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NOTE D'INTRODUCTION

Il devenait un peu fastidieux d'inviter les lecteurs de ce Dossier FIPAD, mois après mois, à "inter-agir" - malgré les premiers signes, encourageants, de cette interaction qui ont trouvé leur place dans cette livraison et dans certaines des précédentes. Aussi avons-nous pensé, le caractère multilingue de cette publication s'affirmant, qu'il était temps, sans cesser de nous répéter, d'innover quelque peu, et de nous adresser, dans leur langue, à ceux de nos lecteurs qui utilisent le français.

Cette livraison innove aussi d'une autre manière : pour la première fois, nous publions un article en espagnol, sur Le Pérou et un autre développement. Le texte que l'on lira est trop bref pour réfléter suffisamment les efforts de nos amis du Centre d'études et de promotion du développement de Lima; mais la liste des travaux qu'ils ont entrepris donnera une plus juste idée de l'ampleur de leur projet.

Le texte de James Robertson, Une autre Angleterre, s'inscrit pour sa part dans un processus d'animation d'un réseau polycentrique et constitue ainsi plus une invitation au travail qu'un produit fini.

Ainsi l'une de nos ambitions commence à se réaliser : enraciner la discussion pour une nouvelle stratégie internationale de développement dans des stratégies alternatives au plan national. Près d'une vingtaine d'autres scénarios sont en chantier, intéressant des pays aussi divers que le Brésil et la Suède, Malte et les Etats-Unis, le Sri Lanka et l'Ouganda, le Japon et la région arabe, l'Afrique australe et la Grèce, l'Italie et le Chili ou le Venezuela. Les réactions que susciteront les deux documents prêcurseurs présentés ici seront sans doute utiles aux auteurs des autres travaux en cours.

Les autres "matériaux" de ce Dossier, et la plupart des "interactions" sont aussi de nature, nous l'espérons, à susciter le dialogue mutuellement enrichissant qui est l'une des raisons d'être du projet Tiers Système de la FIPAD.

A vous la parole.
Abstract: The concept of health planning has got grossly distorted in the Five Year Plans. The Sixth Plan is no exception. The "health sector" is actually a "health services sector". The planners have not even attempted to develop a rational procedure to determine the quantum of allocations to the health services sector in the context of other components of the health sectors and of the national plan as a whole. Efforts are also lacking in identifying an optimal package of health services under a given allocation, as also in identifying optimal programmes to deal with individual health problems. The planners have also failed in paying adequate attention to the problems of organization, management and monitoring of the different elements of the health services.

Their record in the field of population control is even more dismal. They identified themselves with the contention that the fruits of development are being eaten away by rising population. Along with others, they too abdicated their responsibilities and allowed almost a free hand to foreign agencies to influence the policy formulation, planning, programming and implementation of the national family planning programme of India. The Sixth Plan proposals look like a headless monster - only the head of the monstrous organization built up to force people to accept sterilization has been removed, the rest is retained intact.

The lack of competence in planning is only the effect and the cause lies in the value system of the political leadership - in its culture. They have made egalitarian pronouncements to provide a smokescreen to promote the interests of the privileged classes who control the levers of political power. There is an obvious need for a fundamental change in the culture of the entire system - a cultural revolution. Such revolutions cannot be brought about overnight. The façade of political commitment to deliver goods to the people provides great opportunity for the concerned people to do hard and patient work to bring about the desired change.

LA SANTÉ ET LE CONTRÔLE DES NAISSANCES DANS LE 6E PLAN INDIEN

Résumé: Le concept de planification de la santé a été gravement déformé dans les plans quinquennaux indiens. Le 6e plan n'est pas une exception. Le "secteur santé" est en fait un "secteur des services de santé". Les planificateurs n'ont même pas essayé de mettre au point une procédure rationnelle pour déterminer la proportion des affectations aux services de santé en fonction des autres éléments du secteur santé et du plan national dans son ensemble. Pas d'effort non plus pour définir un ensemble optimal de services de santé dans une certaine enveloppe
financière ni pour définir des programmes optimaux pour traiter des problèmes individuels de santé. Les planificateurs n'ont pas d'avantage accordé l'attention nécessaire aux problèmes d'organisation, d'administration et de surveillance des différents éléments des services de santé.

Le bilan est encore plus sombre en matière de contrôle des naissances. Ils admettent que les fruits du développement sont "mangés" par une population croissante. Avec d'autres, ils ont abdiqué leur responsabilité et presque laissé des organisations étrangères libres d'influencer la formulation des politiques, la planification et la mise en œuvre des programmes indiens de contrôle des naissances. Les propositions du 6e Plan sont comme un monstre sans tête - à cela près que la tête d'une monstrueuse organisation forçant les individus à accepter la stérilisation a été coupée. Mais le reste est demeuré intact.

Le manque de compétence en matière de planification n'est qu'un effet; il faut voir ses causes dans le système de valeurs de la direction politique, dans sa culture. Les déclarations égalitaires ne sont qu'un écran de fumée derrière les leviers du pouvoir politique.

Le besoin est évident d'un changement fondamental dans la culture du système dans son ensemble - d'une révolution culturelle. Un tel changement ne s'opère pas en un jour. Les promesses politiques de répondre aux aspirations populaires fournissent cependant aux intéressés une occasion de travailler dur et patiemment pour opérer les changements qu'ils désirent.

LA SALUD Y EL CONTROL DE NACIMIENTOS EN EL 60 PLAN INDIO

Resumen: El concepto de planificación para la salud ha sido totalmente torcido en los planes Indios quinquenales. Esto vale también para el sexto plan. El "sector de salud" es en realidad un "sector de servicios de salud". Los planificadores no han aún intentado desarrollar un procedimiento racional para determinar las asignaciones al sector de servicios de salud en el contexto de otros componentes de los sectores de salud y del plan nacional entero.

Faltan esfuerzos para identificar un grupo óptimo de servicios de salud, y programas para tratar con problemas de salud individuales. Tampoco se han dirigido a los problemas de organización, dirección y control de los distintos elementos de los servicios de salud. Sus antecedentes en el campo de control de nacimientos es aún más pésimo. Los planificadores han abdicado su responsabilidad y han dejado más bien que agencias extranjeras influyan la formulación de la política, la planificación y la implementación del programa nacional del control de nacimientos. Las proposiciones en el sexto plan parecen ser un monstro sin cabeza - sólo han cortado la cabeza de la organización monstruosa construida para forzar al pueblo a aceptar la esterilización, el resto queda intacto.

Hay que buscar las razones para la falta de competencia en el sistema de valores de la dirección política, en su cultura. Sus pronunciamientos de igualdad han sido solo una cortina de humo que permitió promover los intereses de las clases privilegiadas. Lo que hace falta es un cambio fundamental en la cultura del sistema entero - una revolución cultural. La facachá de comprometerse a las aspiraciones del pueblo provee la oportunidad para los interesados de trabajar con paciencia para realizar los cambios deseados.
HEALTH AND POPULATION CONTROL IN THE SIXTH PLAN OF INDIA

Health Planning

Through the 27 years, planning in the so-called health sector has tended to give quite a different meaning to the word "planning". Here planning essentially meant allocation under certain heads: hospitals and dispensaries; medical education and research; control of communicable diseases; rural health programme; training programmes; indigenous systems of medicine and homeopathy; and "other programmes". Two other heads, namely, environmental sanitation and water-supply and family planning, have now been taken out of the "health" sector. Health planning in the successive Five Year Plans meant varying increases in the allocations under these heads.

The framers of the Sixth Plan have also realized the serious flaws in the health planning process adopted earlier (1, p.230):

"There is serious dissatisfaction with the existing model of medical and health care services with its emphasis on hospitals, specialities and superspecialities and highly trained doctors, which gets limited in practice mostly to urban areas and which is available to mainly well-to-do classes. It is also realized that it is this model which is depriving the rural areas and the poor people of the benefits of good health and medical services. Serious doubts have, therefore, been raised as to whether we did right in adopting this Western model of medical services and healthcare whose costs go far beyond our resources, which emphasizes curative rather than preventive and promotional aspects and which creates immense problems because of over-emphasis on inappropriately high level of professionalisation, institutionalisation and centralisation".

They have also emphasized the need for searching alternative models. But, as in the past, after all the heart-searching, they have come up with a "health plan" which has not touched the "existing model of medical and health services" which they have disapproved so categorically: a classical instance of a condition of "soft-state" of Gunnar Myrdal. The Sixth Plan cannot in a way be called distinctive when it promises to "provide better health and medical care to the rural areas and the poor people" (1, p.230) and that it will not permit any "linear expansion of curative services in urban areas based on specialities and superspecialities" (1, p.231). Such pious resolutions and determinations can be traced right to the beginning of Plan development in India.

For the First Plan it was, as now, a round condemnation of the colonial Western model, a vigorous programme of social orientation of medical education through establishment of departments of preventive and social medicine and launching of the primary health centres, along with the "revolutionary" Community Development Programme on the auspicious October 2 1952. (Significantly, the "revolutionary" tradition is being continued - the revolutionary Rural Health Scheme was launched on October 2 1977.) The Second Plan promised a nation-wide coverage of the rural population through primary health centres and a massive allocation to launch, with the help of the US government and WHO, a military-style campaign to eradicate malaria once and for all by the mid-sixties. Inspired by American consultants, the Third Plan saw the launching of the nation-wide extension approach to
family planning as an integral part of the health services to "educate" and "persuade" the rural population to accept the small family norm. It also commended a UNICEF-backed mass campaign to eradicate smallpox from India once and for all by 1966. Again, with active help from the Ford Foundation, the Population Council of the USA, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and the Swedish International Development Authority, the Fourth Plan pushed ahead the family planning programme with utmost vigour: massive programmes of promoting use of the IUD, mobile sterilization and IUD units, target-oriented, time-bound programmes (which included allocation of family planning targets to policemen and revenue officials and performing sterilizations on railway platforms) and the notorious mass vasectomy camps, were all products of the Fourth Plan. The Fifth Plan had two facets: realizing the failure of coercive methods, health, family planning and nutrition were made as a component of the Minimum Needs Programme to launch a frontal attack on poverty - development was recognized as the best contraceptive; however, all these ideals were abandoned with the declaration of the emergency and the privileged classes unleashed an open class war against the poor and the weak, and sterilized over 7 million people against their will. Neglect of the health programme led to resurgence of malaria and other communicable diseases; even the pretension of looking after the health of mothers and children was given up; seriously sick patients were turned away from public hospitals because they were unable to produce the certificate for sterilization which they had underwent some five to ten years back. 

All the major programmes which were launched with so much fanfare and promise have ended as disastrous failures: social orientation of medical education is still a distant dream; the primary health centres have miserably failed to meet even the most pressing needs of the rural poor; the promise to eradicate malaria by the mid-sixties could not be kept and massive resources are still being allocated to "contain malaria"; other communicable diseases are rampant and they continue to cause extensive suffering among the people; and the mothers and children continue to suffer very high rates of mortality and morbidity. The account of the family planning movement through the past two decades itself is a saga of most expensive and colossal failures. All these provide a strong enough indictment of the entire system. The health planners, the entire Planning Commission, the bureaucrats, the technocrats and the intellectuals are all closely identified with these decisions. In a real democratic set up they ought to have been held accountable for their acts. It is one of the cruelest ironies that the entire system actually seems to thrive on such disasters. They use the past blunders to justify launching yet another ambitious programme, the failure of which, in turn, provides a case for embarking on a still more ambitious venture. This serves a very positive purpose for the ruling classes. It glosses over and even glorifies the shortcomings of the health planners, the members of the Planning Commission, the bureaucrats and the technocrats; it ensures that incompetent persons keep on occupying key positions and even get promoted to higher ones, and it also helps the political leadership to provide a sop to the masses while they actively perpetuate a medical and health care system which essentially serves the privileged classes.

Health planning in the Sixth Plan follows the same pattern. As it is becoming more and more difficult to obscure the increasingly unjust character of the existing health service system and as the masses are becoming sceptic and restive about the promises of the leadership of the country, there is increasing political
political leaders, technocrats, professionals or tycoons get heart attack they are given VIP treatment in community hospitals. Despite their proverbial inefficiency, these hospitals mobilise whatever resources they have to "serve" the VIP and in this process the masses of the people who throng in these hospitals to seek relief from the sufferings due to diseases are deprived of services still further. Knowing that their lives are in the hands of the specialists and super-specialists in these hospitals, the VIPs are much more amenable to the suggestions of these top clinicians not merely in terms of getting the latest gadgets from the affluent countries so that VIPs can be served better when they get the next heart attack, but also in terms of filling key positions and even in the development of the community health services in the country. These top clinicians, with their deep-rooted privileged class values, who serve the fat, arteriosclerotic VIPs, are thus able to influence the entire health service system much more than a community health worker who has spent his whole professional life among the masses to make medical and health services meaningful to them. And, after the VIP recovers from his heart attack or cancer or piles and he makes available lakhs of rupees for expansion of super-specialities, he takes the public platform to exhort doctors to serve the rural population. The fact that, without exception, the Padma Bhushans awarded to physicians since independence went to clinicians who serve the VIPs, poignantly underscores the value system of the political leadership. The message is clear: if you want prestige, honour, award, influence and affluence, be a top clinician and serve the ruling classes; you are condemned to misery and neglect if you venture to serve the masses.

The response to the discovery of a coin lesion in the lung of the President provides a dramatic instance of the value system of the Indian leadership. The Prime Minister has been extolling the virtues of auto-urine therapy and naturopathy to the masses; the then Health Minister was exhorting people to take to indigenous systems of medicine and yoga. But cashing on the predicament of the President, cancer super-specialists managed to extract about Rs. 20 m from the Government to install the latest gadget in cancer, "Linear Acclerator" at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, and at the Tata Memorial Cancer Hospital in Bombay to serve the future cases of coin-lesions better. The malady thus lies deep in the culture of the political leadership of the country - their lack of real commitment to the welfare of the masses of the population. A sweeping change in this culture at the political level on a large scale - a cultural revolution - is needed as a remedy to bring the value system of the political leadership in tune with the Directive Principles of the Constitution. This, in turn, should lead to sweeping changes in the "culture" of the bureaucracy, and the various institutions for education, training, research and planning. They must all become subordinate to the interests of the population of the country as a whole rather than that of a tiny privileged class.

It will, however, be naive to expect such changes to occur overnight; such changes have to be brought about by patience and hard work along with an insightful analysis of the entire situation. It will also be equally wrong to presume that there are no thoughtful people at various levels who are deeply concerned about the present state of affairs. To these people, the political commitment to deliver goods to the masses provides a considerable scope of work; the façade can be used as an opportunity. By bringing together motivated people from various fields, the façade can be used to build an alternative health and population control system which is much stronger, dynamic and vigorous by rooting it
firmly on the people. Such a people-oriented programme can provide a vital entry point into the community to promote social and economic changed which are crucial pre-requisites for building a healthy society.

REFERENCE:

AN INTERACTION

TOWARD A NEW WORLD HEALTH ORDER

a draft by Stig Andersen

1. The striving for the New International Economic Order and the "Basic Needs" approach to development are in many ways contradictory to one another. The NIEO deals with a new way of arranging the international economic system and is dominated by macro considerations where arrangements are between states and groups of states, notably industrialized market economies and the Third World countries. On the other hand, the "Basic Needs" Approach deals largely with problems within states and relationships between people and groups of people and exclusively, at this point, in the Third World. The most common criticism by the industrialized countries against the NIEO is that it only would tend to favour those countries which are more industrialized among the Third World nations, and within countries those groups that are already in power and that already enjoy the benefits of the early stages of growth. The main criticism by the Third World of the "Basic Needs" approach is that it implies an interference by industrialized countries into the internal policies of each country and, worse still, that it implies refusal to adopt and implement the NIEO by providing "lollipop" assistance to the poorest, which will not bring about any development process in the Third World, but on the contrary keep them poor. To this last argument is sometimes added that the "Basic Needs" approach also tends to be an instrument to increase the world market for industrial products from the rich countries, rather than improving the productive capacity of the developing countries themselves.

2. NIEO, even if it were implemented in a high degree and soon, would not per se bring about any change in health conditions, although higher living standards in the Third World is one pre-requisite for better health in these countries. "Contribution of Health to N10", the title of the World Health Assembly 1980 Technical Discussions, seems to look toward another relationship: if we can somehow bring about better health (in the Third World), how would this affect the earlier attainment of the NIEO? First, healthy people (whether in the North or South) would not tolerate present highly unjust distribution of income and wealth. Healthy people would probably organize and threaten a revolution to attain more justice.

3. More positively stated, there are no doubt interacting cumulative processes which relate better health with better economic order. A new international economic order is a pre-requisite for economic and social development in the Third World, and economic growth can lead to better health. Conversely, healthier people can be more productive and change the national and ultimately the international economic order.
4. However, it is the main contention of this note that a New World Health Order must be based particularly on an analysis of health systems in the industrialized countries, because (a) "in the face of the mounting evidence that modernized medicine is irrelevant as a determinant of health, we have responded with phenomenal new investments in medicine" (John McKnight), and (b) with hardly any exception (probably not even China, in the 1980s), the Third World countries are simply emulating the rich countries, the principal difference being that it does not (yet) cost these countries as much. Virtually all Third World countries are engaged in a mad scramble to get as costly and as health-indifferent, or even health-demoting, health systems as the rich countries.

5. The striving toward a new World Health Order should therefore consist of two equally important attacks: replacement of the supply-determined and addictive health systems in the rich countries (East and West) by a need and demand-determined system in these countries, and prevention of further emulation of these systems in the Third World, combined with attempts to build up indigenous health promoting systems in these countries, building upon the best health traditions already existing there supplemented by the socially relevant scientific knowledge of the rich countries, as opposed to the organizational experience of these.

6. Health is the individual's symbiotic existence and development in his or her environment. The single most important factor determining a person's health is his or her will to be healthy. This will, in turn, is conditioned by the physical environment and the social forces in the smaller and larger community of which the individual is a member. This, obviously, does not mean that physical environment and social forces do not have a direct influence on the health of the individual, but only that it is often overlooked that the "will-mechanism" is a decisive factor, as evidenced by much physical and mental ill-health in what would seem near-ideal economic environments.

7. Health in the broadest sense is mankind's highest goal. Social and economic productivity, clean air and water, and beautiful art, are means to bring about the highest attainable standard of "physical, mental and social well-being" (WHO constitution) for the largest possible number of individuals. It is also true, but secondary, that healthy people tend to be productive and have surplus energy to produce beautiful art.

8. Health promotion in both North and South would inter alia include the following:
   . demystification of medicine and the medical profession;
   . education towards personal, family and small-community self-reliance in health matters;
   . use of higher technology, elaborate hospitals, etc., as only emergency and "last resort" facilities, and not as "first resort".

9. In the North, in addition, planned investments in further high-technology curative establishments and brain and body scanners should be shifted toward priorities such as replacing smaller towns for larger cities, creating more pleasing surroundings around and inside human habitation, and other types of investments which would improve people's purely physical environment. But it would also be necessary to look into even more fundamental phenomena affecting human health:
Is the most health-demotion factor in the industrialized countries in the last quarter of the 20th century not "friendly fascism" in political life? Ignacy Sachs defines "friendly fascism" as the "authoritarian alliance between Big Business and Big Government whose conservative dynamism may overcome our capacity for continuous social mutation in response to our predicament".

Is full employment really such a wonderful goal? If some people want badly to work 60-70 hours a week, they should certainly not be prevented from it, but if other people feel that two six-hour days would do, must everyone conform to such fixed working weeks as now prevail?

Dying is a part of life. It must come when it must come. The hysteria surrounding death in selected cases (e.g. Eisenhower, Franco, Boumedienne) makes it impossible for ordinary people to have an ordinary view of death.

Love-making and caring for should be by far the most popular pastimes for the human kind. Love-making has been made a bit easier and more varied in Western society recently, but there are many miles to go before healthy men and women have about as much good love-making as they would like. Caring for has become an almost forgotten pastime.

10. With the immense difference in level and quality of life between North and South, the human race cannot become a lot healthier. Therefore one of the most important elements of the New World Health Order must necessarily be a massive transfer of resources from North to South, accompanied probably by a considerable transfer, migration, of population from South to North. The transfer of resources should not, however, be tied to certain inputs, for these inputs would, at this point, and with the present approach to health services in the North, in all likelihood be counter-productive. The political leaders in the South, though not the medical establishment there, would probably show slightly more wisdom in the use of the resources transferred than the aid administrators in the North.

11. In the South, while many of the priorities listed in paras 8 and 9 above would apply as well, there are several other urgent priorities, including:

- Drastically improved drinking water supply and basic sanitation, especially in the rural areas. Priority action within this subject is likely to pay off in concrete health improvement terms at rates many times higher than any other actions at comparable cost.

- Increased food production for local consumption, as opposed to cash crops for export.

- The creation and constant development by the population itself, with such marginal provincial and state assistance as may be necessary, of an affordable, confidence-inspiring, near-home health service, with referral service to provincial and state levels.

12. To achieve a priority setting along such lines by the governments of the Third World countries will only be possible when industrialized countries have thoroughly changed their approach to health matters. It would be quite useless, as well as dishonest, for them to try to dissuade the governments in the Third World from emulating the systems in the industrialized worlds (both East and West), as long as the people and leaders there do not recognize their health-demotion and criminally wasteful behaviour and take action to stop it. Even the most angelically patient health philosopher in the South is unlikely to change his views on anything by people who are hell-bent on eating, drinking, smoking, drinking, stressing and international-conferencing themselves to death.
This is the report of a working group formed under the auspices of the Centre for the Study and Promotion of Development (DESCO) to carry out a project on Peru and Another Development. This text is a resume of an extensive document entitled 'Global Report'. In addition, the work included a series of commissioned monographs which are listed below. These papers are available from DESCO.

The paper assumes another development as the only viable national project for countries such as Peru - another development seen as essentially a political process, non-technocratic and necessarily conflictual.

Another development, urging both as a condition and its purpose the transformation of power structures, does not imply autarchy but the breakdown of external dependencies and mechanisms of internal and external domination; the construction of an authentic nation state and the development of collective self-reliance between non-aligned countries.

Another development is not seen as a recipe but instead as a proposal which evolves from the analysis of each concrete reality. The paper thus treats political matrices of another development in Peru: the satisfaction of basic needs, socialization of the means of production, transformation of the methods of integration in the international economy, transformation of the bases of power.

Finally, the paper criticizes past United Nations development strategies, questions the viability of an International Development Strategy which ignores fundamental conflicts existing between distinct groups of countries and further proposes the elaboration of some sort of "Fundamental Charter of Development of Peoples"; this would legitimate national processes aimed at another development, including the guarantee of the full exercise of human rights and of democratic formulas, and would favour collective self-reliance and real international co-operation.

List of monographs (the 'Global Report' and the monographs will be published by DESCO)

1. Production structure and basic needs:
   - Food (31 pp), Teobaldo Pinzas;
   - Education (80 pp), Raúl Vargas;
   - Housing (112 pp), Adolfo Córdova;
   - Health (51 pp), David Tejada

2. Production structure, employment, technology and capital accumulation:
   - Employment (36 pp), Raul Gonzales;
   - Technology (28 pp), Rachel Hertenberg;
   - Capital accumulation (29 pp), César Cabrera;
   - Production structure (61 pp), Arnaldo Rondón;
   - Rural development (73 pp), Luis Cruz

3. The international order and another development (24 pp), Julio Velarde

4. International politics and another development (40 pp), César Arias

../cont. on pg.12
LE PéROU ET UN AUTRE DÉVELOPPEMENT

Le texte qui suit constitue le rapport du Centre d'études et de promotion du développement (DESCO) qui a travaillé sur "Le Pérou et un autre développement". Il s'agit de la version résumée d'un texte plus important, lui-même issu d'une série de monographies dont la liste figure plus bas.

Un autre développement est le seul projet de société valable pour des pays comme le Pérou, telle est l'hypothèse de ce travail, qui voit un autre développement essentiellement comme un processus politique, non-technocratique et nécessairement conflictuel.

Un autre développement, dont la transformation des structures du pouvoir est à la fois la condition et l'objectif, ne signifie pas l'autarchie, mais la rupture de la dépendance et des mécanismes de domination interne et externe; il requiert la construction d'une nation authentique et la poursuite de l'autonomie collective des pays non-alignés.

Un autre développement n'est pas une recette, mais un projet qui découle de l'analyse de chaque réalité concrète. L'étude examine la matrice politique d'un autre développement au Pérou : satisfaction des besoins élémentaires, socialisation des moyens de production, transformation des rapports avec l'économie mondiale, transformation des bases mêmes du pouvoir.

Le document examine enfin d'une manière critique les stratégies de développement des Nations Unies et s'interroge sur la viabilité d'uns stratégie internationale de développement qui ignore les conflits fondamentaux entre groupes de pays; il conclut en proposant une "Charte fondamentale du développement des peuples" qui légitimerait les processus nationaux tendant à un autre développement, y compris la garantie du plein exercice des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie, et favoriserait l'autonomie collective et une coopération internationale réelle.

Liste des monographies (Rapport principal et monographies seront publiés en espagnol par DESCO).

1. Structure productive et besoins élémentaires :
   - Alimentation (31 pp.), Teobaldo Pinzas
   - Education (80 pp.), Raul Vargas
   - Habitat (112 pp.), Adolfo Cordova
   - Santé (51 pp.), David Tejada

2. Structure productive, emploi, technologie et accumulation :
   - Emploi (36 pp.), Raul Gonzales
   - Technologie (28 pp.) Rachel Hartemberg
   - Accumulation (29 pp.) Cesar Cabrera
   - Structure productive (61 pp.), Arnaldo Rondon
   - Développement rural (73 pp.), Luis Cruz

3. L'ordre international et un autre développement (24 pp.), Julio Velarde

4. Politique internationale et un autre développement (40 pp.), Cesar Arias

5. Distribution de la richesse et rapports sociaux de production :
   - Rapports sociaux de production (35 pp.) Guillermo Davila
   - Participation (40 pp.), Jose Salcedo

6. Structure du pouvoir, droits de l'homme, lutte sociale et moyens de communication de masse :
   - L'État et la transformation de la structure du pouvoir (51 pp.), Ines Garcia
   - Lutte sociale (35 pp.) Jose Alvarado
   - Mass media (25 pp.) Francisco Moncloa
   - Droits de l'homme (52 pp.) Enrique Bernales
"PERU Y EL OTRO DESARROLLO"

DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo.

Aclaraciones preliminares

El presente texto constituye el informe del equipo de trabajo constituido para la ejecución del proyecto "Perú y el Otro Desarrollo", encargado por la Fundación Internacional para Alternativas de Desarrollo (de Nyon, Suiza), a Rafael Roncagliolo, investigador del Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, DESCO (de Lima, Perú). La redacción de este resumen es una síntesis apretada de un documento amplio titulado "Informe Global" que se adjunta al presente, y que fue obra colectiva de un equipo integrado por Rolando Ames, Fernando Gonzáles Vigil, Luis Guiulfo, Hélan Jaworski, Henry Pease García, Rafael Roncagliolo y Fernando Sánchez Albavera, este último coordinador general de trabajo. El equipo a su vez, encargó un conjunto de monografías especializadas que también constituyen anexos a este documento síntesis y que son las siguientes:

1) Estructura productiva y necesidades básicas:
   a) Alimentación, Teobaldo Pinzas
   b) Educación, Raúl Vargas
   c) Vivienda, Adolfo Córdova
   d) Salud, David Tejada

2) Estructura productiva, empleo, tecnología y acumulación:
   a) Empleo, Raúl Gonzáles
   b) Tecnología, Rachel Hartemberry
   c) Acumulación, César Cabrera
   d) Estructura productiva, Arnaldo Rondón
   e) Desarrollo Rural, Luis Cruz

3) Orden internacional y otro desarrollo, Julio Velarde

4) Política internacional y otro desarrollo, César Arias

5) Distribución de la riqueza y relaciones sociales de producción:
   a) Relaciones sociales de producción, Guillermo Dávila
   b) Participación, José Salcedo

6) Estructura de poder, derechos humanos, conflicto social y medios de comunicación masiva:
   a) Estado y transformación de la estructura de poder, Inés García
   b) Conflicto social, José Alvarado
   c) Medios de comunicación masiva, Francisco Moncloa
   d) Derechos humanos, Enrique Bernales.

Tanto el "Informe Global" como dichas monografías serán editadas en español por DESCO, institución que acogió y apoyó el proyecto.1/

El presente resumen contiene cuatro secciones:

I. Perspectiva analítica y política
II. Conceptualización del "otro desarrollo"
III. Las políticas matrices del "otro desarrollo", y
IV. Viabilidad de una nueva Estrategia Internacional de Desarrollo.

1/ Estos documentos pueden pedirse a DESCO
I. PERSPECTIVA ANALITICA Y POLITICA

1. La categorfa de "otro desarrollo" surge por oposición al "desarrollo" en su acepción clásica. Pensar en términos de un "desarrollo alternativo" demanda, desde el primer instante, colocarse en una perspectiva analítica y política que sea: (a) Histórica y no estática; (b) global y no parcelada; (c) procesal y no lineal; (d) política y no tecnocrática; y (e) nacional y no transnacional.

2. El "otro desarrollo" sólo es pensable en términos de una consideración histórica a propósito de la naturaleza particular de cada sociedad subdesarrollada, y de la historia global del capitalismo que generó el subdesarrollo de unas sociedades como costo, contraparte y mecanismo de financiamiento del desarrollo capitalista de otras. En esta perspectiva, las categorías "desarrollo" y "sub-desarrollo" mal pueden reducirse a comparaciones en abstracto de indicadores empíricos, más o menos complejos.

3. El "otro desarrollo" es, por lo tanto, un proceso generado a partir de una transformación global. Supone un corte cualitativo en la evolución de las sociedades subdesarrolladas, y no simplemente la suma de reformas parciales, a que deban sujetarse estas sociedades.

4. El desarrollo alternativo sólo adquiere eficacia histórica al ser visualizado como una utopía que traduce sus ideas matrices en ideales colectivos. La imagen final de los mecanismos institucionales y de las formas sociales a que el "otro desarrollo" se dirige, sólo puede ser afinada a través del proceso mismo, y se mantendrá en permanente elaboración.

5. La conquista del "otro desarrollo" es un proceso esencialmente político y no tecnocrático. Esto es, su posibilidad depende inicialmente menos de la capacidad técnica para formular modelos y propuestas económicas, que de la capacidad política para movilizar y articular a las clases y sectores sociales bajo cuya conducción las medidas técnicas han de ser aplicadas. Por lo mismo, el proceso del "otro desarrollo" es un proceso conflictivo y no un proceso de conciliación de intereses irreconciliables.

6. El "otro desarrollo", asumido desde esta perspectiva, corresponde al único proyecto nacional viable en países como el Perú. Este proyecto sólo puede ser el de las clases y capas oprimidas, naturalmente opuesto, al proyecto transnacional de las clases dominantes. Estas últimas no tienen ni han tenido históricamente, la capacidad ni las condiciones estructurales para formular y proponer un proyecto nacional capaz de integrar y desarrollar la sociedad peruana.

II. CONCEPTUALIZACION DEL "OTRO DESARROLLO"

7. El "otro desarrollo" es un proceso conflictivo que parte del tratamiento eficaz de la cuestión política del poder interno y externo; se asienta sobre una racionalidad económica y social alternativa al capitalismo; resalta las especificidades históricas; es conducido por un bloque social opuesto al dominante; estimula la movilización popular y la democracia; opera a través de dos fases analítica y lógicamente diferenciables; y enfrenta una cantidad de obstáculos de los que da razón la experiencia histórica reciente de América Latina.
8. La cuestión del poder, en sociedades como la peruana, implica la cancelación de los mecanismos de dominación externa (relaciones entre clases a nivel internacional y entre metrópoli y periferia) e interna (entre clases y entre regiones). Siendo desarrollo y subdesarrollo, como lo señalaba la evidencia histórica, partes integrantes de un único proceso global, la transformación de las bases del poder y su auténtica democratización, llevan necesariamente a alterar las estructuras que configuran nuestra formación social.

9. La transformación de la estructura de poder es a la vez una condición y una finalidad del "otro desarrollo". Presumir alguna forma de "neutralidad social" sería inconsistente con la perspectiva en que el "otro desarrollo" cobra relevancia, e implicaría disolver tal perspectiva en los supuestos básicos del desarrollo clásico, que es, por lo demás, inviable. Optar por el "otro desarrollo" es, por lo tanto, tomar partido por las clases y sectores oprimidos y marginados, a quienes corresponde el rol protagónico del desarrollo. En este sentido el proceso del "otro desarrollo" es un proceso de democratización del poder, por la vía de la acumulación de fuerzas sociales y su articulación en un nuevo bloque social que genere un proceso de enfrentamiento y ruptura con el bloque hegemónico y dominante en la sociedad a transformar.

10. El desplazamiento del bloque de poder hegemónico y dominante, dado el carácter dependiente e intermediario que este bloque tiene respecto a la dominación externa, implica simultáneamente cancelar los mecanismos de subordinación con el exterior y construir un auténtico Estado Nacional, que rescate la soberanía integral (territorial, política, económica y cultural) de la Nación, redefiniendo las relaciones funcionales que explican su vulnerabilidad, y al mismo tiempo, asegurándose formas de vinculación y alianza que den viabilidad internacional al proceso hacia el "otro desarrollo". En este sentido, el "otro desarrollo" no puede asumirse como un proceso viable en medio del "aislamiento" internacional, ni tampoco autárquico. Por el contrario requiere, como alternativa a la dependencia externa a ser cancelada, el desarrollo de mecanismos de "auto-suficiencia colectiva" entre los países en él comprometidos.

11. Se trata de construir una nueva racionalidad económica y social fundada sobre principios rectores tales como la democracia real, la hegemonía del trabajo, la acumulación social y la solidaridad.

12. A partir de estos principios rectores, la postulación del "otro desarrollo" adquiere un carácter creativo, no dogmático, cuya viabilidad depende de su capacidad para asumir e interpretar cada realidad histórica específica. La idea del "otro desarrollo" no es una receta de aplicación lineal y homogénea a imponer a cada Nación (y también en esto se diferencia de los esquemas fijos del desarrollo clásico) sino una postulación que emerge del análisis de cada realidad concreta.

13. Por ello para iniciar un proceso hacia "otro desarrollo" caben diversas estrategias, de acuerdo con las especificidades históricas de cada situación y momento, las mismas que determinarán la composición del bloque social alternativo. En sociedades como la peruana, de fuerte heterogeneidad estructural, este bloque social alternativo deberá acumular la mayor cantidad de fuerzas (clase obrera, campesinado, capas medias). El rol protagónico en la conducción de este bloque proviene de la condición real y concreta de clase dominada que corresponde a los trabajadores.
14. La acumulación ideológica y política de fuerzas sociales, en el seno del bloque alternativo, implica atender simultáneamente las cuestiones de la movilización popular y de la democracia real. El "otro desarrollo" no es viable si se entiende como conducción vertical, de cúpula, de arriba a abajo. Por el contrario su implementación depende del grado de movilización y participación creativa que se logre al interior del bloque y en su conducción. Esto supone que el propósito y la gestación del "otro desarrollo" son intrínsecamente democráticos, en el sentido de privilegiar el consenso y la participación reales, entre las mayorías oprimidas que resultan las únicas capaces de viabilizar el proyecto.

15. La experiencia reciente en América Latina, y en el Perú, anuncia que todo intento de implementar "otro desarrollo" confronta conflictivamente un conjunto de amenazas internas y externas que obligan a distinguir, la etapa que llega hasta la ruptura de la estructura de poder en que se sustenta el bloque hegemonico y dominante, caracterizada por la dinámica del manejo de los desequilibrios y la acumulación de fuerzas sociales de cambio; y una segunda, que inicia la construcción del nuevo ordenamiento a partir de una redefinición del conflicto social y por tanto de la construcción del nuevo ordenamiento económico.

III. LAS POLITICAS MATRICES DEL "OTRO DESARROLLO"

16. Así conceptualizado el "otro desarrollo", las políticas matrices conducentes a él se agrupan en torno a cuatro objetivos:

(a) Diseñar y administrar la estructura productiva en función de las necesidades básicas de la población.

(b) Socializar los medios de producción de modo que la generación y apropiación del excedente, estén determinadas por criterios de acumulación social.

(c) Transformar las modalidades de inserción en la economía internacional, redefiniendo la participación nacional en la división internacional del trabajo.

(d) Transformar las bases del poder y consolidar la vigencia de una democracia real que permita el ejercicio del poder por las mayorías nacionales.

3.1. Satisfacción de las Necesidades Básicas

17. Las políticas están dirigidas a replantear la racionalidad económica y social que determina las estructuras de producción, distribución y consumo, de tal forma que:

a) La motivación de la producción y la disponibilidad de bienes y servicios correspondan al valor de uso de éstos, y no a su valor de cambio. Ello supone que la función social de la producción se antepone al criterio de la maximización privada de las utilidades.

b) La distribución de los bienes y servicios corresponda a un criterio general de redistribución del consumo. Esto es que, la satisfacción de las necesidades no está sólo vinculada al ingreso monetario disponible. Aceptando que en el corto plazo no es viable reducir signifi-
cativamente las diferencias de ingreso, de lo que se trata es de alterar el peso relativo de los diversos componentes del gasto familiar, a través de la prestación de servicios gratuitos y la distribución directa de bienes esenciales.

c) Los patrones de consumo correspondan eficazmente a la dotación de recursos disponibles y a la redefinición de la escala de preferencias. Si bien se asume que el patrón de consumo es una categoría dinámica, que se administra de acuerdo a las variaciones que experimente la dotación de recursos y los requerimientos de ahorro, se rechaza el criterio "consumista" de la insaciable de las necesidades.

18. La nueva racionalidad económica y social que se configura de acuerdo a las orientaciones propuestas en el párrafo anterior, supone en términos operativos tres líneas básicas de acción.

a) Alterar la "función de producción" de los bienes y servicios esenciales, lo cual exige definir las características del "producto final", racionalizar y estandarizar los insumos y equipos necesarios para su elaboración, y utilizar al máximo los recursos locales.

En este sentido de lo que se trata en la sociedad peruana es de precisar un conjunto "manejable" de bienes y servicios, cuya producción se administre en base a cuatro criterios fundamentales:

i. Máxima utilización de mano de obra y recursos materiales nacionales.

ii. Estricta programación de las importaciones requeridas, tendiendo a la minimización de los componentes externos.

iii. Control de la diversificación de bienes y servicios.

iv. Administración y control de precios, transfiriendo excedentes de un sector a otro y redefiniendo los términos de intercambio entre el campo y la ciudad.

b) Planificar la producción y el abastecimiento de los bienes esenciales, garantizando la participación de la población en el diseño, organización, administración y control de los canales de comercialización a nivel local, regional y nacional.

La intermediación comercial no se concibe con fines de lucro, sino como una función económica indispensable para garantizar el acceso de la población a la oferta disponible de bienes y servicios.

c) Definir la magnitud del patrón de consumo y una política de precios coherent con los niveles de ahorro que se requieran para garantizar el crecimiento de la producción de bienes y servicios. Debe aceptarse que existirá un conflicto entre el consumo presente y el consumo futuro, por lo que en una sociedad como la peruana, una mayor cobertura en la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas, requerirá replantear la cantidad y calidad de los bienes y servicios, a la vez que reducir el nivel de vida de ciertos grupos sociales.
3.2. La Socialización de los Medios de Producción y la Reorientación de la Generación y Asignación del Excedente

19. La socialización de los medios de producción tiene por objeto reivindicar al trabajo como eje ordenador del sistema, y garantizar la acumulación social. En este sentido, la propiedad privada no ha sido históricamente en el Perú compatible con una estrategia que privilegie la función social de la producción, esto es, la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas.

20. Nuestra perspectiva de "otro desarrollo" plantea, diversas formas de propiedad, con hegemonía de las formas sociales de producción y una dirección planificada del sistema económico.

21. Se asume que la riqueza social se apropia por cuenta de los trabajadores bajo dos modalidades: Una indirecta que corresponde a las formas de propiedad estatal, que implica que la riqueza generada se acumula socialmente. Dentro de esta modalidad, la riqueza revierte a los trabajadores mediante una mayor y mejor disponibilidad de bienes y servicios, la generación de nuevas oportunidades de empleo y la prestación de servicios gratuitos.

La otra modalidad, directa, supone la vigencia de formas asociativas de propiedad, en las cuales los trabajadores como conjunto se apropian de una parte mayoritaria del excedente, contribuyendo con una fracción al incremento de fondos orientados a la acumulación social.

22. La apropiación individual del excedente resultará pues, subsidiaria dentro de ambas modalidades de propiedad. No obstante, debe reconocerse que siendo imprescindible la expansión acelerada de los bienes y servicios esenciales, debe estimularse la productividad. Por ello, la política de remuneraciones deberá fijarse tanto en función de la capacidad como de acuerdo a las necesidades de los trabajadores.

23. La Propiedad Estatal, en que los medios de producción pertenecen al conjunto de la sociedad, abarcará el control de aquellas actividades cuya función es generar y asignar excedentes para la financiación del desarrollo (comercio exterior, explotación masiva de recursos naturales, industrias intensivas en capital, banca, financieras, seguros, etc.), y/o que por su naturaleza comprometen la marcha del conjunto del sistema económico. A su vez, el Estado tendrá a su cargo la prestación de servicios sociales (educación, salud, vivienda, transporte colectivo, seguridad social, etc.) y la realización de la infraestructura.

24. La Propiedad Asociativa, donde los medios de producción corresponden al conjunto de trabajadores, agrupados en complejos sectoriales, abarcará el control de cualquier actividad económica que no esté reservada para el Estado.

25. Dentro de este contexto se plantea pues, la hegemonía de la acumulación social, y de una racionalidad económica que anteponga el interés del conjunto al interés individual, limitándose la propiedad privada a las actividades de reducida significación económica.
3.3. Transformación de las Modalidades de Inserción en la Economía Internacional

26. En el "otro desarrollo", la magnitud y características de las relaciones económicas internacionales corresponden al tipo de desarrollo productivo que las sociedades definen autónomamente.

Por ello estas relaciones están subordinadas a la conducción nacional del proceso productivo frente a la lógica transnacional que prima actualmente en la sociedad peruana.

Para que ello pueda darse, se requiere aplicar un conjunto de políticas dirigidas a reducir y cancelar progresivamente, la vulnerabilidad de la estructura productiva, las que deben ser acompañadas por otras que den viabilidad internacional, al proceso hacia el "otro desarrollo".

Estas políticas se refieren básicamente a:

a) Definir estructuras de producción y consumo con un mínimo indispensable de vinculación con el exterior, reduciendo significativamente el componente importado.

b) Cancelar las formas de descapitalización existentes, a través de la nacionalización de las actividades fundamentales para la generación y asignación de los excedentes.

c) Reducir al mínimo las formas de transferencia de excedentes al exterior (utilidades, regalías, pago de servicios en general, etc.).

d) Nacionalizar la comercialización de los bienes fundamentales de exportación, y diseñar canales más autónomos de acceso al mercado mundial, de tal forma de centralizar capacidades de compra y venta con el objeto de incrementar el poder de negociación internacional. Dentro de esta línea, debe propiciarse la concertación de "Programas Recíprocos de Intercambio" donde se identifiquen líneas de común interés con otros países, y se definan las magnitudes a ser comercializadas.

27. La centralización del comercio exterior deberá corresponder a una estricta programación, que se antepone a los argumentos convencionales del "libre comercio". No obstante, ello no supone plantear de ninguna manera la "autarquía". Por el contrario, se acepta que para la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas de la población se requiere definir una mecánica de complementariedad e integración productiva con la economía internacional. En pocas palabras, se requerirá vender tanto al exterior como se requiera para cubrir los déficits internos programados y los compromisos financieros que se asuman.

28. El cuestionamiento del libre comercio es fundamental, para replantear los esquemas de integración económica que se han ensayado en los países en desarrollo. Nuestra perspectiva acepta, que desde una posición aislada no es posible transformar nuestra inserción en la economía mundial, y menos aún la actual división internacional del trabajo. En este sentido, se reconoce la importancia de las formas de cooperación e integración internacionales, pero siempre y cuando éstas fortalezcan la direccionalidad del proceso hacia el "Otro Desarrollo". La cooperación e integración técnicas y económicas debe establecerse, a nuestro juicio, desde una pers...
pectiva esencialmente sectorial. Es decir, que no comprometa integralmente el proceso de desarrollo, sino más bien que lo refuerce y complemente en aspectos muy específicos.

29. Se considera fundamental fortalecer la cooperación internacional para acceder al mercado mundial en condiciones más ventajosas, tanto a través de organizaciones de productores, como de la conformación de entes empresariales multinacionales, que permitan contraponer poder político y económico al de las transnacionales. Se reconoce pues, la importancia de la autosuficiencia colectiva, de tal forma de crear condiciones para una transformación del actual orden económico internacional.

30. En la medida en que se vaya reestructurando la estructura productiva será necesario continuar la expansión del comercio exterior, alterando progresivamente la composición de las exportaciones y las importaciones, de tal forma de alcanzar un excedente neto cada vez mayor. Lo importante es quién se apropia de este excedente y para qué se utiliza, no el planteamiento de formas utópicas de autarquía, que como tales no tienen ninguna viabilidad.

31. En síntesis, las acciones dirigidas a transformar la forma de inserción en la economía mundial, no pueden darse independientemente de las acciones que se adopten para transformar la estructura productiva. Lo que se pretende en suma, es definir un tipo de vinculación que refuerce la capacidad nacional de acumulación y que garantice un desarrollo autónomo.

3.4. Transformación de la estructura de poder

32. Una de las acciones básicas en este aspecto se orienta a transformar el Estado, no sólo en tanto que burocracia formal, sino en su sentido más profundo, de aparato de concentración y articulación del poder, que no garantiza de manera efectiva un auténtico control democrático. La transformación del carácter del Estado, sanciona a su vez la transformación de la estructura del poder, cuyo control pasaría de manos de una minoría enfeudada a los intereses extranjeros, particularmente transnacionales, a manos de las mayorías populares organizadas.

33. Vista la perspectiva de la transformación de la estructura del Estado, esto es de la conquista del poder, desde una situación como la peruana, no puede dejar de mencionarse que las clases oprimidas antes que meras categorías sociales son verdaderos actores dotados de una historia y de instancias de autoidentificación específicas.

El "otro desarrollo" no puede entenderse como un partir de cero, menos aún como una receta a imponer en cualquier tiempo y lugar.

34. En el caso peruano han empezado a darse las condiciones para la acumulación de fuerzas ideológicas y políticas de cambio, a partir de la reivindicación de la historia nacional concreta, y del balance y superación de las experiencias reformistas vividas. Dicho en otras palabras, el conflicto social que ha de terminar por desencadenar el "otro desarrollo" vía la transformación del poder y del Estado, ha ingresado en una etapa cualitativamente superior al pasado, lo que se manifiesta de variadas formas. No sólo se trata de una creciente, aunque no constante capacidad de movilización popular. A este indicador principal se suma la existen-
cia de elementos de autoidentificación de las clases oprimidas y de conquista de un espacio de legitimidad dentro de la sociedad civil, que se vuelve condición sine qua non para la acumulación y la hegemonía ideológicas. Incluso instituciones claves de la sociedad política y de la sociedad civil, tales como las Fuerzas Armadas y la Iglesia Católica se han visto presionadas a reconocer esta realidad.

35. Desde el punto de vista de la acumulación de fuerzas es necesario reconocer que la posibilidad del otro desarrollo pasa por dos etapas analíticamente diferenciables, aunque orgánicamente superpuestas: la primera consiste en lo que llamamos la conquista inicial de la hegemonía, esto es, la capacidad del bloque alternativo para ganar "la dirección intelectual y moral" de la sociedad. Sólo cuando esta dirección intelectual y moral (hegemonía) ha sido conquistada, el bloque alternativo estará en condiciones de conquistar el poder y mantenerse en él. De esta manera la cuestión del "o tro desarrollo" inscribe su contenido económico en la cuestión política del poder, y esta última llama de inmediato al problema específico de la lucha ideológica, o instancia ideológica del conflicto social.

IV. VIABILIDAD DE UNA ESTRATEGIA INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO

36. Los dos decenios para el desarrollo, que buscó implementar el Sistema de Naciones Unidas han contemplado posiciones voluntaristas y objetivos, por lo general, insuficientemente instrumentados.

El fracaso y frustración de estas "buenas intenciones" no es una situación que pueda atribuirse sólo a los organismos del Sistema de Naciones Unidas. A fin de cuentas, el comportamiento de éstos refleja el interés de los países Miembros. Dicho de otra manera, estos organismos han podido ir hasta donde los países los han dejado, y muchas iniciativas importantes de los funcionarios internacionales han sido frustradas por la indiferencia, tanto de los países desarrollados como de los países en desarrollo.

37. Después de estos dos decenios, consideramos que es legítimo preguntarse acerca de la viabilidad de una estrategia internacional de desarrollo que ignora la existencia de posiciones opuestas entre distintos grupos de países. ¿Hasta qué punto puede existir una estrategia que armonicen objetivos de desarrollo entre los países, cuando muchas veces sus dinámicas resultan antagónicas? ¿Qué sentido tiene el planteamiento de reivindicaciones económicas en favor de los países subdesarrollados, cuando no se cuestionan las causas estructurales del subdesarrollo?

38. Nuestra posición es que no puede existir una estrategia internacional de desarrollo dentro de lo que formalmente se acepta y entiende. Una estrategia no es otra cosa que un conjunto de acciones coherentes entre sí, que se sustentan en una concepción común, y que conducen al cumplimiento de una serie de metas y objetivos pre-definidos. ¿Puede existir una concepción común entre los que asientan su bienestar en la explotación y dominación de los otros?

39. Más que una estrategia lo que se requiere es replantear la conceptualización del desarrollo que maneja el Sistema de naciones Unidas, haciéndolo explícita la oposición de intereses que existen a nivel internacional. Hasta el momento no ha sido posible un cuestionamiento real de los sis-
temas de dominación, que hacen inviable el "otro desarrollo". De ahí, el carácter eminentemente declarativo y formal de las "Estrategias Internacionales".

40. Pensamos que el Sistema de Naciones Unidas debe partir de la base que existen diversas formas de conceptualizar y entender la problemática del desarrollo, y que todas ellas deben contar con un alto grado de legitimidad internacional. En suma, más que una Estrategia Internacional de Desarrollo de lo que se trata es de crear un marco que dé viabilidad a los procesos hacia el Otro Desarrollo y que impida que las experiencias de esta índole se vean bloqueadas internacionalmente.

41. De lo que se trataría es de elaborar orgánicamente una especie de "Carta Fundamental del Desarrollo de los Pueblos", donde a partir de la vigencia irrestricta de los derechos humanos, y de los propósitos del Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional, se reconozcan diversas alternativas y posibilidades de desarrollo. Esta Carta debería, en su esencia, dar legitimidad internacional a una nueva conceptualización del desarrollo. Esta debería ser la puesta en vigencia de los principios fundamentales del "otro desarrollo", reconociéndose que los procesos corresponderán a realidades históricas específicas, que los harán diferentes entre sí, por lo que se aceptaría que no caben ideas pre-fijadas acerca de cómo emprender el desarrollo de los pueblos.

42. En líneas generales, esta "Carta Fundamental del Desarrollo de los Pueblos" debería legitimar los procesos nacionales que persigan un desarrollo dirigido hacia la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas; que transformen las estructuras de poder, eliminando su concentración; que garanticen el ejercicio de fórmulas auténticamente democráticas; que garanticen la plena vigencia de los derechos humanos y que diseñen modalidades de organización económica conducentes a su cumplimiento; que realicen transformaciones internas dirigidas a replantear el rol subordinado que pueda tener un país en la economía internacional; que condene y conduzca a procesos de ruptura con cualesquiera formas de imperialismo; y que privilegie la autosuficiencia colectiva y la cooperación internacional como sustento de una verdadera convivencia internacional, en pro de la paz y la justicia social.

List of monographs (continued from pg. 1)

5. Distribution of wealth and social relations of production:
   Social relations of production (35 pp), Guillermo Dávila; Participation (40 pp), José Salcedo

6. Structure of power, human rights, social conflict and means of mass communication:
   State and transformation of power (51 pp), Inés García; Social conflict (35 pp), José Alvarado; Means of mass communication (25 pp), Francisco Moncloa; Human rights (52 pp), Enrique Bernales.
Abstract: The paper is a call for a feasibility study and for social action for another development in Britain. A scenario of transition is proposed from industrialism, and from the present path to super-industrialism, to a more decentralized, more human and self-reliant pattern of development. The author discusses another development in terms of employment, food, habitat, community development and trade, and presents a timetable for social transformation from the present to the year 2000.

UNE AUTRE ANGLETERRE

Résumé: Cet article constitue un appel à une étude de faisabilité et à l'action pour un autre développement en Grande Bretagne. Il propose un scénario de transition de l'industrialisme et des tendances au super-industrialisme vers un développement plus décentralisé, plus humain et autonome. L'auteur examine "un autre développement" en termes d'emploi, d'alimentation, d'habitat, de services collectifs et de commerce, et suggère un calendrier de transformations sociales d'aujourd'hui à l'an 2000.

UN OTRO DESARROLLO PARA INGLATERRA

Resumen: El informe desea animar un estudio de factibilidad y fomentar acciones sociales para un otro desarrollo en Inglaterra. Propone un escenario de transición del industrialismo y del camino actual al super-industrialismo, a un modelo de desarrollo más descentralizado, más humano y auto dependiente. El autor presenta un otro desarrollo en términos del empleo, alimentos, la habitación, servicios colectivos y comercio, y presenta un calendario para la transformación social desde el presente hasta el año 2000.
ANOTHER BRITAIN

by

James Robertson

1. INTRODUCTION

This report has been written for inclusion in the IFDA Dossier,* which is being compiled as a contribution to the United Nations Development Strategy for the 1980s and beyond. The report was commissioned as a "feasibility study" for an alternative path of development for the United Kingdom.(1) It suggests further action to clarify such a path and to bring about a change of direction towards it. Its starting assumptions are as follows.

First, the conventional approach to the development of Third World countries in the last 25 years, modelled on the pursuit of quantitative macro-economic growth in industrialised countries (in the hope that wealth thereby created would "trickle down" and raise the standard of living all round), has not proved successful. An alternative approach - "another development" - should now be adopted. Its aim should be to develop people's capacity to define and satisfy their own needs (material and non-material), and to realise their potential in harmony with their environment. Self-reliance and self-development are key goals.

Second, "another development" is needed in the industrialised countries also. There, institutional overdevelopment and excessive material throughput are now the cause of widespread economic dependency and social underdevelopment. Moreover, growing competition from rapidly industrialising Third World countries is forcing a basic choice on the industrialised countries - whether to try to accelerate towards a super-industrial, hyper-expansionist (HE) future, or to change direction towards a post-industrial, sane, humane, ecological (SHE) future in which human development becomes the primary goal.**

Third, if both industrialised and Third World countries choose "another development", not only will this offer a better future to their own peoples. It will also help to create (over, say, the next 25 years) a new international economic order, in which relations between peoples will be more equal and less exploitative. By contrast, further international specialisation of production and division of labour in line with conventional economic progress, will tend to exacerbate political conflict and environmental stress on a global scale.

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* Further information can be obtained from the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA), 2 Place du Marche, CH-1260 Nyon, Switzerland.

** For a fuller discussion, see "The Sane Alternative". (2)
Fourth, both negative and positive factors are already foreshadowing a change of direction towards "another development" in the industrialised countries. As old patterns of activity continue to break down, people will increasingly find ways of breaking through to new ones. Easing the breakdown of the old, and facilitating the breakthrough to the new, are processes of "decolonisation" and "liberation" (see Section 2 below). Purposefully carried out, they will smooth the transition to "another development".

Fifth, this transition will itself be "another development". In other words, it will mainly be initiated by people in "civil society", the "informal economy", the "third system", acting on personal and group initiatives of their own to change the direction of their lives and of the society in which they live. To concentrate mainly on mobilising the institutionalised powers and resources of governments, finance, and the media in support of "another development" will, therefore, be self-defeating. Reports like this should be content with more personal, more pluralistic, and more modest aims: to communicate a sense of the action which the author himself intends to take (in the hope that mutual cooperation may thereby arise with some readers); and to help other readers to identify possible courses of action for themselves.

Finally, I start with the knowledge that the prospect of "another Britain" is in tune with Britain's historical situation and cultural traditions. As the first industrial people, the British are among the first to experience the limits to industrialism as a form of development. Moreover, leisure and quality of life have always had a high priority in Britain, compared with purely material success. This has been seen as a weakness, when conventional economic growth was the overriding goal. As "another development" gathers momentum, it will be a strength.

2. APPROACH

IFDA asked that this study should be conceived as an extension to the final chapter of "The Sane Alternative". I there suggested that "another development" would be a highly disaggregated, pluralistic process, and discussed how it could be taken forward. As a device to enable people to envisage how they might help to create a people-centred future, I combined six "transformation roles" with thirty "activity areas" to generate 180 "transformation activities".

The six transformation roles are as follows.

A) Lifestyles: changing one's personal way of life so that it is more consistent with "another development".

B) Enabling (Liberation): fostering new growth points (e.g. alternative technology, common ownership in industry, Yoga techniques) which help people to liberate themselves from dependence, to become more self-reliant, and to develop their autonomy.
C) **Enabling (Decolonisation):** managing the breakdown of existing institutions, relationships, etc., so as to help previously dependent people to become more self-reliant and to develop their autonomy.

D) **Metaphysical Reconstruction:** creating and communicating new visions and paradigms for "another development".

E) **Strategy:** mapping the transition to "another development"; identifying crucial areas of change, key enabling decisions, important unresolved problems, and possible stumbling blocks; and providing opportunities for communication, information exchange and cross-fertilisation.

F) **Opposition:** opposing and attempting to obstruct activities - such as practices perpetuating racial or sex discrimination, or the introduction of inhumane technologies - which are contrary to "another development".

The thirty activity areas are as follows:

1) Families, Households, Local Communities
2) Roles of the Sexes
3) Roles of Children, Adults and the Elderly
4) Land Use and Land Tenure
5) Agriculture and Food
6) Conservation of Minerals and Materials
7) Manufacture, Repair and Maintenance of Things
8) Provision of Services and Care to People
9) Politics and Government
10) Economic Organisation
11) Management
12) Energy
13) Transport
14) Cities, Towns and Rural Resettlement
15) Housing
16) Roles of Professions
17) Science and Technology
18) Health
19) Education
20) Money and Finance
21) Work and Employment
22) Religion
23) Arts and Culture
24) Leisure, Entertainment, Sport
25) Information, Communications
26) Crime, Prisons, Police, Law
27) Defence and the Military
28) Third World
29) European Community
30) Disarmament and Peace

Many examples of "transformation activities" can be found in Britain today, covering all the 30 activity areas listed above; much information is available about them; and I am in touch with many of them in the context of "Changing Direction". But the scope for further initiatives of this kind, as "another development" gathers momentum, is virtually limitless. So in this report I shall concentrate on certain specific aspects of the "Strategy" role, remembering always that a strategy for "another development" will itself evolve pluralistically.

3. **MAPPING THE TRANSITION**

What will actually happen in Britain if "another development" takes place? What will "another Britain" be like? How quickly could it happen? Those of us who advocate "another development"
should have answers to questions like these. With this in mind, I have held preliminary discussions with a number of non-governmental organisations and persons about the possibility of a pilot project on the following lines.

First, we shall postulate a time-scale for "another development" in Britain. It should be optimistic, but not excessively so. For example:

1979 Evidence will continue to suggest that the industrialised countries, and Britain in particular, cannot rely on continued economic growth and that a change of direction ("another development") may be necessary. The broad outline of this change will begin to become clearer.

1980 UN will adopt a development strategy which emphasises the merits of "another development". This will add credibility to the idea of a change of direction for countries like Britain.

1985 By this time it will be generally recognised that various aspects of "another development" are actually taking place in Britain. Moreover, Britain will be one of the industrialised countries whose government has adopted the following policy goals:

(1) internationally, to help to achieve a world economy within 25 years in which materially overdeveloped countries will have converged with materially underdeveloped countries around a more equal, permanently sustainable, materially adequate standard of living;

(2) internally, to move towards greater self-sufficiency and a better balanced economy, more directly concerned with enabling people to define and meet the needs of their own households, neighbourhoods, and districts.

1990 By this time, many aspects of social and economic life in Britain will provide evidence that a fundamental change of direction towards "another development" has taken place.

2000 Britain will have moved a long way toward greater economic self-sufficiency at national, regional, local and household levels. The world economy will be on the way toward a permanently sustainable, materially adequate standard of living for all.

Having postulated this target timetable for "another development" in Britain, the next step will be to fill it out in more detail. Desirable and potentially feasible changes consistent with it will be postulated in various fields (such as employment, energy, etc.), and quantitative values will be attached to these changes for the years 1985, 1990 and 2000. The changes thus postulated in each particular field will then be reconciled with one another.
to create a more comprehensive picture of what "another development" might imply for the economic and social life of Britain over the next 20 years.

The coverage for the pilot project will initially be as follows.

(1) Employment in Agriculture, Industry, Services and Professions; and new patterns of Paid and Unpaid Work.

In agriculture, manufacturing, and services alike we envisage both the further mechanisation and automation of large enterprises supplying mass-produced products and impersonal services, and the consequent release of many people, not only to enjoy leisure, but also to work (paid or unpaid) in a more self-defined way than at present - on small farms, in small firms, in small community enterprises, and in the provision of goods and services on a person-to-person basis. So we shall postulate, for example: a shift out of large manufacturing and service enterprises; a shift into agriculture; a shift into small enterprises; a shift towards part-time paid work; more free time; more equal distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women; higher status for socially useful work, including unpaid work that is socially useful; and, at least during a transitional period, an extension of today's transfer payment systems (e.g. social security and unemployment benefits) to provide unpaid workers with a money income.

(2) Food Production and Consumption

We shall postulate: changes in agriculture and in diet which will make Britain more self-sufficient in indigenous types of food and less dependent on imported feedingstuffs, butter, etc. This will imply: less meat in the diet; more smaller farms, part-time farming and do-it-yourself (DIY) food-growing; and less energy-intensive, more people-intensive farming.

(3) Urban/Rural Patterns of Settlement; and new Patterns of Family and Community Life

We shall postulate a more dispersed pattern of settlement countrywide; more people living nearer to their work; more people growing food in cities, more people manufacturing in the country, and more people providing services directly to other people in both; more people spending more active time in and around their own home and locality; more people with their own foodplots and workshops; increasing investment by households and neighbourhoods in all kinds of equipment, including mechanical and telecommunications equipment; more living and working together by children, young people, adults, and the elderly; and, at the same time, better opportunities for more people to have access to culture, recreational travel, etc.
(4) Energy Use and Energy Supply

We shall postulate decreasing energy use, partly owing to higher efficiency and conservation, and partly owing to less energy-intensive patterns of work, life, transport, etc. We shall also postulate a more decentralised pattern of energy supply, based increasingly on renewable energy sources and on the use of energy now wasted.

(5) Imports and Exports

In general, we shall postulate that decreasing quantities of goods and services will be exchanged by Britain with industrialised and Third World countries alike - as development in Britain (and elsewhere) becomes more self-reliant, indigenous and needs-oriented. In particular, we shall project the decreases implied under the four previous headings. We shall also postulate, however, that certain types of economic interdependence - and especially those which contribute to self-reliant development in Third World countries - will continue to grow; and that more people in all countries will continue to have better opportunities for educational and recreational travel, and better access to global communications.

Some preliminary numerical figuring has been done. It suggests that these five headings may provide a broad enough coverage, but not so broad as to be unmanageably complex, for a useful pilot study.

The scenario, or postulated path of development, generated in this way will help to clarify many questions: for example, does Britain have enough land for "another development"? It will help to identify many decisions, initiatives and policy changes that will facilitate "another development". It will raise important questions about other areas of activity such as transport, health and education. In short, this pilot project could be the first stage in the development of an action-oriented economic model of "another Britain".

The practicalities of this pilot project will now be explored, including its funding.

4. CLUSTERS OF ISSUES

Important aspects of "another Britain" are emerging from many different areas of interest, including: environmentalism, world development, peace and disarmament, community politics, humanistic psychology, appropriate technology, sex equality, and alternative approaches to work, health, education, economic organisation, agriculture, communications and religion. If activists in these fields can tap the potential synergy between them, "another development" will rapidly gather momentum. A useful strategic task is, therefore, to identify the potential synergy in particular clusters of issues.
One important cluster of issues, with which I shall continue to be
directly involved, surrounds the future of work (and leisure) and
education. They are closely linked with a third set of issues
concerning the future of money.

Work (and Leisure)

The negative prospect of continuing high unemployment and the
positive demand for more meaningful work are combining to generate
momentum for "another development" in the following ways.

(1) Creating Jobs. Priority will continue to shift from
centralised capital-intensive development towards decentralised
employment-intensive development. To take three examples, (a) government could adopt policies favouring
energy conservation as opposed to the construction of
new power stations; (b) industry could adopt strategies favouring durable, repairable, recyclable products; and
(c) local government could assume more responsibility for
local employment. Systematic examination is now needed
of every sector of the economy, to identify job-creating
possibilities such as these and the action required to
realise them.

(2) Saving Jobs. Priority may also be starting to shift from
redundancy-creating development to skill-utilising develop-
ment. In effect, this has been proposed by the Lucas
Aerospace shopstewards in their campaign for the right to
work on socially useful products. (6) Again, the scope
for redeploying existing skills to socially useful work
needs to be examined throughout the economy.

(3) Sharing Jobs. Part-time employment and work-sharing
(e.g. by earlier retirement, more sabbaticals, longer
holidays, a shorter working week, more part-time jobs)
will become more common. Here too, in a multitude of
specific employment situations, the practical possibilities
need to be systematically examined.

(4) Paradigm Shift. As the dominant "industrial" paradigm
of work as a full-time job gives way to a "post-industrial"
paradigm of work as socially useful, personally fulfilling,
self-defined occupation, important questions will have
to be answered. What psychological factors will ease
(and impede) a radical revaluation of paid and unpaid work
as sources of self-esteem and social esteem? How could
this revaluation be facilitated by new transfer payments
systems? How will it relate to the demand for greater
sex equality as regards work? How will it affect children
and the elderly, currently defined as pre-employed and
post-employed? How will it affect leisure activities,
expenditure on leisure, and the distinction between
leisure and work?

As the questions raised about the future of work under these four
headings are explored further, they will interact on one another. They will also interact powerfully with questions about the future of education and money.

Education

"Another Britain" will involve significant changes in education, comparable to those envisaged for work. These changes will be stimulated by increasing dissatisfaction with the present education system. Education will come to be seen as the process of acquiring, not paper qualifications as now, but skills and experience—physical, manual, mental, psychological and interpersonal—which can help people to do useful and rewarding work (paid or unpaid), and to discover, develop and fulfil themselves as persons. It will be seen as a permanent aspect of life, with the positively integrating role of bringing together home and work, men and women, young and old—not compartmentalising them as at present. It will be seen as a process of liberation from dependence on other people and institutions, including dependence on teachers and educational institutions. The following are among the changes envisaged.

(1) Institutional. Further decentralisation and democratisation of educational institutions.

(2) Content. Syllabus changes in tune with the principles of "another development", for example giving greater emphasis to local issues and interests, co-operative self-reliance, humanistic psychology, environmentalism, planetary citizenship, alternative futures, appropriate technology, sex equality, and other people-centred subjects.

(3) Variety. A greater plurality of educational forms, including "free" schools, education "otherwise" (i.e. at home), and various types of special or alternative schools and colleges. In particular, informal teaching arrangements and "skills exchange" networks will continue to develop outside the formal economic and educational systems. The growing desire to learn from experienced practitioners (rather than from professional educators), and the growing demand for life-long learning, may tend to downgrade the role of educational institutions like universities and schools.

(4) Technology. The liberatory potential of technology will accelerate "another development" in education. Aids to learning, such as computers and computer terminals, television, and all kinds of audio-visual and communications equipment, will enable learners to be more self-directed. Information technology will become an increasingly important form of equipment in households and neighbourhood centres, helping individuals and local communities to be more self-reliant in creating their own living culture and entertainment.
Excessive dependence on money is one of the main obstacles to "another development" in work and education - and in other fields also. More democratic, local and personal control of how money is spent will be one feature of "another Britain". Another will be a lower throughput of money, i.e. less expenditure and less income, for a better quality of life - at the household, corporate, governmental, and national (i.e. balance of payments) levels alike. The following are among the changes envisaged.

1. **Decentralisation** of taxation, banking and other financial activities, with a consequent decentralisation of investment decisions in the public and private sectors.

2. **Democratisation** of decision-making in financial institutions like pension funds and insurance companies, so that investment managers become more accountable to people affected by their decisions.

3. **Creation of New Financial Institutions** - such as local enterprise trusts, appropriate technology investment trusts, ecological land bonds, etc. - which will enable people to invest their money in the particular aspects of "another development" that interest them most, and so to use their money to help to create the kind of future they want.

4. **Reduction of Indebtedness** and of today's increasing financial commitments (mortgages, hire purchase, credit cards, pension contributions, insurance policies, etc.), which help to keep people's noses to the grindstone of paid employment.

5. **New Government Policies on Taxation and Public Expenditure**, which will enable people to reduce their dependence on money incomes. Examples may include:
   a) incentives (comparable to tax allowances and investment subsidies for companies) to encourage households and neighbourhoods to invest in productive tools and equipment;
   b) an extension of today's unemployment benefits, so that more people can opt for unpaid work if they so wish;
   c) public expenditure on housing with land and workshop facilities attached, so that the occupants can be less dependent on the formal (monetised) economy for goods and services and for work.

The development of a model of monetary flows to simulate the possible impact of these changes - on patterns of household income and expenditure, corporate income and expenditure, public finance,
and the balance of payments - will make it possible to explore the financial aspects of "another Britain". This model will link with the economic model of "another Britain" suggested at the end of Section 3 above. It will thus help to illuminate the possible interactions between some of the most significant new trends, as the demand (and supply) for jobs, for money, and for purchased goods and services flattens out and then declines, (8) and as education focusses increasingly on preparing people for fulfilling work, useful unemployment, and productive leisure.

Other Examples

Here are two other examples (among many) where the exploration of clusters of issues is helping to unlock the gates to an alternative path of development in Britain. First, a project on "Appropriate Technology for the UK" (5) has been exploring:

(a) new procedures for "technology choice" in government and industry, which would encourage the development and use of "humane", "conserver" and "liberatory" technologies;
(b) the establishment of "local enterprise trusts" to stimulate local economic activity and employment; and
(c) other measures to encourage small businesses, including co-operatives.

Second, the Unit for the Study of Health Policy (10) has been exploring the negative relationships between:

(a) health and conventional economic growth,
(b) health and commercial advertising,
(c) health and the media coverage given to high technology medicine compared with coverage given to public health.

5. SOME UNDERLYING QUESTIONS

Increasing interest has been shown in the last few years, both among laypeople and among the specialists chiefly concerned, in all the issues covered in this report. A number of underlying questions often emerge in discussion. These need to be widely debated and clarified, on the following lines.

The Dynamics of Social Transformation

To change the dominant direction of Britain's development will require a transformation - a post-industrial revolution. How will this come about?

It will not be brought about by conventional types of action aimed either on the one hand at political, economic and social reform (or revolution) or on the other hand at personal change and personal growth. It will come about as more and more people - for negative or positive reasons or a mixture of both - change the direction of their lives and their work in ways that facilitate a social transformation. Hence the key importance of "transformation roles" (see page 2 above).

More specifically, the post-industrial revolution will not emerge from organised conflict between classes of citizens, nor will it
be brought about through the agency of the state. In countries like Britain today neither that conflict nor that agency can initiate social transformation as they could in Marx's time. Nonetheless, Marxist insights do illuminate crucial aspects of the post-industrial revolution: for example, the dialectical features of the conflict between the HE and the SHE visions of post-industrialism; the dynamic of breakdown and breakthrough; and the objective and subjective conditions required for the post-industrial revolution.

The Politics and Economics of "Another Britain"

The practice and theory of "another development" in politics - i.e. self-reliant, participatory democracy - are underdeveloped in a Britain still dominated by traditions of representative, centralised government and uni-dimensional ("flat earth") perceptions of a Left/Right political spectrum. Thus, although "another development" embraces both the decentralist co-operative strand in socialism and the decentralist self-reliant strand in conservatism, it is neither socialist nor capitalist, Labour nor Conservative. The Peace People, emerging from the bankruptcy of conventional politics in Northern Ireland, are probably the best existing model for "another politics". (11)

In spite of E.F. Schumacher's pioneering work on economics as if people mattered, alternative economics is also underdeveloped in Britain. The various post-Keynesian schools now fashionable - monetarism, state planning, protectionism - are blind to the possibility of "another development". But, as half a century ago, the urgent challenge of continuing high unemployment is again likely to provide the spur to the next breakthrough in economic thought, and thus to a theoretical basis for "another economics".

"Another Development" in One Country

Could Britain go it alone? Or must "another development" be international in scope?

In principle, people in one country could pioneer "another development" without international agreement. In practice, this might involve economic risks which many people in Britain today would think unacceptable. Moreover, it would be impeded by existing international arrangements, such as membership of the EEC. These practicalities need to be examined in detail, in the context outlined in Sections 3 and 4 above.

However, if "another development" is good for Britain, it will also be good for other industrialised countries. In fact, people in all these countries are already turning towards "voluntary simplicity". So, in practice, the risk of going it alone may not prove so serious as it looks at first sight. An international movement for "another development" is already emerging.
Peace, Disarmament and "Another Development"

Will "another development" help to promote peace and disarmament? Or will it, by weakening Britain's military strength, make its people vulnerable to external aggression? Are world-wide peace and disarmament pre-conditions of "another development"?

"Another development" will certainly involve a reduction in the armaments industry and the arms trade. So, if more and more countries adopt it, it will contribute to international disarmament. That will not only release resources for peaceful purposes, but also offers the best prospect of international security in the long term. In the short term, however, "another development" in one country could make it more vulnerable to military aggression, and might help to destabilise the international balance of terror. Ways must be found of countering this fear. The risk could be somewhat reduced by "another development" in defence - i.e. the creation of a self-reliant, locally based, non-violent, defensive capability. The risk must, in any event, be compared with the risks inherent in a business-as-usual approach to the international arms race.

The disarmament lobby and the peace movement have made little headway in Britain in recent years. This is partly because they have not squarely faced people's genuine fears; and it is partly because disarmament and peace have come to be regarded as matters of specialist interest. There is a great need now to clarify the links between development and peace, in terms which non-experts can discuss. (12)

The Role of Corporate Elites

It is easy to see how industrial, financial, trade union, professional and government leaders in industrialised countries - working through international companies, banks, trade unions, professional bodies, associations like the Trilateral Commission, and government organisations like OECD and EEC - could try to develop a system of global management (a corporate world order), aimed at maintaining the conventional trajectory of economic development and the conventional balance of power between industrialised and Third World countries. It is not so easy to imagine how these leaders could contribute effectively to "another development". The answer is: by decolonising their institutions, by giving their power away, and by enabling people now dependent on these institutions (as customers, employees, citizens, etc.) to become more self-reliant.

My recent experience suggests that an increasing number of senior business people in Britain - though they may not like the idea of "decolonisation" for its own sake - are now prepared to examine its implications for new products, new services, and new marketing, personnel, and public relations strategies. More recently, a few forward-looking trade unionists have begun to recognise the need for radically new approaches to employment and work. Politicians, though privately worried by the evident bankruptcy
of conventional policies, still feel unable to confess that alternatives to full employment and economic growth should be examined. Senior civil servants are similarly constrained by their perceptions of the feasible. Bankers and financiers are still unaware that "another development" is on the agenda. The question is: how can these corporate elites be encouraged to explore the practicalities of "decolonisation"?

6. IN CONCLUSION

As I said in Section 2, many recent initiatives point towards "another Britain". (Two examples are Turning Point(13) and the Parliamentary Liaison Group for Alternative Energy Strategies(14).) Their numbers and significance will grow, as the conventional paths of progress become increasingly blocked. I have suggested some strategies for encouraging them. Here are a few more:

(a) commission opinion surveys which stimulate public interest in the idea of "another Britain";

(b) publish social fiction(15) about life in "another Britain";

(c) persuade the media(16) to take "another development" seriously;

(d) persuade more grant-giving foundations(17) to do the same;

(e) introduce the concepts of "another development" into management education(18);

(f) develop new legal structures for decentralised business and community enterprises(19);

(g) explore the links between "another development" and a more familial society(20);

(h) stimulate parliamentary interest in alternative futures(21);

(i) press for decentralisation of the media(22) and government, as well as of industry and finance;

(j) mobilise consumer support for "another development";

(k) promote alternative policy studies (research programmes, conferences, journal, centres).

My further action now will be:

(1) immediately, to pursue the specific suggestions for a pilot study and monetary model in Sections 3 and 4;

(2) more generally, in the context of "Changing Direction", to stimulate further discussion and exploration of "another development" as outlined in this report;
(3) to continue to facilitate networking contacts, nationally and internationally, on various aspects of "another Britain";

(4) in the longer term, to consider whether to participate in setting up a centre to develop strategies for "another Britain".

I look forward to co-operating with members of the IFDA network (and with others) on these activities and on complementary activities of theirs.

NOTES

(1) Many of the persons named in the following notes gave valuable help for which I am very grateful. This does not necessarily imply that they agree with what is said.

(2) "The Sane Alternative: Signposts to a Self-Fulfilling Future" is obtainable from the author at 7 St. Ann's Villas, London W11 4RU, England. (Price: UK only - £1.95 post-free; outside UK - $5.00 + 75c surface mail or $2.50 air mail).

(3) "Changing Direction" is a project embracing much of the author's current work.

(4) David Hall and Tom Hancock (Town and Country Planning Association, 17 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AS, England) have given valuable information and advice on this aspect of "another development".

(5) John Davis (10 Grenfell Road, Beaconsfield, Bucks, England) in particular provided useful figures. His project for the Intermediate Technology Development Group on "Appropriate Technology for the UK" is a vital contribution to "another development" for Britain.

(6) CAITS is the best source of information about this campaign (contact: Mike George, Centre for Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems, North East London Polytechnic, Longbridge Road, Dagenham, Essex RM8 2AS, England).

(7) John Turner (30 Greenwood Road, Hackney, London E8, England) author of "Housing By People", is also preparing a contribution to the IFDA Dossier.

(8) Bill Martin (Leisure Consultants, Lint Growis, Foxearth, Sudbury, Suffolk, England) suggests that a model might show a series of negative multipliers in the economic sense and positive multipliers in a social wellbeing sense.

(9) Rodney Stares (9 Oxford Square, Watchfield, Nr. Swindon, Wilts, England) has valuable practical experience of setting up a Local Enterprise Trust.

(10) Contact: Peter Draper, Unit for the Study of Health Policy, Dept. of Community Medicine, Guy's Hospital Medical School, 8 Newcomen Street, London SE1 1YR, England).
(11) Contact: Ciaran McKeown, Peace People (Fredheim, 224 Lisburn Road, Belfast 9, Northern Ireland).

(12) The East/West Peace People (contact: Peter Cadogan, 1 Hampstead Hill Gardens, London NW3, England) are well aware of the importance which the Northern Ireland Peace People place on their community development activities.


(14) Contact: Renee-Marie Croose Parry (81 Onslow Square, London SW7 3LT, England).

(15) The International Foundation for Social Innovation (5 Rue d'Alger, 75001 Paris, France) are using social fiction as a means of clarifying possible futures.

(16) The "Alternatives" column of The Guardian is a recent breakthrough. Harford Thomas (82 Hillway, London N6, England) founded it and continues to write regularly in it.

(17) In "Trusts In A Time Of Change" Wallis Johnson (Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Beverley House, Shipton Road, York Y03 6RB, England) refers to Britain's role in "another development".

(18) The following are among those already active or interested:
   Prof. Gurth Higgin (University of Technology, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, England).
   Prof. John Morris (Manchester Business School, Booth Street West, Manchester M15 6PB, England).
   Prof. Charles Handy (St. George's House, Windsor Castle, Berkshire SL4, England).
   Ronnie Lessem, City University, Graduate Business Centre, 23 Goswell Road, London EC1M 7BB, England).
   Philip Sadler, Ashridge Management College, Berkhamsted, Herts HP4 1NS, England).

(19) A good example is the Scott Bader Commonwealth (Wollaston, Wellingborough, Northamptonshire NN9 7RL, England) - contact: Godric Bader or David Rally.

(20) A Canadian example is the work of the Vanier Institute of the Family (151 Slater Street, Ottawa K1P 5H3, Ontario, Canada) - contact: Bill Dyson.

(21) A U.S. example is the Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future (722 House Annex, Washington, DC 20515, USA) - contact: Anne Cheatham.

(22) This is the aim of Community Communications (contact: Simon Partridge, 92 Huddleston Road, London N7, England).

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MATÉRIAUX

DE L’AVENIR DES RELATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES

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Dakar, Sénégal (Langue originale: Français)

ON THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Abstract: The paper analyses the concept of the new international economic order (NIEO) on its way to failure. The ambiguities of the NIEO are discussed and brought into relation with the present stalemate in the negotiations on the Common Fund and the Code of Conduct for transfer of technology, and with the apparent exhaustion of the development offensive of the Third World. The deeper causes of the stalemate—in particular the prolonged contemporary crisis in the international division of labour and its inherent structural contradictions—are analysed in a historical perspective based on the evolution of European imperialistic expansion since the 19th century, the emergence of socialist states in the 20th century and their differentiation in the recent past. In discussing possibilities beyond the NIEO the author predicts that either the forces of global monopolistic capitalism will overcome the present resistance, both in the North and the South, and will achieve an international division of labour in their own way, or that the active groups and states of the Third World will continue to resist and to work towards a new order. The prospects of setting up a common Third World front to achieve, for instance, revisions in the international division of labour, are at present limited. The question of technology, particularly the technology of whole productive systems controlled by monopolies (e.g., turn-key plants), is a key variable in the on-going process of transformation. The present crisis of the NIEO can be interpreted either as a stage of development of capitalist expansion or as a crisis leading to a transition to socialism. The author concludes that, in reality, a new wave of Third World populism and of popular struggles can be predicted.

Sobre el porvenir de las relaciones económicas internacionales

Resumen: El informe analiza el concepto de Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional (NOEI) que está en camino de fracaso. Se habla de las ambigüedades del NOEI y éstas se ponen en relación con el actual estado de las tablas en que se conducen las negociaciones sobre el Fondo Común y el Código de Conducta para el traslado de tecnología, y en relación con el agotamiento aparente de la ofensiva del Tercer Mundo para el desarrollo. Las razones más profundas que determinan esas tablas—especialmente la crisis contemporánea prolongada en la división internacional del trabajo—son analizadas en su perspectiva histórica basada en la evolución de la expansión imperialista europea desde el siglo XIX, la emergencia de los estados socialistas del siglo XX y su diferenciación en el pasado reciente. Hablando de posibilidades más allá del NOEI el autor pronostica que o las fuerzas del capitalismo global monopolista superarán la resistencia actual tanto en las sociedades del Norte como en las del Sur y lograrán una división del trabajo a su manera, o los grupos y estados del Tercer Mundo presentemente activos continuarán a resistir y a trabajar para alcanzar un nuevo orden. Nota que las probabilidades que el Tercer Mundo monte una frente común para obtener, por ejemplo, revisiones de la presente división internacional del trabajo son limitadas.

/cont. pg.16
Samir Amin

DE L'AVENIR DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES

La faillite du Nouvel Ordre Economique International (NOEI) n'est peut-être pas encore consommée. Mais à quelques semaines de la 5e session de la CNUCED, qui se tiendra à Manille en mai 1979, peut-on prétendre que dans un seul domaine la mise en œuvre de la Charte solennellement adoptée par l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies en 1974 ait enregistré un progrès quelconque ? Simultanément peut-on aujourd'hui continuer à affirmer que ce qui unit les pays du Tiers Monde l'emporte sur ce qui les divise ? Que peut signifier non-allignment lorsque les superpuissances interviennent ici et là à l'appel même des pays du Tiers Monde dressés les uns contre les autres ? A quelques mois du sommet des Non-alignés, prévu pour l'été 1979, le Tiers Monde n'est-il pas simplement menacé de cesser d'exister ?

La faillite de la stratégie dite du NOEI et la décomposition du Tiers Monde ne sauraient néanmoins faire oublier la persistance de la crise et le développement de bouleversements réels dans les relations entre l'Ouest et l'Est (bloc soviétique et Chine). La description de l'échec des "négociations" Nord-Sud ne suffit donc pas. Et l'analyse impose que l'on replace les évolutions dans ce domaine dans leurs rapports avec celles qui caractérisent le système mondial dans son ensemble, aux plans politique et économique.

Les objectifs du NOEI constituaient un programme cohérent répondant aux aspirations des États du Tiers Monde. La logique interne du programme - relèvement des prix des matières premières exportées par le Tiers Monde, nouveau souffle d'industrialisation d'exportation vers les pays industrialisés fondée sur la main-d'œuvre à bon marché et l'abondance des ressources naturelles, accélération du transfert des technologies et réduction de son coût - reflète le caractère contradictoire de l'accumulation du capital à l'échelle mondiale. D'une part en effet, ce programme s'inscrit d'emblée dans une perspective d'approfondissement de la division internationale du travail : par le relèvement du taux de la plus-value (la surexploitation de la force de travail à la périphérie) il permet le relèvement du taux du profit à l'échelle mondiale et apparaît donc comme un programme de développement capitaliste à cette échelle. Mais d'autre part, dans le cadre de cet objectif commun de développement capitaliste, les stratégies propres des monopoles et des États impérialistes et ceux des bourgeoisies et des États de la périphérie entrent en contradiction.

Les monopoles impérialistes ont une interprétation limitée du "nouvel ordre". Il s'agit pour eux de tirer davantage profit de la main-d'œuvre à bon marché et des ressources naturelles du Tiers Monde par la délocalisation de segments des processus productifs qu'ils contrôlent. Dans cette stratégie la délocalisation ne vise nullement à la création d'économies industrielles nationales intégrées dans le Tiers Monde, fussent-elles ouvertes sur l'extérieur. Au contraire l'intérêt des monopoles est d'exporter des segments non articulés les uns aux autres de manière à conserver le contrôle de "l'ensemble de la vie économique à l'échelle mondiale". Dans ce cadre les monopoles peuvent faire des concessions mineures aux "pays hôtes", voire même, dans les cas extrêmes, renoncer à la propriété formelle du capital. La concurrence entre ceux-ci, l'absence d'intégration des segments
transférés, leur dépendance technologique comme celle découlant de l'obligation d'exporter les produits sur les marchés métropolitains contrôlés par les monopoles, réduisit le contenu de la propriété formelle du capital car tout cela permet aux monopoles d'imposer à leurs partenaires des conditions contraignantes à l'extrême. C'est le "laissez-faire" à l'échelle d'un monde dominé par les monopoles. Dans ces conditions le financement même de cette délocalisation par des moyens propres des pays du Tiers Monde serait bénéfique supplémentaire pour les monopoles vendeurs d'usines "clés en mains". Cette ponction opérée à leur profit est en effet "intégrée" dans la structure des prix. La ponction peut, au demeurant, s'enfler de transferts financiers visibles au titre des ventes de techniques, brevets et marques commerciales, comme à celui des intérêts des prêts octroyés pour soutenir l'expansion des unités. Parfois même les structures de prix sont déformées dans un sens qui enlève aux segments transférés leur rentabilité apparente : les prêts destinés alors à combler "les déficits de gestion" ne sont rien d'autre que des formes de résurrection de l'éternelle tendance du capital au pillage. Un néocapital financier, à l'image du vieux capital mercantiliste, apparaît à nouveau, comme à l'aube du capitalisme : l'accumulation "primitive" est permanente.

Cette stratégie a un nom - et ce n'est pas un hasard - le "redéploiement". Activement soutenue par la Banque Mondiale, le FMI et les autres instances de l'organisation des États capitalistes industrialisés, elle fait passer pour un "nouvel ordre" la multiplication de nouvelles enclaves - les "zones franches". Évidemment cette stratégie réduit au minimum le rôle de l'État local, consigné dans les fonctions d'une administration chargée simplement de la police de la force de travail exploitée. Elle vise aussi à diviser le Tiers Monde, non seulement en accentuant l'écart entre pays à "croissance forte" et "pays stagnants", mais encore en mettant en concurrence entre eux les premiers.

Ce que les pays du Tiers Monde, tout au moins le groupe moteur parmi les non-alignés, entendent par nouvel ordre international est passablement différent. La révision de la division internationale du travail dans le sens indiqué est censée accompagner et renforcer la mise en place d'une économie nationale, auto-centrée et industrielle.

Le renforcement de l'État national et l'intervention active de la politique d'État devaient garantir, dans cette stratégie, que l'industrie ne sera pas constituée d'unités désarticulées, mais que des filières entières du processus productif seront mis en place. Le recours à l'importation des éléments de ces chaînes intégrées (séries d'usines achetées "clés en mains") implique un niveau élevé d'exportation, tant de matières premières "traditionnelles" que de produits industriels nouveaux. Le succès de la stratégie dépend donc, dans une large mesure, de la capacité d'obtenir les concessions qui constituent le programme du nouvel ordre économique international.

L'opposition de ces deux "interprétations" du nouvel ordre est apparue dans toutes les négociations concernant la division internationale industrielle du travail et la "délocalisation". Les points débattus concernent la nature et le choix des implantations, le degré de décentralisation des décisions, les modalités du financement et des transferts, les questions de formation de personnel et de gestion, l'ouverture des marchés extérieurs. Les États du Tiers Monde insistent généralement sur l'implantation d'industries aussi complètes que possibles, connectées
en aval et en amont les unes aux autres, la définition de règles d'accord permettant de soumettre la gestion des unités industrielles aux politiques industrielles d'État, le choix pour la gestion des unités de cadres nationaux, l'ouverture des réseaux internationaux de distribution des produits manufacturés aux entreprises délocalisées (l'abaissement des barrières protectionnistes des pays industrialisés étant jugé insuffisant pour permettre la pénétration sur ces marchés), le soutien à la recherche technologique nationale, la réglementation des modalités de financement (pour éviter par exemple qu'en définitive la filiale d'une transnationale ne finance ses investissements par l'appel aux moyens bancaires locaux sans faire entrer de capitaux neufs), la réglementation des transferts (partage des risques, plafonds de profits exportables, obligations d'investir dans l'économie nationale une fraction de ceux-ci), etc.

Ces "exigences" ont toujours été jugées inacceptables par les transnationales, intéressées seulement par la délocalisation partielle par le moyen de filiales pratiquement contrôlées par elles. À la limite la négociation elle-même perd son sens. Or, progressivement la majorité des États du Tiers Monde s'est alignée de fait sur la stratégie du redéploiement. Ne sont en position de négocier que les États qui refusent l'implantation directe des filiales et cherchent à lui substituer l'achat d'usines "clés en mains" dans le cadre d'un programme global d'industrialisation.

La stratégie de ces États comptait sur la possibilité de modifier favorablement l'ordre international par des actions combinées, certaines unilatérales, d'autres obtenues par voie de négociations collectives d'États à États (Nord-Sud). L'idée était, on doit s'en souvenir, d'organiser des cartels de producteurs du Tiers Monde qui seraient parvenus à imposer des révisions des prix des matières premières. Le contrôle national des ressources naturelles devait permettre non seulement d'agir sur l'offre, mais aussi et surtout de mettre en œuvre une politique d'exploitation de ces ressources qui tienne compte des intérêts nationaux à long terme et mette un terme aux rythmes d'exploitation commandés exclusivement par les besoins du monde développé. Renforcés de la sorte, les pays du Tiers Monde espéraient disposer d'un pouvoir de négociation véritable qui devait contraindre le Nord à faire des concessions : ouverture de ses marchés, code de conduite en matière de transferts de technologie, etc. La coopération entre pays du Tiers Monde ("l'autonomie collective", "collective self-reliance") s'inscrivait dans cette perspective pour la renforcer.

**Le bilan des négociations**

Or, le bilan des négociations ouvertes depuis la crise pétrolière de 1973 et l'adoption de la charte du NOEI en 1974 est en fait négatif.

Au projet d'origine de cartels de producteurs ayant recouvré le contrôle de leurs ressources naturelles la négociation au sein de la CNUCED a substitué un "programme intégré" portant sur 18 matières premières et l'établissement d'un Fonds commun de stabilisation. Or, aucune négociation pour ces matières premières n'a abouti jusqu'à présent, tandis que les ordres de grandeurs qui sont en discussion pour le capital du Fonds commun sont bien en dessous de niveau requis pour donner un sens à l'opération. Chemin faisant, l'idée d'indexation des prix des matières premières a été évidemment abandonnées. Parallèlement, des concessions mineures faites à
certains (comme le système Stabex en faveur des signataires des conventions de Lomé) permettent de retarder des concessions plus substantielles au bénéfice de l'ensemble du Tiers Monde.

A l'objectif que les pays du Tiers Monde s'étaient fixé à Lima - 25% de la production et du commerce mondial des produits manufacturés à l'horizon 2000 - on a substitué progressivement un programme douteux de "libéralisme commercial à l'échelle mondiale" accompagnant des délocalisations partielles dans le cadre du redéploiement des transnationales. Mais là encore on ne peut même pas dire que ce programme soit mis en œuvre sérieusement, ni par les transnationales elles-mêmes, ni par les États industrialisés (voir les mesures protectionnistes prises dans le domaine des textiles par exemple).

Dans le domaine des transferts financiers, lassé de l'échec des apports extérieurs (on se souviendra qu'à l'origine l'objectif était de transférer 1% du PNB; que chaque année on s'éloigne un peu davantage de cet objectif; et que "qualitativement" l'aide a beaucoup déçu), le Tiers Monde était passé à l'offensive en prenant position sur la réforme du système monétaire international, et en proposant à cet effet la création de nouvelles unités de paiements internationales basées sur les produits de base et l'élaboration de règles permettant de soutenir les efforts de développement en établissant un "lien" entre l'émission de ces liquidités nouvelles et les besoins des pays du Tiers Monde. Il s'agissait sans doute de projets utopiques.

Toujours est-il que l'offensive du Tiers Monde dans ces directions s'est essoufflée. Progressivement le centre de gravité des préoccupations s'est déplacé vers la question de la dette, qui divise le Tiers Monde. Simultanément, lorsqu'un pays du Tiers Monde ne parvient plus à supporter le poids de la dette, le FMI et les pays créanciers se retrouvent pour lui imposer, à travers une véritable mise en tutelle de la victime qui rappelle les protectorats établis au XIXe siècle en Orient et en Amérique latine, des politiques qui sans exception ni nuance sacrifient globalement le développement à l'équilibre extérieur, en frappant plus particulièrement les travailleurs et les couches les plus défavorisées, en dépit du discours sur les "besoins de base".

Dans le domaine des "transferts de technologie" on sait que l'idée d'un "code de conduite" légalement contraignant a été rejeté par les partenaires industrialisés. Dans d'autres domaines, comme le droit de la mer par exemple, les aspirations du Tiers Monde ont été traitées avec le plus grand mépris.

On pourrait allonger indéfiniment la liste des échecs et des déceptions. Simultanément, on pourrait s'interroger du rythme des "thèmes nouveaux" proposés au rythme accéléré de la mode, le plus souvent ambigus et qui, de ce fait, peuvent être soupçonnés d'être des manoeuvres de diversion. "Population", "Environnement", "priorité aux besoins de base", "priorité à l'emploi", "redistribution du revenu", "technologies intermédiaires ou appropriées", "coopération entre pays en voie de développement", "sciences et technologies au service du développement" se succèdent et se substituent à l'absence de changements dans le monde réel des relations internationales.
Les causes de l'échec

Au-delà du constat d'échec, il reste à en analyser les causes. Sont-elles purement circonstancielles (la crise économique) ? Peuvent-elles être attribuées aux "erreurs de tactique" du Tiers Monde (divisions et faiblesses de celui-ci) ? Ou bien ces circonstances et ces faiblesses expriment-elles l'impossibilité d'un développement auto-centré dans la périphérie du système capitaliste contemporain ?

Sans doute la crise, que nous croyons être principalement une crise structurelle de la division internationale du travail (DIT), est-elle tenace, comme en témoigne l'échec des politiques conjoncturelles, "classiques" (monétaires) ou néo-keynésiennes. La crise, amorcée dès le milieu des années 60 dans le champ des relations interimpérialistes par l'effondrement du système monétaire de Bretton Woods, est maintenant sortie de ce cadre pour frapper de plein fouet la vie économique et les systèmes de production.

Il n'est pas possible de "prévoir" l'évolution de la crise qui porte en elle des possibilités contradictoires. L'ensemble des luttes qui l'accompagnent peut en effet conduire à une rupture du marché international intégré qui a caractérisé - avec l'hégémonie des Etats-Unis - le système mondial du dernier quart de siècle.

Les ruptures dans le système monétaire international, les mesures protectionnistes - même limitées -, le renouvellement de "préférences impériales" se substituant au "libéralisme sans rivages" (par exemple les accords de Lomé entre l'Europe et les pays de l'A.C.P.), rappellent que des "repliements impériaux" analogues à ceux qui ont suivi la crise des années 30 ne sont pas impossibles. Il va sans dire que la répétition d'un krach financier global pourrait déclencher une évolution de ce genre. Or, la base pour un krach de ce genre n'existe-t-elle pas dans l'endettement des Etats du Tiers Monde et de l'Est ?

Force est cependant de constater que, dans l'immédiat, les réactions des centres capitalistes vont en sens inverse. Le réalignement des impérialismes seconds sur l'impérialisme américain hégémonique est une réalité dont témoignent de nombreux faits : les efforts conjugués déployés pour maintenir un système de paiements multilatéraux fondé de facto sur le dollar (en dépit des progrès de la coordination monétaire européenne - le Fonds Monétaire Européen pouvant devenir une pièce d'un ensemble préservant l'hégémonie des Etats-Unis), le choix européen lui-même qui, avec les "stabilisations" en France, au Portugal, en Espagne et en Grèce, renforce l'hégémonie allemande, jusqu'ici courroie de transmission de celle des Etats-Unis. Le mouvement ouvrier lui-même ne tend-il pas à placer l'accent sur la stabilité monétaire, fût-ce au détriment de l'emploi et de l'unité de la classe ouvrière (en sacrifiant les intérêts de la fraction des travailleurs "non-intégrés" - émigrés, jeunes, femmes - frappés davantage par le chômage, à ceux de l'"aristocratie ouvrière" qui ne souffre que de l'inflation ? Cette tendance ne renforce-t-elle pas le réalignement ? Evidemment il reste à savoir si le réalignement actuel est durable, c'est-à-dire si le marché mondial a la capacité de résister tant au plan politique qu'économique à une crise longue.

Or, il faut replacer le refus de concessions au Tiers Monde dans ce cadre.
Les tendances effectives qui opèrent dans le champ de la délocalisation doivent être analysées dans ce cadre, en rapport étroit avec la question de la circulation mondiale du capital (et donc de la dette).

En effet, la période actuelle est caractérisée par une grande abondance de capitaux disponibles pour des raisons multiples : ralentissement de la croissance et des investissements dans de nombreux secteurs (en particulier dans les zones non monopolisées de l'économie) parallèle au maintien de profits élevés dans le secteur des monopoles, d'où l'excédent des liquidités des transnationales ; émission inflationniste dans les pays industrialisés ; recyclage des fonds pétroliers, etc. Or, les transnationales industrielles et financières sont en position privilégiée pour faire circuler ces capitaux à l'échelle mondiale, au mépris, s'il le faut, des politiques d'État. À la fois cause et effet des fluctuations spéculatives des changes, ces liquidités ont largement trouvé leur voie dans le placement auprès des États, de l'Est et du Sud.

Il faut ici distinguer l'endettement des pays de l'Est de celui des États du Tiers Monde. En effet, les capitaux prêtés aux pays de l'Est, même s'ils proviennent de consortia privés avec l'aval des gouvernements, contribuent certainement à l'accélération de l'industrialisation de ces pays et invitent à ré-intégrer cette industrialisation dans les échanges mondiaux (ne serait-ce que pour assurer le service de la dette). Par contre, dans les pays du Tiers Monde, c'est seulement une fraction mineure de cet endettement qui soutient directement l'industrie. En fait, les exportations industrielles du Sud ont très peu progressé - à l'exception de celles de quatre pays : la Corée du Sud, Taïwan, Singapour, Hong Kong. La majeure fraction de l'endettement, en provenance ici aussi de consortia privés, est employée à payer les importations courantes et à sustenir les appareils d'État en difficulté.

Sans doute devrait-on nuancer cette opposition. Après tout l'accès des pays de l'Est au marché financier occidental allège la ponction qu'ils opèrent sur leur revenu au profit des dépenses militaires. Il reste que par leur nature politique les systèmes à l'Est et au Sud sont trop différents pour que l'on puisse négliger de voir que les effets de l'endettement extérieur n'y sont pas analogues.

Doit-on se poser la question relative à cette "résurgence du capital financier"? Celle-ci doit-elle conduire quand même finalement à l'accélération de l'industrialisation du Tiers Monde, l'investissement dans les industries d'exportation étant seulement retardé par la conjoncture ? Ou bien cette dette demeurerait un poids mort, dont le service apparaîtra, comme ce fut le cas au XIXe siècle, comme une ponction parasitaire supplémentaire sur le revenu ? Dans ce cas, le système apparait dans toute sa vulnérabilité : fondé sur une série d'équilibres fragiles résultant de la contradiction entre la mobilité des capitaux d'une part et leur immobilisation dans des emplois non liquides de facto d'autre part. La perspective d'un krach financier ne peut alors être exclue.

Les développements qui précèdent invitent à réfléchir sur les modifications réelles en cours dans les relations internationales, économiques et politiques.

Une statistique significative : entre 1974 et 1978, tandis que la production d'acier dans l'ensemble des pays capitalistes industrialisés diminuait de 36 millions de tonnes, elle augmentait du même volume dans les autres régions du
monde, principalement grâce à l'accroissement de la production des pays de l'Est (URSS, Pologne, Roumanie, Tchécoslovaquie) et de la Chine, et seulement dans une mesure accessoire par celle du Tiers Monde (et pratiquement cette contribution se limite à 5 pays : le Brésil, le Mexique, l'Inde, la Corée du Sud et Taïwan). Telle est la réalité : si les rapports économiques se modifient à l'échelle mondiale, c'est entre l'Ouest, l'Est et la Chine, non dans le champ des relations Nord-Sud.

Le développement de l'Est et de la Chine s'accompagne-t-il de leur volonté de réintégrer la division internationale du travail, comme il le semble ? Et à quelles conditions ? Les monopoles, qui dominent les sociétés de l'Ouest et du Sud vont-ils étendre leur domination à l'Est et à la Chine, comme certains le proclament ? Le système capitaliste va-t-il devenir à nouveau véritablement mondial, après avoir été un temps menacé par des constructions socialistes autarciques ?

**Perspective historique**

Les défenseurs de la stratégie du NOEI donnent des réponses positives rapides aux questions qui précèdent. Ils en tirent argument pour prétendre que la construction d'une économie nationale auto-centrée et la participation à la division internationale du travail ne sont pas incompatibles. Si l'URSS et même la Chine, en dépit de la nature non capitalistes de leur économie, aspirent à s'intégrer dans les échanges mondiaux et même à traiter avec les transnationales, les États du Tiers Monde qui n'ont pas les avantages de ces pays-continents peuvent-ils envisager une autarcie absurde qui les condamnerait irrémédiablement à la stagnation ?

Qu'il soit possible de concilier l'intégration au système mondial et une stratégie de développement national, le NOEI devait le démontrer puisque la division internationale du travail devait s'ajuster aux exigences du développement national des pays du Tiers Monde.


L'expérience historique du développement ne plaidait-elle pas néanmoins contre les thèses du NOEI ? L'expérience historique des pays capitalistes industrialisés n'enseigne-t-elle pas que l'industrialisation et la mise en place d'une économie nationale ont toujours été réalisées en niant la division internationale
du travail, c'est-à-dire en cessant de s'y inscrire passivement conformément aux "avantages comparatifs" du moment ? C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi la construction d'une économie nationale a toujours impliqué une politique d'État. L'État-Nation de la bourgeoisie au XIXe siècle, de la France républicaine à l'Allemagne et au Japon impériaux, a été l'instrument indispensable de cette construction. Et, si celle-ci n'a pas été réalisée dans l'autarcie, il n'en demeure pas que les relations extérieures ont été soumises aux exigences de la construction interne. Souvent d'ailleurs ces relations extérieures, axées sur l'exploitation des périphéries, ont tout simplement accéléré les rythmes de l'accumulation interne (c'était le cas, notamment de l'Angleterre et de la France). Pour les pays venus plus tard, mais avant la période impérialiste - Allemagne, Italie, États-Unis, Japon, Autriche-Hongrie et Russie -, la construction auto-centrée a toujours impliqué le protectionnisme, le financement par l'État des infrastructures, une politique d'État d'organisation du système financier et monétaire, une politique d'État de transformations agraires visant à promouvoir le progrès de l'agriculture et l'autosuffisance alimentaire, etc. Bien que ces développements nationaux ne soient pas inscrits dans un cadre autarcique, il importe de signaler que les relations extérieures étaient toujours soumises à la logique de l'accumulation interne et à ses exigences et non l'inverse, comme il importe de souligner que toutes ces expériences, le Japon dernier en date, sont antérieures à la constitution du système impérialiste.

L'expérience historique des pays ayant rompu avec le capitalisme est encore plus évidente. Non seulement l'URSS et la Chine ont opéré des transformations sociales et économiques fondamentales, mais encore elles l'ont fait dans l'autarcie, une contrainte d'ailleurs imposée par le monde capitaliste. Même les petits pays de l'Europe de l'Est ont traversé une période pratiquement autarcique, à l'époque des plans stalinien des années 50, au cours de laquelle l'essentiel d'une structure économique nationale a été mis en place. Sans doute aujourd'hui ces pays paraissent-ils souhaiter s'intégrer davantage dans les échanges mondiaux.

Pour certains, c'est là l'aveu de leur faillite : échec de l'agriculture soviétique, échec d'une tentative d'industrialisation "originale" de la Chine. Ce raisonnement est court. Il passe sous silence le fait essentiel que, quelle que soit la nature des rapports de production qui caractérisent ces sociétés - socialistes ou non -, une économie nationale auto-centrée y a été mise en place.

Dans ces conditions ces pays ne se présentent pas sur le "marché mondial" en position de faiblesse, loin de là. Quelles que soient ses faiblesses l'URSS dispose de nombreux atouts : ressources naturelles, contrôle étatique de la production, capacité du système politique de prolonger l'isolement relatif du pays, enfin (et l'avantage n'est pas de moindre importance) puissance militaire planétaire. Quant à la Chine, il n'est pas dit qu'elle soit prête à accepter de passer sous les fourches caudines des monopoles, comme un vulgaire pays "sous-développé"; elle entendra sans doute conserver la maîtrise totale de ses relations extérieures.

Sans doute les relations au sein du "camp socialiste" ont-elles changé radicalement. L'Union soviétique a en effet choisi de tenter d'empêcher par tous les moyens la modernisation et l'industrialisation de la Chine et, ce, à notre avis, quel que soit la nature du système politique et social de ce pays qui, par sa seule taille s'imposerait comme un partenaire égal remettant en question le partage/lutte à l'échelle planétaire, entre les deux superpuissances actuelles (et c'est pourquoi,
à notre avis, toutes les tendances chinoises - de "droite" ou de "gauche" - seront nécessairement anti-russes).

Ce changement qui a consacré l'éclatement de l'ancien "système socialiste" agit aussi dans le sens d'une réintégration par la Chine du système des échanges économiques avec l'Ouest. Mais il en est de même, bien qu'à un degré moindre, en Europe orientale. Au sein du Comecon, l'URSS ne tente-t-elle pas d'imposer une spécialisation que certains membres jugent contraire à leur intérêt national ? La Roumanie, comme la Yougoslavie et l'Albanie dans des circonstances différentes, mais également la Hongrie et la Pologne, cherchent à préserver et à développer des structures industrielles nationales auto-centrées menacées à des degrés divers. Cependant, le contrepoids que ces pays peuvent chercher à trouver en accentuant leurs échanges avec l'Ouest ne jouera-t-il aussi comme un facteur supplémentaire pas en faveur d'une "réunification" du marché mondial ?

Une thèse qui extrapole jusqu'au bout ces tendances prétend que l'avenir verra ainsi l'unité du marché mondial rétablie. Ainsi dessine-t-on une large fresque historique présentant l'aspect d'un mouvement oscillatoire. L'unité du marché mondial, constituée au XIXe dans le cadre de l'hégémonie britannique (étalon sterling), menacée à partir de la fin du siècle par la montée des impérialistes rivaux, maintenue tant bien que mal jusqu'en 1914, a cessé d'exister pendant la "guerre germano-américaine de 30 ans pour la succession britannique" (1914-45), pour être rétablie dans l'après seconde guerre mondiale dans le cadre de l'hégémonie des Etats-Unis. Menacé un temps par la montée des pays de l'Est, ce marché serait néanmoins en voie de reconstitution. Cette fois le temps de l'oscillation serait plus rapide, parce que la distance qui sépare les pays de l'Est et la Chine de l'Océan ne leur permettrait pas de "jouer seuls", surtout dans la désunion. Ajoutons enfin que l'attitude des pays de l'Est à l'égard de ceux du Sud témoigne de la priorité donnée par les premiers au maintien d'un réseau d'échanges mondiaux multilatéraux.

Cependant, la perspective que les monopoles sont en voie d'étendre leur domination aux économies "socialistes" reste à démontrer. On reviendra plus loin sur cette question.

Toujours est-il que la situation des pays du Tiers Monde est très différente de celle des pays dits socialistes. Les économies du Tiers Monde ont été façonnées comme telles, c'est-à-dire dépendantes par leur subordination à une division internationale du travail inégalée, à l'époque impérialiste.

Le mouvement de libération nationale serait-il en mesure de transformer cette relation de dépendance et de contraindre le système mondial à s'ajuster à un développement national auto-centré de la périphérie ? Dans ce cas l'impérialisme n'aurait été qu'une étape dans l'expansion du capitalisme à l'échelle mondiale non le stade suprême de celui-ci, mais simplement un stade intermédiaire, assurant le passage d'un système caractérisé par son assymétrie centre/périphérie à un système global homogène de domination des rapports capitalistes.

Si aujourd'hui le "groupe des 77" apparaît sur la scène internationale comme un "syndicat de revendications économiques", on ne saurait oublier que la solidarité politique effective des peuples d'Asie et d'Afrique a précédé le groupement de défense économique. Cette solidarité, d'abord arabo-asiatique, puis étendue à
toute l'Afrique pour devenir afro-asiatique, était celle des États ayant arraché leur indépendance et des mouvements encore en lutte pour celle-ci, dans les années 1950 et 60. Elle n'a jamais englobé l'Amérique latine, sans doute parce que le problème de l'indépendance ne s'y posait pas, mais aussi peut-être parce que ce continent appartient à l'aire culturelle européenne. Or, le mouvement de libération revêtait et revêt une dimension culturelle - non européenne. De surcroît, la solidarité politique afro-asiatique s'est déployée dans une période caractérisée par l'hégémonie des États-Unis et le confinement de l'URSS. Celle-ci, dont l'égalité de puissance militaire n'était pas encore établie, était sur la défensive. Le "non-alignement" et le "neutralisme positif" des origines se situaient dans le refus des pays nouvellement indépendants d'entrer dans les alliances antisoviétiques de la guerre froide.

Toutes ces conditions ont changé. Le mouvement de libération nationale bourgeois a arraché l'indépendance; le système impérialiste s'est ajusté à une nouvelle alliance internationale des classes qui accompagne une nouvelle division internationale inégale du travail (DIT); la guerre froide a cédé la place à la coexistence; l'Union Soviétique s'affirme au plan militaire à égalité avec les États-Unis; les deux superpuissances affirment l'une et l'autre des objectifs planétaires.

Les bourgeoisie du Tiers Monde sont-elles capables, dans ces conditions, de faire franchir à leur pays une nouvelle étape : après l'indépendance politique, peuvent-elles conquérir l'indépendance économique ? La conjoncture des années 1970-75 semblait le faire croire. Les années suivantes ont démontré la faiblesse du projet. L'Occident s'est ressaisi et réunifié, le front du Tiers Monde s'est effrité; et le Tiers Monde, ayant perdu son autonomie, est devenu le terrain d'ennemis entre les deux superpuissances. Cependant, il apparaît que la question de la libération nationale est loin d'être réglée, contrairement à certaines opinions. L'impasse du NOEI et l'impotence de la bourgeoisie sont à peine démontrées que, au rythme où va l'histoire de nos jours, les forces populaires du Tiers Monde partent à nouveau à l'assaut, comme en témoignent les événements de l'Iran.

S'il ne paraît pas possible d'évacuer la nécessité au moins d'un passage par le retrait de la DIT, fut-il autarcique, il est bien évident que cette condition nécessaire n'est jamais suffisante. La Birmanie, bien qu'elle se soit repliée sur elle-même dans une quasi autarcie, est stagnante, faute de bouleversements dans les rapports sociaux de production. Quant aux expériences "socialistes" du Tiers Monde qui ont capoté, la cause de l'échec n'en est nullement que les pays en question se seraient retirés du système mondial, mais plus banalement aussi que les transformations dans les rapports sociaux y ont été limités.

Au-delà du NOEI

Après le NOEI, où va le Tiers Monde ? Va-t-il progressivement se soumettre au programme de redéploiement des monopoles qui, au-delà de la crise actuelle, finira par imposer une nouvelle division internationale du travail ? Ou bien les États du Tiers Monde parviendront finalement à franchir une nouvelle étape du développement capitaliste en imposant leur participation à la DIT sur un plan moins inégal, progressant de la dépendance à l'interdépendance ? Ou encore, les bourgeoisie du Tiers Monde échouant à le faire, une nouvelle vague de révoltes populaires amènera à nouveau les peuples du Tiers Monde à occuper le devant de la scène ?
La thèse la plus répandue est celle que les monopoles finiront par imposer leurs stratégies de redéploiement. Les tenteurs de la mise en œuvre proviendraient principalement des circonstances de la crise. Au terme de 25 ans de croissance forte les classes ouvrières de l'Occident se retrouvent faibles politiquement (ayant renoncé à leur projet de société propre), mais fortes économiquement (à cause des effets du plein emploi de la période). Ce sont ces classes ouvrières qui s'opposent au redéploiement, qui aggraverait le chômage au centre. Les monopoles doivent d'abord les vaincre, pour mettre en œuvre ensuite leur stratégie. Cette analyse contient certainement une part de vérité. De surcroît, l'issue de ces luttes du centre est, pour le moment, encore incertaine. Mais, quelle que soit cette issue, la lutte des classes au centre occupe-t-elle le devant de la scène à l'échelle de l'évolution mondiale ? Force est de constater que, depuis l'impérialisme, cette lutte s'entrecroise avec celle conduite par les peuples de la périphérie, qui a en définitive modulé l'évolution à l'échelle mondiale d'une manière plus marquée.

La stratégie de redéploiement est déjà à l'oeuvre en Asie orientale (Corée du Sud, Taïwan, Hong-Kong et Singapour) à une échelle qui a donné des résultats tangibles, inlassablement montrés en exemple par les institutions internationales comme la Banque Mondiale.

La thèse la plus favorable aux monopoles met en avant les effets de croissance forte de la stratégie du redéploiement. La réponse restera que le développement ne peut résulter d'implantations délocalisées en désordre et non articulées dans des ensembles intégrées nationalement. D'ailleurs la croissance induite en question est nécessairement inégale à l'extrême dans sa distribution, accentuant par là même des distorsions fondamentales dans l'orientation ultérieure du développement. L'Iran ne témoigne-t-il pas du caractère explosif de ce mode de développement ?

La thèse "officielle" des défenseurs locaux de cette stratégie dans les pays de l'Asie orientale, notamment en Corée, est que l'articulation en question est construite progressivement par une politique d'État systématique. La sous-traitance au bénéfice de nombreuses petites et moyennes entreprises locales est organisée, soutenue par l'État; la réforme agraire et la "révolution verte" ouvrent des perspectives d'autosuffisance alimentaire; ainsi progressivement les filiales des monopoles sont "encerclées". On ne cache pas que cet "encerclement" est facilité par l'idéologie confucéenne de fusion de l'État et de l'économie. On laisse entendre malicieusement que la Corée du Nord opère de la même manière, les coopératives et les petites unités "socialistes" s'articulant sur les grandes unités d'État créées sur la base de l'aide et de la technologie soviétiques. S'agit-il d'une illusion ou bien y a-t-il là embryon d'une exception, qu'il faudrait expliquer par l'idéologie confucéenne ? La question préalable à laquelle il faut répondre est évidemment de savoir qui finance qui : est-ce l'économie nationale qui finance l'accumulation des unités monopolistiques ou l'inverse ? Toute la problématique de l'échange inégal s'inscrit ici.

Cependant, les États moteurs du Tiers Monde n'ont pas renoncé à leurs objectifs, au moins au plan national quand bien même la possibilité d'un "front commun" imposant une révision globale de la DIT s'avérerait plus difficile qu'il ne le semblait.
Le premier de ces objectifs est le relèvement substantiel des prix des matières premières, c'est-à-dire la captation des rentes minières et foncière. En effet, il semble que jusqu'à notre époque, le capital a bénéficié d'un accès quasi libre aux ressources naturelles et ce à l'échelle planétaire. Cela paraît évident pour les ressources minières, mais c'est aussi le cas chaque fois que dans l'agriculture d'exportation, l'absence d'une forme structurée de la propriété foncière non paysanne a permis au capital d'échapper à la ponction de la rente foncière absolue. Nous avons développé sur ces points la thèse que la constitution et le renforcement d'une bourgeoisie industrielle dans le Tiers Monde constituait la condition de la captation à son profit de ces rentes. Il reste que jusqu'à présent seuls les pays pétroliers sont parvenus à ce résultat. Or, on ne peut ignorer que leur action en 1973 et 1974 convergeait avec les objectifs des transnationales du pétrole et des États-Unis (soucieux, semble-t-il, à l'époque, de mettre à la raison l'Europe et le Japon pour leur imposer le ralentissement). Doit-on en conclure que les bourgeoisies du Tiers Monde sont trop faibles pour agir si elles ne peuvent exploiter des contradictions interimpérialistes ?

Le projet du NOEI visait précisément à renforcer par leur front commun les Etats du Tiers Monde vis-à-vis des centres du système. On pensait alors que cet intérêt commun l'emporterait sur les divergences réelles d'intérêts immédiats. Par exemple, les pays candidats à l'exportation industrielle les mieux placés ont intérêt à ce que les prix des matières premières, dont ils sont plus importateurs qu'exportateurs restent bas. Mais comme certains pays d'Asie et d'Amérique latine auraient besoin pour pénétrer sur les marchés des pays développés du soutien (moral ?) de la collectivité du Tiers Monde, on concevait qu'en contrepartie, ils soutiendraient (toujours moralement ?) les demandes des pays quasi exclusivement exportateurs de matières premières (l'Afrique entre autres). Après tout en dépit d'une divergence d'intérêts immédiats, le soutien de l'ensemble des 77 à l'OPEP reste entier. De même, les intérêts divergents en ce qui concerne la dette extérieure, puisque les pays les plus "riches" - ceux dont la croissance est forte ou dont le potentiel est grand - sont aussi ceux qui peuvent s'endetter le plus aisément sans craindre - à raison ou à tort - la "faillite" et la mise en tutelle qui menace réellement les autres.

A défaut d'actions communes fortes menées dans le domaine des relations Sud-Nord, les États du Sud peuvent-ils envisager de se renforcer par la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie de coopération intra Tiers Monde ("collective self-reliance" ou "autonomie collective") pendant et complément du développement national auto-centré ("national self-reliance") ? Bien peu a été amorcé jusqu'ici si ce n'est par des conférences, des discours (comme la Conférence de Buenos Aires, "TCDC en 1978) et une succession de "projets" (comme le projet d'une Banque du Tiers Monde, envisagé par la CNUCED, se substituant à l'écueil de l'intervention du Tiers Monde dans la réforme du système monétaire international, ou celui de transnationales du Tiers Monde, ou encore celui de structures de recherches technologiques communes). Mais s'agit-il de projets nécessairement "utopiques" ? Le discours sur le "delinking", c'est-à-dire l'atténuation des relations Nord-Sud par la substitution d'une intensification des relations intra Tiers Monde, est-il seulement un discours ? La question n'est-elle pas, plutôt que de proposer de "bons programmes" de coopération intra Tiers Monde à opposer aux "mauvais programmes" (dont on attribuerait ce caractère à l'ignorance), de savoir pourquoi les programmes en question sont "mauvais" ?
Quelle stratégie des sociétés du Tiers Monde ?

Ces faiblesses internes des sociétés du Tiers Monde étant enregistrées, quelle est, par-delà le discours, la stratégie véritable qu'elles pourraient mettre en œuvre ?

L'accent mis sur la puissance économique irrésistible des monopoles à notre époque tend à évacuer l'analyse des faiblesses des bourgeoisies et des classes dirigeantes du Tiers Monde. Sans doute, si la "technologie" pèse si lourd dans la balance à notre époque, c'est que faisant l'objet d'une appropriation par les monopoles, elle permet à ceux-ci d'imposer la vente "en bloc" de systèmes productifs ("usines clés en mains") dont une petite partie seulement représente des éléments techniques véritablement nouveaux. Cette position permet aux monopoles de capter non seulement l'ensemble des rentes et des surprofits mais encore de tirer à eux une bonne partie du profit normal. Dans ces conditions, on ne s'étonnerait pas que, même si l'objectif de Lima de 25% de la production industrielle était atteint, la fraction du surplus global retenu par les pays du Tiers Monde lui serait très inférieure et ce indépendamment de la propriété formelle des installations.

Il reste que les conditions que les monopoles imposent aux pays du Tiers Monde sont plus sévères que celles qui caractérisent leurs relations avec les pays de l'Est et la Chine. Il y a beaucoup de raisons à ce fait; et aux raisons générales déjà évoquées on ajoutera que les pays de l'Est, et la Chine, lorsqu'ils achètent de la technologie, sont aussi capables de l'assimiler et donc de la reproduire puis même de la développer. L'infrastructure scientifique et technique des pays du Sud ne le permet pas.

Bien entendu la technologie, quelle qu'elle soit, n'est jamais neutre par rapport aux rapports de production et l'importation de celle-ci a des conséquences, en Chine comme en URSS ou dans le Tiers Monde. Mais si les pays de l'Est européen ont développé aussi des technologies analogues à ceux de l'Ouest, ce qui facilite leurs échanges extérieurs, c'est parce qu'ils ont fondé leur développement sur des rapports sociaux voisins de ceux de l'Ouest et non parce qu'ils seraient soumis aux monopoles. Par ailleurs, il n'est pas prouvé que la Chine envisage, jusqu'ici une importation massive de technologies au point de déformer ses orientations fondamentales ("prendre l'agriculture pour base", etc.), encore moins de se soumettre au diktat des monopoles. Le Tiers Monde par contre n'a pas même l'embryon de "technologies adaptées" à ses problèmes. Et, s'il opte pour une industrie axée sur l'exportation, il sera bel et bien contraint d'importer, et en position faible, de la technologie à une échelle massive, déterminante de ses orientations globales, ne serait-ce que par suite des contraintes de compétitivité de ses produits sur les marchés des pays développés.

On est donc renvoyé de la question apparente - celle de la force des monopoles - à la vraie question - celle des raisons de la faiblesse du Tiers Monde et de la nature de classe de ses systèmes sociaux.

Que l'on qualifie donc de "capitaliste" en général le développement en cours à l'Est et au Sud, et de "bourgeoises" leurs classes dirigeantes, ne suffit pas. Car il y a une grande différence entre la "bourgeoisie nationale" de l'Est (si l'on veut qualifier cette classe de bourgeoisie) et les bourgeoisies "neo-compradoras" du Sud.
La différence se situe dans les conditions historiques de constitution de ces "bourgeoisies". A l'Est, en URSS ou en Chine, la "bourgeoisie" est une classe nouvelle, issue d'une révolution socialiste, dévoyée par la suite. Le temps révolutionnaire est marqué par la convergence d'un bloc de classes populaires, anti-capitalistes, comprenant la classe ouvrière, les paysans exploités et diverses couches moyennes. C'est du sein de ce bloc qui se constitue, pour se séparer des masses, la nouvelle classe. Cette convergence a rendu possible une construction économique nationale. Elle a, entre autres, permis, par le bouleversement des rapports sociaux à la campagne (la révolution paysanne), le développement de la base agricole et alimentaire de l'industrialisation. Or, ce temps de convergence manque dans les pays du Sud. La nouvelle bourgeoisie ne se constitue pas à partir d'une révolution paysanne et socialiste. Elle dérive directement des classes façonnées à l'étape antérieure de l'impérialisme. La "crise agricole et alimentaire" du Tiers Monde, incapable de soutenir son industrie par une progression appropriée de son agriculture, est l'expression de cette absence de révolution paysanne. Dans ces conditions, la bourgeoisie n'est pas capable de construire une économie nationale, elle peut seulement s'alimenter de la croissance induite par son insertion au système impérialiste.

On dira certes que l'URSS aussi connaît des difficultés alimentaires. Sans doute, mais celles-ci résultent également de la rupture de l'alliance ouvrière et paysanne avec la collectivisation des années 1930-33. Cela n'est donc pas un hasard; cette réalité, incontestable, constitue le point faible du système soviétique. L'ancienneté relative de cette rupture explique aussi la forme achevée de la nouvelle société de classes soviétique. Jusqu'à ce jour rien n'autorise à conclure qu'il en est déjà de même en Chine.

Ce contenu de classes des États du Tiers Monde analysé, on peut alors mieux comprendre la nature véritable de leur stratégie. Celle-ci ne vise pas la construction d'économies nationales mais seulement l'insertion dans la DIT. L'amélioration de sa position est, dans ces conditions, souvent plus facile à obtenir au détriment des partenaires faibles.

Les ambiguïtés du discours sur "l'autonomie collective" tiennent à cette raison. D'une manière très générale, l'ambiance d'un "libéralisme généralisé intra Tiers Monde" (les préférences généralisées entre pays du Tiers Monde), les expériences de "marchés communs", défunts (comme le marché de l'Afrique de l'Est), stagnants (marché arabe) ou embryonnaires (CDEAO par exemple) trahissent des objectifs de ce type. Le partenaire puissant envisageant ces programmes de s'insérer dans la DIT à son bénéfice immédiat fut-ce au détriment des autres. Le débat sur les "sous-impérialismes" le rappelle. La réalité des inégalités au sein du Tiers Monde le rappelle encore davantage. Car les pays dits les "moins développés" sont souvent, comme nous l'avons montré, des pays dépendants au second degré, annexes des pays dépendants de première ligne. C'est pourquoi l'exigence d'un développement autoncent doit être encore plus fortement ressenti dans les pays "moins développés", pour lesquels l'espoir d'un développement dépendant est lui-même illusoire.

L'éclatement au plein jour des contradictions au sein du Tiers Monde, tant au plan économique qu'au plan politique (voir les événements de la corne orientale de l'Afrique, du Sahara occidental, de l'Afrique centrale, du sous-continent indien, de l'Indochine, etc.) ne révèle pas, à notre avis, une remontée de
"nationalisms" anciens, précapitalistes, libérés par l'indépendance recouverte. Même lorsque ces conflits anciens sont mobilisés - et ils le sont - c'est pour les mettre au service de stratégies de bourgeoisies dépendantes, constituées ou en voie de l'être, qui aspirent à améliorer leur position dans le système mondial au détriment des plus faibles. L'appel aux puissances extérieures n'est donc pas pur hasard; car cet appel doit pallier les faiblesses d'une stratégie qui ne peut être que faible parce qu'elle ne peut pas répondre aux aspirations profondes des masses populaires, mais seulement, au mieux, les mobiliser sur des objectifs partiels qui ne sont pas susceptibles de remettre en cause la direction des classes exploiteuses. Que cette stratégie fasse du Tiers Monde l'enjeu des superpuissances dans leur lutte pour la domination/partage mondiale, bien des événements tendent à le démontrer chaque jour davantage.

La "crise" du NOEI, replacée dans l'analyse globale des tendances du système mondial, révèle la nature double et contradictoire du processus des transformations en cours, qui peut être analysé comme une étape du développement du capitalisme à l'échelle mondiale mais aussi comme un moment de sa crise et de la "transition socialiste".

Lorsque l'on analyse l'évolution en cours comme l'expression du développement du capitalisme à l'échelle mondiale, il apparaît que les centres nouveaux qui émergent sont les pays communistes (Europe orientale, URSS, Chine, etc.) et non les pays du Tiers Monde. Seuls les premiers sont en position, ayant rempli les conditions d'une construction nationale préalable, d'entrer dans la DIT sur un pied d'égalité.

Mais dans ces termes l'analyse est unilatérale. Précisément par ses deux aspects fondamentaux l'évolution du système revêt le caractère aigu d'une manifestation de crise des rapports de production capitaliste, illustrant le caractère objectivement nécessaire de rapports nouveaux, véritablement socialistes.

Il n'est pas indifférent en effet que les centres potentiels nouveaux soient apparus à partir de révolutions socialistes. Quel paradoxe que l'expansion du capitalisme ne puisse plus se faire véritablement que par un dévouement de la transition socialiste !

Il n'est pas davantage indifférent que, lorsque la transition socialiste n'a pas été amorcée fût-ce pour être dévoyée, l'expansion du capitalisme reste de type périphérique. La problématique de la libération nationale demeure alors entière même si, évidemment, les conditions de celle-ci continuent à changer, comme d'ailleurs elles ont toujours changé dans le passé. Une nouvelle vague de luttes populaires est donc prévisible, comme en témoigne la montée du populisme dans le Tiers Monde. Encore une fois les peuples du Tiers Monde peuvent bien occuper le devant de la scène dans la transformation du monde.

CONT. DE pg.1

La cuestión de la tecnología, especialmente la tecnología de sistemas enteros controlados por monopolios (eg. "turn-key plants") es una variable clave en el proceso de transformación. La crisis actual del NOEI puede interpretarse como una etapa en el desarrollo de la expansión capitalista o como una crisis que conducirá a una transición al socialismo. El autor concluye diciendo que en realidad se puede prever una nueva horda de populismo en el Tercer Mundo y de luchas populares.
Abstract: Neither the relatively generous tariff preferences granted by the European Economic Community to some Third World countries under various association agreements, nor the more limited concessions under the Generalised System of Preferences, have succeeded in their aim of promoting export-oriented industrialization in the Third World. Whenever imports from the Third World compete with and threaten investments and jobs within the European Economic Community, protectionist pressures from capital and labour lead to the imposition of quantitative restrictions which override the preferential schemes and severely limit their effects. While European Economic Community trading firms are generally in favour of increased imports from the Third World, they do not consider preferential tariff margins as a determining element in their purchasing decisions; reliability of product quality and delivery dates appear to be more important factors. Moreover, they assert that Third World exporters are more interested in increasing sales volumes than in appropriating the tariff margins through higher prices. Thus, the tariff revenue foregone by European Economic Community governments on account of preferential schemes tends to end up as a subsidy for European Economic Community importers, rather than for Third World exporters or even for European Economic Community consumers. Consequently, Third World countries should use their political leverage with the Community to replace ineffective preference schemes with long-term sectoral trade arrangements, specifying quantity, quality and delivery of their exports to the European Economic Community, as well as indexed prices. The European Economic Community tariff revenue thus regained (now about US$600 million p.a.) should be added to Overseas Development Assistance resource transfers, outside the 0.7% target and preferably through multilateral channels.

Original language: English
Ainsi, les pays du Tiers Monde auraient intérêt à utiliser leur influence politique auprès de la Communauté pour remplacer des préférences inopérantes par des accords commerciaux par secteur et à long terme qui spécifieraient les quantités, la qualité et les livraisons de leurs exportations vers la CEE, de même que des prix indexés. Les revenus tarifaires ainsi récupérés (environ 600 million de dollars des États-Unis par an) pourraient être ajoutés à l'aide publique au développement, en plus de l'objectif de 0.7%, préférentiellement dans un contexte multilatéral.

¿QUIÉN APROVECHA DE LAS PREFERENCIAS COMERCIALES DE LA CEE?

Resumen: Ni las relativamente generosas preferencias tarifarias dadas por la CEE a algunos países del Tercer Mundo bajo varios acuerdos de la asociación, ni las concesiones más limitadas admitidas bajo el Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias han tenido éxito en su objetivo de promover la industrialización hacia la exportación en el Tercer Mundo. Cada vez que importaciones del Tercer Mundo compiten con y amenazan inversiones y empleo dentro de la CEE, apremios protecciónistas de capital y sindicatos resultan en la imposición de restricciones que superan los esquemas preferenciales y limitan severamente sus efectos. Mientras que firmas comerciales de la CEE están generalmente a favor de aumentos en importaciones del Tercer Mundo, ellas no consideran márgenes de tarifas preferenciales como elementos determinantes en sus decisiones de compras. Garantías de la calidad del producto y de las fechas de entrega les parecen ser factores de mayor importancia. Además, afirman que a los exportadores del Tercer Mundo les interesa más el aumento del volumen de ventas que la apropiación de márgenes de tarifas por medio de precios aumentados. De este modo, los ingresos aduaneros a que renuncian los gobiernos de la CEE a causa de los esquemas preferenciales son necesarios para los países industrializados para los consumidores de la CEE.

Por consiguiente, los países del Tercer Mundo deben usar su influencia política con la CEE para reemplazar inequidades esquemas de preferencia por arreglos comerciales sectoriales, los que estipularan cantidad, calidad y términos de entrega de sus exportaciones destinadas a la CEE, así como los precios ajustados. Los ingresos así recobrados (cerca de 600 millones de dólares US al año) podrían añadirse a los fondos de la ayuda al desarrollo, encima del objetivo de 0.7%, preferentemente en un contexto multilatéral.
"WHO BENEFITS FROM EEC'S TRADE PREFERENCES?" 1/

VAGN KJELLBERG

DENMARK, MAY 1978

INTRODUCTION

Trade preferences for Third World countries are very much part of the present measures for International Development Cooperation. They are also among the measures with which the International System of States plan to establish a New International Economic Order.

Trade preferences are primarily tariff-reduction schemes for the lowering of the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff-barriers, and as such their purpose is to promote and diversify Third World export of manufactured products to Industrialised Countries. Exports of manufactures should help Third World countries in their industrialisation and development. Employment and consumption opportunities would increase. This again would bring about a betterment of the overall welfare in the Third World. The first systems of trade preferences simply replaced former colonial trade relations. Trade preferences, as general development cooperation measures, were later formulated in UNCTAD in the 1960s and were successively implemented by the Industrialised Countries for the benefit of the Third World as a whole in the form of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).

Third World countries continue to assert that trade preferences would help them in maintaining or achieving a competitive edge in their export sectors. For example, one of their strong arguments in the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) was that "across the board" MFN-tariff reductions by Industrialised Countries would erode their preferential access to such important export markets. 2/

1/ The "Documentation" for this paper was prepared during the Spring of 1978. It is obtainable from the IFDA Secretariat. Both the "Documentation" and the present "Policy-Paper" were submitted to IFDA in a strictly private capacity.

It is, of course, understandable that Third World countries will resist any changes which will work to their own disadvantage. But the question is really whether trade preferences, in the first instance, have served as constructive development cooperation measures and whether they, in the future, will be likely to help Third World countries in developing their productive forces for the benefit of their own economies and people. It is in the context of this question that the paper will discuss: "Who benefits from EEC's trade preferences?"

Part I is a short analysis of how EEC's trade preferences and imports from the Third World have developed over the years. This part is primarily based on previous graduate studies of the subject. Part II is a discussion of how the industrial and commercial sectors work vis-a-vis the preferential trade systems of EEC. This part is mainly based on interviews and discussions with about 16 EEC import-firms, the Services of the EEC Commission, some Federations of Commerce and Industry in EEC, ACP and ASEAN Representatives in Brussels, and UNCTAD officials concerned with trade preferences.

Policy options are mainly suggested in the concluding part of the paper. The inevitable prevalence of the World Capitalist System during the 1980s is taken as given. Therefore, the paper only suggests state intervention measures, e.g. options for a new United Nations Development Strategy, which, in the short run, will be agreeable to the Capitalist System and which, at the same time, will necessitate the pursuance of Third World collective self-reliance as a viable way of reducing the impact of the exploitative World Capitalist System.

**PART I**

EEC has two principal systems of trade preferences for Third World countries. One is the system of contractual "North-South" agreements, notably the Lomé Convention and EEC's other cooperation agreements with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. The other is the autonomous Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for which EEC unilaterally (subject to GATT) can impose tariffs and quantitative restrictions on any product at any time. Restrictions such as tariff quotas, ceilings and butoirs should not be confused with the real quantitative restrictions imposed, for example, as a result of the Multifibre Agreements (MFA). The MFA restrictions are only imposed on imports from low-cost Third World countries which have no special contractual trade agreement with EEC, e.g. the "GSP beneficiaries". The trade provisions in EEC's cooperation agreements are much more favourable. Both primary and manufactured products have in principle free access to the EEC market. Any tariff imposition on quantitative restriction is subject to consultation in joint institutions. In addition, there are provisions for industrial cooperation and trade promotion. Hence, the objectives of EEC's contractual trade arrangements are thus far more comprehensive than those of GSP.

As a general rule, any preferential import into EEC must satisfy the requirement that the product is either wholly obtained/produced or sufficiently worked/processed (normally 50% value-added) in the country of origin. However, this rule is considerably modified in the contractual trade agreements. All ACP and EEC countries are considered as one single market, so that any intermediary and component can circulate and undergo any value-added process and still enter
EEC as a product originating in whatever ACP country that may happen to act as the exporting country. EEC and Maghreb are likewise considered as one single market. Moreover, a special cumulative rule of origin is applied on imports from ASEAN, ANDEAN and CACM. The rules of origin are as such a compromise of three sets of interests: protecting productive activities in Europe; promoting productive activities in the Third World; and collaborating reasonably with international free enterprising. 3/

It is obvious that EEC all along has pursued a discriminatory preferential trade policy vis-à-vis the Third World. Certain countries, particularly those in Africa, were invited to become parties to comprehensive cooperation agreements while the rest of the Third World was offered only a much more uncertain and limited GSP access to the EEC market. This discriminatory policy goes back to the time of the establishment of EEC, the time of decolonisation.

As an immediate post-colonial undertaking, the Six founding member states of EEC entered into association agreement (the Yaoundé Convention) with former Italian, French and Belgian colonies in Africa. In effect, what happened was, that these particular African countries obtained preferential access to the important West German market in addition to their original Metropolitan markets. Meanwhile, United Kingdom, that had opted to stay out of EEC, continued, together with its former colonies, a preferential trade system for the Commonwealth.

Hence, during the first post-colonial decade the majority of African countries had special trade arrangements with one or more of the present major member states of EEC. This was a period of steady economic growth in Europe. There was a constant heavy demand for standardised consumer goods. European capital began to internationalise extensively. The opportunity was there, to move into Africa, to encourage value-added production, to import manufactured products into EEC or Britain, to reap the benefits of the trade preferences in force at that particular time.

This did not happen. Take, for example, the composition of African Associates' exports to EEC. In 1958, foodstuffs, beverages and raw materials made up 82% of total export value. Though this share decreased to 65% in 1969 a closer examination of the composition discloses that the products, which statistically were classified as manufactures, were processed timber, tanned leather and skins, cotton yarn and fabric, and other semi-processed primary products. Exports of these products had rapidly increased in volumes and unit values, while the primary exports experienced a stagnation in unit values and volumes during the same period. The trade preferences in question had apparently failed to promote a diversified industrial growth even in the export-oriented sector. 4/


The fact that the trade preference system of that time was unable to help bringing about a structural change in Euro-African trade relations is further substantiated in Table I, which shows the growth and distribution of imports by origin and destination over the period 1964 - 1973.

TABLE I
Selected European Imports from African Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Growth in Imports, 1964-'73 percentage of current values</th>
<th>Import in 1973 current mio. EUA&lt;sup&gt;a/&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EEC-Ass. &lt;sup&gt;b/&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-Ass. &lt;sup&gt;c/&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (F.R.)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a/</sup> In 1973, 1 EUA = 1.25 US $.

<sup>b/</sup> Main countries: Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Zaire.

<sup>c/</sup> Main countries: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia.


It is seen in Table I, that the former British and French colonial trade structures were continued during the period. But this did not discourage the French and British to increase, at comparable rates, their imports from both EEC-Associates and Non-Associates. This suggests that the respective systems of preferences had at best prevented a deterioration of business relations. In the case of Germany the rate of growth of imports from the Associates was much lower than from the Non-Associates. The latter countries' greater capacity to export compensated by far for the absence of preferential access to the respective European countries.

As already mentioned, it was decided to give it yet another try. In 1975, soon after the enlargement of EEC, the African states south of Sahara and a few Caribbean and Pacific states entered into a cooperation agreement with EEC, the so-called ACP-EEC Lomé Convention. A year later the Maghreb and Mashreq countries entered into similar agreements with EEC. By the mid 1970s EEC had as well improved its GSP to cover, in addition to manufactures, a range of semi-processed and processed agricultural products. Moreover, special commercial agreements were arranged with a number of Asian Commonwealth countries as a consequence of British accession to EEC. <sup>5/</sup>

Although the new EEC systems of trade preferences have only been in operation for a few of years, it is already now possible to preliminarily assess the trade relations under consideration, as shown in Table II.

### Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>1975 Mio. EUA</th>
<th>% total</th>
<th>1977 Mio. EUA</th>
<th>% total</th>
<th>1975-1977 growth in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third World (excl. oil)</td>
<td>21,876</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>37,357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP States</td>
<td>5,664</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8,825</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb &amp; Mashreq</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,537</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian sub-continent</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (less Singapore)</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East, selected</td>
<td>2,865</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5,097</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**b/** The sum of the percentages was 67% in 1975 and 68% in 1977 of total (100%) EEC non-oil imports from Third World countries.

**c/** EEC's oil imports from Third World countries (OPEC) were roughly calculated to amount to Mio. EUA 29,695 in 1975, and Mio. EUA 37,780 in 1977.

**d/** Data corrected for oil imports which amounted to about 1/3 of total EEC imports from ACP.

**e/** Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia (Libya not member); Mashreq: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria. Data corrected for oil imports which amounted to about 1/2 of total EEC imports from these countries.

**f/** Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.

**g/** Singapore was excl. because its economic structure resembled those listed below. Data corrected for oil imports from Indonesia.

**h/** Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan (note: imports from Taiwan have no GSP access to EEC).

The first thing to notice in Table II is that the industrial and commercial sectors were slow in taking advantage of the ACP-EEC provisions for trade cooperation. The ACP states, and for that matter the Maghreb and Mashreq, just about managed to keep their relative position vis-a-vis the other groupings of Third World countries. This was mainly owing to favourable conditions for their primary exports rather than to any structural changes in their export sectors. It is often argued that in the absence of the Lomé Convention, the ACP countries' export to EEC would have suffered a real set back. This is true to the extent that ACP countries' (non-oil) world exports developed at a much slower rate than exports to EEC alone. But it is also a fact that EEC at present imports over 40% of ACP countries' (non-oil) world exports.

In the event that the ACP-EEC trade cooperation becomes really successful it may well render the ACP states even more dependent on the EEC trade block, especially if they should fail to expand their trade relations with other groups of countries. So far, as Table II shows, it was the ASEAN and other Far East countries that experienced a more than average growth in their exports to EEC. Despite the much less favourable trade preferences for those countries, EEC imported about 20% of their total exports of light manufactured products.

The different export performances divided the Third World into corresponding coalitions vis-a-vis their trade negotiations with EEC. ACP countries complained that the trade aspirations of the Lomé Convention had not yet begun to materialise. They therefore called for more effective trade and aid measures to help them to catch up with other Third World countries. The latter did, of course, also call for better preferential access. The ASEAN countries, for example, argued, even though they knew well enough that they did much better than most ACP countries, that for the sake of the principle they had to press for better trade preferences with EEC. For obvious reasons any country is hesitant to accept that other countries have certain acquired rights which it is deprived of itself. Apart from the general political issues at stake, Governments (and others) apparently continued to base their arguments on the economic theories of trade creation and trade diversion effects of tariff preferences. Third World governments claimed that trade preferences were necessary if their export sectors were to become competitive, and EEC governments and others argued that trade preferences partly were responsible for some industrial displacement and unemployment in Europe.


The theories of tariff preferences are discussed in various works of Bela Balassa and Harry G. Johnson.

It is thus evident that, although the impact of trade preferences statistically seems to be very modest, both "donor" and "beneficiary" states are attaching much importance to trade preferences. Therefore, the question of assessing the real impact of trade preferences becomes as much a question of examining how the market works in practice. That is then the subject of Part II.

PART II

In the European market, as elsewhere, two groups of principal economic actors are concerned with the question of trade preferences. Importers and international firms form one group. Domestic capital and labour form the other.

Because it is the latter group which suffers from competitive imports, it is also this group which seems to be most concerned with trade concessions for the Third World. Thus it is generally alleged that it is the tariff-cuts which render imports from the Third World unduly competitive. EEC industries have, indeed, been exposed to competitive pressures. However, most of the Third World products which have caused major problems for EEC industries appear to have been competitive irrespective of whether they have had preferential access to the European markets. In other words, as confirmed by most EEC importers and representatives of federations of commerce interviewed for this paper, the principal incentives to trade were not provided by the trade preferences. In many cases, importers thought that it was not really worth the trouble to make deliberate efforts to obtain duty-free access for imports from the Third World.

Major product groups such as clothing and footwear, and mechanical and electronic articles are primarily imported from Far East countries which only enjoy GSP access to the EEC market. To obtain duty-free or tariff-reduced customs clearance for those products at an EEC port of entry was for the most part a matter of good luck since tariff quotas, ceilings or quotas often were exhausted at the beginning of the year. In order to be on time in this "first come first served game", importers would take special care to place their orders for delivery at European ports at the appropriate time. Third World factories were therefore troubled with excessive demands at certain periods of the year and the regular cargo liner traffic was burdened with a concentration of consignments during late December every year.

Inasmuch as attempts to be "the first" would obviously not enlarge the overall opportunities for preferential access, many European importers were getting tired of "the game". After all, they only managed to obtain preferential access for about 10 - 30% of their total imports of products which were subject to tariff quantitative restrictions. This percentage appears to correspond closely with the statistical information available on preferential imports. In 1976, for example, about 30% of imports (less oil and agric. products) from the Third World obtained preferential access. For 1975, more detailed information is available, as Table III shows.

9/ See the "Documentation" for this paper, loc. cit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCT\textsuperscript{a/}</th>
<th>In percentage of total</th>
<th>ACP\textsuperscript{b/}</th>
<th>GSP\textsuperscript{c/}</th>
<th>3rd World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07 Edible vegetables</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Edible fruits and nuts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Coffee, tea, maté and spices</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Animal and vegetable fats, waxes and oils</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Preparations of meat, of fish, of crustaceans or molluscs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Preparations of vegetables, fruits or other parts of plants</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Tobacco</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Organic Chemicals</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Artificial resins and plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers, articles thereof</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Raw hides and skins and leather</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Articles of leather</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 Wood and articles of wood</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 &amp; 56 Man-made textile fibres</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Cotton</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 Carpets, mats, and other fabrics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Knitted and crocheted goods</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories of textile fabric</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 Footwear</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73 Iron and Steel articles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 Tools, implements and cutlery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 Boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 Electrical machinery and equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 Optical, photographic, measuring and hospital instruments</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 &amp; 92 Clocks and watches, and audio-equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 Toys, games and sports requisites</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a/} CCT is an abbr. of Common Customs Tariff (of the EEC). CCT nomenclature corresponds to CCNN, abbr. of Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature.

\textsuperscript{b/} African, Caribbean and Pacific States, (about 50 states) parties to the Lomé Convention. Though the trade provisions of the Convention entered into force by 1st July 1975, most of the ACP countries had preferential access to most of the 9 EEC countries before that time (for example, the FEC-East Africa agreement and the British Commonwealth preference system).

\textsuperscript{c/} Two GSP beneficiaries are excluded, namely Romania and Yugoslavia, they are not classified as Third World countries in this context (moreover, Taiwan is not a GSP beneficiary).

It is seen in Table III that a high percentage of the selected imports of processed agricultural products enjoyed preferential access to EEC and that the percentage shares of ACP and GSP, respectively, were comparable. The high overall percentage was owing to the fact that the products in question were of no major concern for the EEC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The apparent liberal preferential access for those particular product groups was, therefore, not a reflection of any special EEC "generosity". The absence of "generosity" becomes even more explicit in the case of the very limited provisions for preferential access for imports of sensitive products such as leather articles, clothing and footwear. It is important to notice, as mentioned before, that imports of those products from ACP countries were negligible despite the provisions for unlimited and duty-free access. Instead such products were primarily imported under MFN conditions while some imports happened to enter under the GSP. Preferential imports of textiles alone (CCT 50-63) accounted for only 25% of the total.

There has not really been any improvement of preferential access for those products which are threatening the interests of domestic capital and labour in EEC. But this has not prevented Importers from marketing large volumes of Third World labour-intensive and standardised light manufactures, the quality of which was high enough to permit a reasonable mark-up margin without cutting the competitive edges significantly. Another major part of EEC imports from the Third World was made up of primary tropical produce, for which there traditionally has been a rather inelastic demand over the years - irrespective of the application of even relatively high tariffs.

Many of the interviewed Importers disclosed that their pricing policies generally were unaffected by the prospects of preferential access, and that they in any event hardly felt a competitive need for passing on their "tariff savings" to allow a lowering of wholesale and retail prices for the benefit of EEC consumers. The Importers also disclosed that "tariff savings" barely influenced the negotiation of cost prices of Third World exports. The Third World producers appeared in most cases to prefer increases in volumes for increases in unit prices. Therefore, inasmuch as the "tariff savings" from preferential imports were, for the most, neither passed on to EEC consumers nor to Third World producers, it was not surprising to learn that many Importers referred to such "savings" as "windfall gains" on their own part. On the part of the EEC budget such "windfall gains" ought then to be accounted for as foregone tariff revenues and thence as a sort of subsidy scheme for European Importers.

The foregone tariff revenue is, of course, not important in absolute terms. How much it amounts to exactly is difficult to determine. In 1976, for example, the preferential imports (less oil and agric. products) amounted to about US$ 6 billion. With an average tariff reduction of roughly 10%, the foregone revenue would be about US$ 600 million. This sum represents, in relative terms,


the same as about 12% of EEC countries' net transfer of ODA in 1976. 13/ In other words, under the pretext of assisting the Third World, the EEC and member states could apparently afford to forego revenues to European Importers, the equivalent of which they would find it difficult to appropriate additionally for ODA purposes.

To place the argument in the proper context it should be recalled that the foregone tariff revenues in question accrued as "windfall gains" in connection with imports of Third World products which were competitive in most of the cases in which they, or one or the other reason, entered the European market under the normal MFN tariffs. Therefore, it is safe to assume that European Business would not necessarily change its trading practice if trade preferences were discontinued altogether, nor has trading practice changed dramatically yet in response to the contractual provisions for unlimited and duty-free access for African products even though the provisions, with very favourable rules of origin, have been in force vis-à-vis several African countries for nearly two decades.

The modest impact of trade preferences is further revealed by the fact that despite the higher transport costs and the gradual re-imposition of tariffs on products from, for example, the Far East, the European Importers were determined to continue what they considered to be a reasonable good business. The way the market works seems thus to contradict the theories of tariff protection on which the policies of trade preferences have been developed. 14/ The contradiction becomes even more accentuated by the fact that the re-imposition of tariffs apparently have failed to bring about the desired protection so that the EEC countries recently had to take recourse in tightening the Multifibre Agreements (MFA) which regulate textile imports from the so-called GSP beneficiaries. Therefore, given the present level of MFN tariffs, it is first and foremost product quality and reliable delivery which help in promoting Third World export, and if those requirements are met, then it is only effective non-tariff barriers such as MFAs, which seem to provide effective protection for domestic capital and labour in Europe.

If very effective barriers were erected against, in particular, competitive consumer goods from the Far East, it might encourage European Importers and International Firms to take full advantage of the favourable ACP-EEC trade arrangements. This is already beginning to happen. Importers have, for example, begun to buy large consignments of shirts from producers in Mauritius. Certain West African countries, particularly Ivory Coast, may soon begin to produce large quantities of standardised labour-intensive consumer goods to be marketed in Europe at competitive prices and acceptable qualities. But given the sluggish demand for ordinary consumer goods in Europe combined with the political imperative of maintaining a high level of employment, then the same


ACP countries may eventually experience that the EEC countries will begin to invoke safeguard measures as provided for in any EEC agreement - however liberal it intends to be. So while ACP countries in the first instance might manage to conquer a part of the European market which presently belongs to a few Far East countries, the ACP countries themselves might later face the same sort of strong EEC barriers against their own products.

The ACP countries are perhaps in a better position than the rapidly industrialising Far East countries. Many of the former are potential resource-rich countries. This, in itself, could provide a considerable leverage in other political and economic areas. However, in the final analysis, EEC will pursue a protectionistic policy to the extent that domestic capital and labour carry more political weight than international capital and commerce. The difference of interests between those two principal groups of economic actors is widening and there will be an ongoing struggle, according to the Representatives of Federations of Industries and Chambers of Commerce interviewed for this paper. In general, Federations of Industries wish to project national capital whereas Chambers of Commerce favour a free trade policy or at least transparent and simple regulatory measures.

Nobody would realistically expect the EEC states (or other industrialised regions) to restructure their economies in any radical way in the foreseeable future. This is a fact that Third World countries do best to reckon with in their planning of the development of their productive forces. The Industrialised Countries will never demand big enough volumes of imported goods to make it viable for all Third World countries to develop export-oriented economies on that basis alone. It is so much the more surprising that nearly all Third World countries concentrate on improving their preferential access to EEC. On the contrary, it is quite understandable that EEC, on its part, wants to use trade preferences as a convenient and harmless way of building good relations with the Third World.

Between the interests of the Third World and the interests of EEC, there appears to be room for pursuing a number of policy options in the field of trade relations. A few of such policy options are discussed in the following, concluding part.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The crux of matter is, of course, that trade preferences, as any other international development cooperation measure, is part and parcel of the World Capitalist System and that it is utterly unrealistic to expect that Third World countries would seriously attempt to break away from that System - break away from the domain of North America, Western Europe, Japan, and the oil-rich countries. Virtually none of the intergovernmental resolutions on the New International Economic Order (prepared by Third World governments) are questioning the Capitalist Market System per se but are instead calling for a restructuring of that System. Take, for example, the proposal for drawing up a code of conduct for Transnational Corporations. A code of conduct may perhaps regulate certain business practices but the Transnational Corporations will, for certain, continue to be the main agents for the internationalisation of the capitalist mode of production and exchange. No doubt, the International System of States will go on supporting the expansion of the Capitalist System until
it collapses as a result of its own contradictions - whenever (or if ever) that may happen. 15/

In the absence of any immediate prospects for radical changes in "North-South" relations or rapid development of "South-South" collective self-reliant economies, it may perhaps be worthwhile for Third World countries to attempt to replace EEC's trade preference systems with more concrete and profitable trade arrangements, which as well would be acceptable to European Importers and International Firms that in any case will continue to be the main economic actors in EEC-Third World relations for many years to come. This does not necessarily imply that the Third World is in a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis the EEC whose economic (and political) future partly depends on how relations will develop with the Third World. In the Capitalist Market System, European Importers and International Firms are natural Allies of the Third World. This is a reality which the Third World should transform into a strong leverage for the negotiation of sectoral trade agreements.

A case in point is the ACP sugar producing countries' agreement with EEC. This permanent agreement (for an indefinite period) was a result of the economic and political power struggle related to the interests of the British sugar industry at the time of Britain's accession to EEC. A representative of the industry has argued that Britain made the sugar agreement one of the many conditions for joining the EEC. But since the EEC sugar-beet producing countries could not accept unlimited amounts of ACP sugar, at world market prices, to enter the EEC market then the volume was specified according to the British demand and at the CAP unit price, which is adjusted for inflation and income movements in EEC. The unit price is therefore normally much higher than the world price. The difference is covered partly by intervention from the EEC budget and partly by the consumers. Though the agreement leaves much to be desired, the ACP sugar producing countries can at least, with same degree of confidence, plan the sugar sector of their economy.

Special sectoral trade agreements do not necessarily reinforce Third World dependence. They may, indeed, serve as a first step toward a more economical sound and independent position especially if such a trade approach were pursued in concert by a number of Third World countries. European Importers of light manufactures are not unfamiliar with long term delivery agreements which they often prefer for the more haphazard way of going round bidding in competition with other Buyers. Importers are, first and foremost, interested in proper delivery of products of the right quality. This is why many of them have their own technicians posted at Third World factories with which they have contracts, or they place their orders at factories which are renowned subsidiaries of Transnational Corporations. Some of the European International Buying Groups (e.g. INTER-COOP and INTERCONTO) would, no doubt, welcome the idea of entering into special long term agreements with Third World countries.

Moreover, Free Enterprises are now accustomed to state intervention. Indeed, they sometimes welcome intervention as a necessary measure to dampening the repeated eruptions of crises in the Capitalist System. What Free Enterprises do not like are complicated systems of state interventions such as GSP and MFA. It is also well-known that Third World Governments and Exporters prefer simple and concrete trade arrangements for the sort of complicated agreements which presently regulate their trade relations with EEC.

There is, therefore, every reason for the Third World to reconsider its options vis-a-vis EEC. To reiterate, the essential point is that EEC cannot afford a breakdown of relations with the Third World and that EEC countries in the place of trade preferences will have to accept other economic means of pursuing their political interests vis-a-vis the Third World. The approach is to trade-off the present systems of trade preferences, be it the autonomous GSP or the contractual agreements, with new appropriate long term and "price indexed" contracts for both primary and manufactured products.

If the Third World countries were to trade-off their tariff preferential access to EEC, they could rightly argue that since the EEC countries at present were prepared to forego tariff revenues of the order of say US$ 600 million annually to whoever manages to benefit from it, mainly in the form of "windfall gains" (which per definition is not essential for business), then a trade-off package should perhaps include a provision for the transfer of such "extra" tariff revenues (if not all revenue from tariffs and levies collected on imports from the Third World) for the benefit of International Development Cooperation under the control of, for example, certain United Nations agencies. Such transfers should, of course, be made in addition to the 0.7% ODA target in order to be meaningful in the context of a trade-off package.

New systems of EEC-Third World contractual agreements should be dynamic in scope and function. Third World Exporters and European Importers and International Firms should agree, within the framework of explicit provisions for Third World and European state intervention, to jointly promote the development of all productive forces in the Third World. This implies that the domestic economies in Third World countries should benefit from the production and exchange activities in their respective export sectors (provisions for off-shore production would probably be undesirable). It also implies, that Third World countries (governments and the industrial and commercial sectors) progressively will have to enter into contractual agreements (a collective self-reliant approach) in order to further develop their productive forces beyond the capacity of their domestic economies and the obvious limitations in "North-South" trade at any period in the process of World Development.
Abstract: This paper is a summary of three brief enquiries conducted in Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands on public opinion about the Third World. The summary analyses the role of different social actors and traditions which may account for the relative progressiveness of these three countries. Questions are raised about the opinions of people at large, about the role of official development assistance (ODA) and its steep rise over the past decade, and some conclusions are drawn on information policy.
Kristen Ringdal

PUBLIC OPINION AND INFORMATION ON THIRD WORLD RELATIONS IN NORWAY, SWEDEN AND THE NETHERLANDS

NOTE BY IFDA

Why is public opinion in Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands on the Third World and on the development problématique more favourable and more progressive than public opinion in other industrialized countries? IFDA asked three writers from the three countries to reflect on this question, each to conduct a two-week tour of interviews in one of the countries which is not his or her own, and to compare the findings together. The bulk of interviews were conducted with people who work on Third World information in a professional capacity. Due to the brief duration and the modest nature of the project, no attempt was made to reassess the general attitude of people at large towards the Third World. Nor was it possible, at this stage, to conduct comparative interviews in other industrialized countries. Some elements of the study could, nevertheless, lend themselves to a fresh discussion on public opinion towards development.

This summary has been compiled from three reports prepared in June 1978 by Anton Ploeg (Netherlands) on Norway, Kristen Ringdal (Norway) on Sweden, and Berit Härld (Sweden) on the Netherlands. It was written by Kristen Ringdal, and he alone bears the responsibility for the conclusions drawn. The three country reports can be obtained from IFDA on request.

We feel that the issue of public opinion on the Third World in industrialized countries is important, and we would like to encourage readers to react and to send us their contributions (of 2-3 typewritten pages) to the debate.

SUMMARY REPORT

The three nations covered by this study are relatively progressive in their policies toward the Third World compared to other rich nations. They are at the top of the OECD statistics of official development assistance (ODA) and they have taken a progressive stand at UNCTAD IV. Why are Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands more progressive than other rich nations?

The progressiveness of the three nations on the level of official policy may be the result of pressure from one or more of the following three levels: the elites, the mass media, and public opinion. The elites consist of official decision-makers - people in leading positions in business and large organizations. The mass media include the attitudes of journalists as well as the amount and quality of Third World coverage in the mass media. Public opinion is the general attitude of people at large. This has been assessed through polls in about a dozen countries in Europe. We decided to interview persons working with information on Third World relations. A total of nearly 80 persons were interviewed.
Progressiveness

Why are these three nations more progressive than other rich nations?

The first point to make is that several of those interviewed had doubts about their progressiveness. In Sweden it was said that their ODA policy was the best in the world, on the other hand this was not reflected on the Swedish trade policy. Private investment in African nations with conservative regimes continues.

The second point is that the information workers interviewed did not regard the people at large as well informed, or specially interested, in relations of other countries with the Third World, though several in Sweden were of the opinion that the level of knowledge was higher in their countries than in West Germany and in the United States. In other words, none of the persons interviewed mentioned pressure from the "grass roots" as the reason for the great increase in the ODA of Norway and Sweden in the 1970s.

The third point is the importance of people in leading positions. In the eyes of those interviewed, the elites of the political parties and the large organizations led the way both in the first phase and later when the ODA was heavily increased. The different types of elites have shown a remarkable agreement on basic principles, without which it would have been very difficult to increase the ODA.

Lastly, no one was of the opinion that the relatively intense information work in the three nations was an important factor in explaining the progressiveness.

Commenting on the social and cultural background which led to a favourable attitude towards development, the people interviewed mentioned the following factors:

a) The cultural and religious traditions in the three countries include a desire to repair the world. This feeling has been, and still is, very strong and has led to substantial missionary activities, actively supported by the populations at home. In the Netherlands the Calvinist attitude - an attitude which is not restricted to the followers of the Calvinist faith but is also apparent among the Roman Catholics in the country - implied guilt feelings which favoured not only mission work, but also charity work like fund-raising and, nowadays, development aid.

b) The political traditions in the three countries emphasize welfare policies. In Sweden and Norway, the Social-Democrats have been in office almost without interruption since the 1930s. During this period the two countries have been transformed into welfare states. In the Netherlands, coalition governments of Labour and the Catholic party started this process after World War II with the support of the other Christian-Democratic parties. Having established a thorough welfare system, the governments could turn outside to attempt to promote a measure of welfare in the poor countries.

c) The Netherlands has been a colonial power for a long time, which led to close ties with Third World countries and an international orientation of Dutch enterprises. The Dutch are aware of their dependence on other countries for their
existence. This may explain the greater role of commercial interests in Dutch aid policies compared with those in Sweden, and especially in Norway. While one Swedish correspondent said that the internationalization of the economy had been a background factor in getting Sweden's foreign aid programme, this factor was not mentioned at all in Norway.

Commenting more specifically on the steep increase in development aid, the most frequent reasons mentioned were:

d) The steady economic growth in the post-war period has resulted in enormous increases in the standards of living in the three countries. This prosperity has made the people feel that they can afford to help the poor of the world. Further, economic growth made increases in development aid possible without cutting down on wages and social security at home. Many were of the opinion that the stepping up of development aid could not have been accomplished in periods of stagnation like today.

e) In Sweden and Norway the main political parties were in agreement on the issue. Non-Labour governments in both countries have in fact not made significant changes in aid policies. Significant factors in the Netherlands were the opinions of the many action groups and an active Minister in a Ministry dominated by Social-Democrats.

f) The governments have been actively supported (some respondents said 'pushed') by groups of opinion leaders in several sections of the population (in the Netherlands there was talk of a 'development lobby'). In Sweden it was mentioned that radical groups have been able to influence the politicians, as they met no resistance.

g) In Sweden, the government decided, in 1968, to increase ODA to 1% of GNP by the mid-1970s. This was said to have had great strategical importance, making it impossible for the government to reduce the stepping up of development assistance when the economic stagnation set in.

h) A few of the persons interviewed in Norway remarked that elements of snobbery were involved in that the people prided themselves that they, as a small nation, gave an example to other nations with regard to foreign aid. In the Netherlands, respondents drew attention to the small size of the country - pointing out that such countries are prone to show that, although small, they are not dependent in their policies upon bigger nations.

People at large

How can we explain the relative "coolness" in the people at large?

We think two factors are important: first of all, foreign policy is an elite domain, especially in small nations where foreign policy is formulated in the foreign office. The foreign offices, of course, interact with the parliaments and consult the large organizations, but the picture of foreign policy being remote from the people at large remains. Second, very few see connexions between the situation in the Third World and their own concrete living conditions. Polls show that people at large are much more occupied with the problems of daily life,
e.g., housing, getting new roads, bettering the health system, etc. One might, however, object to this in referring to polls which show wide acceptance for the principle of development aid.

It is true that 70-80 per cent of the population in these three countries are in favour of the idea of development assistance; however, this picture becomes more mixed as more concrete questions are posed. This may be understood from the reasons people give for development assistance. They are primarily moral (of the type "we ought to help the starving people in the Third World"). Very few connect the idea of ODA to justice or self-interest in securing peace in the world.

Earlier research shows that the elites in several countries are more positive in their Third World orientation than the population at large. Why has the positiveness in the elites not been converted into more progressive policy in other rich countries?

This is a highly complex question and we can only give some hints. First, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands are not unique as to religion. The same can be said of sending missionaries, though the amount of money collected per capita for such activities are among the highest in the world. To give a fuller answer, one would have to look at the historical experience of the three nations. Along with other rich nations, they have developed a welfare society. This may be unique compared with the United States, but certainly not compared with West Germany. Rather, we think that the ideology of equality that pervades, especially in the Scandinavian countries, is unique. Historically, this has developed from a non-violent solution to class conflicts that evolved from industrialization.

Another observation is that the countries studied are small. They have fewer means to influence international policies than larger ones. To increase their prestige and influence they are prone to base their foreign policy upon the United Nations, where one nation has one vote. In line with this is the heavy emphasis placed by the United Nations on the 0.7% of GNP target for ODA.

**Official Development Assistance**

Why has the ODA of Norway and Sweden increased rapidly in the 1970s in contrast to most other rich nations?

In addition to factors mentioned earlier, economic recession set in later in Norway and Sweden. For Norway, the North Sea oil made it possible for the government to try to 'buy' Norway out of the stagnation.

Another factor is the reasoning behind the ODA. The large nations have used ODA as an instrument of foreign policy, to secure investments or exports or to stabilize regimes. In Scandinavia, at least, the official reasons are based on arguments of solidarity. The ODA is meant first of all to serve the interests of the Third World. This has made Scandinavia less affected by the general frustration of the major powers as to ODA as a means of furthering self interests.

We conclude this part of the paper by pointing out the policy advice from these observations. First, the uniqueness of the three countries as to ideology of
equality is not instrumental. We can, however, say that it will be difficult to find acceptance in the general population for increased ODA in any country as long as social security at home is neglected. Second, the politicians should not take the "negative" public opinion as an excuse for cutting down the ODA budgets. As mentioned, the people at large are positive to the idea of ODA, and the experience of Norway and Sweden shows that the ODA can be increased even rapidly without creating severe political opposition.

Lastly, it seems that a policy of equalization, both nationally and between nations, will meet most resistance in time of economic stagnation. Thus, in perspective, the weakest groups will benefit from economic growth.

Information policy

Polls show that the mass media, especially television, are the main sources of information for the people at large. Since the media work from the implicit policy of reporting "news", the concentration is on the extraordinary: scandals, wars and catastrophes. Thus, information workers see their function as being to enlarge people's views and to explain the background for the news. In this way, information activity on the part of the NGOs is to counteract the impressions from the media.

In the three nations, the State is heavily involved in information work. The Dutch government spends around 9 million US dollars each year; the money is distributed to NGOs by the National Committee for Information and Conscientization. In Sweden, 3.4 million dollars and in Norway, 1.9 million dollars are spent on information from the State budgets. SIDA in Sweden and NORAD in Norway have adopted the policy of decentralizing the information activities to NGOs, though they themselves also do information work. Most of the people interviewed had great belief in this policy of decentralization. People have greater confidence in their own organizations. The NGOs can take ideological stands which an official information body is unable to. The NGOs see the relationship to Third World from a different angle, thus promoting a composite picture.

The information workers in the three countries had great confidence in personal information. This includes both study travels to the Third World, as well as personal contact between senders and receivers of information. In Sweden, this has resulted in a project on the part of the Labour movement to educate a local network of opinion leaders on international questions. Another project in the same line has been developed by SIDA. The aim is to educate local groups in schools on relationships between Sweden and the Third World. When completed, this will comprise 3-4,000 persons covering all countries. This project is based on the importance of getting Third World relations into the curricula of the schools. The formation of the picture of the world at this stage may have consequences in attitudes to problems of the Third World in adulthood.

In Sweden, the concept of "internationalization" of teaching is accepted as an ideal. This is a process that at present is in the starting phase. The study organizations are also beginning to think in terms of getting Third World perspectives into subjects such as ceramics and weaving. In this way, they will be able to reach many who would otherwise not join a study circle on Third World problems.
Decentralization and personal information have consequences for the target groups for information. Most of the NGOs try to reach groups that are interested and likely to use the information, the idea being that these groups act as opinion leaders discussing Third World relations in their organization and social network. This also implies a view of the role of information. Very few information workers think that information does matter much as to affecting attitudes in a short-term perspective. To evaluate the effects of information work is extremely difficult. One must, however, compare the "normal" way of seeing Third World problems today with 10-15 years ago. In this perspective, it is evident that our view of the Third World is changing. One of the persons interviewed in Sweden had reflected on this and he was of the opinion that the conscious information work which, however, reaches out to only a segment of the population would gradually change the way the whole population thinks about the fundamental causes of poverty. In the long run, this will mean more than the "news" in the media.

Finally, some words on the content of information: a common belief exists among the information workers that concentrating on the extreme suffering of the poor and on catastrophes has negative effects. It is therefore very important to report progress picturing a Third World with hope for the future. Secondly, it is most important to make information concrete, for example, by comparing the living conditions for workers in Sweden and in Africa.
INTERACTIONS

ELOHEH, OR THE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSE

by Jimmie Durham-

Some Geneva friends and I have been talking to each other about ecology and development for a long time.

They tell me stories about Indians and I tell them stories about Swiss farmers.

Now I am sitting by the Rhone River in Geneva trying to write about my own people, the Cherokee, in time to beat a deadline so that I can go to a party tonight where there may be people from South America, Africa and different parts of Europe.

I think all of that may have bearing on an article about ecology and American Indians. At home I have a collection of stone arrowheads that have been handed down in my family for about seven generations. Just that long ago we were in the "Stone Age", and we have not yet passed from that age into any other age, partly because we are not yet free people and partly because the "Plastic Age" does not please us. Neither does it please my Geneva friends nor most of the people who live in it.

Having been afflicted so recently and so severely by the Plastic Age, without the comparatively gradual move into it that Europeans have had, American Indians may have a more clear view of humanity's role in the world. In trying to explain that view, I would like to warn readers against being overly romantic and "idealistic" about Indians or, on the other hand, being overly arrogant and assuming that we are "primitive savages". Both of those ways of thinking come from racism and have nothing to do with reality.

I think we should also be a little nervous about the phenomenon of Europeans thinking with Third World people about ecology and development; we of the Third World have neither the time nor the options, nor the priorities that Europeans have, even though we may agree that Western imperialism is a monster in its death throes. It is those death throes that we must deal with as we struggle to regain our places in history.

For example, solar energy may be appropriate technology for Navajo Indians in New Mexico from a strict cultural point of view or even from an economic point of view if seen in isolation. But first the Navajo must spend all of their energy to regain their land and freedom. (Indian reservations are controlled by the U.S. government so that Indians may not use the land they live on.) Like or not, part of that struggle for freedom must be some industrialization and building up of capital, to be able to deal with a monster (the U.S.) that must be dealt with. Third World people do not have the privilege of turning their backs on the economic strangle-hold of the U.S. and Europe.
Thus it may be necessary for the Navajo to raise European sheep or cattle at this time, even though it is ultimately ecologically destructive to do so, and therefore economically impractical in the long run.

But, considering those problems and necessities, it is all the more imperative that we hold on to our vision of the world, and that other people begin understanding that vision. We are not "trying to go backwards in time" as our detractors, and even some of our friends, say. We have always been dynamic and adaptive people, as that is part of our vision, our social philosophy. Yet, we do not really see time or history as a linear march towards some utopia. We are not, either, against technology. We think that defining human progress or development in technological terms, or defining "developed" countries as technological countries, is a false definition. All human societies at all times have had technology, and until recently most human societies have had the technology that suited their situation fairly well. (In Western Europe that began changing with the Roman conquest.) The problem of technology and progress is not the least bit simple, and I believe it will take the involvement of all humanity thinking about it for a long time to solve it.

Personally, I like the idea that humans have been to the moon, even though going to the moon is not really very high on any list of human needs, and better representatives of our species could have been chosen over those morons who went.

At this time, however, almost all of us surely agree that most modern technology causes human suffering and alienation, including destruction of the environment, and that it is controlled by people who do not think of human values and needs, nor even of long-range practicality.

But what many people do not see is that there is involved a mentality - a way of seeing the world - that does not disappear just because a society stops being capitalist. It is a mentality that helped produce capitalism and imperialism, and then was re-enforced by them.

Readers must by now think that I am rambling, as I am supposed to be writing about the American Indian view of ecology. Whether or not I am rambling, my intention is to try to place the Indian way of thinking in a less esoteric position. We are usually too much thought of as outside some "mainstream" of human events.

In speaking to Europeans, it is usually necessary for Indians to point that if we are not understood it may be because the European way of thinking is unreal, and that it is a way of thinking that is inflicted upon Europeans, and so, unnatural. You see, we do not really think you are racially inferior, just misguided.

Now, I shall finally begin talking about us. First I would like to clear some common misconceptions. American Indians have been in North America for at least 70,000 years. Before Columbus our population, excluding Mexico, was somewhere around twenty million or more. We had an extremely varied and nutritious diet all the way across the continent, with no poverty, and with cures for most of the diseases we knew. Our medicinal technology was extremely sophisticated, including chemical birth control methods and universally free aspirin (solicylic
acid) for hang-overs. Technological development was in continual progress, al-
though not with the explosiveness that comes with capitalism. (I would like to
point out that very much of capitalist technological development has been for
war, or for relieving the ills brought on by technological development, or for
sustaining more and more humans to the exclusion of other animals.)

Indian people in North America are very different from one nation to another,
culturally and even racially. But there is an underlying vision that unifies
most of us. Some notable exceptions are the Aztec, Inca, Kwakiutl and Karankawa
societies, but in those instances it was more a case of twisting the vision
around backwards than of having a different vision.

Life styles are varied according to the geographical region, since for us culture
springs from our life on specific lands, or I should say in specific ecological
systems.

I am Cherokee, so I will speak about Cherokees. But we are not very different
from any of the other nations east of the Mississippi. All Indians of those
regions are farmers and hunters, a fact so ignored that I think there is no
name in anthropology for that kind of society.

First let me explain what we do, and then I will explain why.

We raise corn, beans, many kinds of squash and pumpkins, tomatoes, melons, and
sunflowers, cotton and, of course, tobacco. We also gather many wild plants
that are staples, such as poke, several kinds of nuts, many kinds of fruit,
buckwheat and water potatoes. We fish for many kinds of fish and also eat tur-
tles and crawfish. We hunt, or at least we used to, seven different kinds of
mammals and twelve kinds of birds that I can think of.

Our gardens are not large compared to our population because several crops are
planted in the same space. For example, beans are planted in such a way that
they grow up the corn stalks and squash is planted in the rows between the corn.
Those three kinds of plants benefit each other, and the soil is re-fertilized
each year by the dead stalks and leaves and by fish scraps. In the spring the
earth is plowed well before planting time, which gives predators and the spring
storms a chance to kill many of the grubs and parasites. There is almost always
surplus from the gardens, enough so that each village had warehouses for surplus
corn and beans. But a crop failure was seldom disastrous because we did not
depend exclusively upon domesticated crops. The same was true of hunting and
fishing. Early British travellers reported seeing huge herds of semi-domesticated
turkeys. We could have easily depended exclusively upon those animals for meat,
but we never thought to do so. It would have meant domesticating those animals,
which we consider as elder relatives. Needless to say, such a system as I have
just briefly described is completely sound ecologically. It places humans
within the ecological system, instead of in opposition to it, or "at the mercy
of" it, as goes the stereotype about us primitives. It should be clear that it
is possible for all sorts of development and change to take place within such a
system. It is still eminently practical today, and I hope readers are not con-
fused by the way I have switched back and forth from present to past tense verbs;
it is only because we are not now allowed to practice that system completely, yet
I do not want to speak of us in the past tense.
Let me now go back to the beginning, though. At first there was only water. A giant turtle dove down to the bottom and brought up some mud on his back. That made land. After some time the animals decided they wanted some light, and each kind of animal tried to steal the sun but with no success. Finally, a little spider over in a corner said, "Well, I will go steal the sun". When people asked who in hell she was, she said, "Oh, I am your grandmother, I have always been here but just like to sit and weave so you forget about me". Then she went and caught the sun in her web and brought it back. But all these animals were generous so they agreed that other people could have it part-time. That is why we have night and day. Soon, the buzzard began flying over the land where the Cherokees would be. Every time he dipped his wing it made a valley. That is why our land is up and down so much.

One time, all the animals were having a council meeting, and decided to make humans. They began arguing because each animal wanted humans to be like himself. The bear said that humans should like to sleep a lot, eat honey, and walk on their hind legs sometimes. The deer said humans should be sleek, and be able to run fast. And so on; but arguments are boring so everyone began to fall asleep. All except coyote, that is. He was just getting started, because he likes to stay awake all night. When all the other animals were sound asleep, coyote went around and took a bite out of each one. He chewed it all up and spit it back out. Then he sang a certain song and the first human came to life. That is why we are a little like each of the other animals, but we like to sing and make jokes like coyote.

The other animals are our elders. You can easily see that they all know what to do in life. But humans are like young children to the other animals; we are the ones who get confused and always have to think what to do each day. To be wise we should watch and listen to the other animals. Each person has special animals who are his teachers. He must stay with them sometimes, and always do what they advise.

Readers may have already noticed that our idea of where humans came from is much more scientifically correct than are European or Christian myths. Our way of thinking about humans puts us not at the centre or at the "top of the heap", but just one kind of animal among many, and not even a very smart kind at that. Not knowing what to do, we must constantly watch the rest of nature. Certainly we cannot see ourselves as outside of nature.

We do not call ourselves Cherokee; our word for ourselves is "Ani Yun Wiyah", which means something like "the people who truly originate from this place". The word "Ani" means "people". It is also used to make singular nouns for animals into plural nouns. For example, "Wohali" is "eagle", but the only plural form is "Ani Wohali" - "eagle people". Instead of saying "three eagles", we say "three of the eagle people".

Cherokees are divided into seven clans. I am of the wolf clan, but we have no word that corresponds to the word clan. To say what clan I am from I must say "Tsi Watah", which means "I am a wolf". The wolf clan as a whole is called "Ani Watah", the Wolf people. Obviously (to some people, anyway) I am a human being, but I am also a wolf.
There is no separation, even in thought and language, between humans and other animals. We never have to ask whether "nature" is benevolent, malevolent, or neutral; we cannot place ourselves outside of it to ask such questions. One's family is, after all, one's family. Of course, neither can other people place themselves outside of nature. They only pretend to, and we can all see the horrible results such childish arrogance brings.

The Cherokee word for land is "Eloheh". That same word also means history, culture, and religion. We have no history and no culture if we have no land for them to come from. We cannot think of ourselves as existing without existing directly in the land. Land for us is not property, or even a place to build a house and plant crops. It is something truly sacred in the most profound sense, and it is part of ourselves.

All of our lives are directed towards "tuning in" to the rest of nature. There are ceremonies for all sorts of phenomena. The longest festival is the Green Corn Dance in the Spring and in early Autumn. There are songs, prayers, and dances for hunting deer, for going fishing, etc. Anthropologists have said that by these ceremonies we are trying to "gain power" over these animals or events. That is a very twisted way of thinking. What we are really doing is trying to get ourselves into certain rhythms or certain moods. When I dance the Wolf Dance I am able to put myself in a completely different place than where I normally am. I see myself and the world through different eyes for a moment, and I partake in someone else's (the Wolf's) rhythm and power. But it is reciprocal. I also give my rhythm into those animals or events. In other words, I tune in.

When we pray (sing), we pray to the four directions: North, South, East and West. But when we take tobacco, as part of the prayer, we first offer it to six directions, or powers - those four and up and down. Thus our elders teach us that there are seven directions: North, South, East, West, Up, Down, and inside one's self.

So, we are given much responsibility in the world. Each one of us is a direction. Cherokee government is by council, which actually consists of every Cherokee. When one goes to council it is a duty to listen carefully to what others are saying and to say your own thoughts with care and integrity.

Eloheh can be thought as a council of everything that is alive. The council of the universe. We all are in this council to state ourselves with integrity, and to listen carefully to all the other members.

I think we place humans as a whole and as individuals in a more realistic perspective than Europeans do.

One does not go out and shoot one's brothers and sisters for sport, or kill off an entire race of people, such as the Whooping Crane people, for progress or through carelessness.

The more we are part of the land which sustains us and our needs for sustenance, the more fulfilled we feel. We like to be with our whole family, because everyone says such interesting things.
There is no technology or even a philosophy which allows humans to escape this earth - this Eloheh - or to have "mastery" over it. We will always have to eat, and so we will always have to depend upon our family for groceries. Maybe we can get unnaturally fat or numerous by stealing the groceries of other members of the family, or murdering them, but such a situation cannot last and it certainly does not make the fat murderers feel very good.

*/ Of the Cherokee nation. Jimmie Durham is a member of the American Indian Movement and of the International Indian Treaty Council. He played a key role in the organization of a non-governmental international conference held at the United Nations in Geneva in September 1977 which discussed discrimination against indigenous populations in the Americas.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AS PART OF A SELF-RELIANCE STRATEGY

by Shann Turnbull*/

The IFDA Dossier 2 of November 1978 invited comments on "how a new dialogue on industrialization could be initiated". Rather than just propose a dialogue, I would propose a five point plan as a basis for initiating action.

Industrialization is predicated upon the use of more productive technology. While the transfer of technology can be achieved through the purchase of machines, manuals and books, it usually also requires the transfer of individuals with the relevant knowledge of its application. The transfer of individuals can be initiated by either the donor or recipient country.

At the end of the last century, Japan initiated a programme of industrialization through sending nationals to be trained overseas for this express purpose. The success of this strategy has been outstanding, yet it has not been widely encouraged or followed. The transfer of individuals from donor countries is the most commonly employed method for transferring technology. This method can be quite efficient, though limited in extent when carried out through the government sector. The dominant, most effective but least beneficial method of industrialization is through the operations of transnational corporations (TNCs).

The transfer of industrial knowledge through TNCs, with their present system of perpetual property rights, represents a very inefficient technique and can very often be counterproductive for developing countries. Any corporation which provides stockholders with perpetual property rights creates a means for extracting values in excess of the incentive required to initiate new investment and/or the transfer of technology. The concept of values in excess of incentive or 'surplus profits' cannot be properly evaluated unless a cashflow system of analysis is used. Astoundingly, modern economic theory is not based on the cashflow system of analysis used by TNCs, individuals, and the small businessman. As a result, many of the most gifted and knowledgeable economists are denied insights into the problems and opportunities which TNCs provide for a self-reliance industrialization strategy.
A cashflow system of economic analysis (paradigm) reveals that the perpetual property rights of TNCs create the means for the technologically advanced countries to extract surplus profits from the poor countries and to make the rich in the rich countries richer. This ability is inconsistent with the basic assumption of market economies that competition will limit excessive profits. Correction of this defect can be achieved by the use of dynamic property rights (tenure).

Dynamic tenure is created where monopoly property rights transfer from one class of individuals to another class on a continuous basis with the passage of time. Such arrangements could be introduced into the constitution (charter) of corporations so that all the property rights of foreign venture capitalists transferred to resident employees and/or consumers, etc. at, say, a rate of 5% per annum. This creates what is referred to as an Ownership Transfer Corporation (O.T.C.). If such arrangements were introduced through the provision of tax incentives it could provide a means of phasing out (de-linking) over 20 years all existing foreign perpetual property rights while still attracting new foreign investment and technology.

The elimination of all foreign ownership over time would also eliminate the export of values in excess of incentive after the phase-out period. The capture of these values by residents would substantially accelerate domestic development and self-reliant industrialization. The practicality and advantages of this proposal will be difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate without using the same method of cashflow analysis as is utilized by the TNCs themselves.

The potential for organizing all economic development within a nation or its internal regions on a self-financing basis is largely hidden from economists who base their analysis on concepts of 'profit' and 'rates of profit' which depend upon arbitrary and ever-changing accounting conventions. Cashflow analysis makes quite explicit the fact that economic growth is not a zero sum process and that everybody can become better off if the ownership (tenure) of the means of producing greater wealth is appropriately distributed. Because of this, the cashflow paradigm reveals what should be a self-evident tautology that all economic growth has the potential to be organized on a self-financing basis.

Economic growth occurs when a society increases its ability to both produce and consume goods and services. Technology provides the only way to increase the output of a society without requiring an increase in human labour. The use of technology to increase the output per person will only create growth in a society if the society concerned can also increase its ability to pay for more goods and services. The degree to which a community can increase both its ability to produce and purchase its own output will depend upon (a) the extent that the community owns the revenues of production, and (b) the extent that such revenues exceed the costs to the community of establishing and operating the more productive technology. All technology which generates economic growth must, therefore, pay for all its cost within each community and so become self-financing within each community. The financial problem of generating economic growth is one of bridging the 'payback period' between the time of incurring the costs and of receiving the revenues of more productive technology.
Provided every community can build its own financial and/or social institutions to bridge the 'payback period' of development, then there is absolutely no justification for any community to become dependent upon alien credit institutions. While there could be some constraints on local urban centres and regions within a nation for creating financial institutions to allow self-financing local development, there should be no such constraints on a national economy.

The development of self-financing investment banking institutions in every nation would greatly accelerate the rate of economic growth in each country because it would eliminate the cost of interest payments and any devaluation losses on foreign credits. This financial de-linking of developing nations would also increase their political independence. This would not be in the political or economic interest of the rich industrialized nations and their public or private sector bureaucracies.

The implementation of a self-reliance development strategy based on the self-financing concept and the more efficient transfer of technology is not, however, necessarily dependent upon any initiatives by the rich nations. The Third World can, therefore, introduce self-reliant development strategies on a unilateral basis. This may require that they band together to introduce the five point action plan as suggested below:

1. Conversion of economic opinion leaders to the cashflow and tenure methodology (paradigm) of economic and social analysis so that new insights and solutions to the problems of industrial self-reliance can be identified, accepted, developed and implemented.

2. The education of political leaders and their constituents, especially those in the Third World nations, to the new options identified by the cashflow paradigm for implementing a self-determined, self-financed, self-reliant industrialization strategy.

3. The United Nations and its agencies to introduce the new self-help, self-reliant development strategies based on:
   a) transfer of technology through:
      i) movement of individuals;
      ii) the Ownership Transfer Corporation concept;
   b) the building of local self-financing investment banking and associated institutions to de-link dependent urban areas, regions and nations from alien sources of credit and political influence while at the same time both accelerating and democratizing the process of development.

4. The World Bank and all other governmental international financial institutions to change their operations from providing international credits to teaching client nations how to build their own institutions so as to allow all domestic development to become internally self-financing.

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TOWARDS SOLIDARITY CONTRACTS - THE TEVOEDJRE CONCEPT ARTICULATED
by Reginald Herbold Green*

The contract of solidarity is based firstly on a diagnosis of the present state of the world and secondly on a new view of the development of nations. ... it can become effective only if it recognizes that inequalities exist and if it leads to a will to eliminate them. ... the only way out lies in acceptance of a model of poverty by all.

- Albert Tévoédjré

However keen the aspiration towards a completely new economic order may be, there is no force capable of imposing it overnight. Although the importance of moral and political factors cannot be underestimated they are not enough. We must start with the objective legal realities ...

- Jokica Hadzi Vasileva

Solidarity cannot, of course, replace the struggle for radical changes in the international division of labour and the socio-economic structure of the developing countries, but it can and should help in this struggle.

- Tamas Szentes

Even though it is self interest which motivates this support, the end result is appropriately called "solidarity" which is viewed as any commitment to social measures which are designed to reduce the costs which accompany social conflict.

- Sheldon Danziqer and Robert Haveman

I.

These four quotations from "Towards solidarity contracts" (Labour and Society, Vol.3 - No.3/4, 1978, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva) illustrate the intellectual appeal, practical problems, and theoretical imprecision of the topic at the present time. The idea of "solidarity contracts" as an enforceable way of international and national socio- and politico-economic reconstruction transcending (by recognizing) inequality, self interest and struggle was launched by Albert Tévoédjré, director of the IILS, in January 1976 and has been the subject of considerable subsequent research and dialogue leading to this volume of essays relating it to the struggle for a New International Economic Order.

As Therese Pang puts it succinctly:

The idea of solidarity replaces the missing factor of return for services rendered not by a political factor but by the idea of a superior interest, common to both parties. ... The solidarity contract has to be fitted into a context in which there is as yet no feeling of solidarity: the contract may thus be viewed as a means of compensating for the lack of this feeling of solidarity.

There are therefore two elements or goals to the "solidarity contract":

...
1. achieving a form of relationship based on a foundation beyond either direct exchange or mutual self-interest; and

2. creating a structure of relationship which includes mutual, enforceable requirements on the contracting parties.

On both points confusion appears to exist both intellectually and in radically different interpretations among contributors. Solidarity in family, clan, subclass, class or nation usually does go beyond self-interest, but it is arguable that the foundation from which it is built is a perceived mutual interest which encompasses "enlightened self-interest". Certainly several of the authors so interpret it. If this is correct then less unequal exchanges, conflict reduction, disaster prevention or limitation and other areas of potential perceived mutual self-interest may need further study and dialogue as affording the most practicable base to use in constructing toward inter-governmental "solidarity contracts".

Many of the contracts posed as examples do not appear to be enforceable, nor is it always clear how the mutual obligations could be formulated without the appearance (and reality) of international agencies as "Platonic Guardians" dictating constraints set by industrialized countries to Third World recipients - a process the UN's extended family is all too apt at performing (often unwittingly) but hardly one consistent with "solidarity contracts". In the absence of a perceived mutual interest in the results and of an operational world governmental (juridical and enforcement) apparatus, mutual obligations may well enable each party to pull out if the other defaults, but that is the opposite of enforcing mutual performance.

II.

The nature of the goals and the imprecision (or contradictions) in and among the articulated definitions raise grave doubts as to whether "contracts of solidarity" are even in principle a via media or golden mean between the "what we have we hold" attitudes of the "great" and second-line industrial powers and the struggle à outrance theme of the most single-minded revolutionaries. These are hardly stilled by the repetitive use of slightly refurbished "aid" contracts, the citing of the Lomé Convention as a solidarity institution and TNC's as plausible "solidarity contract" partners and the tendency in a majority of the contributions (by no means all) to treat struggle as a minor secondary contradiction, the result of misunderstanding or a concept not even worthy of mention.

More specifically:

a) Enforceability in a legal sense is not attainable short of world government. In its absence enforceability must be internal to the parties' own consciences or perceptions of mutual interest. What levels of consciousness and what driving forces does this imply?

b) Can one really treat the Marxian (or for that matter the Christian or Islamic or Buddhist) concepts of contradiction and struggle as either totally out of date or secondary? Why and how - and in whose interest?

c) Are solidarity contracts likely in the present international and national contexts to be means to achieve or ways to postpone radical structural change? Among whom? Under what conditions?
Is not the concept — especially so long as it remains imprecise and tied to examples of aid contracts — likely to prove subject to co-option and serve to mystify and demobilize? The danger seems even more acute for "solidarity contracts" than for basic human needs, so the political and technocratic efforts to co-opt that radical Third World approach to the service of multinational marginal reformism and multilateral platonic guardianship should stand as a warning to "solidarity contract" theorists and practitioners.

In particular, how does one treat "solidarity contracts" which are sectional and struggle oriented? Third World and regional bodies? OPEC? The South African — TNC (e.g. Rio Tinto Zinc) — industrialized countries (e.g. two successive Labour governments of the UK) solidarity contracts turning on Rossing Uranium — Foreign Investment — Regional Geopolitics — Cheap Power, etc., far beyond short term profit and loss so as to suggest Messrs. Vorster, Duncan and Benn were engaged in a "solidarity contract"?

Except in special — or at least a limited range of — cases, does not solidarity with necessarily entail solidarity against, with some sub-classes, states, enterprises, individuals being among those whom solidarity is against? What then? On what criteria does one choose between competing, conflicting, struggling solidarity groupings?

III.

To consider what role "solidarity contracts" can play it is necessary to recall the point underlined by Paulin Houtondji that solidarity has usually arisen out of struggle and — historically at least — usually out of social, institutional political or class struggle with the result that:

For anyone actively embroiled in these conflicts — whether he is personally involved or merely feels that they concern him to some extent — it may be said, in simplified terms, that any solidarity experienced, whether imaginary or real, whether based on an objective community of interest or an illusion, always appears, in retrospect, to have been conceived for the purposes of combat ... uniting only in so far as it divides ... Struggle and solidarity are not separate — solidarity exists primarily to further, and in the context and relationship of, struggle. True, the object of struggle may be a common non-human peril, e.g., smallpox, some aspects of ecological destruction, a plague of locusts, but that only underlines the reality that solidarity is inherently both combatitive and protective and also that it is based on a perceived mutual interest.

In fact, all but one of the strongest papers in the volume, Szentes, Hountondji, Oteiza and Rahman, Vasileva and that part of Chonchol not somewhat artificially linked to the opening definition of "solidarity contracts" — all really build from solidarity as a means to unifying excluded, exploited and oppressed persons, primary communities, classes or states to struggle for basic change against entrenched elites, institutions and classes. The exception — WHO team — is in a field in which a broader solidarity against non-human opponents is likely to be more readily attainable, but even so has some aid and platonic guardian admixtures which — while quite possibly objectively necessary today and consistent with initial progress toward making health an "enforceable" (or at least accessible) basic human right — raise questions as to whether what are outlined are
true "solidarity contracts".

This does suggest that, if one thinks and analyses more precisely, there are areas of international relations in which "solidarity contracts" could be practicable and mobilizing today:

a) among "like minded" states, class (sub-class) organizations, parallel institutions (e.g., some co-operatives), voluntary bodies: for specified objectives agreed in the context of a broader ongoing contact and dialogue;

b) among "like goaled" states, institutions like a trade union domestically, or like OPEC vis-a-vis at least its industrialized (East and West) customers;

c) among states or institutions perceiving themselves as "common imperilled", e.g., by locusts or mass starvation or cholera.

In this approach "solidarity contracts" would be a form of organizing for struggle not its antithesis. They are at least to some degree self enforcing and capable of having some built-in conflict resolution devices so long as the common objective or peril remains. They would be a potentially growing, but probably not the dominant, aspect of the attempts to secure international change and are built from perceived common interests (attempting to broaden the perception and commonality) rather than rejecting them. They would not be the only nor in the North/South or the state/enterprise arenas the normal - form of negotiated agreement. To imagine that TNC's can be plausible "solidarity contract" partners (as opposed to useful parties to a negotiated business contract) as Coppe and Sugranyes argue, is a form either of self delusion or mystification and is likely first to confuse and demobilize and then to heighten animosity and increase the violence component in struggle.

The concept of "solidarity contracts" - thus reduced and partially redefined - seems worth much more careful definition, articulation and attempted application if, and only if, one constantly bears in mind Paulin Houtondji's warning:

let us be frank: any talk of solidarity is likely to be misleading if it takes no account of the existence of violence, brutality and oppression and disregards the widespread presence of conflicts of interests within every nation as well as on a world-wide scale. ... It would in that case be nothing more than one of the many strategems adopted by those in power to quell the efforts for liberation of the oppressed masses of the world, weaken their determination, stave off their victory.

Or as the present reviewer remarked in a related context - "I agree that wolves and sheep have certain common interests in conflict with those of cattle herders but, as a would-be sheep, I am quite unconvinced that the effort to create a Joint Benevolent Society of Sheep and Wolves is sound - unless one happens to be a wolf."

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WHAT IS A STRATEGY

by Johan Galtung

1. Introduction

Strategy, that is politics. And politics, like anything else can be done more or less well. To know whether it is done more well or less well, and above all to have some ideas about how it could be done better, a theory of strategy is indispensable. Much of that exists today, after all this is what key thinkers in the field of politics such as von Clausewitz and Lenin were writing about in very different ways, and more recently there is that remarkable book called Strategy for a Living Revolution, by George Lakey. However, there is no dearth of material in this field.

Rather, there is a tendency, particularly well-known from UN documents and from recent "world models" to stop the analysis where "politics" begins, with formulations like "this, however, is a political question". Of course, that is where the analysis very often should start, leading up to action directives that are clear and justified in terms of the goals to be obtained - at least on paper. It has been the view of the present author for the last 20 years or so - and the work done in the field of peace research is an example of this - that an analysis without policy implications of a strategic nature is no good analysis. There are two reasons for this. First, as has been said by so many - our task is not merely to reflect the world but to do something about it, and to the extent we are exercising paper-and-pencil operations we can at least guide these operations towards policy implications. Second, and less frequently mentioned, when policy implications are spelt out the analysis itself, both its strength and its shortcomings, tends to become much more understandable.

Readers can say to themselves and to others "so this is what you mean!"; the author himself might be one of these readers and feel that his analysis is challenged by his own implications in the sense that the whole thing does not hang well enough together and hence be prompted to revisions. In short, it is a good way of forcing a dialogue, the author with himself, the author with the readers, the readers among themselves.

It is the contention of the present paper that in order to spell out a strategy one has to know not only what the goal of that political
activity is, and why (the justification) - the answers to these two questions would be nothing but regular analysis of what is wrong in present society and what a better society might look like. One also has to know who shall do it (the carriers of the strategy, die Träger, les porteurs), and how they are going to do it. And more than that, some ideas have to be given as to where (in social space, possibly also in geographical space) concrete actions have to be carried out, and when (in social time, in some cases also in chronological time). It is only by adding the who, how, where and when to the what and why that a sufficient level of specificity is given so that at least the thinking of strategies moves from the realm of goal formulations to the realm of processes.

In saying this one should carefully avoid a too sharp distinction between goals and processes in the field of politics. Thus, a goal which is not at the same time a process becomes a dogma, a rigid, ahistorical final stage of development - hence an absurdity. And a process, such as a political fight, which does not at the same time have some character of being a goal in itself is hardly worth participating in. This is so clearly seen when one is participating in a political fight: the intensity of the experience, the joy of participation, of doing something meaningful - all that goes much beyond expectation of goals to be realized, it attaches to the process itself. In fact, after the goal has been "achieved" - the enemy is out of the country, the class enemy has been eliminated as a class - the aftermath does not nearly carry the same range and depth of satisfaction as the struggle itself. This, however, is not the same as saying that struggle is the goal of humankind: one will probably come closer to important insights in human beings if one postulated an undulating pattern of struggle alternating with goal achievement or at least some respite from struggle as something worth striving for. And this is perhaps what the Chinese mean or meant when they talked about "a permanent revolution".

Strategy, then, is the link between theory and practice. It has to have an element of either to steer clear of the Scylla of actionism without goals and a commitment to goals without any action. But what a good strategy is we never know before it has been translated into practice and proven to work.
2. The When

In the list of 6 small words used in the introduction it might have been logical to start with the what and the why - and precisely for that reason we would like to start with the when and the where. In a study of goals the what and the why would dominate, in a study of processes of development the when and the where should so to speak lead the train of thought.

We shall split the time dimension, the when, in two aspects: some reflections about when to start political action in an absolute sense, and when to initiate actions in a relative sense, meaning by that the time order of different types of political action. We shall refer to these two aspects as "the principle of ripe time" and "the principle of correct time order" respectively, and now proceed under these two headings.

(a) The principle of ripe time. Easily this is the point that could best be used as a way of differentiating between politicians and theoreticians. A good politician has a sense of timing, a theoretician may have a sense of all the rest but is not sufficiently attuned to the seismic waves of the political landscape to know when to march forward. There is a good expression in French: attendre son heure, but it is obvious that it cuts both ways. On the one hand it is a warning against he who rushes forward against the tidal waves where a little bit of waiting would have given him tremendous additional energy or momentum. On the other hand it should also serve as a warning against he who does nothing but waiting, using the "principle of unripe time" as a perennial pretext for inaction, letting all the tidal waves pass, occasionally picking out a counter-wave which can be used as evidence that he is correct in adapting his unperturbed waiting posture.

The metaphors used above point to one simple principle: to work with rather than against trends that are present anyhow, especially when they are in the "right" direction, but also when they are neutral and can be steered somewhat. A strategy is a guided or steered process, and should make full use of forces operating in the political landscape anyhow. As a metaphor might serve the way in which women in many "primitive" societies give birth: in a squatting position, making use of the force of gravity in addition to their own muscular forces and contractions; as opposed to women in "advanced" societies lying horizontally, working neither with nor against the pull of gravity.
Thus, the timing question becomes one of knowing when such socially and politically relevant forces are operating. No doubt survey analysis may be an important tool here: trend data showing declines or increases in certain attitudes may be more important than data giving the absolute figures. To be low but on the increase may be better than to high but on the decline – the gradient in public opinion figures may give more information about the political forces operating than the absolute figures. Thus, an attitude which has held a commanding position for a long time but shows indications of slipping, and particularly in the center of political opinion formation in society would be less worth gambling on than a less widely held opinion rapidly gaining adherence, particularly in the center of society.

In saying this it should be emphasized that by center/periphery we certainly do not mean bourgeoisie/proletariate. It is only that societies do have steep gradients of social position, these gradients are strongly correlated with being sender and being receiver of politically relevant attitudes, and for that reason it would count more what happens among skilled workers in the cities than among uneducated old ladies in the countryside. (In saying so we have already indicated four components of this gradient: age, sex, urban/rural – education – and one could add others, income, primary versus secondary and tertiary sector, functionary vs. worker, and the geographical center/periphery dimensions of any society).

There is an other, however, much more precise but also more difficult to define component in the question of "when" in the absolute sense. Again a physical analogy might be useful: an eskimo who wants to topple an iceberg into the water will know that no force he can mobilize is able to do so before the iceberg is in a position of highly unstable equilibrium, at the very water front. At that point only a little muscle would be sufficient. The question of identifying when repressive regimes are in unstable equilibrium is a major one – the point would be not to waste forces trying to unsaddle a firmly entrenched oppressor, but rather wait till he is vulnerable.

One might say that the upshot of all this would be to argue in favour of some kind of political jiu-jitsu; an art of fighting where the two principles mentioned are fully utilized. In so doing one is applying strategies that the weak can also make use of. And an other upshot of what has been said so far is the crucial significance of being ready with the goal once time is ripe so as to avoid being caught in a dilemma between
not knowing what to do when the time is ripe and working against all social forces with precious, even perfect goals in mind.

(b) The principle of correct time order. We now assume that the total strategy has a number of sub-strategies, there are many different things to be done, and the question is: in what order? The general contention is that this is a much understudied problem in political science in general and the strategy of development in particular, and hence a field where some possible new breakthroughs might be made.

Thus, consider the following five elements in almost everybody's program of development:

1. Power to the people
2. De-coupling, de-linking from dominant world power structures
3. Distribution of access to production factors, more particularly:
   - control over land, water, seeds, and other raw materials ("land")
   - credit facilities ("capital")
   - education and health "quality of human resources"
   - technologies ("means of production")
   - organization ("mode of production")
   - transportation/communication (distribution factor)
4. Agricultural production,
   - of food stuffs
   - of industrial raw materials
5. Industrial production,
   - for mass consumption
   - of capital goods

Since there is nothing about export in this program it might be the typical program of an early phase of self-reliance with much emphasis on self-sufficiency. Most important, however, is the order of implementation of the 5 points above: if it is not as indicated in this list it might very easily go very wrong. In short, the field of strategies is not like conventional arithmetics: the order of the factors is by no means unimportant. For instance, if production comes before distribution re-distribution later may be extremely difficult or impossible because of the vested interests created among those who control the production factors. Similarly, if de-linking comes before a change in the internal power structure the masses might even more than before become the victims of internal oppression. Further, if production comes before de-linking the result may very easily be export oriented production, with surplus value accumulating on the top
rather than where it is needed. And if, industrial production is stepped up before agricultural production the result will easily be food dependency. And so on, and so forth.

The list above should not be interpreted in a too rigid manner. Above all, it should not be interpreted in a linear manner, meaning first one starts with point (1), then comes point (2) and so on:

\[(1) \quad (2) \quad (3) \quad (4) \quad (5)\]

Rather, the interpretation is something like this:

\[(\alpha) \quad (\beta) \quad (\gamma) \quad (\delta) \quad (\epsilon)\]

A task is initiated, but it is not concluded — after some time the system may be ripe for a second step which is not concluded either, and so on.

Thus, the interpretation of what is said above is not the classical "revolution first, then one can go ahead with the rest". The point is rather that to do something about number (5) above, the distribution of access to production factors, some amount of decoupling, of de-linking from dominant world power structures is probably indispensable. And for this to happen some amount of power to the people who see themselves as the victims of the coupling, the link with the dominant world power structure, is equally indispensable. But here it might well be that merely the introduction of more genuine popular representation in an otherwise not too well functioning parliamentary system, or some more freedom to trade unions would already be helpful — after all, those among the Third world countries that have a more progressive stance often has nothing more than that in terms of "power to the people".

A question that now could be raised would be the following: accepting the idea that there is such a thing as a wrong time order does not imply that there has to be a ripe time order in terms of the order in which certain strategies are initiated, whether it is according to the first or the second version in the drawings above. There is a fourth very simple possibility: that the strategies are carried out concurrently:
In other words, why not simply try to do everything at the same time?
There are several reasons why, and the problem is an important one.

First of all, one might say that if this is possible by all means do so. But the point of departure is a country or a region or a group so steered from the outside through local, oppressive elites that it is difficult to see that it would at all be possible. Why should that elite group or metropolitan power be interested in any distribution at all - point (3) on the list? As this is a rather indispensable part in a total strategy it sounds unlikely that there would be any political space for any move in that direction as long as nothing has been done about points (1) and (2).

But then there is a second argument of a totally different type. It is quite true as can be observed, that an approach that leaves out some factors for some time and puts them further down on the agenda by necessity will be one-sided, disequilibrated, uneven. Thus, in the first stage it might lead to a society rich in popular assemblies with considerable real power, still with much outside penetration although the bridgehead for that penetration, the domestic elites, has been undermined, eroded, done away with, with a highly asymmetric distribution of all production assets, and with an economic life based on export of raw materials and processed or assembled goods for the world market, and import of luxury goods, capital goods, some consumer goods and some food stuff. One might say that in such a situation there would be a clear contradiction, evident to everybody, between the power distribution and the distribution of goods and services in the society. And one hypothesis would then be that the more glaring the contradiction, the more momentum is generated for social change. The reason for that is that the contradiction is not an abstract one only to be seen in a statistical distribution, it is very concrete. It expresses itself in the rank disequilibrium of so many individuals in the society concerned: in concrete persons being high on power and low on goods and services and resources to produce these goods and services. In other words, it is inside people, not only between them. The latter is also a substantial basis of social leverage, but when the former is added it becomes a tremendous social force.
In saying so one might be thinking of the Iranian situation spring 1979: there is much more power to the people, but the rest is still more or less as it was under the shah regime. What one then notices, clearly, are policies of de-coupling, de-linking from the powers designated as imperialist: the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain and Israel. Continuation along such lines would increase the power level inside the country and make it possible to have an even more symmetric power distribution, in so doing the contradictions between the first two and the remaining three points on the list would be even more glaring. And so on, and so forth: the basic point is simply systematic use of uneven, unbalanced development as a driving force.

(c) A note on the relationship to UN strategies. How does this tie in with UN strategies? If one should give a very sketchy summary of these strategies it might perhaps be useful to start with strategies in the field of external economic relations, particularly trade policies. And here it seems fairly clear that the UN has had 3 major strategies:

I. Import substitution
II. Increased export of commodities
III. The New International Economic Order

Roughly speaking, the import substitution phase spearheaded by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America had as its centerpiece the idea of industrialization for the production of capital goods in the Third world itself, so as to be able to substitute for imports and thus decrease the dependency on the industrialized countries. The reasoning seems rather perfect, in practice whatever the reason was - capital goods produced locally tended in that stage not to be competitive with the capital goods imported from the First world countries. Operating on the market conditions the strategy became untenable.

The next strategy, hence, was an effort to be able to import more by exporting more. The result was in increased drive to produce commodities demanded by the First world industrial machineries and consumption, at the well-known risk of substituting cash crops for subsistence crops, of losing raw materials out of the country without getting the added value resulting from production, and of exposing oneself to poor, even deteriorating, and at least fluctuating terms of trade. (Of these 3 arguments against that second strategy the third one is most often heard and probably least important).
The third strategy, the New International Economic Order, can be seen as a response to the difficulties with the second, with some elements of a return to the first but this time on the basis of "collective self-reliance", on the basis of the Third world as a whole or its continental and sub-continental sub-divisions. The focus is on improving the terms of trade, and, to a lesser extent, on import substitution. There may, however, be a time order involved here: first in terms of trade, then a utilization of the excess funds generated in order to industrialize.

If these are the external strategies, what would then be the internal strategies? It is easily seen that the most "progressive" one or at least change-oriented one would be during the first period, of import substitution. After all, to bring about that major economic change an equally substantial social change is needed, and the two welded together could very well pass under the slogan of a "unified approach". After all, industrialization carried in its wake major social changes in the First world countries, it would also do so in the Second and Third world countries.

But under the second strategy, and to some extent also under the third since it is so closely related to the second, much less change is needed internally in the Third world society. All that is needed is an economy where production factors are not distributed, but in the hands of a small group that both controls land, raw materials in general, capital, are healthy and educated enough to enjoy long lives in which experience can accumulate and be converted into full-scale exercises of power supported by the skills embedded in education, over technology, and control organization for production, be it of cash crops or of industrial, mass produced goods. In this type of structure peasants will first be made landless by being evicted from land they have been cultivating because land becomes valuable to the owner when it can be used for cash crops rather than subsistence crops, after that the landless labourer will also become labourless labourer because of the introduction of labour extensive technology. The story is well-known, it is repeated everywhere and the basic point is the fundamental compatibility between an export oriented economy (the negation of factor (2) on the strategies list), and a highly underdeveloped social structure where distribution of power, access to production factors, and the consumption of agricultural and industrial goods are concerned. Since the New International Economic Order has so many of the same elements, except for the international accumulation of proceeds from the exchange process one would assume in general that NIEO will by and large be compatible with
the maintenance of internal status quo, and even reinforce it.

Thus, the second and third international development strategies of the United Nations are probably by and large internally regressive. They are not related to any acceptable theory as to linkages between external and internal strategies except if one assumes that the purpose of these two trade strategies is essentially to maintain internal status quo. As such it will generate more contradictions between classes inside these countries, but not within individuals because of the consistency of the policies pursued. Internal inequalities will be maintained, only amplified and consolidated. There will be some exceptions to this: as educational and health policies probably will be initiated there will be people who have more education and more health than they have power and economic resources; some of them might be able to use these two resources and generate some political momentum. The likely outcome of that type of political momentum might be a return to the strategy of import substitution but at a higher level, the level of not only collective self-reliance, but also national self-reliance and local self-reliance.

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POUR UNE EXPERIENCE DE COOPERATION EXEMPLAIRE
par Ahmed Ben Salah

1. Depuis le milieu de cette décennie, la communauté internationale a adopté une somme impressionante de résolutions et d'idées sur les nouveaux rapports qui doivent s'établir entre les nations au plan socio-économique. Mais il est de plus en plus évident que, depuis, ces résolutions et ces idées demeurent lettre morte. Pire encore, une très nette évolution en sens contraire s'impose de plus en plus dans les rapports internationaux, couverte comme il se doit... par la multiplication des foyers de guerre dans des centres nerveux du Tiers Monde. On a fait beaucoup pour détruire l'enthousiasme et aussi la lucidité qui sont nés des différentes sessions extraordinaires de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, des travaux courageux des différents groupes non officiels comme le Rapport Dag Hammarskjöld 1975 : Que faire? - Un autre développement. Après quoi, on retourne aux pratiques coloniales avec à peine un semblant d'habileté puérile, facilitée par l'autoritarisme de régimes absurdes dans le Tiers Monde.

2. Mais un fait demeure : la grande majorité des États ont adopté en principe des mesures et des décisions relatives au réaménagement, dans le sens d'une coopération juste, des rapports économiques internationaux. L'étude de synthèse préparée par la FIPAD le démontre et le rappelle s'il en est besoin. Il en est besoin effectivement. Mais le besoin réel demeure de tenter de les appliquer quelque part dans le monde pour démontrer :

a) la praticabilité de ces mesures et de ces décisions quand la volonté politique existe;

b) que l'alternative aux guerrillas coloniales pour la possession directe ou à peine indirecte des sources de matières premières, que l'alternative à ce développement dangereux existe;

c) que la lutte contre les hégémonies militaires, économiques et idéologiques, quelles que soient leurs couleurs, que cette lutte passe par une nouvelle forme de coopération, non pour consolider des régimes politiques, n'importe quels régimes politiques, mais pour se préoccuper de la promotion et des progrès des peuples et pour les réussir dans le cadre de la découverte qui ne peut se consolider qu'à partir de la satisfaction des besoins sociaux, économiques et culturels des peuples;

d) que les pays industrialisés admettent que leurs peuples ont besoin de coopérer pour évoluer dans le sens de la promotion des valeurs politiques, intellectuelles, culturelles au service desquelles doivent être mis les énormes moyens matériels et techniques amassés depuis des décennies.

3. A cet effet, nous sommes quelques-uns à avoir toujours supposé qu'il était possible de tenter une ou plusieurs expériences. Prenons un exemple : la Tanzanie et un pays scandinave, ou l'ensemble des pays scandinaves.

Comment tenter l'expérience?
On peut imaginer le processus suivant :

a) création d'une commission Tanzanie-Scandinavie;

b) communication des connaissances sur les sociétés, les cultures et les économies des deux partenaires;

c) évaluation des besoins quantitatifs et qualitatifs au plan des investissements, des cadres, des apports technologiques de la Tanzanie;

d) évaluation de l'apport tanzanien, au plan matériel et culturel, au partenaire scandinave;

e) confrontation des évaluations avec la réalité des échanges et des apports;

f) établissement d'un plan pluriannuel de coopération au plan du flux de capitaux ou d'aides, de cadres, d'apports culturels, d'échanges commerciaux; ce plan devant être non seulement conforme aux besoins, mais aussi aux résolutions, décisions, mesures et idées adoptées au niveau international par les partenaires;

g) une déclaration politique devrait pouvoir émaner des partenaires à la signature éventuelle d'un accord global. Cette déclaration pourrait être au plan politique, idéologique même, d'une importance exceptionnelle parce qu'elle aurait affirmé la faisabilité des concepts relatifs à des rapports nouveaux entre les États, entre des sociétés humaines différentes par leurs cultures, leurs niveaux de productivité, par les natures des développements souhaités.

4. Il serait enfin souhaitable que la FIPAD soit associée durant tout le déroulement du processus et cela en raison de son apport précédent et aussi en vue de l'utilisation de l'exemplarité de ce renouveau de la coopération internationale.

\[1/\] Gilbert Rist, Some major UN resolutions in perspective, FIPAD, Nyon, 1977

A LETTER FROM CALIFORNIA

The last mailing of Dossier 4 prompts these remarks in the hope that friendly, critical reactions are welcome and may serve a purpose. I will be very brief, though obviously there is much that could be said about any of the points raised below.

1. It seems to me that the emphasis on the international order which appears to dominate discussions is misplaced. The conception is grand, but the power to do anything about it, is not commensurable with the sweep and scale of the idea. More importantly, even a successful NIEO would still leave capitalism intact; in fact, it would more efficiently implement capitalism (and therefore unequal development) on a world scale. This is inevitable, when the discussion is carried on in terms of vague abstractions such as North and South, which are practically meaningless. Instead, I would like to see more discussions of territorial developments within cities, regions, and nations. It is at this level that "alternative" developments have the greatest possibility of being realized.

2. As I read through the various articles, especially Building Blocks, I am struck by the absence of any serious controversy. Indeed, the format chosen for the Dossier doesn't encourage controversy, debate, or dialogue about any issue of central importance. It would be relatively easy, I think, to change all this. The adversary is not merely mainstream development doctrine, though that is obviously the prime candidate for the role. It is also important that such ideas as we propose are refined and recast as they come face to face with opposition that is loyal. For that matter, even a debate or dialogue with the "enemy" would be salutary, so long as the subject is of compelling interest.

3. The papers published in the Dossier tend to be polemical pieces, without a clearly defined theoretical position. I think theory cannot be avoided if the policies are to be solidly grounded. I realize the difficulties of starting a theoretical discourse in the pages of the Dossier, but I also don't see how it can be avoided. There must be some constraints on discourse, either political or theoretical. The practical problems that stand in the way of this can be overcome, I believe.

Other than that, I am enjoying the Dossier and I keep passing it on to my students and friends. I'm glad you exist. It makes our work that much easier.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF THE SWEDISH LABOUR MOVEMENT

The International Centre of the Swedish Labour Movement (AIC) was founded in 1978 by the Social Democratic Party (SAP), the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Co-operative Union and Wholesale Society (KF), within the framework of the Workers' Educational Association (ABF). The AIC board is chaired by Olof Palme.

The AIC has the following main tasks:

- Co-ordination: The AIC will be responsible for co-ordinating campaigns, collections, delegations, visits, etc., with regard to international issues of common interest to various sections of the labour movement.

- Documentation and research: The AIC will collect and process documentation on international issues, i.a., in order to acquire a broad basis for opinion-forming with regard to international issues within member organizations.

- Information: The AIC will provide information on international issues through seminars, conferences and publications.

AIC statement:

"Democracy, solidarity and equality are values common to the entire labour movement. In an increasingly internationalized world we require increased political and union co-operation across borders.

"Many countries are plagued by poverty, extreme injustice and a lack of democratic rights. Organizations and movements in various parts of the world are turning more and more often to the Swedish labour movement to request solidarity action and co-operation. The struggle by our popular movements to change Swedish society has often constituted a source of inspiration. We must become even stronger in order to meet this challenge.

"The ambition of superpowers and trans-national companies to increase their control over individual countries is threatening to place large groups of people beyond the opportunity of themselves forming their societies along democratic lines. ...

"The AIC was formed in 1978 as a co-operation organization within the labour movement in order to reinforce international activities. The task of the AIC is, i.a., to co-ordinate international work within the labour movement, to carry out solidarity work and to increase international awareness and readiness within the member organizations.

AIC address: Upplandsgatan 3, S-105 53 Stockholm, Sweden."