Contents

Introductory Note

Building Blocks / Matériaux
- Secteur public et stratégies de développement (Ismaïl-Sabri Abdalla)
- Collective self-reliance - The case of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (Kenneth Hall & Byron Blake)
- Vers la démystification de la nouvelle magie blanche: le cas de l'industrie zairoise du cuivre (Ilunga Ilunkamba)
- Can Sweden be shrunk? (Nordal Akerman)
- Power resources - The five controls (Celso Furtado)

Markings
- Africa towards the year 2000 (Report of an OAU/ECA symposium, by Albert Tevoedjrè)

Interactions
- A new strategy for urban development (Jaime Lerner)
- Water planning and management - An alternative view (Jimoh Omo-Fadaka)
- Lemmata of another development (Stelios Kafandaris)
- Pour un rééquilibre de l'information, outil d'aide à la décision (Jean Masini)
- Agricultural co-operatives in Vietnam - Which lessons to draw (Lan Phuong)
- Common Fund, uncommon technology and Manila (Chakravarthi Raghavan)
- On national brotherhood-relations: Norway-Tanzania (Egil A. Wyller)
- Global security through disarmament and development (Inga Thorsson)

Footnotes

Contributions to the IFDA Dossier are presented under the sole responsibility of their authors. They are not covered by any copyright. They may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission of the authors or IFDA. In case of reprint, acknowledgement of source and receipt of a copy would be appreciated.

Executive Committee: Ismaïl-Sabri Abdalla, Ahmed Ben Solih (co-chairman), Gamani Corea, Mahbub ul Haq, Enrique Iglesias, Jan Meijer (co-chairman), Marc Nerfin (President), Justinian F. Rweyemamu, Ignacy Sachs, Juan Samavia, Maurice F. Strong, Ingo Thorsson

Secretary: 2, place du marché, CH-1260 Nyon, Switzerland; Telephone 41 (22) 61 82 82; Telex 28 840 IFDA CH; Cable FIPAD, Geneva
INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The present seventh issue of the IFDA Dossier has been printed in 7,500 copies and addressed to some 6,200 individuals, organizations or institutions on the IFDA mailing list, which extends into virtually all member countries of the United Nations. Secondary distribution, through the network of like-minded institutions, reaches some 500 additional individuals.

We receive daily an abundant mail. We sometimes attend meetings (such as the recent Vienna planning session for the NGO Forum parallel to the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development, or the April session of the UN Preparatory Committee for the International Development Strategy). Through members of the network, we also hear about other gatherings (such as the Addis Ababa ECA/UNEP seminar on alternative development patterns for Africa, or the European Youth Center/World Federalist Youth conference in Strasbourg). From all this, it seems that the Dossier is read, and appreciated, and is stimulating dialogues. It appears then to fulfill one of its main functions: to bring to the fore some alternative views on what a development strategy should be.

How far will the official development strategy reflect the expression of unheard voices and an emergent third system? This is another story. The UN Preparatory Committee receives some direct inputs, such as those of the Committee for Development Planning and the UN system Task Force on the Strategy. The Third System Project operates at another level: more than a direct contribution to the intergovernmental process, the Project is meant to broaden, and hopefully deepen, the public dialogue on development and the new international order.

What is important, therefore, is that the Dossier really reaches those who are interested. Hence the following request: would readers take a few minutes and send us the names and addresses of individuals, organizations and institutions which should be included in our mailing list? Would readers inform us of relevant seminars, symposia and the like, for which the Dossier may provide some background material?

This, too, would contribute to the further broadening of the dialogue.
DOSSIER FIPAD 7, MAI 1979

MATÉRIAUX

SECTEUR PUBLIC ET STRATEGIES DE DEVELOPPEMENT

par Ismail-Sabri Abdalla
Chairman, Third World Forum
P.O. Box 43, Orman
Le Caire, Egypte

Langue originale: Français

PUBLIC SECTOR AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

Abstract: State ownership of productive enterprises is prevalent in all Third World countries, including those proclaiming themselves capitalist. Its principal merit is to make explicit the political nature of economic decisions, even in the context of conventional (imitative) development strategies. Indeed, in all cases where such strategies have led to greater social equity or national independence, the public sector can be seen to have played an influential, if not decisive, role.

The minimal conditions for the effectiveness of the public sector are its participation in profitable activities (not just in public services), its predominance on the commanding heights of the economy, and its adoption of macro-economic management criteria. Given these conditions, the public sector can serve as a means for centralizing and redistributing part of the national economic surplus in accordance with development objectives. It can also ensure investments for plan fulfilment, participate in import and export activities in order to improve the external terms of trade and the internal distribution of benefits from trade, give a lead in providing social benefits for its employees, and strengthen the planning process. The public sector is, however, vulnerable to political pressures for uneconomic pricing and employment practices, to exploitation by national private enterprise, and to bureaucratic and technocratic management.

A strategy for "another development" would evidently accord a decisive, if not dominant, role to the public sector, but it would also call for limits on the temptation to over-nationalize. State ownership is appropriate for enterprises of national importance; alternative forms of social property should be sought at sub-national levels, with the State confining itself to a supporting role. State ownership should not be imposed on the small-scale or traditional sectors. Moreover, since "another development" is by definition participatory, the management of public enterprises should be entrusted to workers' collectives, with the State retaining certain reserve powers. Similarly, the process of elaborating, executing and evaluating plans - which should become a feature of social action at all levels - should spring from a mutually educating dialogue between citizens and planners.
EL SECTOR PUBLICO Y ESTRATEGIAS DE DESARROLLO

Resumen: La posesión estatal de empresas productivas prevalece en todos los países del Tercer Mundo, incluso en los países que se delarán capitalistas. Su mérito principal está en hacer explícito la naturaleza política de decisiones económicas aún en el contexto de estrategias convencionales imitativas de desarrollo. En verdad, en todos los casos en que tales estrategias han resultado en un aumento de equidad social o independencia nacional, el sector público a desempeñado un papel, si no enteramente decisivo, de gran influencia. Las condiciones mínimas que permiten al sector público hacer efecto son su participación en actividades provechosas (no solo en servicios públicos), su predominio en la economía, y su adopción de criterios de dirección macro-económicos. Dadas estas condiciones, el sector público puede servir como un medio para centralizar y redistribuir parte del exceso económico nacional de acuerdo con objetivos del desarrollo. También puede asegurar inversiones para llevar acabo el Plan, participar en actividades de importe y exporte para mayorar las condiciones exteriores del comercio y la distribución interna de los beneficios del comercio, dar la dirección en proveer beneficios sociales para sus empleados, y dar fuerza al proceso de planificación. Sin embargo, el sector público queda vulnerable a aperos políticos para precios y prácticas que no son económicos, a la explotación por empresas privadas nacionales, y a una dirección burocrática y tecnocrática. Es evidente que la estrategia para "un otro desarrollo" otorgaría un papel decisivo, si no dominante, al sector público, pero también demandaría límites a la tentación para demasiada nacionalización. La posesión estatal es apropiada para empresas de importancia nacional; se deben buscar formas alternativas de propiedad social a niveles sub-nacionales, con el estado limitándose a un papel apoyador en tales casos. La posesión estatal no debe imponerse en los sectores tradicionales o pequeños. Además, ya que "un otro desarrollo" es por definición participatorio, la dirección de empresas públicas debe ser entregada a colectivas de trabajadores, con el estado reteniendo ciertos poderes. El proceso de elaborar, ejecutar y evaluar planes - lo que debe llegar a ser una característica de acción social a todos niveles - debe resultar de un diálogo mutuamente educativo entre ciudadanos y planificadores.
La propriété de l'Etat ne résout pas par elle-même l'ensemble des problèmes de développement. Son principal mérite est de rendre apparente la nature politique des décisions économiques autrement dissimulées derrière le "libre jeu des forces du marché". Ainsi, les options socio-politiques perdent de leur opacité. Les forces politiques peuvent alors intervenir et imprimer - même au niveau de la micro-économie - la résultante de leurs rapports de force, lesquels reflètent entre autres choses le degré de conscience et la capacité d'organisation de chacune d'entre elles. L'existence d'un secteur public ne suffit donc pas pour appréhender la nature d'une société. La preuve en est l'existence - et même l'importance - du secteur public dans toutes les sociétés contemporaines. Dans les "pays industrialisés à économie de marché" les entreprises publiques s'emboîtent avec plus ou moins de bonheur dans la structure de l'économie. Elles rendent souvent au secteur privé des services fort appréciables : renflouer des firmes en difficulté chronique, effectuer de très importants investissements indispensables à la bonne marche de l'économie mais dont le rendement est médiocre, voire aléatoire, ou même faciliter la concentration. L'histoire de l'IRI en Italie est riche en exemples de toute sorte illustrant l'appui qu'accorde le secteur public à l'économie capitalistes. Au demeurant, sous prétexte de productivité et de compétitivité, les entreprises publiques tendent à avoir en matière de salaires, des prix du crédit ... etc., le même comportement que les entreprises privées de même taille, même si dans certains cas d'autres dispositions avaient été prévues sous la pression des forces populaires qui avaient poussé à la nationalisation. L'objet de cette communication étant le rôle du secteur public dans les pays dits du Tiers Monde, il est inutile de nous étendre sur le cas des pays industrialisés, une fois clarifié le rapport essentiel entre la propriété de l'Etat et la nature et l'orientation socio-politique de l'Etat qui l'exerce.

Nous tournant maintenant vers le Tiers Monde, force est de constater l'existence - et l'importance - souvent considérable - du secteur public dans les pays. Paradoxalement - en apparence du moins - l'Etat joue un rôle économique déterminant dans certains pays se proclamant ouvertement en faveur d'un développement capitalistes. Au Brésil en 1974, par exemple 45 des 100 plus grandes firmes apparteniaient à l'Etat fédéral, elles possédaient 74% de l'actif global et réalisaient 63% des profits.1/ Par contre, dans un pays qui opte pour le socialisme mais n'ayant que peu d'entreprises dont la taille et le rôle justifient leur appropriation par l'Etat, la part du secteur public dans l'économie peut demeurer modeste pour un temps.


Ajoutons que dans les pays comme l'Arabie Saoudite ou le Kowait, réputés modérés sinon conservateurs, le secteur public contrôle plus de 70% du P.N.B. y compris les activités non-pétrolières.
C'est le cas par exemple où se trouve l'Afghanistan. Enfin, on peut citer à la limite un nombre non négligeable d'entreprises publiques dans des pays du Tiers Monde qui ne sont en fait que des "terminaux" pour des sociétés transnationales. Comment donc pourrait-on généraliser en parlant du rôle du secteur public dans l'ensemble des pays du Tiers Monde ? Ce genre d'amalgame ne peut conduire qu'à la confusion. Cependant, il n'est pas question de retomber dans un empirisme absolu et traiter le problème pays par pays. Il nous semble que la réponse apportée à deux questions fondamentales rendrait assez aisée une approche systématique :

**Primo:** Quelle est la stratégie de développement suivie réellement ?

**Secondo :** Dans quelles conditions le secteur public pourrait-il servir au mieux cette stratégie ?

**ROLE DU SECTEUR PUBLIC DANS LE CADRE D'UNE STRATEGIE CONVENTIONNELLE**

Pour peu qu'une économie nationale ne soit pas stationnaire, elle se développe, quelle que soit la nature de ce développement ou l'opinion qu'on porte sur lui. Il arrive que les autorités d'un pays se prononcent pour une stratégie aux objectifs clairs et articulés et vont-même jusqu'à tenter de la traduire en plans savamment élaborés. Cependant, il ne s'agit pas de s'en tenir aux documents de ce genre. C'est uniquement la lecture patiente et lucide des faits de développement qui permet de connaître la stratégie réelle, celle qui résulte en dernière analyse des rapports de forces au sein de la société. Nous entendons par stratégie conventionnelle tout développement conçu plus ou moins sciemment comme un "remake" de ce qui se passa en Occident lors de la montée du capitalisme, même si l'on y additionne d'autres ingrédients : souci de justice sociale, désir d'indépendance nationale, rôle plus déterminant de l'Etat, etc. Cette stratégie se distingue, à travers les variantes, par les caractéristiques suivantes :

a) La primauté de l'économique par rapport au social, au culturel et même au politique. Ce qui revient en fait à la concentration des efforts autour d'un nombre relativement limité de "grands projets" et aboutit à une croissance sectorielle (dans des secteurs souvent d'importance discutable) que la pratique de la comptabilité nationale transforme illusoirement en croissance générale. Le meilleur "indice" de la primauté de l'économique c'est le P.N.B. donné comme indicateur de développement.

b) L'importance des transferts de l'étranger par rapport à la mobilisation des ressources nationales : transfert de capitaux, de technologies, d'experts, d'équipement, etc. Par leur volume, leurs formes et leurs conditions ces transferts tendent à intégrer davantage l'économie nationale à celle du centre de l'ordre international : le capitalisme occidental. Les intentions patriotiques, le nationalisme ombrageux de certains hommes d'Etat et, dans une certaine mesure, même les nationalisations n'y peuvent rien.
c) L'accent mis sur la production et la productivité alors que les problèmes de la répartition sont, sinon relégués ouvertement au second plan, traités par des correctifs dictés par le souci de stabilité politique quand celle-ci n'est pas assurée par une dictature forte et efficace.

d) Les valeurs marchandes continuent de gouverner en dernier ressort l'économie nationale quel que soit le degré du dirigisme ou le nombre des prix subventionnés ou garantis.

On voit aisément que ces caractéristiques se retrouvent dans l'immense majorité des expériences de développement entreprises dans le Tiers Monde au cours des trois dernières décennies. D'où le qualificatif de conventionnel. Partout, ces expériences ont changé à des degrés divers l'image des économies sorties du giron du colonialisme. C'est dans ce sens qu'on peut dire qu'il y a eu un certain développement. Que cela ne soit pas le développement que nous entendons et souhaitons est une autre question. Car en réalité c'est un autre développement qui nous préoccupe. Nous y reviendrons dans la seconde partie de cet exposé.

Cependant, ce qui précède ne doit pas être pris pour une condamnation en bloc et sans nuance de tous les efforts de développement qui ne rampent pas avec le cadre conventionnel. Loin de nous une pareille pensée. La performance économique n'a pas été la même partout. Les exigences d'indépendance nationale ou d'équité sociale ont pu ici et là faire des percées qu'on ne saurait méconnaitre. Dans tous les cas de succès relatif, on trouve que le secteur public a joué un rôle déterminant sinon décisif. L'examen empirique ainsi que l'analyse théorique indiquent que ce secteur ne peut agir efficacement qu'à certaines conditions. Une fois ces conditions remplies, certaines possibilités d'action s'ouvrent. Mais ces possibilités sont à leur tour soumises à des contraintes au sens mathématique du mot. Voyons maintenant les choses de plus près.

Les conditions :

Si l'on veut que le secteur public serve réellement de puissant levier en matière de développement et de planification, il faut commencer par lui en donner les moyens. Il y a à cet égard certaines conditions minimales sans lesquelles la propriété de l'Etat ne pourrait guère être à même de répondre aux exigences d'un rôle actif de l'Etat, rôle rendu indispensable par la nature même du capitalisme préférable.

a) Le secteur d'État doit sortir des limites des services publics, souvent déficitaires, pour s'engager résolument dans le cœur des activités économiques lucratives. Sans cela, il ne serait pas à même de contribuer à la formation du surplus financier qu'exigent les investissements nouveaux.

b) Il doit, par ailleurs, occuper une position prépondérante dans les "hauteurs dominantes" de l'économie : banques et assurances, commerce extérieur, industries de base, principaux moyens de transport. On sait que
La vie économique d'un pays a ses propres structures de pouvoir matérialisées par les entreprises dont les décisions commandent et le niveau et les directions des activités des autres "agents éconorniques". Le crédit, les fournitures d'énergie et des matières premières ou des produits semi-finis, l'écoulement des produits finis surtout à l'extérieur ... sont autant de leviers de commande dans l'ensemble de l'économie nationale.

c) Sans abandonner totalement les soucis de bonne gestion économique et de productivité, il doit se distinguer du secteur privé par la place qui y revient aux considérations macro-économiques liées aux objectifs du développement. Par contre, si rien ne distingue une entreprise publique d'une entreprise privée sauf la propriété, le secteur d'Etat ne pourra ni suppléer à la carence de l'initiative privée ni répondre aux besoins à long terme de l'économie nationale.

Les possibilités

Grâce à la position qui lui est ainsi assurée, le secteur public aura des possibilités d'action assez étendues tant dans la planification du développement que dans la mise en oeuvre de ses plans, programmes ou politiques.

a) Le secteur public pourrait centraliser une part appreciable du surplus économique en vue d'une réa1location plus conforme aux objectifs de développement politiquement définis. En effet, ses profits sont directement à la disposition des Pouvoirs publics, sans devoir passer nécessairement par les voies incertaines de la fiscalité. Il est bien connu que celles-ci sont dans les pays du Tiers Monde particulièrement tortueuses et souvent obstruées. Mais c'est surtout le contrôle des institutions financières - les grands collecteurs de l'épargne qui met à la disposition du secteur public une masse financière de manœuvre dont l'importance n'échappe à personne. Il importe aussi de confier à des entreprises publiques des activités donnant lieu à certaines rentes de position, soit à cause d'une demande excessive par rapport à l'offre (cas de certains produits d'importation) soit à cause d'une situation de monopole ou quasi-monopole de fait. Enfin, le secteur de la construction absorbe en moyenne 40 % de l'investissement national. Les marges de profit y sont souvent considérables et les vérifications des coûts réels assez malaisées. Laisser entièrement dans les mains des firmes étrangères et des sous-traitants privés, ce secteur peut provoquer une véritable hémorragie de capitaux publics. Il est donc essentiel que l'entreprise publique se fraye un chemin dans ce domaine dont la complexité et la multiplicité des parties prenantes font penser à une jungle.

b) Le secteur public peut opérer les choix d'investissement édictés par le plan ou susceptibles de concrétiser les grands principes de la politique de développement définis par l'autorité publique. L'exemple classique à cet égard est celui de "grands projets" nécessitant de gros investissements sur de nombreuses années et dont la rentabilité offre peu d'attrait à un secteur privé capable de mobiliser seulement des capitaux relativement modestes et soucieux avant tout d'accélérer la rotation des sommes investies. Cependant, limiter l'intervention du secteur public à ce genre de
de projets équivaut à en faire un simple appendice du secteur privé, appendice de taille peut-être, mais appendice quand même. D'autres domaines d'intervention sont évidents : les industries ayant un haut effet multiplicateur, celles qui facilitent ou même provoquent la naissance ou le développement d'autres activités économiques, par opposition à celles qui s'enclavent parce qu'elles font trop peu appel aux "inputs" locaux et leurs "outputs" alimentent peu ou prou d'autres productions. On peut ajouter, aussi, les activités industrielles ou autres qui assurent un meilleur équilibre sectoriel dans la croissance et permettent d'éviter l'apparition des goulets d'étranglement. Théoriquement du moins, le secteur public devrait pouvoir faire des choix technologiques plus judicieux et obtenir des termes meilleurs dans les négociations avec les transnationales. Rien n'interdit une option en faveur des techniques à haute intensité de travail. Si les considérations de taille ou de prestige poussent trop souvent les technocrates du secteur public à vouloir à tout prix "la technologie la plus avancée", il est tout aussi vrai que les entrepreneurs privés préfèrent, dès qu'ils en ont les moyens, avoir affaire aux machines plutôt qu'aux hommes. Enfin, le secteur public peut - si la politique du gouvernement le dicte - apporter un soutien appréciable aux coopératives de production ou aux petites et moyennes entreprises, par l'octroi de crédit, la fourniture de machines, pièces de rechange et produits semi-finis, ainsi que par des réseaux adéquats de commercialisations.

c) On sait que le commerce extérieur a été jusqu'à maintenant le talon d'Achille des pays du Tiers Monde à l'exception de cinq pays parmi les exportateurs de pétrole. Même dans le cadre d'une stratégie qui ne vise pas à la réduction draconienne des échanges extérieurs (surtout avec le centre), la "rationalité" exige une politique tendant à contenir le déficit extérieur sans porter préjudice au développement. Une telle politique signifie : côté importation : assurer l'approvisionnement régulier en produits essentiels aux meilleurs prix et réduire tant que faire se peut l'entrée des produits de luxe. Du côté exportation : accroître le volume tout en s'assurant des prix rémunérateurs. L'utilité du secteur public dans l'application de cette politique ne saurait être surestimée : la vue d'ensemble des besoins de l'économie et des directives du plan, le pouvoir accru de négociation, la pratique de plafond de profits à l'importation, la possibilité de stabilisation relative des prix versés aux producteurs de matières premières, etc.

d) Au niveau social, si l'État se donne une politique cohérente d'emploi, de salaires et de prix dans le but d'améliorer le sort des couches les plus défavorisées de la société, un secteur public puissant pourrait être l'instrument privilégié de cette politique. On peut citer ici : les crédits que les entreprises publiques sont capables d'accorder à l'apprentissage, la formation et le recyclage pour améliorer à la fois les salaires et la productivité. Logements sociaux, repas subventionnés, transports collectifs quand ils sont assurés par l'entreprise ou un groupe d'entreprises publiques contribuent aux mêmes résultats. Une différenciation des prix à la vente peut être un moyen efficace de subventionner les produits de première nécessité tout en distribuant le poids des subventions sur les prix d'autres produits, etc.
e) Enfin, le secteur public pourrait contribuer à l'amélioration de la planification. Au niveau de l'élaboration du plan, le secteur public devrait être la source la plus précieuse de données statistiques de base. Il pourrait également se charger d'études indispensables aux choix de technologie et aux calculs de rentabilité ainsi qu'à la construction des tableaux d'input-output. Sans son apport, l'utilisation par les planificateurs de la plupart des techniques de planification risque de relever de l'exercice d'école plutôt que d'exprimer une prise réelle sur le concret de développement. Lors de l'exécution du plan, les entreprises publiques sont sensées obéir aux directives adoptées par l'Etat-propriétaire. Néanmoins, ce rapport formel ne suffit pas par lui-même. La preuve en est donnée par les trop nombreux cas où les administrations et les entreprises publiques détourneront les directives du plan, voire même en font fi ouvertement. Une symbiose entre planificateurs, dirigeants du secteur public et responsables des grandes administrations dans toutes les phases du travail de planification (de la conception jusqu'au rapport final sur la réalisation) est la condition sine qua non d'un succès raisonnable de la démarche planificatrice permettant d'entrevoir la fin de la schizophrénie actuelle plan d'un côté, évolution socio-économique réelle de l'autre.

Les contraintes

Les possibilités d'action énumérées ci-dessus sont soumises à des contraintes. Celles-ci pourraient être ramenées en dernière analyse à des facteurs politiques. Comme nous l'avons signalé plus haut, la propriété publique rend plus apparent l'enjeu social. Aussi, un secteur public ayant une place déterminante dans l'économie nationale ne saurait ignorer les pressions contradictoires des diverses forces sociales. Il sera plus vulnérable aux jeux de ces forces que ne le sont les administrations incarnant directement la puissance publique. Trop souvent les dirigeants politiques voient dans des "concessions" imposées aux entreprises publiques - parfois au détriment de leur bon fonctionnement - un prix jamais trop élevé pour sauvegarder l'essentiel : le pouvoir politique. Voici quelques actions souvent contraignantes pour le secteur public.

a) Les consommateurs : Assez légitimement, la population accepte mal les hausses de prix décidées par les entreprises publiques, même si elles peuvent être justifiées au nom de la "bonne gestion". Il lui semble normal que les firmes privées cherchent à maximiser leurs profits, voire même à "exploiter" le consommateur en tirant partie des situations de pénurie relative ou d'une position de monopole. Mais elle conçoit mal que l'Etat se prête à ce genre de jeu. Les pouvoirs publics cèdent parfois, face à ces pressions, justifiées par ailleurs par la médiocrité du niveau de vie des masses populaires. Il sera encore plus difficile de s'y opposer lorsque le discours politique des dirigeants se veut socialiste et les média officiels affirment que le secteur public "appartient au peuple". D'un point de vue strictement économique, des "prix sociaux" sont une contrainte par rapport aux objectifs d'accumulation (ou de formation de capital) assignés au secteur public. En principe la planification des prix en tant que partie intégrante du plan de développement est sensée trouver les solutions optimales entre ces objectifs contradictoires.
b) Le secteur privé : Parmi les consommateurs ou usagers des biens et des services fournis par le secteur public, se trouve une catégorie de privilégiés : les entreprises privées. Placées en aval des entreprises publiques, elles exercent une pression constante pour obtenir à des prix avantageux ou même subventionnés l’énergie, les matières premières, les produits semi-finis, le transport des marchandises, et évidemment le crédit. Leurs arguments sont à première vue plus "économiques" que "sociaux". Il s’agit de stimuler la production, d'encourager les industries nationales, etc. Mais le drainage des fonds du secteur public vers le secteur privé s’effectue aussi dans l’autre sens : lui vendre à des prix élevés. Les contrats de fourniture, de construction et de sous-traitance sont des moyens aussi classiques qu’efficaces dans ce domaine. Ici la contrainte touche l’objectif de centralisation du surplus financier en vue d’une meilleure allocation. Le plan financier doit accorder une attention particulière aux mouvements des fonds entre les deux secteurs. Celui des investissements doit de son côté donner au secteur public les moyens d’intervenir pour contrecarrer les manoeuvres tendant à renverser le courant en ce qui concerne l’accumulation financière.

c) La bureaucratie et la technocratie : La gestion des entreprises publiques peut être Te lieu par excellence où des contraintes sérieuses limitent leurs possibilités d’action. Parfois les cadres de l’administration publique envahissent ces entreprises et y transplacent des modes de gestion inappropriés. C’est alors le règne de la bureaucratie renforcée par les moyens financiers dont disposent les entreprises publiques d’habitude exemptées des rigueurs budgétaires. L’inefficacité d’une direction de ce type s’aggrave encore par la tendance au gonflement du personnel administratif par rapport à celui directement engagé dans la production. La loi de Parkinson produit ses effets bien connus. En fin de compte, la rentabilité décline au grand dam de l’image du secteur public dans l’opinion. Autre danger dans le domaine de la gestion : la technocratie. Dans ce cas on se trouve en présence de "managers" dynamiques et hautement qualifiés. Des succès éclatants, au niveau micro-économique, peuvent être enregistrés. Malheureusement, ce succès même pousse les dirigeants des entreprises publiques à prendre leurs distances à l’égard des autorités et surtout par rapport aux organes de planification. Ils sont tentés alors de recourir au maximum à l’auto-financement (ou aux banques là où il n’y a pas de planification du crédit), pour opérer des choix d’investissement ou de technologie qui ne sont pas forcément les meilleurs d’un point de vue macro-économique. Résistant souvent à l’intéressement des travailleurs et à leur participation à la gestion, certains de ces "managers" caressent l’idéal de "bâtisseurs d’empires". Le problème de gestion des entreprises publiques n’a pas de solution technique à découvrir dans un quelconque manuel de "management". Il est éminemment politique. Car seules l’orientation politique juste et la participation populaire peuvent assurer le contrepoids nécessaire face à la bureaucratie et à la technocratie.

d) Les travailleurs : En règle générale, les travailleurs attendent des entreprises publiques des conditions de travail meilleures et des salaires plus élevés. À priori, répondre à cette attente légitime pourrait aller
de pair avec une productivité accrue. La taille des entreprises publiques devrait normalement leur permettre de rentabiliser les salaires différenciés et des dépenses sociales en améliorant la productivité de travail (formation, recyclage, stimulants matériels, etc.). Mais si les dirigeants du secteur public ne sont pas suffisamment conscients de ce problème et décident à le traiter d'une manière adéquate, ils imputeront aux "exigences sociales" toutes les conséquences de leur mauvaise gestion. Par ailleurs, il est des cas où les pouvoirs politiques, inquiets face au chômage chronique que les projets de développement les plus coûteux n'entament guère, imposent aux entreprises publiques une politique d'embauche assez laxiste. Cette situation s'aggrave par le fait que les dirigeants de ces entreprises sont loin de chercher à absorber ce travail additionnel dans des emplois liés à la production (ateliers de réparation, centres de formation, ateliers de fabrication d'équipements auxiliaires, etc.) et se contentent de mettre les nouveaux venus sur leurs feuilles de paye, considérant leurs salaires comme une charge sociale de plus. En réalité, une politique de l'absorption de sous-emploi chronique propre à nos pays ne peut se concevoir qu'au niveau macro-économique lors des choix d'investissement et de technologie.

Au terme de cette section, nous voulons rappeler que même dans le cadre d'une stratégie conventionnelle le secteur public est appelé à jouer un rôle important. Plus l'Etat propriétaire est sensible aux aspirations populaires et attentif aux nécessités de l'indépendance nationale et de l'équité sociale, plus ce rôle sera décisif. Néanmoins, il faut toujours avoir présents à l'esprit les possibilités et les limites du secteur public ainsi que les dangers qui menacent son bon fonctionnement. Il est du secteur public comme de la prise du pouvoir, ce qui importe est ce qu'on en fait.

**LE ROLE DU SECTEUR PUBLIC DANS UN "AUTRE DEVELOPPEMENT"

1. Par le terme "un autre développement" nous entendons l'ensemble d'éléments nouveaux qui ont surgi au cours des dernières années d'études, recherches et débats sur les faiblesses de la stratégie conventionnelle que de nombreux auteurs proposent comme des remèdes à ces faiblesses, des antidotes contre les facteurs qui perpétuent la dépendance, l'extraversion et la déformation du développement. Nous nous bornerons ici à rappeler brièvement ces éléments.

a) Le"self-reliance": Pour mettre fin à la dépendance il faut savoir et pourvoir compter sur soi, sur ses propres ressources souvent sous-estimées, voire insoupçonnées. Cela n'a rien à voir avec l'autarcie ou l'autosuffisance au niveau de l'économie nationale. D'abord, parce que compter sur soi ne signifie pas refuser par principe tout échange extérieur. Mais seulement que ces échanges soient exempts d'exploitation et surtout que la survie du pays n'en dépende jamais. Ensuite, et c'est là l'essentiel, compter sur soi devrait être une attitude générale pratiquée à tous les niveaux de la société, de l'individu au pays tout entier, en passant par la communauté villageoise, la coopérative, l'atelier, l'usine, l'école, la collectivité locale, etc. Il s'agit d'une mobilisation générale des
ressources et des énergies pour faire face aux problèmes concrets qu'affrontent les individus et les groupes, et les résoudre autant que possible par les moyens du bord grâce à des décisions démocratiquement prises au niveau approprié et aux efforts librement consentis. Cette mobilisation libérera, du moins à terme, le pays concerné de la dépendance envers l'extérieur, dont la preuve est le fait qu'il ne peut jamais se passer d'aide étrangère.

b) La participation : Il est évident que le "self-reliance" ainsi compris ne peut être que l'œuvre et le comportement d'hommes libres. Par liberté nous n'entendons pas uniquement le respect passif des droits de l'homme. Cela est nécessaire, mais non suffisant. La liberté doit acquérir un contenu positif concret et efficace, à savoir la participation des membres de chaque groupe - de la famille jusqu'à l'État - à la prise de décision qui les affecte et partant assumer les conséquences de ces décisions. Ainsi ce terme de participation couvre certaines notions déjà en circulation sans être pour autant clairement définies comme : libertés communales et municipales et autogestion. Mais il ouvre surtout de nouveaux horizons à la recherche de nouvelles formes de gouvernement des hommes et de gestion de leurs affaires.

c) La satisfaction des besoins : L'expérience du Tiers Monde a démontré combien il était vain d'attendre la satisfaction des besoins des masses les plus larges indirectement, à travers une croissance économique conçue toujours, même par les entreprises publiques, en termes de productivité et de rentabilité. Le fameux effet de percolateur s'est avéré être un mythe. Les inégalités sociales augmentent au lieu de diminuer. Elles freinent la croissance (ce qu'on appelle l'étroitesse du marché) et poussent à l'exportation à n'importe quel prix, renforçant ainsi la dépendance. Un plan qui se contente de comptabiliser les agrégats, projeter en la modifiant d'une manière plus ou moins heureuse leur évolution, ne mérite pas ce nom. En fait, pareil plan ou bien reste un document académique ou bien introduit un dirigisme paralyssant. Un vrai plan devrait avoir pour point de départ les besoins immédiats des masses les plus larges et déterminer avec réalisme le niveau de satisfaction possible à la fin de la période de plan. Ensuite, et seulement ensuite, il doit remonter des objectifs de consommation finale calculés en termes physiques aux projets, entreprises et activités capables de les fournir, jusqu'aux industries de base. Tout cela, en tenant compte du juste équilibre entre consommation immédiate et consommation future (les exigences d'accumulation).

d) L'écodéveloppement : Le calcul microéconomique tient compte uniquement de la rentabilité de l'entreprise à court moyen terme. Or, l'expérience prouve que l'Occident qui se développa dans des conditions exceptionnelles (colonialisme et néo-colonialisme) Porta un préjudice considérable à l'environnement (pollution, épuisement des ressources, etc.). Seul un calcul macroéconomique à long terme permet l'établissement des rapports harmonieux entre l'homme et l'environnement. Ainsi on pourra éviter la rupture des éco-systèmes sans pour autant tomber dans un conservationisme de mauvais aloi. L'écodéveloppement signifie que l'action de l'homme, au lieu de détruire les écosystèmes, réalise le passage d'un écosystème à un autre,
assurant ainsi la "solidarité de génération" tout en assainissant l'environnement des hommes d'aujourd'hui.

e) La technologie appropriée : La science est universelle mais la technologie ne l'est pas. Toute technique est la réponse qu'apporte une société donnée à un problème concret qui s'y pose, en utilisant les connaissances scientifiques du moment et en tirant sur les ressources dont elle dispose dans le respect de ses valeurs sociales. Ainsi, peu de techniques sont uniques et universelles à la fois. Les pays du Tiers Monde, en s'attachant aux transferts de technologies, accroissent leur dépendance et n'apportent guère les meilleures solutions à leurs problèmes. Une technologie appropriée est celle qui sert le mieux les objectifs du développement et sa stratégie, qui réalise la meilleure combinaison possible des facteurs de production, qui tient compte de la nécessité d'utiliser toute ressource nationale mais d'une façon rationnelle et qui tient compte de l'environnement culturel.

Notons pour terminer ce bref rappel des éléments d'un autre développement, que ces éléments (et probablement d'autres encore) constituent un tout dont chaque partie réagit sur l'autre. Un autre développement ne saurait être dispensé au détail.

2. Voyons maintenant quel rôle pourrait jouer le secteur public dans le cadre d'une telle stratégie.

a) Il est évident tout d'abord que le secteur public aura un rôle décisif, sinon dominant. Cependant, son expansion devrait se heurter à deux limites. Premièrement, il s'agit de prendre garde contre toute tentation de tout nationaliser. Il existe un rapport entre les forces de production et les formes efficientes de propriétés. La propriété sociale se justifie dès lors que la production est suffisamment socialisée : large division technique du travail, importance des machines comparée au travail, multiplicité des apports de capitaux (sociétés anonymes), étendue des marchés desservis, complexité de la gestion qui impose le recours à des "managers" professionnels, etc. Plus prosaïquement, on peut simplifier jusqu'à dire que la propriété sociale sera efficiente en principe chaque fois que le stade de l'entreprise individuelle ou familiale est dépassé et que les propriétaires des capitaux font appel à un management professionnel (même si certains gestionnaires possèdent des parts dans le capital social). En deuxième lieu, la propriété de l'Etat n'est qu'une forme d'appropriation sociale. Elle s'impose quand l'entreprise est d'intérêt national, c'est-à-dire desservant le marché national dans sa totalité ou sa majeure partie, et que les forces de production mises en œuvre sont à un niveau tel que le processus de prises de principales décisions centralement est à la fois nécessaire et techniquement possible.

b) Le fait que les pays du Tiers Monde ne sont pas "industrialisés" au sens qui s'applique aux pays occidentaux ou aux pays socialistes d'Europe, implique que la petite production y joue un rôle de premier plan. Les planificateurs et les responsables du développement concentrent leurs
efforts sur le secteur moderne porteur de tous les espoirs et ne s'intéressent au reste de l'économie que marginalement. C'est là une erreur capitale. Car même si l'on admet qu'une industrialisation à l'européenne est la seule voie possible et que de plus, elle pourrait être réalisée même au bout de quelques décennies (deux affirmations fort discutables), force est d'admettre qu'une part substantielle des activités économiques continuera de se dérouler en dehors de ce secteur moderne. En conséquence, au nom de la rationalité autant que de celui de self-reliance, il est indispensable de donner aux activités "traditionnelles" les cadres institutionnels et les moyens qui les rendent plus efficaces et capables de mettre en valeur leur potentialité de développement. La propriété de l'État à ce niveau peut s'avérer tout simplement catastrophique. D'où la nécessité d'imaginer et de promouvoir d'autres formes de propriété sociale : au niveau de la coopération villageoise, de l'agglomération urbaine, de la province, des communautés professionnelles, etc. Le succès de telles formes dépendra bien entendu de l'environnement politique. Une politique positive devrait battre en brèche la tentation d'une tutelle exercée par le pouvoir central ; tout simplement cette tutelle manque totalement d'efficacité alors que son poids inhibe les initiatives créatrices ou innovatrices des producteurs. Le contrôle exercé conjointement par les membres d'une coopérative échappe à de pareils dangers. Une autre condition politique essentielle à l'épanouissement de la petite propriété "sociale" est la démocratisation complète de l'administration locale. Une distinction très nette doit s'opérer entre l'action que l'État pourrait entreprendre en tant que pouvoir politique suprême incarnant les intérêts globaux de la nation d'une part, et celle venant en aide aux pouvoirs locaux de l'autre. La première catégorie devrait être bien délimitée et comporter peu de cas d'intervention. La seconde devrait être exemptée d'autoritarisme, de paternalisme et de privilège. Sa forme privilégiée serait l'aide technique et financière décidée en commun par les autorités locales et les administrations centrales. Ajoutons que cette analyse n'exclut pas le maintien de la propriété privée des moyens de production, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de propriétaires-travailleurs. Toute forme de regroupement de producteurs privés doit être démocratique, c'est-à-dire basée sur l'adhésion vraiment volontaire et la pleine participation à pied d'égalité à la gestion commune.

c) Pour revenir au secteur public stricto sensu, sa gestion doit être participative. L'entreprise publique doit être comprise avant tout comme un collectif de travailleurs que l'État a doté initialement d'une certaine quantité de moyens de production. En économie capitaliste, la "personne morale" qu'est l'entreprise n'est pas l'ensemble des machines mais l'ensemble des actionnaires. Le "fétichisme de la marchandise" n'a jamais été jusqu'à reconnaître à l'équipement un patrimoine juridique. Il faut donc ne pas perdre de vue que le passage de la propriété capitaliste à la propriété sociale est sensé résoudre la contradiction entre les forces de production et les rapports de production. La logique même de ce passage implique que l'entreprise publique devient un "collectif de travailleurs". Cependant, l'État demeure un bailleur de fonds même au-delà de la dotation initiale. Plus important est le fait qu'à notre avis la propriété de l'État s'impose surtout lorsque l'entreprise est
d'intérêt national, lorsqu'elle sert directement un grand nombre d'individus et d'entreprises dispersés aux quatre coins du pays. Or, seul l'État est habilité à représenter l'intérêt national, à exercer un contrôle au nom de la société entière. La gestion de l'entreprise publique devrait donc appartenir démocratiquement au collectif de travailleurs tout en assurant à l'État un droit de regard et d'intervention. On pense tout de suite à des formes de co-gestion, d'auto-gestion assorties d'un domaine réservé où la sanction de l'autorité de tutelle demeure nécessaire, etc.

d) Arrivé à ce point, on peut demander : et que devient la planification dans tout cela ? J'aimerais déclarer tout de suite deux convictions personnelles. Primo, la planification est une nécessité, car le libre jeu des forces de marché se fait la plupart du temps dans un sens défavorable au développement. Secondo, aucun groupe de planificateurs, quel que soit leur niveau de connaissances et d'habileté, et nonobstant les moyens techniques mis à leur disposition, ne saurait saisir correctement la réalité socio-économique trop fragmentée et dont une partie appreciable échappe à la statistique, ni opérer à huis clos des choix justes et acceptables aux yeux de ceux dont la réalisation du plan va dépendre en fin de compte. Ceci pose, la planification pour réussir doit devenir une démarche sociale pratiquée à tous les échelons et surtout à la base, du niveau de l'unité de production ou de la communauté où s'imbriquent les activités économiques, sociales et culturelles (village, quartier, entreprise, etc.). Un dialogue incessant est mutuellement éducatif entre tous les échelons, ouvert aux non-planificateurs, se déroulant dans la phase d'élaboration du plan aussi bien que dans celle de l'évaluation de l'exécution de ses tranches peut assurer à la fois le réalisme du plan et l'adhésion pleine et consciente de ceux qui le mettent en œuvre. Les fonctions principales de l'autorité centrale de planification doivent être au nombre de deux. D'abord, dégager de l'ensemble des plans partiels (d'entreprise, local, provincial, sectoriel, etc.) et des débats qui soulèvent leur élaboration des orientations générales assorties de choix alternatifs qui seront soumis aux instances politiques pour trancher. En second lieu, une fois prises les décisions politiques portant sur les choix fondamentaux, intégrer les divers plans mentionnés en un ensemble cohérent et opérationnel.

xxxxx

Un mot pour conclure. L'opposition développement conventionnel - un autre développement n'est ni une concession à une phraséologie à la mode ni une tentative de camouflage de l'opposition fondamentale capitalisme-socialisme. Si j'ai pourtant opté pour ces termes relativement nouveaux, c'est d'abord pour souligner que le socialisme n'est pas un mot magique qui dispense de l'élaboration des projets de société. C'est aussi parce que je ne crois pas à l'existence d'un modèle socialiste universel. Les expériences socialistes concrètes sont immensément riches en enseignements, mais chacune a sa composante nationale où les facteurs d'histoire et les faits de culture ont des rôles déterminants. C'est enfin parce que les différences culturelles, les formes de domination d'hier et d'aujourd'hui et leurs stigmates dans nos économies soulèvent des problèmes spécifiques qui
ne peuvent être ramenés à des concepts simples et détachés du contexte historique et culturel comme l'industrialisation, le secteur d'État, la modernisation ou la technologie la plus avancée. Nos problèmes dans le Tiers Monde sont beaucoup plus complexes, les solutions justes et cohérentes que nous pourrions y apporter dans une perspective de libération totale de l'homme et des hommes seraient autant de contributions à l'enrichissement et à la diversité de la civilisation humaine.
NO CELEBRATORY SONG

So long
as car-parks take
precedence over hospitals
Multi-storeyed hotels
over homes for people
Irrelevant factories
over paddy-fields
for our daily sustenance

So long
as foreign investors
devastate our estate
and the voice of Capital
speaks louder than
the pleas of fisherman

I shall
sing no celebratory song
no matter
how many songs go down
This tongue
will be of thistle and thorn
until they right the wrong

So long
as blind bulldozers
are allowed unchecked
to gouge our landscape
and Multinationals
licensed to run
amuck across this land

I shall
sing no celebratory song

So long
as Law comes before justice
the edifice before service
the payment before treatment
and appearance before essence

I shall sing no celebratory song

So long
as the poet is debased
and the businessman praised
the realist rewarded
and the idealist denigrated
I shall
sing no celebratory song
no matter
how many suns go down
This tongue
will be of thistle and thorn
until they right the wrong

So long
as our rivers and streams
our beaches, our air
our oceans and trees
our birds, our fish
our butterflies and bees
are strangled, stifled
polluted, poisoned
crushed, condemned . . . .
by lop-sided development

I shall
sing no celebratory song
no matter
how many suns go down
This tongue
will be of thistle and thorn
until they right the wrong

Cecil Rajendra

Excerpted from Asian Action, Newsletter of the
Asian Cultural Forum on Development, March-April
1978 (Room 301, 399/1 Soi Sri off Silom Road,
Bangkok 5, Thailand).
BUILDING BLOCKS

COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE - THE CASE OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
by Kenneth Hall & Byron Blake
c/o Hall
8168 Aboss Lane
Clay, N.Y. 13041, U.S.A.
Original language: English

L'AUTONOMIE COLLECTIVE - LA CAS DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ DES CARAIBES (CARICOM)

Résumé: L'autonomie collective (collective self-reliance) est de plus en plus reconnue comme la stratégie la plus appropriée pour combattre les obstacles au développement rencontrés par le Tiers Monde nationalement et internationalement. Cependant, les modalités actuelles de l'intégration économique régionale entre pays du Tiers Monde se heurtent à des difficultés considérables et l'on peut se demander si les conditions sont réunies qui permettent la mise en œuvre de l'autonomie collective comme une stratégie pratique à court et le moyen terme.

L'expérience du CARICOM permet de reexaminer les bases sur lesquelles reposent les accords régionaux existants, leurs résultats, la nature des problèmes actuels, et aussi de suggérer de nouvelles mesures qui permettraient d'atteindre les objectifs et de réaliser les vœux si souvent formulés dans les réunions mondiales et régionales.

Au plan théorique comme au plan de l'organisation, le CARICOM devrait assurer la coopération la plus complète dans de nombreux domaines. En particulier, il devrait assurer le renforcement, la coordination et la régulation des relations économiques et commerciales entre les États qui en sont membres de manière à assurer leur développement harmonieux et équilibré.

Pour certains de ses membres, le CARICOM représente la seule option possible s'ils veulent préserver leur viabilité économique, financière et politique en tant que pays indépendants. Dans leur ensemble, les pays du CARICOM sont affectés par les problèmes résultant de leur petite taille, la faiblesse de leurs ressources, la fragmentation géographique, politique et économique et un degré élevé de dépendance.

L'étude souligne certains résultats du CARICOM mais mentionne aussi que le chemin vers l'autonomie collective est semé d'obstacles en dépit d'une histoire commune, d'une certaine habitude de la coopération et de certains problèmes communs. Même si l'expérience du CARICOM révèle le fossé entre les déclarations et la pratique, l'expérience est positive dans la mesure où elle continue, et met en œuvre nombre des mesures envisagées et des programmes de coopération à une échelle plus grande que dans aucune autre région du Tiers Monde.
LA AUTODEPENDENCIA COLECTIVA - EL CASO DE LA COMUNIDAD DEL CARIBE (CARICOM)

Resumen: La autodependencia colectiva se acepta hoy en día como la estrategia más apropiada para superar los obstáculos al desarrollo que experimenta el Tercer Mundo a niveles nacionales tanto como internacionales. Sin embargo, los modos de integración regional económicos actuales entre países del Tercer Mundo enfrentan grandes dificultades. Se puede preguntar si existen las condiciones que permiten la implementación de la autodependencia colectiva como estrategia factible a corto y a medio plazo. El experimento del CARICOM permite la reexaminación de los principios sobre cuales se basan los acuerdos regionales actuales, sus resultados, la naturaleza de problemas actuales, y también la posibilidad de sugerir nuevas medidas que permitieran el logro de fines y la realización de deseos formulados a menudo en reuniones regionales y mundiales. De un punto de vista teórico tanto como en cuanto al plan de organización, el CARICOM debe asegurar una cooperación muy completa en muchos campos. En particular se debe asegurar el refuerzo, la coordinación y la ordenanza de relaciones económicas y comerciales entre los estados miembros de manera que su desarrollo armónico y equilibrado sea asegurado. Para algunos de sus miembros el CARICOM representa la única opción posible si desean preservar su viabilidad económica, financiera y política como países independientes. En su conjunto, los países del CARICOM están afectados por problemas que resultan del hecho de ser pequeños, de la debilidad de sus recursos, de su fragmentación geográfica, política y económica y de un alto nivel de dependencia. El informe subraya algunos logros del CARICOM pero además añade que la autodependencia y el camino hacia la autodependencia colectiva está lleno de obstáculos a pesar de una herencia histórica común, de estar en la misma región geográfica y de tener ciertos costumbres de cooperación. Aunque CARICOM también ha mostrado la gran diferencia entre la declaración y la práctica, el experimento es positivo ya que continua a realizar las medidas y los programas de cooperación a un nivel más amplio que cualquier otra región del Tercer Mundo.
COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE: THE CASE OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)

Introduction

Collective self-reliance has become widely accepted lately as the most appropriate strategy for overcoming the constraints on development experienced by the Third World both at the national and international level. It has become widely accepted at a time, however, when the existing arrangements for regional economic integration among Third World countries are experiencing considerable difficulty and raise doubt as to whether the conditions exist to permit the implementation of collective self-reliance as a viable practical strategy in the proximate and medium term future. Collective self-reliance appears contradictory particularly at the international level where it is being enunciated simultaneously with the declaration to establish a new international economic order. The issues raised by the record of regional economic integration and the simultaneous attempt to pursue policies of collective self-reliance and the creation of the new international economic order suggest the need to re-examine the premises on which existing regional arrangements have been made, their achievements, and the nature of the current problems they are experiencing and to propose new measures which could achieve the goals and realise the aspirations so frequently enunciated in the international and regional fora. The experience of CARICOM will be used as a basis for this examination.

CARICOM (THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY)

CARICOM comprises the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean and include Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent. The Bahamas maintains informal links with CARICOM while other Caribbean countries participate in some of its activities. It is the most recent stage in a long history of efforts to achieve political unity, economic integration and general co-operation among those countries. Its most immediate predecessors were the West Indies Federation which lasted from 1958-62 and Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) which was established in 1968 and ultimately gave way to the present arrangements.

CARICOM pursues activities in three areas: economic integration through the Common Market arrangements, functional co-operation and the operation of common services such as education, health, transportation, communications, culture and sports, and coordination of foreign policy. Institutionally there are the Heads of Government Conference, Common Market Council of Ministers and several ministerial institutions and the CARICOM Secretariat as the principal administrative organ. Integration and co-operation is also pursued through independent institutions called associate institutions such as the Caribbean Development Bank, the University of the West Indies, the West Indies Shipping Corporation, the Caribbean Investment Corporation and the Caribbean Food Corporation. Conceptually and organisationally CARICOM is intended to achieve the fullest cooperation in a wide variety of issue areas to achieve the objectives of regional development. Specifically, it is intended to achieve the strengthening, co-ordination and regulation of economic and
trade relations among its member states in order to promote their accelerated harmonious and balanced development, the sustained expansion and integration of economic activities, the equitable share of benefits derived from those activities and a greater measure of economic independence and effectiveness in dealing with other states and international co-operations. It also aims at promoting the efficient operation of certain common services and activities for the benefit of the population, the promotion of greater understanding among the Caribbean people and the advancement of their social, cultural and technological development.

COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE AND CARICOM

At its most general conceptual level collective self-reliance denotes the desire of countries to rely collectively on their own resources in the attainment of their development objectives. At the policy level it does not imply autarchic development but rather a dynamic interrelationship between a group of countries on the one hand and the rest of the international community in the areas of trade, transfer of technology and exports. The critical criteria are that the policies pursued in international economic relations are determined by specific deficiencies and are intended to strengthen and/or complement deficiencies in resources, indigenous scientific and technological capability and the achievement of genuine reciprocity among countries sharing similar aspirations. At the internal level collective self-reliance implies structural transformation designed to promote social justice and effective utilisation of local resources, the satisfaction of the basic needs of the population and engender public participation and democratisation in the development process. It has generally been conceded, however, that few if any Third World countries or groups of countries are now pursuing those policies at the internal and international level. Collective self-reliance has therefore assumed an operational definition which is significantly different from its theoretical and conceptual formulations. At the operational level it calls primarily for two sets of policies. First, Third World countries should combine their bargaining strengths so that they can better exploit their bargaining positions and negotiate a more advantageous arrangement with the industrialised countries. Secondly it advocates expansion of economic transactions and increase in social and cultural links among Third World countries so that a greater utilisation of their material, spiritual and cultural resources could be achieved.

CARICOM is more consistent with the objectives of the operational definition of collective self-reliance than the theoretical and conceptual requirements suggested by the more comprehensive definition. In this context CARICOM is perceived not merely as a desirable but as an essential strategy in overcoming the development problems in the region. For some of its members CARICOM represents the only feasible alternative if they are to maintain their economic, financial and political viability as independent countries. As a whole the CARICOM countries are characterised by the problems associated with small size, limited resource base, a legacy of political and economic fragmentation and a high level of economic dependence and geographical and physical fragmentation of Third World island countries. These problems provide a very strong case in favour of collective self-reliance among the countries.
POLICIES OF COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS

As an instrument of collective self-reliance the Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing CARICOM is substantially in keeping with the measures for economic cooperation among Third World countries agreed upon by these countries at the Conference on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries held in Mexico City the 13-27th of September 1976. At the operational level, decisions have been taken and activities have been pursued in the areas of trade and related areas, in production, infra-structure and services, monetary and financial measures, technical co-operation, external economic relations, health, education and culture, industrial relations, communications, insurance, tourism and intra-regional travel, meteorology and harmonisation of laws. The institutional arrangements, furthermore provide adequately for the participation not only of member governments but are decentralised to include all the portfolios at the national level through regular ministerial and official meetings.

There is some controversy over the significance of the achievements in the areas of activities that have been pursued. One school of thought views the whole process as one of gradual implementation through a series of stages in order to fulfill the objectives. Others have placed more emphasis on the slow pace of implementation generally, on the current difficulties being experienced, the lack of activity in certain key areas and are therefore less impressed with the range of activities which have been undertaken.

There is no doubt that, since its inception, achievements have been registered in the three broad categories of policy options, namely, strengthening the bargaining position, mutual assistance and increase in the economic transactions and cooperation in a wide range of areas. Thus the volume of intra-regional trade expanded by more than six-fold between 1967 and 1975, the percentage increasing from 8% of total trade in 1967 to 11% in 1973. A common external tariff has now been agreed upon and a scheme for the harmonisation of fiscal incentives has provided a framework for a common policy of protection and incentives for regional production. The establishment of an interim balance of payments facility and an expansion of the intra-regional clearing scheme have facilitated expansion in trade and further eases the restrictions arising from monetary problems. Trinidad and Tobago has also provided substantial grants and loans to most members of the community to assist in meeting their financial and balance of payments difficulties arising particularly from the substantial increase in the price of oil imported in the region. In the area of sectoral integration the Caribbean Food Corporation has been established as the first step in the implementation of a regional food plan and the Corn/Soya Company in Guyana has begun operations. Implementation has also taken place in the area of industrial programming, with priority being given to the pulp and paper sector and the sea-island cotton.

In the field of external economic relations, CARICOM successfully worked as a single unit in the negotiation of the Lomé Convention and was instrumental in the establishment of the ACP. A new economic and technical cooperation agreement was concluded with Canada in 1979 and a similar agreement was concluded with Mexico earlier. The establishment of a new West Indian Shipping Corporation, Caribbean News Agency, the Caribbean Examinations Council, the Caribbean Broadcasting Union, give some indication of steady and increasing activity across a wide range of fields.
Whether these achievements justify the optimism sometimes expressed about CARICOM as a viable instrument of collective self-reliance is questionable. The experience of the movement since 1976 casts serious doubts on the capability of the existing arrangements to operate effectively and to achieve its declared objectives within a reasonable time. These doubts derive from several trends observable within the movement. There has been a reduction in economic transactions between the member countries during that period as indicated by the significant drop in the volume of regional trade as a percentage of total trade, from 11% in 1973 to 6% in 1976. More important has been the tendency to adopt unilateral action on the part of the member governments in pursuit of national or ideological interests. The dissatisfaction of several members of the community with the distribution of benefits further suggests that one of the prerequisites of successful collective self-reliance, namely the capacity for trade-offs, has not yet been fully developed.

These developments have stimulated predictions that CARICOM will either collapse or stagnate. It has been suggested, for example, that in the proximate future there will be a halt in the activities in new issue areas, that there will be no further developments in certain critical areas such as foreign investments and exchange rates, that the proposals for joint ventures would not be implemented and that there would be a reversal of progress which has been achieved in the free trade regime and the operation of arrangements for the intra-regional trade and commodities.

These developments and the associated predictions raise the further question of whether the pre-condition exists for the successful operation of CARICOM as an instrument of collective self-reliance. It has been suggested for instance that there are not enough resources to permit substantial compensation for those who are presently non-gainers until such time as the potential of the activities being undertaken is fully realised. Furthermore national alternatives have increasingly been resorted to in a context where CARICOM is no longer perceived as consistent with the priorities of some of its members and offers a less attractive alternative in the pursuit of national goals. The current difficulties are also assumed to be fundamental in nature and not temporary difficulties which are amenable to compromise. Finally it is suggested that the community at present lacks internal dynamic and that there is little prospect of acquiring new sources. This view is, however, not universally shared especially by those who regard the institutional framework as basically sound and the current difficulties the result of temporary problems traceable directly to the international economic recession in the mid-70's.

**Some Problems and Proposed Solutions**

Despite the differences over the explanations and the extrapolations about their future impact on the process of Caribbean integration, there is agreement that the present arrangements have not worked as effectively as was anticipated and that new instruments and renewed effort would be needed to regain the lost momentum if CARICOM is to continue as an attractive alternative to the national options and not as an increasingly irrelevant vestige of Caribbean economic-political-social development. In this connection, proposals have been submitted which suggest the need for a re-examination of the basic assumptions, the objectives and the operations of CARICOM. These proposals have derived from an identification of certain key issues.
At the institutional and decision-making level a major problem is associated with the implementation of decisions arrived at. Estimates vary with regard to the number of decisions implemented but it is known that the proportion within the time frame specified is rather low particularly in areas requiring domestic legislation or in sensitive areas of national concern. Frustration has been created in some quarters as some governments have complained about the inconvenience, and in some cases the negative impact, created by non-implementation by other member states. This is particularly significant as the CARICOM Treaty contains a significant proportion of declaratory goals leaving the specific mechanisms, the timing and method of implementation to the ministerial bodies and the member governments. Questions have also been raised with regard to the decision-making process itself which requires the consensus of all member states with each member having a built-in veto. This has resulted in a time-consuming process characterised by compromises which limit the effectiveness of the measures agreed upon. Equally important is that many governments lack the capability to implement decisions even when they are willing to do so. These problems suggest the need for measures to strengthen and speed up the collective decision making and implementation processes. Proposals have been made to improve the process by the establishment of a commissioner system, a re-organisation of the secretariat giving it greater emphasis on implementation and a decentralisation of its activities on the basis of functional areas so that units could be nearer the points of implementation and be more readily accessible especially to those governments which require assistance. At the national level, it is suggested that there should be institutional organisation to permit more effective national co-ordination with regard to regional issues. Proposals have also been made for the creation of joint administrative departments to permit a greater degree of effectiveness especially among the smaller members of the community. Implementation of these proposals would remove some of the bottle-necks which currently impede the achievement of the objectives of CARICOM.

A much more important issue, however, is the divergence of policies being pursued at the national and at the regional level. The adoption of collective self-reliance at the regional level pre-supposes complementary policies of self-reliant development at the national level and a willingness of national governments to co-ordinate their planning in such a way that appropriate complementarity could be achieved in policy and production. Recent experience suggests, however, the existence of this disparity, where some governments have attempted to formulate and implement policies of self-reliant development consistent with domestic priorities while others are not pursuing similar policies. This has resulted in operational and policy differences and has prevented either the adoption of decisions in major areas of the Treaty or their implementation. In some cases it has even led to the restriction of trade on what are considered as non-essential items by some countries but which are considered as significant in the export component of others. Thus the whole common market arrangements experience serious difficulties with the imposition of import restrictions by Guyana and Jamaica against "inessential" products, partly because of their very serious balance of payments problems and partly in keeping with the adoption of basic needs strategies at the national level. The adoption and implementation of the recommendations submitted to the Common Market Council with regard to licensing and quantitative restrictions, regional import programming, trade in agricultural products, state trading and public sector procurement, as well as for
financing intra-regional trade, would go a long way in meeting some of those difficulties. Urgent measures are also needed to implement projects in the industrial and agricultural sectors which give priority to the use of regional resources.

Perhaps one of the most controversial issues that has arisen recently deals with the question of the distribution of benefits, specifically, the dissatisfaction expressed by the Leeward and Windward Island member states that they have received little or no benefits or a disproportionate amount in relation to their inputs. This implies that the mechanisms which exist such as the special regimes for the Less Developed Countries have not operated effectively to prevent polarisation of economic activities and disparity in the distribution and allocation of benefits and resources. It also implies that the member states are not yet ready for the "trade-off" strategies of development. This strategy requires the willingness and capability to offset cost of one kind against gains of another at different time periods. In part this situation is the result of the impact of the world economic crisis in the mid 1970's on the economics of most members countries. More importantly it is directly related to the inability of all member states, except Trinidad, to absorb additional costs and postpone anticipated benefits for an indefinite period. This was in direct conflict with the assumptions on which the CARICOM was based. In 1973 it was optimistically expected that Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago would be able to carry the main burden of implementing policies of collective self-reliance but by 1976 three of those countries were experiencing serious economic problems of their own and had to be assisted by Trinidad and Tobago or by other sources rather than contributing substantially to the cost of collective self-reliance. To the extent that the problem is temporary, there is some hope that solutions can be found in the near future but if, as seems likely, these are fundamental structural problems, then the existing disequilibrium is likely to continue and could conceivably only be solved by the expeditious adoption and implementation of more concrete and far reaching measures of collective self-reliance.

CARICOM also appears to lack the public support of the population which could bring to bear the requisite influence on the decision-makers at the national level that would force them to pursue national policies which are consistent with the objectives of collective self-reliance at the regional level. This is the result of the institutional structure whereby CARICOM is essentially an arrangement between governments and more specifically the national bureaucrats. Unless structural and institutional re-organisation is undertaken at the national level to permit public participation in the development process, then CARICOM is likely to remain divorced from popular will. Efforts will be needed then to democratise and decentralise economic and political decision-making at the local level so that regional policies would become an integral part of national planning and decision-making. Proposals for worker participation at the national and regional level are consistent with these ideas and should be encouraged. This would also provide new resources from which a new dynamism could develop.

Another area to which some of the current difficulties are related is the question of the capability of CARICOM as a whole to pursue meaningful policies of collective self-reliance both at the regional and at the international level. Increasingly there are suggestions that CARICOM will only become viable if it is linked with a larger area or combines its own negotiating strength with those of other developing countries which would enable it to
enter into arrangements which are complementary to the pursuit of collective self-reliance. The experience with the Lomé Convention, the formation of the ACP and other efforts at the international level would tend to lend support to that view. The tendency of some member countries to look outside of the region for solutions to their national problems also suggests that some countries, at least, have doubts about the viability of CARICOM, as an instrument of collective self-reliance. In this connection urgent steps should be taken to implement the proposals and decisions to strengthen the machinery for the co-ordination of external economic relations and to participate in the wider international efforts at Third World collective self-reliance.

CONCLUSION

CARICOM's experience of collective self-reliance suggests the necessity for the adoption of policies of collective self-reliance if the region as a whole is to overcome the constraints of development. It also implies, however, that the attainment and consistent pursuit of those policies are plagued with difficulties even in a situation where the countries involved have a common historical heritage, are located in the same region, had a heritage of close working relationship, have common problems and are at more or less the same stages of development. CARICOM has also demonstrated the wide gap which currently exists between the declaration of the goals of self-reliance and their transformation into concrete and successful policies. The experience has also indicated some of the constraints imposed by the small Third World island countries and suggests that the achievement of collective self-reliance will depend, at least for those countries, as much on their own efforts as on the wider collective self-reliance of all Third World countries. CARICOM cannot be regarded as a failure since it continues to implement many of the measures and operate programmes of cooperation in a wider group of areas than any other regional movement among Third World countries. Its achievements in some of these areas have been significant. Furthermore, while there are undoubtedly some serious problems there are many people in the region who are of the view that those problems can be solved and that the experiment would continue to be significant in any assessment of collective self-reliance as a viable feasible and successful strategy for Third World countries.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

H. Brewster and C. Thomas, The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1967)


W.G. Demas, Essays on Caribbean Integration and Development (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1976)

West Indian Nationhood and Caribbean Integration (Barbados: CCC Publishing, 1974)


V. Lewis, The Caribbean Community: A Political Analysis (Barbados: Barbados Advocate News, 1973)


"Evolution of the Process of Integration in the Caribbean and the Current Situation and Perspectives of CARICOM" (Georgetown: Caribbean Community Secretariat, 1976)


To Care for CARICOM (Goergetown: Caribbean Community Secretariat, 1975)

Michael Manley

THE SEPARATIST TRAP

Where results are the opposite of intentions it behoves a man to re-examine his strategies. Let us therefore begin by taking a fresh look at a foreign policy for a country like Jamaica.

The first thing that we have to appreciate is that in economic terms size is increasingly a pre-condition of survival in the world. Hence a first thrust of foreign policy for a small country must be to seek to become part of a larger economic region which provides a larger basic market together with greater opportunities for economic specialisation. Once this is grasped it is not too difficult to move to the second leg of a foreign policy which flows from the recognition of the common dilemma of the Third World.

In Jamaica's case the break-up in 1961 of the abortive West Indian Federation created a general ambivalence towards regionalism even in its economic form. It is not the purpose of this book to debate the issue of political Federation which is closed for the time being. It is the purpose of this book, however, to point out that the emotional consequence of the political trauma of 1961 must never be allowed to cloud our judgement of contemporary reality. It is vital to Jamaica's future that we should play our part in the creation of a Caribbean Common Market. This involves many steps and considerable technical adaptation but the objective must be clear and must be of an eventual scope to include all the countries of the Caribbean regardless of their ethnic, linguistic or political characteristics. Indeed, in the broadest sweep of history, economic regionalism must be seen as extending to include all the countries of Central and Latin America which embrace the Caribbean. Guyana and Belize represent geographical out-posts and are historical pioneers of this concept. Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El


Michael Manley is the Prime Minister of Jamaica.
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, French Guiana and Brazil all form a natural economic region bounded by Barbados to the east and stretching up through Cuba, the Bahamas to Bermuda to the north. Geography and a shared colonial history combine with the characteristics of Third World underdevelopment to create a region that is just beginning to awaken to the fact that it shares a common, manifest destiny. This grouping contains the resources, the diversity and the scale of potential market to make it one of the viable and exciting development areas of the world. Furthermore, if its people can summon the historical vision and political common sense to move beyond the apparent ideological differences within the region, they could demonstrate to the rest of the world a new approach to the question of foreign investment. The Caribbean contains capital exporting countries like Venezuela as well as a number of nations which must still seek to import foreign capital and technology. However, all the countries of the region have suffered from exploitation at the hands of foreign capital and are, therefore, well placed to learn the lessons of history and to evolve new relationships in which the movement of capital is responsive to the needs and national objectives of both the exporting and the host countries.

The challenge of the future is to shake off the shackles of yesterday's assumptions which have delivered us into a separatist trap. The logic of tomorrow's possibilities unfolds in the larger context of regional co-operation and economic integration. This is so for precisely the same reasons that make it logical for the countries of Europe, after two thousand years of conflict, to form an economic block now. It is so for the same reasons that connect the respective economic accomplishments of America and Russia to their sheer size.

The perception that leads one to the conclusion that economic regionalism is a logical pre-condition of accelerated national development must now be applied to the world situation. It is one of the tragedies of the post-colonial period of all those countries which we now loosely describe as the Third World, that they have permitted themselves the luxury of ideological distraction.
VERS LA DEMYSTIFICATION DE LA NOUVELLE MAGIE BLANCHE:
LE CAS DE L'INDUSTRIE ZAÏROISE DU CUIVRE

par Ilunga Ilunkamba
Faculté des sciences économiques
Université nationale
B.P. 765
Kinshasa XI, Zaïre

Langue originale: Français

TOWARD THE DEMYSTIFICATION OF THE NEW WHITE MAGIC: THE CASE OF THE ZAÏRE COPPER INDUSTRY

Abstract: Although most of the copper industry of Zaïre has been formally nationalized for twelve years, transnational firms still exercise effective control over it through the propagation of technological myths. Thus, the retention of (mainly Belgian) expatriate technical personnel (in conjunction with the introduction of Zaïrois cadres - who are themselves often 'co-opted' by the transnational system) is justified by the paucity of Zaïrois engineering graduates, whereas in neighbouring Zambia the mining companies themselves took the initiative to stimulate the education and training of Zambians to take over technical functions. The refining in Belgium and Japan of the bulk of Zaïre's copper is justified, inter alia, by the difficulty of predicting demand for different types of refined copper, while in fact most of the trade is conducted under yearly contracts. The perception of Belgium as the largest consumer of Zaïre's copper has perpetuated the predominance of Belgian interests in the marketing process; yet a large part of Belgium's copper imports is in fact re-exported in refined form to other consumers.

In order to strengthen effective national control of the copper industry, it is necessary to counter these myths by embarking on a programme to "zaïrianize" technical functions (drawing upon the Zambian experience), by expanding domestic refining capacity, and by exploiting the dependence of Belgian firms upon the supply of Zaïrois copper to negotiate more advantageous marketing arrangements. Moreover, the internal surplus generated by the copper industry, which before nationalization was used by the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga to consolidate its economic power by investing in vertically-integrated enterprises, should now be used to diversify the economy, notably by investment in agriculture, and thus reduce Zaïre's dependence on copper. Since the major copper enterprises are in the public sector, the State has the power to initiate this diversification policy, which could be financed by the creation of tax-exempt diversification funds within those enterprises.
HACIA LA DEMISTIFICACION DE LA NUEVA MAGICA BLANCA: EL CASO DE LA INDUSTRIA DEL COBRE EN ZAIRE

Resumen: Aunque formalmente nacionalizada en gran parte hace 12 años, la industria del cobre de Zaire queda efectivamente en el control de empresas transnacionales que ejercen este control para propagar mitos tecnológicos. De este modo se justifica la retención de empleados técnicos expatriados Belgas (en conjunto con la introducción de empleados Zaíreños, ellos mismos a menudo "asimilados" por el sistema transnacional), con la escasez de ingenieros graduados Zaíreños, mientras que en Zambia, país vecino, las compañías mineras han tomado ellas mismas la iniciativa de estimular la educación y el entrenamiento de ingenieros indígenas para permitirles acceso a funciones técnicas. El refinamiento de la mayor parte del cobre Zaíreño en Belga y en el Japón se justifica con el argumento que es difícil pronosticar la demanda para distintas formas del producto refinado, mientras que en hecho la mayor parte del comercio está reglado por contratos anuales. La idea de Belga como país que consume la mayor parte del cobre de Zaíre ha perpetuado la dominación de intereses Belgas en el proceso de promoción comercial; sin embargo una gran parte de las importaciones de cobre por los Belgas se vuelve a re-exportar en forma refinada a otros consumidores. Para aumentar el control nacional efectivo de la industria del cobre se necesita oponerse a los mitos por medio de un programa para "zaírificar" las funciones técnicas (inspirándose del experimento en Zambia), aumentando la capacidad doméstica para el refinamiento del cobre, y exponiendo el hecho de que las firmas Belgas dependen de aprovisionamientos de cobre Zaíreño para poder negociar arreglos comerciales ventajosos. Además, el excedente interno producido por la industria de cobre que la Union Minière du Haut Katanga usaba antes para consolidar su poder económico invirtiendo este excedente en empresas verticalmente integradas en sus operaciones, se puede y se debe usar ahora para diversificar la economía, especialmente para inversiones en la agricultura, ya que esto reduciría la dependencia Zaíreña del cobre. Ya que las grandes empresas de cobre están en el sector público, el estado tiene el poder para iniciar esta política de diversificación que se pudiera financiar por el establecimiento de fondos para la diversificación - libre de impuestos - dentro de sus empresas.

Notes: (cont. de p.12)

7/ Nyembo Shabani, L'industrie du cuivre dans le monde et le progrès économique du copperbelt africain (Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1975), pp.201-222


VERS LA DÉMYSTIFICATION DE LA NOUVELLE MAGIE BLANCHE :
LE CAS DE L'INDUSTRIE ZAÏROISE DU CUIVRE

1. Introduction
L'analyse proposée ici présente une stratégie destinée à :
(a) accroître le contrôle national sur l'industrie du cuivre ;
(b) réduire la dépendance de l'économie zaïroise vis-à-vis de cette industrie.

2. Vers un contrôle national effectif de l'industrie zaïroise du cuivre
Bien qu'en grande partie nationalisée depuis janvier 1967, l'industrie zaïroise du cuivre demeure contrôlée par le biais de la technologie par les firmes multinationales. Ce contrôle technologique des firmes multinationales s'exerce à travers :
(i) la fourniture du personnel technique
(ii) le raffinage des minerais
(iii) la commercialisation des produits miniers

En vue d'élaborer une stratégie alternative, on va passer en revue ces différentes prestations, en proposant, pour chacune d'elles, une perspective de la situation présente et une critique (désaliénée) des choix retenus.

2.1 Personnel technique
L'industrie zaïroise du cuivre est caractérisée par une forte prépondérance du personnel technique expatrié, essentiellement belge. La zaïrianisation des cadres consécutive à la nationalisation de l'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) et à la création de la Générale des Carrières et Mines du Zaïre (CECAMINES) a concerné les fonctions administratives, sans pour autant entraîner une réduction sensible des effectifs absolus du personnel expatrié, ce qui a contribué à gonfler les effectifs (nationaux et expatriés) dont l'évolution n'a pas obéi à des impératifs de production.

Le tableau 1, qui présente l'évolution comparée de la production du cuivre et du personnel de cadre universitaire, permet de dégager l'impact négatif de cette politique.

Tableau 1 : Production par cadre universitaire à la Gécamines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Année</th>
<th>Personnel de cadre</th>
<th>Production (en milliers de tonnes)</th>
<th>Production par cadre (en milliers de tonnes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>362,2</td>
<td>1,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>405,8</td>
<td>0,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>471,1</td>
<td>0,665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Les raisons généralement évoquées pour justifier cette prédominance expatriée tiennent à la répartition de la population studente zairoise. En effet, comme l'écrit le Rapport Annuel de la Gécamines en 1971, "la proportion d'universitaires zaïrois est plus élevée dans les activités administratives (de 72 à 100%) que dans les disciplines techniques et médicales (12 à 17%). Nous sommes en effet tributaires du marché d'emploi... Une limitation réside dans le fait qu'un nombre relativement peu élevé d'étudiants entreprend et poursuit des études d'ingénieurs : le nombre d'étudiants inscrits en faculté polytechnique est au nombre total d'étudiants dans le rapport de 1 à 7. Or, se fait, en raison de notre vocation essentiellement industrielle, que c'est avant tout d'ingénieurs que nous avons et que nous continuons à avoir besoin. Si l'on tient compte de ce que la durée des études d'ingénieurs est de 5 à 6 années après la fin des humanités, il ne fait pas de doute que les efforts consentis ne peuvent produire leurs effets qu'à long terme" 2.

Cette attitude passive ne correspond pas à la capacité légendaire de l'entreprise minière du Haut-Shaba à transformer son environnement naturel et humain. Elle est démentie par l'expérience de l'industrie zambienne de cuivre, où, malgré des similitudes de départ, la politique de zambianisation a suivi un modèle différent de celle de la zaïriennisation. En effet, la zambianisation a consisté en un processus progressif de remplacement effectif du personnel expatrié par des techniciens zambiens. Ainsi, le rapport expatrié/zambien dans les fonctions généralement dévolues aux techniciens étrangers, qui est en 1964 de 10,8 expatriés pour 1 Zambien, se situe à 1,3 expatrié pour 1 Zambien en 1968. La base de la zambianisation est le financement par les entreprises minières (Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (NCCM) et Roan Consolidated Mines Limited (RCH)) d'un vaste programme, à tous les niveaux (exécution, surveillance, direction), de stages et formation formelle dans les écoles techniques et universités au pays aussi bien qu'à l'extérieur. Ce programme, qui couvre tous les secteurs d'activité de l'industrie (mines, métallurgie, services techniques, administration, service médical...) se déroule suivant un plan élaboré en fonction des postes à africainer.

Il est en principe possible au Zaïre de s'inspirer de l'expérience zambienne. Toutefois, l'application du schéma zambien suppose d'une part l'identification à la fois des fonctions à zaïrianiser et des niveaux et types de stages et d'éducation formelle à organiser ou fournir et d'autre part les choix des candidats les plus aptes à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur de l'industrie du cuivre.

Cette tâche a été réalisée en Zambie par Anglo-American Corporation et Roan Selection Trust sous la double pression de la zambianisation de l'Etat, qui cherchait à réduire la dépendance héritée de la période coloniale vis-à-vis de l'Afrique du Sud et de la Rhodesie et de l'évolution des événements, qui provoqua une certaine insécurité au sein du personnel expatrié, surtout après la Déclaration Unilatérale d'Indépendance par Ian Smith.

Il serait naïf de compter sur les firmes multinationales pour planifier la zaïrianisation effective de l'industrie du cuivre. La situation actuelle permet le maintien d'un équilibre social à la fois interne et externe à l'entreprise qu'elles sont les seules à contrôler. Comme s'exprime le groupe de recherche "Wajengaji", "on pourrait croire que la plupart des jeunes diplômés zaïrois qui entrent à la Gécamines (deviennent) métamorphosés, "absorbés", "digérés", qu'ils ont perdu leur nationalité, y sont annihilés peut-être par peur de perdre une situation financière
avantageuse..., s'ils occupent un poste de direction, ils donnent souvent l'impression de n'être que des figurants télécommandés par des adjoints ou conseillers étrangers. Dans le cadre de la stratégie géopolitique des monopoles, il devient de plus en plus clair que la présence du personnel expatrié dans l'industrie du cuivre joue un rôle important dans le maintien du statu quo politique dans la région.

C'est, au contraire, une des rares occasions où la "collective self-reliance" (autonomie collective) des pays du Tiers Monde peut se révéler positive. En effet, il serait utile de considérer la constitution d'une équipe fonctionnelle zairoise pluri-disciplinaire, qui, avec une assistance limitée des entreprises zambiennes, pourrait élaborer un canevas à la fois de formation et de zaïrianisation.

2.2 Raffinage des minéraux

Si on prend une production plafond de la Cécamines de 470'000 tonnes, on réalise que 220'000 tonnes, soit 46,8% seulement sont raffinées au Shaba. Le reste est raffiné en Belgique par la Métallurgie Hoboken. Toute la production de la Société de Développement Industriel et Minier du Zaïre (SODIMIZA) est expédiée sous forme de concentrés vers le Japon.

Les arguments développés pour justifier le raffinage à l'extérieur reposent sur deux hypothèses également erronées. La première est que "la diversité de ces produits (c'est-à-dire des formats spéciaux) et les exigences de la clientèle demandent de la part des producteurs de jouer en quelque sorte le rôle d'un épicier, ce qui les oblige à fournir rapidement des stocks de formats très variables. S'il est techniquement possible de produire en Afrique des produits aussi variés, la production de ces produits en Afrique entraînerait des immobilisations des stocks qui compenseraient le gain réalisé par le traitement au Zaïre de ces formats très différenciés sans compter le risque non négligeable des fréquentes ruptures de stocks, qui entraîneraient une désaffectation de la clientèle".

Ce point de vue qui est commercial, et donc concerne la société chargée de la commercialisation des produits miniers plutôt que l'usine de raffinage, ne prend pas en compte l'importance relative des différentes catégories de ventes. En effet, comme la plupart des entreprises productrices du cuivre, la Cécamines réalise 90% de ses ventes sous contrats à terme (d'une durée d'une année) et 10% seulement au "spot". Les contacts avec la clientèle pour la conclusion de tels contrats (à terme) s'établissent entre les mois de mai et juin via la Société Zaïroise de commercialisation des minéraux (SOZACOM) (qui agit par l'intermédiaire des agences de la Société Générale des Minerai). Vers fin juin, la Cécamines envoie ses estimations de production et la programmation de ses livraisons (quantité et spécification des formats désirés) à la raffinerie Hoboken. Vers septembre, la conclusion des contrats intervient à travers les agences. De façon générale, vers novembre 90% de la production sont ainsi vendus.

La seconde hypothèse, essentiellement technique, est la difficulté d'appliquer les procédés (comme la transformation du cuivre électrolytique en format marchand par simple fusion), qui permettent la production des formats spéciaux nouveaux, tels que les billettes. En effet, l'application de ces procédés à la Cécamines se heurte à des difficultés dues à une pollution mécanique des cathodes qui, obtenues par lixiviation et électrolyse des métaux en solution, sont rugueuses et facilement polluées par des entraînements mécaniques. Mais, comme le reconnaît...
R. Cayron lui-même, le problème de lavage des cathodes n'est pas insoluble et le projet d'usine de raffinage au Bas-Zaïre, basée sur ces procédés, est là pour le prouver.

La création au Zaïre d'une usine de raffinage soulève deux questions. D'abord sa localisation au Bas-Zaïre, justifiée à la fois par d'abondantes disponibilités en énergie électrique et par la proximité du port d'embarquement vers les pays consommateurs, lié à la Voie Nationale (Shaba - Océan Atlantique) son fonctionnement en pleine capacité (200'000 tonnes) et toute possibilité ultérieure d'accroître sa capacité de production afin de répondre à une expansion de la production cuprifère (600'000 tonnes prévues pour la Gécamines dans les années 1980).

La deuxième question que pose l'usine zaïroise de raffinage est celle de sa gestion, qui, étant donné les capacités techniques nationales disponibles, ne pourra se faire que dans le cadre d'une convention de coopération technique avec une des principales firmes multinationales du secteur des métaux non ferreux. L'idéal serait pour l'État zaïrois de s'associer à des partenaires différents selon les étapes de réalisation de l'usine (études préliminaires, construction, gestion technique). Ainsi, après que le groupe de la Société Générale de Belgique, par l'intermédiaire de la MECHIM, ait réalisé les études de faisabilité, la construction de l'usine serait confiée à une autre firme qui, à son tour, serait exclue de la liste des candidats possibles pour la gestion quotidienne de l'usine. Cette politique est réalisable, car la technologie impliquée dans le processus de production est largement standardisée. Elle est rendue difficile - et non impossible - par la situation actuelle du cuivre sur le marché mondial qui incite à la prudence pour tout nouvel investissement dans le secteur. Mais - ce qui est le plus important - elle exige l'existence d'une forte volonté politique de diversification.

2.3 Commercialisation des produits miniers

La commercialisation des produits de l'industrie zaïroise du cuivre est contrôlée à travers des liaisons conventionnelles complexes par les firmes multinationales, et notamment la Société Générale des Minerais. Quelqu'importante qu'elle soit, la création de la Société Zaïroise de Commercialisation des Minerais (SOZACOM) n'a pas modifié cette situation. Toutefois, il est incontestable que la rationalisation des décisions au niveau de la commercialisation consiste à rendre effective l'intervention de la SOZACOM dans la vente des produits de la Gécamines et d'autres entreprises minières zaïroises.

La difficulté majeure (pour ce faire) provient d'une perception erronée de l'importance de la Belgique dans la consommation du cuivre zaïrois. En effet, l'analyse de la structure des pays consommateurs du cuivre zaïrois est opacifiée par l'intégration verticale de la Gécamines au sein du groupe de la Société Générale de Belgique. Les expéditions du cuivre blister et des cathodes (52,3% de la production de la Gécamines) à la raffinerie Hoboken, internes à l'ensemble multinational auquel participe ainsi la Gécamines, sont enregistrées par l'économie zaïroise comme exportations et contribuent à donner à la Belgique une importance démesurée dans le commerce du cuivre zaïrois. En fait, une grande partie de ce cuivre est exportée (après raffinage) par la Belgique vers d'autres pays. Pour corriger cette perspective, il faudrait déterminer la part du cuivre zaïrois dans le cuivre exporté par la Belgique. Cela permettra de calculer d'une part les quantités annuelles de cuivre effectivement consommées ou simplement stockées en Belgique, et
d'autre part les importations réelles (importations directes et via la Belgique) des autres pays consommateurs du cuivre zaïrois.

La deuxième difficulté provient du fait que (pour des raisons sans doute non techniques) le Zaïre s'est avéré jusqu'ici incapable dans les négociations bilatérales (Zaïre-Belgique) de tirer profit de la dépendance belge vis-à-vis du cuivre zaïrois. Tel qu'il apparaît au tableau 2, la Belgique est, parmi les principaux pays consommateurs du cuivre zaïrois, celui qui en dépend le plus.

Tableau 2 : Importance du cuivre zaïrois pour les principaux pays consommateurs en 1976 (en %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pays</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgique</td>
<td>62,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allemagne Fédérale</td>
<td>7,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

La forte dépendance belge vis-à-vis du cuivre zaïrois fournit au Zaïre un facteur d'interdépendance qui contribue tant soit peu à réduire la dépendance (généralement dégagée en termes absolus) du Zaïre par rapport à la Belgique. Malheureusement, ce facteur n'a jamais été exploité.

La troisième difficulté à la rationalisation au niveau de la commercialisation provient de l'ignorance (réelle ou fictive) de la façon dont la Société Générale des Minerais opère dans ses relations avec la clientèle. En effet, l'essentiel des contacts avec les clients est réalisé par les agences de vente, qui sont soit des filiales ou des sociétés étrangères au groupe, rémunérées par une commission sur le chiffre d'affaires réalisé.

Le tableau 3 présente les agences de la Société Générale des Minerais dans les principaux pays consommateurs du cuivre zaïrois.

Tableau 3 : Agences de vente dans les principaux pays consommateurs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pays</th>
<th>Agences de vente</th>
<th>Remarques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgique</td>
<td>Société Générale des Minerais (SGM) (Division Zaïre)</td>
<td>Filiale de la SGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1. SOGEMET</td>
<td>Organisme de droit public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Groupement d'importation et de répartition des Métaux (GIRM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allemagne</td>
<td>Metallgesellschaft</td>
<td>Commission de 0,50% du chiffre d'affaires</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Il ressort de ce tableau que sauf pour la Belgique, la Société Générale des Minerais agit par l'intermédiaire des entreprises non affiliées dans les principaux pays consommateurs (bien que partiellement en France). Dans le cadre des accords...
de Munich de 1974, la SOZACOM a un droit de préférence vis-à-vis de la Société Générale des Minerals en ce qui concerne les agences de vente. On peut concevoir qu'il y ait des réticences de la part de SOGEMET à des relations directes avec la SOZACOM. On ne voit pas pourquoi GIRIM et Metallgesellschaft réagiraient de la même façon.

Le contrôle effectif par l'Etat des différentes étapes du cycle de production et de circulation du cuivre ouvre des perspectives nouvelles d'utiliser le surplus dégagé de l'industrie cuprifère pour diversifier l'économie et réduire progressivement l'importance prépondérante du cuivre. Le problème à ce niveau est d'organiser des mécanismes de transfert du surplus du secteur minier vers d'autres secteurs, notamment l'agriculture.

Il est à ce propos intéressant d'examiner la façon dont la Société Générale de Belgique a organisé le transfert de surplus de l'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga vers d'autres secteurs d'activité durant la période antérieure à l'appropriation publique.

3. Transfert de surplus au sein de l'ensemble multinational

La stratégie du groupe de la Société Générale de Belgique est basée sur le principe du "dividende secondaire". La notion de "dividende secondaire" exprime "la contribution d'une filiale dans le chiffre d'affaires d'autres filiales" 5/. En effet, le commerce préférentiel entre sociétés affiliées permet au groupe de fixer ses propres prix. Ainsi, "le contrôle sur les matières premières et le manque de concurrence garantissent la réalisation des marges bénéficiaires" au niveau de plusieurs filiales 6/. Cette nécessité d'assurer le dividende secondaire concerne non seulement les filiales du secteur des métaux non-ferreux, mais aussi celles opérant dans d'autres secteurs, tels que les transports, les banques, les assurances, etc...

L'industrie du cuivre au Zaïre a suscité, dans le pays, la création d'un réseau d'entreprises périphériques, dont elle conditionne soit l'offre (parce qu'elle leur fournit les matières premières) soit la demande (parce qu'elle leur achète la quasi-totalité de leurs produits). Le tableau 4, qui présente le schéma d'effets d'entraînement en amont et en aval, permet d'évaluer la position de l'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga dans l'économie du Shaba. S'il est indéniable que "la consommation intermédiaire (de l'UMHK) a créé des débouchés nouveaux et ses produits sont à l'origine des nouvelles activités...", la réalisation de ces dernières par l'entreprise minière du Shaba a permis une "planification monopolistique". Celle-ci est "la programmation de la construction de l'économie d'un pays ou d'une région par une société privée dont l'objectif essentiel est de rentabiliser ses investissements, d'accroître ses bénéfices et d'améliorer sa puissance contractuelle sur le marché" 7/.
### Tableau 4 : Schéma d'entreprises périphériques de l'UMHK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>En amont</th>
<th>En aval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energie électrique:</strong></td>
<td>Zinc, Cadmium:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOGEFORT, SOGELEC</td>
<td>METALKAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acide sulfurique:</strong></td>
<td>Laminoirs Tréfileries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOGECHIM</td>
<td>Câbleries à cuivre et zinc:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explosifs:</strong> AFRIDEX</td>
<td>LATRECA CABELCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ciments:</strong> CIMENKAT</td>
<td>Acide sulfurique:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRABEKA, U.M.H.K.</td>
<td>SOGECHIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructions métalliques</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charbon : Charbonnages de Luena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denrées alimentaires:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINOTERIES DU KATANGA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemin de fer:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.C.K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A la limite, ce qu'on a appelé "le pôle de développement du Shaba" se confond avec le processus de dominance de l'économie de la région par l'UMHK. En effet, "Lubumbashi" est devenu pôle par suite de l'implantation de l'ex-Union Minière, c'est-à-dire de l'exploitation des minerais (cuivre et autres) à un endroit éloigné des côtes et sans liaison fluviale avec la mer. En vue de donner à l'entreprise minière les facilités de transport pour ses exportations et aussi pour ses importations, tout comme pour ses approvisionnements intérieurs en main-d'œuvre, on construisit des chemins de fer. Dans la mesure où certains approvisionnements en "inputs" pouvaient se faire sur place au moindre coût, il y eut l'établissement d'autres entreprises - filiales ou non - liées à l'activité de l'Union Minière* (2)*.

Le contrôle par l'UMHK des entreprises périphériques s'exerce d'abord par filiation (participations directes et indirectes).

Il s'exerce aussi par le système des avances permanentes. Ce système consiste en l'octroi par l'UMHK à un fournisseur d'un montant important, soit à valoir sur les factures soit destiné à couvrir le bénéficiaire de tout retard de paiement. Il est certain que l'importance des commandes de l'UMHK devrait justifier des meilleures conditions d'achat, et notamment du crédit fournisseur. Mais étant donné le fait que l'avance permanente (et c'est de cela qu'elle tire son qualificatif) n'est jamais prise en compte lors du paiement des factures et étant donné la régularité des paiements de l'UMHK, les avances permanentes constituent, en fait, un mode de financement par l'UMHK des entreprises périphériques.
Les contrats à façon constituent un autre mode de financement des entreprises périphériques par l'UMHK. En effet, il existe, entre cette dernière et certaines filiales, des conventions aux clauses relativement similaires aux termes desquelles l'UMHK finance intégralement ces entreprises.

Ainsi, à travers ces conventions, l'UMHK réalise un transfert des prix au profit des filiales, qui, à leur tour, le réalisent au profit des sociétés d'engineering du groupe situées en métropole.

On peut retenir la répartition des recettes de l'UMHK fournie par E. Sengier pour la période 1945-1952, qui se présente de la façon suivante (en %) 9/:

- frais de production 44
- impôts et redevances 23
- dividendes de 1er établissement 16
- participations et accroissement d'avoirs en banque 4

A la lumière des relations existant entre les sociétés du groupe tant au Zaïre qu'à l'étranger et étant donné les rémunérations pratiquées entre ces sociétés, on peut estimer qu'une part importante des frais de production dissimule des transferts des prix au sein du groupe.

Dans les conditions de carence hégémonique qui caractérisent l'Etat post-colonial au Zaïre, il serait souhaitable de s'inspirer de ce mode de transfert pour orienter le surplus dégagé de l'industrie du cuivre vers des secteurs qui permettent la diversification de l'économie et la réduction, à long terme, de l'importance prépondérante de l'industrie cuprifère.

4. Vers la réduction de l'importance du cuivre dans l'économie

Il est illusoire de croire que l'Etat zaïrois soit à même d'entreprendre, d'organiser et de gérer un vaste programme de diversification de l'économie. Cette tâche exige une transformation des structures difficilement réalisable à court terme.

Les origines historiques du "mal zaïrois" résident sans conteste dans le caractère "lumpen-bureaucratique" de la classe politique, dont le comportement en tant que groupe, loin d'être rationnel, contribue, au contraire, à saper ses propres fondements.

Il est, par contre, possible d'amener les entreprises publiques minières à réaliser des investissements (via filiales à créer ou déjà existantes) dans d'autres secteurs, notamment l'agriculture.

Ce programme d'investissements pourrait être organisé dans le cadre des "conventions de développement" entre l'Etat et les entreprises concernées, aux termes desquelles ces dernières s'engagent à entreprendre des investissements dans des secteurs déterminés, tandis que l'Etat, en leur accordant des allégements fiscaux, leur donne les moyens de mobiliser les ressources dont elles ont besoin pour ce programme. Un effort supplémentaire est à exiger de l'Etat pour identifier les secteurs dans lesquels les investissements doivent se faire.
Ce qui est suggéré ici est en fait la réduction de la prépondérance de l'industrie du cuivre par l'industrie du cuivre. Il va de soi que les entreprises minières ne pourraient jouer ce rôle que si elles sont effectivement sous contrôle national.

Deux questions méritent d'être approfondies :

La première concerne le choix des secteurs dans lesquels il faudrait réaliser les investissements de diversification. Ce choix est rendu facile par le fait que des contingences immédiates imposent la recherche d'une stratégie alternative. 

En effet, face à la crise du capitalisme mondial, qui se manifeste, au niveau interne, par une forte diminution des recettes en devises de l'industrie du cuivre, il s'avère impérieux de "désenclaver" l'économie, en explorant des stratégies qui établissent un lien entre le développement industriel et l'agriculture.

Il faut rappeler que le développement d'une industrie florissante du cuivre, pourvoyuse des devises, a permis la mise en place d'un processus d'industrialisation d'import-substitution qui, à un moment, a fait considérer le Zaïre comme un des pays les plus industrialisés d'Afrique Noire. Le modèle zaïrois d'industrialisation a été basé sur l'idée qu'il faut procéder par étapes : d'abord développer l'industrie des biens de consommation jusqu'à ce que la demande de cette industrie en biens d'approvisionnement et en biens d'équipement ne puisse être satisfaite par les importations, planter alors une industrie des biens intermédiaires, pour finir dans une troisième phase par la production sur place des biens d'équipement pour lesquels il y aurait à ce moment un marché suffisant.

Ce schéma suppose l'existence de larges disponibilités en devises. Il faut reconnaître qu'il fonctionna plus ou moins sans accrocs aussi longtemps que l'industrie du cuivre put assurer le financement des importations des biens intermédiaires et d'équipement. Mais la chute des prix du cuivre sur le marché mondial a partir de 1974 amena au blocage du modèle et mit en évidence la nécessité de développer l'agriculture. C'est donc essentiellement vers le secteur agricole que doivent s'orienter les investissements.

La deuxième question à examiner est celle des moyens dont dispose l'État pour persuader les entreprises minières à s'engager dans des activités nouvelles.

Cette question d'importance il est vrai, peut être résolue dans le cadre des relations verticales qui existent entre le Département (Ministère) du Portefeuille et les entreprises du secteur public. En effet, le Département assume les pouvoirs de tutelle et d'orientation générale des entreprises publiques. La stratégie suggérée ici ne dépasse pas les prérogatives du Département du Portefeuille vis-à-vis du secteur public.

Toutefois, malgré l'existence (dans une large mesure) du pouvoir de contrainte de l'État, il est indispensable de mettre en place des mécanismes qui garantissent le succès de l'opération.

Comme on l'a déjà indiqué plus haut, le principal mécanisme d'incitation, serait l'octroi de certaines facilités (fiscales) aux entreprises en contrepartie de leur participation à l'effort de diversification. Ces facilités pourraient
principalement concerner la constitution par les entreprises d'un fonds de diversification. Ce fonds de diversification serait alimenté par la perception, au profit des entreprises, d'un montant ou d'un pourcentage sur les quantités qu'elles produisent ou sur le chiffre d'affaires qu'elles réalisent, selon des modalités à préciser pour chaque entreprise. Ce prélèvement serait exonéré de toutes contributions et taxes quelconques et n'entrerait pas en ligne de compte pour le calcul des contributions cédulaires sur les revenus. Le fonds de diversification ainsi constitué servirait à financer des projets de diversification.

Il faudrait évidemment organiser, au niveau de l'État et notamment au sein de la Commission des Investissements, la conception et la sélection des projets, et un système de contrôle permettant de suivre l'exécution des projets.

Un facteur important joue en faveur de la nouvelle politique, c'est la nécessité de mettre fin aux goulots d'étranglement qui entravent le fonctionnement de l'économie zairoise. Il n'est pas exagéré d'affirmer que cette nécessité est aujourd'hui perçue par la plupart des agents économiques opérant au Zaïre. La stratégie proposée permettrait précisément d'assurer à la fois l'équilibre social interne et le maintien des conditions minimales de fonctionnement du système dans son ensemble aussi bien qu'en ce qui concerne les secteurs pris isolément.

Dans cette optique, il sera vraisemblablement aisé d'amener les entreprises privées du secteur du cuivre à participer au programme de diversification, surtout qu'elles assument, dans les espaces territoriaux dans lesquels elles exercent leurs activités, des prérogatives qui relèvent généralement de l'État et qu'elles prennent en charge, par conséquent, des responsabilités qui dépassent le champ étriqué de l'initiative privée.

Mais, du point de vue des entreprises privées, il est évident que la politique de diversification entraîne, à long terme, des transformations de structure qui remettent en question leur position dominante dans l'économie. C'est sans doute de cette perspective à long terme que viendront leurs réticences à contribuer à l'effort de diversification. Voilà pourquoi il faudrait compter en grande partie sur le secteur public, qui est, du reste, l'instrument privilégié de l'action transformatrice de l'État.

NOTES

1/ Pour une discussion plus approfondie de ce thème, voir Ilunga Ilunkamba, Propriété publique et conventions de gestion dans l'industrie du cuivre au Zaïre, (Kinshasa, thèse de doctorat, 1978); "Conventions de gestion et transfert de technologie au Zaïre. Le cas du cuivre", Africa Development (1977:2)

2/ Gécamines, Rapport Annuel 1971, p.34


5/ Michel de Vroey, Propriété et pouvoir dans les grandes entreprises (Bruxelles: CRISP, 1973), p.141


(cont. à p.2)
UNE AUTRE SUÈDE?

Résumé: Le texte qui suit contient le résumé et les conclusions d'une travail de 40 pages, rédigé en anglais, qui peut être obtenu en écrivant à la FIPAD.

Le besoin d'un changement vers "une autre Suède" est largement ressenti, mais des obstacles nombreux et sérieux devront être franchis pour que le processus de changement puisse aboutir: l'économie suédoise présente des rigidités dues à sa structure très concentrée et à ses liens étroits avec la Communauté économique européenne; à la veille d'avances techniques importantes qui auront d'importantes répercussions sociales, experts et décideurs paraissent détachés de l'opinion publique et mal préparés pour un changement vers des techniques plus humaines; et les deux mouvements politiques qui décident de l'avenir du pays - le parti du centre et le parti socialiste - sont en pleine mutation: seront-ils en mesure de réorienter leurs stratégies pour une nouvelle libération des citoyens, cette fois une libération de la passivité et de l'aliénation?

Analysant les principaux problèmes et en esquissant les objectifs d'une autre Suède, l'auteur présente une série de suggestions détaillées pour l'économie, l'énergie, l'agriculture, l'aménagement urbain, de même que pour la participation populaire à tous les niveaux. La ville d'Orebro, près de Stockholm, est étudiée en tant que cas pilote; elle suggère un chemin vers les nouvelles communautés de l'avenir.
¿PUEDE SUECIA ENCOGERSE?

Resumen: Este informe incluye un resumen y las conclusiones políticas de un documento de 40 páginas sobre una otra Suecia que se puede obtener de la FIPAD.

Se aprecia generalmente en Suecia que es necesario cambiar hacia un otro desarrollo, pero hay que vencer varios obstáculos graves antes de que el proceso de cambio pueda tener éxito: la economía sueca no se presta a cambios debido a su estructura concentrada y sus relaciones estrechas con la CEE; a principios de una serie de avances sensacionales en la tecnología que causarán importantes repercusiones sociales, expertos y directores parecen estar en desacuerdo con la opinión pública y mal preparados para cambiar hacia una tecnología más humana; y los dos movimientos políticos que deciden el futuro del país Sueco - el partido central y el partido social democrático - están en plena transformación: ¿podrán ellos reorientar sus estrategias para realizar una nueva liberación del pueblo - esta vez una liberación de su pasividad y enajenación?

En su análisis de los problemas principales y su formulación de fines para el futuro de Suecia, el autor presenta sugestiones detalladas para la economía, para energía y agricultura; para planificación de ciudades, y también para la participación del pueblo a todos niveles. Se analiza la ciudad de Orebro, cerca de Estocolmo, como ejemplar de prueba en el camino hacia un nuevo modelo para las futuras comunidades en el país.
This is but a short summary of a 40-page report of the same title that can be obtained from the IFDA secretariat. The aim here is only to give readers a notion of what kind of proposals are submitted in the report.

1 Background

Sweden of today is beset with problems of both economic and psychologic nature. Traditional export industries do not yield any longer a safe basis for the highest standard of living in the world. Unemployment is high by Swedish standards. Some 300,000 people, out of a workforce of 4 million, are retired on sick pensions or as early retirees, because they cannot sustain the pace of work. Again, people have to start moving if they want to find a job. Private investments are down 30% the last three years and the State had to nationalize industries that otherwise would have gone into bankruptcy. Obviously, the Keynesian formula, that had worked wonders for so many years, is not nearly as applicable in the time of stagflation.

But the psychological side to the crisis is at least as important. While the general public has made it clear (in the last election and in a series of opinion polls over the last years) that it wants another kind of development as is willing to pay the price for the fulfilment of non-material ambitions, the politicians steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the situation and avoid the first task of a leadership, i.e., to lead. With very little real hope, the parties cling to old formulas, thinking that an increased private as well as public spending will put us back on the tracks of unproblematic growth.

The reasons why people ask for a change are manyfold. First, they extrapolate, assuming that economic crises are here to stay and that we'd better behave accordingly. Second, the social dysfunctions of growth are only too evident: rising rates for crime, drunkenness, drug addiction, a quicker pace at the assembly line, a society that is seen as unfathomable and bureaucratic, a physical environment that is cold as ice and has no cracks where human fingers can get a hold. Third, there is a tacit knowledge that we have allotted ourselves a standard that cannot be maintained forever and that has now begun to defeat itself. We now face the prospect of trying to meet skyrocketing welfare costs with taxes that cannot rise much further without causing severe social losses. Fourth, many signs indicate that the social fabric is on the verge of breaking. Fifth, the lack of consistency in politics, the tendency to evade sensitive issues, have eroded the credibility of the political leadership. Sixth, energy worries have spurred an interest in saving as such: a political party that could make the puritan streak in Swedes come out in a sensible and practical way could sway the opinion. Seventh, the so-called oil crisis of 1973 brought home to Swedes how vulnerable their country is, certainly regarding energy as Sweden depends to 70% on oil for its energy consumption, but in other areas as well. Eight, the idealism that made Sweden the first country to reach the goal of 1% of GNP in development aid and which has stood up well during the present economic crisis, asks for a less wide gap between our international postures and the kind of development we pursue at home.

What people clearly are expecting, though not always being able to express it, is a development where the human scale has again become a guiding rule
and where social reforms are made with rather than for people. This means accepting that the admired Swedish model will have to be changed considerably. It is a question of shrinking a number of units, of scrapping economic big power dreams, and admitting that libertarian socialism is not to be found in the direction where Sweden at present is going.

2 Some obstacles to change

In the Swedish debate, the space between the trivial and what is rejected out of hand, is very small. Given that people and politicians distrust proposals that are radically new and total in scope, and that at the same time more modest reforms are forcibly adjusted to existing conditions and systems of regulations, one has to look for some middle ground. In this paper, our discussion has been limited to a few central areas, where comprehensive reforms are both possible and necessary. But first, some factors of decisive importance for the possibilities of change, have to be listed.

a) economical

A number of reasons can be given why current tendencies in Swedish economy are not conducive to change: the process of concentration within industry, the limited number of milk cows, the close relations with EEC, the rising share of GNP taken up by exports.

b) technological

We are obviously on the threshold of a series of technological breakthroughs. Considering the pace of development in fields like biotechnology and communications, electronics and armaments, it is safe to predict that many innovations will cause wide social repercussions. They can easily belie every attempt to provide society with a more human, less technical face.

To test the preparedness for the change that is imposed on us, and the will to change present development, some 30 leading experts and decision-makers were interviewed. This round of talks revealed little imagination and much gloom. It seems as if the elite is totally out of tune with the public.

c) political

There are two political movements that decide the future of Sweden: the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party. Together they would be able to overcome almost any opposition to change. Divided, they cause a non-productive stalemate.

Up to now, the Center Party has been the main ecologist movement of Sweden. But instead of a concrete plan for countering the effects of the industrial state, it has offered voters a cluster of sentiments. Its anti-capitalism has been blurred in the last decades and it hasn’t tried to stop the extreme centralization of the farmers’ cooperative movement, which is close to the party. Out of the failures of this party may come a movement of discontent of the kind that Denmark still experiences.

The Social Democratic Party is of course the champion of the modern welfare state. It has erected an enormously impressive edifice of laws and reforms that have liberated most and given the poor strength enough to voice com-
plaints. But by making security rather than solidarity with self-realization the catchword, by presenting this security as a gift from the State, and by regarding conventionally defined growth as the engine of progress, the party has made itself dependent on processes over which it has little influence. Ideologically it has boxed itself into a corner, unable to think of anything but "more of the same". The proposal for wage earners' funds, which will give shop stewards rather than workers more power, is an illustrious example of the leadership's distrust of the membership, its unwillingness to use the imagination and strength of ordinary people. In the face of rapidly growing social dysfunctions it cannot see its way. Only by admitting that something has been systematically wrong in its strategy the last 10-15 years can it hope to meet the wishes of a people that is fed up with the standard political analysis. Will it be able to liberate people once again, this time from passivity and alienation caused by a scale that was not made for humans?

3 Problem areas and goals

a) Economy, energy, agriculture

Suggestions made in this section include the following:

1. Sweden must seek another production profile than the present one, with more government support going to companies at the low and the intermediate levels.

2. Society should be planned for a prolonged period of energy scarcity - that way we will be better equipped to meet the then following period of energy abundance.

3. A decent and meaningful job for everyone is the most important task if democracy is to be saved. This can be done through a series of reforms. One is to share the jobs there are by introducing the 6-hour day. Another is to spread risks more evenly. A third to let resources and needs meet by redefining what is productive and what is not and accepting a somewhat lower material standard, if this is what it entails.

4. If people are not to be treated as a clientele they must be given a much wider responsibility for their own welfare. This can be done without erasing what has been achieved in the past through the implementation of social scientist Gösta Rehn's system for social insurance with individual drawing rights. This would enhance flexibility considerably, both for the individual and for society, by making transfers easier between different life periods of the same person.

5. On the local level there should be an all-cooperative organization to take care of the secondary or informal economy that should be encouraged to expand. This would make it possible to pull out of the market the satisfaction of a number of basic needs. Also, the realization that so much of one's total outlays is spent within the same organization, though now at different parts of it, will probably strengthen interest in association activities and deliberations. A loan- & savings-institution could instead of interest on savings provide members with inexpensive goods and services.

6. Every commune should by law be compelled to establish plans for its supply of water, heating, foodstuffs, transportation, basic textiles, machines, and waste disposal. At the same time, alternative plans for the supply of the same things in emergencies should be made and publicly discussed. This "zero planning" should make people more interested
7. To stop speculation in land, and to make it possible again for young people to acquire farms, only rather drastic measures will do. Society should buy all usable land, then lease lots with right of inheritance to farmers, home owners and housing corporations. Two ways to achieve this could be contemplated. One is the suggestion that a limited part (25 billion sw cr) of the pension funds (now 120 billion sw cr) should be used to this end. Another is to create a special land- and housing bank, initially financed through society and through the selling of bonds with a guaranteed interest rate slightly above inflation (the demand for this kind of bonds are much higher than supply). Subsidies and taxes in the agricultural field should aim at expanding the number of occupied, rather than the opposite as is currently the case. Overmechanization and excessive use of chemicals could be fought the same way and would be less attractive if these suggestions were accepted.

b) City planning

1. The great task of the 80’s and 90’s is not to build new towns or new city sectors, but to rebuild the existing cities. The social importance of making cities liveable again - softer, denser, more challenging and more on the human scale - cannot be overestimated. Practical work in Sweden has shown that a dead-dull block of the usual three "loafs" of three-storied houses in straight angles to each other can be transformed to a dense, exciting milieu with 40 % more living and office space. A crash program along these lines must be started.

2. Through the all-cooperative associations, neighbourhoods should be given much more influence over planning. The boards of the associations should be elected from below, not appointed from above. They should be allocated funds to be used within a general framework.

3. Every city but the very largest should be able to supply itself with food from the farmland surrounding it. City sectors or neighbourhoods could contract a farmland area at fixed prices.

4. The rebuilding of the cities should to some extent be carried out by the inhabitants themselves, through neighbourhood or all-cooperative associations. Important decisions, like the necessary demolition of many high-rises, would have to be a joint responsibility of neighbourhoods and the city council.

c) Participation

1. The political parties, especially the Social Democrats, must assign a much wider role to their memberships. The sham with rigged deliberations, questionnaires with highly leading questions and a crude misuse of the results must be substituted with an open debate and real consultation. The elitism and leadership cult has got to stop.

2. Innovations within the field of communications can ease more frequent contacts between those ruling and those ruled. But it can also do just the opposite if developments here are not watched closely and excessive use of complicated techniques and gadgets is not rejected.

3. Half-democracy will not do to make people assume responsibility for their places of work. That is why the proposal for wage earners’ funds could turn out to give more power to shop stewards and union men rather than
workers. Instead, we suggest that one should opt for a cooperative system. In this small enterprises with five employees or less could be privately or cooperatively run, corporations with a clear national interest owned by the State though perhaps managed by workers' collectives, and the rest owned and managed by workers. Every unit should be independent but cooperate with others through a common credit institution which could have some kind of supervisory role, as is the case in the successful Mondragon cooperative in Spain. Consumers and local communities should be represented on the boards. Laws would regulate how profits are used and losses covered. Though process for making Swedish industry turn into a system of cooperatives would have to get started through some scheme for wage earners' funds, it doesn't stop there but goes on to put all power and all responsibility where they belong – among those who work. If this principle was rigidly followed, the present squabbling and misuse of a widened democracy (by ignoring consumers' interests, by keeping up marathon discussions, by trying to get a second chance of career through union activity) would be eliminated.

4. As society becomes more and more complex, citizens must be better equipped to tackle problems. Otherwise democracy can hardly survive. Liberalism has to a vast extent shaped basic values in the Swedish debate. As always it has helped to dismantle structures that were a support for the weak and has created such a chaos (in e.g. education) that the way has been cleared for reactionary sentiments. Its crude view of the relationship between elites and the public, attempting even to deny that elites exist in all kinds of political systems, has made the debate concentrate on cosmetics rather than real problems. Only by consciously fighting the liberal myths can any progress be made towards a democracy that is more than an empty shell.

5. Information on and control of ongoing R&D is of vital importance if development is to be something we can mould and not only be hit by. Public hearings could be used to gain information of the true meaning of research with possible social repercussions. Scientific councils should include not only representatives of various organizations as is now the case, but also respected laymen. The appearance of more scientific journalists should be encouraged with scholarships and the like. At universities, every student going into humanities should be obliged to start with a half-year long course in natural sciences, and vice versa.

6. If passivity is to be broken, politicians must not shy away from so-called negative decisions, like reducing TV time, implementing a strong censorship on violence in films, and combating organized crime and drug addiction. For the Social Democrats it must a compelling task, at last, to take some interest in opinion-making and the way values are shaped.

7. Democracy and participation are heavily influenced by phenomena that seemingly are quite unrelated to them. Foremost of these is the scale of milieus, organizations, communes, houses, unions, places of work, etc. A shrinking of the scale is thus one of the most important changes, perhaps the very top priority, if the Swedish society is going to be an even more decent and humane place to live in. But existing systems of regulation do not make change easy and may distort or block it. Therefore, a committee with experts, laymen and MPs should be set up to review and purge these systems of unnecessary items and those that make experiments impossible.

8. Decentralization needs the support of a strong central power. This is the only way to neutralize rivals' interests and to support economically weak communes against mighty corporations. But in every deliberation on the central level one should ask: could this be done locally, as well or at all?
4 Örebro: Strategies to get there

Örebro is a middle-sized city (pop. 118 000) not far from Stockholm. Its conditions by and large reflect those of the whole country. In order to test the proposals made in this paper and to discuss how the envisaged process could be started, a small meeting of leading Social Democratic decision-makers in this city, was convened. The participants agreed in the analysis made, which is remarkable considering to what extent their own party is to blame for many of the criticized conditions. Regarding the proposal for an all-cooperative organization on the local level, there was a certain scepticism. In Örebro a scheme is now carried out for establishing community councils. These are appointed from above with the same representation as in the city council, and so far they have only an advisory role. But starting January 1st 1980, they will have the discretion to use money allotted them for certain broad-defined purposes. But this does not solve the problem of passivity. Here, we maintain, only a scheme on the lines of the one suggested in this paper will do. Besides an interest in these matters, the participants were positively disposed towards the proposals for "zero planning", a much broader effort to infuse democratic procedures into living areas, and State/communal ownership of all usable land.

The Örebro meeting showed that something is growing in Sweden, a hint, albeit fickle, that we may be on our way to a new model. It's about time. No-one should avoid realizing that the old one does not work as it once did. The fight for equality and security was a liberating one. Now the aim must be to liberate people once more by breaking passivity, shaping a new concept of security and by making society less formal, less "strong" or "great" and more inviting. Reforms must be made with people instead of for them. The goal is to make society more of a common responsibility and more of a common pleasure. The way to this end, so we think, goes through a shrinking of the scale. Man must again be the measure of everything man-made.

Think shrink - it can be done!

Selective bibliography


Centrum för tvärvetenskap (The Center for cross-scientific studies of the conditions of Man):
- Välsviken - On the husbandry of resources and democracy in planning and maintenance of housing. Göteborg 1976 [In Swedish]
- Länergisamhället (Low energy society). Göteborg 1974
- Närproduktion av livsmedel (Close production of food). Göteborg 1978


Gösta Rehn: Towards a society of free choice. Swedish Institute for Social Research, Reprint Series No. 35 a, Stockholm 1978

Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier (The Secretariat for Future Studies):
- Det särbara samhället, 1 och 2 (The vulnerable society). Stockholm 1978
- Sol elleruran. (Sun or uranium - to choose energy future). Stockholm 1978

- - Georgia (Georgia. The new South - and the old). Stockholm 1978
BUILDING BLOCKS

POWER RESOURCES - THE FIVE CONTROLS

by Celso Furtado
11 rue Guy de la Brosse
Paris IV, France

Original language: Portuguese (translated into English by IFDA with the author's approval)

LES CINQ POUVOIRS

Résumé: Le texte qui suit est extrait, avec la permission de l'auteur, du dernier ouvrage de Celso Furtado, Créativité et dépendance dans la civilisation industrielle. Il a été traduit du portugais par la FIPAD et revu par l'auteur.

La lutte de la périphérie contre sa dépendance à l'égard du centre est analysée en tant que l'un des aspects principaux du développement. Cinq "pouvoirs" potentiels doivent être étudiés et utilisés si l'on veut changer ce que l'on appelle l'ordre économique international:

1. les pouvoirs en matière de technologie,
2. les pouvoirs financiers,
3. les pouvoirs de marché,
4. l'accès aux ressources non-renouvelables,
5. l'accès à une main d'oeuvre bon marché.

Dans le passé, les pays de la périphérie ont essayé, jusqu'à un certain point, d'utiliser ces "pouvoirs", mais ce n'est que récemment qu'ils l'ont fait systématiquement en vue de modifier en leur faveur l'ordre économique international actuel.

L'ancien système des relations économiques internationales, dans lequel le marché des produits de base était complètement dominé par le pouvoir financier de certains groupes, est lentement remplacé par un nouveau système au sein duquel l'action politique joue un rôle décisif. La mobilisation de la volonté politique, la constitution de coalitions et la formulation d'accords entre pays de la périphérie ne sont pas seulement essentiels en termes de taille des marchés et de capacité financière, mais ils sont aussi des éléments-clés de l'accès au pouvoir potentiels.

RECURSOS DE PODER - LOS CINCO CONTROLES

Resumen: La lucha de la Periferia contra su dependencia del Centro se analiza como uno de los aspectos principales del desarrollo. Se deben estudiar y utilizar cinco recursos de poder para efectuar cambios en el orden económico internacional. Estos recursos potenciales son: el control de la tecnología, el control al acceso de recursos financieros, de mercados, de recursos no-renovables, y el control al acceso a labor barato. Los países periferales han probado usar hasta cierto punto estos recursos de poder, pero solo recientemente se ha hecho esto de un modo sistemático con el fin de modificar el actual orden económico internacional a su propio favor. El sistema antiguo de relaciones económicas internacionales en el cual el mercado de productos básicos estaba dominado por el poder financiero de ciertos grupos se reemplaza lentamente por un nuevo sistema en el cual la acción política desempeña un papel decisivo. La mobilización de la voluntad política, la formación de coaliciones y de acuerdos entre los varios países periferales son esenciales no solo en cuanto al tamaño de los mercados y capacidad financiera, sino también porque representan claves a un acceso acelerado a los recursos de poder.
The forces underlying international economic relations have become so complex that it is very difficult to understand which are important and which are secondary. International prices have become extremely sensitive, owing to the mass of information available for processing and the advantages which can be derived from being one step ahead in using it. Big enterprises (especially large financial groups) are able to co-ordinate their activities in several areas and to monopolize the power of initiative thanks to the means they possess on a global scale. In order to confront this situation, the countries of the Periphery have created banking systems and commercial enterprises which seek to organize the supply of certain products and put pressure on some markets. However, behind these "games", in which the new managers and technocrats have become experts, lie the real power structures which determine action in the long run. These should be the object of our studies if we want to know the possibility of an eventual change of the power relations governing the international economy.

Among the power resources determining the so-called international economic order, the following are of particular relevance:

a) the control of technology
b) the control of financial resources
c) the control of the markets
d) the control of access to non-renewable resources
e) the control of access to cheap man-power.

These resources, in different combinations or doses are the origin of the predominant positions occupied by certain states or large groupes in the struggle for the surpluses generated by the international economy. These forces are of different strengths and tend to organize among themselves and produce a power structure. The struggle against dependence is nothing more than the efforts by the countries of the Periphery to change this power structure. Coalitions of countries sometimes can achieve the critical mass required to control certain resources or to articulate combinations of resources which are highly effective for the creation of power. To control stocks of a certain commodity is important, but it is even more important to have the necessary financial resources to exert this control for a long period of time. To dispose of oil is one weapon but the effectiveness of this weapon may considerably increase if associated with the possibility of organizing the supply of oil in the world market on a global scale.

Control of Technology

Looking back at the above-mentioned resources, the first - control of technology - is presently the corner-stone of the international power structure. When reduced to its essentials, the struggle against dependence becomes an effort by the Periphery to annihilate the Centre's monopoly over technological resources. This is because technology is able to replace all other power resources. It is worthwhile to point out that technology in the industrial civilization is the final expression of human creativity. As we have said before, all other forms of creativity have gradually been put at its service. The dynamics of this creativity is accumulation: of working instruments, of infrastructures and of human competences geared, in particular, to produce new knowledge. What we call the industrial civilization is the result of a particular orientation of human creativity which favours accumulation and tends to reproduce certain social structures. The product of such an orientation of human creativity is modern technology - the high ranking ingredient of the accumulation process. Those who control technology have dominant positions in the struggle for the surpluses. To challenge these positions at the international level through the control of other combined resources or of the critical mass of some resources is the essence of the struggle against dependence.

There is little doubt that the technological superiority of the North tends to increase with the expansion of the network of transnational interests. Transnationals in the final instance manifest the intention to maintain the control of technology during the present phase of planetary dissemination of industrial activities. Sharing technological know-how through licensing contracts has little or no interest for an enterprise which can exploit its own technology, using it to constitute the capital of affiliated companies or subsidiaries, and also to mobilize local financial resources and to expand the scope of its activities. This is why, far from seeing the formation of an international technology market, one sees, during the present phase of the industrialization process in the Periphery, the transfer of advanced technology limited to operations between groups which are in a position to offer one another compensations in the form of exchange of technological know-how.

Control of Financial Resources

Nevertheless, on other fronts one may say that the evolution of the economic power of the Periphery has been positive in many ways. The changes which occurred during the last decades in the field of financial resources are considerable. The development of banking facilities and of direct state action are mobilizing important masses of financial resources. Direct access to international financial markets has allowed many countries of the Periphery to have freedom of action to an extent that was unknown when the IMF exercised its rigid trusteeship. In any case, it is now evident that transnationals establish themselves in the Periphery with capital raised mostly locally (profits from import-export operations, mergers with local groups, government subsidies, etc.) and with capital supplied by the international financial market whose reimbursement is guaranteed by local monetary authorities. The important investments in infrastructures required for the establishment of transnationals are financed by compulsory local savings and/or external loans guaranteed by the state. To sum up, we can say that there are potential financial resources available which
can be used by states. This increases their capacity to take initiatives in international relations.

The emergence since 1973 of important current balance of payments' surpluses of a number of peripheral countries - the oil producers - was the second relevant element on the financial front. For the first time it was possible to promote big projects of common interest to peripheral countries, without applying to industrialized countries or to international financial agencies controlled by them. Transfer of financial resources among Third World countries reached significant levels and the problem of financing the stocks of certain primary commodities - stocks which determine the international prices of those commodities - was faced under more favourable conditions by the Periphery. The Periphery became an important source of funds for the international financial market which supplies transnationals, giving them in turn the capacity to use technology as a means of control of the economies of the Periphery. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that this new element precipitated the dependent countries' awareness of the true nature of international economic relations.

Control of Markets

The control of access to international markets is another source of power in international relations. Customs barriers have existed everywhere and at all times and have been used as an offensive or defensive instrument in confrontations with external interests. At the present stage of international relations, when transnationals are manoeuvring to control strategic positions all over the world, all measures taken by states to control the access to their markets become increasingly relevant. To gain access to peripheral markets with great potential remains the primary strategic goal of many transnationals. Implantation is easier for those enterprises which already possess well organized commercial networks, or control another sector of the market through import contracts, or are linked to the local financial system. By capitalizing on these "invisible assets", on the prestige of their brands, on their long amortized equipment, the transnationals are ready to set themselves up in peripheral countries without putting any pressure on their own resources, with the exception, in certain cases, of managerial personnel. The question raised is whether the existence of a subsidiary company will imply a loss of external sales for the mother company thus circumscribing the latter's activities.

In view of the small investment necessary for the installation of a subsidiary company in the Periphery, it is clear that the obstacles to the entry of other competing transnationals are also insignificant. Thus markets are of the "competitive monopolistic" type as against the oligopolistic type prevailing in the Centre. The "competitive monopolistic" structure leads to the fragmentation of the market and the companies react by multiplying types of products and by saturating the market with publicity. Inherent to this type of market is the misuse of productive capacity and the high social costs involved. An alternative to this waste of resources is the concession of special privileges to one or two enterprises. The state is in this case forced to supervise closely the activities of these enterprises and sometimes even demands to participate in their management.
The small size of the internal market of some peripheral countries led them to join together to form free trade zones, customs unions, common markets and other similar associations, all aimed at expanding the territory inside which enterprises could operate. Some of the problems mentioned above are also present in these extended markets which remain medium-sized even by peripheral standards. The need to coordinate national policies applied to transnationals appears in this case even more vital if the states in the coalition want to avoid that transnationals take advantage of possible competition for the attraction of new enterprises. The implementation of common economic policies and the financing of joint projects strengthen the position of small states when they deal with transnationals.

It was within the context of coalitions of countries seeking to solve the problems created by the narrowness of their internal markets that there emerged with clarity the outlines of a policy aimed at preserving the state's control over national markets against the offensive of transnationals. The basic orientation of such a policy has been to limit in time the concessions accorded to transnationals, concessions which are usually inevitable during an initial stage given the difficulty of obtaining access to technology. Permanent concessions are replaced by agreements valid for a limited period of time.

The control of the enterprises-of their production, financial and marketing departments, not only the control of their shares-must be gradually transferred to centres of decision in the host country. Access to local capital is dependent on this transfer. The purpose of such measures is clearly to integrate the enterprises in the host country's economic system - or collective economic system, in the case of a coalition of countries - so that the policies of these enterprises are in accordance with that system. In that case, their links with foreign transnational groups, suppliers of technology or of commercial services, become secondary. If local control can be extended to numerous sectors, it will result in the creation of a critical mass which will make possible to obtain from transnationals the transfer of technology on less onerous terms. Furthermore, it has become possible to choose technology in accordance with defined objectives and to create a market for locally-produced technology. However, the objective of such a policy may be completely frustrated if the critical mass is not acquired. The larger the markets created, the bigger the chances are to obtain positive results. Therefore, in the case of small countries of the Periphery, coalitions are a sine-qua-non condition for success.

Control of Access to Non-Renewable Resources

The control of access to non-renewable resources has always been considered one of the major sources of power in international relations. The division of the planet among a small number of countries, which were starting their industrialization process during the second half of the last century, had that purpose in mind and not the need to find new markets or to invest surpluses of capital. What is new today is the generalization of the industrialization process combined with a considerably intensified accumulation in the Centre. For a long time, the spread of technology throughout a planet, which was only starting to be known, created the illusion that the supply of all natural resources was infinitely elastic. Though it is not excluded that one day a
large number of those resources which man extracts from nature - in particular metals - will be recycled and may become partly renewable, it was not in this direction that the industrial civilization moved. The logic of the present system of accumulation, with its very short time horizon, consists of exerting increasing pressure on non-renewable resources. But these resources are located mainly in the Periphery, and since for the first time peripheral countries have the possibility of exploiting them for themselves, an entirely new problématique has emerged. It is true that there are powerful interests at work in the Centre trying to prevent these realities from becoming widely recognized, and to diffuse the illusion that technology itself will eventually solve the problems it creates. These interests bear the responsibility for the present escalation in the waste of resources which is destroying in the first place the reserves of the Centre. The United States, Canada and Australia continue to exploit their reserves of non-renewable resources according to the criteria of privately-owned enterprises which plan for the short run and obstruct all attempts to organize the supply of such resources on a global level. Thus a relative price increase of the majority of these resources becomes a prior condition for reducing their present wasteful exploitation and for using technology in a way that will bring about the much-needed economies.

The suicidal policy of some countries of the Centre in relation to their resource reserves will only reinforce the position of the Periphery in the medium and long run. In this area, more than in any other, access to positions of power requires the coalition of countries and the financial capacity to sustain long-term commercial schemes. For example, the financial weakness of the copper-producing peripheral countries is certainly the main reason why they have been unable to intervene significantly in the copper market. However, one cannot deny that the predominant trend is in the direction of a reinforcement of the bargaining position of those who control the supply of non-renewable resources.

Control of Access to Cheap Manpower

The vast reserves of manpower which exist in many countries of the Periphery now represent mainly a weakness for those countries in their international relations. These masses, which have no opportunity to work outside a subsistence economy, are the reason for the low prices of many agricultural products exported by their countries. Therefore, the organization of trade in agricultural products was the first form of struggle against dependence. This same manpower has now begun to appear in the international market in the form of manufactured goods produced by subsidiaries and affiliated companies of transnationals, established in strategic points of the Periphery. In the light of the structural trends pointing to the decentralization of industrial activities, the control of the access to these reserves of man-power might become a power resource in international relations. At present, countries with abundant manpower are only too happy to put it at the disposal of transnationals. The facilities offered to those who invest in export-oriented industries are generous in all the peripheral countries. If there is an obstacle to the expansion of the transnationals it comes from the Centre itself, eg. the opposition of the labour unions in the United States to the establishment of American companies abroad because of the direct and indirect repercussions
at home of this "export" of work opportunities. However, there are many indications that the transnationals will continue to move to those countries which dispose of abundant cheap labour, provided they offer a minimum of industrial facilities. This is the best way to reduce pressure for wage increases and to maximize the enterprises' growth potential.

If the trends mentioned in the preceding paragraph proceed and the manpower channelled into the international market through manufactured goods gains in importance to the transnationals, the peripheral countries will be in a position to change their present weakness in another power resource. An increase in the price of this manpower, even a sharp one (if measured in terms of what it produces for the international market) will still not make this labour expensive for transnationals whose products have access to the markets of the Centre where wage rates are five to ten times higher. Countries disposing of relatively less expensive manpower might collect a tax on exports which makes up for the gap between the price of their manpower and the price of manpower in other competing peripheral countries. It would not be surprising if the Periphery would tend to adopt a co-ordinated fiscal policy aimed at recovering part of the surplus the transnationals derive from exploiting the cheap manpower of those countries. In the present situation transnationals can choose among many peripheral countries and thus exert pressure on every one of them. Wages are kept at a very low level and still transnationals benefit from export subsidies. But it cannot be ignored that, with the emerging new structure, the labour forces in the Periphery play an increasingly important role in the social structures of the Centre. The old international relations, characterized by commodity markets controlled completely by the financial power of certain groups, are slowly being replaced by new systems in which political action has a decisive role.

**Conclusion**

The power resources mentioned above should not all be considered on the same plane. All of them have already been used by peripheral countries in different degrees, but only recently are they being used in an articulated manner to change the present order of international relations for the economic benefit of the dependent countries. As technology is the highest ranking resource (in practice it may replace all the others without being replaced by them) and the one which is monopolized by the Centre, one may say that "dependence" is primarily "technological". To combine other resources of power in order to neutralize (even if partially) technological dependence is the essence of the efforts undertaken by the Periphery in its pursuit of development.

The struggle against dependence begins in general by asserting the control of non-renewable resources. Afterwards it becomes a matter of attaining positions which will permit the control (even if only partial) of access to internal markets. From victories on these two fronts will flow a critical mass of financial resources which will make it possible to consolidate one's positions and expand one's field of action. The battle on the technological front will only be viable when control of an important part of the internal market and of financial resources is assured.
At all stages of this effort to change international relations, coalitions and agreements between countries of the Periphery will play an essential role, both at the regional level (countries of the same area) and on the sectoral level (countries exporting the same products or undertaking projects in common). These coalitions can bring together scattered power resources to produce irreversible impacts.

The struggle against dependence is taking the form of a "confrontation" even if the goals set for each phase of the process by the countries of the Periphery seem modest. This is possible because of the difference between the potential power resources those countries possess and the small fraction of those resources they can actually mobilize. In the short term, it is a question of creating real interdependent links without enjoying technological autonomy, of trying to change the technological trend without controlling it. However, it will be only from more advanced and solid positions that it will be possible to set out for more ambitious goals, for example, to introduce a new logic of the ends of the accumulation process and to rescue creativity from the present domination of an instrumental rationality.

The central problem will still be the generation of collective political will in the Periphery since this will be the only way to accelerate access to power resources. Nothing can be so counterproductive in this respect as the instigation of regional rivalries resulting in armaments races. The sophisticated armaments sold by the Centre are a financial burden on the Periphery and an open door to new forms of dependence with unforeseeable consequences. The paroxysm within this new framework of irrationality would be the race for nuclear weaponry which would destroy all that has been achieved so far in the fight against dependence. Though it is absolutely irrelevant for the global strategic balance that one country of the Periphery acquires the nuclear weapon, it will certainly have negative effects on the relations of peripheral countries among themselves, especially among neighbouring countries. The profound solidarity between dependent countries will be broken, even when that solidarity was not active. Many peripheral countries will react by seeking the protection which the superpowers will not be slow in offering them. If to this we add the formidable drainage of resources from the countries which will fall into this abyss, we will have an idea of the negative effects such a choice will have on the struggle against dependence.

Leaving aside this sombre perspective, however there is reason to affirm that the progress already achieved permits the Periphery to consolidate new forms of coalition and to take new initiatives designed to achieve a new order in international relations. However, one must nor forget that the struggle against dependence is only one of the aspects of development and this cannot be successfully achieved without the liberation of the people's creative capacity. One of the most negative effects of the domination of peripheral countries by transnationals is probably the fact that they have transformed the managerial elites of those countries into simple transmission belts of external cultural values. The dependent system loses even the capacity to conceive its own ends, and thus it fits authoritarian regimes like a glove. Economic dependence, cultural domination and political authoritarianism are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
AFRICA TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000

by Albert Tévoédjrè (Rapporteur)

1. At the invitation of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, a Symposium on the Future Development Prospects of Africa towards the Year 2000 was held in Monrovia (Liberia) from 12 to 16 February 1979. It was attended by some 40 experts from various parts of Africa, representing the world of economics, science, labour, health, diplomacy and futures research, who took part in a personal capacity.

2. The Symposium, whose objectives merit the firm support of the international community, benefited from the co-operation of the Government of Liberia and the organizations of the United Nations system.

Opening statements were made by: H.E. Dr. William R. Tolbert Jr., President of the Republic of Liberia; Mr. Edem Kodjo, Secretary-General of the OAU; Mr. I. Djermakoye, Under-Secretary General of the United Nations and Commissioner for Technical Co-operation; Mr. Adebayo Adedaji, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; Mr. Michel Doo Kingué, Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and Regional Director for Africa; and Mr. Kenneth S. Dadzie, United Nations Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation.

6. In the light of these statements, ... the participants decided to focus their discussions on two main themes:

. what type of development should Africa aspire to for the year 2000?
. what ways and means should be employed for this purpose?

7. The very fact of raising these issues automatically entails hazarding a diagnosis of the present situation, formulating ambitious objectives for the future and implementing coherent programmes immediately.

1/ This is the final report of the joint OAU/ECA Symposium on the Future Development of Africa Towards the Year 2000. Further copies may be obtained from the General Secretariat of the OAU, P.O. Box no. 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

2/ The principal sources of international support for the Symposium were the United Nations Development Programme (Regional Bureau for Africa) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
The diagnosis

8. The African continent is more drastically affected than the other regions of the world by the negative achievements of the development strategies adopted by most countries whose failure, aggravated by the social crises which the industrialized countries are currently undergoing, hardly needs emphasizing. For all its vast natural resources and the praiseworthy efforts of its governments and peoples, Africa in particular is unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of general well-being. The problem of under-employment and unemployment is more and more serious. The use of resources is well below its potential. The state of inter-African co-operation is a far cry from the decisions and hopes that were clearly enunciated by the higher authorities of the countries concerned. Commitments undertaken by heads of State remain a dead letter in a great many cases where their implementation could represent an effective contribution to improving the standard of living of the people.

9. Though a symbol of vitality and joy, Africa is equally familiar with the sombre reality of death - massive infant mortality, violent death in all its forms. The prospect of impending disaster is not just a figment of the imagination. The facts are there to be seen, pointing to the past and to the present with an accusing finger and to the future with scornful laughter.

10. Altogether, Africa's gross national product accounts for only 2.7 per cent of the world product. At 365 dollars, Africa has the lowest average annual per capita income in the world, while its infant mortality rate at 137 per 1,000, is the world's highest. Sparked off by an urban-oriented development policy, under-employment and unemployment have reached alarming figures and now affect 45 per cent of the active population. Although at present there is one doctor for every 672 inhabitants in urban areas, in the rural areas the average is only 1 per 26,000 inhabitants.

11. Worse still, Africa is excessively dependent on other countries, even for food. Trade and commercial structures are still almost invariably in a North-South direction, a legacy from the past which fosters the laws of unequal exchange and its consequences: deteriorating terms of trade, outward-oriented production, little domestic processing of raw materials, and so on.

12. The participants stressed that, while underdevelopment is not a natural state and although the Third World countries are neither backward nor short of resources but the victims of a world economic system that was designed to benefit the more powerful nations, they are also the victims of misconceptions and erroneous strategies that have steered them towards ill-suited models of development that are geared neither to human needs nor to a basically endogenous development.

Approach and objectives

13. Faced with such a thoroughly disturbing situation, which can only decline further in the near or distant future so long as the same methods are employed as in the past, the only possible approach to the turn of the century is to adopt a radical change of attitude. This means classifying the problems involved, identifying their causes, evaluating performance and isolating the factors that can be put down to the general disorder that prevails in the world. Thereafter, the areas which depend on domestic policies, structural changes and systems of
values must be given priority attention so that a new human-being-oriented African development policy can evolve in which the continent can find its own identity and status instead of having them imposed on it.

14. The prime objective of development has to be the creation of a material and cultural environment that is conducive to self-fulfilment and creative participation.

15. This implies a number of breaks with the past:
   . a break with a number of concepts and habits, starting with excessive mimicry in every field;
   . a break with the obsessive accumulation of material and financial possessions and with the persistent confusion of growth with development, which prevents the promotion of a policy aimed at a better distribution of income for the sake of a balanced and harmonious endogenous development;
   . a break with the evil of deceitful slogans and paper-thin achievements in favour of a courageous attempt to tackle the embarrassing facts of life so as to be able to start today to prepare the future.

16. The dream of an Africa free from hunger, sickness, ignorance, unemployment, social and cultural inequalities, external pressures and aggression can only come true if the continent is self-sufficient, in other words through self-perpetuating development with the free and effective participation of the entire population. Basically, this means increasing the social usefulness of men through employment - the priority goal from which all the rest must follow.

17. The second objective is to devise policies for the rational use and exploitation of natural resources, entailing above all self-sufficiency in food and local processing of the raw materials. More than anything, self-sufficiency in food is a guarantee of security and, as such, a contribution not just to the well-being of Africans but to world peace as well.

18. If Africa is to come to terms with the idea of autonomy, the whole educational and training set-up must be looked at anew and the barriers removed between education and employment, education and society, education and culture - in other words, between education and life. This is the third objective on which the change in mental and social attitudes that self-sufficiency calls for actually depends.

19. For this reason, one of the main areas of consensus during the Symposium was on the importance of science and technology. So long as it has no audacious and vigorous autonomous research policy geared to the most pressing needs and problems of Africa, the continent will continue to be at the mercy of the kind of dependence that is inseparable from "transfer of technology" policies.

20. The fourth objective stems from the realization that the issues of freedom and justice can no longer be left in abeyance. Only yesterday, the birth of a State that respected basic freedoms was one of the most important demands in the struggle for independence. Has this erstwhile dream now turned into a nightmare in which repression and censorship condemn and reduce whole generations of Africans to silence?
21. History has shown us that some of the profound traumas that are being relived today leave in their wake nothing but mute victims, total misery and utter oblivion.

22. If these objectives are to be achieved, current methods must be entirely rethought and replaced by a humane, forward-looking approach to the decolonization of the future. The vision of tomorrow means nothing unless it is matched by a commitment to action today.

Components of a Programme of Action

23. The cry of distress which was heard from the Monrovia Symposium is thus - as the participants emphasized again and again - a reaction to a widespread, deep-rooted, malignant evil which bears witness to the fact that the grave problems with which Africa is confronted are the outcome of the development plans and strategies implemented hitherto. The only way of avoiding the disasters that loom at the turn of the century is to foster a new political will.

24. The participants in the Symposium were convinced that Africa can embark upon a strategy that affords it complete control over its own needs and over the cultural, social, technical, economic and financial instruments that are capable of promoting appropriate action and guaranteeing success in its bid to change life in Africa.

25. This strategy for change, for which there is an irrefutable need, was widely discussed by the participants in the Symposium who distinguished four principal aspects:

I. A NEW PEDAGOGY GEARED TO AFRICAN UNITY

II. THE NEED FOR SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL VALUES UNDERLYING A NEW APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

III. MASTERY OVER THE TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS THAT ARE VITAL TO THE NEW TYPE OF DEVELOPMENT

IV. A NEW APPROACH TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, WITH THE EMPHASIS ON LINKS BETWEEN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

I. A new pedagogy geared to African unity

26. To begin with, the participants in the Symposium made a point of issuing a warning which can be summed up as follows: "Considering the gigantic resources and achievements of such countries as the United States and the Soviet Union, considering the patiently organized labour of 900 million Chinese and considering the ever-growing economic force represented by the European Common Market, were the African countries to continue to pursue a narrow nationalistic path they would be faced with the prospect not only of an ever-widening gap between rich and poor countries but also of the progressive marginalization of the continent, condemned to accept its role as a mere branch of some former or new empire".

27. Consequently, African unity is not just a slogan, a pious dream or an irresponsible ambition. It is a necessity.
28. To back up this approach, the Symposium urgently called for three specific measures:

i) First, the creation of an African common market based on progressive co-
coordination and integration, which would evolve in the form of concentric
circles reflecting the economic areas that currently exist on the con-
tinent. The African common market could also apply to individual products:
meat, cereals, textiles, etc.

The Symposium called upon the OAU to make all the necessary arrangements
to initiate action along these lines without delay, with the support of
the UNDP and the ECA.

ii) Secondly, the extension of arrangements for the free movement of persons
and goods on the African continent. This calls for a decision which,
though symbolic, is also highly promising: the suppression of visas
among African countries.

iii) Thirdly, the awakening of African public opinion to the idea of the unity
of Africa so that it does not remain the preserve of political circles
alone. Various forms of action along these lines are advocated at the
level of associations of women, young people, workers, sportsmen, etc.,
and of the centres of education (secondary schools, colleges, universities,
etc.).

29. This new pedagogy geared to African unity is necessary if the concept of
development based on collective autonomy and on the African peoples' own values
is to be a realistic proposition.

II. The need for scientific, cultural and social values underlying a
new approach to development

30. The first step is to encourage schools, occupational and political circles and
the public at large to "reappropriate" the traditional African cultural values of
solidarity, mutual respect and attachment to the environment. The objectives of
the Cultural Charter of Africa (Port Louis, 1976) are more relevant than ever
before and the participants in the Symposium urged that steps should be taken to
start applying the Charter with UNESCO assistance.

31. Culture frees mankind, and one of the cultural values is "the duty of freedom".
The Symposium stressed the fact that no development or political stability is
possible so long as individual and collective rights go unheeded and basic free-
doms - which are inseparable from justice and solidarity - are ignored.

32. It is with this in mind that the Symposium called for the creation within the
OAU's General Secretariat of a Human Rights Department to analyse all matters
related to personal, economic and social rights and to take appropriate action
in co-ordination with the international community.

33. By the year 2000, Africa must succeed in freeing African man from the handi-
caps of negative development, specifically by eliminating discrimination based on
race, sex, age, physical condition, ethnic group, religious or philosophical
convictions. The participants in the Symposium focussed their attention on two
areas in particular:

a) educational reform and a new approach to the problems of scientific and
   technological research;
b) a more dynamic approach to health programmes.

**Education and scientific research**

34. The objectives for the year 2000 presuppose the existence of a strategy of Africanization and democratization of knowledge in the course of man's preparation for life and education. It will therefore be necessary:

i) to eradicate illiteracy completely by the turn of the century, partly by making primary education compulsory for all Africans of school age and partly by launching a dynamic adult literacy campaign. Only the mobilization of the Africans themselves as pedagogic agents - not forgetting the use of the African national languages if the population of the rural areas is to be reached - can pave the way for the democratization of education;

ii) to place employment, in other words the social usefulness of men and women, at the centre of education and, as advocated by the International Labour Organization, to develop a variety of occupational training techniques at the post-primary and post-secondary level while reforming the placement facilities that will be expected to find employment for young people around the year 2000;

iii) to give priority to the training of instructors in every field, and particularly in that of the exact sciences and management sciences;

iv) to strengthen the autonomy of the higher education institutions and research centres at the national level, while encouraging the development of pan-African communications techniques.

35. Education must consist not only of strictly school-type programmes but also of training facilities for all those who will one day be called upon to control the more complex instruments of development.

36. As far as science and technology are concerned, therefore, the strategic objectives should be to reduce Africa's total dependence in these fields and to help the continent as quickly as possible to master properly those sciences and techniques that can enable it to tackle Africa's major development problems successfully. The objective for the year 2000 is to rid the continent of the general approach that currently prevails and which accepts without question the concept and practice of "transfer of technology" - an expression which the Symposium suggests should be stricken from the international vocabulary.

37. The Symposium accordingly urged the OAU and ECA, with UNDP support, to promote the speedy implementation of the programme of action adopted at the African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, which was held in Cairo (Egypt) in August 1978. From this programme, the Symposium pinpointed the following measures:

a) Strengthening of African institutions concerned with science and technology for development.

b) Support for the African Centre of Technology with a view to helping the African countries to increase their technological capability and avoid the common pitfalls of subjection and dependence.
Support also for non-governmental African scientific associations and for inter-African university co-operation, for example by the creation of scientific prizes.

c) Encouragement to new ideas:
   i) by means of educational reform with a view to developing the African spirit of invention,
   ii) by the creation of a pan-African status for researchers,
   iii) by means of a scheme for popularizing scientific information.

d) Greater autonomy for higher education and research via-a-vis the political authorities.

38. Culture, education, training: Africa cannot hope to become more productive unless a more dynamic attitude is adopted towards health problems.

Health as a precondition for development

39. Consequently, it is essential, within the context of the prospects for development and economic growth in Africa, to devise a regional strategy geared to achieving the social objective of "health for everybody" by the year 2000. Without the formulation of national policies, strategies and plans of action, no such regional strategy is possible. The introduction or extension of the development process in the health sector requires a firm political commitment to embark upon the reforms that are essential for this health objective to become a reality. Given the will and determination, it will be easier to define national policies in the health sector and draw up the necessary programmes in detail. What is needed now is to face up to the most pressing problems and to devise and implement better health schemes. Each programme will contain specific objectives (quantified as far as possible), an indication of the techniques (including pharmaceutical techniques), facilities, equipment and supplies that are needed and a description of the means of appraisal of and correlation between the various components.

40. One satisfactory approach, as suggested by the World Health Organization, could be the promotion of primary (essential) health care based on practical, scientifically valid and socially acceptable methods and techniques which are made universally accessible to all individuals and all families in the community, and in which they participate fully. Primary health care is an integral part of socio-economic development. In addition to the health sector as such, it includes all the allied areas such as agriculture, cattle breeding, industry, education, habitat, public works and health programming by country. The provision or extension of national health advice facilities, national health development centres and technical co-operation among Third World countries are other ways in which the promotion of primary medical care can be fostered. Specifically, the Symposium recommended every African State to take steps to ensure that all citizens have access to drinking water by the end of the century. It also recommended the intensification in every African country of the campaign to preserve traditional medical formulas and practices.

41. The approach to development adopted by the Symposium, which places mankind at the centre of development, presupposes their mastery of the instruments that are conducive to their greater well-being. First among these are instruments which
relate to planning and employment, self-sufficiency in food and the control of natural resources and financial techniques.

III Some technical instruments

Planning and employment

42. Endemic poverty, widespread unemployment, illiteracy and a deteriorating environment - this is the common lot of all African countries and is why it is more urgent than ever before to gear all development policies to "the individual in society". The participants in the Symposium considered that it was essential that the OAU and ECA, along with national planning bodies, should bring their various conceptions and principles into line with one another and revise their development plans in the interests of the greatest number by giving priority to employment, the satisfaction of basic needs and respect for the environment.

43. The participants moreover recognized the need for regional co-operation in the development of industry and the exploitation of natural resources. The pressure on people to move from the countryside to the towns could be alleviated by industrialization policies designed to avoid urban concentration.

Food

44. The capacity of the African nations to meet their own food requirements is one of the fundamental objectives of their self-help and self-sufficiency strategy. By the year 2000, they must have succeeded in reversing the trend towards a reduction in food production, ending their growing dependence on imports and averting the catastrophic effects of drought. No efforts must be spared to ensure the vigorous application of the FAO/ECA Regional Food Plan for Africa, to set up a body to control the implementation of this Plan and propose strategies for the future, and to institute a regional inter-African food security scheme. The Symposium proposed that the degree of a country's dependence on others for its food imports should henceforth be considered as one of the most significant indicators of its level of development!.

Control of natural resources

45. Aware of the considerable importance of the rational and efficient management of natural resources (mineral deposits, water, energy, forestry, etc.) and its potential for the continent's industrial development, the participants in the Symposium concluded that it was essential that Africans should have recovered total and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources by the year 2000. In other words, they must:

1/ Other indicators could be the possibility of social usefulness (employment), access to land, distribution of water, possibility of using local construction materials, literacy rate and degree of knowledge of one's own culture, eradication of diseases attributable to bad hygiene, efficiency of public transport as measured by the number of points visited, effective participation in decisions affecting the community and management of its affairs.
a) co-operate in the training of high-level national personnel specialising in all aspects of intensive exploration and exploitation of the continent's mineral resources, possibly by means of the creation of multinational African enterprises in the sector at the regional or continental level;

b) carry out a general survey of Africa's water resources, from the standpoint of hydraulic power, navigable waterways, consumption of water by people and animals, industrial uses and co-operation schemes for the utilization by several countries of waterways and lakes that are common to them all;

c) set up interlinked high-voltage networks among neighbouring countries in order to make the maximum use of the enormous hydro-electric potential of Africa and investigate other sources of energy (solar, aeolian, geothermal, animal waste, etc.);

d) make greater use of Africa's vast forest resources for the greater benefit of the local populations and set up forest plantation schemes for combating soil erosion and desertification.

Transport and communication

46. One of the essential instruments of domestic development and inter-African co-operation is a reliable transport and communications network. The participants in the Symposium therefore drew attention to the urgent need for States to apply all the provisions of the United Nations Resolution concerning the Transport and Communications Decade in Africa (1978/88), the African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence (Abidjan, May 1973) and the pan-African telecommunications project.

47. The implementation of all these projects is conditioned by a number of imperatives, one of which - and not the least - is access to financial resources, which in turn is dependent on the international monetary system.

Financial and monetary instruments

48. At the international level, the Symposium drew attention to the injustices of the prevailing system and Africa's extremely limited quotas and condemned the current monetary disorder as being particularly harmful to the Third World countries. It strongly urged the African governments and other governments of the Third World to join forces to ensure that new arrangements are made and extensive reforms contemplated with a view to promoting a better balance and distribution of power within the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Furthermore, the OAU and ECA should undertake studies immediately to determine the implications for Africa of the creation of a European monetary system which is now under discussion.

49. With specific reference to Africa, the Symposium considered that the fact that there were so many monetary systems was an obstacle to the development of inter-African trade, the movement of goods and people and the establishment of a viable economic zone. This diversity further reduced the continent's economic power vis-à-vis the rest of the world. One of the major objectives for the year 2000 should be monetary integration. It was therefore necessary to encourage any research, experiments and projects that could be undertaken from now on at the initiative of the OAU.
50. Turning finally to the financing of regional projects, the Symposium recommended that, in the spirit of the African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence, the African Development Bank (ADB) should devote at least half of its programme resources to multinational projects during the period 1980-2000 and that the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ADEBA) should devote at least one-third of its resources to such projects over the same period.

51. There must be close co-operation between countries suffering from the same ills so that they can control the technical instruments in the field of currency and finance.

IV Co-operation among nations

52. Co-operation between Third World countries is thus a necessity, not just as a framework for their demands but also, and above all, as a means of cultivating a development mentality based on collective self-dependence in order to change the living conditions of millions of men and women whose poverty is the cause of their increasingly marginal existence and who, at the start of the next millenium, may bear witness to the fatal failure of the strategies of today.

53. On several occasions the Symposium drew attention to the example already afforded by Afro-Arab co-operation in numerous spheres. This example can bolster the policy of horizontal co-operation and render it more efficient.

54. Specifically, the example of a "radical" technology for breathing new life into the villages and basic communities has shown very clearly that co-operation between Third World countries must not be allowed to remain a subject of mere intellectual speculation. The people themselves, the workers, peasants and craftsmen who want their share of knowledge and know-how too are directly concerned. It is they above all who must be put in touch with the achievements of their counterparts in similar environments, with due respect for the findings of the United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries which was held in Buenos Aires in September 1978.

55. It suffices for the OAU to take a direct interest in the organization of such co-operation and, suddenly, governments and officials at every level discover an opportunity to exchange new ideas that are conducive to genuine progress for the masses.

56. Finally, there is the question of international co-operation, and here the Symposium issued a serious warning:

57. Africa is of course in the world and the affairs of the entire world are also its affairs. But it refuses to become integrated into a world of vassals. By the year 2000 it intends to have built up this new responsible, contractual form of co-operation, in which solidarity will not be that of "a horse and rider" and in which freedom will not be that of "a free fox in a free henhouse". It is not interested in interdependence which is merely the same old dependence with a less embarrassing name. Consequently, the participants in the Symposium urged that all international negotiations in which Africa participates should be conducted in the light of a clearly formulated diagnosis of the impending catastrophe
and a forward-looking approach to Africa's development objectives. The countless statements heard on this subject suggest the following guidelines:

We wish to be the agents of our own progress and no longer merely the beneficiaries of the progress made by others on our territories using our natural resources ...

We want to take over the management of all our own affairs and not merely participate in it to an extent dictated by others ...

The era of the international division of labour is over. The time has come for the development of the creative autonomy of peoples within a readjusted international exchange system ...

58. These options are valid for the North-South Dialogue, the Lomé Convention, the Common Fund negotiations, the Law of the Sea, and the Tokyo Round.\(^1\)

59. They are valid also as far as Africa's participation in the United Nations system, its contribution to that system, the responsibilities it exercises within it and the demands it expresses through the system are concerned. It would be much easier to live up to these standards if the continent were better organized, if its representatives were better able to see how their policies, commitments and possibilities can be harmonized. Here again, co-ordination through the OAU is a necessity. An OAU handbook containing the conclusions of meetings, the principal resolutions and the progress made in various areas would, by providing a number of landmarks and, above all, by showing the negotiators clearly how much ground still remains to be covered, help them to see exactly where they stand.

60. The Symposium also stressed that bilateral and, above all, multilateral co-operation can serve the fundamental interests of Africa, provided that, for the sake of an endogenous popular development, the best possible use is made of the facilities afforded by the international community either in the form of compensation which is due to it on several counts or through the promotion of the solidarity of nations in order to overcome the special constraints that are felt in every region of the world. With this in mind, the Symposium stressed the importance of respecting the oft-cited financial transfer commitments in order to further the development of the countries most seriously affected by the negative aspects of the prevailing international economic structures.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE RAPPORTEUR

61. We came to Monrovia with our minds on the year 2000, in other words on the younger generation which by then will have done away with apartheid in all its forms provided it is given the means to do so today. Placing the younger element of our population foremost in our thoughts, helping them to become responsible citizens and respecting their responsibilities, encouraging their participation

\(^1\) The Symposium adopted the proposal of several participants that Africa should, through the OAU, initiate negotiations in the context of the Tokyo Round with a view to concluding an agreement along the lines of the Lomé Convention with such countries as the United States, Japan, the Scandinavian Governments and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.
in decisions that concern them - this is how we can best work towards a change for progress in Africa. Ready for every sacrifice for which the need is profoundly felt, these young people also passionately aspire to peace. They demand that an end should be put to the violence from which our continent has suffered so much for centuries - slavery, forced labour, mercenaries for every war. They demand that our first item of expenditure should be expenditure on development in reason, economy and humanity.

62. It is this younger generation, which is now getting itself ready in the school co-operatives, on worksites and in workers' education centres, which will judge tomorrow whether or not we have betrayed it. It is with this younger generation in mind that we have dreamed of a strategy of public safety. We are profoundly convinced that, unless the basic freedoms are respected, the response will be subversion and repression and the start of a downward path to destruction. We are convinced that progress comes from criticism, self-criticism, tolerance - preconditions for this dignity to which we aspire. Through these universal instruments that are also our own, we must find the answers to the questions that the young, the women and the physically and mentally handicapped are constantly asking us as they pursue us into the sombre retreat of our comfort, a comfort which in the last analysis is unwholesome because it affords us no rest. We are already coming to realize that, without profound change, without a revolution in our aspirations, there is no possibility of political stability. But, on the other hand, what marvellous prospects, what shared knowledge and prosperity we can finally look forward to if we adopt a new approach to the future and to the organization of labour and can thus restore a valid existence and true dignity to Africa and its peoples!

* * *

63. At the closing sitting, which was presided over by Mr. Cecil Dennis, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Symposium thanked the Government of Liberia for its hospitality and for the facilities placed at its disposal which had enabled the meeting to take place in such excellent conditions.

64. The symposium also congratulated Mr. Edem Kodjo, Secretary-General of the OAU, on his happy initiative in organizing this pooling of ideas and experience. Finally, it expressed the hope that prospects meetings of this kind would be held periodically at various levels in order to provide the necessary guidelines and support for co-ordinated action in favour of the collective development of the African peoples.

1/ The Symposium accordingly adopted the principle of creating a Pan-African Prospects Association and requested Professor Mahdi Elmandjra to make the necessary arrangements for its organization.
The more we think about the urban problem, looking at it from a multiple point of view, the more convinced we are, that it is necessary to restore old values, which made the city more human; values that can acquire new dimensions in the context of the present.

These values should be reincorporated within the traditional guidelines, which rule the life of the cities.

The city, integration of functions

Today's city should correspond to the integration of functions, where housing, work and leisure find themselves as strictly tied together as in the city of yesterday. This, of course, from an up-to-date point of view, combining construction techniques, means of transport, communications, with old human values, which we wish to preserve, intensify or create.

Our poet, Vinicius de Morais, said: "Life is the art of encounter".

If we were asked today to summarize in one word the urban functions, we would say: "encounter".

The city is the background for encounters. Encounters which should be promoted in all activities of urban life. These activities should be strictly tied together and never separated, whether in new cities or already established cities.

The separation of city functions was a consequence of an erroneous interpretation of the "Athens Charter".

Until this day, the global view of the city is lost, decomposing its functions and evaluating its necessities, diagnosing the obvious and giving a prognosis of a tragedy.

In this way, we lose the views of a large number of the population, emphasizing sectorial solutions, dealing with what is important and not with what is fundamental.

The city thus thought of is a projection of tendencies, of all that we do not want to be continued, of all that is of no interest to consecrate.

"Tendency is not destiny". The destiny of the cities is in our hands and can continually be renourished by successive approximations. It is as if we were to fire a shot. But a shot, the trajectory of which we have conditions to accompany and correct at any moment.

The city represents much more than an integration of functions.
It represents settling. This settling refers to the way of life and to traditional and cultural values.

A new city needs settling. This settling time gives the city the necessary "ambience".

To think of an already settled city is like looking for its hidden design. Strange archeology which keeps on reviving old buildings, streets, old meeting places, giving new functions and values which were so dear to us.

It is like on an old drawing - erase everything that is in the way.

It is like discovering on a kaleidoscope, that old lost design which will provide a meeting place.

It is like giving new contents to this design, consolidating it with mass transport, with land use and with the road framework.

These three factors (even though they are not the only ones), when integrated into one guideline, define the growth structure of a city.

In a city which is not yet settled, the design - its growth structure - must be created.

There is a need for continuity

The emptiness of the city derives from a lack of continuity. "Visual space is uniform, continuous and inter-connected" (Mac Luhan). The spaces that are created do not substitute advantageously the street with a meeting point. The lack of continuity, closed spaces, exhibitional commerce, do not give the commercial centers conditions for meeting, like a traditional street does. People go on the streets in order to frequent it, while one goes to a Commercial Center with a determined aim. The traditional street allows for discoveries. Little by little its equipments offer themselves gradually; the new center represents the massifying impact. The traditional street is defined lineally. Its variety lies within what is happening.

Public transport as a cohesion factor

The dissociative characteristic of individual transport is even more accentuated in the cities. Human scale is forgotten in the road framework. Large parking areas create empty spaces, which mark sadly the arid landscape of today's cities.

Public transport must have an added function which is that of integration. It must provide the conviviality of the passenger with the itinerary and thus of the inhabitant with the city. Passing through important points is fundamental, in order to establish a reference, and starting from there, an identification.

The city, a happening of leisure

Leisure in the city should not be directed leisure. The movies, the theater, or other equipments, placed away from the urban structure are not sufficient to offer animation. Leisure should happen spontaneously, inter-connected with other day-to-day urban functions. It is the conviviality with the city which should provide leisure. Leisure is strictly tied in with the organization of meeting points.
Urban landscapes should reflect the manner in which we organize the meeting points.

It should give the landscape elements of surprise, of variation of perspectives, of continuity and of optimization of dispersion.

The city should be a happening. A series of happenings, which would cancel out the attraction of television and other elements which reduce a larger participation by man within the city.

People are the attraction of the city. Man is the actor and the spectator of this daily spectacle, which is the city.

Quality of life

At the moment when the city no longer meets the objective needs and starts attending to the subjective needs, it is contributing to a better quality of life. A quality of life which, on the scale of the community, means the cancellation of negative conditions and, on the scale of the individual, the proportion between its satisfactions and its aspirations. At this moment, the quality of life will condition the objectives of economic development.

Cause and effect

When dealing with urban problems, it is important to act on the cause and on the effect. Many people understand that it is useless to take care of cities while the causes, which stimulate more and more the concentration of large urban centers, are not solved.

However, while the causes are not solved and the effects continue happening in the cities, something has to be done during this transition period. Rapidly.

There are two ways to act: 1) propose steps to avoid that causes happen, and 2) help solve the already existing problems.

We propose a strategy of action which takes advantage of this transition with the same speed that the structure of urban growth is being engaged, even if the elements which compose it, such as mass transport, land use, road framework, are not definitive.

At any rate, they constitute important data for what is going to happen later.

Systematics of waste

The city must be thought of for day-to-day activities and should not be dimensioned for a maximum tragedy. We must think of a structure to match our reality. Today's urban inhabitant is an indigent living in a super-dimensioned and millionaire structure.

At a time when there is great concern, within the country, in relation to resources for urban development, paradoxically a system of waste is being stimulated.

Waste of resources allocated in the name of the automobile is considerable, and it starts with the family budget, inasfar as housing dimensioning is concerned.
Here is an example: in housing units with 120 m², frequently 50 m² is reserved for the automobile— an area which is often taken away from the family itself. Waste of resources allocated in the name of the automobile extends to public administration, with an exaggeration in the dimensions of streets, which have no importance as roads, such as viaducts, U-turns, expressways which are not part of the basic structure of the city. Waste of resources on infrastructure networks, carried out in non-priority areas.

However, the greatest waste is time, bringing about a loss or a delay in the possibility of intervention. Time wasted on diagnoses for checking easily verifiable tendencies. Time wasted on excess methodology, most of the times a methodology of tendencies which we wish to avoid.

We are living in a phase of emergency

There are moments in the history of a country, when decisions are made in a matter of hours; decisions of utmost importance, due to their socio-economic implications. However, it is mainly with urban problems that decisions are delayed by a system without any synchronization with the speed of happenings.

How about discussing for a while the role of planners; up to what point has this role been an end and not a means?

Behind the label of "research" there is lengthy evaluation methodology of tendencies within a city, a methodology of consecration, of projecting everything that we do not want to continue, of everything that we are not interested in consecrating.

An underdeveloped country is one that accepts what is being abandoned by other (developed) countries, meaning, the one that buys the obsolete as being the newest.

We would obtain surprising results if we were to confront what is spent on polluting and what is spent on protecting. What is spent on deteriorating and what is spent on preserving. What is spent with diagnoses and what is spent with proposals for execution.

The important and the fundamental

The city can only be solved, starting with the moment in which it knows what it wants. That is, starting with the moment at which those responsible for it know what is fundamental for its future.

Very simple, isn't it? But how many administrators can answer with assurance what the objective of their city is? What is fundamental for their city?

Everything is important, but what is fundamental?

Important is the problem of any person, but fundamental is the problem of a large number of people.

Important is the hole or the ditch in front of a person's house, but fundamental is directing the problem of a city's transport.

Important is the access to a certain neighbourhood, fundamental is the road system
which represents, essentially, the framework of what the city wishes to be.

Important is the public square of a certain section, but fundamental is the substantial increase in the green area index of a city.

Important is the help given to certain groups or needy entities, but fundamental is the promotion of a permanent structure of jobs.

Let us not get confused with the scale, because sometimes it is important to place 10,000 people at a dedication, but fundamental is gathering 200 people within a cultural activity.

Or as time goes on: important is an underground system in the year 2000, fundamental is a transport system right now, right away.

It is fundamental for administrators to know what the urban structure that they wish to consolidate is; where the city is heading; what are the transport axes which will consecrate this occupation.

Important is the plan, fundamental is the planning, that is, the people, that plans the city.

Important is long term basis, fundamental is now.

At the speed at which Brazilian cities are developing, any plan that takes more than two years to be carried out will become obsolete. Haste is the friend of perfection. Let us think about the ideal and carry out what is possible. Now.

*/* Architect, Planejamento Urbano
Curitiba, Brazil.

WATER PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT - AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
by Jimoh Omo-Fadaka*/*

Water management is probably the most serious problem facing mankind. Today, 460 million people are starving because they do not have enough of it for their crops. Some 1.2 billion people are without safe drinking water. Another 200 million suffer abysmal indignity and disease for lack of sufficient quantities to cleanse away their wastes. Each day, the situation worsens. By tonight, 200,000 newborn babies will have added their demands to the world's fixed stock of water. By the end of the century, human population will come close to doubling. Water consumption, too, will double - perhaps triple. Hence, if a world water crisis is to be averted by the end of the century, action must be taken immediately.

Looking for a solution

It is because of this crisis that the United Nations held a Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina, from 14 to 25 March 1977. The Conference produced many documents and a World Action Plan, which it hoped would help solve the water crisis. The documents and Action Plan are summarised in 'United Nations Water Conference (Summary and Main Documents)' by Asit Biswas, who was himself directly
involved with the preparation of one of the major background documents and the World Action Plan.

According to the documents, the world does not lack fresh water. The total global supply is sufficient to meet needs into the foreseeable future. The problem is availability. The Conference, in its report, emphasized that water tends "to be available in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or with the wrong quality". And the solution advocated? Move it locally to where people want it, either by irrigation or by impounding behind big dams.

Big dams provide us with an example of the problems of technology when you dam the flow of rivers to water agricultural fields. What happens when we dam the flow of a great river and create an immense body of water where there was none before? Not enough thought was given to this ecological question in the 1950s and 60s as dozens of big dams went up from Pakistan to Ghana, Egypt to Brazil. Everybody thought big dams meant instant progress, and Third World countries were easily persuaded that there was nothing like a big dam for a fast economic take-off. Few people worried about after-shocks in the ecosystem.

In the past few years, however, dam owners the world over have begun to compare notes and discover that when a dam backs up waters behind it, everything changes: the water's chemistry, the kinds and numbers of indigenous flora and fauna, the way of life for all the people who lived on the land before the lake came, the fertility and salinity of the soil downstream, the pressures on the earth's crusts and the tendency, therefore, to earthquakes and landslides. Moreover, while the promised progress is usually less than expected, these changes produce problems that are real and proliferating.

Big dams: The dream that failed

/EDITORIAL NOTE: Drawing upon the experiences of Egypt, Ghana and other Third World countries, the author describes some negative consequences of big dams - both technical (e.g. water loss through increased evaporation, storage loss through silting) and social (large-scale resettlement of displaced communities, aggravation of water-borne disease)./

Key calculations simply were not done thoroughly enough until recently. Engineers honestly did not know they were committing ecological sins. Rich countries putting up the money sincerely thought of themselves as benefactors. Third World countries were suitably grateful, and displaced people getting pushed around never seemed to matter.

It is obvious that many of the problems generated are the unavoidable features of large-scale undertakings of this sort. The adverse effects of such undertakings on the happiness, health, physical and mental well-being of the people are now evident. Many officials are worried. Even in Cairo and Accra, where the spell of the dams is still strong, officials privately admit that they would not be built if Egypt and Ghana had things to do over again. As one Egyptian agronomist put it, "I'd give my soul to turn that water muddy again." That will not happen, ever!
Technology not the answer

The Water Conference in Argentina was one of many the United Nations has convened in recent years to consider pressing world problems and suggest solutions. Special Action Plans were drawn up for two of the more urgent matters identified by the Conference: water-for-home and water-for-growing-food. The water-for-home provision is concerned with water supply and waste disposal. The Conference proposed to fill this need in all urban and rural sectors by 1990. The cost will be US$8 billion a year. Initially, efforts are to be concentrated in Third World countries. The period 1980-90 is to be known as International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. The plan anticipates that international aid will be required in both funding and technical assistance.

The other Action Plan, water-for-growing-food, seeks - in the words of the Conference Report, intensification and improvement of water development in agriculture. Governments are also expected to make the major contributions to the plan, and it is to have assistance from the world community.

The view expressed in the Report that water tends "to be available in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or with the wrong quality", expresses the usual strong anthropocentric bias, although within that context it is true. Having identified the water problem, the Report suggests that what is needed is more technology to get water to where people need it. All the rich countries and international organizations are expected to offer cash, technicians and equipment - mostly on loan and at interest - to achieve it. In the end, it is the Third World countries that will pay and pay, thus increasing their debt burdens.

The flaw that this slant of mind reveals, however, is that the solution to the water problem, and to human problems in general, is not in nature but in ourselves, in our approach to nature and to the fundamental relationship that connects us to the sources of our existence. It is at the core of most of our environmental ills, including those of water shortages. And it militates against the kind of thinking necessary to bring about the integration of human endeavours with natural processes required to cure those ills. It is not water that is out of order, out of place, but mankind. Tampering with the order of nature can be fraught with disaster, as we are discovering to our consternation and dismay. Better to change our order of thinking and consider the wisdom of living in harmony with nature rather than trying to conquer nature by the use of technology.

Assuredly, the answers to our water problem do not lie in the continued, indiscriminate application of technology on which we have come to rely so heavily and so much to our detriment. Technology is basically improvisational. It treats the symptoms; it provides no lasting cures. Moreover, technology is part of the problem.

Ten years ago, the eminent hydrologist, Dr. Raymond L. Nace, warned against our enslavement to technology when he said, "Three besetting sins tempt water planners and their advisers: faith in science and technology; worship of bigness; and arrogance toward the landscape". We have been too much inclined in the past to blunder ahead, aware only of our human requirements, disregarding - at horrendous cost - the realities of the natural situation.
Another development in water planning and management

There is an urgent need for a radical revision of modern water planning and management. New, comprehensive and realistic planning and management criteria need to be substituted for those in operation today. In other words, viable alternatives to large-scale dam projects should always be considered. The new policies should have as their criteria of success the well-being of human beings rather than the professional pride of engineers. The new policies will involve a break with the conventions of the past. They will require a patient and possibly painful re-education of professional planners and public alike.

The problems of big dams will not go away if we dabble vaguely at their symptoms. The ultimate reckoning, if we continue with present policies, is certain. Deluding ourselves that it will not happen will only make it that much more painful.

The United Nations is uniquely qualified for radical investigations of viable alternatives to huge dams and another development in water planning and management. It can be above prejudice and vested interests of planners and individual countries. It could employ men of talent and vision able to break free of the sick, tired, discredited planning doctrines of today. The Water Conference in Argentina was an opportunity to be bold and radical. We are all the worse for the fact that it opted entirely for conventional planning, albeit of a conscientious kind. It was a wasted opportunity.

Not that all big dam proposals should be turned down. Viable alternatives should always be considered as a matter of priority. Third World countries should ask themselves if the potential benefits are worth the tremendous cost in human terms. They now know that once a giant dam is built, it is there, breaking timeless natural laws and banishing people.

*/ Jimoh Omo-Fadaka, Nigeria, is a free-lance journalist and an associate editor of "The New Ecologist", London.

LEMMATA OF ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT

by Stelios Kafandaris*/

The growing bibliography of Another Development has established lemmata, i.e., assumptions, arguments and demonstrable propositions which, at some point in time, should be codified and possibly, theoretically presented using the analytical tools of social sciences. Two of the most conspicuous ones are outlined below in an attempt to show their intimate links with the core elements of Another development, namely, the orientation towards basic human needs, the endogeneity and self-reliance and the awareness of ecological inter-connectedness.

The virtues of decentralization. The man-centrism of Another development leads directly to decentralization. Big Business and Big Government (Sachs, Dossier 2) are the main targets. Decentralization is the operative tool required to set in motion the processes of basic needs coverage, endogeneity and self-reliance.
Time is the chief global resource (Sachs, op.cit.) and the only one available so perfectly decentralized. The hierarchical power structure of today has not mobilized human time, and cannot. It has only stifled it.

Furthermore, decentralization is tacitly related to the global ecology. It leads to decongestion of industry, services and amenities which yield direct savings on social sacrifice. There is abundant evidence and theoretical justification that congestion is one of the main causes of social costs accrual (negative externalities). After all, it is intuitively unequivocal that outer limits will be exceeded (and in some parts they have already) in stages depending on some sort of excessive concentration. Apart from reducing or removing disutility, decongestion increases the reliability of the system, thus minimizing the chances for catastrophic failures (black-outs, nuclear pollution, famine, total war). Hence the pursuance of decentralized programmes: solar and wind energy, the most decentralized forms of energy; cycling and walking for mobility; home (and roof) growing of foodstuffs; recycling of waste material. Locally adapted technology, labour intensive techniques and soft technology in general come under the same argument. They require decentralized, descaled effort (i.e. human) rather than centrally generated capital (and centrally administered, with all the strings of dependence). In some respects capital cannot be viewed as accumulated labour but as congested and congesting human effort.

Allied to the above themes are the complex gains from in situ processes. Thus, for instance, preventive health care is a decentralized service which, apart from the direct benefits to health that it entails, by far more valuable than curative medicine, it has the indirect effect of reinforcing decentralization proper. This is valid for most services (c.f. Bhaduri, Dossier 3). The objective of basic needs coverage will be more efficiently and more effectively fulfilled under a decentralized system which minimizes bureaucratic wastage and which is continuously strengthened from the delivery of the services.

There is also an intrinsic relationship between decentralization and tradition. It is not just a historical accident that there was a stable state of decentralization since time immemorial until the industrial revolution, with minor exceptions (basically ceremonial conglomerations). Thus traditional values are not sought out of conformism with previous movements but out of the tangible need to rediscover applicable processes under decentralization. In this context traditionalism is not just formalism; on the contrary, it can take a place along he basic needs since there is the plausible hypothesis that the last hundred years have not been sufficient to wipe away experiences of primordial decentralization.

Low intensity fights irreversibility. Time is unidirectional and so are most forms of resources in the final analysis. The concept of entropy can be borrowed from physics to describe the irreversibility of the process of development. The appreciation of the ecological constraints and the improvement in the use of resources are steps towards arresting entropy. Another development thus plays the role of Maxwell's demon in real life. Its strategic choices aim at delaying, if not avoiding, the irreversibility of the global predicament. The orientation towards basic needs would not only sort out the problem of inequality of distribution under constrained supply conditions, but would also decelerate the rate of wastage—thus fighting entropy.
Preference for low intensity processes should be inserted as a simple rule. Coverage of basic needs is the pre-eminently low intensity process. The main characteristics are flexibility, simplicity and thereby higher reliability, and maximum economy in the use of resources for the maintenance of the whole system. Low intensity is a concomitant to man-centered development. The very nature of the human effort in its proper sense is of low intensity. Accordingly, it is directly connected to decentralization, thus rediscovering the need for soft technology. Since low intensity processes require smaller amounts of accumulated resources, they allow flexibility for trial and errors. Given the inexact nature of planning and the inability to experiment in cases where huge commitments of resources are involved, low intensity is the only way out of the impasse.

It may look paradoxical, but the option to defer for later a decision on a project more often than not is the option closest at hand to the principles of Another development. The established order pushes forward projects compatible with its ideology, therefore opposing and obstructing Another development. Fighting against such projects (nuclear plants, fly-overs, subways, airports, tourist resorts) is one of the most serious tactical weapons in the hands of the people. It is a struggle for future flexibility. Another development begins by the negation and resistance to "development".

Notes on analytical antecedents

All criticism to the Neoclassical Economic Theory could be considered as a preface to the theoretical grounds of Another development. It should be noted that Growth is the practical spearhead of Neoclassical thought. Another theoretical premise is the critique of development by the Neomarxist school of social scientists who established testable models of underdevelopment, exploitation and dependence at international scale, thus complementing Marx.

Literature on Regionalism has been growing parallel to that of development. However, an older source will be noted as it offers a most lucid and powerful analytical model of the anti-social nature of centralization. This is H. Hotelling, Stability in Competition, Econ. Journal XXXIX, 1929. He presents a simple and abstract locational problem of two vendors along a linear region, where it is shown that maximum profits are secured only if they locate in the center, thus maximizing social costs. Centralization commences as a result of business suspicion and monopolistic tendencies. The locational image is then extended into abstract notions of centralization as non-differentiation and hence exploitation of non-existent qualities.

Indirect association with the analytics of collective self-reliance can be found through the strategic anecdote "Prisoner's Dilemma". Collective self-reliance is in fact very close to collective confidence, which is the basis of the dilemma. Confidence would provide optimum results despite the fact that it is not a rational course - Another development presents a fresh concept of rationality anyway. Confidence and self-reliance involves risks which citizens and states, or prisoners in dilemma, are unwilling to take. This evidence explains at least in part the resistance to collective self-reliance that is encountered. This resistance has been a major behavioural trait of the 20th century (pollution, arms race, disregard for international agreements, or at country level, tax evasion and selfish consumerism).
Selfish conduct is invariably counter self-reliant. Intuitively, this can be supported by the idea of interconnectedness (only one earth). There can be no isolation and, therefore, no long-term reward for selfishness. This has been supported by statistical evidence (c.f. for instance, overfishing which leads to temporary prosperity). Further, it is intriguing to note the inverse: the distributive effects of local development, yet another corroboration of the validity of collective self-reliance. Upgrading a depressed area benefits the whole region; same with slums in cities. Given the limits in resources, distribution according to need would yield optimal results, another support for the principle of basic needs compatible even with the traditional distribution theory (via the principle of diminishing returns).

Last, but not least, the work of ILO in building analytical arguments for labour-intensive processes should be registered. ILO has now extended the analytical efforts, embarking upon computer modelling for development scenarios. Although early results are not contrary to intuition or theoretical analysis, it is encouraging to note that the project BACHUE Philippines includes in the tests an "inward looking" growth path.

/*/ Stelios Kafandaris, of Greece, is co-ordinating a project on "Another development for Greece" in the context of IFDA's Third System Project.

POUR UN RÉÉCUILIBRE DE L'INFORMATION, OUTIL D'AIDE À LA DÉCISION
par Jean Masini/*/
Il est de fait que beaucoup de responsables ne sont pas encore sensibilisés à la valeur réelle de l'information. Et cependant le courant à monter est très fort, car, en caricaturant à peine, on peut constater que les flux d'information qui relient les pays du Nord à ceux du Sud et les flux inverses ne sont pas de même nature. Du Sud vers le Nord circulent des flux porteurs d'information économique qui sont le fait d'organisations internationales ou d'organismes d'études privés qui trainent vers le Centre, les données économiques et sociales prisées dans les pays du Sud et y permettant la décision relative aux pays du Sud, de soit investir, soit importer ou exporter, soit répondre à un appel d'offre, etc.

Simultanément, les flux des pays du Nord vers le Sud s'organisent au sein de réseaux polarisés pour véhiculer un modèle de consommation, de mode de vie venu du Centre où il a largement prouvé son inefficacité, sinon son inadéquation.

Il est indiscutable que les Centres de décision, publics ou privés des pays du Nord sont mieux au fait de la valeur de l'information. Leur équipement est fondé largement sur l'utilisation d'un matériel informatique qui se prête de plus en plus aux nécessités informationnelles de la décision. Les pays du Sud auraient avantage à bâtir leur propre système d'information, reliant des observatoires économiques nationaux à des réseaux internationaux existant aujourd'hui ou pouvant être créés entre les pays du Sud.

Il est certain que la technologie de l'informatique se conçoit et s'exploite à partir des pays industrialisés. Ceci pose le problème de la dépendance technologique de ceux qui ne peuvent avoir qu'une attitude de consommateur, la Recherche-Développement dans le domaine de l'informatique s'effectuant quasi exclusivement dans les pays du Centre.

Le choix ne peut pas se résoudre par un renoncement pour échapper à la dépendance, car l'asymétrie ira croissante et les désavantages s'amplifieront. Au contraire il faut, tant que cela reste possible, recourir à une politique diversifiée d'équipement informatique et tant qu'il y aura au moins plus d'une firme offrant des produits similaires sur le marché, on pourra utiliser des modèles différents dans la mesure où ils resteront compatibles, ce qui est largement la tendance actuelle.

Dès lors il sera possible pour beaucoup de décideurs de pays du Sud de saisir les données fournies par les systèmes d'information situés en pays du Nord et ceci ne se limite pas seulement aux banques de données. Sont également saisissables et à un coût relativement peu élevé, des instruments de modélisation par lesquels sera traitée l'information.

Ces systèmes comportent des banques de données regroupant l'ensemble des statistiques mondiales, c'est-à-dire y compris celles des pays du Sud. Ils comportent aussi des modèles généraux ou sectoriels qui peuvent être utilisés avec une large batterie d'hypothèses, d'utilisation simple, que l'on peut d'ailleurs affiner par l'emploi de modèles plus spécifiques, mis au point par l'utilisateur, que la qualité des programmes qui sont très conversationnels permet d'utiliser. Les utilisateurs peuvent d'ailleurs faire appel à toute une organisation d'assistance technique et d'initiation.
Ces systèmes s'améliorent et les progrès dans ce domaine sont très rapides, à tel point qu'on peut affirmer que l'évolution de l'informatique n'est pas encore stabilisée. Cette phase d'évolution très heurtée a jusqu'à ce jour laissé le plus grand nombre de pays périphériques à l'écart. On peut cependant imaginer que dans ce domaine le fait précisément de se trouver aujourd'hui encore à ce stade ouvre un grand nombre de possibilités, à condition d'y attacher l'importance que ce problème mérite. La Conférence des Nations Unies sur la Science et la Technique pour le Développement devrait être l'occasion d'une prise de conscience de l'acuité de ces problèmes. Ces problèmes impliquent la mise en œuvre simultanée d'opérations convergentes vers un rééquilibre dans ce domaine. À la base de tout se trouve la formation. Le principal obstacle à l'accès de l'information n'est pas aujourd'hui tant son inaccessibilité que le manque d'hommes capables de recueillir, de classer, de stocker, puis de saisir l'information qui aura été sélectionnée parmi un afflux d'informations diverses et possédant des degrés très distincts d'utilité réelle à la prise de décision.

Cette formation est plus une formation générale qu'une formation de techniciens de l'informatique qui aujourd'hui encore sont formés par ceux-là même qui conçoivent et commercialisent les machines et donc incluent obligatoirement dans leurs programmes de formation les éléments qui sont issus d'un contexte global de nations industrialisées, par nature différent du contexte des pays du Sud.

La difficulté reste donc d'isoler dans la mesure du possible ce qui est technique, donc outil, de ce qui est programme, donc politique.

C'est dans ce domaine que précisément la formation peut assurer la mise en place d'équipes capables de créer à terme des logiciels adéquats. L'ambition est élevée car les logiciels actuellement en place se basent sur des calculs statistiques et économétriques de très haut niveau, mais l'évolution des mathématiques modernes semble très permissive en ce domaine.

Elles passent progressivement de l'explication de l'universel à celle des singularités, de différences, et il devient maintenant possible à des équipes qui n'ont pas une base mathématique exhaustive de se spécialiser dans la recherche de l'évolution des singularités.

Le recours à de telles tentatives initiales dans les pays de la périphérie peut s'associer peu à peu à la mise en place d'instruments d'aide à la décision récupérant l'élaboration du modèle et basant cette décision sur un faisceau d'informations progressivement comparable à celui des pays du Nord.

*/

Directeur des Affaires Internationales, Institut d'étude du développement économique et social, Université de Paris, France.
The Vietnamese peasants' struggle for national independence and social change has long been a symbol of hope for progressive forces in the Third World. Much has been written on the Vietnamese war for national liberation but little is as yet known of the parallel social revolution which was undertaken and has transformed a largely pre-capitalist, feudal colony into an independent socialist state. Information on this transformation is scarce and fragmentary as no systematic field surveys have been undertaken, and the few available studies rely almost exclusively on limited official sources and data. Amit Bhaduri's recent contribution on agricultural cooperatives in Northern Vietnam \(^1\) gains thus in importance as a rare attempt seriously to assess the social transformation of the rural scene in socialist Vietnam.

In Vietnam, agricultural cooperatives seem to have played a major role in increasing agricultural production and in providing during the war a decent livelihood for all. Inevitably the question arises: to what extent do Vietnam's agricultural cooperatives constitute a model applicable to other countries in the Third World?

Only an analysis of the specific circumstances and conditions under which the North Vietnamese cooperatives developed and operate can allow us to distinguish between those characteristics particular to the Vietnamese experience and those of more general relevance to the Third World. The following reflections may contribute to such an analysis and help us draw some policy conclusions from this experience. The main ideas of this paper have also been summarized in a chart. As this analysis is intended to follow up and complete Amit Bhaduri's paper, it is assumed that readers are familiar with basic factual information on the Vietnamese cooperative movement.

1. Agricultural cooperatives in Northern Vietnam can be understood only as part of a wider social revolution.

The launching of the cooperative movement in North Vietnam was not an isolated policy measure to solve problems of agricultural production, marketing or credit as has been the case in most countries. On the contrary it was the logical and necessary outcome of a long and gradual process of agrarian reform and profound social change.

Since the 1930s the Communist Party had initiated partial land reforms, confiscated land belonging to the French administration or its Vietnamese "collaborators", organized credit services to reduce the influence of private moneylenders, reduced tenancy rents and allocated communal lands to landless and poor peasants. Radical land reform was finally implemented in 1953, lasting for three years, dispossessing

landlords, rich peasants and many middle peasants and returning the "land to the tillers", namely to the landless and the poor peasants. 1/

By 1957 a radical social change had taken place in the countryside which created not only basic conditions for a successful launching of the cooperatives in 1958 but also made inevitable the organization of such cooperatives as a next step in the continuing social revolution. The implementation of the land reform through mobilization of the masses of the rural poor had abolished existing social structures: it had destroyed traditional power structures in the villages, liberated the peasant cultivator from economic exploitation and freed him ideologically and culturally from a rigid system of traditional values and beliefs. This triple liberation of the majority of the rural poor — economic, political and ideological — were the preconditions necessary to organize agricultural cooperatives, unhampered by past structures of inequality and dependence. More than associations merely to bring together small peasant-owners once land reform was achieved, agricultural cooperatives were meant to serve as the basic organizational framework for the continuation and deepening of the social revolution in the countryside and for the gradual socialist transformation of relations of production in rural Vietnam.

2. Mass mobilization was a condition sine qua non for the successful launching of the cooperative movement and, more generally, of the social revolution in Northern Vietnam: land reforms, the organization of cooperatives and other measures of social change were mainly achieved through large-scale mobilization of the poor and landless cultivators and were carried out by the rural poor themselves.

Social reforms in the Vietnamese countryside had long been implemented through traditional administrative channels and political institutions which had obvious vested interests in the preservation of existing social structures and relations of production. Such reforms produced little or no results and did not bring about any significant social change. 2/ In 1953 when the Communist Party decided to launch radical land reform, the responsibility for its implementation was given to the rural poor. Party cadres, trained in the law and implementation techniques, were sent to the villages to "mobilize the masses".

Mass mobilization was usually initiated and sustained through intensive campaigns of political information and education, analysing the prevailing situation of the poor cultivators, explaining the Party's agrarian policies, and convincing them of their long-term interest in actively supporting and participating in the Party's policies. Emulation campaigns, appealing to collective social values, and rectification campaigns, exposing errors and abuses, were organized periodically. Most

1/ During this land reform, a total of 810,000 hectares of cultivable land has been redistributed to 72.8 per cent of the peasantry in Northern Vietnam. See Võ Như Thìn, Croissance économique de la RDV, Hanoi, Editions en Langues Étrangères, 1967, p. 200.

2/ In South Vietnam, the Diem government had implemented several land regulations in 1955-57 through bureaucratic channels. These measures resulted only in the exacerbation of socioeconomic inequalities in the countryside. "Landlords continue to levy high tenancy rents... and no diminution (of rents) was allowed during period of bad harvests". See Tu Đô, Saigon, 3/3/61 (daily newspaper).
important, mass participation in agricultural cooperatives and other mass movements was consistently based on the triple principle of voluntary membership, mutual benefit and democratic management.

If the immediate slogans of mass mobilization in Vietnam changed over time, two fundamental purposes have constantly inspired and motivated them: class struggle, for greater social justice, and national struggle, for national independence. In Vietnam, unlike other colonial countries, the struggle for national independence was not led by nationalistic elements of the bourgeoisie or the traditional aristocracy but by a peasant-based Communist Party. The national and social revolution thus went hand in hand - one reinforcing the other.

By resorting to the mobilization of the peasantry to implement radical social changes and to achieve national independence, the Communist Party in fact merely perpetuated a long-standing tradition in Vietnam. The Vietnamese emperors had often mobilized the masses to repel invasions by their traditional enemies - the Chinese and the Mongols - or to bring new land into cultivation and to establish colonies and villages in the Southern part of the country. 1/

3. The active and successful participation of the peasantry in the Vietnamese revolutionary process required the central, guiding authority of the Communist Party to channel mass initiatives into a coherent overall national strategy.

In order to orient popular initiatives along its guidelines the Communist Party had from the outset encouraged the formation of party-controlled mass organizations such as peasant unions and youth and women's associations. The role of these organizations was to ensure that mass participation effectively contributed to a coherent national strategy for social change and that it did not lead to self-defeating anarchy. While spontaneity had always been an important driving force in the Vietnamese revolutionary process, it had to express itself within the framework of a comprehensive strategy of change.

Likewise today, extensive "work democracy" in cooperatives and popular participation at local and regional levels continues to require Party guidance in decisions which define fundamental options of social change. Democracy and participation at the local level are considerable: only the target levels of output and sale to the State of the cooperative's major products are fixed by the State; most other decisions regarding production, management and redistribution of profits are taken by the members of the cooperative. The new managerial reforms initiated since 1976 are meant to further increase local participation in development planning. This decentralized administrative structure of production and planning is however balanced by a centralized and hierarchical...
Party organization whose units, from the central to the cooperative level, ensure the coherence of local and national development efforts. A local Party member and the Secretary of the Party local cell assume respectively the functions of president of the cooperative's Administrative Committee and its Control Board, and are elected as such by the cooperative's members. 1/

If unguided mass mobilization may result in anarchy, excessive control by the central authority may lead to the hypertrophic growth of a bureaucracy which is likely to monopolize power and to suppress local initiatives and popular participation - a development as counterproductive to the ultimate goals of revolution as anarchy. The crucial factor in the failure or success of a people-based revolutionary movement may well be the capacity of its participants to define in a concrete but constantly changing situation the right balance between central control and guidance and local initiative and participation. It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which this balance has been achieved in North Vietnam during war time, and the field research required to determine this can hardly be carried out now. The success of the revolutionary war seems to indicate however that the Vietnamese have found this balance or, at least, have reasonably come close to it. Their present capacity to adapt to new post-war situation and to redefine an optimum balance between central guidance and local participation, will be crucial for the future course of the Vietnamese revolution.

A further point, implied above but worth emphasizing, is the necessity of an efficient leadership. The Vietnamese leadership had grown out of 40 years of revolutionary struggle and has had sufficient time to learn from errors and excesses. 2/ Great attention was given to the ideological and political formation of Party cadres so that the Vietnamese revolution during the war was more or less able to avoid falling into the trap of bureaucratization and authoritarian Party rule. Its surprising stability had allowed coherent long-term policies to be defined and implemented. No single leader has ever monopolized excessive power as Vietnamese leadership has always been collective 3/, and the Party has been deeply rooted in the peasant masses. These characteristics certainly contributed to a considerable extent to the success of the Vietnamese revolution.

1/ "Ces responsables présentés par le Parti doivent être élus par les masses" ("Those persons nominated by the Party must be elected by the masses"). See PHAM CUONG and Nguyên Văn BÀ, La Révolution au Village de Nam Hông 1945-1975, Hanoi, Editions en Langues Étrangères, 1975, p.76.

2/ For example, Trương Chinh, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, sought in 1953 to resort to mass mobilization to carry out land reform. However, at that time, rural political organizations of the Party and mass organizations were not sufficiently consolidated to be effective in dealing with the sudden release of social energies of the peasantry. The well-known errors and abuses which resulted were denounced by the Party itself and were followed by a "Campaign of rectification of errors".

3/ The cult of personality in which leadership is embodied in one charismatic person, such as Mao, Kim Il Sung, Soekarno, has never characterized the Vietnamese Communist Party. Despite the prominence of Ho Chi Minh, party leadership has always been diffused among many leaders, rendering the Party less vulnerable to repression by colonial administrations (1930-45). The cult of personality of Ho Chi Minh has arisen only since his death.
Social Revolution

Destruction of former social structures (feudal, colonial, capitalist)

Agrarian Reform

Partial Land Reforms (1930-1953)
- Reduction of rents
- Creation of a "Service of Credit"
- Confiscation and provisional redistribution of foreign-owned land

Radical Land Reform (1953-1956)
- "No landlords"
- "Land to the Tillers"

Means of mass mobilization

Ideology
- Nationalism: "anti-colonial"
- Class struggle: "anti-landlords"

Organization
- Peasants' unions
- Mutual aid teams
- People's Army
- Party organizations

Approach to Social Revolution

Active participation of poor peasants and landless agricultural labourers
Tactical alliance with rich and middle class peasants
Consolidation of rural organizations of the party
Formation of cadres

Means of mass mobilization

Ideology
- Nationalism: "anti-imperialist"

Organizations
- Collectivization of work and risk
- Increased production
- "Mutual Benefit"

1930 Approx

1958 Approx
Agricultural cooperation (1976-present)
Large size cooperatives at township level as semi-independent production, planning and management units.

Planning and Management Approach
Comprehensive, integrated, but decentralized State Planning
Local specialization, with self-reliance at district and province level.

Means of mass mobilization
- Ideology:
  - Nationalism: "anti-hegemonist"
  - "People's right to be the collective masters"
  - Economic efficiency
  - "All for production"
- Organization:
  - People's Associations
  - People's Councils
  - Party organizations

Planning and Management Approach
Limited but centralized State Planning
Regional autonomy with self-reliance at the cooperative level
"Voluntarism" and "Democratic Management" at the cooperative level.

Organization
- People's Associations
- People's Councils
- Party organizations

Technical Revolution
Reorganization of Planning and Management

Urban structure of the Cooperative
in Vietnam (1930-1979)

Cooperation
Level cooperatives (1960-present):
Collective work
Collective means of production
(partly) private economy: 5% of total
livable land of the cooperative

1976
Approx.
4. The cultural and ideological liberation of the rural poor constituted an important precondition for their mobilization and their active participation in revolutionary social change. The large-scale participation of the poor peasantry in measures radically transforming existing social structures was indeed possible only once they were liberated from the rigid traditional beliefs and culture.

In Vietnam, traditional Confucian social ethics had assigned to each individual a particular role with specific duties and obligations; relations between social groups and individuals - between the citizen and the king, the mandarin bureaucracy and the peasantry, the child and his parents, etc. - were strictly determined by a hierarchical system of principles of conduct, the axis of which was the social relation between the citizen and the king. 1/ A subtle and sophisticated philosophy had thus moulded the Vietnamese peasantry into a cosmic and human order which made radical social change through peasant revolt inconceivable.

To shatter traditional beliefs and values, and those religious, cultural and ideological structures of oppression and domination, was a vital task for the Vietnamese Communist Party. Conscientization and political education were mainly used to achieve this goal: Party cadres encouraged the poor peasants and landless labourers to analyze collectively their social condition. Sources of exploitation and injustice were publicly identified, the peasants' practical experience and knowledge were valorized and local initiatives encouraged to tackle local problems. Concrete political actions made the poor peasants aware of their collective strength. They gained in self-confidence and came to believe in their own capacity, as a group, to shape and control their social and natural environment. Cultural and ideological liberation thus led to the emancipation of the peasantry, released spontaneous forces of social creativity and contributed fundamentally to the success of the Vietnamese revolution.

5. If radical social change is to be based on the voluntary and active participation of the rural poor, the process must be introduced in a gradual way and geared to the peasantry's increasing aspirations for social change. The land reform as well as the cooperative movement

1/ See Nguyên PHAN QUANG, "Mảo suy nghĩ xung quanh vấn đề nho giô ở Việt Nam và giáo lý truyền thống của dân tộc", in Tạp Chí Trí thức Học (Philosophical Review), Hanoi, No. 2, June 1978, pp. 67-68.
were initiated gradually, step by step 1 as the poor peasant's perception and awareness of his social environment and his personal motivation evolved over time. A careful analysis by the leadership of this changing motivation of the peasants was of prime importance for the definition of realistic development programmes and strategies.

In Vietnam, as elsewhere, the peasant's basic aspiration has always been to assure for himself and his family a decent livelihood and access to basic social services and essential commodities. His immediate motivation in joining the revolutionary movement however evolved over time. At first, poor peasants and agricultural labourers joined the revolution for increased wages and reduced rents, but soon they fought for and won private ownership of land. Prospects for mechanization and increased production then made them join mutual aid teams and lower level cooperatives. But for the social revolution to continue, private ownership of land had to be overcome and the peasants motivated to collectivize their land in socialist cooperatives. This was possible only when private ownership of land became a clear obstacle to further mechanization, to increased production and to common action in the face of danger. When large-scale bombing of North Vietnam began in 1964, peasants were strongly motivated to join high-level cooperatives in order to share the risks of these aerial attacks. In addition, collectivization provided their families with health and school facilities.

6. The need to subdue collectively a difficult natural environment, the social requirements of wet rice technology and an extremely high population density have contributed much more to the successful collectivization of production in Vietnam than some apparently "collectivist" characteristics of traditional social structures. Environmental, technological and demographic factors had indeed long accustomed the Vietnamese peasants to solve basic problems of livelihood and human survival through collective approach.

Centuries of collective organization by Vietnamese peasants to reclaim lands and control tides and floods were necessary to make

1/ In Northern Vietnam, mutual aid teams were first initiated to prepare the launching of two successive forms of cooperatives: low-level or semi-socialist cooperatives where private ownership of means of production was maintained, and high-level or socialist cooperatives where the means of production were collectivized. The sizes of agricultural cooperatives also increased gradually. At their formation their sizes varied from 20 to 30 hectares of land and increased to 50 to 70 hectares during the first Five-Year Plan 1961-65. By the end of 1970, virtually the entire rural sector was organized in about 8,000 socialist cooperatives of about 150 hectares each. Since the 1976 managerial reforms, the actual tendency is to reorganize agricultural cooperatives at the township level and to enlarge to 300 to 500 hectares of farmland each, in order to make better use of land, increase further mechanization and to form basic management units for the rural sector.
Northern Vietnam's Red River delta inhabitable at all 1/, and sophisticated systems of dikes and waterworks had to be built to ensure production and create the material basis for human survival. Collective water management was equally important to ensure and regulate water supply for the irrigation of rice fields. Together with other characteristics of wet rice technology, such as the need for high labour inputs at specific moments, it required a certain degree of collectivization of work. The Communist Party was aware of the link between agricultural technology and social organization of work, and has taken this into account when defining the successive stages of the social revolution in Northern Vietnam: the successive phases of the cooperative movement were thus accompanied by the promotion of ever larger and more sophisticated water conservation and irrigation works. The two processes of change - social and technological - went hand in hand, one reinforcing the other.

The extremely high population density in the cultivated areas of Northern Vietnam 2/ has been a further factor favouring agricultural cooperation. The radical land reform of 1953-56 which "gave the land to the tillers" left most households with plots too small to feed the family, and collectivization of production became inevitable.

High population density, the need to engage in a common struggle against a hostile natural environment, and the social requirements of wet rice technology were undoubtedly important factors favouring collectivization of production under the cooperative movement. Western scholars however have so far attached more importance to certain apparently "collectivist" or "socialist" characteristics of the Vietnamese traditional society. Most important among such social characteristics cherished and mythified by foreign scholars, are the village autonomy, the communal lands and the traditionally collective leadership.

1/ On the formation of "ricefields Lạc" in Ancient Vietnam - the main characteristic of which was their dependence on sea tides - see Dinh Văn NHAT, "Ruồng Lạc vê thời Hưng Vương" in Nhiên Cửu Lịch Sử (Historical Studies), Hanoi, May-June 1978.

2/ For example, the population density in the delta province of Thai Binh is 864 inhabitants per Km2. See Võ Nhân TRI, op.cit., p. 26.

The average population density in the Red River delta is 600 inhabitants per Km2, and is much higher in some other regions: 1,650 inhabitants per KM2 in Tra Lu canton for instance! In the Mekong delta, the central plain of Thailand and in the Irrawady basin of Central Burma, the population density varies between 100 to 200 inhabitants per Km2; whereas in the Vietnamese Highlands there are only 3 to 5 inhabitants per Km2. See Pierre GOUROU, L'Asie, Paris, Hachette, 1971, pp. 56-57.
A popular Vietnamese saying - "Luật vua thua lệ làng" ("the village's habits prevail over the emperor's law") - has led many to conclude that the traditional Vietnamese empire was a loose federation of autonomous self-governing villages. A careful analysis of history shows however that village autonomy lasted only when the interests of the village, as defined by its Notables, did not clash with those of the emperor or the mandarin bureaucracy. As regards the communal lands, they were by no means collectively owned or exploited but belonged to the emperor, were managed by the village Notables, and allocated to individual peasants against the paying of rents. And if traditional leadership was indeed collective and secular it never involved the ordinary peasant but only the village Notables who ruled through a "Council of Notables". The absence of hereditary and non-secular rulers in the Vietnamese villages may however have facilitated revolutionary social change. 1/

7. In Northern Vietnam, extensive local self-reliance and autonomy of agricultural cooperatives, as a result of limited State planning, had fundamentally contributed to the development of the economy during the war. At present, the further development of the rural sector seems, however, to be hampered by the excessive decentralization of agricultural production and management. Priority is therefore given to the local specialization of production and to the integration of local production units into an overall national plan.

Since the early 1960s when low-level cooperatives were developing into higher level cooperatives, the war in the South of the country escalated to the North, and the Vietnamese leadership was forced to abandon previous development plans. The country's efforts were henceforth concentrated on the conduct of the war. State planning which was highly centralized in the economic field, was thus limited to key production units of the State sector. Deconcentration of production, regional economic autonomy and local self-reliance became an imperative necessity: in fact, the cooperatives were more and more isolated by the almost complete breakdown of means of communication - caused by intensive bombings - in many parts of the country.

As post-war Vietnam engaged in large-scale reconstruction and development programmes, comprehensive State planning at the national level became increasingly important. State planning was extended to all sectors of the economy; the expansion in size of production units and the specialization of production according to comparative advantages are now being encouraged. Agricultural cooperatives are, therefore, merging into larger specialized ones of township size. Self-reliance and autonomy will be sacrificed at the cooperative level, and will be applied to the

1/ Among the ethnic communities of the Vietnamese Highlands, where the notion of leadership and political power is embodied in one person, normally the head of the tribe or clan, and is transmitted to his legitimate successor, the introduction of collective revolutionary leadership was indeed difficult. This was one of the reasons why the land reform and agricultural cooperation were implemented only at a later stage by the Communist Party in these regions.
district level - as districts are to become the basic, self-reliant, agro-industrial units of production, planning and management.

Conclusion:

The Vietnamese experience shows that the successful organization and development of agricultural cooperatives required as fundamental conditions:

- the abolition of former social structures of inequality and exploitation;
- the emancipation of the rural poor through mass mobilization, and
- a peasant-based leadership capable of defining and implementing a coherent long term strategy for social and economic change.

Other factors, such as the specific production techniques of wet rice agriculture, the need to master collectively a hostile natural environment and high population density, had contributed significantly to the success of the cooperative movement in Northern Vietnam. Some apparently "collectivist" characteristics of the Vietnamese traditional society also favoured a collective approach to production. But most important was the patriotic war for national independence: the collective solidarity of the masses when "The fatherland is in danger" has in fact created favourable conditions for the collectivization of production under agricultural cooperatives.

Examples in many other Third World countries seem to indicate that the introduction of agricultural cooperatives into local rural communities, structured along hierarchical lines and characterized by socioeconomic inequalities, does not bring about real progress for the most disadvantaged segments of the peasantry. On the contrary, these cooperatives may be taken over by the existing local power structures and allow the same pattern of inequality and dependence to reappear inside the cooperative framework.

If the ultimate aim of agricultural cooperation is to increase the well-being of the rural poor, social revolution and agricultural cooperation must go hand in hand and must be accomplished simultaneously.

---

* Lan Phuong, of Geneva, is also writing a paper entitled "Ethnic diversity and the nation-state - an alternative strategy for national integration: the case of Vietnam", in the context of IFDA's Third System Project.
COMMON FUND, UNCOMMON TECHNOLOGY AND MANILA

by Chakravarthi Raghavan

Five years of agitation, discussion and negotiations on the concept and details have at last resulted in an agreement on the fundamental elements of a Common Fund under the Integrated Programme on Commodities (IPC).

The Third Session of the UN Negotiating Conference on the Common Fund agreed on 21 February 1979, by a consensus decision, on the fundamental elements of the Fund. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD has been asked to do preparatory work and convene an interim committee of the negotiating conference to further elaborate and draw up the Articles of Association of the Fund. The negotiating conference is to meet again and adopt the Articles before the end of 1979. If all goes well, and given the imperatives and timetable of national legislative actions, the Fund could be in business by 1981.

The agreement on an important element of North-South dialogue is expected to clear the air for Manila UNCTAD V, and the international community, hopefully, will be able to address itself there to the broad range of North-South issues and the fundamental structural changes in global economic relationships necessary to bring about the NIEO.

As now agreed upon, the Common Fund will have 750 million dollars of direct government contributions to its capital - 400 million to the "first window" that will finance stocking operations, and 350 million to the "second window" that will deal with operations, other than stocking, aimed at improving the commodity economy of Third World countries.

Of the 750 million direct government contributions, 280 million for the "second window" will be raised through voluntary pledges, the pledging to be done at Manila (in advance of the final agreement and setting up of the Fund). 500 million of the 750 million will be in cash.

The 470 million dollar mandatory government contributions (of which not less than 70 million will be to the "second window", through a voluntary process of contributors earmarking a portion of their contribution for it) will be raised on the basis of a one-million dollar equal amount contribution by each member State to the share capital, and the balance (of about 320 million) raised through an assessment formula - group B (or industrialized market economy countries) contributing 68 per cent, the G77 (or Third World countries) 10 per cent, group D (or socialist countries) 17 per cent and China 5 per cent. Of 470 million share capital, 150 million will be on call and 100 million "callable".

Each International Commodity Agreement (ICA), joining the Fund, would deposit in cash with the Fund 33\(\frac{1}{3}\) per cent of its maximum financial requirements (MFRs) for stocking of that particular commodity. Each ICA will borrow from the Fund the finances needed for stocking, while pledging the stocks. In effect therefore, as and when existing ICAs come into the Fund and new ones are created, producer-consumer governments (in the ratios agreed upon in individual commodity agreements) would be contributing one-third of the MFRs of the ICA to the capital of the Fund.
If and when all commodities are covered, these 1/3 contributions would add up to an estimated 2 billion dollars. On the basis of the stocks pledged or the stock warrants and guarantees of governments, the Fund will be able to raise from the market the two-thirds needed for stocking, and again if all commodities are covered this could go up to 4 billion dollars.

The voting strength of the Fund would be somewhat more equitable than in existing international financial institutions, where everything is weighted in favour of the rich industrialized countries. On the Common Fund, the G77 will have 47 per cent of the votes, China 3 per cent, Group B 42 per cent and Group D 8 per cent. Financially significant decisions will be taken only by three-fourths majority and important decisions by two-thirds majority.

The "second window" of the Fund will finance commodity development measures other than stocking, aimed at improving structural conditions in markets and enhancing the long-term competitiveness and prospects of particular commodities. These could include research and development, productivity improvements, marketing and measures designed to assist, by means of joint financing or through technical assistance, vertical diversification. It would promote coordination and consultation with regard to measures other than stocking and their financing with a view to providing a commodity focus and establish a close working relationship with existing international financial institutions, avoiding duplication of activities.

Though the fundamental elements of the Fund have been agreed upon, there is still much distance to be travelled before it will be a reality.

For one thing, the United States is not reconciled to the allocation of voting strength among the various groups, and especially the idea of G77 having 47 per cent vote while Group B as a whole will have only 42 per cent. It wants to maintain the voting pattern on the basis of contributions, and as a special case without precedent, is agreeable to have parity between G77 and Group B on the Common Fund. While this is all sought to be put on philosophical grounds, perhaps the intention is to ensure for the USA by itself a blocking one-fourth vote on all significant financial questions, and with the assistance of one or two others in the Group B who can always be depended upon to vote with the US, a blocking one-third vote on important decisions. The USA wants to reopen this issue of voting in the interim committee. If this is done (to accommodate the USA and ensure its membership) several Third World countries want to reopen other issues. Also, the USA is cool to the "second window", and some of the private remarks of US policy-makers raise doubts whether the US will pledge monies to the "second window" and in a significant manner. Even more, the US 'philosophy' recently reiterated by policy-makers is to contribute to such institutions only if the contributions would be returned to the USA in some form (through procurement and services). As was pointed out to the Congress (in defence of US contributions to the UNDP), for every 1 dollar contributed, 2 dollars are returned by procurement and services to the USA. If at some future point the Third World countries want to be 'independent' in commodity economy, surely technological and other work in the commodity field should rely on and strengthen Third World intellectual and industrial potential and research capacity, and not be returning "second window" finances to the industrialized countries.

The socialist countries, too, have expressed their reservations on the mandatory
contributions, assessments and voting based on groups (rather than individual countries) and some other matters.

Undoubtedly, despite its many limitations, the agreement is a major achievement. But the euphoria of achievement needs to be tempered by the limitations of the Fund as now emerging.

The idea of a Common Fund can perhaps be traced to Keynes and his grand design of the thirties to save the world capitalist economy from its bust-boom-bust cycles and recurring depressions, of which the depression of the thirties was the most dramatic and, but for the stimulation of the Second World War, the deepest and most persistent. Keynes's scheme involved a better world trading arrangement, the creation of an international monetary institution to serve as the central bankers' central bank (with countries having reserves above and below their quotas paying a one per cent penalty for the surplus or deficit to the bank), a world bank to finance industrial development, and a commodity fund to finance stocks and control commodity trade. His grand design was partly modified in the creation of GATT, the IMF (with no penalties attached to surplus countries) and the World Bank. But his commodity bank was rejected.

The need for action on the commodity front became apparent even by the late sixties and early seventies. The major commodity, foodgrains, has had its markets always regulated by the industrialized countries, through their own stocks and controls on acreage. In fact it was the US that gave the push for the current world inflation by pushing up foodgrain prices, taking advantage of the scarcity in the early seventies (following the extensive drought in the Soviet Union). This was ahead of the OPEC oil price increases.

The OPEC decision was undoubtedly a political move by an important group of Third World countries with some far-reaching economic implications. But the USA showed the way earlier. The US tried to counter the oil price increase by trying to organize the oil consumers (both industrialized and Third World) against the producer-exporters. Thanks to the political wisdom shown by the non-aligned, and the Algerian initiative, the US move was frustrated, and the issue became one between Third World countries (as suppliers of raw materials) and industrialized countries (as consumers of these raw materials and suppliers of industrial goods, capital and technology).

The sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974, with its mandate to UNCTAD for an integrated programme on commodities, as well as the Dakar meeting in February 1975 of the non-aligned countries and its call for a Special Fund to finance buffer stocks of raw materials and primary commodities exported by Third World countries, ultimately resulted in UNCTAD formulating proposals for the IPC and the Common Fund as an integral part of it.

The Dakar meeting, it should be noted, in putting forward the idea of a Special Fund invited all Third World countries to contribute to the Fund and envisaged close relations between the Fund and the Producers Associations of Third World exporters. True, Dakar was silent on the question of contributions by industrialized countries to the Fund (and thus did not rule it out). But clearly what Dakar had envisaged was collective self-reliance by Third World countries, on the lines of OPEC action, and with support from the surplus OPEC dollars, to enable the South to negotiate better with the industrialized countries for a more equal exchange and bring about the NIEO.
When one talks of the IPC and the Common Fund being one of the main pillars of the NIEO, the concept has to be kept in mind. To the extent that the final outcome has departed considerably from the concept, the pillar is on somewhat shaky foundations. The tortuous negotiations - with Algiers (1973), New York (1974), Dakar (1975), Manila (1976), Nairobi (1976) and Geneva (1977-79) serving as milestones down a slippery path - have witnessed a steady erosion of the original concept. The fault, however, lies squarely with the Third World countries.

The UNCTAD proposals after the Dakar conference envisaged that 10.7 billion dollars (on the basis of 1970-74 average prices) would be needed for stocking operations on the commodity front. Of this 4.7 million dollars was to be for the three major food-grains (wheat, maize and rice, mainly exported by industrialized countries, and imported by industrialized and Third World countries). The food-grain stocking was intended to provide food security to the Third World countries. The ten core commodities (coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, cotton, jute, sisal, rubber, copper and tin), all of interest to Third World countries, was estimated to need 4.7 billion dollars for stocking, and five other raw materials (lead, zinc, iron ore and aluminium - of which bauxite was mainly produced by Third World countries - exported by both industrialized and Third World countries) was estimated to need 1.28 billion dollars.

The capital needs were to have been obtained from the exporting, importing and petroleum-producing countries, with 'considerable support' from the multilateral agencies, and with market borrowings. The last was the minor element, though envisaged to grow over time, mainly because cost structure of market borrowings was such that the cost of stocking would have been greater and the risks higher, making the objectives of the IPC harder to achieve. The direct government contributions were intended to be 2 billion dollars paid directly to the Fund and the borrowings 4 billion dollars. But the bulk of the borrowings, it was hoped, would come from governments through ODA, and multilateral financial institutions, bringing down the cost of the funds.

Though the fund was expected to operate on commodity markets generally through the ICAs, the two billion dollar direct contribution to the Capital Fund's kitty (rather than through the ICAs as now envisaged) would have enabled the Fund to act as a catalyst in stimulating new commodity agreements. It was envisaged that the Fund would be authorized to intervene in individual commodity markets, for a limited period pending the establishment of a commodity organization. This was intended to provide emergency price support, if the Fund was requested to do so by producing countries accounting for more than one-half of total exports and agreeing to initiate moves for the establishment of a commodity organization, and on approval of the Board of Directors of the Common Fund by a qualified majority. With all these limitations, it was still envisaged that the Fund would intervene directly without an ICA being in place, in the event the world should witness 'some catastrophic decline in commodity prices, calling for urgent and immediate action'.

From this point of view, the fundamental elements agreed upon now are some distance from the original concept. They do not envisage financing of national stocks in Third World countries to avoid distress sales by them (in commodities like cotton, for example, where Third World producers without holding power are at a greater disadvantage than industrialized producers and are victims of speculative manipulations of the market by powerful transnational interests), as
demanded by the Arusha document (1979).

But the "second window" of the Fund has emerged stronger, and could well prove to
be the more dynamic institution with great potential. The objectives are clearer
and better. In some earlier versions, only financing of 'pilot plants' for
vertical diversification and processing of raw materials was envisaged. Now the
'pilot plant' has been dropped, implying a much wider concept.

However, against the objectives set for it, the initial financing available is
too small, though it could act as seed money, and draw upon other resources
available in other multilateral agencies. For the Fund to be viable and able to
grow would need constant pledging of new funds - and if Third World countries do
not keep up the pressures, it could well be starved of resources and made useless.

All this needs to be stated merely to remind the Third World countries of the
ever-increasing tasks ahead in the achievement of their objective of improving the commodity
economy. It is a reminder lest industrialized countries make too much hoo-ha
Manila about what they have done on the Common Fund and 'persuade' the Third
World countries to 'ease' pressures on the important tasks in the programme of action for NIEO. It is also a reminder of what remains and needs to be done,
and what Third World countries can do to fill the gap, through a (supplementary?)
'special fund' as envisaged at Dakar, relying only on themselves to take care of
the tasks not covered by the Common Fund. Some sacrifices, individual and collective by Third World producers, some 'wisdom' by OPEC countries (to realise
that financing of commodity stocks is a better hedge against inflation and depre-
ciation of capital than investing petrodollars by recycling through transnational
banks in euro or dollar securities), could still alter the South's bargaining
position with the North for NIEO.

TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

The two-week resumed session of the conference on code of conduct for interna-
tional transfers of technology made some progress, though not sufficient to clinch
the issues, and left some major issues still unresolved. The progress made so
far, however, gives hope that, if Third World countries bring political pressure
to bear at Manila and get UNCTAD to give some guiding principles for the negoti-
ators to work on, a resumed session, later in 1979, could see a code in place.

One of the issues posed by Arusha was the insistence of the G77 that the code
should apply to all 'international transfers'. At the resumed session, Group B
made some advance by conceding that the code would apply to transactions within
a TNC between the parent and subsidiary across national frontiers. But G77
insist that transactions between a TNC subsidiary and a national enterprise within
a country should also be covered. The Group B seems willing to concede that such
transactions could be regulated in accordance with the code through national
legislation. But this is not sufficient to meet the fears and problems faced by
Third World countries in relation to TNCs. The Group B has also indicated that
the code would apply to TNCs insofar as parent-subsidiary relationships are con-
cerned, but are hedging it with their position on the substantial issue of restri-
ctive business practices (RBP) prohibited by the code.
The RBP issue remains deadlocked so far - the Group B countries insisting that only those RBPs should be prohibited that restrict competition, whereas G77 feels not only those RBPs affecting competition but also those affecting their development and technological development should be prohibited. Even if everything else is agreed upon, if the limited view of Group B insofar as RBP chapter is to prevail, the code is as good as useless. This is a field where Manila could give political direction.

A major advance at the resumed ression was in regard to the institutional machinery for overseeing the code. Both Group B and Group D have agreed that the machinery should be established within UNCTAD, and that UNCTAD secretariat should service the machinery. The Third World countries want this to be an intergovernmental organization, composed of signatories to the code, while Group B and Group D envisage the machinery to be the Committee on Transfer of Technology. While this issue partly turns upon whether the code will be a legally-binding instrument or a voluntary one, it also involves whether only signatories will oversee the code through the machinery, or other nonsignatories, represented on the Committee on Transfer of Technology, will also have a say.

The issue of universal but voluntary code or universally and legally-binding instrument is a very thorny one. The Arusha decision, while reiterating the G77 objective of a legal instrument, was worded so as to give some flexibility. However, the interpretation of this flexibility varies among the G77. One idea was that (since the Group B is totally opposed to a binding instrument) it would be wiser to evolve a good, universal but voluntary code to start with, leaving it to the overseeing machinery to review the issue and call for another conference a few years later. This too perhaps could benefit from some guidance from Manila.

The issue of applicable law and settlement of disputes appears more intractable, with Group B and Group D positions convergent and opposed to G77, who insist on national law. The issue however goes beyond transfer of technology and it is doubtful whether the present state of international law is conducive to some codification. Perhaps initially it may well have to be left out of the code.

On the issue of industrial property rights, an understanding was reached that each country adopting legislation on protection of industrial property should have regard to its national needs for economic and social development and to ensure effective protection of industrial property rights granted within its national law.
ON NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD-RELATIONS: NORWAY-TANZANIA

by Egil A. Wyller

We all know from our daily experience that social group-relations cannot replace personal relations between individuals. Groups can help other groups to survive, but only an individual can help another individual to live, and to live rightly.

This also holds good for relations between countries and nations. Today's development aid works in a strictly quantitative way and within the frame of group-relations. But a country does not only comprise a group of - say - 50 million people; as a nation, the country constitutes a person, juridically and also culturally, politically, etc. Each member of a real nation is marked by this specific personality: you are an Englishman, I am a Norwegian, you are a Tanzanian, you are a Nigerian, etc.

Now the whole world of today is in a bad state, not only the Third World. We need each other's help to live rightly, as brothers need brothers. Therefore personal brotherhood relations between nations should be established - not to the exclusion of, but supplementary to, existing development organizations. By this means, not only the economic problems, but also the personality of the brother-nation - religious, cultural, political, etc., could be taken into account, and the population of each country could take over some direct responsibility for the brothers "over there". Thus, a principle of mutuality could be a determining factor concerning our opinion of the Third World. We would not only look upon the other nation as a people needing our help; we would also learn to look upon ourselves through the spectacles of our brother.

Such a turning of the perspective cannot, however, be obtained through general and international political decisions and resolutions. Individual nations have here to act independently, as free subjects, and carry through the alteration all by themselves, although without neglecting their multilateral obligations. For example, my own nation, Norway, should take up direct contact with another country whose conditions and style of life we should try to understand from inside. Thus our sense of global responsibility could be realized through a concrete meeting with a nation of fellow-beings, and not only through the distant and depersonalized concept of "underdeveloped countries" or "the Third World".

Surely, we are a rich country, the other is a poor one. This offers a difficult starting point for a balanced brother-relationship. But my country is a small one, without any colonial guilt. A mutual relation of confidence can be established between ourselves and the poor country, on the condition that this country is committed to self-reliance and free human dignity.

Such a country is Tanzania. The number of its inhabitants in relation to Norway's is in the ratio of 4:1, which roughly corresponds to the ratio between the numbers of Third World people and those in the industrialized countries. The official contact between the two countries is already well established and is based upon

---

1/ This is a continuation of the discussion on the theme addressed by Ahmed Ben Salah in IFDA Dossier no. 6: "Pour une expérience de coopération exemplaire"
true cordiality and human confidence. Norwegians living in Tanzania (in connection with missionary or development projects) seem to be on good terms with the people there, and vice versa for Tanzanians who are making studies in Norway. We also respect the political integrity of this country and the true statesmanship of its leaders (especially President Julius Nyerere).

Consequences for Norway

1. Broad sections of our people should get to know the language of our brother country, i.e. Kiswahili. This is now possible within the plan of our school system for teenagers. Knowledge of Kiswahili should become part of a good general education in our country. (Tanzania on its side should continue to learn English, not Norwegian, as its foreign language.)

2. Information on Tanzania, its people and culture, should permeate all our education; research on it should be promoted at the universities.

3. Confronted with the material shortcomings in our brother country, our people has to regain a simpler way of living.

4. Adaptation of our commercial and industrial policy for the benefit of our brother country.

5. Steady increase of Norwegian development aid earmarked for Tanzania, based on growing motivation within the Norwegian population for this task.

6. State subsidized air traffic between the two countries for people having obtained a certain degree of knowledge about the other country.

Consequences for Tanzania

1. Interest for the well-being of the Norwegian (possibly of the Nordic) brother country (countries), based on consciousness of life values which Tanzania can transmit to us.

2. Access to a "speakers platform" in Norway - through radio (recording tape), television (video), contributions to newspapers, etc. This would apply not only to current information, but also to putting forward opinions and ideas, to explanations of standpoints and decisions, etc.

3. Actual assistance in teaching the Kiswahili language and culture, e.g., Tanzanian students at Norwegian universities could teach at Norwegian schools.

4. Receiving Norwegian (Nordic) guests in their country, while avoiding the usual tourist system - receiving them as friends and co-workers in the existing social systems (ujamaa and other rural and urban communities).

Both countries together should establish a Norwegian-Tanzanian commission for long-term planning of cultural, economical and political collaboration. A specially important task would be to stimulate mutual translations of literary works within the two languages, including political speeches and manifestos.

This idea was presented to President Nyerere when he visited Norway in April 1976. He declared his keen interest in it. It has also been discussed in a University seminar in Oslo, in April 1978, by representatives of the University, the Norwe-
gian Church, the Parliament, the Foreign Ministry and youth organizations. They all agreed upon the main principles of this idea, and upon the necessity of introducing them to political life. Other important politicians in Norway today have given their support to the idea, but until now within the frame of seminar discussions not on the political level. A working group is in contact with the Tanzanian Ambassador for the Scandinavian countries in Stockholm. But the Norwegian people and, as a consequence, the Norwegian political parties, do not seem ripe as yet for carrying the idea through. We will have to use time and are in great need for practical and theoretical help and advice from circles all over the world.

Perhaps other countries will try to do what Norway should have done? The first step must certainly be taken from an industrially developed country which is without a colonial past.

*/ Filosofisk institutt, Universitetet, Oslo 3, Norway.

GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

by Inga Thorsson*/

/EDITORIAL NOTE: In 1976, the world devoted some US Dollars 334 billion (334,000,000,000) to military expenditure, according to the estimates of SIPRI, the Stockholm Peace Research Institute. This was equivalent to about two-fifths of the combined Gross Domestic Product of all Third World countries, i.e., income being unequally distributed as it is, to the combined income of perhaps three-quarters of the poorest inhabitants of this planet. It was equivalent to 1.3 times the total GDP of Third World countries in Asia (except West Asia), about the size of the total GDP of Latin America, or twice that of all countries in Africa. Some 30 member States of the United Nations had, in 1975, a GDP inferior to US Dollars one billion. Total official development assistance from OECD countries amounted in the same year to less than US Dollars 14 billion. About 400,000 scientists and engineers are engaged in military research and development; expenditures on that count absorb annually US Dollars 25 billion, i.e. two-fifths of total world R&D expenditure.

Only the deadly threat to the survival of the human species it implies catches up with and overtakes such an insane waste of resources.1/

To try and do something about that, the United Nations held, in 1978, a Special Session on Disarmament, which may be seen as having laid new ground, introduced new approaches and given a new impetus to disarmament efforts.

1/ This is taken from "Disarmament and Development, An Introduction", Development Dialogue (1977:1), an issue largely devoted to this question. Interested readers may obtain copies from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Ovre Slotts-
gatan 2, S-752 20 Uppsala, Sweden.
Inga Thorsson, who represents Sweden in the disarmament discussions, addressed this question in her speech at the Socialist International Congress in Vancouver, Canada, last November. What follows is the second part of her speech.

A prerequisite for reaching the goals of the New International Order will be disarmament, and a conversion of resources from military to constructive development purposes in all regions of the world.

The issues of the economic and social consequences of the arms race, and the relationship between disarmament and development, were given considerable attention at the Special Session. Several valuable UN studies have in the past examined these issues. These have, however, not had a measurable impact on the level of military expenditures. Indeed, there has been no cutback in military spending. And no mechanisms exist for the transfer of released resources to constructive civilian purposes.

What is needed, and what the Special Session decided would have to be done, is to achieve an agreed, gradual and balanced transfer of resources from military to civilian purposes. What is needed is an in-depth analysis of the problem. This would lead up to conclusions and recommendations to national governments, in very concrete, practical and action-oriented terms, on how, in a given situation of disarmament, material and human resources now used for military purposes could be redeployed to constructive civilian purposes. Particular consideration must then be paid to the need for economic and social development in developing countries. What is needed to achieve this is a new study at the international level, to be carried out within the UN.

And this is what the Special Session decided, based on a proposal by four Nordic countries. The urgent need was generally recognized to put the immense human and material resources, now consumed by the military machines, to constructive use for development purposes.

In accordance with the decision of the Session the UN Secretary-General appointed, in August last year, a group of governmental experts to carry out the study. Already at the Conference on Disarmament in Helsinki half a year ago I had an opportunity to report on the then draft terms of reference for the study which were worked out by an ad hoc group of experts which I had the pleasure to chair. As these have now been unanimously approved by the Special Session, I should like to indicate here, very briefly, their main contents.

The study is to be carried out in three research areas:

In the first we would try to identify the extent to which, at present, real resources are utilized for military purposes. Thus, one would estimate, e.g.

- the utilization of labour, within the military sector as well as within industries producing weapon systems and military equipment;

- the utilization of research and development capacity, in terms of scientists, engineers, technicians and research facilities, for military purposes;

- the utilization of production facilities and of raw materials for the production of military supplies, with particular attention to be given to military consumption of non-renewable resources and scarce raw materials.
Special attention should also be given to the special conditions of industries working for the military systems, compared with those which produce for the civilian market. At this stage, a particular effort should also be made to examine the opportunity cost of resources devoted to military purposes. In this context, special consideration should be given to resource requirements which arise out of economic and social development needs, particularly in Third World countries.

In the second research area, the study would analyse the effects both of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of a disarmament programme on world economy and national economies. This would include, inter alia, the effects of the arms race and disarmament respectively: on the use of limited resources of energy and raw materials, on the supply of and demand for R & D capacity; on transfers of technology, not least to Third World countries, on international trade and national balances of payments, on employment and production; and on development programmes for improving well-being and living standards.

Finally, and most importantly, the study would analyse the short- and long-term problems which are supposed to be associated with a reallocation of real resources to economic and social development and would suggest methods by which such problems could be overcome.

Factors to be taken into account would include, inter alia:

- replacement of military demands by civilian demands and any required measures of planning for this purpose;
- time factors in the process of readjusting production, the need to coordinate disarmament measures and measures of economic policy, and the preservation of employment;
- the practical mechanisms needed for the transfer of real resources, released through disarmament measures, to economic and social development efforts.

The group of governmental experts was convened to its first session in early September, 1978. As chairman of the group, I am glad to note that at that session we unanimously adopted a report outlining the organization of work and a timetable for the study. We are on the road. And we are determined to continue forward with the greatest amount of efficiency that we can muster.

It is essential that the endeavours that have now begun lead up to results in terms of practical conclusions and recommendations to governments of Member States. They should be considered an example of the growing recognition of new threats to our security, globally and nationally, to our survival, through possible global turbulences in years to come. This growing recognition will have to lead to requests for fresh thinking and new approaches by political leaders and decision-makers everywhere. Long enough have we tolerated the immense waste of human and material resources that is the self-evident purport of the arms race. The starving and suffering people of our one and only earth are in better need of these resources than the war machines.

Anti-militarism was one of the pillars on which democratic socialism was built in the beginning of the century. The prospects for fulfilling the fundamental intentions of our movement on the road towards disarmament may seem so much
bleaker in the world of today where the military systems have developed a powerful life in the middle of our societies. Certainly, along this road, democratic socialism is faced with extraordinary difficulties. Short-term economic contradictions and still-justified national security considerations constitute effective obstacles. And yet, it is the gigantic task of this movement not to let arguments of technical detail dominate but to bring the issue back to matters of principle, to questions of economics, of ethics, morality and, ultimately, survival.

Even for a modest success, this tall order calls for a re-integration of the problem of the arms race and its underlying moving force of militarism in the agenda of the day-to-day work of our organizations. We must come to realize that it demands the same political mobilization of individuals as do questions of health, social security and full employment.

In the efforts for such a political mobilization the trade unions also are of key importance. In this context, I would like to point to the importance that the UN expert group dealing with conversion of military to civilian production will attach to the need, during the course of our work, for cooperation with, among others, the labour movement.

General and complete disarmament, the ambitious objective set out for the UN work in this field since its very beginning, may still seem to be very distant, even unrealistic. Nevertheless, a heavy responsibility rests with those of our fellow parties who at present hold office. They have a moral responsibility to encourage multilateral disarmament efforts with a view to preserving national security and balance of forces on a gradually lower level.

In this process I hope that a conversion of resources from military to constructive development purposes will be found practicable by those who will have to carry it out.

It is not only practicable - it is indispensable - for the security of all of us, now and in the future.

*/ Inga Thorsson, of Sweden, is a Member of Parliament and Under-Secretary for Disarmament Affairs. She is also a member of the Executive Committee of IFDA.
"We in Africa have over years become mimic people. Although we pretend to be real, to be preparing ourselves and our countries for self reliant development process and authentically African life style, all we have really succeeded in doing is to mimic other societies and their life styles".

This is what Mr. Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa said at the opening of a joint UNEP-ECA seminar on Alternative Patterns of Development and Life Styles held in March in Addis Ababa.

"IN doing so, we use borrowed phrases, jargon and terminologies which are foreign to our people and only succeed in beclouding issues before us and in confusing our people", he added.

Calling upon African States to make a break with the past and set about the urgent and imperative tasks of evolving their own patterns of development and life styles, Mr. Adedeji said: "Social and economic transformation which we so earnestly seek to bring about dramatic improvement in standard of living of our people - both quantitatively and qualitatively - which was promised to African peoples during the struggle for independence, will continue to elude us".

One of a series of regional seminars on this theme being organized by UNEP with the UN regional commissions, this one demonstrates the difficulty of introducing the concept of alternatives into an intergovernmental institutional framework still much influenced by conventional priorities and by suspicion of innovation, as well as the danger of drawing too heavily on extra-regional "advice" - especially of a dogmatic nature - when discussing regional matters. Thus, the seminar report is something of a catalogue, an amalgam of views lacking a clear line. Nevertheless, the seminar can be seen positively as a contribution to a growing African dialogue on alternatives (cf. OAU/ECA Monrovia meeting report - in "Markings" section).

One of a preparatory expert meeting chaired by Justinian Rwemymamu, papers on African issues and national experiences (Nigeria, Tanzania) and on experiences outside the region (China, Yugoslavia, Latin America, Eastern Europe - excluding USSR, and "the Western world" - the latter, by CIRED, drawing upon project "Tomorrow Today"). Not in this seiers, but most noteworthy, is a major study by ENDA for UNEP entitled "Environment and Development in Africa: What prospects for the future".


Cette ouvrage synthétise les évaluations de la durée de vie des produits de consommation courants (automobiles, biens ménagers, construction). Les résultats de la recherche ne confirment pas l'idée d'une dégradation sensible de la qualité et de la durabilité des produits avec le développement de la "civilisation du gadget". Les enquêtes menées dans le domaine des équipements ménagers et de l'automobile ont abouti à identifier les facteurs techniques et les mécanismes socio-économiques
qui influent sur la durée de vie des produits. Elles mettent en cause certains aspects des stratégies et comportements des acteurs sociaux (entreprises de fabrication et de réparation, consommateurs...). Des propositions sont formulées pour rendre la durée de vie des biens plus compatible avec les politiques rationnelles de lutte contre le gaspillage et de mise en valeur des ressources. Elles n'aboutissent pas systématiquement à un allongement de la durée de vie des biens, comme le montre l'étude sur le bâtiment. En tout état de cause, le livre démontre la nécessité de ne plus laisser la détermination de la durée des biens à la confrontation des intérêts, tantôt convergents, tantôt divergents, des acteurs sociaux.

L'action sur la durabilité doit constituer un des axes majeurs d'une politique des ressources.

Cet ouvrage a paru dans une nouvelle collection, Développement et environnement, publiée sous la direction d'Ignacy Sachs. Les auteurs sont des collaborateurs du Centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement (CIRED) à Paris.

- Don Thomson and Rodney Larson, Where were you, brother? An account of Trade Union Imperialism (London: War on Want, 476 Caledonian Road, London N7 9 BE), £1.20
- Valentina Borremans, Reference guide to convivial tools (Cuernavaca: Tecnopolítica no. 79/13). Apartado 479, Cuernavaca, Morelos, Mexico. A very rich (more than 1,000 entries) draft annotated bibliography.
- Secretariat for Future Studies, Sweden in a New International Economic Order, A project presentation (Stockholm, 1979), P.O. Box 7502, S-103 92 Stockholm, Sweden
- Paula Palmer, "What happen": A folk-history of Costa Rica's Talamanca coast (San José: Ecodesarrollos, 1979) Apartado 1908, San José, Costa Rica. Some unheard voices: in "What Happen", the people of Costa Rica's Talamanca Coast talk about everything important to them - how they came from the islands of the Caribbean to the unpopulated shore where they founded the communities of Cahuita and Old Harbor the survival skills, values and customs that sustained them; shipwrecks, snake doctors, quadrille dancing and cocoa farming; and the uncertain future of their communities as tourism develops on the coast that is their home.