario is expensive to most, unlikely to arise and unstable if entered upon. But is it the only alternative to an OECD/TNC/Differentiation and Incorporation future?

Ultimately there seems to be a more basic misreading. This is a call to arms, to vision, to charisma, to heroic virtue by governments and those affected by change. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Joseph Schumpeter argued - against his own hopes and wishes - that capitalism (and bourgeois democracy) were doomed because the capitalist had become an inherently and irremediably pedestrian figure without either charisma or moral authority. Effectively he projected what Interfutures would term death by sclerosis. The evidence presented about the nature of the present crisis - and the recurrent warning that descent into a protectionist maelstrom among OECD economies is only too plausible a scenario - in Facing the Future would seem to confirm Schumpeter's vision. What act of "creative destruction" do the writers envisage to achieve a structural change on this front? They do view shock as preventing or reversing sclerosis, so the question may not be rhetorical but the answer is far from self evident.

Since what is called for overall is close to a revolution (not in any strict sense a counter-revolution; the system sought would in Lenin's terms be a more advanced stage of capitalism, and, therefore, one his analysis would argue might well justify proletarian support), a comment from one of Marx' critiques of Hegel may be relevant:

No class of civil society can play this (emancipatory) role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm, in itself and in the masses, a moment in which it fraternises and merges with society in general, becomes confused with it and is perceived and acknowledged as its general representing a moment in which its demands and rights are truly the demands and rights of society itself; a moment in which it is truly the social head and the social heart. Only in the name of the universal rights of society can a particular class lay claim to general dominion.
Are the establishment intellectuals of liberal democracy such a class today? Are the men of Bilderberg or the Trilateralists? If not then the Facing the Future is inherently a flawed and uncertain trumpet.

IV. For the ashcan of history? Not just yet

It is quite true that with only a moderate degree of bias the slogan for Interfutures' magnum opus could be phrased: Privileged of the world, Unite! You have everything to loose if you do not reforge the chains! That is presumably not a slogan dear to the hearts of most readers of the IFDA Dossier. However, that is no reason not to read Facing the Future. There are five rather good reasons why it should be read:

1. it is the best sustained statement of the neo-capitalist case available - if that is the enemy it is as needful to know it as if it is the mentor and friend;

2. a number of pieces are sure to be used - consciously or not - by actors with less clarity, wholism and personal decency than the authors - one could crib a "policy for Pinochet" form the volume but that would be both a libel on it and a stupid misreading as on their own principles the team should (presumably do) see the Chile of the junta as inherently unstable and thus a general danger to capitalism with a human face;

3. much of the data, organization and analysis presented as backdrop (e.g. on population, energy, value changes, time lags) is of direct use to anyone concerned with the trajectory of the 1969-19?? New International Economic Disorder;

4. the international trade/structural adjustment and North/South sections have explorations of options and constraints (freedom and necessity) which are in part as critical to the process of struggle for a NIEO consistent with the speeches of Presidents Boumedienne and Nyerere as with those of Chairman Mao, and with the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States as to the process of struggle for a mutated New Bretton Woods order;

5. if it were fully implemented, preferred scenarios A (high growth) or B1 (moderate growth with agreed alternative values) would be better than the present or the least unlikely scenarios, D (militant protectionism plus North-South dominance groupings of the EuroAfrica type) and B3 (moderate growth with increased intra and international cleavages). Better not simply for capitalism and for capitalists - better, in all probability for workers and peasants on the periphery and at the centre. This is at least a yardstick against which to test alternatives.

V. Differentiation and incorporation: The end of the Third World

Facing the Future (like IsmaI-Sabri Abdalla in Development Dialogue) has it right - the unity and definition of the Third World is in contrast

and in struggle with the First World (and peripherally the Second). Within itself there is heterogeneity and differentiation which is increasing. Naive Third Worldism has this quite wrong - organizing on the basis of the 77 is building a rather unstable coalition along a secondary contradiction because it is antagonistic and subject to attack.

Equally correct is the diagnosis that without changes in world economic geography and global economic management participation there can be no stable international economic system. Nor can anyone except a convinced neo-isolationist quarrel with the assertion that there are mutual interest solutions (of the negotiated not the natural harmony variety) and that Group B countries have an obligation to take initiatives in identifying and preparing them. (Evidently Group B UNCTAD delegations did not read Facing the Future or rejected it virtually in toto.) Many more detailed proposals are equally sound, albeit in respect to South-South it is noticeable that the source of the funds the TNC banks channel to the South is never cited, much less is direct South-South channelling of oil surpluses (say à la the Manila/Havana proposals of Iraq and the earlier more modest ones of Algeria and Venezuela) mentioned.

The problem is the general use of the perspective and the pieces. The Third World is to be made to disappear but in a very specific way which for a majority of the people of the Third World might well have some resemblance to the con man's three card trick. The NICs are to be incorporated into OECD (hopefully more centrally than Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey are today and in this study). OPEC is to be encouraged to venture in Nicer and collegial world monetary management. The would-be NICs and/or significant raw material exporters are to be given access to processed goods markets. The very poor are to be provided with more aid. (China and, for different reasons, India do not fit well so become a fifth and a sixth fragment of the Third World.) This is not a divide and rule strategy - albeit it would have that result - but a selective, graded incorporationist one.

The aid approach is also interesting. More is sought - especially in Scenario A - for concentrated use in Africa and South Asia to reduce inequalities. For other regions, better managed, longer term debt and sorting out the 1980's repayment hump are prescribed. The question here is partly one of tone and partly one of ends. The tone of the basic needs and aid to poorest bits is that some silly elites out there are "so sharp they'll cut themselves" and must be restrained from such madness. As to ends, the regional aid venture cited as a model - Club du Sahel - has been radically criticized as a vehicle for external planning of the region (and for very uncertain and uneven concern with the absolutely poor). With it and Lome near as examples of North-South collegial management relevant to the very poor countries, a certain wary cynicism on the Third World side would appear amply justified.

VI. Facing the new protectionism

The Interfutures teams' two horror story scenario are C (North-South break)
and D (North-North predatory protectionism with bits of the South as appendages of the Northern triad EEC/Japan/USA albeit why EEC would remain in one piece under D is unclear). And one of the counts against C is that it would collapse into D. Scenario B-3 (moderate growth with growing divergence) is both seen as most likely and criticized as in great danger of collapsing into D.

However, Facing the Future does not adopt the Neanderthal Free Trade line of the GATT Secretariat. It sees international trade as requiring a reversal of the new protectionism if major losses are not to ensue for all parties. But it accepts (probably for the wrong reasons) that while genuine adjustment to (not false adjustment to block) change is vital so too is time to reduce social costs and strains. Thus it seeks to encourage exploration of medium term coordination, target setting and management (pp 383-389) for economic geography and trade.

In two ways this is not "managed free trade". Facing the Future is quite serious about seeking trade expansion including special measures to increase Third World access to First World markets for temperate foodstuffs, processed goods, textiles and garments, steel, ships. But, also, it is anti-bureaucratic. A state role does not alarm it - a joint state/TNC body or a state trading body with dynamism appear to be on its "good" list. "It must not lead to a bureaucratic management of the world economy". (p. 401)

One need not be a free trader or a TNC/State symbiotic management advocate to back this aspect of the Interfutures Report. The new protectionism is a grave danger - especially if one supposes that transition to stable, unified values with low growth in the centre is almost impossible except from a successful initial moderate to high growth position (i.e. a failed growth strategy is neither a stable state economy nor a hopeful point from which to seek to reach one). In particular the escalation of the current trade wars would be very crippling (and excluding) for most South economies. Free trade is better than free discrimination against the South (by the multifibre arrangements, the EEC variant of "selective safeguards"). Management of economic geography change to avert sudden demands for "adjustment" protection and coordinate views on probable trade flows would also be potentially particularly useful to the periphery.

A number of secondary points (e.g. TNC roles) are disputable. But the Thrust against protectionism with odd North/South geo-political slices and for greater Third World market access in the North is broadly in line with the 77's Arusha Framework for Negotiation. For that matter it is consistent with the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties as well. There is no reason to assume anyone is muddled - it does have a role in several futures.

Own commodities processing is an area in which Interfutures and the 77 are basically at one. So is stabilization as to substance but not means. The report backs export earnings vs commodity price stabilization. As it does not specify the financing channel, it is hard to tell whether it deserves the criticism that compensatory finance is to a managed commodity price as a means tested unemployment relief grant (or loan) is to a minimum wage.
VII. Where now?

George Santayana wrote that he who will not know and understand history is deemed to repeat it. The authors of Facing the Future have certainly made the attempt as Minister Rui Baltazar Santos of Mozambique put it in a rather different context "to look at our mistakes so we do not fall into repeating them." If they seem too attached to order - as a basis from which to manage change and master events - it is perhaps too easy to criticize. There was a demonic side to Savonarola, more damaging he could not build. Too many alternative futures do appear to start - and end - with the premise "Worse is better" without paying adequate heed to what is to be born out of the worse - a maimed variant of Trotsky's prescription.

There is, however, a rather more basic failure. This tome really is a call to a New Bretton Woods order, a new capitalist Golden Age, in effect a return of history with a number of warts removed plus better muscular coordination. Marx' comment from the "18th Brumaire" suggests a catch to that:

"spare me another Sparta or another Rome,..."

Whether Bretton Woods was tragedy may be debateable. The radicals who now praise the bloc trade systems of the 1930's as a better model seem a little careless in their appropriation of history and their analogy of the Lome Convention to Schacht's central European trade system and Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is hardly self evidently the praise for Lome they suppose it to be:

The attempt to achieve a second coming of a born again Bretton Woods, however, almost surely is farce and in danger of becoming a gallows humour farce at that. That may be unfortunate - the belief in the New International Economic Disorder's leading to liberation of the peripheries or the triumph of socialism requires a good deal of faith and a great deal of nerve.

There is one line in Facing the Future which speaks directly to this: "not to develop a sort of resignation to the inevitable but to generate creative responses". (p. 424). There is much in the report to serve as irritant or stimulant, solvent or catalyst, thesis or antithesis in such an effort. To pursue the quest Chinua Achebe expresses on behalf of himself and others:

"a deepened need to alter things within that situation, to find for myself a little more room than had been allowed me in the world."
MICHAEL ZAMMIT-CUTAJAR ON CHANGING THE POSITION OF AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY
by Byron Blake and Kenneth Hall*/

We welcome the comment of Michael Zammit-Cutajar on our attempt to analyse the efforts of the Manley Government to change the structure of the Jamaican society and to indicate some of the difficulties - the resistance - that the process has encountered. We agree with Zammit-Cutajar that "change is a risky business and efforts to bring it about are often doomed to failure". It is this very recognition which prevented us from jumping to a conclusion as to which way the change in Jamaica will go. The situation is presently at a critical stage, the pressures on the Government and people are not only intense but increasing. The final outcome, in terms of the direction and rate of change, will depend on the willingness of the people to withstand the pressures, the duration of such pressures (will depend to a large extent on the international environment) and the calculations of the Government on the need for tactical moves as an option to the direct pursuit of its convictions. It is such considerations which are currently very unclear rather than the commitment or wish of the authors which will determine the outcome of the process.

To the extent that it will help the process of change and clarify the issues for our readers the authors find no difficulty in stating their view on the need for and the efficacy of the policy of change attempted by the Jamaica Government and hence their hope as to the direction in which Jamaica will go. We share the view that the structure of the Jamaican economy and society as it emerged up to 1972 was economically, politically and socially non-viable. It would have been subjected to change either officially directed (Government policy) or unofficially (from the masses of sufferers on the streets and in the villages). Given the realities of the internal power relations and the relationship between the Jamaica economy and the international capitalist economic system it is also our view that any process of change whether officially or unofficially initiated would have to be based on a strategy at both the national and international levels. Given our preference for change at the least cost - we have no illusions that change always involves costs - we would "hope" that the present officially directed programme for change would be supported both internally and externally and given a chance to succeed.

*/ See Dossier No. 8, June 1979.
While the governments of the world were making their decisions at UNCTAD V in Manila, another decision has been made, this time by Third World non-governmental participants at this conference. This decision is to establish Coalition 77, a non-profit making, non-governmental organisation dedicated to voicing the views of the peoples in the Third World for collective self-reliance. Its role would be to contribute to the establishment of a New International Order in the 1980s and to provide coordination and communication between non-governmental organisations, in the Third World, that reflect the need for self-reliant development.

Coalition 77, as its name implies, will attempt to both support, when necessary, the Group of 77's collective efforts at establishing the critical human dimension of that agenda so it could be meaningful to the majority of peoples in the Third World.

The primary objective of Coalition 77 will be the establishment of a mechanism through which individuals and organisations from the Third World could work together in order to ensure justice in human relationships and development, at the international level by working for the New International Order, while at the same time working at the national level through the implementation of programmes committed to the welfare and benefits of the peoples of the Third World.

The Coalition is open to non-governmental Third World citizens who subscribe to its objectives and who are committed to contribute both moral and/or material support, including the growing numbers of those who reside in industrialized countries.

The coordinator is Djibril Diallo (Senegal) and the Secretariat is assured by Chandra Soysa, P.C. Box 601, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

An excellent analysis of the meaning and political challenges of self-reliance in science and technology, illustrated by the Indian experience. The following assertion deserves quotation: "There is no reason why India should not be able to make a transition to a level of living comparable with the most affluent countries of today, within 30-40 years, coupled with more egalitarianism and social justice, and avoiding the mistakes of the North, especially with regard to insults to environment. The economic distance between the rich and the poor countries ("gap") measured through the conventional yardstick of GNP/capita is highly misleading,
if one does not adjust it to differences in relative prices, and all the
more so, if one distinguishes between needs and pseudoneeds. Once these
adjustments are made, the real gap would appear to be much narrower, and
therefore more bridgeable than commonly believed”.

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search, Bombay 400 005, and Special Adviser to the Deputy Chairman,
Planning Commission, India.

. Pieter Verloren van Themaat, The Institutional Pattern of a New Inter-
national Economic Order (Rijsuniversiteit Utrecht: 8pp); available from IFDA.

. Pieter Verloren van Themaat, Towards a Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of State; and their Subjects (Rijsuniversiteit Utrecht: 9pp);
available from IFDA.

. RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES SUISSE-TIERS MONDE : BILAN, PERSPECTIVES,
PROPOSITIONS DE CHANGEMENT, par Philippe Berberat et Hilmar Stetter,
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tous ceux qui, au cours d'un séminaire tenu à Berne, le 30 mars 1979, ont
bien voulu apporter des remarques et des suggestions. Elles ont été très utiles dans la rédaction de ce document.

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