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NOTE INTRODUCTIVE

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NOTE INTRODUCTIVE

Les réunions internationales - intergouvernementales ou autres - se succèdent à un rythme impossible à suivre, et le calendrier des mois qui viennent s'annonce plus chargé encore. Le bilan de tous ces voyages, discours, rapports, déclarations, etc., est mince. Le plus souvent "mass media" et transnationales de l'information n'en parlent qu'à peine. Les décideurs, dans les capitales, n'ont probablement pas le temps de prendre connaissance de toutes les résolutions adoptées par consensus ou autrement. Dans les assemblées intergouvernementales, les délégués n'ont en général pas assez de pouvoir pour entraîner la mise en oeuvre, par leurs gouvernements, des décisions positives qu'il leur arrive de prendre.

Le problème ne réside évidemment pas dans la mécanique du "dialogue" mais dans le refus de la structure du pouvoir, bénéficiaire de l'ordre existant, d'accepter maintenant une restructuration qui se produira de toute façon un jour.

Au pied du mur de l'impasse intergouvernementale et face au refus transnational, n'y aurait-il vraiment rien à faire?

Certains pensent qu'en continuant à parler on finira bien par arriver à quelque chose. D'autres suggèrent un moratoire dans le "dialogue" Nord-Sud au profit d'un dialogue Sud-Sud qui renforcerait la capacité de négociation du Tiers Monde. D'autres encore sont d'avis que la solution doit être recherchée au sein de chaque société.

En réalité, il n'y a pas à choisir entre ces différentes méthodes. Le combat doit être mené - tout en en modulant l'intensité - sur tous les fronts simultanément. Il faut même ouvrir d'autres fronts.

Ne serait-il pas temps, pour commencer, que les "spécialistes" du développement et de la coopération internationale cessent de ne se parler qu'entre eux?

Ne serait-il pas utile, par exemple, que les distingués orateurs de la table ronde organisée à Colombo en août par la Société internationale pour le développement - parmi lesquels tant de nos amis, membres du Comité ou du Conseil de cette Fondation notamment - aient l'occasion de s'adresser directement, par des conférences, des interviews, des émissions à la télévision, aux simples gens du Nord? Ne pourraient-ils pas essayer de dialoguer avec les travailleurs, les jeunes, les vieux, les femmes, les écologistes, tous frappés ou menacés par le chômage, l'inflation, l'aliénation, l'inégalité, la dégradation de la qualité de la vie, tous victimes du mal-développement? Ne pourraient-ils pas envisager avec eux les contours d'un autre développement pour tous? Ne serait-il pas possible, aussi, d'expérimenter de nouvelles formes de dialogue?

Ne serait-il pas temps de porter enfin le débat sur la place publique?

MATÉRIAUX

L'AUTOGESTION EN FRANCE? ESQUISSES ET FIGURES POSSIBLES

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Langue originale: Français

Résumé: L'autogestion, sous différentes formes, est l'objet d'une discussion
en tant qu'une des issues à la crise dans laquelle se trouve la France aux
plans du développement, de la culture et des institutions. Elle est aussi
l'objet d'un certain nombre d'expériences pratiques dispersées dans le pays.

Trois scénarios possibles pour le développement de l'autogestion en France
sont identifiés par l'auteur:

1. Dans le cadre du modèle socio-économique libéral actuel, l'autogestion
peut servir à mieux faire fonctionner le système, sans réduire la domination
du capital et de l'Etat.

2. Telle que la conçoivent les partis et les syndicats de la gauche fran-
çaise, l'autogestion est un moyen de restructuration vertical (du haut en bas)
vers le socialisme s'accompagnant de la propriété sociale des moyens de pro-
duction et d'une planification démocratique et décentralisée, mais néanmoins
dirigée par l'appareil d'Etat.

3. Dans un scénario optimal, l'autogestion devrait s'enraciner dans un pro-
cessus de transformation sociale partant de la base, autonome, endogène,
pluraliste, égalitaire et informant toutes les activités économiques et
sociales, nationales et locales. L'autogestion ne serait pas octroyée
d'en haut, mais se développerait à partir des expérimentations sociales en
cours. Ce scénario souhaitable se heurte à d'immenses obstacles dont le
moindre n'est pas les structures hiérarchiques et bureaucratiques de la
gauche. Si elle n'engendre pas sa propre dynamique, l'autogestion demeurera
une utopie, aux mieux un critère de la critique sociale.

Une étude complète peut être obtenue en écrivant à l'auteur au CICRA (voir p.16).

SELF-MANAGEMENT IN FRANCE? POSSIBLE OUTLINES

Abstract: Self-management, in different forms, is currently discussed as one
of the ways out of the crisis of development, culture and institutions in
which France finds itself. It is also the object of several scattered prac-
tical experiments in the country.

Three possible scenarios for increasing self-management in France are identi-
fied by the author:

1. Within the prevailing liberal model of economy and society, self-management can be an instrument to make the existing system work better, in no way reducing the domination of capital and the State.

2. As seen by the parties and unions of the French Left, self-management is a means of "top-down" restructuring towards socialism, accompanied by social ownership of means of production and by democratic and decentralized planning, but still controlled by the State machinery.

3. Optimally, self-management would be rooted in a continuous process of "bottom-up" societal transformation - self-reliant, endogenous, pluralistic, egalitarian - permeating all economic and social activities at national and local levels. Rather than being imposed from above, optimal self-management would itself be self-managed and would grow out of on-going social experimentation. This ideal scenario faces tremendous obstacles - not least from the hierarchical and bureaucratic structures of the forces of the Left. If it does not generate its own dynamic, it will remain a utopia, at most a yardstick for social critique.

A full report on this project is available from the author at CICRA (see p.16).

LA AUTOGESTIÓN EN FRANCIA? CONTORNOS POSIBLES

Resumen: La autogestión se considera actualmente, en diversas formas, como una posible solución para la crisis de desarrollo, cultura e instituciones en que se encuentra Francia. También ha sido el objeto de varios experimentos prácticos en distintas partes del país. El autor identifica tres posibles guiones para el aumento de la autogestión en Francia:

1. Dentro del modelo liberal prevaleciente de la economía y sociedad, la autogestión puede ser un instrumento para mejorar el funcionamiento del sistema actual sin reducir la dominación del capital y del estado.

2. Desde el punto de vista de los partidos políticos y sindicatos de la Izquierda en Francia, la autogestión es un modo de cambiar la estructura de "cabeza a pies" hacia el socialismo, acompañado por la posesión social de medios de producción y por la planificaión democrática y decentralizada pero todavía controlado por el gobierno.

3. La solución óptima sería aquella en que la autogestión estaría firmemente arraigada en un proceso·continuo de transformación de "pies a cabeza" de la sociedad - autodependiente, endógeno, pluralista, igualitario - penetrando todas actividades económicas y sociales a niveles de administración locales y nacionales. Más bien que impuesta de arriba la autogestión óptima sería ella misma autogestionada y desarrollarla de un experimento social continuo. Este guión ideal enfrenta obstáculos enormes - entre otros de las estructuras burocráticas y jerarquicas de las fuerzas políticas de la Izquierda. Si no logra generar su propia dinámica seguirá siendo utopista, al méjor un rasero para medir la crítica social.

Un informe completo sdbre este proyecto se puede pedir al autor, c/o CICRA (vease p.16).

Olivier CORPET

L'AUTOGESTION EN FRANCE ?

Esquisses et figures possibles

A l'heure où la plupart des systèmes économiques et sociaux ne semblent pas parvenir à maîtriser leur propre développement, l'élucidation et la promotion d'une alternative fondée sur *l'autogestion* peut paraître une véritable gageure, un défi au "réalisme". Tel est pourtant l'objectif de cette étude : montrer comment et à quelles conditions les voies, moyens et fins de cette alternative peuvent être trouvés *dans* et *par* l'autogestion.

A cette fin, il convient d'envisager quels pourraient être les principales transformations institutionnelles et les changements dans les conduites et les pratiques sociales qui rendraient possible la mise en oeuvre de l'autogestion dans un pays comme la France. L'autogestion est prise ici comme hypothèse plausible d'évolution (ou de révolution) historique de la société. Mais il s'agit bien d'une *hypothèse* à inventer et vérifier et non d'une *nécessité* à révéler et imposer.

1 - SITUATIONS D'UNE RECHERCHE PROSPECTIVE SUR L'AUTOGESTION

De la "crise" aux nouvelles demandes sociales

La crise est partout : dans les faits et dans les esprits. En réalité, elle résulte de la conjonction de trois aspects particuliers : une crise du mode de développement, une crise des formes de représentation politique et sociale et une crise des valeurs culturelles. Toutefois, la notion de "crise" est ambiguë et peut recouvrir plusieurs interprétations impliquant des stratégies différentes de "sortie de crise".

Cette étude repose donc sur l'hypothèse que la crise est le résultat des contradictions internes aux systèmes capitalistes et étatiques mais également d'un long mouvement de critique à la fois théorique et pratique de ces systèmes sous tous leurs aspects. Aussi, cette crise peut être l'occasion d'opérer des choix décisifs et d'inverser les logiques économiques et sociales existantes. Ainsi, à côté des revendications "défensives" (maintien du pouvoir d'achat, garantie de l'emploi, préservation des avantages sociaux, etc.) qui restent importantes, s'inscrivent également d'autres demandes sociales tout aussi déterminantes : réappropriation du temps et de l'espace ; besoin d'autonomie et de responsabilité ; refus de l'aliénation au travail ; désir d'affirmation des différences et d'apprentissage de relations égalitaires ; recherche de nouveaux modèles de développement et de consommation ; etc.

Les obstacles à l'émergence d'une alternative : le dilemme des choix de société

Plusieurs traits marquants caractérisent actuellement la société française :
. une société profondément divisée et inégalitaire ;
. une société centralisée où les représentations étatiques jouent un grand rôle ;

. une société fortement intégrée à la division internationale du travail ;
. une société où les rigidités institutionnelles (structuration des groupes
  industriels, organisation du travail et des professions, système éducatif,
  etc.) excessives sont autant d'obstacles à sa transformation et où le chan-
  gement des mentalités et des comportements s'avère malaisé.

Dans ces conditions, toute expérimentation sociale est soit vouée à s'étio-
ler, soit conduite, pour se développer, à renverser tout un édifice d'insti-
tutions et de représentations. Chaque projet entraînant un changement social,
même limité à certains domaines, est alors presque nécessairement un enjeu
politique lié à un *choix de société*. Ainsi, pour prendre un exemple, derrière
le recours à l'énergie nucléaire se profile pour certains, le spectre d'une
société centralisée, productiviste et policière, tandis que pour d'autres la
primauté accordée à toutes les formes "d'énergie douce" peut seule s'accorder
avec le choix d'une société décentralisée, égalitaire et autogérée. Tout choix
technologique est donc un choix à la fois politique et social. Ce qui rend
l'émergence d'une alternative toujours très complexe et problématique.

La dissémination des idées et pratiques autogestionnaires et les différentes Interprétations de l'autogestion

Désormais, le terme "d'autogestion" cristallise tout un ensemble de pratiques,
de théories et d'aspirations fort dissemblables entre elles mais qui toutes
traduisent un même désir d'auto-institution de la société, une même volonté
d'auto-organisation du corps social.

La reprise des idées autogestionnaires par d'importantes forces politiques
et syndicales, la place de plus en plus grande qui lui est faite dans les
pratiques revendicatives, sans oublier l'abondante littérature et les nom-
breuses recherches dont elle est l'objet, font de l'autogestion un thème ma-
jeur, une exigence sociale incontournable.

Toutefois, il convient de relever que cette multiplication des références à
l'autogestion s'accomplit à deux niveaux bien distincts :
- celui des *projets* et *programmes* qui visent à "produire" l'autogestion ou
  du moins ses conditions, et à partir desquels il est possible de tracer
  l'épure d'une société autogérée ;
- celui des *pratiques* existantes dans divers secteurs, qui s'inspirent des
  idées autogestionnaires et visent *ici et maintenant* à en préfigurer les
  formes futures en même temps qu'à en éprouver les potentialités.

C'est la prise en compte et l'articulation de ces deux niveaux qui permettent
de fixer la spécificité de la *démarche autogestionnaire*. Définissant à la
fois les *fins* et les *moyens* de toute transformation sociale, l'autogestion
impose de rompre avec les modèles et les processus habituels du changement
social et notamment avec la conception d'une "transition" dont le déroulement
serait contraire au but visé. Tout projet autogestionnaire pour *demain* s'ins-
crit dans les plis des pratiques autogestionnaires *d'aujourd'hui*. Dans cette
perspective, la tâche centrale d'une sociologie de l'autogestion est consti-
tuée par le repérage de ces *virtualités* autogestionnaires. Quant aux diffé-
rentes interprétations existantes de l'autogestion, qui varient suivant les
divers courants de pensée (marxistes, libéraux, chrétiens, libertaires, etc.),
loin de nuire à ce concept, elles confirment plutôt son caractère *pluraliste*,
exclusif de toute orthodoxie, de tout système clos.

Cependant, indépendamment du champ d'application plus ou moins étendu qui lui est assigné dans différentes approches (minimalistes ou maximalistes), le concept d'autogestion utilisé dans cette étude, combine trois significations :
- l'autogestion comme *projet* de transformation - partielle ou totale - d'une société,
- l'autogestion comme *forme* - égalitaire et différenciée - d'organisation des rapports sociaux,
- l'autogestion comme *mouvement* de critique - pratique et théorique - de l'ordre social institué.

Seule la prise en compte simultanée de ces trois dimensions de l'autogestion peut permettre la saisie des fonctions opératoires qu'elle exerce dans les différents champs d'une société.

Sens et difficultés d'une réflexion prospective sur l'autogestion

L'émergence d'une prise de conscience des limites écologiques du développement et l'ampleur des bouleversements scientifiques et technologiques prévisibles rendent plus nécessaire que jamais une réflexion de type prospectif. Certes, l'autogestion *ne se décrète pas* et l'exercice prospectif -qui éclaire la route sans en imposer le tracé- ne doit pas entamer ce principe fondamental hors duquel elle risque toujours d'être neutralisée ou détournée. C'est pourquoi toute réflexion prospective dans une perspective autogestionnaire doit être elle-même socialisée. Ce qui signifie que, loin de constituer l'instrument du pouvoir de quelques uns prétendument en charge de l'avenir de tous, la prospective peut devenir un *outil* de réappropriation sociale de l'avenir social.

Dans cette perspective, en contribuant à développer de nouvelles attitudes à l'égard de la détermination du *devenir* d'une société et de l'élaboration d'un projet *collectif*, le recours à la prospective peut aider à résoudre certains problèmes posés par la réalisation concrète de l'autogestion ; notamment tous les problèmes relatifs aux rapports entre l'autogestion à court terme des unités économiques et sociales de base et la planification à moyen et long terme du développement d'une économie autogérée.

2 - CHEMINEMENTS ET TRANSFORMATIONS AUTOGESTIONNAIRES : TROIS SCENARIOS,DES AUTOGESTIONS ECRITES ET PRATIQUEES AUX AUTOGESTIONS PRATICABLES.

" Le paradoxe d'un scénario est ainsi qu'il est condamné à ne "dire" à peu près rien de la situation qu'il est censé décrire par anticipation. Sa fonction est donc autre : elle est de familiariser avec une démarche et une vision .... Un scénario est fait pour être récusé et, une fois rejeté, en nourrir un autre de ses propres dépouilles ...." A.C. Découflé, *Traité élémentaire de prévision et de prospective*, Paris, PUF, 1978.

Les ébauches de scénarios présentées ici visent essentiellement et prioritairement à tracer les grandes lignes d'une *représentation* contrastée des différentes figures possibles de l'autogestion appliquée. Si certains traits communs se retrouvent de façon plus ou moins prononcée dans chacun des scénarios, l'accent est toutefois mis en premier lieu sur ce qui les différencie les uns des autres, voire les oppose, notamment au niveau des dynamiques sociales qui sous-tendent chacun d'eux. En effet, chaque scénario est porteur d'une logique propre qui s'inscrit dans les conditions générales (politiques, économiques, sociales, culturelles, ...) de sa "mise en scène".

Dans ce cadre, il est évident que pour chacun des scénarios possibles, l'évolution de la crise sera déterminante suivant qu'elle s'amplifiera, se maintiendra ou au contraire, se résorbera. Chaque scénario définit donc également un mode particulier de "sortie de crise". L'évolution de l'environnement international constituera de ce point de vue un facteur prépondérant, mais pour une large part, imprévisible. Par ailleurs, parmi l'ensemble des facteurs qui conditionneront la réalisation de l'une ou l'autre de ces autogestions appliquées, le degré de mobilisation sociale et le niveau de créativité et d'innovation sociales joueront un rôle décisif. Ils permettront de mesurer l'ampleur du *mouvement social réel* et influeront, plus qu'aucun autre élément, sur le rythme, l'extension et l'intensité du processus ainsi engagé. Chacun de ces scénarios correspond donc à une conception plus ou moins large de l'autogestion, repérable à travers l'utilisation qui en est faite, le rôle qui lui est dévolu et l'espace qui lui est imparti.

Scénario 1 - L'autogestion restreinte et fonctionnelle

Ce scénario s'inspire dans une large mesure des conceptions libérales de la société et de son évolution. Il prolonge et infléchit les principales orientations économiques et sociales qui ont cours actuellement en France et dont les caractéristiques seraient :

- sur le plan *économique* : la poursuite d'une croissance modérée (ou dite "sobre") ; une politique économique visant d'une part à ouvrir l'économie française sur les marchés internationaux et d'autre part à faciliter une meilleure intégration de cette économie dans la division internationale du travail ; une politique industrielle de redéploiement des activités productrices qui permette une meilleure adaptation aux contraintes de la concurrence internationale : développement de secteurs de pointe (aéronautique, télécommunications, ingéniérie nucléaire. etc.) et reconversion des secteurs régressifs (sidérurgie, textile, etc.) ; un renforcement du rôle du marché et des mécanismes concurrentiels.

- sur le plan *social* : la mise en oeuvre de politiques sociales destinées à réduire les inégalités sociales les plus importantes, à élaborer des régimes de protection sociale pour une large part privatisés et à établir un système de relations professionnelles contractualisées mais assurant cependant le maintien des principales prérogatives patronales (privées ou étatiques) et des différentes structures hiérarchiques ; l'institutionnalisation de formes participatives plus ou moins développées (co-surveillance, cogestion) dans certaines entreprises et la recherche de nouvelles formes d'auto-organisation du travail industriel dans des secteurs limités, lorsque la technologie et la conjoncture le permettent ; tentatives d'implantation de réseaux de communications et d'information électroniques et de systèmes de gestion décentralisés dans les entreprises.

- sur le plan *institutionnel* et *politique* : une transformation du rôle de l'Etat par une meilleure délimitation de son champ d'intervention et à travers la détermination de nouvelles fonctions stratégiques pour les entreprises nationalisées et l'introduction de systèmes de gestion plus efficients dans le secteur public ; un réaménagement du système administratif comportant un transfert important des compétences aux niveaux locaux et régionaux dans le cadre d'une politique de déconcentration régionale ; le renforcement de la vie associative locale appuyé par le développement d'un large secteur

d'économie sociale à base coopérative et artisanale ; le maintien des ins-
titutions politiques traditionnelles accompagné de l'établissement de pro-
cédures de "démocratie directe" (type référendum) au plan local et régio-
nal et sur des problèmes précis.

Dans cette perspective, la référence à l'autogestion est purement *instrumen-
tale*. Elle est utilisée de manière très limitée et contrôlée. Elle sert no-
tamment de moyen de ré-activation des institutions traditionnelles au plan
local et communal. Quant aux expériences d'auto-organisation dans le domaine
du travail, elles peuvent être poussées assez loin au niveau des ateliers et
services, mais relèvent toujours d'une conception néo-taylorienne de la divi-
sion du travail. Des expériences autogestionnaires - coopératives, associati-
ves - sont tolérées et parfois même encouragées dans des espaces (cadre de
vie, activités socio-culturelles, etc...) où l'Etat s'est dessaisi de certai-
nes de ses prérogatives et où il se borne à un contrôle global des activités.
En fait, cette autogestion-appendice ne correspond à aucun projet social ou
politique de transformation d'ensemble de la société. Il est donc difficile
d'imaginer que ces pratiques et ces procédures d'inspiration autogestionnaire
au niveau micro-social puissent se développer hors des espaces contraints où
elles sont confinées. Ce risque est aggravé du fait même que dans cette pers-
pective, l'autogestion comme mouvement joue un rôle mineur. Elle est en effet
toujours soumise à l'action rationalisatrice et organisatrice de couches di-
rigeantes au niveau de l'Etat et des entreprises. Il est par conséquent fort
vraisemblable qu'au terme de ce processus, les principales caractéristiques
et structurations du système capitaliste auront été préservées, réformées,
voire renforcées, et que l'autogestion aura pu ainsi servir de justification
idéologique et d'auxiliaire technique pour la réalisation de ces mutations
internes au système économico-social.

Scénario 2 - L'autogestion octroyée et institutionnelle

La logique fondamentale qui détermine le déroulement de ce scénario est -
pour l'essentiel - celle qui inspire les programmes de la gauche politique et
institutionnelle depuis de nombreuses années et dans laquelle la référence à
l'autogestion est explicitement formulée. Les grandes orientations de ce pro-
jet de transformation globale du système capitaliste sont :

- sur le plan *économique* : un rythme de croissance élevé ; une politique
  économique de "reconquête" des marchés intérieurs permettant de réduire le
  poids du commerce extérieur et de réglementation des implantations de firmes
  multinationales ; une politique industrielle de restructuration des filiè-
  res industrielles, de soutien et de protection des secteurs exposés à la
  concurrence internationale ; un rôle plus grand de la planification - dite
  démocratique - au niveau national et régional.

- sur le plan *social* : une politique active de transferts sociaux et des re-
  venus afin de réduire les inégalités les plus notables ; une extension des
  droits et services sociaux ; un développement des équipements collectifs ;
  un accroissement des pouvoirs des travailleurs notamment dans les entrepri-
  ses nationalisées où seraient tentées des expériences d'autogestion au niveau
  des ateliers et des services dans le cadre d'une cogestion avec les pouvoirs
  publics ; un rôle accru des syndicats et une institutionnalisation de la
  négociation sociale ; une réduction progressive de la durée du travail vers
  les 35 heures / semaine.

- sur le plan *institutionnel* et *politique* : une transformation profonde du
rôle de l'Etat permettant l'élaboration, l'application et le contrôle de
ces différentes politiques économique, industrielle et sociale ; une exten-
sion du secteur public et nationalisé ; l'introduction de modèles partici-
patifs dans l'administration ; une politique d'aménagement du territoire et
de décentralisation effective au niveau régional des politiques sectoriel-
les et de moyens budgétaires réels ; un fort développement des secteurs co-
opératifs, associatifs et non-marchands ; élaboration d'un droit social à
l'expérimentation ; une institutionnalisation des nouvelles structures dé-
mocratiques au plan local (association et comités de quartier, collectifs
divers, etc.)

Ce "programme" tente de traduire en transformations institutionnelles certai-
nes revendications autogestionnaires énoncées dans diverses luttes ; aspira-
tion à une participation plus importante des salariés aux décisions qui les
concernent ; refus de relations hiérarchiques autoritaires et non fondées sur
une "juste" reconnaissance des compétences ; volonté de maîtrise du dévelop-
pement économique ; etc.

Cependant, si des structures autogestionnelles sont mises en place et si une
place plus importante est attribuée aux initiatives de la "base" pour créer
et autogérer des organisations différentes (coopératives, associations, grou-
pements d'habitat, etc.) l'autorisation de ce changement reste le plus sou-
vent une prérogative étatique et gouvernementale. Ainsi, du fait même de
l'ampleur des changements institutionnels au niveau de l'Etat et des princi-
pales structures de la société, les conduites sociales devront se conformer
aux normes plus ou moins explicites que le nouveau pouvoir instituera peu à
peu. Au "risque", sinon, de voir s'amplifier les dissonances entre l'action
gouvernementale et le mouvement des forces populaires et se produire ce qu'
on désigne habituellement par le "débordement" ou la création d'un "double
pouvoir".

Ce processus d'autogestionnalisation des structures économiques et des rap-
ports sociaux est donc limité, rythmé et conduit en fonction d'impératifs
politiques et institutionnels qui lui sont, pour l'essentiel, extérieurs.
L'autogestion octroyée par "en-haut" - si elle n'est pas négligeable et si
elle peut éventuellement par sa dynamique interne accroître son propre champ
d'intervention - ne se confond pas nécessairement avec l'autogestion conquise
par "en-bas". Il est même fort vraisemblable que ne recouvrant pas les mêmes
espaces, ni n'intéressant exactement les mêmes forces sociales, elles seront
parfois conduites à s'opposer, voire à s'annuler. Dans ce cas, la puissance
et les orientations du mouvement autogestionnaire ainsi que le nouvel agence-
ment des pouvoirs et contre-pouvoirs qui résulteront des réformes entreprises,
commanderont la détermination des nouveaux enjeux politiques, sociaux et cul-
turels, et donc la définition d'une autre manière de travailler et de vivre
ensemble.

Ces deux scénarios conduiront, c'est certain, à des sociétés bien différentes, notamment sur les points suivants : l'extension du rôle de l'autogestion, les forces sociales associées à chaque projet, le degré d'intervention de l'Etat, les statuts de la propriété industrielle et foncière, les transformations des relations avec les pays du Tiers-Monde, etc.

Cependant, sur de nombreux autres points, ces deux scénarios présentent des analogies importantes qui se caractérisent en particulier par :
- une conception linéaire et cumulative ainsi qu'une programmation plus ou moins rationalisée des espaces, du temps et des rythmes du changement social ;
- une importance primordiale accordée aux bases économiques de ce changement et donc une action tournée en priorité vers la rationalisation et la re-structuration de l'appareil productif et vers la création de grands groupes industriels et commerciaux et le recours à des technologies "lourdes". D'où la perpétuation vraisemblable d'un double marché de l'emploi avec des mécanismes de compensation sociale plus ou moins développés.
- des politiques (économiques, industrielles, sociales, etc.) définies et appliquées par l'Etat et ses institutions périphériques. Ce *détour par l'Etat* risquant à terme, soit de le maintenir dans ses prérogatives essen-tielles mais sans les moyens d'une action efficace (scénario 1), soit de renforcer son emprise sur la société (scénario 2).
- une priorité de la forme instituée sur le *mouvement* instituant.
- une conception et une application de l'autogestion qui utilise celle-ci principalement comme un *mécanisme de régulation* micro ou macro-social.
- le maintien des représentations culturelles centrées sur les valeurs du travail, de la productivité, du progrès, etc.

Au terme de ces scénarios, l'autogestion risque donc de demeurer, malgré l'utilisation idéologique élargie qui en serait faite, une réalité presque introuvable dans un cas (scénario 1) et une réalité souvent très formelle et institutionnalisée dans l'autre (scénario 2).

C'est pourquoi il est difficile de partager l'opinion suivant laquelle ces réformes - et plus particulièrement celles contenues dans le scénario 2 - tout en n'étant pas d'emblée "autogestionnaires", peuvent tout de même pro-duire les *conditions* institutionnelles et politiques de l'autogestion et donc permettre l'amorce d'une dynamique autogestionnaire.

Scénario 3 - L'autogestion continuelle et élargie

Avant d'établir les principales caractéristiques de ce scénario d'une auto-
gestion *optimale*, il convient de noter :
- les projets les plus avancés en matière d'autogestion écrite (comme ceux du
  PSU, du PS ou de la CFDT , partiellement intégrés dans le scénario 2) s'ins-
  crivent dans une transformation globale et progressive de la société dont
  l'autogestion constitue une des lignes de force avec, entre autres, l'appro-
  priation sociale des moyens de production et la planification démocratique
  et décentralisée.
- les pratiques et expérimentations autogestionnaires, véritables "utopies
  pratiquées" - aussi sectorialisées et localisées qu'elles soient - mettent
  en jeu et en cause, par leur dynamique interne, tout autant les systèmes de
  délégation que le droit social, le découpage de l'espace social, les formes
  de production et de consommation, etc. ; c'est-à-dire, de proche en proche,
  l'ensemble des cadres et des codes d'une société. Toute expérience *partiel-
  le* est donc porteuse d'une transformation *d'ensemble* qui lui imprime un mou-
  vement hors duquel elle ne pourrait que dépérir.

Chaque projet et chaque expérimentation interfèrent donc dans différents do-
maines et réduisent les séparations instituées dans la réalité sociale. C'est
cette activité transversale qui peut permettre l'émergence de nouvelles repré-
sentations, de rapports sociaux différents et d'une croissance autre et jeter
ainsi les bases d'un *mode de production autogestionnaire*.

Ainsi, l'autogestion présente un caractère à la fois *global* en ce qu'elle né-
cessite des transformations structurelles importantes au niveau de l'Etat,
des infrastructures économiques, etc. et *local*, en ce qu'elle implique *simul-
tanément* une multiplicité de changements *d'égale importance* dans tous les es-
paces où des activités créatrices et autonomes peuvent s'exercer (vie quoti-
dienne, éducation, communications, etc.).

L'enjeu d'une transformation autogestionnaire réelle de la société réside
également dans *l'articulation* entre l'unité et la diversité, le central et
le périphérique, l'individuel et le collectif. Cette articulation doit-elle
s'effectuer *dans* et *par* l'Etat, espace réel et symbolique de totalisation
et d'intégration ou bien, au contraire, doit-elle résulter de *l'auto-insti-
tution permanente* de la société, d'une société où se vérifierait expérimen-
talement le dépérissement des formes étatiques ?

Le processus d'*autogestionnalisation continue* mis en oeuvre dans ce scénario 3
peut difficilement être programmé dans le temps à partir d'une impulsion ini-
tiale (un changement politique électoral, par exemple). Il s'inscrit plutôt
dans un mouvement constant d'amplification et de dissémination des pratiques
autogestionnaires *déjà existantes*. Il s'appuie sur une multiplication des
contre-institutions expérimentales dans tous les domaines de la société. Il
est donc "élargi" en ce qu'il se réfère moins à une division et à une hiérar-
chisation planifiées des espaces des autogestions pratiquées qu'à leur exten-
sion dans diverses directions. Aussi l'accomplissement de l'un ou l'autre des
scénarios précédents ne constitue ni obligatoirement un obstacle, ni automa-
tiquement un atout pour son propre déroulement. Suivant ses multiples aspects,

ce scénario   peut prolonger, recouper, dépasser ou contredire chacun des
changements inclus dans les scénarios 1 et 2.

En effet, ce scénario est, en quelque sorte, *déjà là*, au travail dans la so-
ciété actuelle
- à travers la multiplicité de ruses instituantes qui permettent aux diffé-
  rents individus et groupes de réduire l'impact des institutions et des nor-
  mes qui pèsent sur eux ;
- à travers également toutes les tentatives pour esquisser d'autres relations
  et conduites sociales ou   redonner vigueur et efficacité aux structures
  coopératives, associatives ou communautaires utilisées comme lieux privilé-
  giés d'apprentissage d'un fonctionnement collectif réel, égalitaire et dé-
  mocratique.

Les implications stratégiques et politiques de ce scénario ne s'organisent
donc pas autour d'une "prise du pouvoir" fétichisée, qui annoncerait le mo-
ment crucial à partir duquel ces expériences et ces nouveaux comportements
seraient jugés "progressistes" avant, vraisemblablement, d'être taxés derechef
d'irréalisme et d'innopportunité.

Par sa logique même, ce scénario rend nécessaires certaines des réformes con-
tenues dans le scénario 2 (décentralisation, élargissement des droits sociaux,
transformations de la division du travail, etc.) mais en leur conférant un
sens et une dynamique différents. En assurant pratiquement et en tous lieux
la "déprise" du pouvoir d'Etat et de tous les pouvoirs hiérarchiques inscrits
dans l'organisation capitaliste du travail, ce scénario engage une recomposi-
tion structurelle et institutionnelle de la société. L'émergence d'unités *au-
tonomes* et *autogérées* dans la production, la vie quotidienne ou bien l'espace
local doit s'accompagner de l'instauration concomitante de nouvelles filières
et institutions de *coordination autogérée et planifiée* de ces unités au ni-
veau le plus décentralisé possible.

La mise en oeuvre de ce scénario s'insère dans le prolongement et l'appro-
fondissement des principales caractéristiques des autogestions pratiquées
dans différents domaines (santé, travail, habitat, école, etc.) combinées
avec l'application - concertée et contrôlée socialement - des "modèles" auto-
gestionnaires élabores depuis de nombreuses années. Ce scénario implique donc
l'amplification d'un processus d'autogestionnalisation dans divers champs :
structures économiques, mécanismes d'autorégulation globale et sectorielle,
relations internationales, Etat, institutions sociales, aménagement du ter-
ritoire, recherches scientifiques et technologiques, relations sociales et
rapports de pouvoir, espace et habitat, représentations sociales et valeurs
culturelles, etc.

Plus précisément, ce scénario pourrait signifier (*) :

- sur le plan *économique* :
  . la définition d'une croissance différenciée et autonome, ce qui ne signi-
    fie pas un repli sur le territoire national dont la seule garantie serait
    nécessairement d'ordre étatique et centraliste, mais une ouverture con-
    trôlée sur les marchés extérieurs qui donne la priorité à l'établissement

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(*) : On se limite ici à une indication succinte des principales transforma-
      tions autogestionnaires qui sont reprises avec plus de détails dans le
      rapport général de cette étude.

de nouvelles relations de coopération égalitaire avec le Tiers-Monde, dans le cadre d'une lutte pour un nouvel ordre économique internotional.

. l'élaboration de nouvelles modalités de calcul économique par l'introduction de paramètres écologiques et de critères de valeur d'usage des produits ; une inversion des modèles de consommation ("moins" mais "mieux") comprenant notamment un élargissement des secteurs non-marchands et la multiplication des pratiques de réciprocité, la mise au point de systèmes et de circuits de distribution régionalisée des produits manufacturés et agricoles qui soient contrôlés par les consommateurs ; l'élaboration de nouveaux modes d'expression de la demande.

. la détermination de filières industrielles et commerciales qui assurent à la fois l'équilibre des développements régionaux et le renforcement de certains secteurs tournés vers l'exportation : systèmes de communication relationnelle, équipements collectifs, ingéniérie, industrie de l'habitat, techniques pour les énergies "douces", et toutes technologies "autogérables", etc.

. l'abandon des principaux programmes énergétiques et économiques bâtis autour de l'énergie nucléaire ; le développement décentralisé des autres sources d'énergie (solaire, éolienne, géothermique, etc.) en vue d'une plus grande autonomie ; la stabilisation des niveaux de consommation industrielle et privée avec tout ce qui peut en résulter sur les modes de vie : action en faveur des transports collectifs, limitation du rôle de l'automobile individuelle, lutte contre les gaspillages, promotion des industries faibles consommatrices d'énergie, etc.

. une restructuration fédérative des entreprises afin de permettre un véritable fonctionnement collectif des unités productives de base qui les composent ; la création d'un large secteur d'économie sociale (diverses formes de coopératives et associations) qui ne conduise pas à institutionnaliser une répartition duale de l'économie avec d'un côté des entreprises capitalistes hiérarchisées et performantes, et de l'autre des entreprises dites "différentes", prétendument autogérées et en réalité dépendantes du premier secteur.

. une transformation des mécanismes de financement de la création d'entreprises et d'emploi, qui assure notamment la dissociation de l'usage du capital et de sa propriété (grâce, en particulier, au développement des formules de crédit-bail).

. la mise en oeuvre d'une planification indicative fortement décentralisée et régionalisée dans son élaboration comme dans son exercice, le marché conservant un rôle régulateur dans certains secteurs de consommation bien circonscrits et compte tenu du pouvoir accru des consommateurs.

- sur le plan *technologique* :
  . une orientation de la recherche pour le développement de technologies "autogérables" qui assurent une nouvelle répartition non-hiérarchique des fonctions et la requalification des tâches.
  . le développement des réseaux électroniques de communication et d'information décentralisés permettant la détermination "en connaissance de cause" des unités de bases autogérées.
  . l'extension des techniques d'auto-construction dans l'habitat facilitant la création collective de nouvelles structures architecturales et urbaines.

- sur le plan *social* et *culturel* :
  . une répartition égalitaire des revenus et une réduction importante des salaires accompagnée d'une modification profonde du régime du salariat, en vue de la suppression de l'échange marchand de la force de travail.

. une transformation des conditions de travail : fort abaissement de la du-
rée du travail ; définition de nouveaux agencements des temps et des ry-
thmes de travail et de non-travail ; partage social des tâches déquali-
fiées qui ne peuvent être éliminées rapidement ; mise en place de struc-
tures autonomes de travail dans l'industrie et suppression progressive
des formes tayloriennes de production ; promotion de nouvelles qualifica-
tions professionnelles fondées sur la polyvalence ; etc.
. la définition d'une politique de l'emploi centrée prioritairement sur la
requalification des emplois socialement utiles, la mobilité qualitative
des tâches, le contrôle régional du marché de l'emploi, etc.
. le développement des pratiques autogestionnaires dans l'éducation et la
formation à tous les stades et tous les moments de l'apprentissage cultu-
rel et professionnel ; l'extension des formules d'alternance ; la défini-
tion d'un nouveau statut social des savoirs pratiques et théoriques ; etc.
. l'instauration de nouvelles structures de représentation des travailleurs
(création de conseils d'ateliers et de services) ; la modification des
systèmes de délégation et de contrôle des instances élues tant dans les
entreprises que dans les communes ; la redéfinition des fonctions d'anima-
tion et d'encadrement, toutes soumises à l'élection par les collectifs de
travail ;
. une intervention accrue et une participation effective des usagers et des
consommateurs dans toutes les organisations productrices de biens ou de
services qui les concernent ;
. la création et la multiplication d'espaces de sociabilité spontanée et
auto-organisée ;
. la création de nouveaux systèmes de protection sociale, notamment dans le
domaine de la santé, qui soient décentralisés au niveau des municipalités
et des quartiers et cogérés de façon tripartite par les usagers, les élus
locaux et le personnel des institutions créées.

- sur le plan *institutionnel* et *politique* :
. la diversification des régimes de propriété (privée, collective, régiona-
le, publique, ...) et l'élaboration d'un nouveau droit social ;
. une forte décentralisation politique, administrative, économique, fiscale
et culturelle, sur la base de régions autonomes coordonnées horizontale-
ment
. un éclatement des structures étatiques et administratives avec la création
de cellules périphériques, la multiplication des centres de décisions au-
tonomes, la mise en place d'instances décentralisées et de procédures con-
tractuelles de coordination, la transformation du régime des statuts dans
la fonction publique en vue de réduire les puissants "effets pervers" gé-
nérateurs d'une bureaucratie inamovible et paralysante ; l'application
des "modèles" et procédures autogestionnaires dans les services publics ;
la création d'agences spécialisées et régionalisées pour le développement
planifié et le contrôle des politiques concernant l'environnement, les
conditions de travail, les réseaux informationnels, etc.
. un essor des cultures dites "minoritaires" et des "particularismes" locaux;
une extension des droits d'initiative des citoyens à tous les niveaux :
communal, régional, national.
. la reconnaissance du débat libre, collectif et permanent comme condition
essentielle de la production d'un nouvel imaginaire social et de représen-
tations culturelles et politiques adaptées à l'éthique d'un projet auto-
gestionnaire ; la confrontation ouverte et pluraliste des différents pro-
jets ; l'acceptation des conflits comme moments analyseurs de la dynamique
sociale.

Toutes ces transformations énumérées précédemment ne suffiront peut-être pas à *produire* une société intégralement autogérée, dans les vingt prochaines années. Il est fort vraisemblable que de nombreux secteurs et plus particulièrement ceux qui ont des rapports étroits avec les appareils étatiques, seront encore marqués par cette dépendance structurelle et institutionnelle. Il est également prévisible que les attitudes et comportements résultant des emprises étatiques sur la société, demeureront plus ou moins soumis aux modèles et pratiques hiérarchiques et centralistes.

Enfin, on peut légitimement s'interroger sur les possibilités de transformer certaines infrastructures économiques, dans la mesure où les évolutions technologiques nécessaires s'avéreraient techniquement (voire socialement) impraticables sur une telle période.

Toutefois l'intérêt primordial d'un tel scénario réside moins dans les formes sociales et institutionnelles que prendrait la "société autogérée" ainsi produite que dans la *dynamique* dans laquelle s'inscrit cette recomposition sociétale. Pour cette raison, il convient de bien souligner que ce scénario 3 ne pourra se réaliser de façon positive qu'à la seule condition que le processus continu d'autogestionnalisation soit lui-même, à tous moments et à tous niveaux, *socialisé* et *autogéré*.

En ce sens, toute action visant à favoriser l'émergence d'une société autogestionnaire qui s'inscrirait dans l'épure tracée par ce scénario, devrait prioritairement prendre appui sur tous les collectifs qui, *dès maintenant*, inventent et préparent concrètement des autogestions applicables. Quant aux organisations sociales instituées comme les partis ou, dans une moindre mesure, les syndicats, qui se déclarent "autogestionnaires", elles ne pourront valablement constituer une des composantes d'un mouvement autogestionnaire nécessairement protéiforme, que si elles s'avèrent capables d'intégrer dans la pratique d'aujourd'hui ce qu'elles proposent à la société pour demain. Hors de cette exigence, on voit mal par quelle mystérieuse "dialectique" ces institutions - encore massivement hiérarchisées et bureaucratisées pour ce qui concerne le mouvement politique et syndical français - pourraient promouvoir un projet et une stratégie dans lesquels elles ne sont impliquées que d'une manière théorique et idéologique. Elles ne peuvent donc se prévaloir d'un *apprentissage* pratique de l'autogestion.

Il est indubitable qu'un tel scénario se heurtera - et se heurte déjà - à de nombreux obstacles, structurels et sociaux et à de multiples résistances culturelles et politiques. Au demeurant, sa principale force consiste en ce qu'il ne conduit pas à *convoquer le social* pour finalement lui imposer ce que "changer *la* société" ou "changer *de* société" veut dire. Au contraire, il part de ce que le "social" crée et produit lui-même, à travers les autogestions pratiquées, pour en faciliter la propagation pluridimensionnelle et instituante. Cependant, il est évident qu'en l'absence d'une telle dynamique, ces autogestions pratiquées resteront fragmentaires et marginales. En ce cas, l'idée d'autogestion gardera vraisemblablement toute sa force utopique et critique mais elle ne pourra être convertie en une transformation radicale de la société.

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.   par le développement d'un programme de formation sur l'autogestion
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.   par le développement du fonds de documentation sur l'autogestion déjà
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    titres disponibles);

.   par la publication d'un bulletin semestriel d'information et de liaison
    sur toutes les recherches, enseignements et publications concernant
    l'autogestion dans les divers pays. Le no.1 de ce bulletin, Lettre du
    CICRA a paru en mai 1978 et le no.2 en mars 1979. Ce bulletin est
    envoyé uniquement aux membres de l'association CICRA. (Droits d'adhésion:
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BUILDING BLOCKS

A BETTER QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE SHOULD BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL

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Original language: English

Abstract: This report describes how two large Swedish industrial firms –
Berol Kemi and Saab-Scania – have experimented with and introduced workers'
participation in industrial management. Productivity and job satisfaction
have been improved through more self-management by workers, more responsi-
bility on the job, job rotation and through reduction of technology-induced
monotony of mechanized work. The report draws on a series of studies
undertaken at the University of Gothenburg and on fresh interviews with
workers and management. At Berol Kemi these innovations have been promoted
by the local labour unions, whereas at Saab-Scania progressive elements in
middle-level management were the main driving force. In both cases, the
new forms of industrial organization and management have been successfully
implemented. The quality of working life has been markedly improved,
absenteeism reduced and there are fewer disturbances in the production
processes. The report concludes with a remark on the future of such inno-
vations in Sweden.

QUALITÉ DE LA VIE: L'AMÉLIORATION DES CONDITIONS DE TRAVAIL DEVRAIT ÊTRE POSSIBLE POUR TOUS

Résumé: Ce rapport décrit comment deux grandes entreprises suédoises –
Berol Kemi et Saab-Scania - ont, sur la base d'expériences, introduit la
participation des travailleurs dans la gestion de l'entreprise. La produc-
tivité et la satisfaction au travail ont été améliorées grâce à une plus
grande autogestion ouvrière, à plus de responsabilité dans le travail, à la
rotation des postes et à la réduction de la monotonie du travail mécanisé
induit par une certain technologie. Le rapport utilise une série d'études
entreprisent à l'Université de Göteborg et des entretiens récents de l'auteur
avec des travailleurs et des cadres. Chez Berol Kemi, les changements ont
résulté de l'action de la base syndicale, tandis que chez Saab-Scania ce
sont des éléments progressistes dans la maîtrise qui en ont été les initia-
teurs. Dans les deux cas, les nouvelles formes d'organisation et de gestion
industrielles ont bien réussi. La qualité de la vie au travail en a été
améliorée de manière significative, l'absentéisme réduit et on a constaté
moins de difficultés dans le processus de production. Le rapport se
termine par une observation sur l'avenir de telles innovations en Suède.

Berit Härd

A BETTER QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE SHOULD BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL

A better, more rewarding and satisfying working life should not be a privi-
lege, enjoyed by people in higher positions only and the ones who are lucky
enough to have a job which is a hobby for them. It is much more important
that work should give satisfaction also for all those large numbers of
people who have tedious and monotonous jobs. While in an industrial produc-
tion it is difficult to eliminate entirely the monotony of mechanized work,
there is always a possibility that an employee could be given other tasks
and responsibilities and, above all, an authority for his own decisions. In
Sweden a number of factories have experimented with so-called autonomous
working groups. The results have been very encouraging: better satisfac-
tion with the work, but also a higher efficiency. As a result both the
employees and the employers have benefited from the change.

The quality of working life is also closely connected with the quality of
life as a whole. A better satisfaction with the job makes the individual
more capable of using leisure time in a more positive way. This is shown by
several studies in Sweden. But this report will concentrate on quality of
working life, the Swedish efforts towards an increased participation by the
workers, job-enlargement and more self-management.

The need for esteem and belonging

At the Department of Psychology of the University of Gothenburg, Professor
Sigvard Rubenowitz and his staff have made studies concerning the needs of
people in working life and how these needs are satisfied within the autono-
mous production groups. He explains some basic needs for people in working
life this way:

It seems evident that all human beings more or less try to satisfy needs for
survival (physiological needs), for security, for belonging, and
for esteem and self-actualization. There also seems to exist substantial
empirical evidence for stating that the higher the educational and socio-
economic standard of an individual, the higher his salient needs. For most
people in Western societies the need for a sense of belonging, for esteem
and self-actualization are of central importance. If one tries to express
these needs in terms of demands of the working milieu one might say that
most employees within an organization have:

. the need for physical freedom of movement in the work which allows for
   social contact between colleagues and co-workers;

. the need for a certain amount of control of working methods and work
   space, so that each employee has a specific field of work which he can
   recognize as his own;

. the need for variation and qualification at work, so that the employee
   feels that his abilities and qualifications will appear to advantage and
   be considered; and

. the need for development at work, to be stimulated and get possibilities to learn and win promotion.

In one of the studies by Sigvard Rubenowitz covering ten Swedish plants, the respondents were asked to answer some questions on the technological restraints of their jobs, as well as questions relating to job satisfaction. The scientific management ideology and the subsequent technological restraints are the most damaging to the fulfilment of the basic needs in working life. In the study a "technilogical restraint" index was calculated for each employee and related to the answers to the various job satisfaction questions. The relationship between satisfaction and degree of technological restraint was found to be substantial.

In another study by Rubenowitz, supervisors, managers and workers were asked to evaluate their jobs in a metal plant in relation to job content and design, possibilities for the worker to exert influence on the job and the possibilities for social contacts. On the basis of these ratings a "psycho-social work milieu index" was constructed which gave a perfect rank correlation with absenteeism for different departments.

Findings of this kind have pointed to the need for developing new production and job design systems more fitted to human needs, but also more profitable from the point of view of productivity. If we look at the situation, especially in Sweden, it is obvious that the firms interested in new production systems to a large extent have led to such advantages as less problems in the event of absences and easier balancing of work tasks.

Berol Kemi in Stenungsund

One of the plants which have tried a new system with autonomous production groups is Berol Kemi in Stenungsund, a chemical processing industry. All work in the production is managed by big machines and the workers hardly see their own product. They work at the machines in shift gangs of 5-6 individuals. Before the change, each individual worked at only one station at the machines, never moving from his area. By disturbances in the process, e.g., troubles with the machines, they stopped work and waited for a technician. The worker at the machine just waited until the problems were solved. He never had much contact with others in the shift gang as all of them were busy only with their special areas in the production.

It was the labour union in Berol Kemi which pushed for the change to the system with autonomous groups. The top management has been positive to change from the beginning. Now, in spite of complications, there are no workers who would go back to the old system. The old shift gang now works as an autonomous group. Every group has a coordinator. All jobs, including that of the coordinator who has the most responsibility in the group, are rotated. The coordinator must know all the different working areas, which means that the task of the coordinator cannot be laid upon a newcomer to the group. Every group decides for itself the speed of the job rotation, which means that it varies among the groups between 2 and 8 weeks. The group also decides how to solve problems in the production. If the problem can

be solved by a member of the group (e.g. carrying out repairs to a machine)
they do it, if not the coordinator has the authority to request a technician.
The group handles the time-cards and the coordinator of the group can give
permission to workers to leave and arrange for replacements. The ordering
of material and requests for maintenance personnel, if needed, are handled
by the group.

This change has been possible without any changes in the technology. The
change has made the working time less monotonous and given more responsibi-
lity to the workers. If a member of the group expresses a lack of interest
to undertake the responsibility of the coordinator he is not forced to do it.

"We suggested the change and we like it", says a representative of the
labour union at Berol Kemi. "The main reasons why we like it are:

. we don't have to run and ask the boss all the time;

. we have a feeling that we are trusted, that they think we can manage
  things ourselves;

. it is also that we feel we must pull ourselves together and be on the
  alert to be able to take the responsibility;

. earlier we just ignored things, even if we knew how to handle them,
  because we felt that we were not responsible. This was more boring."

One problem they have faced at Berol Kemi is that the older people among
them have difficulties to work in groups. They want a task of their own
and to do that and nothing else. Another problem is the foremen. After
the autonomous production groups took over, new tasks had to be found for
a number of foremen. This has been the case in another part of the plan, on
the maintenance side, where they have now also started similar autonomous
groups. In the production there were very few foremen and only technicians.
Here in the maintenance department and the workshop there was a system with
many foremen and the change caused a lot of conflicts when the foremen
found that tasks they traditionally had were taken away from them. They
were given some new tasks, taken from "above" persons, which led to the
situation that a new category felt threatened. A state of competition
emerged all the way "up".

"There is, no doubt, one category getting jammed in this system and that is
the foremen. But it is necessary to find new tasks for them and new roles.
And the management has stopped recruiting new people on foremen's level",
says one representative of the labour union.

Other comments from the workers: "We feel more satisfied with our work now
after the change. If anybody said we had to go back to the old system it
would cause a storm." "The quality of working life has increased. It is
hard to say if the change has influenced the quality of life as a whole.
But it has influenced our demands on quality of life. We have more claims
than before inside and outside the work, e.g. claims for openness, for
participation.. You are more stimulated and that is important."

"The gap between the boss and the worker has decreased now when we have to talk more with each other."

There have been discussions both about the responsibility and about the salaries. Is it possible to share responsibility? - was the question from the beginning. They found it was possible. The foremen had higher salaries than the workers. Should the workers do the same job without an increased salary? - was another question. This was solved so that the coordinator in the working group on the maintenance department, where they traditionally had so many foremen, got an increase of 3 Sw.Cr. an hour, because the coordinator has more responsibility than the others in the group. Everybody gets this increase of salary as the job rotates.

The top management of Berol Kemi has been very positive from the very beginning to this change and to all development towards more democracy and more participation of the workers. It can be mentioned that in Sweden, through new laws, employees are participating in and influencing through labour unions the whole management of a plant. But this is made by chosen representatives of the employees and does not influence the daily situation of the worker and is, therefore, not relevant in this report.

The main reasons why the management is satisfied with the autonomous production groups are, according to one representative:

. the job rotation makes it easier to replace an absent worker because everybody knows the others' jobs;

. there are less absentees than before;

. the level of knowledge among the workers has become higher and the production much more effective;

. there are less disturbances in the production, which is good for the economy;

. we are also aware that this is a development which must come and which is impossible to stop.

Saab-Scania in Trollhättan

Saab-Scania is a car plant that started in 1971 with the first autonomous production groups, on a small scale, in the department of the plant where the car bodies are welded. Now more than 300 persons are involved, working in 32 production groups. Before the change the car bodies were made on a traditional line with a cycle time of 3-6 minutes. The workers were directly steered by a detailed control system and without any responsibility for the quality or for other parts of the job.

The initiative for change came not from the labour union but from the management at the middle level. The reason for the change was that something had to be done to decrease the high absentee rate (23.1% in 1974) and the extremely high turnover of personnel (75-80%), especially in this part of the plant - the welding of car bodies - where it was higher than anywhere

else. In 1975, new autonomous groups were created and the traditional work-ing line was stopped. At the line every worker had only one job, welding a special part of the car body. There were short and simple working cycles and a stop at one station caused the stop for the whole line. In the new system there is no traditional line. The car body stands on a table which can be raised and lowered. The car body is transported to the working place by a special transport line and 8 persons work at every station. All of them can make all the necessary welding and polishing. The working cycle is long: 50-60 minutes. A stop at one station does not affect other stations.

The expenses for this change amounted to 10 million Sw.Cr. and the payoff time was estimated at $3\frac{1}{2}$ years. In reality this goal was reached within less than 3 years, which is an indication of its success. The new instal-lations for the system took 4 weeks and were made during vacation time. Among the responsibilities for every production group are the following: planning and accomplishment of the production programme; budget; control of arriving material; transport; maintenance; cleaning; teaching of new members; permission rights; control of the product.

Feedback of sample control of the product:

The groups have, together with the foreman, worked out rules for the beha-viour of the group. These rules have been confirmed by the groups and the management committee, consisting of the management and the labour union. There is job rotation within the group every week. The job of contact person is rotated among the members of the group; the contact man has to work with control, maintenance and contact with other functions within the plant. He works on actual production of cars about 50 per cent of his working time.

In the new system, the worker has more possibility to plan his working days. It gives him a possibility to learn more and thus develop himself personally, as well as to have greater social contacts throughout the working day. The individual worker can, in this system, see the connection between his own efforts and the final product. He has more possibility to take part in decisions concerning work organization and questions of rationalization. He has the possibility of taking responsibility, both for the production and for the quality of the production. The system gives possibility for a calm tempo in the teaching of newcomers. It makes it easier to go back to work after a time of illness. The flexibility makes it possible to solve problems at work together in different groups.

Every group produces around 30 car bodies every day. If the group produces less one day they can produce more the next. If they work quickly they can use the time the way they want (but they are not allowed to go home).

"Usually we use this spare time for sitting down together and discussing both the job and other things. It gives us a chance to know each other better", says one of the workers.

These are comments from others:

"We are more independent now. Earlier we were totally dependent on a fore-man. I think we are taking more initiatives now."

"But a system like this is not free from problems. It takes much more time to make a group function than they usually believe."

"There is also a risk that we are chosing only the "elite" people to the groups."

But, according to the rules, the groups should also take a social responsi-bility towards people.

"Of course we have dropouts - we had them earlier too - but the trouble is that there are less places to put them now. Earlier there were more jobs outside the line."

"The demands have increased on the members of your own group and also the demands you have on yourself."

"The demands on the foreman have also grown, especially the demand for information. If the group gets more duties the need for information grows."

"The interest for the production has increased with the new system. Every-body knows better what he is doing, what is his part in the production."

"Now we have the responsibility both for the quality and the quantity. This is more stimulating."

"Earlier if one of our tools went out of function we just dropped it and waited for somebody to come and repair it. Now we repair it ourselves. And we try to maintain the tools so that they do not break."

"There are conflicts within the group but they are not always bad. They can sometimes work in a developing way. There are persons within the group who do not function well. And there are whole groups which function badly. But this is not always the fault of the group. It can also have other reasons (e.g. a bad foreman)."

"It is nicer now in the work. But you must keep in mind that this is also a way of manipulating us. The employers are using our feelings of solida-rity with the other members in the group."

The foreman in this system has got other roles than before, but this has not led to complications. His role was traditionally mainly steering and controlling. "Now when the groups have taken over this, I have got other tasks and as a whole I think my influence on my working place has increased", says one foreman. "Actually my new tasks that have been given to me from others in the plant are more interesting than those that I had earlier", says another.

The top management is very satisfied with the system. They have been able to register favourable gains. First there is a gain in production. The total losses due to things like control after adjustment, balancing losses, were in the old line 61% of the necessary production time. Now it is only

21%. Besides, unplanned stoppages have proved to occur much less in the line-out system than previously. The turnover rate has decreased dramatically and so has illness absence. The absentee rate is now, in the group department of the plant, 13% - which is 5% less than in the traditional part of the plant, and it has decreased by 3% in the last year.

"This means that the system is economic and efficient, which is good", says the representative of the management. And according to opinion surveys, general job satisfaction has increased. This is underlined by the research done by Prof. Sigvard Rubenowitz: The direct participation in the influence of the daily job has the highest correlation with all kinds of job satisfaction.

The model of the future

None of those who have tried the system with autonomous production groups will go back to the system prevailing before the change, according to the workers at both Berol Kemi and Saab-Scania. According to both labourers and management at Berol Kemi, the groups are the model for the future. In both plants they think the system can also be further developed.

The opinion of the workers in both plants is that the model is applicable to almost any plant. One cannot always motivate change by management simply with recommendations of more personal freedom and better job satisfaction for the workers. It can, however, be motivated by higher security in the production and more efficiency. The system must also be adjusted to the different kinds of production and the technical situation in other plants. It is much more limited by technological and economic considerations than expected by most people and the possibility for more radical socio-technical solutions is better in new plants.

The opinion at Saab-Scania is that all other plants must try similar systems with more autonomous production groups. But they should from the beginning involve the labour union much more. There is a need for education that has to be followed up by the unions. And, according to a union representative, "in the autonomous production groups the workers really learn what it means to have influence on the job. The union must take this up and push it further."

According to Sigvard Rubenowitz, in the research done at the univerity of Gothenburg, there is a problem linked to the traditional attitude at the working place. If a relatively tough authoritarian atmosphere has been prevailing on a work place before, the likelihood that the workers will collaborate in autonomous groups is relatively small. Nor can you expect a positive attitude without any question towards job rotation by workers who for years have had individual tasks. In such cases it is better to organize limited self-steering groups with an authorized leader in the beginning. If, however, the newly-hired person is required to be prepared to accept responsibility for associated tasks you gradually will be able to get efficient autonomous production groups.

BUILDING BLOCKS

DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES - SOME CANADIAN SIGNPOSTS

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Abstract: This synthesis paper is based on a comprehensive inventory of alternative development movements and initiatives in Canada, compiled in early 1979. It is an attempt to interpret the outcome of that inventory in terms of an emerging concept of another development for Canada and its potential to generate a common vision for a new Canada which would be based on a healthy society and a healthy environment. The paper explains how the survey leading to the inventory was undertaken and how the conceptual difficulties of defining and identifying "alternative development initiatives" were overcome. Clusters of alternative initiatives have been grouped into Conserver Society initiatives, conservation and recycling initiatives, alternative technology design, alternative economic growth, the cooperative movement, alternative lifestyles movements, alternative consultative processes, alternative institutional arrangements, alternative relationships with other countries, societal reconstruction, and personal initiatives. The author concludes that the alternative development initiatives currently underway in Canada have a real potential to affect long term change. The survey and inventory have illuminated the many opportunities open for voluntary change - opportunities that promise to avoid the bleak prospects of the present Canadian development path.

UN AUTRE DÉVELOPPEMENT - QUELQUES REPÈRES CANADIENS

Résumé: Ce document de synthèse est basé sur un large inventaire, réalisé au début de 1979, de mouvements et d'initiatives pour un autre développement au Canada. Il s'agit d'une tentative d'interpréter les résultats de cet inventaire en termes d'émergence du concept d'un autre développement pour le Canada et du potentiel qu'il recèle de susciter la vision d'un autre Canada, celui d'une société saine dans un environnement sain. L'article indique comment l'enquête qui a servi de base à l'inventaire a été conduite et comment on a résolu les difficultés conceptuelles de la définition et de l'identification des "initiatives pour un autre développement". Les initiatives ont été groupées en "grappes": initiatives de la "Conserver Society", initiatives pour la conservation des ressources et leur recyclage, technologies alternatives, croissance économique alternative, mouvement coopératif, mouvements pour un autre style de vie, processus consultatifs alternatifs, institutions autres, relations internationales alternatives, reconstruction sociale, initiatives personnelles.

Development Alternatives: Some Canadian Signposts

by

Cathy Starrs

This paper is a synthesis of the major findings of a project that set out, in the early months of 1979, to compile an inventory of development alternatives underway in Canada, and to pattern and interpret those initiatives and what they suggest for the future.[1]

The project is a first attempt at drawing together, from various regions of the country and from various perspectives, explorations into "another kind of development" in Canada. It was initiated in the belief that there is considerable activity underway which, while not widely known in Canada or outside it, is leading to an alternative vision of development, one that is consistent with the limits and uncertainties now confronting the physical and social environment and with the opportunities that many Canadians are now discovering, or re-discovering, for themselves. The process of uncovering the nature and extent of these initiatives was seen as serving a number of purposes. It would assist in informing Canadian contributions both to the United Nation's Development Strategy for the 1980's and beyond, through IFDA's Third System Project , and to other international forums concerned with alternative patterns of development and lifestyles. It would also serve in assisting governments in Canada to respond to these alternative visions emerging and so avoid rising social turbulence that will almost surely follow continued pursuit of conventional development. And further, it might well permit opportunities for cross-fertilization and enable those Canadians nurturing the alternative seedlings against the winds of the dominant paradigm to see the forest that is emerging.

The project had two phases - the inventory and the interpretation - and an advisory panel[2], composed of the representatives of the sponsoring agencies and other persons supportive of the need to secure another kind of development than that we in Canada have been following.

The Process

The design of the inventory process had to confront the fact that "development alternatives" is not a phrase in common parlance in Canada. Two options were raised for consideration by the advisory panel. Would the panel wish to set out some broad definitions or key characteristics governing what might fall within "development alternatives"? Or alternatively, ought that phrase, at the outset at least, deliberately be contentless, the project objectives then including the collection of meanings it conveyed to those approached, as well as specific illustrations?

After considering these and other questions, the panel decided not to lay on any preset definitions, recognizing that such course would risk imposing a standard model on what was as yet unknown. Whether by accident or design, this

decision meant that the project would adapt in a Canadian context IFDA's admonition to listen attentively to "the often unheard voices of the people" and only then attempt to "make sense" of what those voices were saying.

That decided, there remained the question of with whom to start. After canvassing a number of possibilities (limited only by project time and resources) it was decided to approach a group of Canadians who had authored in January 1978 a statement entitled "Canada as a Conserver Society: Agenda for Action - a statement of concerned citizens". While not a "representative sample", these 26 persons came from across Canada and from diverse life experiences: community innovators, free thinkers, academics, government officials, people from business and churches. Their collective statement suggested sensitivity to the need for alternatives, their diversity of backgrounds held promise that a canvas of their knowledge of activities underway in their own communities or fields of interest might quickly point to interesting examples of alternatives.

On contacting members of this group by telephone, the purposes of the project were explained and two broad questions put: "what does the notion of development alternatives convey to you -- what key characteristics does it conjure up in your mind?" and: "what specific examples are you aware of that you might term development alternatives?"

Out of responses to these questions fell an array of tentative definitions, long lists of specific examples, as well as many suggestions of other Canadians to whom the same questions might usefully be put. Each example followed up put the same query about the image of development alternatives, in addition to obtaining details of the specific initiative, its history, rationale, objectives, activities, structure, and the like.

It quickly became evident that there were far more initiatives identified through this process than even the most optimistic had perceived, certainly far more than could be contacted in the course of this project. Yet the representatives of its sponsors and other members of the advisory panel did not wish to impose a narrowing of focus, preferring instead as varied a sample as possible. Thus, the inventory as it has emerged stands as something of a pilot project, without pretensions of completeness. The specific initiatives reported serve only as illustrations of the unfolding story of the search for development alternatives underway in Canada.

Development Alternatives - a Challenging Concept

What meanings did those Canadians approached in the course of this project attach to "development alternatives"? Some preferred to avoid the question altogether, responding only to the second query. Other answers reflected impatience with the ambiguity of the expression: "development of what? by whom? alternatives to what?" From some came substituted phrases: "Conserver Society"; "Familial Society"; "an Ecological Society", shorthand expressions seen as pointing more clearly to departures from the dominant characteristics of modern Canadian society, with its consumption ethic, its materialism, its uncaring waste of human and natural resources, its destructive impact on the natural and the social environment, and its injustices.

Others were challenged by the phrase itself and were moved to elaborate on its emerging or to-be-hoped-for characteristics:

"From initially thinking of alternative patterns of development in terms of a needed and necessary emphasis on conserving, recycling and a shift to renewables, I find I have shifted my focus -- I have come to realize that what is at issue is a new belief system - one that allows possibilities for securing sources of human satisfaction that don't mean merely material consumption"

"What is at issue is the blurring of lines between big/small, centralized/decentralized -- the findings of ways in which both can exist in some kind of human harmony."

"To be an alternative, developments must be culture and site specific, and this involves careful consideration of design -- the kind of design that consciously attends to local climate, local resources and local cultural preferences."

"As an alternative to our present quantitative development, it means people seeking developments that improve the quality of their lives and those of future generations."

"It means the antithesis of centralized, high technology development strategies ... development alternatives are regional -- based on local resources; they provide solutions to regional problems and create employment within a community; they tend to be less capital-intensive than centralized strategies, and they can be integrated within traditional employment patterns and social structures."

"For too long, North American society has emphasized the development of technology, science and material well-being as the goals to be pursued. The implication, the underlying and often unspoken assumption, has been that this would automatically translate into human well-being. This seemed to be true at an earlier time in history, but the situation has changed. It is now imperative that human well-being be placed at the centre of attention, not as a by-product or spin-off but as the primary focus of development efforts."

" ... creative alternatives to present economic, political, social and institutional structures which impede the development of humanity's potential"

"It is important to see development alternatives as being formal (to some extent institutionalized) and informal; as intentional (e.g., voluntary simplicity) and unintentional (inasmuch as people adopt new attitudes and activities, discovering implications for themselves); as traditional, things we've known before (practical skills that have gone into disuse or been

downgraded) and as innovative, arising more spontaneously out of people's
needs, resources and interests."

"Development alternatives imply a different relationship between
people and their institutions"

" ... alternative organizational forms for economic development
and for the provision of social services; inherent in these
alternative forms are notions such as no-growth or selective
growth, renewable resources, participatory democracy,
decentralization ... "

" ... survival for our children"

"In its broadest sense, 'development alternatives' involves the
reconceptualization of the human condition"

Some offered regionally specific comments, often staking out their region
as "where the alternative movement is at" in Canada. A few residents of Prince
Edward Island, British Columbia and Quebec each proclaimed their province as
leaders of Canadian development alternatives, statements equally firmly denied
by others from the same region. A few suggested that the major explorations
were taking place in "hinterland" rural communities and the North: others
advised a concerted mapping in urban centres on the grounds that, in a
democratic society, it would be these large populations that would ultimately
determine future directions for Canadian society. And not a few resisted
offering, at least initially, any response, asserting suspicions as to the
intent of the sponsors. This suspicion was grounded in part in reservations
surrounding IFDA'S "Third System" project; if the catchall label, intended to
include everything outside international governmental forums and the
trans-national corporations, had been "the First System", then frequent
comments suggested that IFDA's intent would be "more credible, more
trustworthy". But much the larger source of these suspicions were grounded in
past experiences with governments undertaking community surveys -- experiences
that had led, all too frequently, to the cooptation, if not total smothering,
of community initiatives.

These varied meanings attached to the concept of development alternatives,
more fully set out in the inventory report[3], belied any slim hope that
from this first question would emerge some commonly held definitions, some
clarifying framework.

Some Examples Suggested: An Overall Impression

The task of identifying development alternatives seemed to warrant more
energy consumption than did the supposedly easier task of developing categories
appropriate to an alternatives inventory. Many described their group
initiative with reference to a subject matter area in language differing little
from conventional usage. At the same time, however, there were repeated
expressions of discontent with the verbal descriptions. This suggested
difficulty in giving expression to the inter-related, holistic nature inhering
in many of the initiatives. A similar message was conveyed when draft

write-ups of individual initiatives, sent to each group directly involved and accompanied by a tentative listing of groupings, were returned with indications that many saw their activities falling within more than one cluster.

The categories, or more accurately the clusters, of alternative initiatives, as they appear in the illustrative inventory are:

> Conserver Society Iniatives
> Conservation and Recycling Initiatives
> Alternative Technological Design
> Alternative Economic Development
> The Cooperative Movement - Recent Developments
> The Alternative Lifestyles Movement
> Alternative Consultative Processes
> Alternative Institutional Arrangements
> Alternative Relationships with Other Countries
> Societal Reconstruction: Alternatives to "the Industrial-Nation-State"
> Personal Initiatives

The inventory report elaborates on each of these clusters by describing in some detail the initiatives identified; it also deliberately takes into account, in weaving together the story that is to be told by these illustrations the fact that many of them crossed several clusters. For purposes of this paper, a few examples suffice to illustrate not the import of specific clusters so much as the context in which explorations into alternatives are being undertaken and understood.

Initiatives surrounding the energy debate in Canada serve to illuminate the inter-related convergence that is appearing; so too does the Conserver Society theme.

The Conserver Society

It would not be unfair to state that, from the broadest perspective, each of the initiatives identified warrants inclusion under the first cluster - that of Conserver Society Initiatives. This slogan was first invented by the Science Council of Canada and used to identify a major research project the Council launched in June 1973, a theme that was immediately incorporated into the work of Environment Canada's Advanced Concepts Centre. It has since become widely known across Canada and is today perhaps the most readily identifiable rallying point around which alternatives re-searchers tend to gather. To briefly summarize the characteristics with which the Science Council initially endowed the concept: a Conserver Society is opposed to waste; promotes economy of design - "doing more with less"; favours reuse and recycling and, wherever possible, reduction at source; questions the ever-growing demand for consumer goods and marketing techniques used to manipulate wants; and supports diversity of systems.

From this base, the Conserver Society concept is today invested with the attention and energies of countless citizen groups. In this process, it has been placed in continuously broadening context. The need to redesign public policies in the areas of resource use, science and technologies, have come to be clothed in a concern for the waste of human resources and a call for

societal and institutional transformation from a present focus on system
objectives to a focus on human community growth and development in the context
of a sustainable human society.

This evolutionary process has also prompted the invention of other labels,
since some Canadians have come to regard the Conserver Society title as
inadequate or inappropriately limiting[4]. Whatever the label, the process
of social invention is underway and this discussion is infusing all aspects of
Canadian life, including values and lifestyles, aspects governments find
difficult to address.

The Energy Debate

Many of the initiatives identified are focussing on the energy issue
directly or indirectly; many were prompted into action or underwent a shift in
focus as the shockwaves of the 1973 actions of the OPEC nations reverberated.
The sudden realization that Canada's energy resources were not as abundant as
had been previously assumed, and that further energy development would
certainly not be inexpensive, accelerated the discussion of alternatives. The
Iranian situation served to further this shift in consciousness, and most
Canadians are today aware that critical decisions must be made now.

Supporters of "alternative energy" have been warring for some time now
with the advocates of conventional energy development, particularly nuclear
energy[5]. In attending both to what is being said and what is not being
said in the course of the energy debate in Canada, it becomes apparent that at
its root lie two opposing concepts of development, and two correspondingly
different lifestyle implications. These different concepts are rarely
coherently articulated and addressed in public discourse. When they do arise,
they are submerged rapidly under the charges and counter-charges of
irrationality, impracticality, Luddite back-to-the-caves versus the
technocratic forces for progress. Lost in the increasingly adversarial din
over the issues of safety, containment, degrees of risk acceptable or
unacceptable, centralizing high technologies or less vulnerable, decentralized
technologies amenable to community rather than institutional control, and
statistics relating to energy demand and supply proven and disproven, are the
much more fundamental issues.

As experts on both sides wage war on one another and attempt to entice
greater public involvement, large segments of the populace remain on the
sidelines, muttering poxes on both houses. Yet at the same time, consciousness
is growing that the choice of Canada's energy future is a choice about what
kind of society and what kind of development Canadians want for ourselves and
for our children. In the ears of many, each side is making its own statement
in response to these unarticulated questions.[6]

The advocates of nuclear energy, to take the dominant stand of the
conventional energy forces, are standing under a concept of development that
equates development with economic development. Within this framework human
well-being (personal, family and community growth and development) becomes a
sub-set. It stands in second-order importance to a perceived over-riding
concern to keep the economic machinery functioning. This view is based on the

implicit understanding that the securing of material well-being is a prior
condition for the attainment of other aspects of human and societal well-being.
To this end, the risks and the degree of surveillance necessitated by further
proliferation of nuclear-powered energy stations is an accessitated price to pay.
Because of the attending security requirements, the underlying societal image
unintentionally cast up by this development paradigm is increasingly that of a
police state.

The advocates of "alternative" or "soft" energy, on the other hand, are
embracing a concept of development that has at its core a focus on community
growth and development. In this context, economic growth is an important but
not dominant component and environmental limits are more consciously attended
to, as for example in discussions about the need to limit the use of fossil
fuels so as to avoid disruptions from climatic change. This concept is framed
within a set of principles, principles that are discernable within and across
other examples of development alternatives.

The Emerging Concept of Development

Characteristic of this alternative concept of development are:

- respect for human qualities and capacities and for all life-supporting
  systems on the planet

- acceptance of diversity – the diversity of the human species, of
  cultures, of different ways of perceiving reality, and of the variety
  necessary to sustain a healthy society and a healthy environment

- a recognition of and respect for limits, the limits of nature, of social
  institutions, and of social structures

- a recognition that material prosperity, without attention to these
  limits, can lead to impoverishment

- a concern for the non-material needs required to support human
  well-being

- an unwillingness, at the first instance, to accept without question the
  notion of trade-offs so ingrained in the economic development concept
  (inflation/employment, economic growth/environmental degredation,
  producer interests/consumer concerns ...)

and, above all,

- the fostering of personal and institutional responsibility and
  response-ability, of self-reliance and interdependence rather than
  rugged individualism and independence

No one cluster of explorations into development alternatives speaks to all
of these characteristics, much less any one initiative. But they are there
nonetheless. They emerge in probing beneath the surface for the rationale
underlying the seemingly confused and confusing replies to the meaning of

"development alternatives", and they emerge in the patterning of the
illustrated examples. They are to be found within the understandings of some
governmentally-sponsored activities, as well as within those engaged in by
community groups. While they appear more frequently in familial community
discourse, they do emerge from time to time in official statements and public
forums.

At the moment in Canada, each concept of development has its own
particular style of discourse. Several of the development alternatives
illustrated in the inventory were "conversations about ... work, justice, about
the future" -- convened to permit freer discussion among members of the
Canadian community than pertains in public forums generally.

The public discourse is dominated by the concept of development as
economic growth and the attending necessities of an industrial society. Thus
it tends to be vested in expertise from specialized disciplines, grounded in
institutional authority, and usually fractious and adversarial. It rules out
of order, if not out of the forum, those who would raise issues seen to fall
outside the ambit of the specialized discipline within which the issue is being
addressed, those who would question the institutional authority and its
taken-for-granted assumptions. It is clothed in objective measures and
tolerates only the linear logic of scientific rationalism and the sensate "here
and now" concerns for problem-solving. Thus it is intolerant of expressions of
concern and other approaches to knowledge that emanate from feelings and
intuition, from the human concerns for the growth and development of a human
community.

The human concept of development is more discernable in family and
community gatherings, formally or informally convened. Its style is
conversational and respectful, "Roberts Rules of Order" seen an inappropriate
social technology for discussions that treat of values and inner needs in
addressing social issues. It admits of the diversity with which persons in the
community each construct their own view of reality, while seeking from each the
wisdom drawn from life experience, rather than the objective knowledge drawn
from institutions and disciplines. Credentials of expertise give way to a
predominant focus on the experiential. It seeks the common ground of community
and welcomes a much richer range of expertise in that context.

It is almost impossible to discern the different concepts of development
by attending only to the public discourse and to observed collective behaviour.
The concept of human development appears less amenable to articulation by means
of verbal or written language, now so ingrained by the understandings of the
economic and the scientistic. Indeed, it is often hard to distinguish the
advocates of this alternative development concept from those upholding the
conventional -- "we keep sounding the same" a not infrequent comment, one
underlined with frustration. It is only on listening attentively for the
context that the fundamental distinctions become apparent.

Thus descriptions of specific development alternatives, their activities
and their rationale do not adequately reveal the alternative concept of
development in which they are grounded. They serve only as signposts of a
reality whose visible emanation can be but partially glimpsed through the

spoken and the written word.

Development Alternatives - Some Examples

What follows is a selection of some examples from among the many signposts pointing to another kind of development in Canada.

The Ark in Prince Edward Island is easily the most well known illustration both inside Canada and abroad. The Ark is engaging in the demonstration and continuous research of technology supporting a closed-system bioshelter. It is an integrated ecologically-designed structure, producing and recycling its energy and food requirements in continuous circuitry, thus achieving a high degree of self-sufficiency through reduced dependence on external sources. The structure is heated by solar, biomass and wood energy, and windmill techniques are being tested. A solar greenhouse, organic gardens and aquaculture tanks supply most its food. It is both a research station and living quarters for many of its staff, a feature which enables its scientists to attend to facts that would escape attention in an insulated laboratory environment. It is a public information and demonstration centre, and not infrequently the Ark's staff have profitted by suggestions made by visitors to the premises. It is symbolic of other, perhaps less sophisticated, explorations into practical applications of "soft" energy and of what some have termed "the third generation" of environmental concerns in Canada[7].

Paradoxically, while the Ark was launched with the active support of the federal government and varied expressions of interest from Islanders, and in the face of some scepticism from the public at large, trained to think that Canada's cold climate would not permit effective use of solar energy, its source of support is currently being reversed. As Canadians from other parts of the country continue to flock to the Ark, federal support is wavering. This is attributable to a number of factors, perhaps most succinctly to the dominance of the economic development paradigm in federal institutions, and to the structure of government that is based upon specialization within an institutionalized economic imperative. With this concept so built into the structure, it is understandable that, in present times of government spending restraint, integrated programs that do not fit neatly within the vertical structure of any one department or the operating mandates within a single department are most in jeopardy. The output orientation within and among departments, the need to be seen to be doing, so inherent in all institutions designed under the economic development model, often means that fighting oil spills, passing laws that impose more pollution abatement controls and more energy conservation regulations take priority over activities that move in the direction of eliminating the need for such defensive measures.

Sudbury 2001 is another illustration of the explorations into alternatives underway in Canada. In Northern Ontario, community leaders from among the 170,000 inhabitants of this city and its surrounding municipalities have initiated an experiment in community economic development. Since its founding almost 100 years ago, this community has developed an economic base dependent upon the extraction of its natural resource wealth - nickle and copper. It stands today as "Canada in microcosm" - dissaffected by long years of trading off its resource wealth for rising standards of living. Today Sudbury has one

of the highest wage rate averages in Canada, is dominated by its multi-national corporate citizens, and by a towering smokestack, a "technological advance" that is reversing much of the degredation to the region's natural environment caused by sulphuric gases, though its acid rain now causes havoc elsewhere. Impatient with long years of exploitation by corporate interests and the failure of economic policies promising regional diversity, Sudbury remains today a one-industry community, albeit with the infrastructure of a modern city. Reaction against provincial development plans for the region and increasing attention to its depleting natural resource wealth prompted the community to take action to diversify its economic base by the turn of the century.

The community experiment as it has evolved in the one year of its existence has adopted a three-pronged set of principles through which to accomplish this goal. It is uniquely multi-partite in its structure and its decision-making processes: the Executive Council that comprises its administrative arm includes representatives from all institutions located in the community — multi-nationals and small local business, labour unions and the labour council, its Mayor and the Chairman of its regional government, and its federal and provincial politicians are present, as are the heads of the university and the community college. It is based too upon principles of self-reliance - outside human and financial resources used only to supplement and support the community resources; and it is exploring appropriate technology as the principle under which economic diversification is to take place. Sudbury 2001 is advocating a strategy for economic development referred to as the "Triple S" strategy — selective import substitution, selective technological sovereignty, and substantive eco-development, (a term, briefly put, suggesting development based on ecological approaches, concern for the social and physical environment, and on economy of design).

The recent conclusion of a prolonged strike, affecting one-third of its labour force and shutting down its largest multi-national employer, has served to reinforce the conviction and commitment to 2001's goals. A mohair industrial complex is to be opened shortly, based upon grazing and breeding of angora goats and small industries using the by-products of milk, meat, and mohair. With similar kinds of industries introduced in the future, the residents of the region hope to maintain their community in the face of depleting mineral resources, to restore the natural environment and to permit community growth and development to take place in the context of a lifestyle that permits a blend of urban and rural advantages. As those actively involved in this "hinterland" Canadian experiment well know, the continual problem confronting this search for alternatives is not one of convincing its residents that economic diversification can be achieved, but rather one of containing unrealistic expectations of instant results.

Some of the initiatives identified seemed at first blush poised between both concepts of development. Only on probing the rationale underlying their initiation did it become clear that they appropriately belonged with other explorations into an alternative development model.

Recycling activities are often of this kind. Those engaged in them are frequently asked whether conservation and recycling serve merely to extend the

continuance of the consumption ethic rather than significantly transforming it. Is Five Foundation, active in this field in Metropolitan Toronto and in sparking, with the Recycling Council of British Columbia, the formation of a Canada-wide network of recycling operations, responded vigorously to this criticism. From the outset, its sponsorship and design of community recycling projects has been framed within an insistence on a high component of at-source sorting of paper, cans, bottles and the like, so as to awaken the consciousness of individual householders of the sheer volume of home-generated waste. This stemmed from a conviction that this kind of involvement would in turn lead to a significant reduction in waste and hence to shifts to more conserving lifestyles. The Foundation's largest recycling project has now produced evidence of a dramatic drop in volume collected, and it is looking to documentating, by way of a household survey, the underlying attitudinal and behavioural changes.

Le Monde à Bicyclette in Montreal poses a similar perceptual point. On the surface, one might assume that members of this community group are seeking only ways and means of allowing consumers of bicycles freer use of their vehicles in the urban core. But again such reading would mask the intent of its designers. Underlying their activities is a coherent sense of the linkages between bicycles as an option to transport, and the consequent impact on pollution reduction, energy conservation, land use and enhanced human health.

Conversations About Justice speaks to a recurring theme running through many explorations into development alternatives: community responsibility for institutions. It speaks too to the mode of discourse in which all Canadians can, through dialogue, best come to understand the need for institutional reform and the community role in its achievement.

This initiative was the title first given to a gathering of 50 residents of the Atlantic region who met for two days in Pugwash, Nova Scotia in 1978 to have a "conversation about justice". It was convened under the auspices of the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice in order to give expression to community notions of justice, rather than attending solely, as do various law reform commissions, to the institutionalized concepts and to the concerns of professionals engaged in the administration of the formal justice system. The conversation ranged widely over a number of topics of Canadian life, many not within the purview of the formal system. Participants quickly came to the realization that the problems confronting the formal system had to do fundamentally with society's values and with overblown demands on the formal system. Participants concluded that the community was ready to assume, or re-assume, its responsibilities for the formal system and as well to secure alternative, community-rooted forms for the humane resolution of human conflict.

Future Possibilities

In the concepts of "conversations" and "the Canadian community" lie much fertile ground that requires nurturing if the explorations into alternatives in Canada is to root itself more widely and to lead to necessary and desirable societal change.

As a collectivity, Canadians have been unable or unwilling to discover a compelling ideology on which to bind together all members of our society. Canada was formed out of a desire to cherish certain institutions brought to this country by both founding European cultures: parliamentary democracy and due process (the law). This heritage of respect for institutions has led us to vest in them increased responsibility and authority for the resolution of societal issues, a tendency reinforced by compartmentalized expertise characteristic of the economic development paradigm. Within the understandings of that paradigm, Canada can be viewed, in concert with other industrial nation states, as populated by institutions established to support and reinforce economic development within a framework of democracy and the law.

Yet it is also the case that the alternative development concept - the concept of community growth and development - is also present, and has an even longer tradition. This tradition embraces the belief systems and the simpler structures of the Inuit and the Eskimo, and the respect for nature bred of cold climate pioneers and their survivors. Further, given the heritage of respect for institutions (but not reverence of them), it is not unusual in Canada to find governments playing a leadership role, albeit intermittently, in pursuing this concept of development, the momentum generated by the Conserver Society theme being one striking example.

The alternative development model would see Canada as a human community with humanly-oriented institutions, and there is mounting evidence that Canadians are seeking this expression of themselves. For example, at a recent conference on the "Public Evaluation of Government Spending", the keynote speaker outlined the different perspective brought to this issue were it addressed from the stance of "members of the Canadian community".[8] In that context, issues never attended to by professional evaluators, government officials and others, such as the role of government in the public life of the community, would come to the foreground. So too would many other questions insistently being asked by Canadians of their governments today, and so too would possibilities of relieving governments of many of the responsibilities now thrust upon them. A similar stance is reflected in one of the initiatives identified. "New Canada Projects" is a concept opening ground on which any Canadian can stand, as designer, proprietor and manager, with other members of the Canadian community, of community institutions and as responsible for them.

New Canada - One Canadian's View

Were the "national unity" debate in Canada to free itself from its current predominant preoccupation with jurisdictional sovereignty, constitutional reform, language rights and other accoutrements of a nation state and to move to the foreground the issues of human community, it is this Canadian's belief that we would very quickly give meaning and import to "unity in diversity". In this process, many more Canadians, English- and French-speaking alike, would join together, not necessarily in full understanding of the cultural diversities that characterize this country, but in a fuller appreciation of the richness of that diversity. We would then unite in re-discovering our commonalities: respect for the land, and for the diversity of our natural and multi-cultural environment, balancing material and non-material sources of human well-being, and appreciating different views of reality. The role of

"moral examplar" which Canada has played from time to time on the world stage in the past would more deeply infuse all Canadians, re-awakening the innate Canadian sense of responsible stewardship, and of social justice for all members of the Global Village.

The 1980's will undoubtedly pose for Canadians these and other questions in a very forceful manner. The energy decisions we will have made by the end of that decade, and the processes by which we make them, will tell the tale. The explorers of development alternatives now underway in so many aspects of Canadian life are testiment to what others would remind us of: that the humanizing forces for societal change in liberal democracies come not from governments and other institutions, but rather from the lifeblood of the creative voluntary energies of the people.

Were we able to look back from the perspective of the 21st Century on Canada 1979, what would we see of the history we are writing? Will the historians of the next era tell of new beginnings or of opportunities tossed aside? Will the fragile plantings of development alternatives be rooted out by those shrinking, albeit powerful, numbers of defenders of the economic development paradigm, or will they have grown strong in the formation of another kind of development -- a New Canada?

Whatever the 1980's bring in response to these questions, two conclusions seem clear. First, the array of development alternatives now underway have the potential to affect long-term change, to move away from the mounting turbulence, if not suicidal tendencies, inherent in present development toward a development capable of sustaining the life-support systems of the planet and of sustaining the creative energies of its peoples. Secondly, as the time element grows ever shorter, we may be panicked into taking decisions on the basis of the familiar and ingrained industrial world Mind-set, locking us further into pathways promising still more controls, thus limiting possibilities for creative human existence. Yet this project serves to illuminate opportunities open now that promise to avoid that bleak prospect. What is clearly indicated in taking advantage of these opprotunities for effecting voluntary change is to foster decision-making processes based on "minimum regret" and community responsibility. Our institutions would do well to listen attentively to the voices of Canadians so often unattended from within the barriers of institutional walls, and to join with them as members of the Canadian community exploring in common cause the merits and the limits of the two models of development.

FOOTNOTES

1. The second phase of this project - the interpretative phase of which this paper is the product - has been written in the context of the Third System Project of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA).

Environment Canada sponsored the first phase - the inventory compilation. Its sponsorship is a reflection of its on-going interests in such "development alternative" themes as "Conserver Society", "appropriate technology", and "eco-development"; Environment Canada is also participating in the planning of a UNEP seminar on "Appropriate Patterns of Development and Lifestyles", to be convened in Yugoslavia in 1980, and this project will inform the Canadian contribution to that conference.

The project is also seen as a follow-up on "Canadians in Conversation About the Future", a report on a project, again under the sponsorship of Environment Canada, in which the author of this paper undertook a series of conversations with some "thoughtful Canadians" in 1974-75.

2. Members of the advisory panel were: Dr. Charles Jeanneret, Vice Dean of Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa; Dr. R.W. Durie, Senior Policy Advisor (Energy & Development), Environment Canada and Project Authority for the inventory phase; Dr. H.F. Fletcher, Guelph-Western Research; Dr. R.W. Jackson, Centre for International Affairs, Carleton University; and Mr. Jonathan Cloud of the Alternative Growth Institute.

    Members of the advisory panel assisted in the first phase of this project only; while their insights and advice in the course of designing and compiling the illustrative inventory helped infuse and inform the patterning that emerged, responsibility for this interpretive paper is the author's alone.

3. The report on the inventory phase, tentatively entitled "Exploring Development Alternatives: Canada 1979" is to be published by Environment Canada in the fall of 1979.

4. In Quebec particularly, one hears little mention of "Conserver Society"; rather, expressions such as "The Ecological Society" or "The Alternative Society" - expressions that take into account energy and environmental concerns - are more commonly used.

5. On the point of language, many find it amusing, if not absurd, that nuclear energy is seen to be a form of "conventional energy" while solar and wind energy fall into the "alternatives" category.

6. The statements may often be seen, when they emenate from the same source, as somewhat schizophrenic, as with federal support for both the Candu reactor and its significantly increased level of support for solar energy (though the scale is still tilted in favour of conventional energy).

7. The three generations seen by many as marking the evolutionary phases of environmental concerns include its first phase, a focus on the direct effects of pollution and resulting in pollution control measures; the second recognizes the interdependence of energy, resource management and the maintenance of environmental quality; and the third and newest phase of environmental perception is based on the growing knowledge that man's existence on this earth will increasingly depend on the ability to learn to live in harmony with the environment -- it presumes, as a starting

point, a change from a "consuming society" to a "conserving" society.

8. See "The Public Monitoring of Public Expenditure", notes for keynote
   address by Harold A. Renouf to the Conference on Methods and Forums
   for the Public Evaluation of Government Spending, Ottawa, October 19,
   1978, available from the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

(suite résumé)

La conclusion des auteurs est que les initiatives pour un autre développement
actuellement en cours au Canada ont un potentiel réel de susciter des change-
ments à long terme. L'enquête et l'inventaire ont mis en lumière les
nombreuses occasions offertes à un changement volontaire, des occasions qui
permettent de discerner une alternative aux sombres perspectives de la
situation canadienne présente.

ALTERNATIVAS PARA EL DESARROLLO - SEÑALES CANADIENSES

Resumen: Este informe síntesis se basa sobre un inventario completo de acciones
organizadas e iniciativas para alternativas al desarrollo en el Canadá, compi-
lado a comienzos de 1979. El autor trata de interpretar las consecuencias
de ese inventario y su aplicación a un concepto emergente de un otro desarrollo
para el Canadá, y su potencial para engendrar una visión común por un nuevo
Canadá basado en una sociedad y un medio ambiente sano. El informe explica
cómo se emprendió el estudio que resultó en el inventario y como se superaron
las dificultades conceptuales de identificar y determinar "iniciativas para
un desarrollo alternativo". Se han agrupado categorias de iniciativas alter-
nativas en iniciativas de la "Conserver Society", iniciativas de conservación
y reuso, de diseño de tecnologías alternativas, desarrollo económico alterna-
tivo, el movimiento de cooperativas, el movimiento para estilos de vida
alternativos, alternativas al proceso consultativo, arreglos institucionales
alternativos, alternativas a las relaciones con otros países, reconstrucción
de la sociedad, e iniciativas personales. Se explican iniciativas alrededor
del debate actual sobre la energía, la "Conserver Society" y otros ejemplos en
algun detalle.

Se concluye que las iniciativas actuales para alternativas de desarrollo en
el Canadá tienen fuerte potencial para efectuar e influir en cambios auténticos
al largo plazo. El estudio e inventario han mostrado las numerosas oportuni-
dades para un cambio voluntario, oportunidades que prometen evitar el porvenir
desalentador del camino actual del desarrollo Canadiense.

BUILDING BLOCKS

INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: CRISIS AND CONFLICT

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Original language: English

Abstract: India, at the time of attaining political independence in 1947, had a well established capitalist class, and a trained bureaucracy. Soon after independence the political leadership formulated a programme of rapid economic development, with a balanced growth of agriculture and industry providing full employment and equitable income distribution. Its basic objective was to achieve a self-reliant, growing economy that would provide all possible opportunities for advancement.

In his paper, Ranjit Sau takes a close look at India's evolution - the achievements and the failures - and draws conclusions for the future. An attempt is made at (a) identifying the major components of India's development strategy, (b) analysing the actual performance of this strategy, (c) assessing the current situation, and (d) discerning, to the extent feasible, the contours of the future trends.

LA STRATÉGIE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L'INDE: CRISE ET CONFLIT

Résumé: L'Inde, au moment de son indépendance politique (1947), avait une classe capitaliste bien établie et une bureaucratie qualifiée. Peu après l'Indépendance, la direction politique formula un programme de développement économique rapide reposant sur une croissance équilibrée de l'industrie et de l'agriculture, prévoyant le plein emploi et une distribution équitable du revenu. L'objectif essentiel était de créer les conditions de l'auto-développement ultérieur.

L'auteur de cet article examine de près l'évolution de l'Inde - succès et échecs - et tire des conclusions pour l'avenir. Il s'emploie (a) à identifier les principaux éléments de la stratégie de développement de l'Inde, (b) à analyser les résultats de cette stratégie, (c) à évaluer la situation actuelle, et (d) à discerner, autant que faire se peut, les perspectives.

Ranjit Sau

INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: CRISIS AND CONFLICT

India is a country with a remarkable endowment of natural and human resources.
It has substantial deposits of iron ore, manganese, limonite, and other
minerals. It is equally rich in energy potential: it has coal, lignite, a
modest amount of petroleum, and an immense reserve of hydroelectric power.
India's resources as a whole would give her a leading position in world in-
dustry, in particular the steel and engineering industries and the chemical
industries based on coal. It has a fair supply of skilled manpower. At
the time of attaining political independence in 1947, India had a well-
established capitalist class, and a trained bureaucracy. The country since
then has had a relatively long period of political stability. Soon after
independence the political leadership chalked out a programme of rapid econo-
mic development, with a balanced growth of agriculture and industry, provi-
ding full employment and equitable income distribution. In many respects it
has been a unique phenomenon in world history: the world has never seen
anything like this before. Soon after coming out of the colonial yoke of two
centuries, a vast country with an extremely low level of per capita income,
but immense potentialities in terms of human and natural resources, set out
on the course of massive industrialization and equally impressive agricultu-
ral transformation, all within the system of parliamentary democracy and
bourgeois property relations. Its basic objective was to achieve a self-
reliant, growing economy that would provide all possible opportunities for
the advancement of every individual, big or small. At least so it was in the
professed policy of the country from the very beginning. But soon interests
of the ruling class asserted themselves; and the actual course of history
came to be much different from the original plue-print.

Agrarian relations

In 1951, the population of India was 362 million; in the next two decades it
went up by 52 per cent, or by 186 million. On a per capita basis the net
area sown was initially 0.82 acre; it declined by 22 per cent, to 0.64 acre
in 1971. The index of cropping intensity was 1.11 in 1951, and 1.18 in 1971.
So the gross cropped area was 0.91 acre and 0.74 acre per capita in these
two years, respectively. In relation to countries like USA and the USSR,
of course, India is a land-poor country; but in comparison with China and
Japan, India's land endowment is much better.

About three-fourths of India's population are dependent on agriculture for
livelihood. Some 45 per cent of the national income originates from this
source. Food-grains are the major crops that account for nearly three-
fourths of the cultivated land. Between 1949-50 and 1964-65, agricultural
output as a whole increased at the annual rate of 3.2 per cent; thereafter,
between 1964-65 and 1976-77 the growth rate was lower, namely 2.1 per cent.
All through these years the yield per unit of land improved at the rate of
1.7 per cent annually, while the rate of expansion of area declined from 1.5
per cent per year during 1949-50/1964-65 to 0.4 per cent during 1964-65/
1976-77, and so the rate of growth of output fell.

Self-sufficiency in food has been one of the most dearly held objectives in
India. Growth in food-grains output was at the annual rate of 3.0 per cent
during 1949-50/1964-65, but only 2.6 per cent during 1964-65/1976-77. As
much as two-fifths of the growth of output during the first period came from
the expansion of area under cultivation. And this was a matter of concern,
for the area could not be expanded indefinitely, specially because India had
already brought under cultivation a dangerously high proportion of the total
territory. There was an even more serious matter of concern. The balance
between population and the output of food-grains was precarious; worse was
the fact that the marketed surplus of food-grains, which is the source of
subsistence for the urban region and the major determinant of industrial
wages, stagnated in absolute volume and dwindled fast as a proportion of the
food-grains production. A major change in agricultural policy therefore
took place in the mid-1960s.

In the 1950s and up to the mid-60s, the official strategy of agricultural
transformation was largely informed by the Gandhian concept of a peasant
economy consisting of small and middle peasants. The strategy had three com-
ponents: (a) land reform, (b) co-operative farming, (c) community develop-
ment. It was intended to reconcile the measures for stepping up agricultural
production with those for reducing poverty and unemployment of vast rural
masses. Among the targets of land reform, the first was to abolish inter-
mediary tenures and it was rather easy to accomplish. The most dismal failure
was in respect of implementing the legal ceiling on land ownership and redis-
tributing the land held in excess thereof. Up to 31 July 1977, not even one
half of one per cent of the totoal agricultural land in India had actually
been redistributed. As for cooperative farming, it was visualized that
entire cultivation in the country would be brought under this form of organi-
zation so that small and middle peasants could get full advantages of large
scale production, marketing and other facilities. The community development
programme, the third component of the agricultural strategy, started in 1952
and spread over the whole country by 1963. It was based upon the premise
that rural masses would come forward to supply voluntary labour for the
creation of productive assets without expecting any share in the fruits
thereof. Neither cooperative farming, nor community development, made much
headway; and soon they were forgotten.

The New Agricultural Strategy was launched in 1964-65. Its two main features
are: all-out official support for capitalist farming, and the technology of
cultivation that used high-yielding varieties (HYV) seeds, and high doses of
fertilizer. By its very nature, the technology is applicable only in limited
areas of assured irrigation. The technology spread very fast: from merely
200 acres of HYV cereals in 1964-65 to as much as 24 million acres by 1968-
69, and 62.6 million acres by 1973-74, out of the total cultivated area of
some 360 million acres. Wheat is the only major crop to have gained from it.
But on the whole the growth rate of food-grains remained below the past
trend. A large part of the cost of cultivation under the new technology
goes out of the rural sector in the form of payments for fertilizer and im-
plements, and a share of it even leaks out of the country. This creates
deficiency of demand for the product. Added to it is the problem of rising
costs of fertilizers in the world market; the government however is trying
to keep down fertilizer prices at home.

It may be recalled that due to technical progress in Western countries, costs of fertilizer plants were sharply reduced by the early 1960s, when petroleum also was available in the world market at a low and falling price. A fertilizer-intensive agricultural technology was pressed into India with the help of foreign credits. This was a crucial technological choice for India, which was however out of line with the resource endowments of the country at that time, and more so it is now as prices of oil and fertilizers have soared in the world market.

At any rate, over the years a strong group of rich farmers has arisen in rural India, in the wake of official policy of promoting capitalist farmers and the threat of land redistribution from large landowners. This group is now under economic pressure as there is a deficiency of demand for the food-grains, and a rising trend of cost of production. Side by side, the ranks of agricultural labourers have been swelling as the stagnant non-agricultural sector of the rural economy fails to absorb the growing rural work force.

Big bourgeoisie

With the launching of the programme of rapid industrialization in the mid-1950s, the public sector took up responsibility for constructing the infra-structure of transport, communication and power, and for building up the basic and key industries such as steel, cement, machine tools, and chemicals. The public sector was to make over 50% of the investment in the organized sector. The industrial bourgeoisie readily acquisced to it, for it suited their private accumulation. The record of industrial growth in quantity and quality is certainly remarkable. Initially the emphasis was upon import-substitution, but later the stress shifted to export promotion. The private industrial sector grew rapidly in a protected market. The restrictions such as licensing, quota and all that, were taken advantage of by big industrial houses. Meanwhile, industrial growth in the last 10 years had slowed down; net capital formation of the private corporate sector had drastically fallen. There are several hypotheses to explain this stagnation. One of the impor-tant factors which have contributed to this crisis is that the big bour-geoisie appears to be more inclined to swallow up smaller capitals and thus increase profits than to expand production. Various official restrictions and controlling devices have failed to check the growth of big bourgeoisie and its absorption of smaller capitals. This process is known as the centra-lization of capital, into which India entered some time in the 1960s.

Although the profit rate in industry has improved in the 1970s, there is hardly any sign of revival of the economy. On the contrary, a large number of industrial units have fallen sick, and the government has been obliged to nurse them back to health. The market for industrial goods, particularly those meant for consumption of the less affluent, has not expanded much. Rather there are indications of its relative shrinkage. There were attempts in the early 1970s to use the export market as an outlet for industrial goods; but the results have not been durable.

Foreign capital occupies a key position in the private corporate sector. Branches of foreign companies and foreign-controlled rupee companies are

increasing their hold in manufacturing industries. They account for some 25% of total assets and of net sales, but claim as much as 40% of gross profits of the entire private corporate sector. Most of the inflow of private foreign capital is in the form of retained earnings; the outflow of dividends, royalties and all that far exceeds the net inflow of foreign capital from abroad. In terms of cash also, foreign capital is instrumental to a severe drainage from India. Yet the Indian economy is witnessing an ever-increasing sphere of foreign capital.

Public sector

Defined in a broader sense so as to include administration and departmental and non-departmental enterprises of the government, the public sector in India is the largest employer, and the largest consumer. The public sector also undertakes the major part of investment in the organized economic activities. Yet its contribution to the gross domestic product is not even 20%.

The public sector has a critical problem of resource mobilization. Its own savings cover hardly one-fourth of its investment; the rest is financed through borrowing from the public, banks and from other countries. Companies of the public sector yield very little by way of profit. Its vast investments in irrigation works are a source of continuous loss. Efforts to raise tax revenue, mainly through indirect taxes, add disproportionately heavier burden on the poorer section of the community.

Yet, the public sector, including nationalized banks, is a major source of financing the investment-savings gap of the private corporate sector. Furthermore, whatever little increase in employment has taken place in recent years it has been only in the public sector. It is also to be noted that the wage and salary bill of government administration alone exceeds the wage bill of all the factories in India. A large part of the urban workforce in India is thus not directly under a capitalist employer, although they suffer in other ways under the capitalist system. If the process of economic planning has helped the growth of capitalist farmers and the big bourgeoisie, it has also fostered a powerful group of the petty-bourgeoisie like civil servants, office workers and high-paid professionals, who are the members of the rising middle class.

Crisis and options

The present crisis of the Indian economy has the following dimensions. In agriculture, a basically inappropriate technological choice had been made in the mid-1960s. The new agricultural technology is very much fertilizer-intensive and it relies upon inputs which are becoming increasingly expensive. It is prone to realization crisis, which is the other name for demand deficiency; and what is more, the recent rise in oil and fertilizer prices in the world market has reduced its viability. It was partly thrust upon India by the vested interests of foreign capital. So far the government has shielded the agricultural sector from the impacts of these factors through support price, procurement, subsidy, etc., but it would be increasingly difficult to maintain this policy. On the other hand, it is too late to ask

thousands of rich farmers to try alternative technology. It is not so much
a Ricardian crisis, as it is a case of a wrong technological choice. Unlike
in the Ricardian schema profit has not declined and rent improved as a
result of bringing marginal land under cultivation.

Industrial production has stagnated, and private capital accumulation has
fallen in recent years, not because of a fall in profit rate; if anything,
the rate of profit has gone up and big industrial houses in particular have
increased their assets, sales and profits. While agricultural stagnation,
reduction in public investment and such other factors might have played
their role, there are indications that the big bourgeoisie is engaged in
the process of what is called centralization of capital.

On the whole, India's economy is a capitalist economy, and the laws of capi-
talism are fiercely at work. But it is a case of under-developed capitalism:
the country never had the benefits of competitive capitalism, from the very
inception of the industrial bourgeoisie having been characterized by monopo-
listic features. So also in agriculture - the capitalist farmers after
receiving a major stimulus in the mid-1960s have emerged as a powerful lobby
in the political scene. Third, technology, which is one of the prime movers
of production in the world today, is largely determined by vested interests
of foreign capital - in industry as much as in agriculture. The internal
dynamics of such an under-developed capitalism is incapable of generating
sustained economic growth.

The present complex situation of the Indian economy can move in different
ways. One of the more likely scenarios is that the 'green revolution' type
of technology would continue; as a result capitalist farmers would demand
more and more financial support from the government. The bourgeoisie would
like to see agricultural expansion, but should the diversion of resources to
agriculture cut too much into the public funds, which would have been other-
wise available to industry, a conflict of interests comes into being. The
government would certainly try to strike a balance, but it is likely to
become an increasingly difficult task. In terms of classical economics,
such a problem could be resolved in two ways, namely, reduction of real
wages and proper technological progress. The latter being out of the
question now, only the first option appears to be the only feasible one.
In the policies of neoclassical economics, emphasis is placed on 'correct
pricing'. But India's problem is far too complicated to be corrected by
tinkering with the price mechanism alone. The Keynesian economics under
such circumstances recommends increased public investment to bolster up
demand. But that is also not going to be of much help.

The ruling classes can affort to be eclectical in their policy options. It
appears that three courses are open to them: (i) to reduce real wages,
(ii) to remould the public sector such that it mobilizes resources from the
people at large and spends them in subsidizing agriculture and the private
sector in industry, and (iii) to invite foreign capital as a means of sup-
plementing the available domestic investment. This would be then a mixture
of classical, neoclassical and Keynesian policies. But it cannot take the
Indian economy very far. Real wages are already very low and are falling ˙
in the last two decades. The burden of financing capitalist farmers and

industrial bourgeoisie through the public sector would evidently fall more
and more on the poorer section of the community. And foreign capital is
never a source of net positive inflow in the long run; it may provide tempo-
rary palliative, but sooner or later it drains away much more than what it
brings in from abroad.

At any rate, in such an economy it is somewhat idle to visualize need-
oriented, endogenous, self-reliant, ecologically sound another development
unless it is based on structural transformations in social relations, in
economic activities and in their spatial distribution as well as in the
power structure, so as to realize the conditions of self-management and
participation in decision-making by all those affected by it, from the rural
or urban community to the world as a whole. This then calls for a mass
movement to effect a structural transformation. The mass movement has to
combine economic and political agitations. In India the political set-up
now appears to be more congenial to accelerate the process. In the economic
sphere the policy for transition to another development has to be formulated
keeping in view the contradictions which prevail among the ruling classes.
As the diagram illustrates, there are six sets of such contradictions.

First, although capitalist farmers have emerged in a big way there are still
many villages of India which are dominated by feudal and semi-feudal land-
lords; and there are conflicts of interests among these two classes. In
this tussle, the former deserve support, for feudalism is the worse obstacle
to agricultural growth. More positively, land should be distributed to the
tiller; tenants are to be protected from feudal oppressions; and poor pea-
sants and agricultural labourers should be given an opportunity to improve
their living conditions.

Second, landlords and capitalist farmers do not use their land most effecti-
vely; in India as well as in many other parts of the world, intensity of
cropping invariably declines with farm size. The unutilized land should be
given to poor peasants and agricultural labourers - at least for the time
of the year when it is left idle - for cultivation by them, supported by
adequate official measures for input supply. A section of the bourgeoisie
may extend cooperation in this programme as it enhances the rural market
for industry.

Third, the domination of the big bourgeoisie is to be eliminated. Monopoly is a big barrier to industrial expansion. The public sector should take the leading role in large-scale industry. Again, a section of the bourgeoisie may welcome such a move.

Fourth, evidently foreign capital has captured a large segment of the industrial market in India. Profits earned by branches of foreign companies and subsidiaries are equivalent to some two-fifths of the profits of the entire private corporate sector. In addition, foreign capital comes to India by way of 'other investments' which include minority participation, technical collaboration, credits, etc.; and through this process an enormous amount of surplus is drained away from the country. The big bourgeoisie collaborates with foreign capital; and also a section of the small and medium bourgeoisie seeks help from foreign capital as a means of protection from the onslaught of big bourgeoisie. While the tentacles of foreign capital are thus spread out over a large part of the Indian economy, there are areas of conflict between domestic capital and foreign capital. If a policy is designed to restrict the scale of operation of foreign capital, it is likely that the domestic bourgeoisie may extend cooperation to the same.

Fifth, the camp of foreign capital is not undivided, as capitals from different countries compete for a place in India. Perhaps this cleavage may be used in the better interest of the country. Credits from socialist countries can provide a countervailing power against the vested interests of private foreign capital.

Finally, as we have narrated above, foreign capital has had a role in promoting a particular type of agricultural strategy in India, because it served its interests. Capitalist farmers are now in a great difficulty as a result of that alien technological choice. Indian agriculture is in urgent need of continuous technological progress - a progress that is consistent with the resource endowments of the country. There is plenty of scope for truly revolutionary work in this area which would promote agricultural growth and at the same time strengthen the working class.

It must not be forgotten that the major contradiction is between the ruling classes on the one hand and the exploited masses on the other. Any tactical alliance - united front - with the relatively oppressed sections of ruling classes must be subordinated to the dictates of the struggle to resolve the major contradiction. It is also to be kept in view that the strength of the ruling classes, their ability to unite among themselves, and their capacity to create divisive tendencies in progressive movements should not be under-estimated. The basic point we are trying to make is as follows. Although the Indian economy has entered a phase of crisis, the 'potentialities' of the prevailing social and economic order are not yet exhausted; however, it is possible to work on the internal conflicts among the ruling classes to pave the way for another development. Another development is a goal which has to be reached through stages; in other words, there is a process of transition to that development. And in this process of transition political and economic movements are to be judiciously combined. We have indicated above some guidelines only.

In this country of abysmal poverty co-existing with disporportionate af-
fluence, millions live on a thin edge - an edge on which questions of food,
land and water are constantly answered by cycles of revolt and suppression.
Every day in this subcontinent men die over these issues trying to deter-
mine who will command whom. These everyday struggles for bread-and-water
are largely spontaneous, sporadic and isolated. The long shadow of poverty,
squalor and disease has cast a spell of gloom over the minds of the exploited
masses. Many of them take it for granted that their place in society is
pre-ordained; that nothing much can be done to alleviate the misery; that
this is a land of too many people with too little resources. Indeed, with an
empty stomach for days on end, one can do very little else. In the vast
agrarian sector of India, capitalism - though unevenly developed in some
areas - is yet to take hold over all or most of it. Feudal and semi-feudal
fragmentation of workers and peasants deprive them of the class conscious-
ness that is associated historically with the process of large-scale capita-
list production. It is a necessary condition for social transformation that
the consciousness of the masses be aroused; it is imperative that they are
able to identify their main enemies, and to recognize their allies. First
and foremost, they need the confidence that within the limits of available
resources in the country it is possible to conquer the hunger, and to build
material conditions for the attainment by everybody the best in him. Once
they come to realize this truth they would inevitably ask the next question:
why, then, this impoverishment? What is responsible for this misery? That
is to say, who are the enemy and who are the friends?

People engage themselves in daily battles for survival under the pain of
slow liquidation. The movement for another development has to take its
roots in the day-to-day struggles of exploited masses; and at the same time
it has to constitute an integral part of the long march for social transfor-
mation. Let it be emphasized that the movement relates itself to the
mundane bread-and-water issues, and from there it elevates itself to the
question of political power. This dualism of the movement for another
development is a complex thing to achieve in correct proportion; and it is
all the more difficult for the laymen to comprehend. People participate in
a political-economic agitation as it voices, to begin with, their grievances
and articulates their own immediate aspirations. In the course of the
struggle they ascend to higher levels of consciousness; and they come to
grasp the more basic issues of society. From the particular to the general;
from the immediate to the ultimate; from food-and-shelter for you-and-me to
the welfare of the whole mankind; such is the sequence of revolutionary con-
sciousness. Masses learn it through practice.

Immediate, or so-called 'partial', demands are to be strictly distinguished
from the fundamental aims and tasks of social transformation. Demands for
bonus, for higher wages, and the like, belong to the first category while
the abolition of landlordism, of all exploitation, fall in the second. By
their very nature the basic demands cannot be achieved in the prevailing
matrix of class relations, for they strike at the foundation of the current
social order. Only some of the partial demands may be feasible for realiza-
tion. Yet these two components are always there, and it would be a grave
error to mix them up. The political leadership has to determine the contents

of these two categories, to synthesize them, and to educate the masses as to
how their daily struggle for food-and-shelter merges into the strategy of
historic transformation of the society.

Immediate, partial, demands are again of two types, namely, (a) the maximum
possible concessions from ruling classes, that is, the concessions which
the ruling classes would willy-nilly concede in their own long-term inte-
rest, and (b) the demands which appear 'reasonable' to the masses but cannot
be achieved under the existing correlation of class forces. This classifi-
cation is illustrated below:

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                              DEMANDS
                                 |
          ┌──────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┐
          │                                                  │
     Immediate, or Partial                                Basic
   ┌──────────────┴──────────────┐                        (C)
   │                             │
Feasible                 Not so feasible
                         but 'reasonable'

  (A)                          (B)
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It is a politically tested practice that while fighting for immediate demands
a genuine mass movement must also popularize basic slogans among the people,
educate them and organize them to fight for their realization. It is neces-
sary that practical mass movements should be developed on immediate issues
so that the masses get organized and become conscious through them, and thus
prepare themselves to fight for basic changes. Hence there is no question
of belittling or neglecting such struggles. But it is equally true that
without a constant campaign among the people to fight for basic demands, mass
movements on partial demands alone tend to lose their perspective and direc-
tion, and soon fall into the trap of economism. It is naïve to expect that
another development would be offered by the ruling classes on a silver
platter; rather it has to be accomplished through genuine mass movement,
step by step, without deviations into adventurism or revisionism.

Interestingly enough, official policies in India have always spoken of a pat-
tern of development which is very much akin to the core of another develop-
ment as enunciated above. For instance, the First Five Year Plan, ch.1,
para 1, opens as follows: "The central objective of planning in India at
the present stage is to initiate a process of development which will raise
living standards and open out to the people new opportunities for a richer
and more varied life. The economic condition of a country at any given time
is a product of the broader social environment, and economic planning has to
be viewed as an integral part of a wider process aiming at not merely the
development of resources in a narrow technical sense, but at the development
of human faculties and the building up of an institutional framework adequate
to the needs and aspirations of the people." Similar sentiments have been
expressed in all subsequent Plans with ever-increasing vigour and precision.

Removal of poverty, eradication of unemployment, better distribution of in-
come, reduction of concentration of economic power, and similar objectives
have been repeated again and again all through the Plan documents. Yet,
what actually happened is far apart from what was reiterated as the basic
objectives of planning for economic growth. The Indian economy could not
simply get away from the compulsions and consequences of capitalist expan-
sion in an under-developed economy. All the indications are there that the
similar line of evolution would continue in the foreseeable future unless
the progressive mass movement, which has a long history in India, gathers
momentum and forges ahead against the stream of capitalist advancement.
What would be the shape of that movement? Who would be the leader?

There is a view that the social classes, or strata, which stand between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the bulk of the population in India;
they may be called the middle class that includes small-scale producers,
rich farmers, civil servants, professionals, intelligentsia, and the like.
This class came into political limelight during the freedom struggle; and it
now dominates the political set-up of bourgeoisie democracy by virtue of its
numerical strength as well as organizational ability. It is no doubt an
amorphous group, but the common thread which binds its constituents together
is their opposition to big bourgeoisie on the one hand, and to the proleta-
riat on the other. Having got the political power in their hands now, these
social strate - the middle class - can effect an economic development which
is relatively progressive by the standard of current experience. Modern-
technology is characterized by the fact that it is divisible, that is to say,
it can be used by medium and small scale enterprises also. This is borne
out by the spread of green revolution technology, and by the availability
of machines and equipment of various sizes such as mini-computers, electro-
nic devices for small-scale operations, and the like. Furthermore, economic
assistance is nowadays provided not only by the advanced capitalist count-
ries but also the socialist countries. Under these circumstances, this
school maintains, the middle class can enjoy a degree of social and political
autonomy so as to adopt an anti-monopoly, anti-feudal, and anti-imperialist
economic policy. It can curb the monopoly power of big bourgeoisie and of
foreign capital; it can set up a growing public sector; and it can implement
a moderate degree of land reform to oust the feudal remnants. Such an
intermediate regime faces opposition from above as well as from below; but
it would have an overwhelming support of white-collar employees, profession-
als, intellectuals, and similar groups which are well-organized and articu-
late. So it is politically viable at the present juncture; and what is
more, it is capable of playing a progressive role in this context. In other
words, if the intermediate regime cannot bring about another development
in its entirety , it can certainly pave the way for the same. Led by the
intermediate strata of the society - the progressive farmers, national
bourgeoisie, revolutionary intellectuals and the like - the intermediate
regime is a transitional formation, and it is the only viable alternative
for a country like India now.

There are reasons for disagreement with the above-mentioned school of thought.
If anything, the middle class of India is one of the three beneficiaries of
the capitalist development so far, the other two being the big bourgeoisie

and the capitalist farmers. It belongs to the privileged top ten per cent
of the population, and it is hopelessly alienated from the masses. It is
an amorphous, vacillating and all too often opportunist conglomeration,
hardly known for its anti-monopoly, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal stand.
The middle class is incapable of providing leadership for an independent
economic development even in the transitional phase.

The leadership has to come from the working class. It is only the working
class, in alliance with other progressive classes and strata, which can lay
the foundation for another development. Meanwhile, one has to work from
within the prevailing socio-political order so as to accentuate the contra-
dictions of the ruling classes. The potentialities of the Indian economic
system, in its present shape and form, are not yet exhausted; it is too early
to expect a fundamental transformation. But the present crisis can very well
lead to radical change to the right or to the left. If the solution to this
economic problem is sought through the reduction of real wages - which is one
of the possibilities - the tension in the system is bound to rise, with the
associated consequences coming in its trail. The crisis that began in the
1960s has been aggravated by the changed circumstances in the world market.

The barriers to another development in India are located in its internal
domain, not so much in the external sphere. These barriers can be removed
only by the determined efforts of the masses. Neither the intermediate clas-
ses nor the ruling classes are capable of accomplishing this task. The
struggle for another development in India has to be an integral part of the
movement for the New International Economic Order; the two are inseperably
linked.

* * *

LA ESTRATEGIA INDIA DE DESARROLLO: CRISIS Y CONFLICTO

*Resumen:Cuando la India logró su independencia política en 1947 el país contaba
con una clase capitalista bien establecida y una burocracia formada. Poco
después de la independencia su dirección política formuló un programa de
desarrollo económico accelerado, con el crecimiento equilibrado de agricultura
e industria que aseguraba el empleo completo y una distribución equitativa de
ingresos. Su objetivo principal era lograr una economia autodependiente y
creciente que proveria toda posible oportunidad para adelanto y progreso.*

*En su informe, Ranjit Sau hace un estudio minucioso de la evolución India -
sus logros y fracasos - y saca conclusiones para el futuro. Trata de (a)
identificar los componentes principales de la estrategia para el desarrollo de
la India, (b) analizar los resultados de esta estrategia, (c) valorar la
situación actual, (d) discernir, hasta cierto punto factible, los contornos
de tendencias futuras.*

HOY CHILE ES UNA SOMBRA DE LO QUE FUÉ: PERSPECTIVAS PARA OTRO DESARROLLO

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Idioma original: Español

Resumen: El informe es una síntesis de reflexión múltiple de personas y grupos dentro y fuera de Chile sobre la posibilidad y el contenido de "otro desarrollo" partiendo de la actual realidad nacional Chilena. Chile, estado que fué democrático ya no lo es. El nuevo contexto determina el pensamiento y la acción en torno a las condiciones necesarias para otro desarrollo en el país.

Se destacan como puntos claves de la alternativa la satisfacción de necesidades básicas, el manejo social del proceso de desarrollo, la distribución equitativa de ingresos, la instalación de un sistema político democrático y pluralista, la recuperación de dignidad en la esfera internacional y la superación del ostracismo mundial que experimenta el régimen actual. Se hubieran elecciones democráticas puede que éstas demostrarían que estos principios corresponden a los deseos de la gran mayoría de los chilenos.

El informe propone cuatro grandes procesos necesarios para lograr la meta deseada: la democratización política – multipartidista que tiende progresivamente a la amplificación de las bases estructurales de la participación política; participación social – el establecimiento de una efectiva autonomía de la organización social frente al estado; renacionalización económica – lo que requiere la formulación de una economía política y no de una pura economía; la renacionalización cultural – elemento principal a la lucha para la democratización y que está a la vanguardia de esta lucha.

A pesar de que hoy Chile es una sombra de lo que fué, existe el fuerte deseo de recuperar la identidad perdida. Se inventan nuevos mecanismos de relación y expresión popular. Aún en estas condiciones se piensa y se prepara el otro desarrollo.

El estudio entero de siete capítulos y anexos son obtenibles del ILET.

TODAY CHILE IS A SHADOW OF WHAT IT USED TO BE: PERSPECTIVES FOR ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT*/

Abstract: The report is a synthesis of a process of multifaceted reflection by individuals and groups inside and outside of Chile as to the possibility and the content of "another development" stemming from the present Chilean national reality. Chile, the former democratic state, is no longer. The new context determines the thought and action around conditions for another development in the country. The alternative - which would suggest satisfaction of basic needs, social management of the development process, equal distribution of revenue, the institution of a democratic, pluralistic, political system, the recuperation of dignity in the international sphere and an end of the moral ostracism which the present regime experiences at the global level - would be seen to respond to the desires of a large majority of Chileans were democratic elections to be held.

The report suggests a four-pronged process as necessary to achieving the desired goals: political democracy (multi-party, leading progressively towards the enlargement of the structural bases of political participation); social participation (the establishment of an effective autonomy of the organization of social forces confronting the State); re-nationalization of the economy (requiring the formulation of a political-economy and not merely "pure" economics); renationalization of culture (central to the struggle for democratization and acting even as its vanguard).

Finally, in spite of the fact that Chile today is a shadow of its former self; there exists a strong desire to recuperate a lost identify, new mechanisms for interaction and popular expression are being devised and, even under present conditions, thought and preparation are being given to another development.

*/ The complete 7-chapter study and annexes are available, in Spanish, from ILET.

LE CHILI D'AUJOURD'HUI N'EST QUE L'OMBRE DE LUI-MÊME: PERSPECTIVES POUR UN AUTRE DÉVELOPPEMENT*/

Résumé: Ce document de synthèse résulte d'un processus de réflexion engagé par des individus et des groupes, à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du Chili, sur la possibilité et le contenu d'un autre développement à partir de la réalité chilienne présente. Le Chili démocratique n'est plus. Le nouveau contexte détermine la pensée et l'action quant aux conditions d'un autre développement. Les traits principaux de l'alternative seraient la satisfaction des besoins humains; la direction par la société du processus de développement; l'égalité dans la distribution du revenu; l'établissement d'un système politique démocratique et pluraliste; la récupération de la dignité au plan international et la fin de l'ostracisme que connaît le présent régime. Si des élections libres avaient lieu, on verrait qu'une telle alternative répond aux voeux d'une vaste majorité des Chiliens.

HOY CHILE ES UNA SOMBRA DE LO QUE FUE

Las Perspectiva para Otro Desarrollo

Juan Somavía

Enrique Ponce de León

I. Planteamiento general y restricciones del análisis

Este documento es una síntesis de un proceso de reflexión múltiple de personas y grupos dentro y fuera de Chile sobre las posibilidades y contenido de "otro desarrollo" a partir de la actual realidad nacional. Trata de reflejar con realismo las condiciones concretas que impulsan o limitan su concreción en el marco del desarrollo histórico de Chile, de su actual realidad autoritaria y de la configuración creciente y mayoritaria de una unidad de acción en la base social en contra del poder vigente.

Chile fue democrático, hoy no lo es y quiere volver a serlo. Hoy Chile es una sombra de lo que fue. Ese contexto determina el pensamiento y la acción en torno a las condiciones de otro desarrollo en el país. Como aspiración se trata de concebir, organizar y desencadenar un proceso global de cambios estructurales cuya implicación en la sociedad es la ampliación generalizada de los mecanismos e instancias de participación; en la economía, la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas, el manejo social del desarrollo y la distribución equitativa del ingreso; y en la política la instalación de un sistema democrático y pluralista; como asimismo la recuperación de la dignidad en la esfera internacional y la superación del ostracismo moral en que se encuentra el actual régimen a nivel mundial.

¿Es posible transformar esta alternativa -que si hubieran elecciones democráticas demostraría responder a los deseos de la gran mayoría de los chilenos- en una realidad en gestación? Ello conduce a reconocer que el sistema político vigente impide plantearla de modo directo al pueblo como una alternativa real de organización de la vida social, económica, política y cultural. El régimen considera que ella refleja los postulados de fuerzas "anti-nacionales" y por lo mismo, cualquiera sea su contenido específico, forma parte de un vasto conjunto de ideas que no tienen canales legales de expresión, difusión y elaboración, y que siguen, en consecuencia, la suerte del país confidencial. Los partidarios del otro desarrollo se ven forzados aún a pensar en cierto secreto y actuar con discreción, sin el beneficio del debate amplio y público ni del desarrollo sistemático y abierto de los problemas que abordan. Todo ello en medio de los sobresaltos de una realidad autoritaria a veces sutil, a veces brutal, pero generalmente eficaz como presencia restrictiva del análisis y la acción, lo que afecta la voluntad y las circunstancias concretas para definir las condiciones políticas del otro desarrollo. Asi, el sistema limita de he-

cho la posibilidad de que se expresen y organicen abiertamente los con-
sensos reales que existen en el cuerpo social para superar el actual
régimen.

Sin embargo, las dificultades para construir las bases de otro
desarrollo no emanan exclusivamente del carácter de régimen.   En ver-
dad, tienen mucho que ver también con las polaridades heredadas de los
procesos previos a la ruina del Estado democrático liberal chileno
(burgués en otras versiones), caracteríticos por la extrema diferen-
ciación en los contenidos y en los estilos de los varios programas po-
líticos que conoció el país en las décadas previas al pronunciamiento
militar.

II. Marco histórico del problema

Se suele caracterizar la historia social del país haciendo alu-
sión a un rasgo por cierto enteramente peculiar en el contexto latino-
americano: la existencia temprana de un Estado orgánico y consistente.
Para comprender su accionar en las coyunturas de las últimas décadas,
vale la pena detenerse en el momento en que la nación da origen al úl-
timo de sus actores centrales: la clase trabajadora.

Es más o menos sabido que el estilo de desarrollo del modelo o-
ligárquico liberal de la economía y de la vida social en general del
país experimenta, al final del siglo XIX, una importante alteración
con la aparición del proletariado en medio del incremento de las fuer-
zas productivas que provoca el auge de las explotaciones salitreras
ubicadas en el extremo norte de Chile.   Se entiende este fenómeno como
el basamento de la crisis oligárquica entonces ad portas y del subse-
cuente proceso de democratización.

El origen de las transformaciones institucionales que se pueden
observar en ese entonces se puede fijar resumidamente en los siguien-
tes factores: a) la transformación del Estado en instancia de apropia-
ción de la riqueza salitrera; b) el parlamentarismo como solución de
compromiso a las demandas políticas; y c) la estrecha vinculación del
sistema político (no ya del sólo Estado) a la misma economía salitre-
ra.

Estos fenómenos se expresan en la irrupción en el sistema ins-
titucional jurídico de un conjunto heterogéneo de normas que amplían
la representación política, la base electoral y la extensión del su-
fragio; en el reforzamiento de una estructura política policéntrica,
basada en la formación de alianzas cambiantes entre grupos y partidos
que tienen amplio acceso al gobierno y al aparato burocrático del Es-
tado, lo que imposibilita la estabilidad de los proyectos y programas;
en la burocratización creciente del Estado, convertido ya en mecanismo
redistributivo, con la consiguiente ampliación desmesurada de su tama-
ño y peso sobre la sociedad; y en la disfuncionalidad intrínseca de un
ordenamiento jurídico que pretende hacer coexistir el resabio oligár-
quico con una forma naciente de Estado social de derecho.

En verdad se constituye un Estado de compromiso que resuelve
las contradicciones, apelando, de un lado, a los valores oligárquicos
y de otro al culto del "orden jurídico", sentando el germen de una an-
tinomia entre país "real" y país "legal", que como se verá va a durar

hasta el día de hoy. A pesar de todo, esta forma estatal, habiéndose centrado a partir de 1920-25 en conseguir un equilibrio entre desarro- llo económico y formas democráticas, consigue estabilizarse hacia 1932 por la vía de instalar un modelo de mayor amplitud democrática en lo político y de creciente participación estatal en el desarrollo econó- mico. En su expresión política este proceso está marcado por la apa- rición del Frente Popular (1938-42), aunque su cauce más estructural y continuo haya sido la implantación de una economía sustitiva de las importaciones.

La creciente ampliación de la base productiva y las formas de organización popular que genera, consecuencia directa del juicio ante- rior, ensancha la brecha entre país real y país legal con distintos grados de virulencia. El sistema entra en una fase sucesiva de refor- mas, más o menos profundas que ponen en crisis el sistema político en su conjunto. El aumento de la organización de la base y la incorpo- ración de nuevas masas a la vida política, adquiere una velocidad tal, que rebasa el ordenamiento jurídico, cuestionándolo y poniendo en pri- mer plano no ya la cuestión epidérmica de las reformas, sino el tema del reemplazo de un orden por otro. Se comienza a vivir, por decirlo de algún modo, en una especie de crisis permanente que se prolonga por varias décadas hasta llegar a enfrentar, en los sesentas, al centro social cristiano con la derecha y por último en los setentas, a ambos con las izquierdas, rompiéndose por lado y lado el ya precario equili- brio de la forma estatal.

Chile llega a 1973 como un país bipolarizado bajo el signo de proyectos claramente antagónicos, destruyendo de facto el fundamento multiposicional que estabiliza al sistema democrático liberal.

El proyecto conservador que pone fin a la experiencia socialis- ta estaba, sin embargo, sustentado por fuerzas sociales heterogéneas, que por lo mismo repetían en su interior, aunque en esa época se ig- noraba con qué virulencia, las mismas contradicciones del sistema glo- bal. De este modo unos se alinearon allí por razones que se presenta- ban como altruistas, aunque ingenuas, y otros ocultaban un programa autoritario y extremista, en el más propio sentido de la palabra.

La destrucción del Estado liberal democrático surge como el co- rolario natural de la enconada lucha por destruir el intento de Allen- de de superar las contradicciones de ese mismo sistema. Así ocurre porque Allende representaba la última instancia del país legal por ha- cerse país real.

Las secuelas de división, sectarismo y desconfianza de este iti- nerario histórico reciente siguen penando entre los sectores que hoy luchan contra el régimen autoritario.

III. Breve caracterización social, económica y política del régimen mi- litar

Las proyecciones de lo que se vive hoy aún no pueden caracteri- zarse con exactitud. Sabemos sin embargo, que el actual régimen chile- no es una forma política, económica y social correspondiente a ciertos fenómenos internacionales, tales como el reordenamiento de la división internacional del trabajo, la internacionalización de la producción y

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particularmente la transnacionalización de la empresa capitalista entendida como un fenómeno expansivo y global.

En su expresión como sistema de coacción estatal se caracteriza por concebir y ordenar a la sociedad en términos estrictamente autoritarios, verticalizados y autocráticos, y a cuya ejecución coopera una burocracia tecnocrática y militar altamente modernizada. Esta simbiosis de principios y aparatos opera con diversos grados de coherencia sobre todos los ámbitos de la vida pública y privada, en base a un mito ideológico mesiánico que mezcla el culto de lo ancestral con la figura nebulosa de un gran destino antimarxista que se transforma en fuente de una especie de "way of life" antipopular.

Este sistema por lo tanto no convoca, sino que invoca a la disciplina y al sometimiento para realizar un futuro que la conciencia colectiva, "degradada" por la política* tradicional, ignora. Es también y por elemental consecuencia, un sistema elitista en que algunos son "llamados" a enseñar y lograr ese destino mágico.

Como determinante y sustento lógico en el terreno económico, se concibe entonces una forma -y una sola- de organizarse para proporcionar los bienes y servicios que esa comunidad requiere. Con gran naturalidad y comodidad se instala una versión contemporánea del capitalismo salvaje del siglo XVIII. El modelo adoptado se eleva a la categoría de ciencia y se publicita a través de un sistema de comunicaciones controlado por el aparato estatal como LA VERDAD. Esta verdad es la racionalización material del elitismo del sistema que corresponde en sus contenidos a los intereses transnacionales y a una aplicación sistemática (cuando conviene) de la teoría del mercado en su versión neoclásica. Ello va convenientemente acompañado de los fetiches del caso: el culto al éxito y a la eficiencia medida en dinero. Todo desemboca en que el sentido común del lucro se transforma en racionalidad superior de las relaciones sociales.

Entre tanto, el acelerado proceso de transnacionalización de la economía pasa a ser un vector desnacionalizador global, que afecta de una manera importante a las pautas culturales, ideológicas y de costumbres, así como la escala de valores morales y sociales en general. Se hace "natural" la aparición de pequeños grupos con niveles de consumo propios de las altas clases del mundo industrializado, junto a gethos cada vez más amplios de infraconsumo, de marginados per se de cualquier y eventual beneficio del sistema de superexplotación instalado.

Por decirlo de alguna manera, y para situar la caracterización anterior en términos históricos, o en su relación con el pasado, el país experimenta -y de un modo muy concreto- una gigantesca y masiva vuelta de campana contra el pueblo, cuya manifestación

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* El régimen ha hecho un gran esfuerzo por diferenciar la política de la Política. La mayúscula de la segunda política indicaría la bondad, el patriotismo y la rectitud de quienes hoy la hacen. La minúscula de la primera señala la maldad y la falta de altruismo de quienes los precedieron.

en lo económico es la exhibición orgullosa de un saneamiento de los principales indicadores a costa de la caída de todos -y de verdad el examen detallado muestra que son todos- los indicadores sociales. Y esto con verdadero sarcasmo se presenta como eficiencia.

En síntesis se ha impuesto por la fuerza un modelo social dependiente, concentrador, excluyente y represivo.

IV. El país silenciado: unidad, antagonismos y consenso

Evidentemente, en estas circunstancias es fácil comprender el surgimiento de grandes impaciencias populares y de un malestar que desborda la sola oposición de la clase obrera para transformarse en una oposición de los trabajadores en general y de otros sectores sociales.

Esta masividad de la oposición y el hecho anteriormente expuesto de que el "peso de la noche" que ha caído sobre el país afecta a todos, constituye por un lado la fuerza del antagonismo al régimen y por otro implica también una debilidad. En un país como Chile, cuya sociedad es hasta hoy un cuerpo extraordinariamente politizado, no es fácil compatibilizar proyecto políticos de base social demasiado heterogénea, puesto que fácilmente sale a la superficie todo el complejo de determinantes que diferencian un sector social de otro.

Es sabido que los grupos afectados por la exclusión política, económica y social son socialmente heterogéneos. En lo básico con esto se alude a su ubicación muy desigual en la estructura productiva y a su tendencia a expresarse políticamente en organizaciones bien diferenciadas. Esto implica una valoración distinta del significado de la alternativa del otro desarrollo. A veces tan distinta que para empezar deben despejarse, sea resolviéndolas, sea dejándolas de lado, cuestiones de orden filosófico y las premisas que están en la base de las posturas que se trata de compatibilizar. Esto ha demorado la capacidad de transformar la voluntad de ser oposición en una articulación operativa de una oposición más real, menos discursiva y más eficaz. En la práctica aún son visibles graves diferencias entre los grupos de clase obrera y aquellos que preferentemente representan grupos medios, a pesar de su común resistencia activa al régimen. En definitiva no hay aún una oposición suficientemente unificada en lo político para que sea convincente como una alternativa real de poder estable.

De allí que se esté aún en una fase de búsqueda de coincidencias, puntos en común y definición de orientaciones generales, todas ellas insuficientes como programa alternativo, o sea relativamente ineficaces como estímulos a la movilización de masas, pero expresión clara de una voluntad de consenso que todos entienden como prerrequisito de operaciones políticas mayores.

En ese marco los avances logrados indican un alto grado de entendimiento respecto a que la superación del actual régimen supone la puesta en marcha de cuatro grandes procesos: de democratización política; de participación social; de renacionalización económica; y de renacionalización cultural.

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V. El proceso de democratización política

El proceso de democratización política es concebido como la mar-
cha en un tiempo y en unas circunstancias específicas hacia una forma
de gestión democrática del poder, que pone el acento en los rasgos clá-
sicos de ese orden político y además intenta vincularlos desde su ori-
gen a un estilo de desarrollo que evite la dicotomía entre "país real"
y "país legal".

Como esta última cuestión posee una alta implicancia ideológica,
el nuevo orden democrático se propone establecer una discusión perma-
nente sobre su significado, aunque se entiende que no es posible estabi-
lizar un régimen en cambio perpetuo. No obstante, se perfilan ya cier-
tos rasgos del sistema político que se quiere construir: es multiparti-.
dista y tiende progresivamente a la ampliación de las bases estructura-
les de la participación política.

La consecución de mayores niveles de participación popular se
observa como un proceso extraordinariamente costoso, en la medida que
ella supone igualar las condiciones materiales de la capacidad para
participar. Esto que se vislumbra como una tarea estatal, sería visto
por los economistas del actual régimen, por ejemplo, como un costo muy
ineficiente. Los partidarios del otro desarrollo en cambio, lo ven co-
mo una erogación imprescindible, sin la cual la democracia se diluye en
un puro buen deseo.

También se percibe que el desarrollo político previsible del pro-
ceso de democratización muestra al menos dos fases específicas: la tran-
sición y la puesta en marcha de la redemocratización propiamente tal.

Si se las observa problemáticamente la cuestión más compleja, e
incierta hasta hoy, es la fase de transición y dentro de ella el pro-
blema de las FF.AA. Al respecto el avance y el desarrollo de la dis-
cusión es aún precario; pero, en la medida que se continúa concibiendo
la transición como un proceso pacífico, o esencialmente no violento,
el "qué hacer" con las FF.AA adquiere la misma relevancia que el "qué
hacer" con la economía, en tanto ambas cuestiones deben dar respuesta
a la necesidad de neutralizar los soportes materiales y de fuerza del
régimen autoritario. De ahi las dudas sobre una transición que con-
temple como una de sus fuentes de poder a esas mismas FF.AA, o al me-
nos a una organización militar desplazada del poder pero no derrotada
ni minimizada en su capacidad política de repetir la intervención jun-
to al legítimo aliento que situaciones como la de Nicaragua otorgan a
las formas insurreccionales de transición frente a la obstinación y la
pertinacia de los autoritarios.

VI. El proceso de participación social

El proceso de participación social se piensa sobre la base de un
elemento básico, que es el establecimiento de una efectiva autonomía de
la organización social frente al Estado. Una crítica recurrente al es-
tado democrático liberal que hace crisis en la década del 70, es que
permitió la sobrepolitización de la sociedad, lo que anuló la autonomía
de los sindicatos, de los organismos de base, de las estructuras comu-
nitarias, y de un variado conjunto de otros mecanismos de participación
que se fueron creando a través del tiempo.

En cierto modo se piensa que el fortalecimiento del estado democrático supone un fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil a modo de contrapeso, ya que el carácter democr ático del estado -o de la sociedad política-, depende mucho más de que tal carácter esté impreso en la sociedad civil que de la propia voluntad democrática de ese estado. Igualmente, sólo hay democracia en la base si hay un estado fuerte. Un estado débil no resiste la tendencia a maximizar el ejercicio democrático. En definitiva se require un estado fuerte y una sociedad civil fuerte.

La relevancia que cobran los mecanismos de conexión entre estado y sociedad son evidentemente trascendentales. Es más o menos impensable el establecimiento concreto de mecanismos de esta índole si se persiste en recurrir a la solución liberal, que consiste en dejarlos de manera irrestricta a la iniciativa privada, porque su alto costo financiero y técnico (comunicación social, organización de la participación, capacitación ciudadana, etc.) los haría como hasta ayer y hoy extremadamente elitarios y susceptibles de ser cooptados por los intereses de quienes los hacen posibles: el poder financiero y el poder tecnocrático. En este sentido está muy desarrollada la idea de establecer mecanismos alternativos directamente gestionados por la base. Esta sería la única forma de cautelar que la expresión de la participación democrática y popular consolide el sentido democrático consensual de la sociedad y del Estado, sirviendo al mismo tiempo de barrera a la infiltración elitaria, que en última instancia es fuente del autoritarismo.

Esta perspectiva es casi directamente contradictoria con la experiencia acumulada por las clases y sectores de la sociedad chilena, que de una u otra manera se desarrollaron al amparo del Estado. De aquí surge el imperativo de tener que luchar contra una memoria colectiva que todo lo espera de él. La participación es entonces un enorme esfuerzo pedagógico, progresivo y masivo que coloca a los componentes de la sociedad civil y de la sociedad política en posición de apreciar el rol y las responsabilidades respectivas que les caben en las instancias colectivas y el modo en que pueden y deben acceder a ellas, con qué actitud, y para qué.

VII. El proceso de renacionalización económica

El proceso de renacionalización económica es quizás el que más reclama de una atención superior, que permita avanzar en concreto hacia un programa alternativo. El modelo imperante ha promovido una transnacionalización masiva, no por la vía de las inversiones extranjeras que hasta ahora han sido relativamente reticentes, sino que por medio de un modelo de consumo que es fiel reflejo de los centros imperiales y a través de una inserción indefensa en la lógica y necesidades de la economía transnacional.

Hasta ahora el consenso en la crítica al modelo neoclásico se ha dado más en torno a su costo social que a los propios resultados. No se ha avanzado lo suficiente, quizás como efecto del énfasis en lo social, en la demostración que la lógica interna del modelo es inaceptable en el terreno de la técnica económica para una sociedad democrática. Ambas situaciones hacen la paradoja de que no exista en Chile una conciencia generalizada sobre la "perversidad" del programa

económico que implementa la Junta Militar, a pesar del hecho cotidiano de la exclusión masiva. Este es, a lo mejor, el mayor triunfo ideoló- gico del gobierno al hacer creer al país que su proceder económico es el único racional y técnicamente posible.

Para derrumbar este mito hay que demostrar primero una cuestión de índole general: que este modelo económico supone y requiere al régi- men político autoritario. Que son correlativos. En segundo lugar, y como deducción obvia de lo anterior, que no hay compatibilidad posible entre un sistema democrático y semejante concepción de la actividad e- conómica. Tercero, que siendo esta economía la forma material de un régimen político y no la de todos, es falso que se pueda reputar a sí misma de la única economía posible o del único raciocinio económico científico.

Es necesario, imprescindible, desarrollar más a fondo las críti- cas a las falacias de la lógica imperante, para permitir a fuerzas so- ciales heterogéneas construir un amplio acuerdo con sentido estratégi- co sobre un esquema alternativo de organización de la base material y económica de la sociedad. Esta problemática va al fondo del "otro de- sarrollo". Hay que pasar de una sociedad que se organiza en torno a las necesidades de su economía, a una economía que se organiza en tor- no a las necesidades de su sociedad. Ello lleva a descartar la lógica integradora de la formas capitalistas vigentes para desarrollar crea- tivamente diversas alternativas no-capitalistas de organización de la producción, en donde el mercado cumple una función social.

También es necesario traducir en un programa económico el ideal participativo y la justa distribución de los excedentes, junto con re- definir la concepción de eficiencia en la asignación de los recursos. Desde el punto de vista macro social este concepto nunca puede ser pu- ramente económico, porque el beneficio de todos en el contexto de una economía capitalista dependiente, que pugna por el cambio social y la democratización como condición estructural es siempre desde la perspec- tiva neoclásica, ineficiente, o contiene elementos de ineficiencia. La eficiencia que busca el estado democrático se encuentra en un lugar geo- métrico complejo que combina la eficacia económica con la eficacia so- cial y política. Por esto es que la renacionalización económica, re- quiere de la formulación de una economía-política y no de una pura eco- nomía.

VIII. El proceso de renacionalización cultural

El proceso de renacionalización cultural no puede pensarse, ni se piensa, como el hermano menor de los otros tres. En cierto modo la implantación del régimen autoritario fue precedido por la implantación cultural del mito del progreso expresado como consumo y lucro.

La extrema articulación de la economía nacional a los centros transnacionales exacerba este fenómeno, y la eficacia con que avance la implantación del modelo autoritario depende en buena medida de que los aparatos culturales amplíen y masifiquen el mito original. El país lleva ya un buen tiempo sometido a este proceso de penetración de sus ideas, valores y costumbres. De una manera más o menos clara se perci- be la existencia de un sector social que ya es transnacional en su per- cepción del mundo, en sus aspiraciones sociales y en su conducta perso- nal.

La renacionalización cultural es una lucha de hoy contra el o-cultamiento y la deformación. Así se la concibe y así se la practica con notable fuerza y éxito. Existe una coincidencia y una exactitud espontánea para rescatar lo propio en el medio mismo del intento por restarlo. Si alguno de los cuatro procesos está avanzando hoy día y es consensual, es éste y convoca a su alrededor a un enorme contingente de personas.

Es justamente la espontaneidad de este rechazo y la creación de mecanismos alternativos de comunicación y socialización lo que hace la fuerza de la lucha antiautoritaria en el frente cultural. En cualesquier otro plano la conciencia individual, para transformarse en colectiva, requiere de una racionalización medianamente elaborada que justifique a sí misma el salto de la seguridad de lo personal a la fría solidez de lo colectivo. En el ámbito de lo cultural no media racionalización alguna en el paso de un estado individual al colectivo, puesto que lo individual aquí es inmediatamente colectivo. De esta manera la lucha personal por mantener ciertas identidades básicas es la lucha de todos por cautelar esa entelequia que se llama "alma nacional" y a cuya comprensión se accede por la vía del ancestro, la intuición y el despliegue de la genética social. Cada vez con mayor vigor son los portadores conscientes o inconscientes de los valores del otro desarrollo, los que están abriendo un camino de afirmación cultural -a veces evidente, a veces silencioso- que constituye un dique social no institucionalizado frente a la propaganda oficial. La cultura se ha puesto a la vanguardia de la lucha por la democratización.

IX. La perspectiva

La posibilidad de expresar sistemáticamente las cuestiones involucradas por la problemática del otro desarrollo en Chile, como se vio, están limitadas objetivamente. De hecho, la investigación sobre las premisas y las variables del concepto en una situación concreta como la que se ha descrito, se hace parcialmente y en circunstancias entre heroicas y confidenciales.

Sin embargo, la precariedad no hace sino que resaltar su riqueza. Atrás están los tiempos en que dentro de la Academia, el Partido, o el Sindicato se podía pensar y discutir abiertamente sobre el destino nacional. Atrás la época en que podían aunar esfuerzos para hacerlo. Atrás la posibilidad de comunicarlo con sus métodos y lenguaje. Hoy se es lo que se puede ser según circunstancias impuestas. Hoy Chile es una sombra de lo que fue. Por lo mismo que es tan fuerte el deseo de recuperar la identidad perdida. Por lo mismo es que se inventan nuevos mecanismos de relación y expresión popular. Por lo mismo que aún en estas condiciones se piensa y se prepara el otro desarrollo.

Résumé (suite)

Le rapport suggère une quadruple démarche pour atteindre les objectifs désirés: la démocratique politique (multipartite et conduisant progressivement à l'élargissement de la base structurelle de la participation politique); la participation sociale (l'établissement d'une autonomie effective des organisations sociales qui fond face à l'Etat); la renationalisation de l'économie (exigeant la formulation d'une économie politique et non seulement d'une économie "pure"); la renationalisation de la culture (élément central de la lutte pour la démocratisation et constituant même son avant-garde.

Finalement, bien que le Chili ne soit plus que l'ombre de lui-même, il existe un fort désir de récupérer une identité perdue. De nouveaux mécanismes pour l'interaction et l'expression populaires sont mis au point. Même dans les circonstances présentes, on réfléchit et on se prépare pour un autre développement.

*/ L'étude complète en espagnol - 7 chapitres et annexes - peut être obtenue en écrivant à l'ILET.

BUILDING BLOCKS

LAW AND LEGAL RESOURCES IN THE MOBILIZATION OF THE RURAL POOR FOR SELF-RELIANT DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract: This report examines the experience of human needs-centred organizations of the rural poor in India and in the Philippines. It shows how the development of legal resources can enhance the effectiveness of such organizations. The need of the organized poor for access to the law and the need for struggle within the law against the usuries of money-lenders, state bureaucrats reluctant to implement redistributive policies and land-owners preferring to leave their lands untilled rather than provide access to it to the poor is also discussed.

The keys to access to the law, as a resource, are training of the organized poor through "civic education", the development of "collective advocacy", and building legal resources into the "self-help" and "participatory" dimensions of their organizations. It is pointed out that traditional programmes of legal aid to the individual poor are inadequate and ineffectual (lack of lawyers, funds, creation of new dependencies), and that the poor must organize themselves to manage their vigilance wisely by using the law collectively. The case studies show that the development of legal skills is a core part of a self-reliance strategy; skills in the collective use of the law are crucial if people wish to seize opportunities for social development and for acquiring social power, even if their state has already adopted progressive redistributive laws and policies.

LA LOI ET SES RESSOURCES DANS LA MOBILISATION DES MASSES RURALES POUR UN DÉVELOPPEMENT AUTONOME

Résumé: Cet article examine l'expérience d'organisations de ruraux pauvres oeuvrant à la satisfaction des besoins humains en Inde et aux Philippines. Il montre comment l'utilisation des ressources de la loi peut renforcer l'efficacité de telles organisations. Il souligne le besoin qu'ont les pauvres organisés d'avoir accès aux ressources de la loi et leur besoin d'améliorer la loi dans leur lutte contre les usuriers, les bureaucrates réticents à mettre en oeuvre les politiques de redistribution et les propriétaires fonciers qui préfèrent laisser leurs terres en friche plutôt que d'en ouvrir l'accès aux pauvres.

Les clés de l'utilisation des ressources de la loi sont la formation des intéressés par l'instruction civique, l'exercice collectif de la fonction d'avocat de même que l'insertion des ressources légales dans les dimensions 'autonomie' et 'participation' des organisations en question. Les programmes traditionnels d'assistance légale individuelle aux pauvres sont inadéquats et inefficaces (manque d'avocats, de fonds, et création nouvelles formes de dépendance). Il s'agit en fait pour les pauvres de s'organiser eux-mêmes et de renforcer leur vigilance par l'usage collectif de la loi. Les monographies suggèrent que la mise en valeur de la capacité juridique est partie intégrante d'une stratégie visant à l'autonomie ('self-reliance'); la capacité d'utiliser collectivement la loi est essentielle si l'objectif des masses est leur propre développement et l'organisation de leur pouvoir social, même dans les cas où l'Etat a déjà adopté des politiques et des lois redistributives progressistes.

LA LEY Y LOS RECURSOS LEGALES EN LA MOBILIZACIÓN DE LOS POBRES EN LUGARES RURALES PARA EL DESARROLLO AUTODEPENDIENTE

Resumen: Este informe examina las experiencias de organizaciones de los pobres en lugares rurales de la India y de las Islas Filipinas que tienen las necesidades humanas como su foco principal. Demuestra cómo el desarrollo de recursos legales puede aumentar la eficacia de tales organizaciones. El informe comenta sobre la necesidad que tienen los grupos de pobres organizados de acceso a la ley y la necesidad de luchar dentro de la ley contra la usura de prestamistas, burócratas del estado que resisten poner en práctica las políticas de nueva distribución, y propietarios de fincas que prefieren dejar sus terrenos sin labrar antes que permitir a los pobres acceso a estos terrenos. Para lograr acceso a la ley como recurso es imprescindible y clave que los grupos de pobres organizados tengan una formación en cuanto a "la educación cívica" (los derechos del cuidadano), que se desarrolle una "abogacía colectiva" y que se coloquen los recursos legales dentro de las dimensiones de "autodependencia" y "participación" de sus organizaciones.

Se destaca que programas tradicionales de asistencia legal a individuos pobres son poco adecuados e ineficaces (falta de abogados, fondos, la creación de nuevas dependencias) y que los pobres deben de organizarse para ejercer su vigilancia con prudencia usando la ley colectivamente. Estudios demuestran que el desarrollo de habilidades legales es clave para una estrategia de autodependencia; destreza en el uso colectivo de la ley es decisivo para poder tomar oportunidades para el desarrollo social y adquirir poder social, aun cuando el estado ya haya adoptado leyes y políticas progresistas y redistributivas.

ICLD

LAW AND LEGAL RESOURCES IN THE MOBILIZATION OF THE RURAL POOR
FOR SELF-RELIANT DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

This Report is intended to aid understanding of alternative strategies of
development. It examines the experience of several human needs-centered
groups of the rural poor in India and the Philippines and shows how the
development of "legal resources" within these groups - i.e. the development
of their ability to use law in their struggles for resources - enhanced their
effectiveness. Drawing from this experience and from other studies it calls
attention to the importance of understanding, in any particular setting, how
use of law and legal resources can affect the capacity of endogenous rural
groups to pursue human needs objectives.

1. The importance of human needs-centered rural groups in alternative
   development approaches

The case for human needs approaches has been argued elsewhere and is assumed
here. These approaches emphasize three different kinds of needs:

  . the need for goods and services essential to physical and economic well-
    being;

  . the need for other kinds of resources (knowledge, rights, belief in
    one's equality and dignity) which enable people to become more self-
    reliant in political as well as economic terms; and

  . the need for social structures which enable people to share influence in
    decision-making which affects their immediate welfare and environment.

Satisfaction of these three categories of need reflect both priorities and
inter-dependent ends and means of development.

Efforts to activate this kind of development need hardly await the conception
of a master design, let alone a benign government committed to human needs
approaches. On the contrary, the initiation of these approaches may depend
in the first instance on the mobilization of the very people who are impo-
verished, politically excluded and socially disadvantaged by the existing
political economy and modes of administering state-controlled resources. A
major objective of alternative development is to reduce dependency and re-
liance on bureaucracies, and to recognize that both the ends and means of
development entail struggle by people, and often, conflicts with dominant
groups and officials who wield discretionary power over allocation of
resources essential to the satisfaction of basic needs. The importance of
mobilization and collective action to pursue these struggles has recently
been underscored by conclusions on rural development strategies set out in
India's latest Development Plan. It contains a detailed critique of earlier
administration of resource allocation and proposed major shifts in priorities
for distribution of land and other goods and services to the rural poor.

But it notes:

"Critical for the success of all redistributive laws, policies and pro-
grammes is that the poor be organized and made conscious of the bene-
fits intended for them. Organized tenants have to see that the
tenancy laws are implemented. Organizations of the landless have to
see that surplus lands are identified and distributed to them in
accordance with the law within five years. ... The Planning Commission
is proposing a massive shift of resources in favour of rural areas
with an in-built redistributive character ... But whether the larger
resources will have the desired equalizing effect will depend on the
extent to which the organized pressure of the beneficiaries counter-
acts the weaknesses of the administration and the opposition of vested
interests."

II. The focus of the Report: The importance of law and legal resources to
human needs-centered rural groups

Our Report focuses on participatory groups of the rural poor which pursue
the interrelated ends and means of human needs-centered development. It is
particularly based on reviews of the history of several endogenous groups
through dialogues with their leaders and members: the Bhoomi Sena[1]/ of
Maharastra, India, and two people's organizations of Kagawasan[2]/ in the
Philippines. It examines relationships between these groups and law.

By law we mean far more than simply official legislation and rules, govern-
ment courts and lawyers; the term includes endogenous law and ideas about
justice (such as notions of natural law) which can be used to interpret
rules and help people resolve conflicts and create new community structures.
We are interested in the way people used knowledge of these various dimen-
sions of law to formulate grievances and demands and deal with outside
adversaries in a variety of arenas; we are interested in the way they used
law to create their own norms for group deliberations, decision-making and
other collective activities.

We are particularly interested in the needs of human needs-centered groups
for legal resources: i.e., the knowledge, skills and other capacities
which enable people, working collectively, to understand law and use it
effectively to advance or protect their interests. Thus, we focus on the
way in which legal resources help people in groups to convert a general,
shared concern (such as landlessness) into a concrete issue (do existing
land reform laws entitle them to land) and to choose a course of action to
address that issue (methods to pressure relevant officials to interpret and
enforce relevant legislation to satisfy their claims). Because the problems

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1/ The Bhoomi Sena ("land army") is a large organization of mostly land-
less rural workers of a depressed caste in India.

2/ Kagawasan is the fictitious name of an actual community in Mindanao.
While place and personal names were disguised in the report on the
Kagawasan case, the events and actors described in the report are histo-
rically true.

of the rural poor are usually perceived in political or economic terms, the
significance of law and legal resources is often overlooked.

Obviously there will be variations in the extent to which people can invoke
law as a basis for claims for resources (such as land, employment security,
credit, schools) essential to satisfaction of their needs. Indeed, it is
sometimes'said that legal rules and institutions and public administration
are so biased against the rural poor that recourse to law may be of marginal
value to them. Yet, even where the law seems to be totally on the side of
the oppressor, people who work in concert may still need knowledge of rele-
vant legal matters in order to make more informed choices of alternative
strategies and tactics. Moreover, our studies of legal needs of the rural
poor in various African and Asian settings suggest that legal rights and
duties relevant to the grievances and needs of the poor are seldom so clear-
cut. The rural poor often have inchoate rights and unexplored bases for
making claims or resisting oppressive demands.

Struggles in rural communities over land, indebtedness, employment condi-
tions, or for access to goods or services to satisfy basic needs show how
the poor may need legal resources in order to secure other essential resour-
ces. Landlords, creditors or employers use law (through leases, contracts
and other devices) to impose impoverishing terms, and they resort to the
police, courts and other institutions (to which they have superior access)
to enforce them. Bureaucracies officially charged with duties to provide
schooling, health and agricultural services frequently fail to allocate
these benefits, or allocate them inequitably. These failures may be caused
by organizational flaws, bureaucratic pathologies or by the social biases of
decision-makers. But, in any event, they often go unredressed because the
poor, lacking legal knowledge, intermediaries and access to courts and other
official bodies - lacking legal resources - have no effective means to
pressure administrators to do what in fact the underlying law often intends
them to do: no means to make administrators socially accountable.

III. Characteristics and activities of the groups studied

Obviously, there are many types of organizations of rural people in the
Third World. In some regions they may be mobilized in open, forcible oppo-
sition to the state, or to a particular regime which claims its sovereignty
or to enforcement of a law of that regime. At the other end of the spectrum
are groups which are endogenous, perhaps rooted in culture or religion, but
which play a very limited role in helping people confront conditions of
impoverishment, oppression and political weakness. Widely prevalent, too,
are organizations created under the aegis of the state (such as state-
sponsored cooperatives or communal bodies) which are intended (ostensibly
at least) as vehicles for "rural development". While these "parastatal"
groups may be voluntary and participatory (in form at least), they are fre-
quently managed or manipulated by public officials or by traditional elites
or patrons of the community, and for that reason they may rarely come into
serious conflict with state agencies or dominant groups or classes.

Needs for legal resources of rural groups vary depending on the underlying

composition, motivations and shared perceptions of the group, on its methods of mobilization, organization and decision-making, on objectives and the means chosen to pursue them and on the kinds of conflict generated by a group's activities and its way of handling conflict. A most important variable, for our purpose, is the stance of the group towards the state and its law. We report here on groups which operated within law (even if sometimes only within the outer parameters of it) and generally tried to use state law as a weapon. We are concerned with the way needs for legal resources developed as these groups began to pursue, autonomously, human needs-centered means and ends, such as:

1) civic education: i.e., developing functional knowledge of their rights to claim resources essential to well-being (such as land credit, health care, schools, improved conditions and security of employment or better prices for their produce);

2) collective advocacy: i.e., developing means of asserting these claims by challenging public agencies, landlords or other powerful people or institutions through deputations and demands, demonstrations, claims in court or local councils or in other official institutions;

3) self-help: i.e., developing new, group-managed (often in lieu of state-managed) structures to provide resources (such as credit) or resolve problems shared within the group; and

4) political participation: i.e., developing new means of influencing governmental policy-making in more remote arenas of decision-making (such as legislatures, planning bodies and service-providing ministries).

Activities of this kind characterized the efforts of the groups we have examined first-hand.

Thus, Bhoomi Sena was an organization of historically depressed, landless, rural workers. They became mobilized for organized action when they learned that the Indian government was failing to enforce laws which established their rights to minimum wages, possession of land and security of employment - rights tantamount to the very rights of these people to existence. With this knowledge and through participatory decision-making, they pursued a variety of tactics to force officials to apply the law, and to force landlords, money-lenders and others to obey it. Pursuit of these objectives led to other activities: the creation of a group-managed credit institution, child-care centers, schools and road building.

The Kagawasan groups were peasants who had lived for many years, technically as "squatters", on government lands designated as "forest reserves". They were threatened with eviction when large portions of these lands were scheduled for lease to pulp and timber businesses. They mobilized collective action when they learned that there were legal procedures available to them to request ministry officials to recognize their possessory rights and lease to them rather than the outside industires. They, too, used petitions, deputations and demonstrations and similar means to force persons with

discretionary authority to recognize the justice of their claims. The need
to establish each family's claim to specific lands led to development of a
group-managed system to survey the area and record the names of responsible
possessors. This effort led to development of group-managed structures to
work out concepts of land tenure and settle boundary disputes between fami-
lies, and these efforts led to awareness of the superiority of these group
structures over government courts for purposes of resolving other, intra-
community conflicts. As they gained security in land tenure and as they
began to pay taxes, the Kagawasan groups (often successfully) made other
demands for health care facilities, paramedical training for local people
sponsored by the group and schools for their children.

All of these groups operated through participatory processes which, of
necessity, had to become more elaborate and hence more regularized as the
groups became larger in number. By developing norms and processes for
group decision-making, they were able to preserve participation in the
identification of their needs and the choice of strategies to pursue them.
Of the essence to many of these choices was their realization that (in the
words of our Kagawasan informants) "the law /could/ often be made the start-
ing point" for mobilization and organization for a particular project -
such as a demand that a particular official do what he was in fact legally
empowered (if not obliged) to do. Thus, people, working collectively, found
they were often able to use law to bolster their claims, and to defend
themselves against harassment by the policy, landlords, local officials and
others with power in the traditional social structure. Of course, knowledge
of law and legal skills were only tools, used in combination with other
techniques and in the totality of efforts, but legal resources were often
important in developing the groups and their specific activities.

IV. The importance of legal resources and groups as vehicles to provide them

Indeed, the conflicts and concerns of people in the Kagawasan and Bhoomi
Sena groups suggest that needs for legal resources are basic needs, a core
part of the knowledge and skills which enables self-reliance and the ability
to participate politically. These experiences show why the rural poor
often need a capacity to use law in their dealings with people in power,
with landlords, creditors and employers, and with bureaucracies. They need
legal resources not simply to protect their rights in court but to articu-
late their interests to officials in an agricultural bank, or a ministry of
health, community development or education - wherever official regulations
are interpreted or discretion exercised in ways which directly affect the
welfare of people.

These needs cannot be adequately met through traditional programs of legal
aid. Economic costs and political constraints often imposed on subsidized
legal assistance programs, and the shortage of lawyers in rural areas -
particularly lawyers geared to the problems of the rural poor, all impose
severe limitations. Moreover, reliance on traditional modes of providing
legal services through legal aid offices and individualized dealings between
professional and client often create relationships of dependency which may
be antithetical to the generation of self-reliance and active participation
in rural communities.

While reforms in public administration - such as creation of ombudsman-type institutions - may sometimes help the poor to seek redress against abuses of power, these measures cannot fully satisfy needs for legal resources because they cannot deal with the root problems. The tendency of bureaucracies which control essential resources to underallocate or misallocate them, and tendencies towards class bias and abuse of power, are inherent in the very political economy which the poor must confront. As the Indian Plan (quoted above) puts it:

> "The rural and urban poor have to be organized. Their vigilance alone can ensure that the benefits of various law, policies and schemes designed to benefit them do produce their intended effect."

Individually, the poor cannot usually secure legal resources needed to press claims for other resources. Through organization they can gain knowledge, aggregate claims, amass numbers to press them, gain access to decision-makers and a sense of power essential to meaningful participation.

V. The kinds of legal resources needed by human needs-centered groups

Group needs for legal resources will obviously vary depending on the setting. Indeed, identifying these needs is an important task, for persons seeking to aid collective action by the poor. Nevertheless, our studies suggest several categories of need, and it may help to underscore them.

1. Mobilization: Crucial to the mobilization of the Bhoomi Sena in India and Kagawasan movements in the Philippines was popular appreciation of the fact that there were, indeed, laws which could be used to redress popular grievances - e.g., laws on employment relationships, laws on land distribution, laws creating other rights or entitlements. This knowledge not only helped the group decide on a course of action to address a shared problem, but it helped to overcome apathy grounded in the belief that official law was always on the oppressors' side and fears of government reprisal. Moreover, as the studies show, people began to learn that a great many of the laws which affected allocation of basic resources (such as provision of health care or agricultural services) were laws that delegated discretion - and that it was possible to question officials about how and why they were failing to exercise discretion in ways which would better serve the interests of the group. Thus, a Kagawasan group was able to force officials of the Ministry of Community Development to release discretionary funds (allegedly hoaded by the Ministry) for designated local projects. Bhoomi Sena mobilized members to build roads (long promised by the government, long needed by the community) and then petitioned and pressured the relevant bureaucracy to pay for the labour and costs. In these ways people learned how to question authority, how to file complaints against officials who abused power or failed to use it effectively, how to counteract bureaucratic inertia. As the Kagawasan report says, "the effect of this process /of learning how to use law/ was sometimes awe-inspiring and not a little frightening". And again: "Once people were aware of the moral or legal righteousness of a demand they would develop methods to obtain them ... As /this/ activity progressed... their understanding and use of law grew more and more sophisticated."

2. Institutionalization: Legal resources also seem to be a factor in the institutionalization of groups: they enable people to develop their own or-ganic rules and processes to manage their groups. An internal "constitution" seems necessary to govern intra-group relationships, give order to meetings and facilitate participatory decision-taking and delegation of power and leadership roles. As groups expand and become aggregated with other groups for particular purposes these needs become more extensive. The endogenous, internal legal structures of the organization must be capable of resolving disputes within the group in ways which emphasize the need for cohesiveness and, often, collective interests. Indeed, the characteristics of internal, group law may be of crucial importance affecting the development of shared values and the vitality of the group over time.

3. Access to, and advocacy in, official forums: Bhoomi Sena sought to en-force minimum wage and other laws protecting employee rights, as well as land reform measures; it sought to secure higher wages, schools and local health care services. The group used a variety of tactics: strikes, boy-cotts, deputations to authorities in the regional capital, letters to news-papers, demonstrations, self-defense against bullies hired by its adversa-ries. Pursuit of these tactics brought diverse encounters: in the courts (defenses to criminal charges; defamation, trespass and other tort claims for damages); in policy headquarters (to prevent manipulation of policy by landlords and others in opposition who enjoyed political status); in ministerial offices (to demand enforcement of the laws or issuance of spe-cified instructions to local officials; to demand official investigations or rulings to interpret legislation). The experience of the Kagawasan groups generated similar needs for legal resources.

4. Creation of community self-help institutions: As the activities of Bhoomi Sena and the Kagawasan organizations expanded, the groups increasing-ly developed their own measures to meet shared needs - such as health care centers, road building, credit institutions. Creation of a new social structure to solve one problem often led to recognition of other problems and the need for other new social structures. For example, the creation of a new, group-managed institution to provide credit led to efforts to change customs and behaviour which led to a squandering of money (e.g., expansive weddings; dissipation of funds on litigation and lawyer fees). Efforts to develop new group activities created the need for new community norms and new structures for the settlement of disputes arising as a result of those changes. All of these self-help activities called for the creative use of legal resources.

V. Modes of providing legal resources

Legal resources can often best be provided by knowledgeable organizers and others with relevant experience. To some extent they can be generated by group reflection and participatory decision-making. The extent to which legal specialists may provide knowledge and skills which would otherwise be unavailable is difficult to determine without a careful historical review, with a group, of its perceptions and choices at various stages. But the histories we have reviewed show quite clearly that legal specialists,

properly oriented, did provide information and help which significantly in-
creased the capacity of people to identify issues, articulate positions and
determine carefully strategy and tactics. The problem is not whether legal
specialists can be valuable to groups but how to generate the right kinds
of specialists and define their tasks. If lawyers are to help human needs-
centered groups they must not only develop new concepts and skills, but new
roles.

Traditional legal aid programs (like traditional lawyer-client relation-
ships) are based on a narrow perception of legal roles and skills (e.g.,
preparation of conventional legal documents, counselling on property exchan-
ges, courtroom appearances). They reflect the dependency of the ignorant
client on the progessional. But the lawyer - or "para-lawyer" - working
with human needs-centered groups should not be seen primarily as a litigator
or an office-bound solicitor, nor as a professional serving a client. These
concepts of role are hostile to basic human needs objectives. He should be
part of the cadres of the group he serves, a resource for helping the group
and to mobilize and organize particular projects. He must understand its
collective needs and outlooks. He must help it make participatory, collec-
tive decisions and help develop its own legal resources and its capacities
for self-reliance in implementing decisions.

These tasks may include: education - perhaps teaching (or writing simple
pamphlets and notices) which helps to provide functional knowledge (e.g.,
on such matters as how to register land, deal with tax officials, or simple
explanations of the effects of new laws which directly affect the people
with whom he is working); organization - helping people to work together
collectively and institutionalize group activities; counselling - for exam-
ple, the lawyer who worked with the Kagawasan groups "lectured" on matters
as diverse as "natural justice" (important in helping the group work out
its internal group rules) to the conditions justifying a citizen's arrest
(knowledge which was then used by members of the group to deal with abusive
policemen).

It is unlikely that legal professions, as organizations, will respond to
these needs. They lack the orientation, social relationships and incentives.
New ways must be found, working outside of orthodox professional circles and
traditional legal aid programs to enlist essentially sympathetic lawyers in
this work and train them for it. As yet virtually no attention has been
given to group needs for legal resources in discussions about legal assis-
tance to the poor in Third World countries.

VI. Legal resources to resist suppression

Rights to organize human needs-centered groups and undertake collective
activities are implicit in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and in
numerous international covenants (e.g., that which established the ILO).
These rights are frequently guaranteed more explicitly in national constitu-
tions and legislations. But in some countries, to varying degrees, these
guarantees are negated by the terms of other laws or by the way officials
interpret them. Thus laws which establish preventive detention or which

define sedition in expansive catch-all terms (so that group activities which embarrass officials may be claimed to "undermine the integrity of government") or which call for censorship of all publications, or which prohibit demonstrations or which impose repressive burdens on voluntary associations - these and other measures can be used to intimidate autonomous groups or to co-opt or destroy them after formation. The more expansive the powers of the state to punish collective activities, the greater the likelihood that over-zealous local officials or police may attempt to invoke such powers to suppress group activities. Thus, for example, attempts by groups to dramatize their problems through mass demonstrations have been countered by threats of criminal prosecution for "conspiring to commit breach of the public peace". As the Kagawasan experience suggests, it may be possible to form and maintain aggressive groups in spite of the existence of repressive laws. The development of legal resources within a community may affect the way these laws are invoked and interpreted as well as the means people take to deal with their existence.

Our Report is addressed to the needs of groups which, while sometimes harrassed, were essentially tolerated. The legal resources needed when the actions of officials are more repressive might well be the subject of another report drawing from experiences in such situations. Because these situations may frequently exist they need more attention than basic needs literature has yet bestowed. Even in repressive situations it may still be possible for people to use law (e.g., as anti-colonialists did) to expose fundamental contradictions in the official legal order; to dramatize concrete issues. Of particular interests, too, in these situations is the role of lawyers committed to human needs values and the role of international organizations founded on covenants designed to foster human needs-centered groups. Rights to organize these groups, publicize their grievances, conduct demonstrations and confront decision-makers seem crucial to alternative development. The parameteres of these rights need to be set out for the very reason that alternative development strategies inevitably entail conflict with public authority, often in settings where custom has entrenched official intolerance of criticism.

VII. Some caveats and conclusions

The diversity of communities and political economy contexts within which human needs-centered groups may struggle for existence and for particular objectives makes it difficult to generalize about the role of law and legal resources in these endeavours. Moreover, it is difficult to identify needs for legal resources within groups because of people's generally negative perceptions about state law and institutions. Such perceptions often deter groups from exercising rights or opportunities that the law may provide. Careful review of group experiences may help groups identify these needs with more precision. However, such a review requires legal specialists working within groups. Furthermore, such specialists must gain the confidence of the group and be sensitive to its needs and concerns as well as innovative in developing legal strategies to help meet such needs. Unfortunately, in most settings there are probably few lawyers who are presently equipped for these tasks. Indeed, the continuing failure of legal specialists and legal

educators to address, systematically, the problems and legal resource needs of the rural poor is indicative of very practical problems not addressed here, for example, the problem of mobilizing legal manpower in support of alternative development strategies.

While the studies on which this Report draws suggest the above caveats, they also support some more general conclusions of significance for the realization of human needs-centered development:

1. The rural poor need knowledge of law and the ability to use it (i.e., legal resources) in order to understand their entitlements to essential resources, defend their interests and press claims against public and private centers of power.

2. Legal resources (as that concept has been developed above) are in turn part of the general resources (e.g., knowledge and leadership) which groups need in order to mobilize, organize and carry on specific activities directed towards the satisfaction of human needs.

3. Lawyers, properly oriented, and working within groups, can help such groups to create more effective legal resources, and this help may significantly increase the capacity of the group to pursue human needs-centered ends and means.

4. Participatory, human needs-centered groups can help people secure greater access to essential resources through use of legal resources.

5. Projects which seek to create legal resources for groups must focus on ways to develop these resources within groups as well as ways of delivering resources to groups.

6. In view of the diversity of social and political economy contexts within which rural groups seek to operate, greater understanding is needed of the diverse kinds of legal resources (and legal aid specialists) which may help different kinds of rural groups operating in such contexts.

BUILDING BLOCKS

SOCIO-CULTURAL INVESTMENTS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES

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Abstract: Transnational enterprises act as transnational communication systems in transmitting socio-cultural preferences of rich, Western industrialized societies to Third World countries. More specifically, the TNEs promote a "business culture" with certain value orientations and an ideal of a lifestyle geared to such attitudes, forms of corporate organization, product design and consumption patterns imitative of the rich countries. Advertising has a key role in this process of transmission, but generally television, films, news agencies, magazines, professional journals, books, broadcasting, records, music and video tapes, tourism and even language propagate the business culture in one or the other of its many aspects. Third World countries, which lack a strong developed indigenous socio-cultural system, succumb to these pressures and consequently distort the proper allocation of very scarce resources. A production apparatus is created geared to the consumption wants of the small upper and middle classes and with a heavy dependence on external resources. The adoption of foreign-oriented consumption patterns by a social class limited in number leads to further social stratification and aggravates existing income inequalities. More attention needs to be focused on socio-cultural questions related to development and, particularly, on the special role of TNEs and their socio-cultural impact.

LES INVESTISSEMENTS CULTURELS DANS LE CONTEXTE DE L'ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE DES RELATIONS NORD-SUD: LE RÔLE DES FIRMES TRANSNATIONALES

Résumé: Les firmes transnationales agissent comme système de communication dans la mesure où elles transmettent aux pays du Tiers Monde les modèles des sociétés occidentales. Plus précisément, les transnationales favorisent une culture mercantile ("business culture") caractérisée par certaines valeurs et un style de vie orientés vers des attitudes, des modes d'organisation de l'entreprise, des formes de produits et des modèles de consommation imitant ceux des pays riches. La publicité joue un rôle crucial dans ce processus de transmission mais plus généralement la télévision, les films, les nouvelles

*d'agence, les périodiques, la littérature spécialisée, les livres, la radio,
les disques, la musique, les moyens audio-visuels, le tourisme, et même le
langage, sont des agents de propagation de cette culture mercantile sous l'un
ou l'autre de ses aspects.*

*Les pays du Tiers Monde à qui fait défaut un solide système socio-culturel
endogène succombent à ces pressions et il en résulte une mauvaise allocation
de ressources rares. L'appareil de production est tourné vers la satisfac-
tion des désirs de consommation des classes moyennes et supérieures et
entraîne la dépendance à l'égard des ressources extérieures. L'adoption de
modèles de consommation induits de l'extérieur par une classe sociale aux
faibles effectifs aggrave la stratification sociale et l'inégalité. Les
aspects socio-culturels du développement et notamment le rôle particulier des
transnationales et leur impact socio-culturel demande donc qu'on leur prête
une plus grande attention.*

INVERSIONES SOCIO-CULTURALES DENTRO DE LA ECONOMIA POLÍTICA DE LAS RELACIONES NORTE-SUR: EL PAPEL DE LAS EMPRESAS TRANSNACIONALES

*Resumen: Las empresas transnacionales funcionan como sistemas de comunicación
transnacionales transmitiendo valores socio-culturales de los países industria-
lizados y ricos del Oeste. Más específicamente se puede decir que las trans-
nacionales promueven la cultura del "business", o sea determinados valores
y un modelo de estilo de vida que implican necesariamente la adopción de
ciertas atitudes, formas de organización corporativa, ciertos tipos de produc-
ción y de consumo, a imitación de los países ricos. La publicidad tiene un
papel preponderante en este proceso, pero en general, la radio, la televisión,
el cine, las agencias de noticias, las revistas, los periodicos profesionales,
los libros, los discos, la música, así como el turismo y hasta el lenguage,
contribuyen à la difusión de uno u otro aspecto de tal cultura mercantil. Los
países del Tercer Mundo que no posean un vigoroso sistema cultural endígeno
sucumben a esas presiones, de lo que resulta una distorción en la distribución
de los ya escasos recursos. Así se crea un aparatus de producción fuertemente
dependiente de resursos extranjeros y destinado a satisfacer los modelos de con-
sumo de las clases altas y médias. La adopción de modelos de consumo estran-
jeros por una clase de la populación poco numerosa, resulta en la estrati-
ficación social y agrava las desigualdades de ingresos existentes.*

*Se necesita dedicar más atención a las cuestiones socio-culturales relacionadas
con el desarrollo, y en particular al papel especial que juegan las multina-
cionales mediante su impacto socio-cultural sobre las masas.*

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Karl P. Sauvant and Bernard Mennis

SOCIO-CULTURAL INVESTMENTS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENTERPRISES[*]/

The current discussion about a New International Information and Communication
Order has ventured into an area that has hitherto remained largely ignored.
But the problématique is broader than these discussions lead one to believe.
The issue is not only information and communication, but rather the entire
socio-cultural dimension of North-South relations.

Increasingly it is being recognized that the socio-cultural indifference curves
of host countries are not only the result of internal processes but also may be
derived from preferences imported or induced from abroad. This of course
throws strong doubts on what appears to have been a dogma about the "immaculate
conception of indifference curves"[1]/, be they those of individuals or those of
nations. The result is that questions are being raised about, for instance,
what the main factors are in the development of socio-cultural preferences,
the extent to which certain indifference curves are desirable and appropriate,
and what functions foreign-induced preferences have for the structures of
North-South relations.

A small but expanding literature is developing on this subject matter. Most of
it focusses on the socio-cultural effects of transnational business enterprises
(TNEs), especially as they pertain to the relations between industrialized and
Third World countries[2]/. In many cases, this literature pays special attention
to the question of socio-cultural dependency and domination. This aspect is
particularly important for the Third World countries, since a successful imple-
mentation of their efforts to achieve economic decolonization and development
depends, in no small measure, on a recognition of the effects of socio-
cultural realities and, ultimately, on their ability to emancipate themselves
from inappropriate socio-cultural patterns imported from the industrialized
countries.

For many, the starting point is the recognition that foreign direct investment
not only involves capital, technology and similar resources, but is usually
also accompanies, intended or not, by socio-cultural investments. TNEs, in
fact, can be conceptualized as transmission belts through which socio-cultural
(or even broader: socio-political and economic) preferences of home countries
are disseminated to other countries. Where this occurs, the socio-cultural
profile of host countries tends to lose its national characteristics and
acquire those of the home countries involved. In these processes, TNEs are
merely transmission belts, even if they take an active part in the promotion
of home-country related socio-cultural investments and even if they played a
central role in the original formation of the socio-cultural profiles involved.

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[*]/ This is the main part of a paper presented to the 2ème Colloque de
    l'Association Française pour l'Etude du Tiers Monde on "L'Information et
    le Tiers Monde", Dijon, 30 May to 1 June 1979. It is intended for discus-
    sion only. Comments are invited.

In this paper, we first (I) place the relevance of socio-cultural effects into the historical context of North-South relations. Conceptualizing TNEs as transnational communication systems that transmit socio-cultural attributes, we then (ii) examine this process in terms of who (IIA) says what (IIB) in which channel (IIC) to whom (IID) with what effect (IIE). In a last section (III), we return again to the relationship between economic development and socio-cultural patterns.

I. SOCIO-CULTURAL EMANCIPATION

Third World countries are in a process of liberating themselves from colonial dependency. This emancipation is a historic process that began with the end of World War II and that encompasses at least three dimensions: political eman- cipation, economic emancipation and socio-cultural emancipation.

Political emancipation involves what is usually described as decolonization, i.e., the achievement of political independence. Political independence was largely obtained during the 1960s. The emergency of the movement of the Non- Aligned Countries during the 1960s signaled the successful organization of the Third World as an independent international political force.

With the consolidation of political independence by the end of the 1960s, it also became increasingly apparent that political decolonization had to be com- plemented by economic decolonization and development if a real change in the dependency relationships of the Third World countries was desired. However, during the colonial period, the countries of the Third World were not only subjected to political and economic but also to socio-cultural colonization. The values and behavioural patterns of important segments of Third World so- cieties had gradually been transformed to reflect those of the metropolitan countries. After independence, hardly any change took place. The infused patterns have been maintained and, in fact, reinforced through a variety of mechanisms. This is particularly apparent in the area of consumption patterns which do not reflect the needs and absolute poverty of the Third World but rather the wants and the relative abundance of the indus- trial countries. And these consumption patterns -- to be sure together with other factors -- determine to a certain extent the production apparatus of the Third World countries, i.e., the types of products that are being produced and the types of processes that are being used for their production. To the extent to which the satisfaction of these consumption patterns -- or, more generally, the goals embodied in the socio-cultural system imported from the industrial countries -- requires continued inputs from abroad, depen- dency on countries and their institutions that can help to fulfill these aspirations becomes unavoidable.

Hence, just as it had been realized that political independence cannot be achieved without economic emancipation, it also has to be realized that e- conomic emancipation is, to a certain extent, a function of socio-cultural emancipation.

II. TNEs AS TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Given the important role of TNEs as transnational actors, the increasing re- alization of the significance of the socio-cultural dimension of North-South

relations has given rise to a number of questions concerning the socio-
cultural impact of these enterprises. What is the role of TNEs in changing
or reproducing global socio-cultural structures? To what extent do they
foster or hinder the socio-cultural decolonization process of the Third World?
What direction do they give, through their socio-cultural impact, to its de-
velopment process? And what can be done about those aspects of their impact
that are thought to be undesirable?

Too little empirical research has thus far been undertaken to allow definite
answers to these questions. In fact, even the conceptualization of the pro-
cesses involved is still at the beginning.

We hope to advance the understanding of these processes by conceptualizating
TNEs as transnational communication sustems which serve, inter alia, the
transmission of socio-cultural attributes. The concept of a communication
system allows us to examine systematically the possible effects of TNEs in
terms of its principal constituant aspects. Following Harold D. Lasswell[3]/
these are:

Who
Says What
In Which Channel
To Whom
With What Effect?

The "who" refers to the organization, the sender of the transmission, the
unit that is in control of the process. The "what", then, deals with the con-
tent of that which is being transmitted -- the message, in other words. In
communication theory, the "channels" through which the messages are sent are,
of course, the media; in our context, these media also have to include foreign
affiliates of TNEs. Through the various channels, socio-cultural investments
are passed on to host societies (including those host-country nationals wor-
king in foreign affiliates) -- the receptors of the message, the "whom" in
Lasswell's formulation. The effect of the message on the host society -- and
its feedback to the original sender -- then, constitutes the final link in
the communication process. In the following, we examine the socio-cultural
effects of TNEs in terms of these five aspects.

A. Who

Obviously enough, the "who" in the framework of our paper are the headquarters
of TNEs (as a proxy for the home-country); and, also obviously enough, not only
those in primary and secondary industries (on which most of the past and
current discussions surrounding TNEs has centered), but especially those in
tertiary industries. Today, about 20,000 TNEs control some 80,000 foreign
affiliates which represent (in 1976) a book value of nearly $300 billion.
As a result, TNEs have become the main agents, the main stratifiers, of the
present international economic system (and, one may add, the main manifesta-
tions of the open character of the system). For instance, TNEs are the main
agents for the delivery of goods to foreign markets, either through traditio-
nal trade (a substantial part of which consists of intra-company transactions,
i.e., is channeled through the enterprises' transnational networks) or through
the production of their foreign affiliates (the volume of which -- estimated

at $830 billion in 1976 -- has already surpassed that of the aggregate exports
of developed market economies); they are in the forefront in research and de-
velopment and the transfer of technology; they are (especially in the form of
transnational banks and through the import of capital) crucial for the provi-
sion of financial resources, be it for the financing of international trade,
for development, or for other objectives; and they play a key role in the in-
dustrialization of Third World countries.

It is not intended here to document the importance of TNEs and their role in
host countries, home countries, and the international system. For such a do-
cumentation, the reader is referred to the expanding literature on TNEs[4/].
However, four characteristics of international direct investment are of par-
ticular relevance to the topic of this paper and therefore require mentioning.

The first concerns the limited number of home-countries and headquarters (our
"senders") that originate foreign direct investment. Although all industrial
market economies (and even a number of Third World and socialist countries)
have outward foreign direct investment, nearly half of it originates directly
in the United States, and nearly another one-third in the United Kingdom, Japan,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Switzerland. Concentration in interna-
tional direct investment extends, however, beyond the country level: although
we mentioned that there are more than 20,000 TNEs, only about 150-200 of
them -- virtually all of them headquartered in the five countries just listed --
are estimated to account for approximately one-half of international direct
investment. In the context of this study, this degree of concentration is
important for two reasons: (1) it means that the number of important "senders"
is relatively limited; and (2) since the major home countries in which this
limited number of enterprises is located share essentially the same culture,
the content of the socio-cultural messages that is transmitted can be expected
to be relatively similar.

The second relevant characteristic of international direct investment concerns
both the concentration of ownership and control of foreign affiliates (an im-
portant part of our "channels") as well as the pattern of their locational dis-
tribution. As to the first point, approximately four-fifths of all foreign
affiliates are owned and controlled by parent enterprises headquartered in the
five major investor countries mentioned above, and although no figures are
available on the degree of foreign affiliate concentration in terms of major
enterprises, it can be expected that the 150-200 major TNEs probably control
a substantial number of them. As to the second point, the pattern of dis-
tribution of foreign affiliates (mirroring the distribution of book value)
across Third World countries, while changing, still strongly reflects the
past colonial ties or hemispheric interests of the main investor countries
involved: the overwhelming majority of the foreign affiliates of these inves-
tor countries in the Third World are located in countries that at one point
or another were formally or informally dependent on them. In fact, these in-
vestor countries (especially the United Kingdom, France, the United States)
are the dominant foreign-direct-investment suppliers in most of their (former)
dependencies. The relevance of this pattern for the topic of this paper is
that at the level of the host country, the concentration of sending cultures
is often reduced to one, and the concentration of actual senders reduced to
a few TNEs from that culture.

The third relevant characteristic concerns the ownership and control of
parent enterprises. By definition, TNEs are transnational in scope. For many
of them, a substantial part of their profits, assets, production, and em-
ployment is located outside their home country. But with few exceptions,
virtually all parent enterprises are nearly exclusively owned and managed by
home-country nationals; in fact, in a number of countries, legal provisions
make the take-over of TNEs by non-nationals very difficult, if not impossible.
And where multinational ownership or control exists, it is virtually entirely
limited to nationals of a few industrial countries[5]. In other words, control
over the most important senders and their networks is fully in the hands of
home-country nationals of a very limited number of headquarters countries.

Finally, the fourth characteristic concerns the situation in a number of
specific tertiary industries that are of particular importance to the trans-
mission of socio-cultural investments. In them, the characteristics observed
above are even more pronounced than in international direct investment in
general. To illustrate, only three news agencies with global scope exist
(the American agencies AP and UPI and the British Reuters) and virtually all
market economies (with the exception of Japan) are heavily dependent on them
for their foreign news -- and their selection of what is newsworthy[6]. Si-
milarly, a high percentage (between one-third and two-thirds, a percentage
that tends to be even higher during prime time) of the television programmes
of most countries is imported from a few countries, mainly the United States,
the United Kingdom and France[7]. And, finally, in international advertising --
a key industry when it comes to sociocultural messages -- 21 of the 25 largest
agencies in the world are United States agencies (or strongly linked to them)
and most of them generate about half of their billings abroad. Foreign ma-
jority-owned agencies are the largest in 44 of 73 industrial and Third World
countries; 39 of them are affiliates of American or American-related parents.
In an additional six countries, United States parents have acquired an often
substantial minority interest in the largest agency. If the aggregate five
largest agencies in each of the same 73 countries are examined -- information
is available on a total of 261 of these agencies -- nearly three-fifths of
them (151) are majority foreign-owned; and more than half of these 151 are
controlled by five parent agencies, all of them American or strongly related
to them[8].

B. What

Given these characteristics of international direct investment, the content
of the messages transferred has to be sought in the culture of the main head-
quarters countries and particularly in the business culture of the leading TNEs
of these countries (and especially of the United States)[9]. Actually, a
comprehensive analysis of the "what" would have to go beyond business culture
since more than that is being transmitted (e.g., musical tastes) and since
business culture itself is embedded in the socio-cultural totality of the
home country. However, in the context of this paper, with its emphasis on
TNEs, the business culture-related content of the transmission process is
the main focus of interest.

We conceive of the concept of business culture as referring especially to the
following four components:

1. attitudes, values and patterns of behaviour;

2. forms and patterns of (corporate) organization;

3. production patterns and processes; and

4. consumption patterns.

The first component includes attitudes, values and patterns of behaviour which are learned, shared and generationally passed on in one society (the home country) and that are being transmitted to another society (the host country). Their scope is obviously broader than business culture and includes, for instance, general ideological preferences; "attitudes and life styles" may be an appropriate short hand for describing them in the aggregate. In the more restricted context of foreign affiliates alone, this aspect would include all attitudes, values and patterns of behaviour specifically associated with foreign affiliates -- for short, the "foreign affiliate experience".

The second component of business culture includes structures of corporate organization, including special emphasis on selected functions (e.g., marketing), types of control mechanisms, corporate strategies, and also preferences concerning the role of business in society (e.g., ideological opposition to state intervention and use of the employer-employee relationship -- that is, collective bargaining -- rather than general legislation to achieve certain social goals). "Business philosophy" may be a term that captures most of these elements.

The third component is of particular concern to primary and secondary industries. Relevant in this context are especially the mechanisms of the product cycle through which production patterns and processes (including know-how) are introduced and/or promoted in host countries 10/. Reflecting the relative high consumer incomes and labour costs in home countries, as well as their emphasis on technological advance, expansion of output and increased consumption, these production patterns are often geared towards the production of luxury and advanced consumption goods. They tend to be characterized by capital-, skill-, and energy-intensive processes, product innovation and differentiation, as well as packaging and branding. Furthermore, they tend towards (wasteful) planned obsolescence and use hard-sell advertising for want-creation and consumption expansion.

As can be seen, inherent in the mechanisms of the product cycle are implications for consumption patterns -- identified above as the fourth component of business culture. In the framework of the product cycle, TNEs have a natural incentive to replicate in host countries products and processes already successfully tested and introduced elsewhere (i.e., in home countries) -- and in shaping host country consumption to obtain acceptance of these products. Partially, this can be done through forward and backward linkage through which foreign affiliates may be able to prescribe demand and supply patterns; partially, this can be done through public relations, marketing and advertising aimed directly at the preference profiles of consumers.

C. Channels

Advertising is one of the main channels through which messages are sent that
contribute to the formation of consumption patterns. But preference pro-
files are not shaped by advertising alone. They are also contained in general
attitude and life-style messages that are part of a broader socio-cultural
transmission. The channels for these general transmissions, some of which
have already been mentioned above, are especially the various communication
industries (most notably the mass media), including television, films, news
agencies, newspapers, magazines, professional journals, books, broadcasting,
records, and video tapes .   Other relevant channels (even if they are not
in each case a part of a transnational business enterprise) are educational
institutions (including business schools)[11]/ expatriate managers, individuals
participating in exchange programme, tourism, governmental cultural pro-
grammes,   and even language. Since the controllers of these channels are,
as a rule, located in a few headquarter countries, the messages carried
by them can be expected to be similar.

Apart from advertising, and especially in the context of business culture,
the foreign-affiliate networks of TNEs are naturally the main channel for
socio-cultural investments. The effectiveness of this channel rests on the
managerial control of foreign affiliates by their headquarters: foreign af-
filiates are integrated into hierarchical transnational organizational
structures that can take, for instance, the form of global product divisions,
area divisions, or a combination of both[12]/. Managerial control is often
(but not only) the result of the fact that foreign affiliates are, as a rule,
majority-owned by their parent enterprises or otherwise tightly linked to
them. The effectiveness of the channel is further reinforced by the presence
of expatriate managers in key positions of foreign affiliates and it is com-
plemented (as reported above) by the virtual absence of non-home country
nationals in the headquarters of TNEs. The combination of these factors,
together with modern high-speed communication technologies, makes the foreign
affiliate networks of TNEs indeed a dynamic global communication system.

Several intra-country channels of communication link foreign affiliates to
host countries. They are important since through them socio-cultural in-
vestments associated with foreign affiliates are disseminated into the host
society. Three types of links can be distinguished. The first one involves
inter-institutional linkages related to foreign affiliates. Thus, for ins-
tance, the government bureaucracy may change educational institutions to adapt
to skill requirements of foreign affiliates. As educational institutions
undergo such changes, they may, in turn, encourage changes in the family,
for example as regards attitudes towards type and length of schooling for
both sexes. A second linking mechanism is the "organization-set"[13]/ of fo-
reign affiliates. It consists of the complement of organizations with which
the affiliates have recurrent interactions in the course of obtaining its
inputs from suppliers, banks, etc. and channeling its outputs to wholesalers,
distributors, etc. (i.e., forward and backward linkages). A third linking
mechanism is finally the "status set"[14]/ of employees of foreign affiliates.
Since employees simultaneously occupy roles, directly or indirectly, in most
societal institutions or sub-systems (e.g., the family, the economy, the
polity, educational institutions), they can potentially transmit the foreign

affiliate experience to them. This linkage is rapidly growing since the number of employees working in foreign affiliates has been (and is) substantially increasing with the expansion of international business.

D. Whom

It should be clear from the course of the preceding discussion who the main receptors of the transmitted socio-cultural messages are: the host society as a whole and most notably those particular groups exposed to special and additional channels. As far as attitudes and life styles as well as consumption patterns are concerned, the receptor is the host society as a whole. As far as business philosophy as well as production patterns and processes are concerned -- messages that are, by their very nature, somewhat more specialized -- the main receptor is the economic subsystem of the host country. But because of the linkages of this subsystem with the system as a whole, they do not remain confined to it.

Employees in foreign affiliates are obviously one of the special groups. In addition to being tuned into the general socio-cultural channels that penetrate host societies, they are also exposed to the foreign affiliate experience. The upper and upper-middle classes (especially in Third World countries) are particularly exposed, since many of the messages are geared to them and since their already existing socio-cultural preconceptions predispose them favourably to such messages.

F. Effects

The extent and magnitude of effects can be expected to be a function of a number of conditions suggested by each of the individual aspects of the communication process discussed above. Without attempting to be exhaustive, we can identify a number of them before dealing with the effects themselves.

As far as the originators are concerned, they have to be strong in the sense of being important transnational actors that permeate as many facets of host countries as possible. In addition, clear control as well as clear authority structures appear to be important preconditions for clear messages. As we have seen above, these conditions are well fulfilled.

As far as the content of the transmission is concerned, the critical condition is the degree to which it differs from the prevailing socio-cultural environments (including their business cultures) of the receptors (i.e., host countries). If the messages received are more or less "in tune" with this environment, one could hardly expect any effects. Under such a condition, added special exposure (like the foreign affiliate experience) of some host-country groups to such messages could also not be counted upon to make a difference. To illustrate this point: it is very unlikely that employees living in the Walloon part of Belgium and working in an affiliate of a TNE headquartered in Paris exhibit attitudes, values or patterns of behaviour that are different from those of their colleagues in a local company on account of differences in socio-cultural variables.

Thus, a prerequisite for the operation of socio-cultural investments appears to be an appreciable difference between the socio-cultural environments (including business cultures) of home and host countries. On the basis of this condition alone, the impact is probably most powerful in Third World countries.

Other content-related conditions are the clarity of the message, its frequency, and the extent to which it is convincing (or appealing and seductive). Messages originating in the same or similar sending cultures, reaching host societies constantly and through many channels, and emitted by entities depicting powerful images (such as success, modernity) thus promise to have the greatest effect. Our earlier discussion -- in particular concerning the characteristics of international direct investment -- has shown that the socio-cultural diffusion associated with TNEs fulfills these conditions.

As far as channels are concerned, the actual number of them is probably a variable that influences effect. This also applies to foreign affiliates -- the more there are in a host country, the higher the potential for transmission. In the case of affiliates, the tightness of the various linkages -- both between headquarters and foreign affiliates on the one hand and foreign affiliates and host societies on the other -- can also be suspected to play a role.

Finally, when it comes to receptors, two key variables appear to be the degree of exposure and the vulnerability of the indigenous socio-cultural system. The higher exposure -- to a clear and convincing message, by as many individuals and institutions as possible, in a vulnerable host-country socio-cultural system -- the greater the effects. A high degree of predisposition on the part of receptors (e.g., the upper classes in Third World countries) towards the message would be an added supportive condition. According to our earlier discussion, all these conditions appear to be met in many Third World countries. In industrial countries, as well as in a number of Third World ones, however, resistance to change of the indigenous socio-cultural systems can be expected to be a significant mitigating factor.

In sum, it appears that the combination of key conditions most favourable for pronounced effects to occur is given when a different and vulnerable socio-cultural system is highly exposed to a clear and strong message emitted by convincing senders. The situation of many Third World and a number of industrial countries vis-à-vis the socio-cultural investments of TNEs appears to fit almost exactly this combination of conditions. For a number of them, however, a main source of resistance may be a strongly developed indigenous socio-cultural system. On the other hand, for a number of countries (i.e., those which are characterised by far-reaching similarities in their socio-cultural systems and whose particular cultural modalities are relatively resistant) -- especially developed ones -- effects may be marginal as far as the general socio-cultural system (including life-styles) is concerned. Nevertheless, they may be appreciable in some of its specific sub-components, e.g., corporate organization. In fact, they may even reach individual issues pertaining to life style, such as language, fashion, or reading habits. These propositions, as all the others suggested earlier, require of course empirical testing for conclusive answers.

As already indicated, the effects of socio-cultural investments can be expected to be most pronounced in Third World countries -- with respect to their general socio-cultural systems as well as with respect to all components of their business-culture subsystems. The basic effect is the absorption of home country-related socio-cultural investments by host-country nationals, which leads to a change in the socio-cultural profile of these nationals towards that of home countries.

When the aggregate of such individual changes is linked with parallel changes in the other components of the indigenous business culture (especially consumption patterns and production patterns and processes), they can have profound economic and political implications.   Socio-cultural investments maintain or introduce in Third World countries socio-cultural patterns that are frequently based on want-creation and thus may be highly undesirable (including, incidentally, also for the majority of the people in industrial countries). In any case they reflect the factor endowments and income levels of the industrial and not the Third World countries.

The issue is, therefore, the proper allocation of very scarce resources: should they be used for the establishment of a production apparatus geared primarily to the consumption wants of the small upper and upper-middle classes or be used for the establishment of a production apparatus geared primarily to the satisfaction of the basic needs of large portions of the population? Under conditions of very scarce resources, the adoption of socio-cultural systems and especially the consumption patterns of the rich home countries means first of all that the provision of, for instance, basic food stuffs, health services, clothing, housing, drinking water, education and reliable transportation is neglected. It furthermore means that production processes tend to be utilized which actually may increase unemployment and underemployment; and that, in fact, resources are wasted in products subject to planned obsolescence. Moreover, as observed earlier, to the extent that foreign-oriented consumption wants depend for their satisfaction on inputs from abroad (and on foreign institutions, like TNEs, that provide these inputs), host countries actually keep themselves in economic dependence -- or even increase it.

The adoption of foreign-oriented consumption patterns may also have ramifications for the social stratification of Third World host countries since production patterns that depend on relatively rich population segments may represent an obstacle to efforts aimed at the redistribution of income. In fact, they may even further aggravate existing income inequalities.   The result of these processes is that certain (small) sectors (i.e. the upper and upper-middle classes) in the Third World countries and the corresponding (larger) sectors in industrial countries tend to become integrated into one transnational socio-cultural system and tend to be more closely linked to each other than to the other segments of their own countries. To quote Osvaldo Sunkel:

> These sectors share a common culture and "way of life" which expresses itself through the same books, texts, films, television programmes, similar fashions, similar groups of organization of family and social life, similar style of decorations of homes, similar orientations to housing, building, furniture and urban design. Despite linguistic

barriers, these sectors have a far greater capacity for communication among themselves than is possible between integrated and marginal persons of the same country who speak the same language ... For this international community, inhabiting different countries -- developed and underdeveloped -- to have similar patterns of consumption it must also have similar patterns of income[15].

But the existence of such a transnational socio-cultural system cannot conceal that the linkages in it are strongly unidirectional. Preferences are formed in a very limited number of headquarter countries. From there they are disseminated to the rest of the world. Possibilities for feed-back or synthesis are very limited. The system is thus hierarchically structured, with the associated uneven distribution of autonomy and (direct and indirect) benefits.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The hierarchical structure of the international socio-cultural system mirrors that of the international economic system. And in both systems, the same actor plays a key role in reproducing these structures. Although the two systems are analytically distinct, they are, in reality, mutually enforcing each other. They are part of the existing international dominance system in its North-South dimension.

Our discussion of the socio-cultural effects of TNEs links up here again with our introductory observations about the emancipation process of the Third World countries: it may well be that socio-cultural emancipation is a prerequisite of economic emancipation and the choice of an appropriate development path [16].

The current discussions about the New International Information and Communication Order indicate that the importance of this link is gradually being appreciated -- at least for one aspect of the overall problématique. To quote from "Declaration" of the 1976 Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries on the Press Agencies Pool: "Just as political and economic dependence are legacies of the era of colonialism, so is the case of dependence in the field of information which in turn retards the achievement of political and economic growth ... The Conference reaffirmed ... that the establishment of a New International Order for Information is as necessary as the New International Economic Order [17].

The Non-Aligned Countries have taken the lead in this field. After their 1973 Algiers summit and their 1975 Lima Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Non-Aligned Countries have taken a number of organizational measures (including the establishment of a Press Agencies Pool of the Non-Aligned Countries) to assure that this subject matter receives continued attention[18]. The non-aligned movement also played a key role in introducing these questions into UNESCO, the main forum in which socio-cultural questions related to development are currently being considered.

Certainly, these efforts have greatly contributed to focusing more attention on an area hitherto neglected. But the full scope of the issue at stake has yet to be recognized and acknowledged. And, what might be equally important,

this recognition and acknowledgement has to occur at the highest political level. Perhaps what is needed is an Algiers declaration and action programme on socio-cultural emancipation.

One important caveat has to made before closing. Many of the phenomena discussed here are probably unavoidable concomitants of socio-economic development as pursued by profit-oriented institutions in market economies. In other words, they are systemic outcomes and not outcomes that are associated with particular countries and their institutions. From this general point of view, it is therefore in principle not important whether an enterprise is transnational or national in origin, as long as it is a (profit-oriented) enterprise.

Still, TNEs do play a special role. The main reason is that they, as the main stratifiers of the international economic system and with world-wide financial, technological and human resources at their command, frequently are in a position to influence strongly the character of indigenous production patterns and processes and, more generally, the specific variation of the socio-economic development path of the host countries in which they operate. In other words, they are in an unusually favourable position to promote their particular variation of the market-economy system in host countries. Thus -- and assuming no major systemic changes -- the question becomes whether (within the constraints of the market system) the variation offered by TNEs at the present time is the optimal one for host countries.

While it is possible to delineate such variations at the conceptual level, the researcher who attempts to measure the socio-cultural impact of TNEs is faced with the problem of empirically isolating the specific TNE-related impact and to distinguish it from that of any profit-oriented institution, that of messages sent through channels other than the foreign-affiliate networks of TNEs, and that of progress in industrialization in general (i.e., systemic characteristics).

Unquestionably, this is not an easy task. In the absence of a substantial body of empirical data, therefore, one can only conjecture about the role of TNEs in the formation of the socio-cultural indifference curves of host countries and the importance of these indifference curves for the development process. We are still puzzling.

NOTES

1/ The expression is Kenneth Boulding's.

2/ For current research and literature in this area, see, respectively, the listings under classifier 72 of United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations, Survey of Research on Transnational Corporations: Report of the Secretariat. ST/CTC/3, and Bibliography on Transnational Corporations, ST/CTC/4.

3/ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society", in The Communication of Ideas, ed. by Leyman Bryson (New York: Harper, 1948), p.37.

4/ Main data sources are United Nations, Transnational corporations in world development: A re-examination (New York: United Nations, 1978); OECD, Pénétration des entreprises multinationales dans l'industrie manufacturière des pays membres (Paris: OECD, 1977); and J.P. Curhan, W.H. Davidson and R. Suri, Tracing the multinationals (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977).

5/ For instance, we found that in our sample of 2,776 managers from 38 of the largest 500 enterprises based in the FRG, only about 1% were non-West German, and among them Austrians accounted for nearly 1/3. At the same time, the companies involved did an average of 30% of their business abroad. Similar findings are reported from a 1972 survey of the Conference Board for the USA: it was found that of the 10,760 directors of 855 large US enterprises only 146 - or 1.4% - were not citizens of the USA. See Jeremy Bacon, Corporate directorship practices: Membership and committees of the board (New York: The Conference Board, 1973).

6/ See Juan Somavia, "The transnational power structure and international information: Elements of a Third World policy for transnational news agencies", Development Dialogue, no.2, 1976, pp.15-28 and related study by Fernando Reyes Matta, "The information bedazzlement of Latin America: A study of world news in the region", Development Dialogue, no.2, 1976, pp.29-42. See also Asok Mitra, "Information imbalance in Asia", Communicator 10 (July 1975), pp.1-9; May Emery and John C. Pollock, "Wire-services in the global network: A comparative and structural approach" (Rutgers: Rutgers University, 1977), mimeo.

7/ See Tapio Varis, International inventory of television programmes structures and the flow of TV programmes between nations (Tampere: University of Tampere, 1973). It should be noted that these figures refer to the supply of programmes and not to the ownership of TV stations. See also Tapio Varis and Renny Jokelin, Television news in Europe: A survey of the news-film flow in Europe (Tampere: University of Tampere, 1976); and Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis, Television traffic: A one-way street? A survey and analysis of the international flow of television programme material (Paris, UNESCO, 1974).

8/ See Karl P. Sauvant, "The potential of multinational enterprises as vehicles for the transmission of business culture," in Controlling multinati-enterprises: Problems, strategies, counterstrategies, ed. by Karl Sauvant and Farid G. Lavipour (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976). See also Herbert I. Schiller, "Madison Avenue imperialism", Trans-Action 8 (March-April 1971), pp.52-58; Arnold K. Weinstein, "The international expansion of US multinational advertising agencies", MSU Business Topics 22 (Summer 1974), pp.29-35; and Michel Chevalier, "Which international strategy for advertising agencies", European Business 41 (Summer 1974), pp.26-34.

9/ The dominance of US business culture is not only grounded on that country's share in international direct investment but also in the fact that US business schools - and their affiliates aborad - train an important part of non-US managers; see Sauvant, "Transmission of business culture", See also Theodore D. Weinshall, "Communication, culture and the education of multinational managers", in The multinational company in Europe: Some key problems, ed. by Michael Z. Brook and H. Lee Remmers (London: Longman, 1972), and his "Changing the effects of culture on problem-solving in management education", Management International Review 13 (1973), pp.145-166.

10/ See Raymond Vernon, "International investment and international trade in the product cycle", Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (May 1966), pp.190-207 and his Sovereignty at bay (New York: Basic Books, 1971). For a brief discussion of the product cycle in relation to consumption patterns, see Stephen J. Kobrin, "Multinational corporations, socio-cultural dependence and industrialization: Need satisfaction or want creation?" (Boston: MIT Sloan School of Management, 1977), mimeo.

11/ It should also be noted that many Third World countries base their education on material imported from former metropoles. See, for futher ref., André Cartapanis, William Experton and Jean-Luc Fuguet, "Transnational Corporations and education systems in developing countries: An annotated critical bibliography" (Paris: UNESCO, 1977), mimeo.

12/ See John M. Stopford and Louis T. Wells, Managing the multinational enterprises: Organization of the firm and ownership of the subsidiaries (New York: Baisc Books, 1972).

13/ See William M. Evan, "The organization-set: Toward a theory of inter-organizational relations", in Approaches to organizational design, ed. by James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1966).

14/ R.K. Merton, Social theory and social structure (New York: Free Press, 1957).

15/ Osvaldo Sunkel, "Transnational capitalism". See also Johan Galtung, "A structural theory of imperialism", Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971), pp.81-118. For Sunkel, "Transnational capitalism", pp.147-149, the result of the disintegration of national socio-cultural systems is a polarization in them, with those not included in the transnational system adopting consumption cultures that are different from the consumeristic culture promoted by the TNEs and that, in the longer run, may lead to a reintegration of the individual national cultures.

16/ The concept of individual and collective self-reliance - of date gaining more currency among Third World countries - promises to be a step in this direction.

17/ In Jankowitsch and Sauvant, The Third World without superpowers, vol.3, pp.1554-1555.

18/ The main steps after Algiers and Lima were the March '76 symposium on information in Tunis which clarified a number of conceptual questions; the Jul.'76 Ministerial Conference on the Press Agencies Pool in New Delhi; the establishment of a Co-ordination Committee of the Press Agencies Pool of Non-Aligned Countries. The documents relating to these activities are contained in ibid. For a brief summary of these developments, see Herbert I. Schiller, "Decolonization of Information: Efforts towards a new international order", Latin American Perspectives 5 (Winter '78), pp.35-48. See also Le nouvel ordre mondial de l'information (Tunisia, Secretariat d'état à l'information, 1977) and Tran Van Dinh, "Nonalignment and cultural imperialism", in Nordenstreng and Schiller

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NB: Several footnotes, providing an extensive bibliography of relevant literature, have been deleted due to reasons of space.

MARKINGS

THE CULTURAL ROOTS OF ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT

by Rajni Kothari*/

Changing perceptions on human crisis

While it is recognized that the contemporary human conditions is one of a
deepening crisis, perception as to the nature of the crisis and causes there-
of has changed over the last two decades. Until recently - and this view
still persists - the crisis was perceived in terms of an ideological struggle
between different ways of life and systems of belief, not infrequently
associated with a struggle for power between rival blocs of countries. A very
large part of human energy and world resources was devoted to this conflict,
which is by no means yet over and which in no small way accounts for the ter-
rible arms race that enveloped the world and still persists. Later, after
the mid-sixties and the gradual erosion of the cold war, attention got focus-
sed on something more immediate and very pressing, but which had somehow
escaped human sensitivity for so long, namely the great economic schism that
is dividing the world into extremes of affluence and deprivation, with
concentrations of poverty and scarcity and unemployment and deprivation in
one vast section of mankind and of over-abundance and over-production and
over-consumption in another and much smaller section of the same species.
Furthermore, both these are tied together in a relationship in which resour-
ces from the poorer regions have for long been drained out and continue to be
drained through new instruments of appropriation. The last few years have
witnessed an increasing concern with this single problem of inequity on a
global scale, though it must be admitted that very little has been done
systematically to solve it; indeed it has been getting worse.

All these perceptions of the nature of the human crisis are still relevant -
as found in the mounting piles of ever more deadly armaments on the one hand
and the growing hordes of the very poor and the undernourished living in condi-
tions of extreme deprivation, including starvation, on the other. But perhaps
one needs to think beyond single dimensions and look to more fundamental
causes. After all, the fact that a century of unprecedented material progress
has also been one of sprawling misery and increasing deprivation; the fact
that an age that has witnessed the end of empires and has seen the dawn of
independence for so many nations has also turned out to be an age of increa-
sing domination of the world by just a few powers; the fact that despite
world agricultural production having been ahead of population growth, food
availability has become a serious problem for millions of people; the fact
that on balance there is a net flow of nutritional resources from the poorer

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and more populous, to the richer and less populous, regions of the world;
the fact that policies of 'aid' and transfer of technology and resources
from the industrialized to the non-industrialized regions has in effect
turned out to be a net drainage of surpluses from the latter - all these and
similar other evidences from contemporary life suggest that there is something
basically wrong with our world and the global structures that have permeated
it.   Indeed, there is something basically wrong with the way modern man has
gone about constructing his world.

Industrialization was supposed to be an end to the condition of scarcity for
mankind as a whole; in fact, it has made even ordinary decent existence more
scarce and inaccessible for an increasing number of human beings. Modern
education was supposed to lead to continuous progress and enlightenment for
all and with that a greater equality among men and women; in fact, it has
produced a world dominated by experts and bureaucrats and technocrats and
one in which the ordinary human being feels increasingly powerless and mani-
pulated by forces beyond his control. Similarly, modern communication and
transportation were supposed to have produced a 'small world' in which the
fruits of knowledge and development in any part of the world could become
available to all the others; in fact, modern communication and fast-moving
transportation have produced a world in which a few metropolitan centres are
sucking a large part of world resources and depriving the other regions of
whatever comforts and skills and local resources they once used to enjoy.
Surely then, there is something more deeply wrong with the structure of this
world than the mere production of nuclear weapons or the economic handicap of
the poorer countries. The world we live in is indeed very badly divided, but
the divisions are more fundamental than merely ideological, military or
economic. Perhaps there is something wrong with the basic model of life
that man has created in the last hundred years or so.

Role of knowledge

Crucial to this particular model of life which has produced a world of such
sharp divisions based on such enormous inequality and exploitation, is the
role of knowledge in human affairs. Never before had the product of the human
mind acquired so dominant a role as in modern times. It has changed the
world beyond redemption. Its basic contribution has been to give to man a
tremendous sense of power and manipulation. Nothing else could have made
man so arrogant as this particular role of knowledge.

Now it would be quite an obscurantist position to take if one were to say
that knowledge by itself has brought mankind to grief. The rise of modern
science has, if anything, been a great liberator of man from both the travails
of nature and the excesses of religious doctrine. But something happened to
the progress of science which undermined its original promises. Because it
flourished in a culture (viz. of the West) that looked upon it as an instru-
ment of power and domination rather than as a liberator of the human spirit
as such - which is how knowledge was looked upon by the ancient Chinese or
the Indians, or even the ancient Greeks - science soon became an instrument
of technology which again, not content with overcoming hardships and fulfil-
ling basic needs, went on a rampage for continuous domination, exploitation,

competition and perpetual tension - both between man and man and between man
and the rest of existence. In the course of time it also became an instru-
ment of monopoly and growing inequality in which, while the fruits of tech-
nology were diffused widely within some societies, this happened at the
expense of a great many other socieites, many of which incidentally provided
the basic raw materials for prosperity in those few societies.

In sum, then, largely because of a particular cultural location where modern
technology flourished - a culture that was basically aggressive and in which
there was not enough of moderation and self-control - it has become a Franken-
stein creature. This is being realized only of late. And it has been rea-
lized not because of the inequities to which modern technology has given
rise - after all the problem of poverty emanating from a pursuit of plenty
was not posed until very recently - but rather because the myth it had given
rise to has suddenly exploded. This was the myth of perpetual progress, of
the end to scarcity, and of the possibility of making this progress infinite
and unending and hence available to all. Today, suddenly, the affluent
world itself faces the spectre of scarcity once again and at the same time
is beginning to see the excesses to which modern technology has brought it,
as is being expressed in the continuing concern with the environmental crisis.
In fact, however, the environmental crisis is only a symptom of a very basic
change in relationships - from man's reliance on nature to man's dependence
on machinery which in turn entailed an increasingly aggressive relationship
of man with nature, denuding it at a rate much faster than its capacity for
renewal and regeneration, thanks to an ever-growing demand for energy. But
this has also entailed a growing exploitation of human beings. The domination
of man by the machine - and his dependence on it for his sustenance - means
not just the constant and continuous need for energy and raw materials; it
also entails less and less need for human beings. The result is that there
are in this world millions and millions of what are known as 'marginal' men
and women, people for whom society has no use. The upshot is that man him-
self has become superfluous and obsolescent; he is being looked upon as a
burden not just on nature but also on society. Paradoxical though it may
sound, the system that modern man has produced is one in which the most dis-
pensable element is man himself.

The crisis that faces modern man is a crisis wrought by a particular direction
that science and technology took under the impact of the age of positivism.
The full consequences of such a course are seen in our time as it envelopes
all the particular crises to which men of science and philosophy have drawn
out attention - the threat of total war, the threat of extreme deprivation
coexisting with overabundance, the threat of the collapse of the biosphere.
As we realize this we must also realize that nothing short of fundamental
rethinking about the human enterprise will redeem man from these crises and
that such rethinking will have to address itself to the world as a whole.
For what we face here is an extreme dualism of the world, a world so divided
that its survival itself is at stake. Even if a nuclear war is avoided - an
event that could not be ruled out if the divisions facing mankind become
sharper and deeper - it is not certain that such a badly divided species can
survive the increasing state of tension and violence that it will have to
face. Many other species under such conditions have perished. None of them
had the instruments of mutual destruction that humans have.

Colonizing the future

So far we have been concerned with the growing division between the differ-
ent regions of the world we live in, based on a convergence of many factors,
and producing conditions of increasing deprivation and exploitation in major
regions of the world, despite most of them being formally independent, des-
pite their considerable resource endowment and rich cultural heritage.
Such a dualism of the world along the dimension of space and region is, of
course, the most important division that faces contemporary mankind. But
there are other divisions, potentially no less troublesome, to which thinkers
are only now beginning to pay attention, and as yet rather dimly. The most
important among these is the division between generations. By this I do not
only mean what is usually known as the generational conflict between old and
young, which is of course important and quite serious and which has not
received systematic attention despite a great deal of talk about it. What I
have in mind is something more comprehensive, namely the division between
the present and the future, the future including both the very young among
us and the yet unborn generations. Never before has this concern with the
future been of such immediate relevance and urgency as it is today. While
rational anticipation and prudence in preparing oneself against the future
were inherent in all earlier, thought (though even this has been diminishing
in recent times) the future consequences of present action were never as ir-
reversible and hence ethically relevant as they are today.

Once again this is a result of modern technology. The use to which man has
put it has had a powerful impact on beings that have had no voice in the
making of vital decisions that have affected their lives in so many ways.
As the growing economic, energy and environmental crises are now showing us,
decisions taken at one point in time have the power to affect future genera-
tions in ways that are by and large irreversible. The consequences of what
our parents and the older generation among us did - the ravaging of nature,
the depletion of resources, the pattern of investment, the stock-piling of
armaments, the building of highly centralized economic and political struc-
tures that are difficult to change except by long struggle and violence - are
being felt by the younger generation of today. And what the middle and the
younger generations of today will do will shape the destinies of the unborn
generations of tomorrow. How is one to assure that the interest of the
younger generation and the yet to be born generations of the future are some-
how represented in the present? They have no voice in the decision-making
processes of modern society, least of all in representative systems of
government of which only the old (whom we prefer to call 'adults') have a
monopoly. It has been an assumption of planning and of prudence generally
that one must sacrifice or postpone gratification in the present so that the
future generations can live a better life. In fact, however, modern man has
been doing just the opposite. He has been so involved in his own gratifi-
cation in the present, towards which the mass media and advertisement agencies
have been pushing him, that he is in fact sacrificing the life chances of
future generations - which will consist of several billions of people.

Thus just as decisions taken in the metropolitan centres of the world and
their ever-rising consumption of finite resources are adversely affecting
millions of people in far off places, decisions taken by the old are

affecting and will continue to affect the future of the young and the yet un-
born generations. These are serious questions to which the present models
of politics and economics provide no answer. They call for a different kind
of consciousness which takes a total view of existence, empathises with the
weak, the distant, the unborn and the inarticulate, and can intervene in
legislative and administrative processes at various levels of the world
without, however, degenerating into some kind of Brahminic or mandarin class
or clergy that arrogates to itself all knowledge and wisdom. As yet such a
consciousness (which no doubt exists here and there) is still very dim and
at any rate not very influential in decision-making processes of represen-
tative institutions and governmental structures. But the need for someone
to 'represent' the future in the decisions made in the present cannot be
over-emphasized. Failing that, a growing alienation and schism between the
generations is bound to take place.

Colonizing nature

Beyond this extension of empathy and identity across regions and over the
horizon of time there are still other issues of ethical relevance. Man-in-
technology has not only been destroying nature and the life chances of his
less fortunately-placed fellow beings and the young and unborn generations;
he has not only created a massive system of dominance, exploitation, inequity
and repression through which the human species is divided into opposite
camps - all this is still in the area of what man has done to man. But
beyond this is also the question of what man has done to other species and
forms of life as well as to inanimate nature with all of which he is in
fact united through a common organic bond and without whose health and abun-
dance his own survival is at stake. Increasingly man is destroying, almost
without bounds, various other species - vegetation, gaseous and chemical
sources of life and the sea-beds and rocky lands whose bounty has been the
cause of so much imagination and sense of wonder and joy and creativity.
Springing from the unending acquisitiveness of technological man and the
decline in his sensitivity to his own kind in other regions and generations
and to other forms of life, he has been on a rampage that threatens both the
survival of other species and forms of creation.

Need for a new paradigm

None of these issues - the rampage of technology, the severe dualism of the
human species, the sacrifice of life chances of future generations, or the
destruction of other species and other sources of life and sustenance - were
adequately raised in earlier statements by philosophers of the human predi-
cament. The predicament that faces man today includes all this. And the
salvation that he must work out for himself - and for the whole of nature
along with his own - must address itself to all these issues. In this sense
the crisis that he faces is far more total than ever before.

And yet man has shown an almost infinite capacity (in the course of his his-
tory) for identifying his own immediate purpose with larger purposes; he has
come a long way from the primeval stage when he identified with just a few
kith of his own and cared little for others. Today he is able to identify
not only with millions and hundreds of millions that constitute his own

collectivity (nation, region, etc.) but indeed with the whole of the human species. And even beyond the human species. His capacity to symbolize and identify with abstract entities enables him to think not just for himself or his community or nation or even his species, but for the whole of creation - provided, of course, he uses his capacity for the right ends.

Nor is this entirely new. In some respects in an earlier age, before man began to use science and technology towards an arrogant and exclusive sense of his own destiny, he had shown a striking empathy and identity with the whole of creation. (This was at least true of the Orient, but to some extent also of Christendom.) The intellectual and religious movements that led to a deep sense of regard for life in all forms and an abhorrence of violence in all forms, including violence to other forms of life (in some societies taking the form of what is now called vegetarianism), had their mainsprings in this innate power in man to symbolize and identify with crea- tion and life as such and to revolt against his own excesses. This is what powerful movements like Buddhism and Jainism represented in my own land. Similar movements took place in other regions. It is true that often (as in India) this kind of feeling for life produced a rather quiescent attitude to life's purpose and even a metaphysic that undermined man's own confidence in himself as he ascribed more reality to nature than to himself. It will be necessary to guard against this kind of defeatist religiosity (which one notices today also among the 'anti-materialist' generation in the West). But such an attitude is by no means inherent in developing a larger identity with life and nature and creation.

Man, then, does have these capacities. Indeed of all the species only he has them - for only he is the abstracting animal, the historical animal, the animal that, through language and memory, can integrate sense perceptions with intricate systems of knowledge and awareness and morality. The predi- cament that he faces, however, is basic: he needs to move beyond all the structures he has created - territorial, socio-economic, technological, and in respect of patterns of consumption - and evolve new criteria for human effort and cooperation.

The present structures may have at a certain stage enabled him to overcome strife at lower thresholds of collective being - of the primitive type that he had felt against the menace of an unknown 'nature' and unsure as he was of the behaviour of collectivities beyond his own - but which have now become an encumbrance and a menace in turn. It is not as if man must give up all his activities and knowledge and institutional structures and surren- der all his achievements and start on a clean, new slate. Evolution does not ever take such a form. It is rather that our view of the values and purposes that should inform our activities and knowledge and institutional structures must be consciously reviewed, and wherever choices are called for, these should be exercised. Man has the capacity to exercise such choices and he has before him a historic challenge which he can use to put his house in order. It is best to snatch an opportunity while it poses itself in the form of a challenge - for it may not pose itself in the same form again. Maybe some small technological 'breakthrough' in one field or another will lull him again into quiescence. But we now know that all such breakthroughs

whether of steel and iron, or of electricity or oil, or of still new forms
of energy that are being desperately investigated right now, are temporary
and cannot take the place of fundamental restructuring of social forms in-
keeping with basic needs of the human personality. Gadgets may temporarily
overpower the mind, but ultimately the mind must come into its own and ad-
dress itself to the challenge of life.

The point is that every few hundred years a new situation presents itself.
And each time it calls for a new understanding and a new paradigm of action.
Ours is one such moment in the history of man and the universe. The choices
facing this badly divided and increasingly violent world of ours are many.
They will have to be fairly concrete - in respect of the world political
order, the techno-economic system and its relationship with nature and the
opportunities offered by it, the intellectual effort called for, and the kind
of development strategy needed for moving from the present structure of domi-
nance, inequity, loss of autonomy and dignity for millions of human beings,
to a more just and humane world in which both human beings and human collec-
tivities are able to work out their respective destinies in a framework of
integrity, balance and harmony.

We have said that every few hundred years a new situation presents itself
which calls for a new diagnosis and a new paradigm of action. Now it has
been a characteristic of all these situations that they arise out of a sharp
division in the human community which threatened its stability and survival.
And it was the task of all major intellectual efforts that were stirred by
such situations to seek to overcome the division and restore a basic unity
among men. Today also we face such a situation.

Indeed, the divisions that face us are sharper than ever: the grim division
between the dominant and the dependent nations which also encompasses the
division between the rich and the poor and between the urbanized metropoles
and the rural peripheries; the division between contending ideologies, which
too has become increasingly subtle and sophisticated, but is by no means ir-
relevant; the division between races that has yet to see its real gravity
and violence; and above all the division between an increasingly dehumanizing
human being and an increasingly de-naturalized nature thanks to our over-
emphasis on technology. It is a division between man and man, man and other
beings, between machine and life, between the grand creations of human
reason and will (artifice) and the incessant demands of the biosphere and
the environment (nature) - and through all this, in the most primitive
sense, between the beastly and the benign, the selfish and the social parts
of each being, and between a pursuit of knowledge and science that leads to
humility and self-control and the same pursuit that leads to uncontrolled
power and arrogance.

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Now behind these myriad divisions that seem to permeate modern civilization
lies a dominant philosophical doctrine that has had its greatest triumph in
our own time with practically the whole world accepting it. It is necessary
to come to grips with it for underlying the irrational sway of modern techno-
logy lies a deeper philosophical doctrine emanating from a particular

culture that has brought the whole world under its sweep.

The doctrine of modernity

This is the doctrine of modernity. The power of the doctrine lies in its simplicity. The end of life is narrowly defined, hence realizable by all - progress based on economic prosperity. It is to be achieved by the application of inanimate power to the fulfilment of human needs. There is no mystery about it as it is all 'scientific'. Indeed, there are no mysteries in life as most of them have been uncovered by Science; the little that remained would soon be uncovered. All that men and societies have to do is to discard tradition and superstition and become rational and modern. And all they need to learn are the essential techniques by which happiness could be had by one and all. For a whole generation after the collapse of colonial power, this doctrine held sway over the minds of men and so dazzled national elites that they practically surrendered their hard-won freedom at the altar of the new religion called Modernity.

Today that doctrine is in shambles. Not only has the 'developing' world discovered that all the enormous noise and fury of development projects and the surrender of national and cultural autonomy in the process has led them into a blind alley; the 'developed' world too has discovered that the path of progress was not limitless and that it was highly vulnerable to pressures emanating from the Third World. As with many other acquisitions, progress too was a zero-sum game. And it was a game that others could play as well. Hence all the sudden talk about 'interdependence', of the need for cooperation instead of confrontation, of the great concern for the poor and the under-privileged of the world, the growing criticism of the growth-oriented and centralized model of development, the re-examination of not just the strategies but also the goals of development, the growing stress on alternative paths to the future in place of a uniform and homogeneous course for all.

With such questioning and doubt, however, more fundamental questions have emerged. Is it just the limits imposed by conditions of scarcity that has made the paradigm of modernity unrealizable or is it rather that there was something fundamentally at fault with the paradigm itself? Isn't the theory of progress as developed in the West, based on an anthropocentric view of nature and a positivist conception of knowledge and science, responsible for a model of development based on domination and exploitation? And if these be the essence of the Occidental culture and its contribution to human thought and values, shouldn't we be discarding it, or most of it, and looking for alternative modes of thought and values embedded in some other cultures?

We live in an unstable world. It is unstable not just because the period of Western domination is fast coming to an end and there is taking place a wide diffusion of political and economic power, the full implications of which are not yet clear. It is also, and more fundamentally, because the philosophical moorings of that period have proved shaky and men of thought are engaged everywhere in a deep search for new systems of meaning and of values, new approaches to power and authority, new conceptions of human identity and

cohesion and new bases of containing sources of conflict and ensuring human survival.

Search for alternatives

Increasingly such a quest for alternative systems of thought and being is making intellectuals turn to non-Western cultures known for long-standing humanist traditions and for integrated perspectives on the human condition. What is the role of the Third World in such a quest? Here the picture is not too heartening. Barring a few isolated individuals and small centres of creative work, thinking in the Third World is bereft of systematic inquiry into the fundamentals of life. This situation needs to be quickly corrected. It will be a real tragedy if cultures strong in speculative thought and deductive logic were to fall prey to the lure of positivist science imported from the West at a time when the world was in fact crying out for new world views and meaning and value systems. The religions and civilizations of India, of the Islamic world, of the Sinic culture zone and of Buddhism provide major streams of thought that could substantially contribute to the present search for alternatives. But as yet there seems to be little stirring on these lines among the intellectuals of these regions. The fact that these regions also happen to be new centres of political and economic power is no guarantee that they will provide intellectual leadership, unless the intellectuals themselves strive to do so and impress upon the elites of these societies the need for radical re-orientation of the goals and strategies of development. Indeed, it could be quite the contrary.

Such striving should be informed by two interrelated points. First, modernity is not something that can be wished away. Both as a doctrine of life and a guide to prudence, and as a framework for attending to the affairs of society, it has shaped our world in a fundamental manner, so fundamental that we so often call it the 'modern world'. Modernity is not just Western or Occidental, it is part of us all. Indeed, the West itself is part of us all. It is more than a mere geographical category. It has become the dominant tendency and a major tradition for the contemporary world.

Secondly, however, it is incumbent upon us all - in the West and here and in other non-Western regions - to relate this presently dominant tradition to other civilizational traditions and meaning systems, and to evolve a process of critical interaction between them. This is crucial. The seminar for which this paper is written is being held at a right time, at a time when the entire debate in various spheres is being reopened, whether it is in respect of more basic relationships in society at a very micro level, in respect of family, ethnicity, sex roles and generational differences. On all these themes the discussion displays a new search, skepticism about earlier formulations, and wide-ranging controversy often resulting in considerable confusion. So it is extremely timely that we provide ourselves with a wider framework for these various discussions, a framework that weaves together the concerns of science, philosophy, culture and religion from alternative civilizational perspectives. I hope the discussions are being held in sufficient depth and with complete honesty and candour.

Science and technology

Let me make an attempt to initiate such a discussion within the limits of my capacity. There have been in human history diverse visions and perspectives on the role of knowledge in society and its relationship with values and lifestyles. What concerns us at the present juncture in man's evolution is the impact of a particular vision that came out of the peculiar European experience following the Renaissance, and getting organized in a particular direction after the 17th Century and especially after the advent of the Industrial Revolution. What is peculiar about this vision is that the spur to it came from technology and in course of time there emerged what is known as science-based technology or, more correctly, a technology-directed science. Although in the beginning, as was the case everywhere else, science and technology proceeded on independent streams, one close to natural philosophy and the other to practical craftsmanship, when technological breakthroughs began to tantalize everyone including the scientists, gradually a myth was created that science and technology were part of the same enterprise, an enterprise that was 'modern' and 'rational' and which promised perpetual 'progress' for mankind. Thus took place what may be called an unholy marriage between two traditions. Why did this happen? Why did science take on an increasingly technological character, judged more by its use-value than by its truth-value?

Cultural context

The answer to this must be found in the cultural location from which both modern science and modern technology emerged. It was a culture that treated knowledge as an instrument of power, as an instrument of domination over sinister and unpredictable forces of nature, and later over social forces and institutions, and ultimately over relations between societies and between cultures and races. This peculiar scientific worldview needs to be understood and can be understood only by reference to a particular cultural context.

So it is not so much the impact of something that has run amuck, namely modern technology, but rather a historical process of a fundamental kind which has led to the domination of one particular culture on all others, through the mechanism of science, and through the view that this particular science was 'universal' and hence valid for all as well as beneficial for all. It is essential to come to grips with this particular worldview of which science, and technology, are but means for streamrolling almost the entire world into a uniformity, reducing its rich diversity to a predictable and predetermined state. As we come to grips with it, we may be better able to seek to alter the course of modernity, not necessarily rejecting everything but rather changing the internal relationships that govern the field of knowledge as well as the inter-relationships between knowledge and society. And as we do this we may be able to rediscover traditions of science and the pursuit of knowledge that are at the moment submerged. And similarly rediscover technological traditions from other parts of the world.

Other traditions

These other traditions of science have had long centuries of history and development and are still available to draw on. In the countries of Asia there are very strong traditions of science, as well as of technology, which at the moment are submerged under the dazzling impact of modern science, but which are gradually becoming highly relevant. China, India, Arabia, Persia, Indonesia - in all these major cultural regions there were important traditions of science and technology. What is common to all of them is to think of science as basically a search for truth, as a means of self-realization and self-control, not as a means of bringing anything under domination, including nature. Similarly there are traditions of technology and a great deal of work is going on in the last few years on discovering these traditions which somehow, because of their tenacity and continued utility, have survived in the folklore and in the folk practices of our peoples. There is need to rediscover these in the spirit of intellectual inquiry.

Towards a holistic perspective

One other characteristic of these traditions of science as compared to the latterday Western traditions of science is that knowledge and the pursuit of truth were followed in a holistic way, not as a specialized activity. It is a holistic view of both science and culture. It is not science as a discreet activity and culture as another discreet activity with further fragmentation and specialization under each. It rather thinks of science and culture and various activities under each as facets of the same phenomenon. It is this very comprehensive view of creativity and thought, of science, culture, philosophy, art, technology, economics and politics that intellectuals are seeking today in this world of extreme division of labour and the condition of alienation and neurosis that it has produced. The act of creation and the pursuit of truth are inseparable. The modernists have introduced a dichotomy between science and technology on the one hand and philosophy and art on the other which is most unfortunate. There is need to restore the comprehensive and holistic perspective that was there and still survives in many cultures but is at the moment submerged.

Today the Western world is uneasy with its own traditions, with some people looking for some magic answers from the East. It is a very opportune time for us to reinvestigate and reestablish these traditions and to relocate the place of knowledge and action in them. In saying this it is important to have a modest view of what man can do, and a modest view of rational knowledge. One of the biggest maladies that the modern age has brought in its wake is to put knowledge on a pedestal. Never before men of knowledge, which in the modern age means men of science and technology, had acquired such a command over resources and over the decisions that would affect generations to come and cultures and civilizations far outside the place where decisions are made as well as other species and, indeed, the whole of creation - all in the name of knowledge. It is necessary to return to the tradition of knowledge that conceives it as part of a larger process of self-realization, a larger process of realizing certain values in this life and others.

In the West too this search is on. In fact, perhaps it is more on there than here. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that at a time when within the West leading intellectuals and scientists are raising a banner of revolt against the dominant perspective, the elites in the Third World are becoming extremely enthusiastic followers of it, seeking out the mythology of modernity, and becoming keen purchasers of the commodity called 'technology' and the commodity called 'science'. We face a very difficult time ahead in this region and the other similar regions, a time when one of the main tasks will be to pursuade the decision-makers to move away from the suicidal path on which they seem to be moving restlessly. This calls for an organized attempt on the part of the custodians of social conscience all over the world to raise a fundamental debate and restrain the elites from going this way.

NB: The above 'Marking' is excerpted from a keynote paper presented earlier this year by Professor Kothari at the Seminar on Alternative Patterns of Development and Lifestyles in Asia and the Pacific.

La liberté est décevante tant qu'on pense ne pouvoir en goûter que par loisir, échappée de vacances et de fin de semaine. La liberté est quotidienne; elle est, à chaque instant tout ce qu'on est dans tout ce qu'on fait. Nul avoir ne l'assure. L'être seul la donne. Elle est Métier de Vie.

Edmond Gilliard

NORTH-SOUTH WORKERS' SOLIDARITY[*]/

In Holland, the small SOSV organization (Trade Union Foundation for Co-
operation in Development) has been encouraging Dutch workers in multinational
plants to make contact with their Third World counterparts.

The result, in one case, was a successful strike at the Dutch Phillips plant
in support of a wage claim by their Colombia counterparts and, in another, a
massive and successful vote of rejection by workers in the Estel plant
against the company's plans to invest in South Africa. Today about fifty
groups, numbering altogether about 400 people, are centred round their res-
pective industries, gathering and sharing information with their Third World
counterparts. (...)

Also in Holland, the Industrial Workers Union (Industriebond NVV) has spot-
lighted not just the problem of the divisions of the various ITSs, but the
way, increasingly, their existence contradicts the movement for trade union
combinations at shop floor level.

Talking about the trade union response to MNCs, executive board member
Bert van Hatten says: "The trade union movement has not been able until now
to organize an effective counterbalance to the multinational enterprises,
because it has stuck too long to the organizational structures dating from
the beginning period of the trade union movement of about 80 to 90 years ago.
Within these structures the International Trade Secretariats have remained
relatively weak instruments with few financial funds and limited staff. In
addition the ITSs only organize unions operating in one branch (e.g. the
chemical industry) while most multinational enterprises have long since passed
that sort of frontier and have undertaken a series of activities."

Hatten reveals that his own union plans as an experiment to get all the wor-
kers inside one MNC into one union who can then act on behalf of all the
workers in sister plants of the same company.

Another possible tactic, still to be employed, would be for shop floor unions
to get MNC management to sign a voluntary agreement that they agree to
observe ILO conventions 87 and 98 which cover trade union freedoms like the
right to organize, to strike and to have collective bargaining powers. The
same unions, however, would have to keep in contact with their overseas
counterparts to ensure the agreements were maintained, insisting that manage-
ment provide them with the relevant information to make these exchanges
possible.

[*]/ This is excerpted from Where were you, Brother? An account of Trade Union
    imperialism, published by War on Want, 467 Caledonian Road, London N7 9BE,
    United Kingdom.

An additional and pressing need is for labour academics (of which there are many) to begin transferring information to activists so that a broadly-based attack on the present structures becomes possible, while at the same time encouraging a linking of workers' movements in different parts of the globe.

One example of what could be done by an amalgam of activists and researchers is illustrated by the story of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (IPIC) in the US and Chile. In 1976, after paying out very large amounts of official funds as "compensation" for firms like ITT in Chile, OPIC began to lay plans to again insure MNCs in that country. This would have been the basis for massive entry of direct investment into Chile, and the purpose to help solve the junta's financial problems. This information was discovered by Research Associates International (RAI) in California and they immediately prepared background material and distributed it to hundreds of union offices and to groups affiliated with Chile solidarity work and to church organizations.

Rodney Larson picks up the story. "Although OPIC officially declined to comment on their plans, and privately denied that they were moving in to assist the junta by insuring US direct capital investment in that country, the information from RAI was confirmed by the Washington office on Latin America (WOLA), affiliated with the National Council of Churches. This was done in the usual way of finding sources in the Department of State who leaked the data to WOLA out of resentment over US policies in Chile. A national and international campaign was launched to have this decision by OPIC cancelled. The International Metalworkers Federation alerted their five US trade union affiliates to the action and asked for protests in the US Congress. Some, but not all, did respond. The World Confederation of Labour in Brussels responded to communications from California and immediately protested to dozens of US members of the House of Representatives and Senate and also through the efforts of their Secretary General of that time, Jean Bruck, alerted all their affiliates in the world to this support of the Santiago junta and asked for protests to US missions in various countries. Through the combined action of these and other groups, a very large and effective lobbying campaign was mounted. OPIC, whose record is criticized by many members of the US Congress, responded by dropping their Chilean insurance cover after a year of complaints in order to forestall greater criticisms and because their legislative charter was up for renewal in 1977 and they faced very strong opposition in various labour and other circles.

"Throughout this period the AFL-CIO remained aloof from the campaign. Despite this, the re-extension of the OPIC insurance in that country was forestalled and at a time when there were plans for very large investments in the country which were either cancelled or indefinitely delayed."

One of the points made by RAI about OPIC's record and plans was that it should be made a legally binding rule that no insurance would be granted to any firm in any country that denied the rights of free association and collective bargaining to workers.

The same principle is now being discussed on a world scale by the WCL and on a European scale by the affiliates of the European Trade Union Confederation

which has, in fact, raised the point in formal requests to the EEC. The DGB
in West Germany has asked for similar rules in presentations to the Bunde-
stag. The Swedish LO supported similar reforms and succeeded in obtaining
the rules in the Swedish insurance scheme for Swedish MNCs.

There is no question that if such legislation was enshrined in the program-
mes of the eleven nations that have programmes similar to OPIC, it could have
an enormous effect in aiding repressed workers and unions. But one problem
seems to be the lack of follow-up work in some national federations.

The UK equivalent to OPIC is the government's Export Credit Guarantee Depart-
ment, currently providing insurance cover of over £59 million to British
companies overseas. Significantly one of their staff revealed that "compa-
nies seeking insurance are not, with one exception, required to observe a
code of conduct regarding employment conditions in the host country in order
to obtain cover. The one exception is South Africa where companies seeking
insurance must give an undertaking that they will promote the adoption of the
policy and practices of the government's "Guidelines for UK companies with
Interests in South Africa".

But why only in South Africa? Should taxpayers really have to provide
insurance cover for companies not willing to observe basic UN labour conven-
tions regarding treatment of their workers? (...)

One thing is certain. Sooner or later a shop floor union will begin to nego-
tiate on behalf of the firm's Third World workers. And it will spread. It
will happen if only because the existing official channels are so constipated
that the rank and file will be forced to up and do things for themselves.

In 1973 the 1500 workers at the UK Michelin Plants realized that they were
the lowest paid in the various European plants. They demanded, unsuccessful-
ly, that the management meet them to negotiate over this. A one-day strike
was called, followed by another. The workers then discovered that lost
production was being made up by overtime work in the Italian and French
plants. As far as the official trade union bureaucracy was concerned these
continental workers didn't exist, they belong to Communist-led federations.
Nothing could be done. Then the British convenors took over. They contacted
their French and Italian counterparts and, on the day of the fourth one-day
strike, the European workers also downed tools. The management quickly
relented. Today convenors at the different plants meet regularly.

Recounting this, one of the British convenors said: "We have visited Italy
on numerous occasions. It has been an outstanding experience. The relation-
ship we have built up with shop stewards there is just like links with shop
stewards in this country. There needs to be an international shop stewards
movement of this kind".

This vision is shared by Third World worker and peasant movements who aren't
looking for charity but the chance instead of enduring links and exchange of
ideas and experience. The Michelin shop stewards who upped and went to Italy
point to the time when similar shop floor links will be established with the
Third World. The pioneers would find a disturbing picture of Western

government funds linked to trade union projects in the Third World and not
always appearing to square with the needs of the poor. But there will be
other, more profound, discoveries. It could be the sight of a dying child
being fed fizzy orangeade sold by a Western company as a health drink,
peasant women protecting their menfold as they walk through lines of armed
soldiers to continue the struggle to recover their land, or it could be the
voice of Sri Lankan Tissa Balasuraya, from amid the desolation left behind
by the British tea companies, asking: "How can we liberate the British
workers from this process of exploitation?"

Perhaps, then, we'll comprehend fully and for the first time that their
struggle is our struggle and pause only to ask of our trade union leader-
ship: "Where were you, brother?"

UN COMMENTAIRE SUR LES INTERETS MUTUELS NORD-SUD

par Yves Berthelot*/

I. Dépendances réciproques ou intérêts communs

Les intérêts des pays du Nord et les intérêts de ceux du Sud seront d'autant
mieux servis que le Sud sera plus fort.

L'impact des décisions prises par les pays, les entreprises et les institu-
tions du Nord sur les économies du Sud est depuis longtemps reconnu, il
s'accentue avec l'intensification des échanges et l'internationalisation de
la production. Sans doute, faudrait-il analyser davantage en liaison avec
ces influences économiques, l'impact du "modèle culturel occidental" sur les
habitudes de consommation et les réactions qu'il peut susciter.

L'impact des économies du Sud sur celles du Nord n'est reconnu que depuis peu
et c'est le mérite de John W. Sewell d'en montrer systématiquement les diffé-
rents aspects: ressources minières et énergétiques, production industrielle
croissante et de plus en plus diversifiée, marché pour les biens d'équipements
et gigantesque marché potentiel de bien de consommation, offreur et demandeur
de capitaux.

Passer du constat de l'interaction des économies du Nord et du Sud et de son
extension probable, à l'affirmation que le Nord et le Sud ont des intérêts
mutuels ne va pas de soi et dépend des conséquences politiques que l'on tire
de cette double dépendance.

En référence au passé, deux schémas sont en effet possibles. Le schéma colo-
nial reconnaissait l'intérêt des économies du Sud pour la puissance colonisa-
trice: approvisionnement en matières premières, marché pour les produits
manufacturés, territoire d'accueil pour les surplus de population dégagés

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par l'exode rural et les gains de productivité. D'autre part le schéma du
Plan Marshall reconnaissait de la même façon l'intérêt de l'Europe comme
marché et terrain d'expansion pour les entreprises américaines, mais diffé-
rait du schéma colonial par une caractéristique essentielle: les Européens
décidaient de l'orientation des fonds. En outre, dans le même temps, se
créaient des organisations de gestion de l'économie mondiale pour le commerce
et la monnaie où l'Europe avait un certain pouvoir de décision.

Aujourd'hui où il est de plus en plus clair que le Nord a de nouveau un besoin
croissant du Sud, il est important d'éviter le "schéma colonial" qui, à terme
est voué à l'échec parce que basé sur la domination; au contraire le renforce-
ment de la puissance économique et du pouvoir de décision des pays du Sud est
la condition pour que ceux-ci deviennent des partenaires plus égaux et que
certains des domaines de conflits deviennent des domaines d'intérêt commun.

II. Solution simultanée des problèmes ou procédure continue de négociations

Il apparaît un peu illusoire que des mesures précises résolvent simultanément
et durablement les problèmes du Nord et du Sud car ceux-ci sont trop liés aux
conditions socio-culturelles de chaque pays et naissent chaque jour de l'évo-
lution rapide des situations économiques relatives. Par contre il est sans
doute possible de créer les conditions pour que le réglement quotidien des
conflits nés des relations courantes entre le Nord et le Sud soient résolus
de façon globalement bénéfique à chaque partie. En renforçant les pouvoirs
des pays du Sud dans les instances financières et monétaires, on reconnaîtra
leur importance croissante comme prêteurs et emprunteurs, on donnera plus de
responsabilité aux pays pour ajuster leurs politiques économiques et sociales
et leurs politiques monétaires. La pratique fréquente d'imposer des politi-
ques économiques à travers des contraintes financières et monétaires semble
avoir eu dans les 20 dernières années plus d'effets négatifs que positifs
(Ghana, Chili).

Toutes les sociétés ont créé au cours des siècles des lois pour éviter que
les plus faibles ne soient écrasés par les plus forts; ces lois ont été
d'autant plus efficaces qu'elles étaient simples et stables. Réaffirmer un
certain nombre de règles pous les échanges internationaux est la condition
pour que les plus faibles aient leur chance. Dans l'instabilité des procé-
dures, la multiplication des entorses aux règles anciennes, seuls les Etats
ou les firmes les plus forts peuvent tirer leur épingle du jeu et l'on assiste
à une concentration des pouvoirs dans les échanges internationaux qui, au
plan national, auraient depuis longtemps appelé des mesures antitrust.
L'étaulissement de ce "nouvel ordre" ne serait pas seulement bénéfique aux
pays du Sud, mais donnerait immédiatement à nombre d'opérateurs des pays du
Nord des conditions nouvelles d'expansion et particulièrement à ceux d'Europe.

III. Perspective européenne

Certes, nombre des avantages que l'Europe peut attendre d'un renforcement des
relations Nord-Sud se situe dans les mêmes domaines et sont de même nature
que ceux que peuvent espérer les Etats Unis ou le Japon même s'ils peuvent
être d'importance très différente selon les secteurs. Cependant, dans chaque

secteur, les progrès qui seront accomplis dans la gestion de l'économie mon-
diale seront plus importants pour l'Europe; en effet en raison de la diver-
sité de ses pays et de son manque d'unité celle-ci a des intérêts parfois
plus proches de ceux du Tiers Monde que des Etats Unis ou du Japon. Le cas de
trois secteurs illustrent ces affirmations: l'approvisionnement en matières
premières, la division internationale du travail et le marché financier et
monétaire.

Matières premières

Quelques faits situent le problème minier: l'Europe dépend de l'extérieur
pour son approvisionnement en matières premières dans une moindre mesure que
le Japon mais beaucoup plus que les Etats Unis[1]. 87% des réserves des pays
industrialisés sont réparties entre les Etats Unis, le Canada, l'Australie,
l'Afrique du Sud et l'URSS; les pays en développement détiennent 33% des
réserves connues, alors qu'en raison de leur étendue on peut supposer qu'ils
détiennent environ les deux-tiers des réserves réelles; au cours des der-
nières années, 25% des dépenses d'investissements et 10% seulement des
dépenses d'exploration ont été faites dans les pays du Tiers Monde.

Dans les années 80 la production de certaines matières premières risque d'être
insuffisante par manque d'investissement dans les années passées, l'Europe
et le Japon dépendront de plus en plus pour leur approvisionnement de pays
industrialisés qui sont leurs concurrents et les pays du Tiers Monde ne pour-
ront tirer partie pour leur développement de leurs ressources potentielles.

Quels que soient les succès d'une politique minière communautaire favorisant
les investissements les plus lourds, les pays européens continueront d'ap-
puyer leur sécurité d'approvisionnement sur des relations bilatérales. Les
risques politiques et économiques deviennent proportionnellement beaucoup
plus lourds que pour les Etats Unis et le Japon; et ils ont besoin plus que
ceux-ci et comme les pays du Tiers Monde de négociations et d'accords portant
sur la prospection, les investissements et la transformation.

Ajustement industriel

Malgré une puissance industrielle globale équivalente à celle des Etats Unis,
l'Europe apparaît moins bien préparée que ceux-ci et que le Japon aux redis-
tributions des activités de production qui interviendront dans les années 80.
Les pays européens ont montré une moins grande capacité d'adaptation que le
Japon aux changements intervenant dans les marchés mondiaux (à l'exception
de la RFA) et ils ne tirent pas comme les Etats Unis parti d'un vaste marché
intérieur parce que celui-ci n'est pas suffisamment unifié. Ils contribuent
peu à la nouvelle division internationale du travail dans la mesure où les
banques et les entreprises européennes ont pris une part beaucoup moins
active que celles des Etats Unis et du Japon à l'industrialisation de quel-
ques pays du Tiers Monde. Plus préoccupant pour l'avenir est le fait que le

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[1] Respectivement 75%, 90% et 15% de dépendance extérieure pour le Marché
Commun, le Japon, les Etats Unis selon "Critical imported materials"
special report of the Council on International Economic Policy - Dec. 1974.

manque d'unité gène l'Europe dans la maitrise des processus technologiques les plus avancés et la défense d'une certaine indépendance en la matière; la question d'accès aux technologies va donc se poser de façon plus aigüe et la ranprocher du Tiers Monde.

Plus d'unité permettrait sans doute à l'Europe de lever certains des obstacles en renforçant sa puissance, mais quels que soient les progrès en ce sens, il est certain que de profondes différences subsisteront entre les pays, entre les secteurs, entre les régions.

Cette combinaison de forces et de faiblesses en Europe peut à la fois être un facteur de tensions internes et être un risque d'utiliser, comme cela s'est fait ces dernières années les faiblesses pour justifier des protections vis à vis de ceux qui n'ont pas le pouvoir de s'y opposer, c'est-à-dire les pays du Tiers Monde. Là encore, l'établissement de règles, d'organismes pour gérer les conflits quotidiens, de procédures d'arbitrages indépendantes sont nécessaires pour éviter les tentations de repliements et de fermeture.

Questions financières

L'instabilité financière de ces dernières années a plus affecté les économies d'Europe et du Tiers Monde que celles des Etats Unis et du Japon.

Les changes flexibles ont en effet contribué à renforcer les disparités en permettant de retarder les mesures structurelles des économies les plus faibles et en rendant très aléatoires les anticipations pour tous ceux qui n'ont pas le poids suffisant. L'Europe tente de réagir en créant le SME, qui, dans un premier temps, accroît les risques de tension et d'éclatement de la Communauté si les membres les plus faibles ne procèdent pas aux ajustements nécessaires. Mais demeure la nécessité pour l'Europe comme pour les pays du Tiers Monde de moyens pour que les autorités monétaires nationales et internationales maîtrisent les euro-marchés, les pétro-marchés.

Conclusion

Dans le rapport Nord Sud, deux politiques non exclusives s'ouvrent à l'Europe. Celle de renforcer son unité pour aborder sans risque, aux côtés des Etats unis et du Japon, la recherche d'accords avec le Tiers Monde. Celle de reconnaître sa diversité et la faiblesse de nombre de ses membres qui est aussi la situation du Tiers Monde et de privilégier dans les négociations Nord Sud la recherche de règles et de procédures de gestion et d'arbitrage qui permettent à tous de participer au jeu international sans être écrasés.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SUDBURY: THE "TRIPLE S" STRATEGY

by Narasim Katary[*/]

INTRODUCTION

The principal objective of this paper is to suggest a strategy of economic development for the region of Sudbury. The strategy postulated combines key elements drawn from three scenarios discussed in this paper. The strategy can be labelled Selective Import Substitution - Selective Technological Sovereignty - Substantive Eco-Development. Or, the "Triple S" strategy.

The state of the region is not healthy. The state of the country is not healthy. Sudbury is simply a microcosm of Canada and suffers from most of the problems common to the country as a whole, and a few problems peculiar to itself.

The central thesis of this paper is that, to a significant extent, the amelioration and resolution of the problems of Sudbury are inextricably linked to the manner in which the problems confronting the province and the country are tackled. In presenting the central thesis, the following topics are covered. First, the performance of the regional economy between 1961 and 1978 is briefly sketched. Second, given the problem of lack of adequate diversification, the question - what can be done about it? - is posed and, by way of an answer, five scenarios are presented. Finally, a composite strategy of development is suggested for the region together with some specific examples of the kinds of industries appropriate for the region.

Regional economic performance, 1961-78

The year 1971 represented the peak period during 1961-78 of a cyclical regional economy often described as a yo-yo or roller-coaster economy. The latter is probably more accurate - the yo-yo is expected to come back up, but the roller-coaster does not necessarily climb the next hill if the ride has ended and the price for a new trip has to be paid. The Sudbury economy has, one hopes, bottomed out, and the price for long-term steady development instead of a roller-coaster ride must now be paid.

The roller-coaster trip from 1961 to 1978 consisted of the following hills and valleys:

1961-64: Employment index dropped from 100 to 90; housing starts from 1,232 to 271; net out-migration of population rose to 8,036.

1965-67: Employment index rose to 109.8; housing starts to 884; net out-migration dropped to 1,736 persons.

1968-71: Employment index rose to 136.5; housing starts (for the region) to 3,824; population for the regional area reached 169,000.

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1972-73: Employment index dropped to 108.0 as Inco and Falco employment fell by 4,164; housing starts were 949 and population of the region reached a low of 162,749.

1974-77: Employment index rose to 117.1 in 1976, then dropped to 116.1 in September 1977; Inco and Falco employment rose by 1,082 during 1974-75, then dropped by 1,634 during 1976-77. The region's population rose to a post-71 high of 167,524. Housing starts rose from 457 to 1,295.

1978: Employment index, 102.2 in September compared to 116.1 a year earlier; Inco and Falco employment down by 3,553 in the first eight months; housing starts down from 1,295 to 441; population down by some 4,000.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

The aforementioned problems of Sudbury, with some obvious modifications, apply to the Province of Ontario and the country as a whole. Given the problems, what are the choices open for Canada and Ontario, and by extension to Sudbury and Northern Ontario? Following are the five scenarios which briefly sketch the options for Canada, Ontario, and Sudbury. In each case, the implication for Sudbury is also discussed.

1. Trend continuation

The advocates of this scenario come under the umbrella of post-Keynesian fine tuners of the economy, which include the overwhelming majority of macroeconomists in Canada. These advocates can be called secularists who believe that the problem of the country is simply a matter of downturn in the cycle and, with a little bit of patience and luck, we will see the upturn. The key element of this scenario is that we should steadfastly hold on to our current course, whatever that happens to be, until the babyboom generation entry rate into the labour force trails off by about 1983. As a rule, the secularists are a cautious lot and exhibit no symptoms of ever having been exposed to the notion that some of the problems plaguing the industrialized countries may be more fundamental and therefore structural in character. Also, they appear to be unaware of the tax-based incomes' policy to deal with the "paradox" of "stagflation".

The implication of this scenario for Sudbury would be that the community would muddle along until the international demand structure for nickel alters, to start the economy on a relative upswing. However, this time around there will be a significant difference - the production may go up considerably without any commensurate increase in employment levels thereby signalling a steady state. We would continue to be in the business of "attracting" secondary industries. What is puzzling about this preoccupation is the relationship between economic development and the "attracting" activity. At the beginning of the first industrial revolution, if Manchester, Birmingham and London had relied on "attracting" industries, there would have been no industrial revolution, because there were no industries to "attract".

2. Continentalism

The principal advocates of this scenario for Canada are the C.D. Howe
Research Group and the Economic Council of Canada, with Carl Beigie being
the most forceful spokesperson. The key element of this scenario is that
Canada should form a free trade association with the USA *à la* Auto Pact but,
hopefully, negotiate a better deal on an industry-by-industry basis. The
major advantage seen in this scenario is that Canadian industries would be
able to take advantage of large-scale economies by having a free access to a
very large market thereby extricating themselves out of their current "uneco-
nomic" operations. Within the overall framework of a free trade agreement,
Canada would retain discretion to pursue regional policies and also a fairly
long transition period of up to 15 years is seen to permit rationalization of
Canadian industries.

The implication of this scenario for Sudbury would be that the mining indus-
try would be even more well integrated with the U.S. markets. One possible
result of such an integration may be a repeat of the auto pact and loss of
processing operations to the USA. The most recent National Steel affair may
be an indicator of things to come.

3. Technological sovereignty

The principal advocate of this scenario for Canada is the Science Council of
Canada with John Sheppard as the most forceful spokesperson. The key element
of this scenario is that Canada would pick certain industries in which we
have proven technological competence and potential and then back these to the
hilt. In a sense, we should try to pull a Japan Incorporated in Canada by
making use of every conceivable resource and policy to back the selected
industries in order to make them work. The examples given most often are the
following: natural resource extraction and processing; ocean and arctic
engineering; communication and transportation; biomass energy and so on. The
major advantage seen in this scenario is that we would specialize in a few
industries and do a good job and sort of become the Switzerland of North
America if not the world. The scenario poses the old question, do we want to
be a first-rate delicatessen or a third-rate cafeteria?

The implication of this scenario for Sudbury would be that the Federal and
Provincial Governments would become active partners in the activities of the
mining companies and bolster their international competitive position. It is
quite possible under this scenario to visualize Sudbury becoming the pre-
eminent centre in the world for mining-machinery industry as well as mining-
related research and development. This scenario raises some troubling
questions: how do we know for sure we are picking the right industries, let
alone the right companies? How do we justify creating monopolies and end
competition? How do we avoid getting stuck with obsolete technologies? The
lessons of the Franco-British concord should teach us something!

4. Import substitution

In principle, this scenario has been advocated for Canada since the beginning
of the Confederation. The fact that 110 years later we are still talking

about this scenario is a clear testament to the old adage: when something is everyone's business, it becomes nobody's business. It is no exaggeration to say that we have never seriously believed in self-reliance and pursued a coherent policy of import substitution whenever feasible.

The key element of this scenario is that Canada should systematically develop industries which will substitute for current imports. The typical industries which fall into this category are the following: industrial machinery - agricultural machinery, road transport equipment, etc. (read from Dines table). The major advantage of this scenario is that our dependency on other countries would be less.

The implication of this scenario for Sudbury would be that the long-talked-about mining-machinery industry could materialize and the beginnings of a non-ferrous-metal-industrial complex emerge. Such a prospect would gladden the hearts of many in the community. Although it is hard to argue against import substitution in principle, in practice import substitution often tends to shoring up of uncompetitive industries, thereby raising the price of the product for the ultimate consumer.

5. Eco-development

The principal advocates of this scenario for Canada are the Science Council of Canada, the Federal Ministry of the Environment, and Sudbury 2001, with Andy Wells from P.E.I. as the most well-known spokesperson.

The key element of this scenario is that Canada should base its future on an Alternate Development Paradigm (ALDEP). The main characteristics of ALDEP are the following:

. Economic activities shall be of a small-scale and not necessarily complex. Large-scale organization per se is not rejected, but the concern is riveted on how large organizations might be adopted to serve human needs. The focus is on how work and production might be organized, either on a small-scale or as relatively small decentralized units within larger organizations.

. Economic activities requiring relatively small capital shall be preferred over those which require large capital. Economic activities which can be financed by money raised within the community shall be specially encouraged. Capital intensive activities per se are not rejected, but the concern is with the affordability of a project given the means of a community.

. Economic activities which are labour-intensive shall be preferred over those which are capital-intensive. Gainful and meaningful employment for all people who are able and willing to work is recognized as a right and not treated as a privilege.

. The technology selected for an economic activity shall be appropriate for the need. Depending on the need, the sophistication may be high, intermediate or low. Technology is not considered as value-free and the

impact of the selected technology on the quality of life is constantly
monitored.

. Most, if not all, economic activities shall further the twin objectives
of self-reliance and relative self-sufficiency of the community as a
whole as well as the individuals within a community. Self-reliance and
relative self-sufficiency are not seen as mechanisms to foster narrow
outlooks but viewed as essential pre-requisites for any community to make
a meaningful contribution to the world at large. In this context, it is
clearly recognized that for certain types of economic activity, self-
sufficiency is feasible only at a global scale.

. Economic activities shall be undertaken in such a fashion as to minimize
disruption of the social environment. The needs of any economic activity
are kept in the forefront and preventive steps are taken to ameliorate
social dislocation.

. The physical environment, including the eco-system, shall be treated with
great care in order to minimize environmental degradation as a result of
economic activities. Conservation and the use of renewable resources are
emphasized. Natural resources shall be treated as capital items and not
as income items in all economic calculations.

. Decentralized and dispersed patterns of ownership and management are en-
couraged in all economic activities. The objective of cooperative
management shall be pursued wherever feasible. It is recognized that
industrial conflicts are counterproductive both to the contending parties
as well as to the society at large.

The implication of this scenario for Sudbury would be the clear recognition
that the community as well as the country as a whole have reached a steady
state wherein the kind of growth that we are accustomed to in the past will
not continue. It is premissed on the understanding that the problems beset-
ting the economies of all *affluent societies* are structural in character and
cannot be ameliorated by conventional economic policies. Given these premis-
ses, Sudbury in the future will have to depend a great deal upon local initia-
tives to initiate relatively small-scale industries of the kind identified
by Prof. Rein Peterson in his book: Small Business. This does not mean that
Sudbury will forget about the mining-machinery industry. In fact, what the
scenario implies is that mining machinery is looked upon as an appropriate
industry for the community and efforts would be focussed on it in a more
coherent way.

"TRIPLE S" STRATEGY

Usually, the planners would like to stop at this point, duck the oncoming
missiles and leave the choice to the political process. However, our Region-
al Chairman insists that the planners come forward with a recommendation and
take the lumps with the rest. Hence, we are compelled to make the following
recommendation as a strategy of economic development for Canada and Ontario,
and by extension to Northern Ontario and Sudbury.

We should consciously adopt a strategy of Selective Import Substitution, Selective Technological Sovereignty and Substantive Eco-Development. Or, the "Triple S" Strategy.

Selective Import Substitution means focussing on a few industries where our imports are large enough to give us the appropriate scale and at the same time where we have proven capability. In the case of Sudbury, some obvious examples are: (1) agriculture and food industries like beef cattle production, fruit and vegetable production and potato production; (2) concrete products manufactures; (3) hardware, tool, cutlery manufactures; and (4) professional services like doctors, attorneys, bankers and, of course, planners.

Selective Technological Sovereignty means focussing on a few industries where we have demonstrated technological virtuosity. In the case of Sudbury the obvious example is the mining-machinery industry and associated research, development and demonstration activities. There is no reason why Sudbury should not be the world capital of mining machinery and research.

Substantive Eco-Development means initiating a variety of economic development projects of appropriate scale and technology suitable for each community across the country. In the case of Sudbury, some obvious examples are: (1) energy-related industries such as refuse recycling, solar systems, cellulose insulation, storm doors and windows, electric cars; (2) agriculture and food industries like commercial greenhouses, commercial fish farming, stake food for cattle (poplar converted to food); (3) mohair industrial complex combining angora goats' livestock operation with the processing of mohair wool and the manufacture of textile products for final use.

The "Triple S" strategy is a successful strategy because it combines in a meaningful way what is feasible in this country. It emphasizes self-reliance and relative self-sufficiency for the region and postulates a clear direction for moving away from our current doldrums.

The delineation of the strategy has been kept deliberately simple in order to highlight the key elements. Needless to add, that any detailed plan will have to be based on fairly sophisticated analysis.

SUR LA COMPLEMENTARITE DE LA MEDECINE TRADITIONNELLE ET DE LA MEDECINE OCCIDENTALE DANS LE CONTEXTE DU DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA SANTE COMMUNAUTAIRE

par Nguyen Ngoc-Hanh*/

La notion de médecine se déduit de la notion de santé. La médecine, c'est l'image d'une science, d'un art chargé de prendre soin de l'homme. La notion de santé ne peut se définir que de façon relative à l'homme et à la société qui la prononce. La santé est le reflet de l'adaptation de l'homme à son environnement.

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L'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, dans le préambule de sa charte la définit comme "un état de bien-être complet, physique, mental et social et ne consiste pas uniquement en une absence de maladies et d'infirmités". Ces critères demandent une politique cohérente, une recherche finalisée, des critères globaux d'évaluation.

La médecine occidentale actuelle garde de Laënnec une conception anatomo-clinique de la maladie; de Claude Bernard une vue métabolique; de Pasteur une étiologie simple où une cause produit un effet. Ces conceptions ont permis la quasi-suppression des maladies bactériennes par des traitements efficaces. Cette médecine spécialisée et pharmacodynamique est en phase de recherche pour la prévention et le traitement de maladies à l'étiologie plus complexe, où interviennent souvent suralimentation, obésité, maladies cardio-vasculaires, diabète ...

La médecine traditionnelle a permis au long des siècles aux sociétés non-industrialisées de contrôler, ou au moins d'essayer d'influencer les forces physiques et psychiques qui peuvent toucher la santé et ?e bien-être de l'homme. Ces sociétés ont trouvé des moyens pragmatiques d'hygiène qui ont pour fonction de protéger la santé et d'éviter la maladie, que ce soit par des pratiques religieuses ou magiques ou autre à travers un long processus d'expériences jalonnées d'erreurs. Ces sociétés ont appris à inventer des mesures qui peuvent les aider dans la recherche de la santé et la lutte contre les maladies. Les pratiques empiriques ont comme finalité la responsabilité de l'individu vis-à-vis de lui-même et vis-à-vis de la collectivité. La sauvegarde de la santé exige une observation d'un système complexe de tabous. S'il transgresse la loi sociale, spirituelle ou morale, l'individu est agressé par la maladie. Aussi observe-t-on actuellement dans ces sociétés des maladies telles que le kwashiorkor, état de dénutrition s'observant dans la majorité des cas, lors des procédés d'acculturation, ou lors de la rupture des traditions, quand les familles de la brousse viennent dans l'agglomération urbaine. La dénutrition interfère avec les infections virales, bactériennes, parasitaires et déclenche une mortalité infantile catastrophique dans ces pays, dix fois plus élevée que celle des pays riches. Le savoir et les pratiques médicales traditionnelles, témoins de l'adaptation ou de la non-adaptation des groupes humains à leur environnement, sont donc des éléments culturels d'une importance capitale.

Vietnamienne d'origine, j'ai pu constater dans mon pays la superposition de la médecine traditionnelle et de la médecine occidentale, et grâce à ma formation de médecin en France, je souhaite l'élaboration et à la mise en place d'un programme de développement de la santé communautaire dans une région du Tiers-Monde, en intégrant la médecine traditionelle locale avec la médecine occidentale.

L'association des deux formes de médecine ne doit pas se faire dans leur super-position mais dans la recherche de leur complémentarité. Pour instituer un programme médico-sanitaire cohérent et efficace, il faudra essayer de:

1. Reconnaître les différentes formes de médecine traditionnelle, étudier leur relation aux diverses structures économiques, politiques et religieuses, ainsi qu'à l'écosystème. Les différents systèmes de thérapie comportent des procédés

magico-religieux, chimiques et chirurgicaux: médecine psychiatro-religieuse,
médecine populaire culturelle, médecine savante séculaire.

La pharmacopée est riche et comporte aussi des drogues qui ont fait leur preuve
en Occident: la quinine, l'opium, la cocaïne et le curare, la rauwolfia ...
(ex.: aux Philippines on a pu dénombrer plus de 800 plantes médicinales dont
certaines sont utilisées pour combattre la dysenterie, le paludisme, l'asthme)...
La médecine chinoise, la médecine arabe, la médecine de l'Inde ont des théories
scientifiques séculaires (ex.: l'acupuncture). Mais quelle que soit la forme
de thérapie, les pratiques magico-religieuses tiennent une place primordiale
lors de la prescription. Le traitement peut être considéré comme incomplet
si l'on ne tient pas compte aussi des éléments cosmiques dans l'étiologie de
la maladie (ex.: en acupuncture on ne traite pas une crise d'asthme chez
l'homme mais l'homme asthmatique; sa crise est déclenchée lors de son déséqui-
libre intérieur et des facteurs extérieurs tels la saison, les allergènes, les
agents infectieux). La médecine traditionnelle comporte parfois un volet pré-
ventif: les bains thermaux, la diététique, les disciplines psychophysiques.

2. Eliminer les aspects négatifs de la médecine traditionnelle et éviter de la
compléter par les aspects négatifs de la médecine occidentale. Le génie scien-
tifique et technique occidental mal appliqué ne fera qu'aggraver les pathologies
existantes et créer un nouveau déséquilibre. Distribuer des comprimés d'anti-
biotiques aux populations sans en connaître l'impact réel, c'est déclencher un
autre état de réceptivité des maladies infectieuses.

La méthodologie aura pour principes:

. une connaissance intime et détaillée des coutumes et des habitudes d'un
  peuple avant d'essayer d'introduire une innovation thérapeutique dans une
  région;

. une juste évaluation des caractères sociaux et psychologiques des mesures
  médico-sanitaires à instituer;

. la multidisciplinarité est nécessaire et ne doit pas être limitée à une
  simple intervention médicale. L'action médicale doit être intégrée au
  programme de développement local, principalement dans les secteurs agri-
  coles, artisanaux, des petites industries; programme qui se réalise à
  l'échelon national, régional ou multilatéral.

Le programme médico-sanitaire à intégrer dans le contexte socio-économique de
la population intéressée, doit être accessible aux personnes et aux familles,
grâce à la pleine participation de toute la collectivité. Le personnel et le
financement doivent être adaptés aux ressources de la collectivité, pour que
le développement puisse se faire dans un esprit d'auto-suffisance et d'auto-
détermination. L'accent sera mis sur la médecine préventive:

. éducation sanitaire: hygiène et santé publique;

. éducation nutritionnelle avec développement à long terme et diversification
  de l'agriculture, en vue d'une alimentation plus variée et mieux équilibrée.

. planification familiale pour contrôler la mortalité maternelle et infan-
  tile, et améliorer la morbidité péri-natale;

. vaccinations contre les maladies infectieuses, et prévention des maladies endémiques.

La médecine traditionnelle et la médecine occidentale, adaptées dans leur complémentarité, scientifiquement valables et socialement acceptables, peuvent réduire les méfaits d'une simple greffe de la médecine occidentale. Dans la majorité des pays non-industrialisés, cette greffe est souvent excessive et inabordable. L'impact réel de la médecine occidentale reste modeste, en dépit de coûteuses implantations et si l'on met à part quelques expériences pilotes très ponctuelles.

ORIENTATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH TO DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN NEEDS
by I. Malecki*/

The commonly accepted statement that science and technology should work for realization of the New International Economic Order is too general to be the precise guideline for the orientation of scientific research. More exact orientation can be reached by assuming human needs as the term of reference for further activities and by imposing the top priority to the research that is suitable to meet these needs. It is possible to distinguish (Mc.Hale) the first and second floor needs. The first are: food, clothing, shelter, energy, health care and elementary education as well as the right for employment. The second floor needs include: social security, conditions of work, higher education and conditions favourable for developing individual abilities and interests, etc.

The importance of the minimum needs follows from the following figures (in millions of earth inhabitants):

Undernourished	570
Adult illiterate	800
Children not enrolled in schools	250
With no access to medical care	1500
With inadequate housing	1000

(Date obtained from Center of Integrative Studies, Houston, 1977)

As it is seen, the needs of the whole earth are huge and large-scale political, economic and organizational activities must be taken to meet them. Finding solutions to scientific problems opens new prospects and facilitates socio-economic progress. It is possible to set out a long list of research related with meeting the first-floor needs. We present here only some examples of research of key importance:

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In the field of nourishment

1. Genetic research intended to grow new, largely productive plants and cattle that would be highly resistant to environmental conditions.

2. Biological fixation of nitrogen by plants and micro-organisms in order to partly replace fertilizers.

3. Efficient combating parasites and diseases of plants and animals in tropical climatic zones.

4. Optimization of physico-chemical processes in the soil.

In the field of health care

1. New methods of fertility control.

2. Combating contagious diseases that affect hundreds of millions of people such as malaria, fibriasis, tripanosomiasis, filariasis.

3. Combating tumors and those diseases affecting the blood circulatory system.

In the field of shelter

1. Utilization of local raw materials.

2. Development of new technologies for water supply systems.

3. Improvement in planning of new urban and rural areas.

In the field of energy

1. Development of new energy sources based on "income" energy (sun, wind, geothermal) potentials.

2. Increase of the efficiency of energy utilization.

In the field of education: It is necessary to carry out complex research on factors that promote and impede the development of education, and also to apply a more scientific approach to establishing teaching curricula.

In the field of employment: In most cases, the choice between labour-intensive and capital-intensive technologies is accidental, based on partial reasons, and it mainly follows from the point of view of interests of the company which imports the technology. Here emerges the need for complex studies on the selection of technologies that should be optimal for the society and economy of the country.

The research orientations described here have been established, in a general way, by the Committee of Experts on Research and Human Needs set up by UNESCO (the concluding report of this Committee is now ready).

Let us note that the objectives required to meet the second-floor needs expand the range of first priority research towards social sciences such as sociology, law and politology. We should mention here research concerned with:

1. Limitations of the rights of an individual by social relations.

2. Motivation for doing professional work and its improvement.

3. Orientation of subjects of interest and abilities of a given society.

The research following directly from human needs fails to exhaust all priorities which should be established by the science policy-making body of the government of a given country. It is possible to determine six groups of problems of similar priority level as enumerated above.

1. Research work intended for the better utilization of the country's resources, such as: geological prospecting; exploration and extraction technologies of mineral resources; improvement in technological processing of the country's mineral resources.

2. Research work concerned with improving technologies imported in the form of licences and know-how, as well as studies that serve for the critical assessment of technologies as their prospective purchase from abroad is in the stage of negotiations. The subject of this research depends, of course, on the technology that either has been or is to be purchased. Organization of this kind of research requires a long time and, thus, the research is feasible only if there is a national medium-term plan (e.g. for a 5-year term) for purchasing technologies from abroad.

3. Research compatible with education at the university level. Teaching activity at the university must be connected with research, otherwise it becomes a routine procedure, having no creative value. To meet this requirement, research work must be conducted in all directions of education even if the range is small, i.e. covering the entire field of scientific research with a "thin layer" of means designed for research.

4. Fundamental "free" research.

These are cognitive research activities that are not intended to obtain any practical results. According to some opinions, these research activities are unnecessary in the Third World. However, they seem to have purpose in the countries that have attained a certain economic level, in spite of the fact that they fail to affort direct economic gains. This point of view can be achieved through the following:

. establishment of a workshop and a "critical mass" for the country's scientific community and thus prevent, to some extent, brain drain;

. promotion of the country's prestige at the world scale;

. increase of the general level of knowledge in the country.

It is obvious that, with the exception of super powers, there is no country that could conduct major research in all fields of science. Thus both scientific staff and means should be mainly centred at research which would be the "national specialization" in science. The choice of the specialization is determined by many factors and it mainly depends on whether or not the country has qualified scientists representing a given branch of science. In fundamental research, cooperation inside geographical regions is

particularly valuable and easier than in technological activities. This is true also of applied research when the subject of study (e.g. the appearance of a certain disease) goes across the frontiers to the neighbouring countries.

5. Research for military objectives: In spite of the general will to disarmament, it is necessary to take into account the reality of life. It is well known that most Third World countries allocate a considerable share of their budgets for military purposes. But how does this fact affect the research programme in the country? The related decisions are of a political nature. However, it should be noted that modern military technology is usually so highly sophisticated that it has nearly no contacts with technology for peaceful purposes. For this reason, the opinion that the development of military-oriented research promotes the general level of science and technology of the country seems to be rather doubtful. These countries should reduce research work oriented to military goals to the unavoidable minimum.

6. In the Third World countries, special attention should be paid to the cultural-creative role of science which is in many cases underestimated. It is the duty of science to study the country's history, tradition and culture. This is exceptionally important in the countries in which the invasion of the standardized contemporary civilizations can destroy the nation's cultural treasures worked out over many preceding centuries. That is why the humanities should be treated as equally important as technical and natural sciences. The decision-makers in the science policy should be responsible for development of the humanities.

Conclusions

1. The prospective goals of the New International Economic Order fail to draw out exact guidelines for the development of scientific research.

2. A high priority should be allocated to research oriented towards meeting the minimum (first floor) human needs.

3. The minimum needs are: food, clothing, shelter, energy, health care, elementary education and right of employment.

4. The second floor needs include: social security, conditions of work, higher education and conditions for developing individual abilities and interests, etc. Research concerned with meeting these needs belongs mainly to the field of social sciences.

5. The research problems that must be emphasized in the science policy in Third World countries can be grouped as follows:

   - Utilization of raw materials
   - Improvement of imported technologies
   - Complementing education at the university level
   - Cognitive research
   - Research for military purposes
   - Development of national cultures.

Robin Burns*/

PURARI. OVERPOWERING PAPUA NEW GUINEA? 1/

With the publication of Purari, International Development Action has really come of
age. While continuing in the style of work already established in the early 1970s,
the scale and depth of this study of the proposed Purari Hydroelectric Scheme and
industrial development in Papua New Guinea shows the way in which a joint team of
concerned local and expatriate individuals can provide a masterly analysis of a
particular "development" proposal in the local, national and global contexts.

IDA worked together with the Purari Action Group (PAG) over several years to or-
ganise materials for this book. There are five parts. In part 1 a summary history
of the scheme is presented, together with an outline of the formation and activities
of the PAG and views from Purari people who were interviewed by the PAG (in the
vernacular and translated into English). Part 2 examines the whole scheme, from its
inception through the varying stages of study and negotiations and some of the fac-
tors underlying discussions and actions taken at the different stages. An examina-
tion of environmental and social impacts which the scheme would have is found in
Part 3, while Part 4 presents information on and analysis of comparable schemes
which have actually been implemented in a range of other countries. In the final
part, the scheme is placed in an analytical framework of far-reaching questions
concerning the transfer of technology, the political, economic and social con-
sequences of such approaches to development in the Third World, and the possibi-
lities for different ways of bringing about socio-economic development.

The Purari Scheme

The Purari River was first considered as a site for a possible aluminium smelter
by British Aluminium, half-owner of COMALCO, in 1958. This possibility was revived
in 1971 by the Nippon Koei company of Japan, in a letter to the Australian go-
vernment, and that company carried out a pre-feasibility study of the potential for
hydropower in the following year. In 1974, the Snowy Mountains Engineering Cor-
poration of Australia (SMEC) reviewed Nippon Koei's study and reports on the pro-
posal were made to the Papua New Guinea Government, including one by the United
Nations Development Programme. In that year, a group of mainly tertiary students
in Port Moresby formed the Purari Action Group and began to involve local people
in finding out about the proposal which would so drastically affect their lives.
Additionally, the PNG Office of Environment and Conservation stressed the need for
impact studies of the scheme, the Central Planning Office also began to question
some aspects of the proposal and Prime Minister Somare met Prime Minister Tanaka
in Canberra to discuss further aspects of the proposal.

In January 1975 the Australian, Japanese and Papua New Guinean Governments esta-
blished joint feasibility teams and a round of inter-governmental committee meetings
began, leading to the presentation of a joint SMEC-Nippon Koei feasibility study to
the Papua New Guinea Government in December 1977. In those three years, a number
of problems began to emerge.

1/ Edited by Rob Pardy, Mike Parsons, Don Siemon and Ann Wigglesworth for Interna-
   tional Development Action and the Purari Action Group. Illustrated by Jeff
   Stewart. Available from International Development Action, 73 Little George Street,
   Fitzroy, Vic. 3065, Australia. $5.00.

The first problem concerned the position of the potential Japanese investors, and beginning with pressurising the PNG Government for substantial tax concessions for the feasibility study consultants, it emerged, through examination of patterns of Japanese investment in other parts of the world, that the Purari Scheme was being conceived as yet another Japanese tax-free zone, the first of its kind to be established in the Pacific.

Secondly, a plurality of interests began to emerge. On the Japanese part, the aforementioned desire to obtain a tax-free zone for industrial development, together with use of Purari as a bargaining point for access to Australian minerals, especially during the ALP "resources diplomacy" foreign policy era, were foremost, and were underlined by changing Japanese interest during fluctuating economic situations in Japan and subsequent to their establishment of an aluminium project in Brazil in 1976 (an excellent analysis of these developments is found in Chapters 4 and 5). Australia's position has been less clear. Although the links between COMALCO, British Aluminium, Conzinc Riotinto of Australia and British Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation are now well-known, and known to have, in the case of the first two, been actively interested in PNG and the Purari in particular for at least 20 years, and the latter are now well established in PNG in the Bougainville copper operation, Australian Government attitudes are less obvious. Two considerations do emerge: the possibilities for an industrial complex in PNG to lift the aid-burden from Australia (now 50% of the national budget in PNG, a burden of dependence of which PNG would also be glad to be rid), and the possibility, more relevant to the companies than the government, for electric power to be carried by undersea cable to Weipa, Gove and Darwin.

For its part, the PNG Government has vacillated between interest in capital and industrial development from new sources; concern and even inter-departmental rivalries over control, ownership and impact issues, and concern, as Japanese interest waxes and wanes, over alternative industrial developers and users (no mission has so far met with success, however, even for a proposal for establishing a uranium-enriching plant using Purari power), and the compatibility and nature of the proposed scheme with the 1972 Eight Point Plan for self-reliant development, especially as elaborated in the Constitutional Development Committee's Reports.

Thirdly, the issues which have come increasingly to the fore in PNG are the social and environmental aspects. It became clear that, apart from one study by Goldman of the environmental impact, the PNG Government was to bear the financial burden of any more detailed impact studies, including the abortive attempts to determine the best port site. The activities of the Office of Environment and Conservation and of the PAG began to draw attention to the lack of understanding of the local people of the issues involved, not helped by "information and consultation" visits by Patrol Officers, seeking to convince village councillors and backed up by commercially made films, and by a futile attempt to take a mixed group from the area on a global fact-finding tour, which ended in a tourist visit to dams and smelting plants in Australia. Clearly, the PNG Government is in a dilemma concerning its own desire to increase its GNP and reduce relaince on imports, without substituting one locus for economic dependence for another, and to adhere to its own principles for the nature of development which it has outlined for the country.

The Purari: People and Place

The scheme itself envisages an initial dam at Wabo on the Purari River, with up to
six additional dams, together with the development of an industrial complex based
on several core heavy industries at a coastal site. Even the single dam would
produce more electricity than the entire country could currently use. Therefore,
allowing the construction to go ahead would be close to selling land for the de-
velopment of heavy industry by and for foreign investors, creating "enclave
development" which, apart from the provision of some jobs during the construction
phase, would do little for the actual people in the Gulf Province or even the much
larger area from the Highlands to the Papuan Gulf drained by the Purari system.

The book shows that the minimal hopes of the people themselves, for better facilities
(health, education, roads, jobs) are not only unlikely to be met, but even if they
are (e.g. health), it will be to counteract the effects of new diseases introduced
along roads, through migrant workers and through ecological changes in the water
system; that the local people will be displaced in most significant fields by im-
ported, more qualified workers; that there will be strains·on agricultural land,
ecological changes affecting present subsistence and food-producing patterns;
community life, although only a relatively small number will need to be relocated,
will be severely and irreversibly disrupted including traditional and religious
ties with the land, and even the safety of the dam itself has not been adequately
investigated. The Gulf people, with one of the longest histories of European con-
tact in PNG, yet one of the poorest records for official attention and development
assistance, are moving from an interest in any proposed development, especially one
put to them officially in terms of benefit to themselves, to questioning and hos-
tility:

> "Tell the people in the big government meetings that we do not want them to close
> our river because they want to make money for themselves. Tell them the water
> is ours and has a name..." (p. 11).

> "I can appreciate the need for development in the Gulf Province but this de-
> velopment, I believe, should take place in the people first." (p. 13).

The Development of Underdevelopment?

The bulk of Purari is a deeply-researched and excellently-documented factual account
of the inception of the Purari scheme and its subsequent vicissitudes, including
both favourable and unfavourable reports from industry and government departments.
This not only clearly outlines the scheme, but provides a most useful case study,
together with the minor ones from comparable projects in other countries, of the
processes, problems and factors involved in development planning.

More importantly, however, the book presents both the diversity of opinions and the
problems of opposition to the project in Papua New Guinea itself, both on the local
opposition, interdepartmental problems and national government to foreign company/
government levels, and also an analysis of the many factors involved. It shows that
a smaller scheme, which would dam rivers with far less detrimental environmental
consequences, could produce enough power to establish smaller-scale, less capital
intensive and less socially-disruptive industries in which PNG could be a much
more active participant and beneficiary.

More significantly again, it shows how the whole process of technological development and transfer can be either in the service of an industrial capitalist elite, which in the case of a Third World country is predominantly a European or European-educated elite, or an integral and alternative development growing out of the history, traditions and aspirations of a people. The factors affecting the ability of a Third World country to choose the latter path are also examined, together with an all-too-brief outline of the actions which a cooperative group, PAG, and its IDA partners, can take in awakening people to the events which are taking place.

In the closing words of the book, "What is known of the environmental and social changes Purari would bring, reinforces the experience of others in the Third World - the people become the victims of development ... Many fear that it will mean the overpowering of PNG, not just electrically, but politically, economically, socially and environmentally" (p.216). Even a casual reading of this book shows how well-founded such fears are.

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*/ *A review by Robin Burns, Lecture, Centre for Comparative and International Studies in Education, School of Education, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia 3083.*

REACTIONS TO PREVIOUS DOSSIERS: EXCERPTS FROM A LETTER

from Anil K. Gupta[*]/

I have seen some of the previous issues of IFDA Dossier through my friends ... Not to mention that I have been terribly impressed by the contents, my particular interest is in rural development, credit management and organization development for the rural poor. ...

The paper by Baqai (IFDA Dossier 8) is really impressive, and please convey my compliments to the author who has presented a lucid exposition of the problems of growth policies in developing countries. He has at times taken modest positions which, perhaps, was not warranted. In place of talking of 'elements' responsible for pervasive poverty, the structures and processes that give rise to these elements should get more elaborate attention. The basic needs approach in different envelopes flowed from the World Bank (who lately are realizing at least some of the incongruencies, ref. "Technology of rural development", IBRD Staff Paper no. 295, 1978) and one need not put great faith in this. In any case, the author has really laboured hard to present a beautiful perspective to the development issue.

I hope Mr. Baqai's paper is circulated widely in India, for it has the potentiality of creating much-wanted bridges between intellectuals on this and the other wide of our border. Though I never could agree with resistance to change theory advocated as responsible for mass-scale misery in Third

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World countries (p.7) ... Man (and the rural poor is also a man somehow!) is an irrational animal inasmuch as he would not forego an opportunity for better living because he clings too fast to his old cultural values which must have grown after great homeostatic deliberations and interactions and not by mere prejudices. If he has not accepted some developmental model, it could be because of:

First, he is not sure of the transferability of new techniques/technology on his land or in his hearth.

Second, no such new technology exists at all.

Third, he has limited access to institutions which determine success of new technology; this breeds insecurity and lack of confidence.

Fourth, the power structure in the society ensures - through policy planning mechanisms (i.e. government elected by these interests), bureaucracy (which corresponds with and germinates from this strata), and grass-root workers (who find sure survival under the patronage of the elite strata) - that the last man to acquire dynamism sufficient to gain psychological satisfaction of "also run" only.

Fifth, The policies of low interest rates and subsidy approach strengthen the rural money lender/big farmer for exploiting the poor more rapidly.

Sixth, the "trickle down" hypothesis has not been abandoned totally by the Third World countries. The interests of multinationals, largest producers of consumer goods making fast inroads into rural prosperous classes or near-prosperous classes emerging through various policies in the Third World are given a benevolent look through international aid that would protect the interest of natural allies.

Seventh, any peasant movement which aims to represent the interests of the oppressed and the oppressor is a utopian attempt to further the vested interest. Entire cooperative movements rested on it and the experiences are not hidden from anybody. Institutional innovations (like regional rural banks, etc.) without structural changes in the policy framework and the economic system are bound to result in structuring helping only the small farmer, son of big farmer. In fact recently, in a paper about the agricultural credit policies of Ghana and the Dominican Republic, the suggestion was made that the country should give still greater attention to export-oriented non-food crops (which incidentally were grown by large resources rich farmers) so that through higher FE earnings, they could spend more in infrastructure which in turn would benefit the smaller farmers by greater prospect of higher production. Also it was felt that the demand for food grain would increase as a consequence of the above, resulting in higher prices and higher profitability, prosperity. One can judge the merit of the argument.

Eight, the Antyodayo philosophy is the other extreme of absurdity. Curing a symptom without touching the cause may result in a good window show-piece but then nothing more. These arguments can be extended to several other farmers and stages. However I intend to stop here.

FOOTNOTES / NOTES

, THE UNIVERSITY AND THE THIRD SYSTEM

11 Dutch cities are following Amsterdam's example in setting up *wetenschaps-w;nkel* or science shops, run by the universities' scientists and students for the benefit of "citizen organizations" - environmentalists, feminist groups, neighbourhood associations, etc. At the Amsterdam shop, a commit-tee of 24 advisers, composed of faculty staff, students and representatives of "third system" organizations (Amsterdam Environmental League, the women's movement, the trade unions, etc.), examines regularly requests for research. When approved, the projects are assigned to one of 50 university affiliated scientists who have volunteered to help[1]/.

This Dutch initiative, as yet very modestly funded by the Government, points to a major problem faced by the third system: how to get access to modern research facilities and mobilize the skills of socially responsive scien-tists? In this connexion it is worthwhile to recall the initiative taken by Indian scientists working in several leading research institutes to create special units or programmes aimed at using the existing knowledge for the rural development and the satisfaction of human needs. As an example, one may mention the school science programme at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, the Cell for the Application of Science and Technology to Rural Areas (ASTRA) at the Indian Institute of Science, Banalore, the Jawaja Project of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, the Centre for Application of Technology to Rural Development at the National Chemical Laboratory, etc.

, THROUGH THE 80s - THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY

This is the title of the "First Global Conference on the Future" which will take place in Toronto, Canada, from 20 to 25 July 1980. The objectives of this large-attendance, open-to-all, conference (whose advisory chairman is IFDA Executive Committee member Maurice F. Strong) is to provide a 'meeting place (Toronto is an Indian word for 'meeting place') for the frontier thinkers where research, insights and concern may be shared with each other and with people from all walks of life. Further information from "The First Global Conference on the Future, Inc.", 49 Front Street, East (2nd floor), Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

, L'ASSOCIATION MONDIALE DE PROSPECTIVE SOCIALE, issue du Colloque sur les implications sociales du Nouvel Ordre Economique International organisé à Genève en 1976 par l'Institut international d'études sociales (BIT) prépare son premier congrès mondial qui se tiendra à Dakar du 21 au

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1/ For more details see Garg Yerkey, "Dutch 'Science Shops' open research
   to public", International Herald Tribune, 1 August 1979.

23 janvier 1980. L'ordre du jour comprend quatre sujets principaux:
maîtrise sociale des besoins; développement rural; polituqes de l'emploi;
et contrats de solidarité. Contact: Albert Tévoédjrè, Secrétaire général,
Case postale 6, CH-1211 Genève 22, Suisse.

. THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF METHODOLOGY FOR FUTURE AND DEVELOP-
  MENT STUDIES at the University of Bucharest (Str. Academiei 14,
70 109 Bucharest, Romania) makes "sustained efforts to achieve a multi-
disciplinary approach to economic as well as social development with a view
to define the methodologies, instruments and structures of indicators requi-
red for gaining better insights in order to cope with the increasing
complexity". Among its activities the 'learning project' and a contribu-
tion to the United Nations University project 'Goals, processes and indica-
tors for development' directed by IFDA Council member Johan Galtung.

. THE ASSOCIATION OF GEOSCIENTISTS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
  MENT (AGID) was established to provide a continuining forum for the
exchange of ideas, experiences and information among all persons concerned
with the role of the geosciences and of geoscientists in international
development. What have we learned from the successes and failures of past
technical assistance programmes? How can we avoid a repetition of the
many mistakes of the past and proceed more effectively? AGID does not pre-
tend to know all the answers to these problems, nor to have the ability to
provide instantaneous solutions, but its members are convinced of the need
for practical and constructive action. They are commited to exploring ways
and means by which the effectiveness of the geosciences in international
development can be improved. Address: Apartado 21241, San Martin, Caracas,
Venezuela.

. THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS RESEARCH PROJECT aims to pro-
vide information on, and initiate research into, various aspects of foreign
investment and the activities of TNCs in Australia. Research results are
published in the form of data papers, working papers, research monographs
and books. List of publications and further information from E.L.
Wheelwright, Faculty of Economics, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.

. World Future Studies Federation, Science and Technology and the Future
(Munchen, New York, Paris, London: K.G. Saur, 1979). Proceedings (2 vol.,
1440 pp) and joint report of World Future Studies Conference and DSE-Pre-
conference held in Berlin, 4-10 May 1979.

. J.T.E. Development Digest: After a year of absence, the Joint Task Force
on Development Issues re-appears. It will cover essentially EEC policy to
the Third World as well as churches' relations with EEC Third World policy.
Further information from Jonathan Fryer, 23 avenue d'Auderghem, B-1040
Bruxelles, Belgium.