INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES
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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

ON-GOING PROJECTS

BUILDING BLOCKS

. Crises of maldevelopment in the North: A way out (Ignacy Sachs)
. The unimportance of full employment (Gunnar Adler-Karlsson)
. Industrialization strategies and policies (François Le Guay)
. Basic Human Needs: A strategic conceptualization toward another
development (Reginald Herbold Green)

INTERACTIONS

. Unheard voices (Leelananda de Silva)
. The IBRD World Development Report (Reginald Herbold Green)
. The CDP Approach to a New Strategy (Leelananda de Silva)
. The UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing
Countries (Chakravarthi Raghavan)

FOOTNOTES

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This issue has been sent in English to all those on the IFDA mailing list.

French and Spanish abstracts of the major papers appear on p. 2 of each paper.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Third System Project, undertaken by the International Foundation for Development Alternatives at the request of the Dutch and Norwegian governments, is intended to contribute to broadening and deepening the discussion on development through facilitating the participation of the extragovernmental sector in the worldwide preparations for the United Nations development strategy for the 80s and beyond.

The project has been described at some length in the first issue of the IFDA Dossier, widely circulated and reproduced earlier this year 1/.

The first phase of the project consisted principally in the stimulation of policy-oriented activities meeting the objectives, terms of reference, approach and method of work of the project. Some one hundred such activities are under way, with modest financial support when needed. They involve about 120 institutions, ad hoc groups and individuals, almost two thirds of them from the Third World. This second issue of the IFDA Dossier opens with an annotated list of the activities approved by the end of September, and also indicates the names and addresses of those responsible for their implementation. The purpose of this listing is to invite those interested to get in touch with other members of the network so as to engage in mutually educating dialogues.

One of the objectives of the project being to contribute to the elaboration of the new United Nations development strategy, there are time constraints. To be effective, all written contributions must be circulated by the fall of 1979. One implication is that the stage of submission of proposals is now over. The second phase of the project is the dissemination of contributions and their

1/ Copies are available on request in English, French and Spanish
discussion. It starts with this issue.

This is not to say that all areas of interest or relevance are covered. In an attempt to give a voice to those rarely heard, IFDA sought to organize the project as a collective undertaking made up of genuinely volunteered contributions from those who felt prepared to do so. Thus there are obvious gaps. It is expected that they will be covered by the dialogue now initiated. It will take place primarily by correspondence, in the pages of the Dossier.

We earnestly request interested readers to participate in the discussion. In particular, you are invited to communicate to IFDA any views or ideas you consider important for the new development strategy - preferably in short pieces not exceeding two or three pages in the format of the Dossier. You are also invited to send IFDA any available material you find relevant. The purpose is to elicit new ideas and suggestions for action as well as to take stock, so to speak, of analysis and proposals already formulated. The material collected will be analyzed and brought to the attention of the readership of the IFDA Dossier (which is printed in 6,000 copies). Provided the authors grant permission to IFDA, material may be reproduced in part or in full. This will constitute the substance of the 'Interactions' section of the Dossier.

Papers prepared in the context of the project may be seen as 'building blocks' for the new development strategy. Some have already been received and four are reproduced in this issue. There were no preconceived models for this first collection. These papers just happened to be available - but it so happened that two of them concern principally the development of industrialized countries. After so much advice provided to the Third World, this may be seen as a welcome change. This highlights the fact that development is indeed a universal problem and illustrates the basic political premise of the project: 'A really new development strategy should cover not only the substance of a new international order, but also the concomitant changes in
the internal structures of both industrialized and Third World
countries as well as the linkages and mutual ramifications between
domestic transformations in the North and in the South'.

None of these papers is meant to be final in any sense. Strictly
speaking, they are discussion papers, reports on ideas in progress.
Readers are invited to react to them in the way they see fit, for
instance through writing to the authors or to IFDA. Reactions will
be reproduced or reflected in the forthcoming issue of the Dossier.

The discussion is now open. It is the hope of the International
Foundation for Development Alternatives that it will contribute to
the mutually educating dialogue and to the building of a worldwide
network of committed institutions and individuals. This is the
essence of the Third System project.
ON-GOING PROJECTS

A. STRATEGIES OF TRANSITION

1. THIRD WORLD

1.1 ISSUES

Oppressed people assume control over their own development strategies

A synopsis of case studies from Guinea-Bissau, Bolivia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Paraguay and India (Kerala); lessons for change in development strategies and policy conclusions on how oppressed people can assume control over their own destinies.

Denis Goulet
Overseas Development Council
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20046, USA

Bhoomi Sena - From the village to the global order

A close look is taken of Bhoomi Sena, a movement of 'adivasis' (tribals) in Junglepatti in Maharashtra, India, for liberation from oppression and the establishment of people's power. In this study, the researchers moved from dialogical research in a general sense to participatory research, by joining as partners in research with the activists and cadres of Bhoomi Sena.

Ponna Wignaraja, et. al.
c/o The Dag Hammarkjöld Foundation
Ovre Slottsgatan 2
752 20 Uppsala, Sweden

Development alternatives in Latin America

The compilation of texts on different themes of development strategies, leading to a dossier of 200-250 pages. The reactions of a team comprising approximately 10 Latin American personalities will be solicited. CEBRAP will prepare a publication resulting from these discussions to be submitted to round table discussions.

Juarez Rubens Brandao Lopes
Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP)
Alameda Campinas 463
CEP 01404 Sao Paulo, Brazil

Perception, conception and articulation of development at the grassroots and regional levels in certain Third World countries

The project will take the form of a dialogue between participants belonging to the ENDA network and African peasants in an attempt to identify what groups of

1/ Like all classifications, the one adopted here is somewhat arbitrary and should therefore be seen as provisional.
peasants feel are their needs, the manner in which they grade or prioritize them, and how these are defined.

Environment and Development in Africa (ENDA)
B.P. 3370
Dakar, Senegal

An inquiry into the nature of the State in post-colonial societies (P.051)

An analysis of the emergence of different power systems in the Third World, of the extent to which each system determines the country's choice of development strategy, and of the effect of that strategy on the rights and welfare of the country's people and on its political evolution. The analysis will be supported by some country case studies.

Eqbal Ahmad
The Transnational Institute/Institute for Policy Studies
1901 Q Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009, USA

Rural poverty and development alternatives in South and South East Asia (P.054)

The evaluation of the experience of the development processes in 15 countries in South and South East Asia, and of the impact of such processes on the poorest peoples of this region. The causes of persistent and often increasing poverty would be identified with a view to devising useful policy conclusions.

Keith Griffin (with Mafia1 Ghose)
Queen Elizabeth House
21 St. Giles
Oxford OX1 3LA, England

"Somebody wants to develop me" (P.059)

The project is based on a series of dialogical interviews with a view to making peasant voices in Mexico heard on their own perception of their present situation and preferred future. In so doing, the project will attempt to identify alternative ways of communication in which the voice from below can express itself - thus identifying forms and modes of participation, execution and control in "another development".

András Biro
C/o Elena Uribe
Reyna No. 32, Col. San Angel
México 20, D.F., Mexico

Dilemmas of peasant organizations/movements in Asia (P.064)

There is now ample evidence to show that co-operatives, "panchayats", community development programmes and other such institutions have not been successful as instruments for tackling the poverty of the poorest classes. The dilemmas of such peasant organizations in Asia will be examined, and policies for successful implementation proposed.

Baljit Malik
4.A Bhagwardaas Road
New Delhi 110001, India
Law in the mobilization and participatory organizations of the rural poor for self-reliant development (P.067)

Based on case studies, dialogues at national level, and on commissioned papers, the study examines ways in which law has been, and can be, an instrument to further the objectives of participatory organizations in India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Tanzania and Papua New Guinea. The focus is on access to legal resources, group advocacy, and access to economic resources such as land.

Clarence Dias
International Centre for Law and Development
866 UN Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017, USA

Commercialization of agricultural products: factor of rural development (P.081)

The project includes a study on rural alphabetization and development of rural co-operatives, based on popular participation, in the Borgou province of the Democratic Republic of Benin, and a study on the impact of commercialization of small farms on the dependence/independence of rural people.

Florentin Agoua
Caisse National du Crédit Agricole
B.P. 999
Cotonou, Benin

NGO participation (P.086)

To ascertain to what extent national NGOs in Third World countries are in fact prepared and in a position to form part of a general drive to create in the Third World (using India for the pilot project) the conditions prescribed by action programmes.

J.S. Szuszkiewicz
D 1/31 Vasant Vihar
New Delhi 110057, India

Alternative employment and trade policies for need'satisfaction in Africa (P.087)

A spin-off from research on the implications for Africa of pronouncements on the NIEO, this project will recommend alternative trade and employment policies for African countries to meet the needs of their poverty-stricken citizens.

Kodwo Ewusi
Head, Economics Research Unit, University of Ghana
P.O. Box 74
Legon, Ghana

1.2 COUNTRY SPECIFIC

Another development for Chile (P.005/1)

Analytical study which strives to understand and clarify the specific conditions under which another development is possible in Chile. This implies that the conceptual approach is essentially pragmatic in two major ways: it will take Chilean society as it is today and will reflect the specific conditions of implementation of another development resulting from this reality.
Another development for Peru

The project, given the reality of Peruvian society, attempts an analysis of the meaning of another development in that country; another development seen as the only viable "national project" for Latin American countries and an alternative to the "transnational project".

Rafael Roncagliolo
Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo (DESCO)
Al. Salaverry 1945
Lima 14, Peru

Basic needs, self-reliance and the strategy of industrialization in the Arab countries

Project aims to clarify the concept of basic needs, and to consider its economic feasibility, that is, not solely giving attention to social or political considerations. The starting point is that a strategy oriented towards the satisfaction of basic needs will broaden the local market and offer greater grounds for self-reliance.

Ismail-Sabri Abdalla
Chairman, Third World Forum
6, Ibn Malek Street
Guizeh, Cairo, Egypt

Alternative scenarios of the Brazilian future

Alternative scenarios based on explicit or implicit areas of significant social forces, already present in political spectrum or which may rise during the next decade. A look at the scenarios of transition indicating which policies will be necessary and discussing their viability.

Paul I. Singer
Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP)
Alameda Campinas 463
CEP 01404 Sao Paulo, Brazil

Another development for Malta

A specially constituted group will try to promote public awareness and dialogue about the sort of society that the Maltese should strive for in the 80s and beyond, emphasizing the self-reliant and participatory nature of the development process. "Dossiers" on key issues for Malta will be published in a Maltese-language monthly; an overall policy paper will be contributed to the IFDA Dossier.

Grupp Alternativi
c/o Joe Friggieri
University of Malta
Msida, Malta
The religious and traditional values in development in the 80s, with specific reference to the Savodaya Movement (Sri Lanka)  

The paper examines the role of religious and traditional values based on the empirical experience of the Sarvodaya Movement in Sri Lanka. It considers the cultural milieu of an endogenous, needs-oriented strategy.

A.T. Ariyaratna  
"Methmedura", Sarvodaya Institute  
77 de Soysa Road  
Moratuwa, Sri Lanka

National dialogue for a development goal in Sri Lanka  

Programme seeks to provide opportunities for popular participation in setting development goals for the society - opportunities which are not provided within the prevailing system. Project will take the form of organized dialogues with local groups to articulate national development goals and effective means of achieving these.

Godfrey Gunatilleke  
Marga Institute  
P.O. Box 601, 61 Isipathana Mawatha  
Colombo 5, Sri Lanka

Local action for self-reliant development in Bangladesh  

An analysis of a series of innovative developments based on basic needs/self-reliance strategies, which are evolving alongside with traditional social and religious patterns. The objective is to increase understanding of the process of development of sustained people's institutions at the grassroots level for resisting exploitation and mobilizing manpower and local resources for self-reliant development, and to generate guidelines for catalytic action to promote such development.

B.K. Jahangir  
Centre for Social Studies, Dacca University  
Room No. 1107, Arts Building  
Dacca 2, Bangladesh

Strategies of implementation of rural development programmes in India  

It is clear that in order to achieve peoples' development as a major objective of rural development programmes, it almost always would require structural shifts supported by a dialogical process of total mobilization of the rural people, suitable to the ecological and technological reality. Based on this hypothesis, the project is aimed at analysing the efficiency of implementation strategies of rural development programmes in India and thereby to formulate policy options.

T.K. Moulik  
Indian Institute of Management  
Vastrapur, Ahmedabad 380015, India
Development alternatives for the new Venezuela

Jointly with the Venezuelan Council for Scientific and Technological Research (CONICIT) and the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Latinoamericana (CEREL), IFDA is organizing a phased seminar on Development Alternatives for the New Venezuela. The first session (September 1978) concentrated on an analysis of the present situation and trends as well as on a first approximation of a societal project for the 80s and beyond. The second session (February 1979) will focus on strategies and social forces. Participants include about 20 national "agents of social change" and, at each session, 6 to 8 persons from abroad with experience in social transformation.

Beatrice Rangel Mantilla  
CONICIT  
Apartado 70617  
Los Ruices, Caracas, Venezuela

Luis R. Matos Azocar  
CEREL  
Apartado 68369  
Caracas 106, Venezuela

Rangpur Self-Reliance Movement in Bangladesh

A documentary report on the Rangpur Self-Reliance Movement in Bangladesh on basic needs/self-reliance strategies.

Mohdin Ali  
Gono Unnayan Academy  
Gurudaspur  
Distr: Rajshaha, Bangladesh

Decentralization and self-reliance in an agrarian economy (Vietnam)

An exploration of the economic and political experiences of agricultural co-operation in North Vietnam; setting these experiences in a larger political perspective to consider questions of fundamental importance, such as, to what extent agricultural co-operation is linked to a particular political system and hence, to what extent a particular model of co-operation is reproducible in other Third World countries with similar problems but different political systems.

Amit Bhaduri  
Centre for Economic Studies and Planning  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi 110057, India

Ethnic diversity and the nation-state: An alternative strategy for national integration in Vietnam

Ethnic diversity is a universal fact which, by generating tensions and conflicts, leads to a questioning of the ethical and functional validity of the modern Nation-State as an appropriate and viable form of social organization. The immediate objective of the study is to undertake a critical analysis of the Vietnamese strategy and its apparent success in achieving national integration in spite of ethnic contradictions.

Lan Phuong  
32, Quai Gustave-Ador  
1207 Genève, Switzerland
India's development strategy: crisis and conflict

India now has the experience of planned economic development for about 25 years, within the framework of parliamentary democracy. Her records of achievement, failure and evolution deserve a close scrutiny for drawing conclusions for the future of India, as well as for deriving lessons for other Third World countries. The project is aimed at (a) identifying the major components of her development strategy, (b) analysing the actual performance of this strategy, (c) assessing the current situation, and (d) discerning, to the extent feasible, the contours of the future trends.

Ranjit Sau
Indian Institute of Management
Joka, Diamond Harbour Road
P O Box 16757
Calcutta 700027, India

Zaire: a strategy to strengthen effective national control of the copper industry and to reduce national dependence on that industry

The copper industry of Zaire - the country's principal source of external revenue - is nationalized, but effective control is maintained by transnational corporations, a situation which has its counterparts in other Third World countries. This project, derived from on-going work at the Université Nationale in Kinshasa, will explain how TNC control has survived nationalization and make recommendations for increasing national capacity to control the industry and for using the surplus thus generated to diversify the economy and reduce dependence on copper.

Ilunga Ilunkamba
Faculté d'Economie, Université Nationale
B.P. 765
Kinshasa XI, Zaire

An alternative tourism development policy for Kenya

Based on a new analysis of the existing tourism policy and a survey among local residents in a resort area, the project will describe the present structure and organization of the tourism industry in Kenya and propose alternative policies/strategies for tourism development, including alternatives for the role of the public sector.

S.E. Migot-Adholla
Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi
P.O. Box 30197
Nairobi, Kenya

2. INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

2.1 ISSUES

Choice of energy and societal choices

The weakness of several existing energy scenarios is their concentration on the "technical fix" and their inadequate treatment of non-technical aspects. This project will analyse the non-technical (economic, social, political) hypotheses
of a number of available scenarios for transition to "soft" energy in Western industrialized countries, making them explicit where they are not, checking their internal consistency, and making their consequences clear. The countries covered include Canada, France, FRG, Sweden, UK and USA.

Jean-Charles Hourcade
Centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement (CIRED)
54 blvd. Raspail
75270 Paris, France

"Tomorrow today": social experimentation and changes in life styles (P.015)

The focus of this project is on alternative styles and patterns of time use in industrialized countries. In its first phase, it will set up an information network among interested groups in Western Europe; collect and study information on existing cases of social experimentation and on means of stimulating it; organize dialogues between institutions from different countries, and prepare a programme of public debates for the second phase. Spin-offs include papers on time use and habitat as means of changing life-styles.

Ignacy Sachs
Maison des sciences de l'homme
54 blvd. Raspail
75270 Paris, France

Public opinion in Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands (P.036)

A brief enquiry into the question why public opinion in these three countries is favourable to international co-operation and development assistance; the study is supplemented by three journalistic pieces (one on each country) based on recent interviews.

Kirsten Ringdal
Berit Hard
Anton Ploeg
Institute for Sociology
Berit Hard
Centre for Comparative
University of Trondheim
Social & Economic Studies
Trondheim, Norway
Withof, Transitorium II
Sweden
Utrecht, the Netherlands

The future of Western industrialized societies (P.038)

IFDA organized a small policy-oriented working group on this broad subject in June 1978. Invited participants included Gar Alperovitz (USA), Sven Hamrell (Sweden), Branko Horvat (Yugoslavia), Jun Nishikawa (Japan), James Robertson (UK), Ignacy Sachs (France), Henk Thomas (Netherlands). There is no formal report on the meeting; some participants will contribute papers to the IFDA Dossier either on the general theme of the discussion or on specific national transition scenarios (cf. P.066, 076 and 098).

The unimportance of full employment (P.047)

A critique of the consumer society, full employment excesses, and the tyranny of production in Eastern and Western industrialized countries; a utopian synthesis of capitalism and socialism is proposed - dividing society into a necessity sector, a freedom sector, excess sector and a power sector - in order to stimulate thought and debate on alternative social organization.
Gunnar Adler-Karlsson
Roskilde University Centre
Roskilde, Denmark

Workers' participation in industrial management (P.068)
A report on decentralization of decision-making, job rotation, self-management and related participatory programmes undertaken at Volvo and SAAB/Scania industries in Sweden; the report describes the approach, shows why and how it was implemented, assesses its impact on efficiency, quality of life and economy.

Berit Hård
Lindekullegatan 5
41678 Göteborg, Sweden

2.2 COUNTRY SPECIFIC

Another development for Greece (P.052)
The project will seek to promote dialogue in Greece on its transition to another development. A core group will prepare papers on key issues in the country's future (e.g., population distribution, the natural and the urban environment, styles of production and consumption, education, foreign relations) as a basis for a process of dialogue, leading to the presentation of an overall policy paper for public debate. (The papers will be written in Greek; an English version of the overall paper will be prepared for the IFDA Dossier.)

Stelios Kafandaris
Vas. Konstantinou 83
Athens 138 Stadion, Greece

Another Sweden (P.057)
An alternative scenario on the future of Sweden including issues such as participation, social control of research and development, welfare, city planning, self-reliance; based on the Delphi technique, experts and opinion makers are interviewed showing how much (and in which direction) the Swedish elite may be prepared to change.

Nordal Akerman
Gerdagatan 3
223 62 Lund, Sweden

Another Britain: outlines for an alternative future of the UK (P.066)
A feasibility study for an alternative Britain including themes such as employment in agriculture, industry and services; food production and consumption; energy; habitat and community living; economic interdependence, including trade with the Third World. Modalities for change are discussed and the action required for change is identified.

James Robertson
7 St. Ann's Villas
London W11 4RU, UK
An alternative vision for the USA

There are, active in the USA, a number of groups ranging from consumer groups to neighbourhood organizations, worker participation efforts and many others who are beginning to evolve what are now called "elements" or a "mosaic" which suggests the beginnings of a new direction. A careful and well-organized process of dialogue and discussions with these groups, leading in the direction of clarifying and making explicit what is already implicit - a new future of alternative directions to be discussed in terms of longer-term change in the USA.

Gar Alperovitz
Exploratory Project for Economic Alternatives
2000 P Street, N.W., Suite 515
Washington, D.C. 20036, USA

A self-managed France

Several groups in France see self-management as a key to societal transformation to another development. This project will analyse the national self-management programmes of French political parties, unions and research groups, as well as on-going experiments in self-management at the grass roots (e.g., in industrial production, health and education services, neighbourhood action), in order to show what French society would look like if these ideas were generally applied. It will also examine how different technologies can help or hinder self-management. Finally, it will assess the possible impact of the internal transformations on France's relations with other countries, including those of the Third World.

Olivier Corpet
Centre international de coordination des recherches sur l'autogestion (CICRA)
Maison des sciences de l'homme
54 bld. Raspail
75270 Paris, France

Essays on the future development of American society

A series of students' essays on another USA focussing on maldistribution of work and employment, needs satisfaction, and other topics, with an interpretative overview.

Richard Falk
Center for International Studies, Princeton University
Corwin Hall
Princeton, N.J. 08540, USA

Another development for Japan

As an option in "the age of uncertainty", another development strategy for Japan is proposed based on people's welfare, participatory democracy, respect for human rights, protection of the environment, harmony between agriculture and industry, and solidarity with peoples of the Third World.

Jun Nishikawa
Waseda University
5-4 Asagaya-Kita, 4-chome
Suginami-ku, Tokyo 166, Japan
Poland 2000: models of development in the work of Committee Poland 2000 (P.101)

A background study on the future of Poland, together with elements of a social development model (basic needs, welfare, housing, cultural activities, changes in life styles, consumption, social stratification and change, role of the family, working time, economic growth) and an evaluation of the work of the Committee Poland 2000.

Krysztof Herbst
c/o Maison des sciences de l'homme, Room 311
54 blvd. Raspail
75270 Paris, France

The problems of consumption in France (P.103)

Based on the observation that the consumption patterns of Western industrialized countries have produced social malaise, waste and imbalance in the international order, the study analyses the relevant factors and mechanisms which lead to overconsumption in France and the relevant social actors in this context. From this, a more efficient, less wasteful and more welfare oriented consumption model will be proposed, and problems of transition outlined.

Philippe d'Iribarne
CEREBE
140 rue du Chevaleret
75013 Paris, France

Employment in Germany: options in the context of the North-South problématique (P.105)

Analysis of the contemporary employment crisis in the Federal Republic of Germany, identification of alternative policy options and assessment of the North-South impact of such options. The project will also consider issues such as overconsumption, time use, de-industrialization and self-reliance (both in Germany and in development co-operation) in the context of the employment problem.

Willy Bierter
Herrmannstrasse 8
3500 Kassel, FRG

B. THIRD WORLD COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE

Third World Forum's participation in the Project (P.003)

The Third World Forum, a network of committed intellectuals from Africa, the Arab countries, Asia and Latin America, was established to help promote and mobilize the intellectual capacity of the Third World. It actively contributed to the formulation of the Third System Project. With a view to facilitating its participation in the management of the Project, especially its "collective self-reliance" component, the Third World Forum has appointed a resident representative to IFDA, who works under the direct authority of the Third World Forum Chairman.
Integration in central and southern Africa (P.013/1)

An outline of possible co-operative and federative arrangements from Uganda to Namibia.

Reginald H. Green
Institute of Development Studies
University of Sussex
Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK

A conceptual framework for improving the structure of world trade in primary commodities (P.016)

The project involves the empirical study of the market and price structures of 9 individual commodities to be carried out by Third World institutes and researchers with an intimate knowledge of those commodities. The empirical studies would assist in the formulation of a revised theory of commodity price determination, taking into account the realities of the operations of transnational trading organizations, etc.

Third World Forum
Regional Office for Asia
c/o Marga Institute, P.O.Box 601, Colombo 5, Sri Lanka

- Cocoa: Tetteh A. Koffi
  Food Research Institute
  Stanford University
  Stanford, California, USA

- Sugar: A. Allegne
  47 Ellerslie Park
  Port of Spain, Trinidad

- Rubber: Malaysian Rubber Research & Development Board
  Natural Rubber Bldg.
  150 Jahal Ampang
  Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

- Tea: Marga Institute
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  Colombo 5, Sri Lanka

- Jute: Institute of Development Studies
  Adamjee Court
  Motijheel Commercial Area
  Dacca 2, Bangladesh

- Coffee: Tito Ryff
  Centre for Agricultural Studies
  Fundação Getulio Vargas
  Instituto Brasileiro de Economia
  C.P. 4081-ZC-05
  Rio de Janeiro, GB, Brazil

- Cotton: Institute of National Planning
  Salah Salem Street
  Nasr City
  Cairo, Egypt

- Copper: Carlos Fortin
  Institute of Development Studies
  University of Sussex
  Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK

- Bauxite and Aluminium: Institute of Social & Economic Research
  University of the West Indies
  Mona, Kingston 7, Jamaica
Collective self-reliance

Up-dating, editing and publication of a volume on collective self-reliance. It will contain mostly papers presented to a seminar in Lima on collective self-reliance. However, other papers are being included to make the volume comprehensive in its scope and thereby constitute a standard reference work on the subject.

Enrique Oteiza
UN Development Programme
Apartado Postal 1969
Caracas, Venezuela

Third World Forum Newsletter

The Third World Forum will publish 4 issues of its Newsletter. In addition to Forum news, the Newsletter will attempt to disseminate information on matters of current interest in the field of collective self-reliance to a mainly Third World audience.

Leelananda de Silva
TWF Resident Representative at IFDA

A Third World Secretariat

The project will examine the technical and organizational support necessary for Third World countries in the context of international economic co-operation negotiations. The report could then be used as a political brief to secure support among Third World countries for establishing the necessary mechanisms for this purpose.

Third World Forum, c/o IFDA

Collective self-reliance as a strategy of development

The examination of the concepts of self-reliance and collective self-reliance as a feasible strategy of development for the Third World. Note is taken of Keynesian propositions on this subject in relation to the experiences of Ireland in the 1930s. The relations between self-reliance on the one hand and self-sufficiency, basic needs, trade and peace on the other are the subject of analysis.

Helen O'Neill
Centre for Development Studies
University College, Department of Political Economy
Dublin 4, Ireland

A programme of collaborative research for development and collective self-reliance in South Asia

The programme aims to establish a network of research institutions in South Asia to collaborate in studying the prospects for co-operation among South Asian countries in an attempt to strengthen national development efforts and promote collective self-reliance in, among other areas, co-operation in economic development and science and technology.

Marga Institute
P.O. Box 601
Colombo 5, Sri Lanka
Co-operation among small nations in Asia in the context of the changing Asian political economy (P.045/3)

Programme will, on the basis of the papers addressing the problems of the changing political economy in Asia and the emergence of major centres of growth and power among different groups of countries, identify a feasible strategy for co-operation among small nations in Asia. In a second phase, the programme will examine the forms of co-operation possible among a wider group of small nations including industrialized countries.

Marga Institute
Colombo, Sri Lanka

Nationalized property: Over-compensation or expropriation? A Third World perspective (P.055)

The analysis of the experience of nationalization of foreign investment in selected Third World countries, with specific reference to the terms of payment of financial compensation and their variations between countries and circumstances. Suitable criteria would be developed, taking into account not only legal and juridical norms of financial compensation but also the economic dimensions of particular situations which could possibly lead to the establishment of a code of conduct in the event of acquisition of foreign investments.

Maurice Odle
Director, Institute of Development Studies
University of Guyana
Turkeyen Campus, Box 841
Georgetown, Guyana

Processing of minerals in Third World countries (P.056)

Description and discussion of policy options open to Third World countries with regard to the metal minerals they produce, and the scope for expansion of processing of their own minerals.

Marian Radetzki
Institute for International Economic Studies
University of Stockholm
S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

Another development for Southern Africa (P.062)

A group of researchers who have contributed to recent thinking on the future of Southern Africa, including work carried out by the liberation movements, will assess the possibilities of moving towards another development through a strategy of collective self-reliance for the countries of the region (defined here as Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and countries South). Within this framework, national transition strategies will be outlined, by researchers from the countries concerned, for Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Thandika Mkandawire
CODESRIA
B.P. 3304
Dakar, Senegal
The lack of a proper system of documentation has hampered communication between centres of operation of the Group of 77 as well as organizing research into the evolution of ideas within the Group. The publication is intended to bring together all major documents of the Group of 77 in the various sectors of negotiation. An annotated bibliography would also be made for the available documents.

Karl P. Sauvant
Zentrum fur Interdisziplinare Forschung, Universität Bielefeld
48 Bielefeld 1, FRG

Alternative patterns of Latin American industrialization and the new international and internal order

An examination of alternative strategies for co-operation and the external and internal determinants in the new international division of labour. The social forces that can modify the model of industrialization according to the real NIEO. The common interests between the workers of the developed market economies and those of Latin American societies. The strategic alternatives that are able to satisfy the great national economic and social problems.

Jorge F. Bertini
Asociacion de Economistas del Tercer Mundo, Dirección para America Latina
Ave. del Parque 54
México 20, D.F., Mexico

Third World sovereignty over national resources: a catalogue of major acquisitions of foreign enterprises

Although nationalization is not necessarily equivalent to national control (cf. P.82), it is an important assertion of the political will to break the links of dependence. This project aims to produce a catalogue of major acquisitions of foreign enterprises by Third World countries since 1945, classified by country, sector and period. To the extent it is available, supporting information will be given to permit the importance of the acquisitions to be assessed. An introductory note will describe the different techniques of acquisition and regulation of foreign enterprises and indicate their effectiveness in terms of achieving national control.

Anila Graham
Economic & Development Research Ltd.
116 Seymour Place
London W1H 5DH, UK

Policies of "selective delinking" of North-South relations: terms of trade and domestic distribution of income in developing economies

The paper will explore conditions needed to avoid the negative outcome of the worsening of terms of trade and of domestic income distributions in trade policy. The paper thus addresses a "selective delinking" problem in Third World countries.

Graciela Chichilnisky
Columbia University, Department of Economics
International Affairs Bldg.
New York, N.Y. 10027, USA
Producer associations

Producer associations constitute a major instrument in the organization of strategies for collective self-reliance among Third World countries. In spite of the establishment of a large number of these associations over the last two decades, Third World countries have failed to exploit fully the potential for co-operative action inherent within this framework. The publication of a volume and its dissemination among Third World policy-makers is an important ingredient in creating a new dialogue on this subject.

Gonzalo Martner
c/o TWF Resident Representative at IFDA

C. AREAS OF MUTUAL NORTH-SOUTH INTEREST

The functioning of the international power structure

Obstacles to another development and the New International Order - an analysis of the transnational power structure.

Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET)
Apartado postal 85 025
Mexico 20, D.F., Mexico

A new communications structure

"State-of-the-art" paper on the present discussions on the subject of international communications and the participation of the Third World. The project will include an analysis of governmental and inter-governmental debates on the subject and will pay special attention to the results of the work of the Commission of UNESCO on communications.

ILET, Mexico

A balance sheet of Canadian/Third World relations

Analysis of economic exchanges between Canada and the Third World in terms of trade, balance of payments, production and employment; identification of flows which are compatible and incompatible with a new international order; identification of prospects and alternatives.

Bernard Wood
North-South Institute
185 Rideau
Ottawa, Canada KIN 5X8

Trilateralism: an analysis and a critique

The political weight of the floating international think-tank known as the Tri-lateral Commission has been much commented on since the election of one of its members to the US Presidency. This project will analyse critically the substance of the Commission's world view and its consequent policy prescriptions, comparing them with other approaches to world order restructuring, especially those originating in the Third World. It is a spin-off from the Transnational Institute's programme on the NIEO.
Howard Wachtel  
The Transnational Institute/Institute for Policy Studies  
1901 Q Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20009, USA

Development and the debt problem

The central objective of the project is to analyse the fundamental causes of the balance of payments problems of Third World countries and, more specifically, those relating to their growing external indebtedness. It would inquire into the relationship between external indebtedness and the choice of certain development models based on industrialized countries' experiences. The project would be implemented on the basis of 4 separate but nevertheless integrated studies: (1) mechanisms leading to indebtedness; (2) IMF conditionality; (3) access to capital markets; (4) refinancing of debt.

Juan Carlos Sanchez Arnau  
Centre international pour le développement (CID)  
155 av. Charles de Gaulle  
92200 Neuilly-sur-Seine, France

Who benefits from EEC trade preferences?

Through interviewing EEC firms involved in preferential trade with the Third World (under the Lomé Convention or the GSP), this inquiry attempts to produce useful examples of the real impact of tariff preferences, e.g., on export prices and volumes, on consumer prices of imported goods within the EEC, on profits and on EEC investment in Third World export industries.

Vagn Kjellberg  
formerly at Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, Denmark  
now at The United Nations University  
Toho Seimei Bldg., 29th Floor  
15-1, Shibuya 2-chome, Shibuya-ku  
Tokyo 150, Japan

Co-operation with the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee of Development Associations (ICCDA)

Consultations with regional secretaries of ICCDA as to the contribution of ICCDA to various areas of the Third System Project.

Augustin Kintanar  
Association of Development Research and Training Institutes of Asia & the Pacific (ADIPA)  
P O Box 2-136  
Bangkok, Thailand

Mouheb E. Hamza  
Association of Arab Institutes and Centres for Research on Social & Economic Development (AICARDES)  
c/o Institut "Ali 'Bach-Hamba", 2 rue Benghazi, Tunis, Tunisia

F. Delich  
Latin American Social Science Council (CLACSO)  
Callao 875 - 3º Piso E  
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Integration of marine resource management into a new UN development strategy

This is an interim spin-off from a larger IOI project. It is expected to provide a conceptual framework for marine resource management and to make policy recommendations for integrating this important dimension into a new UN development strategy. It will cover non-living and living resources, shipping and new uses of ocean space.

Industrialization strategies and policies

A synthetic review of the Lima Conference and its implementation, leading to a policy paper on industrialization as part of a self-reliance strategy; the issues of national control of key sectors, internal consumption, support of agriculture, processing of natural resources, development of endogenous technology, and education are discussed; proposals are made for action at the national and international levels.

Task Force on security, disarmament and human rights

An examination of the war system in its many dimensions, particularly the inter-relationships between the arms race, militarism, economic development, human rights and ecological balance. To study and clarify the effects of the present arms build-up on economic development, the satisfaction of basic needs, and on domestic governance structures in the various regions and subregions of the world.
Patterns of international economic relations and their effects on authoritarian tendencies and basic needs  

An analysis of several principal scenarios of international relations and their impact on domestic development patterns to disclose international policies oriented towards positive development. In addition to the North-South dichotomy and the possibilities for collective self-reliance, distinct regional international policies will be analysed in relation to five main markets and two main income groups.

Richard Falk  
Centre of International Studies  
Princeton University  
Princeton, N.J. 08540, USA

Graciela Chichilnisky  
Columbia University, Dept. of Economics  
International Affairs Bldg.  
New York, N.Y. 10027, USA

José Serra  
CEBRAP  
Avenida Campinas 463  
CEP 01404 Sao Paulo, Brazil

ICDA NEWS

The International Coalition for Development Action (ICDA) is a network of national coalitions of development action groups in 18 industrialized countries. IFDA is supporting the publication of ICDA's monthly newsletter, which provides news and counter-information on international political and economic relations.

Bob Scott  
Executive Secretary, ICDA  
4th Floor (WDM), Bedford Chambers, Covent Garden  
London WC2 8HA, UK

Principles and criteria for the assessment of the environmental consequences of technology and development strategies

The project will be carried out in 3 stages. It will

1. develop conceptual framework within which alternative development and technological strategies may be considered in relation to the environment;

2. identify small set of key situations in which the interactions between environment, technology and development are amenable to operational analysis and to an analysis of major existing mathematical models dealing with these interactions. Analysis of these cases will be used to draw general conclusions about the kinds of environmental modifications associated with different economic and technological components;

3. appraise existing environmental impact-assessment methodologies and techniques from the point of view of their capability to deal with generalized impacts of technology and development.

G. Gallopin  
Fundacion Bariloche  
Casilla de Correo 138  
8400 San Carlos de Bariloche  
Prov. de Rio Negro, Argentina
The IMF and the Third World

The study of the role of the IMF in the light of the broader body of development theory and development processes promoted by other leading international agencies like the IBRD and the ILO. The mechanisms by which the IMF could be transformed into a more appropriate agency for the Third World will be considered.

E.A. Brett
School of Social Sciences, University of Sussex
Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN, UK

Science, technology and social structure in the development process

Seminar to produce a set of documents and educational materials - bringing together the insights of several IPRA working groups - to be utilised in the preparatory process of the UN Conference on Science & Technology for Development.

International Peace Research Association (IPRA)
John Shippee (Seminar co-ordinator)  Raimo Väyrynen (Chairman)
4820 Baltimore Avenue  P.O. Box 70
Philadelphia, Penn. 19143, USA  33101 Tampere 10, Finland

Supplying the technology of repression to the Third World

What are the public and private channels through which equipment, personnel, techniques and training for internal "security" are supplied to Third World countries? How do these channels circumvent embargoes? A factual investigation into these questions, based mainly on supplies from the USA, will conclude with recommendations for stemming this particular technology flow. This is a spin-off from the Transnational Institute's programme on Militarism and Disarmament.

Michael Klare
Transnational Institute/Institute for Policy Studies
1901 Q Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009, USA

International institutional arrangements for energy problems

Which are the priority concerns of different countries which can be packaged with energy in international negotiations? Should there be one or several packages? Through exploring these questions, the project will seek to demonstrate the potential for new strategic bargains involving energy and, in consequence, suggest new delegations of responsibility to international institutions. A supporting paper will describe the current work of international institutions in the field of energy.

Peter Cowhey
Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, Calif. 92039, USA

Housing in a UN strategy for the 80s and beyond

The project will discuss a housing strategy for the future based on principles outlined in previous work by John Turner, "Housing by People".
Third World participation in the programmes and projects of the
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

The Aspen Institute, an American-based body for thought and action on humanistic and social issues (with an international outlook), participates in the effort of shaping a new development strategy and draws increasingly on the insights and experience of leaders from the Third World in its on-going work, especially in its project on "financing the future".

J.E. Slater
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies
717 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022, USA

New orientations for French policies towards the Third World

These proposals for alternative policies of co-operation will be inspired by the deliberations of a recent conference on relations between France and the Third World, convened by political, syndical and intellectual organizations of the French Left, in collaboration with the Association of Third World Economists. The main themes of that conference were: energy and raw materials, industrial and commercial policies, international capital movements and labour migration.

Ngo Manh Lan
Association of Third World Economists
11 rue du Port Galand
92220 Bagneux, France

An in-depth review of the North/South negotiating process with special reference to the major rounds of negotiations during 1974-1977

The conceptual difficulties, conflicts of interests and problems of strategy and tactics would be examined, specifically in relation to the negotiations on commodities, trade in manufactures and money, finance and transfer of resources.

Kamal Hossain
Centre for Research on the NIEO
Nuffield College
Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

Just Faaland
Dept. of Social Science & Development
The Chr. Michelsen Institute
Bergen, Norway

The sovereignty of needs

Elaboration of a series of legal principles and the outline of a treatise to promote another development in both industrialized and Third world countries.

José R. Echeverria
C.P. 238
1211 Genève, Switzerland
Food, agrarian reform and rural development

This project comprises: (a) an evaluation of the implementation of the recommendations of the 1974 World Food Conference and of the relevance of those recommendations to world food problems, and - flowing from that evaluation - proposals concerning the treatment of food problems in the new UN development strategy; (b) policy proposals on self-sufficiency in food as the foundation of national and collective self-reliance; (c) policy proposals for alternative strategies of rural development. It is hoped that this work will draw upon and contribute to that being undertaken in preparation for the 1979 FAO Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development.

Jacques Chonchol
64, rue de la Verrerie
75004 Paris, France

Stockholm + 6: an assessment of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (1972)

A delphi exercise, seeking the views of some of the key actors at the Stockholm Conference (government delegates, NGOs, secretariat officials), will be one of the inputs to this assessment of the implementation and the relevance of the recommendations of the Conference. Another will be the book on the institutional follow-up of the Conference which Ms. Hetzel is writing.

Nancy Hetzel
Center for International Studies; MIT
30 Wadsworth St.
Cambridge, Mass. 02139, USA

Impact of international institutions on African development after independence

On the basis of a few country case studies (including Egypt, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, ZaRe), a group of researchers will analyse the impact of the policy prescriptions of non-African international institutions on the economic and social development of African countries. Institutions covered by this analysis will be global (World Bank, IMF, GATT), regional (EEC) and ex-colonial (Commonwealth, Zone Franc).

Fawzy Mansour
CODESRIA
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Dakar, Senegal

Italy: economic restructuring and relations with the Third World

The working group undertaking this project will make recommendations concerning a national strategy of industrial restructuring on the basis of alternative development models and will explore possibilities for establishing dynamic and mutually beneficial linkages between this strategy and development in the Third World. Members of the group will undertake studies of the main sectors of the Italian economy from which overall recommendations will be derived.
Silvano Levrero
Instituto per le Relazioni tra l'Italia e i Paesi dell'Africa, America Latina e Medio Oriente (IPALMO)
Via del Tritone 62-B
00187 Roma, Italy

**Economic relations - Switzerland/Third World**

Analysis of economic exchanges between Switzerland and the Third World in terms of trade, balance of payments, production and employment; identification of flows which are compatible and incompatible with a new international order; identification of prospects and alternatives.

**Japanese fishery interests in South-east Asia and in the South Pacific**

A case study on the impact of Japanese fishery interests in the region, its devastating influence on local fishing communities, and the human costs of Japanese expansion; alternative fisheries development methods will be formulated for countries in the region and recommendations will be made on how the Japanese fishing industry could be controlled.

**Alternative relations between Japan and Thailand**

The project investigates the dominance-dependence pattern of development between the two countries in terms of trade, private investment, development assistance, transformation of rural areas through export promotion policies; gains and losses are examined, and alternative, more equitable relations between the two countries are proposed.

**The potential for cooperation between small enterprises in the North and in the North**

To analyse and evaluate the extent of cooperation among small enterprises in the North and in the South, and to identify the potential that exists for strengthening and expanding such arrangements. Small scale enterprises adopt labour rather than capital intensive solutions to productive and distributive problems and are therefore ideal mechanisms for economic and social development where capital is scarce and the need to create employment paramount.
An international affirmative action programme for development (P.096)

Going beyond the generalities of the NIEO programme, a concrete set of international affirmative action policies in all areas of North-South interaction will be identified for implementation by the North. This constitutes a programme of specific commitments in relation to quantity and value of imports of manufactures, redeployment in terms of industries, workers, regions and so on. The North-South negotiating process in this context would gain in specificity and an element of planning could be introduced into international structural change.

Karl P. Sauvant
Zentrum fur Interdisziplinare Forschung
Universität Bielefeld
Wellenberg 1
49 Bielefeld 1, FRG

The scientific and technological dimensions of the new international order (P.100)

The project will undertake the examination of the important declarations in relation to the NIEO and analyse the scientific and technological implications of the proposals made therein.

Francisco Sagasti
C/o International Development Research Centre
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Bogota DE, Colombia

Automatic mobilization of resources for development transfers (P.102)

An issues paper including the question of international taxation, national tied taxes for development, taxes on non-renewable natural resource use, links with the special drawing rights of the IMF, and the link with reduction of armaments expenditures.

Horst Wiesebach
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
Fraunhoferstrasse 33-36
1000 Berlin 10, FRG

A balance sheet of Swedish/Third World relations (P.104)

Analysis of economic exchanges between Sweden and the Third World in terms of trade, balance of payments, production and employment; identification of flows which are compatible and incompatible with a new international order; identification of prospects and alternatives.

Secretariat for Future Studies
P.O. Box/Fack
S-103 10 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Time is the unique and irreplaceable human resource; the analysis of societal time use provides a criterion for the determination and assessment of development patterns and goals. The pursuit of GNP growth has resulted in a multiplicity of development crises in the North (e.g. structural unemployment, wasteful production, self-defeating welfare services, misguided education). A way out of these crises is through new trade-offs between: a) the time devoted by people to their "formal" work, to produce exchange values of varying utility for the market and for the State, and the time they use for "informal" direct production of use values for the home and the local community; b) time used for both of these categories of production and that available for "non-productive" (cultural, social) use. Both kinds of trade-off imply production of only genuinely useful goods and services, demystification of full employment, balanced distribution of the total workload within an individual life-span and among all citizens, and redistribution of power away from the State bureaucracy and the market towards the "civil society".

NB. This paper draws upon ideas expressed in a discussion on the future of Western industrialized societies, organized by IFDA in June 1978 (cf. P.038). It will be complemented - in a future IFDA Dossier - by a paper on transition strategies for the North.
CRISES DE MALDéVELOPPEMENT DANS LE NORD: UNE ISSUE

Résumé
Le temps est une ressource humaine à la fois unique et irremplaçable. L'analyse de l'utilisation sociale du temps offre un critère pour la détermination et l'évaluation des modèles et des objectifs de développement. La priorité donnée à la croissance du produit intérieur brut a été à l'origine de la multiplication des crises de développement dans le Nord (par exemple, chômage structurel, production de gaspillage, services sociaux se détruisant eux-mêmes, éducation mal orientée). La solution implique des nouveaux choix, a) entre le temps consacré par les individus à leur travail pour produire des valeurs d'échange d'utilité variable pour le marché et pour l'État, et le temps qu'ils utilisent pour la production directe de valeurs d'usage pour eux-mêmes et leur collectivité locale; b) entre le temps utilisé dans ces deux catégories et celui disponible pour des activités "non-productives" (culturelles ou sociales). Les deux arbitrages impliquent que seuls soient produits les biens et services réellement utiles, la démystification du plein emploi, la distribution mieux équilibrée de la quantité de travail à l'échelle d'une vie humaine et entre les citoyens, et le transfert du pouvoir de la bureaucratie d'État et du marché vers la société civile.

CRISIS DE MALDESA.RROLO EN EL NORTE: UNA SALIDA

Resumen
El tiempo es un recurso humano irremplazable y único; el análisis del uso del tiempo en la sociedad provee el criterio para determinar y evaluar modelos y objetivos del desarrollo. El perseguimiento del criterio del producto nacional bruto ha resultado en una multiplicidad de crisis de desarrollo en el Norte (ejemplos: desempleo estructural, producción gastoza, servicios sociales autodestructores, educación desviada). Una salida de la crisis es por medio de un trueque a) entre el tiempo que los hombres dedican a su trabajo formal para crear valores de intercambio de utilidad variable para el mercado y el estado, y el tiempo que se usa para la producción informal directa de valores de uso para el hogar y la comunidad local; b) entre el tiempo que se usa para las dos categorías de producción y el disponible para el uso no-productivo (cultural social). Ambos implican la producción únicamente de bienes y servicios auténticamente útiles, la demystification del pleno empleo, la distribución equilibrada del cargo del trabajo total durante el transcurso de la vida de un individuo y entre todo el pueblo, y la redistribución del poder alejándolo de la burocracia estatal y del mercado hacia la "sociedad civil".
Ignacy Sachs

CRISSES OF MALDEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTH: A WAY OUT

Unless the North acknowledges its development crises, discussion about long-term UN strategies will be devoid of meaning for at least three somewhat contradictory reasons. The mirage of imitative and unilinear growth — beckoning the South to follow the trail opened by the North — dies hard. On the other hand, for those who have already outgrown this fallacy, the credibility gap between North and South will remain wide open so long as the North continues to prodigalize development lessons to the South, as if it had been successful at home. Finally, at a more fundamental level, the configuration of the world polity and economy will be greatly influenced by the outcome of the present crises. A crisis — and, all the more so, an accumulation of crises — is always a crossroads, a compulsion to decide and, therefore, an opportunity for change. But, can we really speak of crises of maldevelopment in the North?

A. The open and hidden crises

The term has been applied abusively, thus losing much of its meaning. It is also vulnerable to co-option by the partisans of “Friendly Fascism” — an authoritarian alliance between Big Business and Big Government whose conservative dynamism may overcome our capacity for continuous social mutation in response to our predicament. Even so, a crisis remains a crisis and we are well and truly in the presence of an accumulation of them.

A quarter-century of unprecedented economic growth failed to bring generalized prosperity to all Northerners. Nor did it enable all of us to lead a meaningful life. Overtaxing of nature and exploitation of the South are but two most conspicuous aspects of this growth pattern. Even if we wanted to pursue it, we seem of a sudden to have lost the ability to deliver “more of the same” at the previous rate. The system is out of joint.

The symptoms are well known: stagflation for some, growth with unemployment for others, the threat of commercial wars among leading industrial powers and the impending collapse of the international finance system.

It must be said here that the much-discussed “oil crisis” was not really one. In strictly economic terms, the sudden readjustment of oil prices amounted at most to the cancellation of the subsidy which oil consumers received through oil prices which lagged behind the general price index. Its effects on the West have since been offset by the inflow of petrodollars to American and other Western banks, the increased profits of transnational oil companies, increased exports — including arms — to oil exporting countries and, last but not least, by the depreciation of the US dollar. It is the political significance of the OPEC action that is far more relevant, all the ambiguities of the international oil game notwithstanding: the unqualified Northern domination over the world economy has been challenged.

On both sides of the ideological fence separating supporters and critics of the capitalist system, an agonizing reappraisal of current theories is going on in order to attempt a cogent explanation of the global processes at work. It is difficult to predict when, if at all, such efforts will succeed. In the meantime,

1/ to borrow Bertram Gross’s suggestive term.
we must content ourselves with a less ambitious approach, trying to point out the most glaring social and environmental costs of the post-war growth process and then to search for development alternatives capable of eliminating or at least reducing the negative features present in the current trends.

In a sense, these costs come as a painful surprise to all those who explicitly or implicitly - whether in the West or in Eastern Europe - were caught in the trap of economic reductionism and became worshipers of the rate of growth of GNP per head, singled out as the indicator to assess the performance of governments and to ascertain the relative merits of different socio-political systems.

Important or even indispensable as economic growth may be to bring about modernization and/or development, it must not be mistaken for either of the two: the same rate of growth can sustain development or maldevelopment, depending on how it unfolds, what is its content, to which uses it is put. Development must be seen as a societal learning process, the growing ability of a community or a nation first, to project goals which conform to a set of accepted values - some variant on the theme of equal opportunity for each person to fulfil his or her own potentialities, extended beyond the present to future generations - and then to work towards these goals while keeping within the external constraints imposed by nature and inherited from history. The normative and qualitative aspects of development are not adequately represented by GNP indicators. Nor is it correct to assume that rapid economic growth generates trickling down effects that take care of social problems, leaving any residual imbalances to be corrected by more or less timid policies for income, employment, foreign trade and regional development. Economic reductionism culminated in growthmania, the belief in the possibility of overcoming all the problems through the acceleration of the rate of economic growth in a sort of continuing escape forwards.

Where do we stand now, in spite of the impressive statistical record of the 50s, 60s and even 70s? What follows is a sobering list, by no means complete, of the crises we are in or shall be facing between now and the turn of the century:

1. Structural unemployment comes first, compounded by the unequal distribution of the working opportunities between sexes, ages, classes and ethnic groups. The almost 40% unemployment rate among black teenagers in USA is a staggering figure indeed. If the present unemployment represents the deferred effects of automation, prompted by the capital-intensive bias of technical innovation, we should prepare for a worsening of the situation in the decades to come as a result of further computerization of our lives coupled with advances in telecommunication. Short of drastic change, the prospect for the end of the century is one of an acute tension between a highly productive minority and a forcibly idle, unproductive majority living on welfare, segregated in ghettos through some kind of apartheid. Hence the importance of looking into alternative patterns of distribution of the total workload, and imposing a tighter social control on the directions of technical progress, neither of which should be misinterpreted as an antiscientific or antitechnical bias.

2. The welfare services, created to take care of the unemployed and deprived, are proving increasingly self-defeating through their mounting costs and excessive bureaucratization, not to speak of their unintended perverse moral effects on those assisted. The combination of the market economy with a paternalistic and bureaucratized Welfare State is unable to foster development, as defined above, to the extent that it leaves hardly any room for innovative social responses from the grass-roots to the ever-changing challenges of modern life.
Imagination and ingenuity in using elements of the environment have a still lesser chance to assert themselves when the State bureaucracy extends its control over the economy, successfully eliminating all vestiges of diversity and of pluralism in beliefs, attitudes and approaches. The upshot of this argument is to ask for a far greater role for local communities and for civil society at large in the realm of social welfare. The identification of genuine needs and the design of solutions that fit into local cultural ecology should rely on the broadest possible citizen participation and accordingly be decentralized, the role of the State in this domain consisting in providing access to resources that cannot be met locally.

3. The educational system, often presented as a major achievement of Northern civilizations, far from preparing people to cope with the emerging crises, has the reverse effects. As Illich has shown conclusively, our schools act as diploma mills. Participation in an initiation ceremony giving access to specific social functions has taken the place of a collective learning process. Confusion reigns between training for professional openings and widening of cultural horizons as a societal goal per se. The ethos dispensed at school and through mass media rests on a contradictory mix of cultural passivity (people being conditioned to remain at the receiving end), dependence for many amenities of life on the State, personified by its multilevel bureaucracy and, last but not least, the expectation of a comfortable personal career and income in accordance with the diplomas possessed. Confrontation with real life comes increasingly as a shock because expectations are not fulfilled or as a result of the boredom produced by routine jobs. Weekend motoring to the countryside or holidays on exotic but crowded beaches are poor antidotes to daily alienation at work. Our educational systems do not foster self-reliance, creativity and sociability. They train people to believe in the limitless capability of the "technological fix" and to seek enjoyment in individualized high consumption.

4. The high consumption society proves, however, extremely wasteful of people's time and of natural resources. This becomes clear as soon as one introduces qualitative criteria into the assessment of societal performance. As a matter of fact, a high - and most probably growing - proportion of GNP and of people's efforts are appropriated by the management and maintenance costs of the economy and of society. Resources and time are spent in a way that does not add to the positive enjoyment of the individual and collective spenders. In most extreme but by no means unusual situations, a feeling of deep dissatisfaction and frustration accompanies these expenditures. For example, many people work at least one day in five to keep their motorcar going, to finance the maintenance of the road system and in this way to give themselves the opportunity to waste a significant portion of their time in traffic jams. Of course, the individual car gives some advantages to the user, mostly in the initial stages of motorization when it still acts as a positional good. But once it becomes the backbone of the transportation system, negative externalities start accumulating and have to be offset by an ever-greater share of resources and time. Such managing costs

1/ The term "civil society" is used here to denote all the social actors that are neither an emanation of the market forces nor agents of the State.

consist of excessive unproductive investments, as well as of wasteful uses of resources, space and environment, arising from a lopsided demand structure in which weaponry looms large, from careless technologies geared to short-term economic profit, and from excessive urbanization. Above all, these costs materialize in the misuse of societal time, a matter to which we turn now.

B. The uses of the time of society

Time is our basic existential category. Two consequences follow immediately from this trivial observation. On the one hand, wasting the irreversible flow of unique human lives is certainly the worst form of wastefulness. On the other, looking into the ways in which a society makes use of its time provides a convenient entry point into the subject of lifestyles, cultural patterns, broad consumption structures and societal goals, or, in other words, into the core of meaningful planning, which is unduly restricted in many discussions to the implementation aspects, to technicalities of social book-keeping.

There are three main critical aspects of our present situation:

1. A badly distributed workload: As already stated, the coexistence of a highly productive minority and a less productive or else forcibly idle majority is a feature of growing prominence. Some people are overworked, others unemployed. Moreover, work is unevenly spread along the life span of individuals, with sharp boundaries between the school years, the professional career and an ever longer inactive wait for death, cushioned by a scanty pension.

   These imbalances, which operate inside nations and between nations, are compounded by two additional complications:
   - the refusal by citizens of Northern countries to perform menial jobs, the ensuing immigration flows from the South and the emergence of a stratum of metaicos in the strict classical Greek meaning of this word;
   - the ambiguous role of the house-wives, converted in modern industrial societies into a "crypto-servant class".

   These maldistributions are likely to increase between now and the turn of the century, unless societies choose to address themselves explicitly to the interconnected problems of equitable apportionment of the total load of available work, the potential uses of increases in social productivity of labour and, more generally, alternative models of time-use.

2. Waste: A too high share of the working time goes to production and activities that are socially meaningless, not to say harmful and environmentally disrupting, even if individually they provide access to incomes and, in this way, become acceptable to people, mostly those who still harbour the illusion of consumer sovereignty.

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1/ J.K. Galbraith observes in this respect: "The conversion of women into a crypto-servant class was an economic accomplishment of the first importance. Menially employed servants were available only to a minority of the pre-industrial population; the servant-wife is available democratically, to almost the entire present male population. Were the workers so employed subject to pecuniary compensation, they would be by far the largest single category in the labour force". See Economics and the Public Purpose (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1975), p.49.
3. Alienation: Whatever the level of remuneration, working time is perceived more and more as a painful means to earn income, rather than an opportunity to realize oneself. These feelings of alienation are aggravated by the exorbitant frictional losses of time, e.g., in daily commuting or in dealings with the heavy public and private bureaucracies.

It would be pointless to try to redress this situation by piecemeal measures without looking in a holistic manner into the uses of the time of society and the purposes they serve. Such an inquiry could well become the starting point of a search for development alternatives conducted by the people themselves through a process of genuine participatory planning. More or less ephemeral grass-root associations of people pursuing common interests, well-established organizations such as labour unions, consumer leagues, political parties and confessional groups, and the mass media should all join in this effort to identify and thus broaden the opportunities for choice, to make more explicit the areas of consensus and of conflict with respect to societal values, and to map out some strategies of action.

This would be a formidable and continuing task, and would progressively reveal a wide spectrum of alternative development patterns reflecting the diverse historical and ecological contexts, the various perceptions and aspirations. Little can be said, at this stage, about such pioneering exercises in future-oriented thinking, except to indicate some broad areas of potential concern.

The total available time of an individual, and thus of a community or of a society, is spent in four categories of activities:

a) the production of exchange values (the 'job'), part of which accrues to the producer in the form of wages;

b) direct, non-market production of use values, usually for the household, sometimes for the local community;

c) rest imposed by biological body rhythms;

d) all other activities, non-productive in the narrow economic sense, but, on the contrary, essential to good and meaningful living of homo ludens: play, education and sociability in all their forms and, at times, the dolce far niente.

Material survival and comfort depend on a mix of (a) and (b); good life results from a balance between material comfort and all other satisfactions and pleasures of life, that is an adequate mix between all the four categories of time.

It immediately follows that a trade-off exists between the volume of production of goods and services and the amount of time available for cultural activities (a shorthand for (d)). A society or an individual can allocate a higher relative share of time to so-called productive work and thus pile up more exchange values, or conversely can restrict the number of working hours and open up a wide range of cultural choices. The reduction of work-time can take different forms: a shorter working-day, a longer weekend, more holidays throughout the year, more time available for training and sabbaticals, earlier access to pensioning, etc.

1/ In order to have an exchange-value the product must be a genuine use-value or else a pseudo-use-value. Maldevelopment, as opposed to development, occurs when pseudo-use-values account for a high share of the total product.
The policy implications of this trade-off for the North are only too evident. Working hours are bound to be shortened in response to deepening structural unemployment and further increases in labour productivity. Instead of arguing for or against such a measure, we should rather explore the contexts in which it should come about and make sure that it is not used as a pretext to shelve policies for eradicating poverty, distributing income and improving the quality of working life, all of which are and must remain important ingredients of the development package. Moreover, access to social assets and resources must be provided, so as to give to people an opportunity of using creatively the time released from work, rather than becoming passive consumers of the services provided by the booming tertiary industries of the "post-industrial" society visualized by Daniel Bell, among others.

Another trade-off arises between time allocated to professional work and to non-market direct production of use-values((a) and (b) in the schema above). The non-market sector should not be equated with backyard production of vegetables, important as it may be, with do-it-yourself activities that more often than not are co-opted by the market system through the supply of kits, or else with State-provided free welfare services. Its main potential lies in the provision of decentralized welfare services to meet the real and diverse needs of people in the household - neighbourhood - community continuum. Development of such services through the people's initiative might take us out of the present impasse of the Welfare States, in both Western and Eastern European forms. The potential superiority of such services can be argued on three grounds: they should be less expensive, better adapted to specific local needs and conditions, and above all should give room to people's creativity and continuing involvement in management and control. The latter should not be invoked as a pretext for the State to withdraw, but rather as an opportunity to change radically the forms of its intervention. Grass-root initiative should be supported by providing it with access to critical resources, skills and knowledge that do not exist locally. Networking of groups engaged in parallel endeavours is but one form of promoting the exchange of experience and information. In other words, the expansion of the non-market sector in the realm of decentralized welfare services would call for a redistribution of power between the civil society, the market and the State.

C. The institutional dynamics of the civil society

In modern industrial societies, the civil society has precious little to say, compared to the market forces and the State, about the uses of the economic surplus and of available time. These two potential margins of freedom are heavily mortgaged by the workings of the economic system, the all-pervading sameness of lifestyles in the high consumption societies, and the regulatory activities of the State bureaucracies. In many cases, the civil society is confronted with a formidable coalition of the market forces, of the State and of the "disabling professions" exercising the monopoly of deciding how people live and what they

1/ According to a Gallup poll, in 1977 in USA an estimated 32 million households - approximately two out of five families - raised fruits and vegetables worth $14 billion in backyards or city lots. An additional seven million people would garden if the government provided land. (B. Stokes, "The Urban Garden : A growing Trend", SIERRA Bulletin, July-August 1978.)
And yet it would be wrong to conclude that the civil society is withering away, doomed ultimately to disappear. On the contrary, recent developments show that the civil society is still able to mobilize itself around such issues as nuclear threat, environmental predicament, and quality of (working) life, while constantly attempting new and original responses to concrete societal problems: housing, education, care of children and old people, recreation and, at the other end of the spectrum, alternative forms of organization of the production processes and working life. We need to learn more about the life-size experiments that are happening before our eyes. Even if they are scattered, small and, in many cases, short-lived, they provide a clue to the alternative shapes of tomorrow, a better understanding of how the balance of power can be altered in favour of the civil society, an insight also into what might be called the institutional dynamics of the civil society: the adaptation of existing institutions to new functions and problems, and the birth of new problem-oriented citizen bodies.

The postulated redistribution of power in favour of the civil society would give to people, local groups and communities, a chance of making explicit and carrying through their collective projects and probably also broaden the space for individual learning to become self-reliant. Cultural dependence is, in contrast, a natural outcome of a situation where all the power is vested in the market and/or the State and where, in consequence, the purpose of life, cultural patterns and consumption models appear to people as exogenously determined, not to say imposed. Self-reliance is the cornerstone of development, as much as dependence lies at the heart of maldevelopment.

A clarification is in order here. Self-reliance is not synonymous with autarchy. It means autonomy of decision-making, power to define one's own purposes and projects and ability to implement them subject, of course, to the ethical constraints of solidarity with other people - the present generations and those to come after us. Thus defined, self-reliance applies to different forms of human organization, from the individual to the commonwealth of nations, passing through the neighbourhood, the community, the micro-region (or town) - the latter being of particular importance to our subject, because it often constitutes the smallest scale at which it is possible to deal with the complexities of real life, while still being able to organize meaningful citizen participation and to cope with local specificity.

Complex and varied relationships exist between all these forms. So long as the balance of power does not prevent the social actors from exercising their self-reliance, many of these linkages are beneficial to development. At any rate, maldevelopment cannot be exorcised by dreaming of blowing up the present world, full of dependencies and interdependencies, into an archipelago of self-contained, bucolic communities. This is not only utterly unrealistic, but also a backward-looking proposition, assuming away a host of problems that must be faced in all their complexity.

One of them, and not the least difficult, consists in making compatible, as a minimum, all the grass-root projects at regional, national and international levels, and promoting positive synergetic effects between them, while ensuring that natural resources are husbanded in an ecologically prudent manner, i.e. on a sustainable basis. Paradoxically, the latter calls, on the one hand, for a much broader local participation in identifying specific environmental problems and in assessing the resource potential of the environment. But, on the other, ecological safeguards and a long-term perspective require contextual macro-planning and formulation of global policies in the realm of resource, land and energy use, as well as of science and technology.

D. The Harmonization Game

Development previously defined as a societal learning process appears now as a multiple harmonization conducted by three and occasionally four partners/adversaries: the civil society, the State, the market forces and, in some respects, the international community. A strongly adversary game opposing the civil society to the market-State coalition is bound to end up in maldevelopment. A perfectly harmonious relationship between the three partners would lead to a distribution of roles through contractual planning, hopefully maximizing the opportunities for development.

The rules of the harmonization game are given by development ethics: the time of society and its material resources must be used for the satisfaction of genuine societal needs in conditions favourable to the realization of each human self. In practical terms, this implies a strong sense of solidarity with the present generation and the generations to come, the readiness to share the existing pool of wealth and identified resources, the acceptance of self-imposed limits for material consumption, and a continuous effort to eliminate wasteful consumption and production patterns and to organize the production processes on a sustainable basis by relying to a much greater extent on the flow of renewable resources managed in an ecologically sound manner.

The variables of the game are situated both at the demand level (the consumption pattern in the broadest sense of the term, including the uses of societal time) and at the supply level, where it is necessary to deal with alternative combinations of resources, energy and space linked through appropriate technologies. As a first approximation we may consider that the primary responsibility for working out alternative patterns of consumption and production should be vested with the grass-root level organizations of all kinds, representing both the consumers and the producers.

As for the States and, to some extent, the international organizations concerned with the planetary management of resources, they have four important functions in the planning development process idealized here:

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1/ This ideal construction implies a fairly restricted and carefully defined function for the market place.

2/ In affluent societies the time has come to ask ourselves, as a political question: "How much is enough?" (See What Now - Another Development (the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on Development and International Co-operation).
1) to organize the continuous tripartite negotiations at all levels, as the backbone of planning itself;

2) to assume directly the responsibility for supplying some critical inputs that lie beyond the reach of the civil society and should not become a monopoly of the market (e.g., in the field of production of knowledge and circulation of information);

3) to directly manage some resources and services, where the responsibility cannot be decentralized because of their global character (e.g., management of the international commons or of communication systems);

4) to influence contextually the outcome of the planning and negotiation process and the adopted production functions by means of policies for resources, energy, land use, science and technology, and the environment, using for these purposes an array of direct and indirect instruments - economic, fiscal, administrative and regulatory.

An idealized design as the one suggested here should not be mistaken for an action plan. Its only purpose is to orientate the discussion on the transition strategies towards another development to be undertaken between now and the turn of the century. We propose to deal with them in more detail in a subsequent paper. Let it be only said, as a way of summing up the present argument, that the problematique outlined here is directly relevant for the format, the contents and also the pertinence of a UN development strategy for the 80s and beyond.

1/ to be included in a future IFDA Dossier
BUILDING BLOCKS

THE UNIMPORTANCE OF FULL EMPLOYMENT

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Abstract: Full employment cannot be recreated in Western industrialized countries, because capital intensity of modern technology is not controlled, redistributive reforms which might create sufficient demand are not undertaken and - in the face of a demand for one billion new jobs in the Third World within the next 25 years - all jobs cannot be maintained in the industrialized countries. Furthermore, the excesses and absurdities of consumism lead to wasteage of resources, to pre-emption of Third World development, and threatens ideas of freedom. As an alternative, a more humane society is proposed based on a synthesis of the best sides of capitalism and socialism: it involves a guarantee of a basic material standard of living ("necessity sector") in exchange against some labour to produce these material necessities, and "excess sector" in which people would have freedom to invest and produce, buy and sell as much as they want, and a "freedom sector" for culture, sports, or whatever people wish. The "power sector" should have approximately "the same outline as it has in our present society" and it should own the means of production. Proposals are made to extend the project on a global basis and to overcome "absolute poverty".
L'INIMPORTANCE DU PLEIN EMPLOI

Résumé

Le plein emploi ne pourra pas être réalisé à nouveau dans les pays industrialisés de l'Ouest à cause de la technologie moderne, parce que les réformes redistributives qui pourraient accroître la demande ne sont pas entreprises, et en raison du besoin de créer un milliard de nouveaux emplois dans le Tiers Monde d'ici vingtcinq ans, tous les emplois ne pourront pas être maintenus dans les pays industriels. D'autre part, les excès et les absurdités du "consumisme" contribuent à aggraver le gaspillage de ressources, à empêcher le développement du Tiers Monde et menacent nos libertés. Comme alternative, l'article propose une société plus humaine qui serait basée sur les meilleurs éléments du capitalisme et du socialisme. Elle impliquerait la garantie d'un niveau de vie matériel de base (le "secteur de la nécessité") obtenu en échange du travail nécessaire pour satisfaire les besoins matériels; un "secteur supplémentaire" dans lequel les gens auraient la liberté d'investir et de produire, d'acheter et de vendre à leur gré et un "secteur de liberté" pour la culture, les sports ou ce que les gens désirent; le "secteur du pouvoir" aurait plus ou moins le profil qu'il a dans notre société actuelle et il serait propriétaire des moyens de production. Des propositions sont formulées pour étendre ce projet sur une base globale de manière à supprimer la pauvreté absolue.

LA INIMPORTANCIA DEL PLENO EMPLEO

Resumen

No se puede recrear el pleno empleo en los países industrializados del Oeste, porque no se controla la utilización intensiva del capital en la tecnología moderna, no se emprenden reformas para la redistribución que pudieran crear la demanda suficiente, y frente a la demanda por mil millones de nuevos empleos en el Tercer Mundo dentro de los próximos 25 años - no se pueden mantener todos los empleos en los países industrializados. Además la demasia y la absurdidad del consumismo y el pleno empleo resultan en más gasto inútil de recursos, a la exclusión del desarrollo del Tercer Mundo, amenazando las ideas del Oeste tanto del Este sobre la libertad. Como alternativa, una sociedad más humana y utópica se propone basada sobre los mejores elementos del capitalismo y del socialismo. Se hacen propuestas para extender la utopía globalmente para superar la pobreza absoluta.
THE UNIMPORTANCE OF FULL EMPLOYMENT. 1)

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1. Consumism and full employment.

A child who is born in North Africa, from its first days surrounded by Moslem culture, naturally becomes a Mohammedan. A child who is born in Southern Europe in the same way becomes a Christian. A child who is born in the Soviet Union, from its first days surrounded by communist culture and propaganda, easily becomes a communist. And a child who is born in Northern Europe or America, from its first days surrounded by capitalist culture and advertisement, equally easily becomes a consumist.

In fact, Consumism has overtaken and replaced all earlier religions and ideologies as the dominant cultural trait in the richest nations of the world, commonly referred to as the West. Consumism is today the Western religion.

It can be shown2) that it is not only the capitalist enterprises with all their sales promotion that stimulates this consumist culture. The press, that normally earns much more income from the advertizers than from the readers and that often is owned by the same interest groups as the big companies, supports the same ideas. The political parties compete for voters by promises of even higher consumption levels if "our" party is voted into government. And the main object of the labour unions has become to raise the income levels of their members so that they can satisfy the demands that the advertizers have stimulated. The individual becomes a prisoner of this web of behaviour of the major power interests of Western societies. Like a Pavlovian dog his consumist appetite is whetted from all sides. Culturally, he becomes a consumist.

It is in this context that a critique of the Western full employment policies should be understood - full employment at any average material standard of living. As things now are, full employment can only be had by economic growth. Growth is the life-blood of the capitalist system. In this way the social-democratic parties in the Western nations have developed a common interest with the big companies. Full employment policy has been a major and wise goal for the labour parties for a long time. But now the situation has changed. Now it can even be said that full employment has been perverted into a major instrument of the capitalist enterprises for furthering the Consumist culture also with the help of social-democratic parties and labour unions. That is, at least, what I have tried to show in a small book that has stimula-
ted some debate in Scandinavia. In Sweden it is called "Thoughts on full employment.". In Denmark it has the more honest title "No to full employment.". Some of the essence of that booklet is summarized below.}

The last years the OECD area has been shaken by some 17 or 18 million unemployed. The earlier keynesian conviction that unemployment was a thing of the passed has showed itself to be an illusion. In the absence of great redistributive reforms the West simply cannot maintain full employment any more. This is a common argument. But the whole political discussion following from it has concentrated upon how full employment can be recreated.

What is new in my argument is that I am not only stating that the West cannot, but also that it should not even try to continue the full employment policies.

The West cannot recreate full employment for three major reasons. It cannot control the capital intensity of modern technology which tends to make man as useful to the economy as the horses were to agriculture when tractors were introduced. For political reasons huge internal redistributive reforms which might create sufficient demand cannot be undertaken. And if we are going to show any solidarity in practices with the poorer nations, where ILO has shown that one billion new jobs will be demanded within the next 25 years, we cannot egoistically maintain all jobs for ourselves in the West. Through import of goods, immigration of foreign workers or export of capital the development of the South will partly affect the employment situation in the West.

To these normal fears I add, however, that even if we could, we should not create full employment, as it leads to some results which are more or less undesirable or even absurd.

2. Full employment excesses.

This argument against full employment is not based upon the alienation debate. The so-called "instrumental attitude to work", tending to look upon it as a necessary evil to earn the money to buy the goods that really give a meaning to life, is no doubt widespread. But it can still be forcefully maintained that a certain amount of work is the best and richest way, not only to earn ones living but also to fill ones existential vacuum with valuable content. That is the moral premise underlying the present thoughts. Employment is certainly not unimportant; on the contrary. But full employment at an already high luxury standard is an unimportant and unwise political goal for the rich nations, as it leads to consumist excesses.
Before illustrating these excesses it should, however, be observed that full employment originally was thought of as an instrument and not as a goal in itself. In the crisis of the 1930's with the emergence of the keynesian policies in societies where unemployment often meant starvation and outright material misery, the early full employment policies were thought of as instruments for giving what we today may call basic needs satisfaction for everybody. The elimination of hunger and misery was the goal, employment the means. But this instrument has gained such an importance that it now can be characterized as the super-ideology of many Western nations. This ideological change is what has lead to the full employment excesses.

Which, then, are these excesses?

a. Some time ago, when OECD appointed a group of so-called wise men to find out what could be done in the West to counter the present unemployment, it was emphatically demonstrated that according to conventional economic thinking the only known way to recreate full employment is through increased economic growth. This was the truth established by the McCracken report.

Full employment policies thus lead to a harmony of interests between the companies - who want high profitable demand - and the labour parties - who want full employment. As already stated, this situation can be characterized as one in which the socialist parties in the West by necessity become major supporters of the capitalist interests in furthering the consumist culture. A theoretical description of how and why this situation has come about has recently been given by Charles E. Lindblom in his excellent book on "Politics and Markets".

If full employment is an even better instrument than advertising for raising the Western level of demand for commodities which from the poor nations' point of view must be seen as luxury goods, it also has a number of indirect effects.

b. A widening of the gap between North and South in absolute terms is the first negative consequence. A three per cent growth in the Swedish or US economy - which may be too low to give full employment according to the McCracken report - means an average yearly addition to the present GNP of about 270 dollars. 270 dollars is more than the yearly average income of the 500 million people who today suffer from absolute poverty. In other words: in order to maintain a high degree of employment in the richest nations it is absolutely necessary that we increase our standard of living year after year by more than the average yearly income of the poorest 500 million people. Full employment in the West necessitates a widening gap between rich and poor nations. This is the logic that can help to explain why all beautiful rhetoric on international solidarity remains nothing but just that.
c. If there is any realism in the fears about a future resource shortage, much debated since the oil crisis of 1973 and the first Club of Rome report on "Limits to Growth", then this necessity for growth in order to maintain full employment in the rich nations also imply that these nations by necessity will have to appropriate an unproportionally great share of the remaining resources. In this way the full employment policy in the West may be said to pre-empt the possibilities for the poorer nations ever to develop.

d. We now know that in the United States the taxation system in its totality is not redistributive. There are extremely good grounds to doubt that even the Swedish taxation system has any redistributive effects; the facts are not known and both the social-democratic and the conservative-liberal coalition governments have refused to investigate this highly sensitive question. If the absence of serious redistributive policies within the rich nations is assumed, the monetary support for full employment channelled into the general economy, may be said to guarantee not only the income of those who are about to lose their jobs. Full employment policies then also guarantee the top incomes, and the ability to buy ever bigger Mercedes Benz and ever more snobbish fur coats at the top of the income pyramid. Even more, this consumption becomes a necessity. In other words, to take the example of the about one million Swedish leisure boats, a serious full employment policy necessitates the purchase of a 20,000 dollar yacht by everybody in Sweden, preferably with the help of state subsidies, before the poorest half a billion individuals in the world even get access to clean drinking water.

e. The production of such luxury goods by those who do not themselves have very much increases the alienation of the latter ones. The instrumental attitude to work is bound to increase with the growth of this kind of wasteful production in a world of widespread misery.

f. The necessity to maintain full employment is today also regularly used as a legitimizing argument for almost any type of policy. It has long been used by various regional interests in the USA and elsewhere for maintaining the production and export of ever more refined armaments. It is used to explain why potentially very dangerous atomic energy simply "must" be developed. On the very day when this article is finally polished, the Swedish news e.g. report two typical cases. In one of the few remaining areas of beautiful nature in Southern Sweden, Oesterlen, two big companies have demanded the right to investigate the mining possibilities. The local municipality, led by the summer-house owners, decided to turn down the application. But the social-democrats, with reference to the necessity
to create more employment opportunities, wanted to permit also this destruction of nature. And sooner or later they are likely to be successful. On the same day the conservative member of a Swedish government committee, appointed to suggest measures to press the South African government to give up apartheid, expressed herself against a legal ban on Swedish investments in South Africa "because it would have negative labour market consequences in Sweden".

All these invocations of the employment effects in order to justify a multitude of various policies usually do not say much about the specific relations between the issue at stake and the employment problems. But they say very much about the central ideological place that full employment has got in our societies. An invocation of it is believed to justify almost anything.

g. Another consequence of the full employment policies at any economic level has to do with the Western concept of freedom. It can be maintained that a continuation of the present trends are likely to lead also the Western nations to a centralized power situation similar to that what exists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In all business cycle downswings, when unemployment is on the rise, the Western governments demand a bigger share of total production in order to guarantee the full employment. And what the governments once have got their hands on, they never give back. According to OECD statistics the share of the public sector of total national income has in most member countries risen from less than ten per cent half a century ago to between one third and one half of GNP today. In some countries, especially those where full employment has been taken extra seriously, the expansion of the public sector has even accelerated. If present trends continue several OECD governments will take over 90 per cent of the total GNP before the schoolchildren of today have retired.

If these trends are permitted to realize themselves, the power situation in East and West will be similar. If it is state socialism in the East and state capitalism in the West will not matter much to the individual. He will be able to work only on what the state wants him to work with and decides to invest in; he will not be able to decide himself to what he wants to devote his life and his working hours. Labour unions will be decorations and the situation may also occur that the state, as is now done in the East by criminal laws against loafers, demand that the citizens work their 8 hours per day for the good of the state, however rich the state may have become.

In fact, what I maintain is that the continuation of the full employment policies will destroy some of the central Western
values, especially that of liberal freedom.

h. Finally, the importance of freedom is by no means only a capitalist idea. The main inspiration behind this criticism of a central Western policy concept is, indeed, Marx's idea of "the realm of freedom".

The step from the realm of material necessity to that of material freedom can never be taken in a consumist culture. Human beings will always be kept in bondage if their material needs are made to grow faster than production can satisfy them. As has been shown above, full employment policies demand such a bondage-creating economic growth. Full employment, while once having been an excellent instrument for liberating the poorest strata in the Western nations from hunger and misery, now is becoming an obstacle to the realization of the realm of material - and thus spiritual - freedom!

3. Towards a synthesis of capitalism and socialism.

If only a small part of my criticism in section 2 against the present full employment policies in the West is considered justified the conclusion must be that the Western nations must reconsider these policies. It is, however, much more easy to criticize and find faults than to suggest ways out of blind alleys. In order to stimulate thinking, it may, however, be worthwhile to try to concretize some directions into which future economic policies might be guided.

In groping for such a concrete proposal my starting point is that from a humanely point of view the existing economic and political systems, both the capitalist and the socialist mixed economies, have failed. It is necessary to try to make a new synthesis, one in which the best sides of both systems are maintained and the worst sides avoided.

The best side of the existing socialist systems is that almost all of them seem to guarantee a certain moderate material living standard to all of their law-abiding citizens. The worst side is the corresponding suppression of political human rights. The worst side of the existing capitalist systems is that they permit both very depressing pockets of material poverty and a ruthless exploitation of some men over others and over nature. The best side is that of the relatively high degree of political freedoms, at least for the lucky ones.

Would it be possible to come in the direction of this new and superior synthesis by changing the present economic goals of the state?
I believe the answer is: Yes! If the Western states as their economic priority goal accepted to create a guaranteed moderate level of living for all, combined with a just distribution of both the right and the duty to work for this real income, and if the governments then with a minimum of interference let the individuals chose to do what they want to do with their lives, we might start to approach the realm of material freedom.

To stress the employment aspect: the state should not try to guarantee full employment at any level of material standard. But it should guarantee that everybody gets the right, as well as the duty, to work much enough to get the feeling that he himself has by his labour earned his income.

This, it might be added, is in contrast to the present situation where, besides that some rich individuals can escape work altogether, we have some strong and deplorable tendencies to divide the labour market into an A- and a B-team, pushing out more and more "inefficient" people from work into a forced leisure, paid for by the state. This is destructive for the individuals afflicted as they feel ashamed of being secondary citizens, useless for society, when they are unemployed, on the dole, in forced retirement, or "only" a housewife. It is also bad for the development of society, as a very serious author, on the basis of a study of the tendencies to do away with "surplus population" by Auschwitz-methods which he detects in all developed nations, can suggest that "Bureaucrats in some countries might someday decree compulsory early retirement and, at the same time grant the retirees 'a mercy death'. The social advantages are obvious. The most vigorous elements in society would constitute its work force and there would be no claim on society's resources by superannuated or economically redundant elements."4)

But, to return from the possible horrors of the future to my suggested utopia, the new economic goal of the state could be realized through a conscious division of society into sectors: one in which people are occupied with satisfying the moderate human needs of consumption and labour; another in which people can work and consume at levels in excess of the moderate needs; and a third in which people are given freedom from material concerns, allowing them the chance to develop their innermost dreams in whichever way they wish, providing they do not thereby harm their fellows.

In the utopian society described here, there are actually four main sectors: the necessity sector, the excess sector, the freedom sector and the power sector.

The necessity sector, which must be state-controlled, should be responsible for supplying people's basic material needs. In this sector we should calculate the total material need which the state must guarantee to satisfy, as well as the total amount of labour needed at given levels of technological development in or-
der to produce these material necessities. This volume of labour should be divided and apportioned out among all citizens, as a right as well as a responsibility. Payment for work done should be in the form of non-negotiable, non-transferrable and non-seizable purchase cards, which guarantee the individual his or her basic material security for life.

For individuals who want a higher economic standard than that allowed by the basic security of the first sector, there should be an economic excess sector in which people would have the greatest possible freedom - provided this brings no harm to others - to buy and sell, invest and produce, save and splurge, invest and lose. All the various forms of business ownership could exist here, with the exception of state-ownership. The State should be allowed to regulate this sector, but only with the most general of laws, and should otherwise be kept out. Privately-owned, co-operative or employee-owned companies should have complete freedom to compete in this excess economic sector.

For those individuals who are not primarily interested in working to earn a higher standard than that given them by the elementary needs sector, there should be a third alternative. This is the freedom sector - for culture, sports, being together with people, or whatever those individuals wish. Within this sector some people will need extra income to realize their dreams. This can be earned through temporary, extra work in the excess sector. People will thus be allowed the greatest possible freedom to attempt to realize, without material or psychological pressures, whatever dreams they may have.

The fourth sector, the power sector, should have approximately the same outline as it has in our present society. The representatives of the people should be chosen through open and free elections and they must, as in the present system, deal with the conflicts and differences which are a natural part of all social systems, including the one described here. A new constitution would, however, be required. The divisions between the three other sectors should insure their stability. For example, it should prevent the excess sector from expanding at the expense of the other two.

The power sector should own the means of production in the necessity sector. But those in positions of power should as a rule not be the same individuals who are the leaders of the government economy. This would insure the balance of power.

This combination should guarantee a moderate economic standard. It would also allow much greater freedom than exists today for people to live a manyfaceted and harmonious life in a society that is less materially-oriented than the present one.
A crucial question is, of course, how much of one's life that must be devoted to the necessity sector. This depends on what the politicians decide to be the moderate economic standard that the state should guarantee. It can roughly be calculated that if the Swedes today decided that the present British standard was enough, about half of the Swedish one and far above world average, and if all men and all women divided the necessary labor to produce this standard, between 15 and, at the most, 20 years of work would be enough to earn the guaranteed entrance ticket to "the realm of material freedom". Much could be said about this, but the important thing to realize is that as we today work as an average 40 years per life, the potential leisure would increase by 20 to 25 years, or, if one would prefer to do some work all the life, a half-time job for 30 to 40 years would leave half the day for other activities. This, in turn, would require rather considerable changes elsewhere in society. The schools, for instance, should not as now only strive to produce humans who are good accessories to the machines, but should instead give young people a broad orientation in the art of enjoying active life, including life outside the relatively short working period.

Let us, however, now turn to a question that was not treated in my booklet. The above idea has been worked out on the assumption that Sweden was a closed economy. To realize it in practice, the OECD-governments must of course jointly cooperate. But let us finish by asking if this idea potentially could have any importance for the North-South discussion. Could it possibly contribute to the breaking of the trend to a widening gap between rich and poor nations that in spite of all rhetoric has characterized both of the U.N. "Development Decades" and which, moreover, as was shown above, must continue as long as the West tries to maintain full employment by present methods?

4. The necessity sector and "absolute poverty".

During the latest years the problem of eliminating absolute poverty or of satisfying basic needs for the poorest people of the world has come increasingly into focus. It is likely that this central human problem may come to be the top priority goal for foreign aid and related North-South policies and possibly also for more general economic relations between richer and poorer nations. The specific question that can be asked in this context is if the moderate material needs goal, as here suggested for the richer nations, could in any way be connected to the policy of eliminating absolute poverty in the poor nations.
Instantly this idea is posed, the elusiveness of the concept of "basic" or "moderate needs" clearly appears. I have assumed that no scientific norms, but only politically decided ones, can be established in order to define these material levels. In Scitovskyl's book on "The Joyless Economy" (p.117) it is reported that legal "poverty norms" vary by a factor of 1 to 25 or even 1 to 30 between Egypt and Ceylon on the one hand and the USA and Switzerland on the other. These norms are heavily influenced by tradition and development levels and can, for practical purposes, only be operationally defined by appropriate political bodies.

What in this context could be done, e.g. by the United Nations, would be to establish an ideal norm for what might be considered the politically acceptable gap between truly "basic needs" in the poorest nations and the culturally determined, much higher moderate needs-levels in the richer nations. The permissible gap here could, in the most optimistic case for instance, be related to the suggestions by Jan Tinbergen and others in chapter 6 of the "RIO-report", proposing that the present gap of about 1 to 13 be narrowed to about 1 to 3.

What then could be suggested was that the governments of the richer nations should, as top priority, establish a policy which guaranteed all the citizens of their country the moderate material level posed by the UN-norms. When that goal had been reached, however, top priority might not, as now is the case, be to establish full employment at any luxury standard in a catch-up-competitive international environment. Instead, the richer nations, realizing their international responsibilities as well as present and future dependencies, might shift their top priorities in economic policies in the direction of eliminating absolute poverty for the poorest groups inside the poorest nations by suitable national and international policies.

Such a shift in policy priorities would correspond to much of present social thinking, e.g. Johan Rawls' contract theory of justice or Irma Adelman's and Cynthia Taft Morris' demonstration that present tendencies in the world economy are likely to increase absolute poverty. In other contexts I have tried to give a theoretical outline of what can be termed "inverted utilitarianism", i.e. an attempt to guide practical economic policies by the criterion of their ability to minimize human suffering, instead of maximizing happiness. Normal utilitarian thinking, unable to define happiness or even to agree upon the gross outlines of what it might be, easily turns into a maximization of the Gross National Product without regards for the distributive effects, thus neglecting the creation of more absolute poverty by the economic growth process. Combined with the intra-Western or East-West
competetive catch-up game, this relegates the elimination of absolute poverty and of easily observable human misery and suffering to a position of low or zero priority, at the same time as the size of the gap, in absolute terms, between North and South is bound to grow to even more horrendous proportions than today. The impossibility to reach "happiness" in this process has also been well demonstrated by the late Fred Hirsch who, moreover, has warned us that the vain attempts to catch up may destroy the resources and the preconditions for a decent life for everybody. His analysis of "Social Limits to Growth" should be extended to cover also the international catch-up process!

The elimination of absolute poverty can logically be realized in only two ways. Either at least the head of the poorest families is provided with a job, by which he earns an income by which he can pay for the goods and services included in a basic needs standard. Or redistributive policies must one way or another be created by which the state takes part of the income of those who work, and thus have one, and transfer it to the unemployed poor.

Theoretically any combination of these two extreme methods can be imagined, but one of them must be used if the other is not. In practice, however, there can be no doubt that the poor individuals in the poor nations have the same desire as the least rich ones in the rich nations of themselves working enough to earn their own bread. They are likely to feel equally depressed, alienated, shameful, and useless to their societies as those on the dole or in forced retirement tend to feel in the West.

As this is so, any basic needs strategy should concentrate upon creating enough of employment for everybody in the poor nations as well as in the rich. This is, of course, especially important in nations where the social security system is weak or non-existent. Materially, one may say that the importance of full employment stands in inverse relation to the efficiency and comprehensiveness of the social security system. Psychologically, some productive employment may be equally important on all development levels. However that may be, a good case could be made for a social and economic policy in the poor nations that concentrated upon guaranteeing everybody both basic needs satisfaction and a possibility to work. This is, indeed, how some of the poorer socialist nations have tried to eliminate absolute poverty. In at least the cases of China and Cuba this policy seems to have been relatively successful, more so than in comparable non-socialist nations. But in these countries the
above discussed excess and the freedom sectors, which at least Cuba should be able to afford, are non-existent.

Would it not be possible to envisage a new economic system also in the poor nations, similar to that above suggested for Sweden and the rich nations, whereby the elimination of absolute poverty was entrusted to a state sector while also here some room was reserved for an excess and a freedom sector, so as to avoid the historically observable abuses of state power in fully socialized nations? Of course, the proportions between the sectors would by necessity have to be quite different from what they would be in the rich nations, but the basic principles might be highly similar. And might not this be a both practical and more realistic way to eliminate absolute poverty than the present inefficient growth policies? These questions should at least be put and serious efforts should be devoted to answer them. The proposed new system may be one way to avoid some rather ugly alternatives of mass starvation, internal and international conflicts, and the hardening of central powers into tyrannies.

If these suggestions for more internationally equitable internal policy goals in the richer nations are to have any realistic chances to become adopted, however, at least two preconditions have to be fulfilled.

The first one is that the East-West conflict is at least partially overcome. The present international economic catch-up competition is largely determined by the East-West conflict. The Soviet Union has time and again posed the "dogmat' i pershmat'" "catch up and surpass" of the leading capitalist nations in per capita production as their top economic priority, thereby legitimizing their new economic system. The West cannot let that happen, especially as economic power is easily transformable into a military one, and it thus feels forced to continue its growth. When the GNP-catch-up has failed, the so-called socialist nations have stressed their ability, and West's inability, to maintain full employment. The East-West competition has thereby made this policy goal into a central ideological point of system competition, pressing the Western nations, as has been shown above, to increase already high absolute average income levels by hundreds of dollars per year in order to raise demand and thus maintain full employment. That the Soviet catch-up goal, if realized, by necessity will lead the Soviet society to the same material luxury levels before their rhetorical expressions of international solidarity can be transformed into practical action, is a problem that the communist theorists seem to have refused to tackle.

Anyway, a calming down of the East-West economic competition is a precondition for an increased willingness of either side to forego employment opportunities or higher domestic income and
production levels inside their own nations, in order to create higher employment and less misery in the poor ones.

The second precondition relates to the domestic policies inside the poor nations themselves. Most of them are now repeating the same class conflicts which so have plagued the development of the now industrialized nations. The poor nations may even be worse off than the West ever was. On the one hand, e.g., their upper or ruling classes may want to catch up, in consumption or military levels, with an international elite many times higher up, thereby wasting much of the available potentially employment-creating investment capital on vain luxury or armament imports. On the other hand the poor countries today cannot, as did Western Europe, solve their surplus population problems by emigration and large-scale appropriation of continents and colonies. Both these, and some other differences, act to reinforce the "natural" class conflicts within poor nations arising in a process of economic change. This should be realized.

Nonetheless, it seems rather hopeless to ask the rich nations to shift their own economic policy priorities to the advantage of the poorer ones, if the concrete advantages of the new Western policies, behind the cloak of "sovereignty", are almost wholly appropriated by the already rich ruling classes in the poorer nations. Thus a precondition for a realization of the central ideas here presented is that the governments in the poorer, as well as in the richer nations are genuinely and concretely interested in creating employment possibilities also for the poorest strata of their own population, thus partly eliminating the worst poverty.

If these two preconditions, of a less intensive East-West conflict and less intensive class rule inside the South, were realized, then it might be conceivable that international priorities along the suggested sort could become a practical reality.

Let me, as a final proposal, then suggest that studies be undertaken which seriously should try to answer the following questions:

1. Would it be better to try to focus the discussion of the "gap" between rich and poor nations upon a "basic needs" level in the poor and a "moderate needs" level in the rich nations than upon often rather meaningless GNP-comparisons of average production that disregards poverty problems?

2. Would it be feasible for the United Nations to establish an ideal permissible "scale of basic and moderate needs" for
various nations and regions of the world? If so, what factors should be taken into account in making it?

3. Could an international discussion be stimulated about the suggested new type of a "mixed" economic system - let us call it "Mariannism" - in which the central goal of the governments would be to guarantee the by U.N. established basic or moderate material standard of living to all citizens, as well as a just share of the labour, required to produce this standard. For the rest, the governments should stimulate their citizens to use their leisure in as free, creative, and harmonious ways as possible.

4. How could a rich nation that has reached the goal of a moderate standard for all best contribute to the realization of the basic needs level in the poor nations? Which domestic and international policies would be most useful?

5. Which would be the problems of the "period of transition" from the present full employment directed, maximum economic growth system to a moderate needs, maximum life fulfillment system, from the present mixed capitalist system to Mariannism?

Irrespective of how these questions are answered it is my firm conviction that for both domestic and international reasons, the present central goal or super-ideology of the rich Western nations, that of guaranteeing full employment for all at any level of relative luxury living must soon be seriously reconsidered and changed.

NOTES:

1. I want to express my gratitude to Fondazione San Michele, Capri, and its Director, who provided me with the remote peacefulness in which this paper could be written.


Abstract: This paper is an excerpt of a paper on industrialization strategies and policies prepared for IFDA earlier this year. The excerpt examines the problem of self-reliance at country level and discusses some of its basic elements including national control of key sectors, internal consumption, agriculture, processing of natural resources, education and technological development. The framework of collective self-reliance and proposals for international action are also outlined. The note by the IFDA Secretariat invites interested readers to submit comments.

NOTE BY THE IFDA SECRETARIAT

The meaning and contents of the Lima Declaration on industrial development (negotiated during the second general conference of UNIDO in 1975) is by its nature a document which has been bedevilled by ambiguity. Some countries hoped to establish that the new pattern of world industry should reflect the efforts of many Third World countries towards increased self-reliance and increased co-operation among themselves. Others wanted to promote interests expressed in industrialized countries for redeploying industries to countries in which they could benefit from cheap labour or availability of raw materials.

These ambiguities were to be removed through further consultations after the Lima conference which were to lead to decisions capable to promote "the right kind" of industrial development, adapted to specific countries and their needs.

In the absence of such consultations established market mechanisms have continued to generate rapid changes whose benefits to Third World countries, if any, are very doubtful.

How can the dialogue on world industry be revitalized, and how could it lead to industrialization strategies which are more beneficial for the Third World?

The following pages on industrialization and self-reliance are part of a paper prepared by François LeGuay for IFDA; they attempt to outline a policy framework aimed at providing answers to these questions.

IFDA invites interested people to make comments on how a new dialogue on industrialization could be initiated. The attached paper may be examined critically, and contributions leading its proposals a few steps ahead would be welcome. Please send your communication to IFDA, Place du Marché 2, 1260 Nyon, Switzerland.

Résumé français, cf p.12
Résumen español, cf p.12
INDUSTRIALIZATION AS PART OF A SELF-RELIANCE STRATEGY

This paper is an attempt to give an operational content to an industrialization process as integral part of a strategy of self-reliance. This implies first that self-reliance is not synonymous with exclusive rural development. Though it departs from conventional market-oriented type, industrialization would be an indispensable component of a strategy aiming at self-reliance. Without industry, attempts to regain internally autonomous power of decision will be rapidly frustrated.

Another preliminary remark will be to stress the close interrelation between a self-reliance strategy and a strategy of basic needs as it has been originally defined at the occasion of the ILO Conference in 1976. Later on the "basic needs" concept was subject to an operation of distortion and recuperation in an humanitarian context of welfare economics, and this has raised suspicion in many Third World countries. It should not be forgotten, however, that as presented at the ILO Conference and in various preliminary papers (e.g. in the study by the Funcacion Bariloche) the concept was a progressive one: the setting of quantitative and qualitative objectives for life standards of the lower income groups implied in itself superseding of market mechanisms and acting directly on production, consumption and incomes.

Putting emphasis on self-reliance does not mean that such needs are ignored. On the contrary, it could be easily demonstrated that a self-reliance strategy, by which a country would alleviate its dependence, is the only way to progress towards satisfaction of basic needs.

Making proposals for the contribution of industrialization to the achievement of self-reliance is very difficult "in abstracto". Actual paths to be followed may be very different from one country to another, according to the specific objectives, conditions, size, resources. It has been argued that for some countries conditions are such that industrial self-reliance is an impossible challenge and collective self-reliance is the only solution. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to consider first the country level where the power mechanisms and decision-making process are situated. Even if very limited, the possibilities of individual self-reliance should be explored first, then collective self-reliance will be envisaged in the context of increased co-operation among Third World countries.

Self-reliance strategy of industrialization at country level

The first problem is to find a criteria which could make operational the concept of self-reliance which too often has remained vague and rhetorical. While undertaking a planning exercise which would aim at building for given horizons (long-term and medium-term) pictures of the industrial situation showing progressive steps toward an ideal situation of self-reliance, it would be at the same time necessary to describe the transition from the present starting point towards those future situations. One could for that purpose try and evaluate (quantitatively and qualitatively) the present degree of dependence of the country and see how every decision on industrialization (at the global, sectoral or project level) would increase or decrease that dependence. Taken in a very general acception the "dependence contents" might be the main criterion for orientating industrialization policy.
In doing so, one deliberately questions the conventional methods of cost-benefit analysis for the evaluation of industrial projects. Even in their more elaborate versions, which try to adapt to specific situations, they assume implicitly an integration in the world market (in particular if they use international prices as shadow prices), and do not take into account the dependence contents. One questions also traditional guidelines supposedly applicable to all countries: emphasis on small scale industries; preference for labour-intensive, intermediate technologies; elimination of protection tariffs; priority to heavy industries, etc. In most cases those general abstract guidelines reflect implicit assumptions: either that there is one ideal path towards industrialization which Third World countries should try to reproduce alternatively that they have to content themselves with some kind of second rank industries opened for them by an international division of labour imposed from outside. In any case, these guidelines do not say anything about the self-reliance contents. Each country choosing a self-reliance industrialization will have to elaborate its own guidelines and instruments of decision.

In order to do so, one has to keep in mind that self-reliance (or dependence) is a complex phenomenon which cannot be approached through simple ratios such as imports/production. Dependence is obvious when local industries are under the control of foreign firms, a control which is not always a legal and financial one but nevertheless real. Third World countries' industries are also dependent through exports to controlled external markets, through imported technology, know-how, capital goods, trained personnel. In a more diffused but maybe more dangerous way, dependence may also be rooted in consumption styles and patterns, imitated from outside.

Not all these elements can easily be quantified, so that the determination of self-reliance content would have to be considered not only within industry itself but also on other productive sectors, on general level of education and skills, on the preservation and use of natural resources, on ecological aspects, etc.

This being said, one could imagine a method for planning industrial development which would elaborate several possible industrialization paths and evaluate quantitatively at short, medium and long term (for instance 1980, 1990, 2000) effects on the degree of dependence of the country which would result from each one of them and would reach an acceptable solution through a process of successive approximations taking into account possible effects. In weighing the various elements, emphasis could be put on objectives considered as more important key points in the development process which could be given highest priority. According to the country's specificity, those could be for instance: self-sufficiency in food; preservation and optimum use of one given vital factor (such as water, space, specific natural resource), mastership of one (or a few) key technology, technical and managerial capacity in specific sectors, etc. Objectives and constraints should be considered together and qualitative elements as mentioned before may be preferred to the quantitative level of output calculated in the traditional way. Real contents of growth would be more important than its arithmetical value. Difficulties of the task and possibilities of errors cannot be underestimated. Complexity is inevitable since one does not accept to reduce development to the maximization of one single quantitative indicator.
In the same way domestic development and external economic relations should be considered jointly with the view of reorganizing and eliminating at an early phase of the exercise those existing external relations which are incompatible with the country's internal objectives. In this respect, situations may widely differ from country to country. It may be conceptually easier (though actually difficult) to design self-reliance strategies for countries which are still at low levels of production, consumption and foreign trade. On the contrary, countries in which sizeable economic and financial flows presently generate dependence through consumption, technology, imports, exports, investments may have first to undo the existing links, to delink their economies from centre-dominated systems, before in a next step establishing relations of a different nature and magnitude. The problem would be especially difficult for those countries, such as some oil countries, which have already reached very high levels of per-capita income, in a system depending heavily on the rent created by one export product. Internalizing existing flows which have been generated in the country from outside may prove to be impossible without a drastic reduction in the magnitude of those flows.

Having emphasized the specificity of individual situations and warned against overall guidelines, there is very little which could be stated as generally applicable to strategies of industrialization. Production objectives are not separable from the conditions through which they are reached; in some cases the balance of dependence effects of both inputs and outputs may lead to the abandoning of projects which at first glance were looking attractive. Building progressively less dependent industrial infrastructures, engineering capabilities, programmes of education and training, research units, capital goods productions may be more important than reaching rapidly in a few sectors high production levels.

To give a few examples which will have to be adapted to individual countries' situations, one could briefly envisage how industrial development could contribute to the solution of some major problems which developing countries have to face on their way to self-reliance.

1. National control of key sectors:  
   An obvious first step in a self-reliance strategy would be to take in hand (in many cases in government hands) the control of key sectors of the economy previously dominated by foreign firms (especially transnational corporations). However, regaining the majority in ownership (51% of the shares) will be only the very first step. Nationalization by itself does not put an end to foreign control. If foreign partners still control the market, the inputs, the technology (through know-how, trained personnel at all levels), dependence may remain nearly as complete as before. Progress in these different aspects in the sector itself and in related sectors (through forward and backward linkages) would be priority objectives in order to progressively overcome the economic and technical dependence (as important as legal and financial dependence).

Most countries will aim at establishing a full industrial network as skilled-intensive and technology-intensive as possible. In this respect special attention will be given to engineering industries (in particular capital goods industries) which cumulate a number of positive points: high degree of technology, numerous possible linkages, labour intensiveness, low energy contents, small size of units, discreet production processes easily separable in independent operations, flexibility in location.
2. Satisfaction of internal consumption:

Having defined a consumption pattern suited to the basic needs of the population and less dependent on foreign models, one major task for a self-reliant industrialization would be to produce the required goods. It may be noted that the industrial system to be established in that connexion will be substantially different from the one resulting from import-substitutions industrial development. Both seem inward-looking but only the first one is really so since the import-substitution model is serving the internal market but following imported consumption patterns, types of goods, processes, input contents, etc. It is expected that a genuine new consumption model, internally conceived, will privilege domestic raw materials, traditional tastes, types of goods and know-how; it will also correspond to a more egalitarian income structure.

3. Support of agriculture:

Among the components of consumption, food plays naturally a key role. In most countries one major objective of a self-reliance strategy will be the achievement of self-sufficiency in food. In that connexion, support of agriculture will be one of the main priorities in industrialization strategies. Development of sectors producing inputs for agriculture (implements, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation equipment, etc.) and sectors serving distribution and processing of agricultural goods are equally important. According to the country characteristics specific time-sequences may be found. Countries aiming at self-reliance will be aware that agro-allied industries are sectors where transnational corporations (or agribusiness) have a particularly strong position in the centre-dominated system. Establishment of an efficient nationally controlled "agro-allied" industry is therefore an indispensable objective. Only if provided with adapted and cheap inputs and adequate distribution systems, will agriculture be able to generate surplus and to distribute incomes to the rural masses. A self-reliant development could demonstrate that the conventional priority to agriculture versus priority to industry was a false dilemma.

4. Production and processing of natural resources:

Availability of natural resources will have a determining effect on the contents of the industrialization strategy as regards choice of sectors, choice of processes and techniques. Industry may contribute in various ways: by refraining from misuse of those natural resources which are scarce and not renewable, by giving priority to sectors linked with processing of renewable ones and by developing production of inputs, equipment for sectors exploiting domestic natural resources. Specific policies according to particular conditions will have to be worked out concerning energy, water, minerals, renewable products from agriculture and forests. It is clear that some Third World countries benefit from climatic conditions particularly favourable for development of solar energy, some others are well endowed for processing products from the humid tropics. For many countries the scarcity of water resources may become dramatic in the near future. Ecodevelopment is for all a major aspect of industrialization. Only in a perspective of self-reliance may it be given its full importance.

5. Technological development:

Technological aspects are probably the most formidable challenge for an industrialization aimed at self-reliance. How to make it possible that a process of acquisition of technology abroad (which is to some extent inevitable)
does not engage the country in a descending spiral of increased dependence but in an ascending one? An answer to this question is undoubtedly crucial.

Technological development is one main factor in the country's future. Pre-conceived and inadequate concepts such as "intermediate technology", "transfer of technology" and many others have obscured the problem. The technology issue should be internalized, taken as part of an autonomous decision-making process. For that purpose a plan of technological development will be built as part of the industrialization plan. It should consider the various aspects of technological development (choice, acquisition, adaptation, innovation of technology) and the different instruments to be used (technology embodied in productive units, engineering capacity, training of qualified workers and technicians, education systems, programmes of fellowships, production of capital goods, institutional and legal mechanisms, research facilities, etc.). These should be co-ordinated and arranged in adequate time-sequences which could be very different from sector to sector. The solution is not to make one across-the-board dogmatic technological choice. A variety of technological levels may coexist at a given moment according to sectors, subsectors or even individual factories. At one end, the emphasis will be put on the mobilization of local skills and know-how (even of pre-industrial character) decentralized units and on-the-job training; this will be the field of so-called soft technologies. At the other end, sophisticated technologies will be implanted, even at an early stage, in key points of the industrial network. In the latter field, objectives of technical self-reliance may influence directly the priorities chosen for the output mix. For instance, if the establishment of a machine tools industry is found a first priority, production of alloyed steel may be given a rank in the time sequence of the steel sector which it would not have otherwise. From this viewpoint also maximization of arithmetical output may not be the optimum solution in a self-reliance strategy.

In this context of an overall technological system, internally conceived for the maximum mobilization of domestic resources and extension of national capacities, acquisition of technology from abroad will inevitably have to play its role. Many factors could be taken into account in order to minimize the "dependence effects" of all related operations, not only imports of productive units, equipment, licenses but also fellowship programmes, technical co-operation programmes, university curricula, etc. Choices will have to be made regarding the types of techniques and processes, the origin of the technology (from a transnational or medium-size firm), the conditions of the contract. On this latter point, the turn-key plant contract (usines clef en main) has been repeatedly criticized. The guaranteed product system (produit en main) proposed as a marked progress, may be to some extent even more dangerous since it transfers to the foreign contractor the full responsibility of training and technical transfer: dependence can thus be increased in the long run. Experience of developing countries which have already established legal and institutional mechanisms for the control of technology imports might be fruitfully studied; systems conceived so far mainly to minimize the cost of acquisition could be adapted for wider purposes.

6. Education system:

A self-reliance strategy requires mutual support between industrialization process and education systems. In many countries the education system (curricula, university organization, fellowship programmes, etc.) is not only presently inadapted to development needs but constitutes a major factor of
dependence. A self-reliance strategy would require a much closer interrelation between the education system and productive sectors (particularly agriculture and industry). Preparation of adapted workers and technicians is a first aspect. More fundamentally, schools and universities should be training places for self-reliance, by combining productive activities with traditional teaching; the ideal would be to transform the schools themselves into self-reliant units.

Collective self-reliance

Much emphasis has been put so far on self-reliance at a country level. In so doing, one does not ignore the fact that, given their size, population, resources, geographical location, it would be a formidable task for many Third World countries if undertaken in isolation. Therefore, one may be tempted to adhere to the statement often made that collective self-reliance is the only solution. In practice, however, careful examination is needed. It would be dangerous to believe that collective self-reliance may be a substitute for individual self-reliance. It should be on the contrary, a new way of extending, accelerating and deepening, through mutual help, efforts for decreasing the dependence of each one of the participating countries.

In other words, agreements of co-operation aiming at collective self-reliance are only feasible between countries which have individually made for themselves the self-reliance option and share common positions regarding their external relations with the rest of the world (regarding trade, investments, co-operation programmes, financial and technological flows, etc.). In practice a first step in a collective self-reliance process would be to agree on a way of delinking the economies from centre-dominated systems.

If this is not clearly defined, co-operation agreements may lead to increased dependence for all or some of the participating countries. There have been cases where transnational corporations were the main beneficiaries of such agreements. Semi-industrialized countries could be used as relays for domination and exploitation of neighbouring less-developed areas; for instance outward-looking industries of one country may more easily incorporate cheap labour if cheaper food is made available by agricultural development programmes in the other country. In such a case, instead of being transferred directly, the surplus will be transferred by steps; as a whole domination by the centre will be increased.

This being said, and assuming determined will of individual self-reliance in all participants of collective self-reliance agreements, industry is a field where co-operation among Third World countries could be the more promising. Trade and financial mechanisms would certainly be insufficient to promote industrial co-operation. The following types of measures could be envisaged:

- joint industrial planning at the level of industry as a whole, sectors and main industrial projects in order to make full use of potentialities for specialization and complementarity;
- elaboration and implementation of commonly decided policies and in particular trade policies vis-à-vis third countries, control of foreign companies, common policy for technical development and acquisition of technology abroad, etc.;
- creation of multinational enterprises among firms, public or private, of participating countries;
- co-ordinated policies in infrastructure, transportation networks, training, etc.

Although they have been established in a context different from the one envisaged here, the industrial experience of existing groupings such as the "Acuerdo de Cartagena" could be usefully studied. It has been able to survive so far because participating countries, irrespective of their relative strength, have found some benefit for their own industrialization; this was possible because the decision of allocating new industries was not left to the market mechanisms but jointly agreed through direct negotiations. It has also shown the necessity of establishing certain rules and mechanisms vis-à-vis the outside world and the importance for actual progress of the group of a strong secretariat appointed by the participating governments but enjoying some independence, able to prepare technical studies and to stimulate the process of concerted action at the political level.

It is deplorable that so few technical permanent bodies for industrial studies, promotion and co-operation have so far been established at sub-regional, regional or interregional levels among Third World countries.

International action

In a self-reliance strategy the determining factor is within the Third World countries themselves in their individual efforts for autonomy of decision and, whenever possible, their concerted action for collective self-reliance. This does not mean that the importance of the international context should be underestimated. In any case, a self-reliance industrialization strategy is a very serious undertaking which will have to face a number of obstacles. These may be more easily overcome if conditions depending on external factors are not made too difficult. Actual progress towards self-reliance by the Third World countries requires the establishment of a new international order including changes in the economic structure, new balance of power and transformation of the existing system of relations among countries. Interdependence between more equal partners should replace unequal relationships resulting from the indiscriminate play of market forces. Emphasis is put not on direct trade and financial flows but on a broader complex of relations through which independent strategies are adjusted and made compatible through directly concerted action.

From this derives a conceptual difficulty for defining in abstracto the image of the future compatible with self-reliant development. The normal sequence would be that the Third World countries aiming at self-reliance first articulate more concretely their goals, strategies and paths, to serve as a starting point for a "concertation" process. One important aspect of the exercise would be the degree and modalities of the "delinking" which is desired during the first steps.

Since the practical contents of a self-reliance strategy have not yet been defined, it is not easy to determine what would be requested from the rest of the world. It is very probably that this difficulty accounts for the ambiguities in the Lima decisions. While the Declaration and part of the Plan of Action are mainly inspired by the self-reliance approach, the recommendations made to industrialized countries are almost exclusively related to trade and aid in the implicit framework of a strategy of industrial redeployment.
The exact role to be played by industrialized countries and by international organizations would have to be determined through the actual process of political consultations. Suggestions which can be made at the present stage will be related more to institutional aspects than to the contents of the new order.

1. Contribution of industrialized countries:

During the international debate which accompanied the 6th Special Session and the Lima Conference, it was recognized that the establishment of a new international order would require from the industrialized countries a full reorientation of their domestic policies along a line more consistent with the interests of the Third World countries, going further than conventional measures concerning trade, financial transfers and technical assistance.

In the industrial field, studies prepared for the Lima Conference showed that industrial policies of industrialized countries, even in the limited framework of redeployment, were far from adequate and in many cases contradicted directly the proclaimed objectives and principles of their aid policies. Adjustment policies were also studied and in a few cases actual measures taken to stimulate adequate adjustments. Consequently, some ideas are available concerning action to be taken in favour of a redeployment process through which industries in the Third World countries would continue their integration into the centre-dominated system.

On the other hand, possible consequences of a self-reliance industrialization on the industry of Third World countries and contribution which could be required from them have yet to be articulated. First requirements may rather be expressed in terms of "how not to harm the process" and "how to remove the obstacles".

A few themes for action could be suggested as follows from the more obvious to the more complex:

- refrain from direct interference in the Third World countries undertaking a self-reliance strategy, whatever form of "delinking" this strategy could imply (nationalization, control of natural resources, revision of existing trade agreements, etc.);

- co-operate with the Third World countries in preventing intervention of those nationals whose vested interests may be an obstacle in undertaking the self-reliance process;

- in particular, elaborate more efficient methods for controlling industrial activities of transnational corporations in their direct and indirect forms; this issue, vital for a self-reliant development, may also be of interest for some industrialized countries becoming pre-occupied with the increasing weight of foreign control in their industrial structure; possible emergence of new solidarities on that issue across the North-South border line is an eventuality which could be considered;

- prepare public opinion and interested social groups for a better understanding of development necessities and better acceptance of the resulting transformations in their own lives and working conditions;
- through research work and adequate training, prepare the conditions for making available to self-reliant countries the stock of skills and know-how adapted to their industrialization; train technicians of a new type who could participate efficiently in the building up of technological systems; orientate independent technical and industrial research centres for developing technology flows which escape the control of big industrial decision centres and which lead to participation and not passive transfer;

- foster the elaboration and development of new types of firm-to-firm and country-to-country industrial co-operation which would create conditions of mutual benefit for partners whose objectives, environment, technical levels, time horizons are at the start very different; their evolutive character may make this type of relation more acceptable in a strategy which aims at progressing towards a less dependent situation.

Finally, one may raise a question which is perhaps the most important one and would deserve more elaborate studies: "What kind of industrial future of advanced countries would be more favourable to or more consistent with self-reliance industrialization in Third World countries?" As a working hypothesis for further reflection it can be suggested that future co-existence and co-operation would be facilitated if industrialized countries undertook a drastic reappraisal of the contents of their economic growth, taking into account a variety of elements presently expressed by some groups, for instance: requests for a better quality of life, ecological preoccupations, dissatisfaction of youth, claims for increased participation and self-management. It seems that the common underlying feature of these trends of thought is the questioning of the market mechanisms and the profit-oriented system on two fundamental issues: the solvable demand which it generates does not adequately represent the real needs; the technology and managerial system which it has developed, if it has made possible enormous progress of productivity calculated in the traditional way, has resulted in intolerable types of division of labour, disruption of interpersonal relations, absurd utilization of space and destruction of the environment.

If this kind of reflection prevails and is translated into limitation of consumption of material goods, efforts to reduce waste of energy and natural resources, new balance between individual and collective satisfaction, invention of new technologies, new forms of social participation and so on, conditions could be created for a new dialogue with a self-reliant South. It is not possible to say how restructuring of industry on both sides could be adjusted and harmonized in a consistent world structure. It may be hoped, however, that release of the pressure on available energy and other natural resources, development of technological and industrial research more adapted to the needs of Third World countries and more generally parallel preoccupations for providing new mechanisms will be favourable elements for this new dialogue and for the establishment of relations of solidarity.

2. Role of international organizations:

The 6th Special Session, the Lima Conference and the ILO Conference have proposed for self-reliant development and for industrialization in particular a number of new orientations whose implementation has so far been very slow, while actual economic evolution sent in an opposite direction.
A series of international gatherings is now approaching: the Special Session of the General Assembly in 1980 which should adopt a new international development strategy, UNCTAD and UNIDO Conferences and a Science and Technology Conference. These present a new challenge to the UN system and, in particular, to those organizations which have a special vocation to deal with development issues and be sensitive to Third World problems. It would be necessary to translate as soon as possible the orientations already fixed into agreed objectives (at least partly quantified), adequate policies and mechanisms for follow-up and implementation. In the industrial field, the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action provided a framework. Activation of the consultations system, clarification of some ambiguities mentioned above could be the first steps towards the adoption of a programme of real implementation and the preparation of the industrial part of the international development strategy.

Suggestions for that purpose may be as follows:

- prepare a comprehensive industrial development survey which would assess the situation of industrial development, three years after Lima, including quantitative evaluation (output, imports, exports, investment, decisions and intentions, etc.) and qualitative aspects such as, for instance, the evolution since Lima of the degree of dependence of Third World industries;

- start the process of studies and consultations at the global level decided at Lima in order to clarify the contents of the 25% targets for 1990 and 1980 (comparing the latter with probably actual trend); study the conditions of consistency of the Lima target with other quantitative objectives such as the 4% growth of food production set by the World Food Conference and figures to be derived from the basic needs objectives proposed by the ILO Conference; of course it should be recalled that quantitative exercises are not aims in themselves but ways of taking policy measures consistent with the objectives.

Adoption by Third World countries of self-reliance industrialization strategies will require serious reappraisal of operational activities of international organizations:

- lending policies which sometimes in the past have been in full contradiction with official statements in favour of self-reliance, basic needs and more equitable distribution of income;

- technical co-operation which too often is piecemeal, stereotyped, leading to mechanical transfer of models, technologies and experiences from industrialized countries; international organizations might be a major channel of information and support for Third World countries which undertake to create their own technological system; for that purpose, they should be ready to make a drastic revision of the contents and methods of their technical co-operation programmes and to resist possible pressure from donor countries against such changes;

- promotional activities which cannot be neutral but should without ambiguity aim at providing information to Third World countries, as well as advice and support, in order to increase their bargaining power and strengthen their possibilities of autonomous decision-making in their negotiations with foreign firms; as a minimum, one could ask for a
serious investigation of the role played by international organizations in the penetration of transnationals and, in particular, of agribusiness in the Third World;

development of industrial co-operation which opens to international organizations a wide field for their operational activities both promotional and technical co-operation; by circulating information, providing competent and innovative technicians and preparing an adapted institutional framework, they can contribute to reducing the imbalance between partners and assist the Third World countries in getting maximum benefit from industrial co-operation agreements.

L'INDUSTRIALISATION COMME ÉLÉMENT D'UNE STRATÉGIE AUTONOME

Résumé

Cet article est extrait d'un document sur les stratégies et les politiques d'industrialisation préparé pour la FIPAD. L'auteur y examine les problèmes de l'autonomie ("self-reliance") au niveau national et certains de ses aspects essentiels, notamment le contrôle national de secteurs-clés, la consommation intérieure, l'agriculture, la transformation des ressources naturelles, l'éducation et le progrès technique. Le cadre de l'autonomie collective ("collective self-reliance") et les propositions pour l'action internationale sont également discutés. Le prologue du secrétariat de la FIPAD invite les lecteurs intéressés à envoyer leurs commentaires.

INDUSTRIALIZACIÓN COMO PARTE DE UNA ESTRATEGIA DE AUTODEPENDENCIA

Resumen

Este informe representa una selección de un documento sobre estrategias y políticas en la industrialización, preparado para la FIPAD hace algunos meses. La selección examina el problema de la autodependencia al nivel nacional y discute algunos de sus elementos fundamentales incluso el control nacional de sectores claves, consumo interno, agricultura, la transformación de recursos naturales, educación y desarrollo tecnológico. El contexto de la autodependencia colectiva y propuesta para una acción internacional están también delineados. El prologo de la secretaría de la FIPAD invita los comentarios de lectores interesados.
Abstract: 'Basic human needs' is presented as a concept of another development in contrast to the, until recently, prevailing concept centred on maximizing accumulation, fixed investment, growth of output and 'modernization'. BHN does not reject accumulation or growth, but it rejects their enthronement as overriding goals over socially determined needs. The paper also describes historical antecedents and rejected strands of the BHN strategy. It concludes that the essence of BHN is about needs and mobilization of workers and peasants as they perceive them. The BHN strategy rests on pre-existing national experiences. In refining it as a global concept greater analysis and understanding of actual practical national experiences is required. BHN is a politically viable strategy in some places at some time, but what the conditions of viability are and how they evolve over time and economic structural change is not clear. BHN should be articulated and promoted in specific national contexts where workers and peasants show interest in it.
LES BESOINS HUMAINS FONDAMENTAUX : UN CONCEPT STRATEGIQUE POUR UN AUTRE DEVELOPPEMENT

Résumé
Les besoins humains fondamentaux sont présentés ici comme élément d'un autre développement par opposition au concept jusqu'à présent dominant centré sur la maximisation de l'accumulation, l'investissement, la croissance du produit et la modernisation. Ce concept ne rejette pas l'accumulation ou la croissance mais il rejette leur précédence, comme objectifs principaux, sur les besoins socialement déterminés. L'article décrit également les antécédents historiques et les éléments abandonnés de la stratégie des besoins humains fondamentaux. Sa conclusion est que l'essence de cette démarche réside dans la mobilisation des travailleurs et des paysans pour satisfaire leurs besoins tels qu'iles perçoivent. Elle repose sur les expériences nationales. Elle requiert une analyse plus détaillée et une meilleure compréhension des expériences nationales. Les "besoins fondamentaux" constituent une stratégie politiquement viable en certains lieux à un certain moment, mais ce que sont les conditions de viabilité et comment elles évoluent dans le temps, à travers les changements de structures économiques, n'est pas clair. Les besoins humains fondamentaux doivent être articulés et développés dans des contextes nationaux spécifiques, là où les travailleurs et les paysans le veulent.

LAS NECESIDADES HUMANAS BASICAS: UN CONCEPTO ESTRATEGICO PARA OTRO DESAROLLO

Resumen
La estrategia de las necesidades humanas basicas (NHB) se presenta como un concepto de un otro desarrollo en contraste con el concepto prevalente (hasta recientemente) basado en maximar la acumulación de inversión fija, crecimiento de producción y modernización. NHB no rechaza la acumulación o el crecimiento económico pero sí rechaza que estos adquieran prioridad sobre las necesidades socialmente determinadas. El informe describe también precursores históricos y elementos de interpretación del concepto que se abandonaron. En conclusión afirma que lo esencial del concepto de NHB reside en la mobilización de los trabajadores y campesinos para satisfacer sus necesidades como ellos las perciban. La estrategia NHB se basa en experiencias nacionales pre-existentes. En articularla como concepto global se requiere más análisis y entendimiento de aquellas. Es una estrategia políticamente viable en ciertos lugares en ciertos momentos, pero cuáles son las condiciones de viabilidad y cómo evolucionan con el tiempo y con el cambio de estructura económica, no es claro. Necesidades Basicas deben ser articuladas y promovidas en contextos nacionales específicos en los cuales sea claro el interés de los trabajadores y campesinos.
The purpose of society is man... to serve man there must be a social organization of economic activities ... conducive to the greater production of things useful for the material and spiritual welfare of man. It may well be a function of society to organize and sustain efficient economic organizations and production techniques, even when... unpleasant and restrictive. Production is important to the extent it serves man and his interests as he currently sees them.

But production is not the purpose of society... When demands of "efficiency" and "production" override man's need for a full and good life, then society is no longer serving man, it is using him.

- Julius K. Nyerere

The state will not collapse because a planned quantity target has not been fulfilled.

- Mao Tse Tung

Development means liberation. Any action that gives (the people) more control of their own affairs is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread. Any action that reduces their say in determining their own affairs or running their own lives is not development and retards them... it is of first importance to place a lot of emphasis on improving (the people's) conditions... The inherited economic structure which has kept many people out of the economic main stream must be replaced immediately.

- Mwangozo (Guidelines), TANU (Tanzania Party)

Basic human needs as presented in this paper is a concept of development. Another development in contrast to the 1945-70 concept centred on maximizing accumulation, fixed investment, growth of output and modernization.

As an organizing concept for a development strategy, basic human needs centres on human (primary community and individual) needs. It gives primacy of place to moving toward the satisfaction of those needs as perceived by workers and peasants. It rejects maximising the rate of growth of productive forces, therefore denying primacy to accumulation. The sacrifice of a minimum decent (socially
determined) standard of life for workers and peasants, either to provide the
"incentive" for capitalist accumulation or the means to socialist reconstruction
for the putative benefit of rather vaguely identified future generations at
unspecific dates, is rejected.

BHN as a strategy turns on five broad target clusters:

(a) basic personal consumer goods - food, clothing, housing, basic furnishings,
other socially defined necessities, whether "material" or not (as, for
example, a decent burial in the Chinese six guarantees);

(b) universal access to basic services, e.g., primary and adult education,
pure water, preventative and curative health programmes, habitat
(environmental sanitation, urban and rural community infrastructure,
communications (in both sense));

(c) the right to, and reality of, productive employment (including self-
employment) yielding both high enough productivity and equitable enough
remuneration for each household with an able-bodied adult member to
meet its basic personal consumer goods needs out of its own income;

(d) an infrastructure - physical, human, technical, institutional - capable
both of producing the goods and services required (whether directly via
home production or indirectly through foreign trade) and of generating
surplus flows adequate to finance the basic communal services and to
provide for investment to sustain increase in productive forces needed
to advance toward BHN fulfilment;

(e) mass participation in decision-taking and review and in strategy formul-
atation and control of leaders, as well as in implementation of projects
and carrying out of decisions.

BHN is production oriented. Consumption transfer payments are very much
secondary, not central. Emphasis is on primary redistribution - of income,
assets, power. Separation of production and distribution is both theoretically
unsound and practically non-operational. The productive employment need is
therefore both an end and a central means.

Indeed a characteristic of the "model" is that each of the main ends is also
a means. In the case of participation, the end centres on overcoming alienation
but the critical means role is power. Mobilization to enforce the strategy
and mobilization to release resources not otherwise utilisable because their
central or centralized exploitation is impracticable (on technical or produc-
tion relations grounds) are essential if a BHN strategy is to survive.

Similarly the production of basic goods is a means because it interlocks with
full employment and participatory power. The evident way for rural communities/
peasants to meet basic food needs (achieve an operational right to an adequate
diet) is to produce it themselves.
Peasant ability to feed themselves increases their power vis a vis employers and bureaucrats. However, it often requires power either to enforce a prior land reform and/or to prevent large landholder/bureaucratic demobilization and diversion of peasant efforts. The degree of reduction of inequality - and of what types of inequality - vital to the concept is not quite clear. For practical reasons relating to resource limits, as well as a belief that unlimited acquisition and unlimited inequality are wrong, ceilings as well as floors are needed. How wide the acceptable floor/ceiling range would be appears likely to be specific to country-culture-time-production relation contexts. Total equality and present degrees of inequality of most economies are limiting cases rather than likely actual target.

BHN embodies socially determined needs - the attainment or near attainment of one set of specific targets would be the cause for another not for a feeling of arrival. Comparative not absolute poverty, exclusion and inequality are the basic target. This is a major divide from the "minimum material needs" school. It is to date obscured by the lack even of a hypothetical detailed BHN trajectory for a middle or high level of productive forces polity/economy (e.g. Mexico, Singapore, Sweden).

BHN is not - either in principle, in the conceptual formulations nor in the national praxes drawn upon - limited to material needs. A decent burial has little to do with production; universal adult education including consciousness raising is neither easily fed into a growth model nor self evidently politically stabilizing. The employment goal at least to some proponents rests on a belief that creative activity includes work and is not limited to leisure (and especially not "enforced leisure"!). Non-material goals pose difficulties in general presentations - quantitative parameters for participation are yet to be devised in any serious sense, the particular non-material needs of any society/class are unlikely to be plausibly aggregated at a global level except in terms of platitudes or of input costs.

The global inequality implications of BHN have usually been glossed over or set aside - particularly in papers emanating from international organizations - because they are so strikingly at variance with the status quo and with any plausible trajectory. Further many of the national experiences drawn upon have been operated rather separately from the international economic strategies of the states concerned. The national BHN state international strategies have concentrated on selective delinking (or more positively, national economic integration), exploitation of specific possibilities for marginal gains in the present international economic context and participation in NIEG type coalitions of states formed along international distribution of surplus (not national inter-personal or inter-class distribution) lines.

II BHN, Accumulation, Growth

BHN does not reject accumulation or growth. What it rejects is their enthronment as overriding goals. At one level this is simple realism. No set of national decision takers - capitalist or socialist - has ever literally viewed maximum growth or accumulation as a key goal. Certainly none has been indifferent to who controlled accumulation, what in particular was produced, how it was produced and distributed, who got how much. The maximum growth of GDP model always was
a rather abstracted clerk's view of decision taking not a worker's, a peasant's, a manager's, a bureaucrat's or a politician's.

However, the BHN strategic conceptualization goes further than this. It views GDP as an inadequate measure of human welfare because human nature is not such that full humanity can be achieved simply through material goods and services. Further BHN places a high priority on progress toward meeting the basic human needs of workers and peasants - especially those in absolute poverty - more fully today and on setting in motion a steady movement upward in BHN satisfaction even if this does reduce growth and possible consumption of future generations.

"Man does not live by bread alone" is a position consistent with a BHN strategy. Among the things needed is bread and the means to make it available more abundantly to more people. Therefore, in low or medium productive force level countries BHN does include growth - of particular goods and services, in particular ways for particular classes, communities, persons - as a crucial means.

In fact, many BHN national practitioners would contend that concentration on basic needs will increase, not decrease, growth. The empirical evidence does not refute them. There is no relation between inequality and savings or growth. While there is a statistical relation between investment and growth it is not a very close one. In many countries small farms yield more per acre than large and utilize surplus more efficiently in building up agricultural potential. Changing production relations and beneficiaries (as in some land reforms) can unlock productive forces previously unusable. Therefore, it seems unreasonable to argue that a BHN strategy would be likely to cause a radical decline in output growth overall or would be unable to sustain a more rapid growth of goods and services critical to meeting BHN goals.

The case of overdeveloped countries would be different. Change is clearly needed for transition to BHN. Equally the gaps - in participation, equality, productive employment, access to basic services and for not unconsiderable numbers, basic personal consumption - between reality and even approximate BHN fulfilment are large. Whether these can be bridged at present total output per capita levels by altering production and distribution has both political and time dimensions.

Politically imposing ceilings is easier if these do not require absolute reductions for large numbers. Therefore, while growth alone will never achieve transition, it may make it easier.

A failed growth strategy - what one has had in rich capitalist countries since 1974 - is not an acceptable stable state and in practice moves away from BHN. A transition to BHN at stable overall resource use and physical output levels must be planned and phased. Therefore, it may be that interim recovery to 4-5% growth in OECD economies is needed to allow the beginning of transition to another development. To date no serious BHN articulation for a rich country exists - the stable state and ecology models are not articulated, do not face equality (or political power) issues squarely and have little worker or peasant support or appeal as now formulated.
III Historical Antecedents: Intellectual and Operational

Basic Human Needs as a concept was not invented in a vacuum by the technical paper preparers and consultants for the ILO's World Employment Conference, even though that Conference was one of the first occasions at which the concept was discussed in its present terminology in a major forum. Like any other concept, it represents reordering existing elements in a new pattern as well as adding newer ones. Main strands influencing the emergence of BHN strategic or strategic component conceptualisation included:

1. The Indian (e.g. K.N.Raj, B. Minhas) basic and minimum needs work of the 1960's, including the studies of differences in their attainment not directly correlated to average productive forces and also including attempts to design state action packages to enable communities to meet these needs as a central aspect in development strategy, plus related South Asian studies (e.g. those of K. Griffin, A. Rahman).

2. The attempt to articulate an economic and pricing calculus more relevant to a socialist society's aims (associated with Kalecki and I. Sachs), or what Minhas has termed the rejection of the Benthamite expansion of neoclassical marginalist economics into a general social model.

3. The "mass needs" debate, particularly in its Mahgrebin-Egyptian aspects centered on examining the limits of socio-economic reconstruction under Nasser and those imposed by the initial (de Bernis) heavy industry centered Algerian strategy.

4. The Latin American thinking flowing from perceptions of the limitations and failures as well as insights of the basic ECLA "gapmanship" model (e.g. E. Cardoso) and the disaggregation of the dependence models to study detailed impact on exploited and excluded groups as a foundation for studying dynamics, (e.g. R. Stavenhagen, C. Furtado).

5. The interaction or contradiction of the New International Economic Order dialogue and that of Self-Reliance. Especially relevant was the perceived inadequacy of changes at international level without parallel or prior national strategic changes. Otherwise, while interterritorial gain divisions might be altered, the excluded, exploited and oppressed in the periphery would be unlikely to be the principal beneficiaries.

6. The reaction against arguments based on Limits to Growth that world resource constraints required continued inequality (or even the ascetic genocide advocated by the "triage" theorists) and in particular the work of the Bariloche Foundation in creating a Latin American model to demonstrate the feasibility of meeting basic material needs in a brief time period if that goal were to receive top priority.

7. The attempt by the United Nations Environment Programme (and particularly by Maurice Strong) to develop an "inner limit" of minimum human needs as a co-constraint with the ecological "outer limit" in the development of environmental policy.
8. The World Bank's (and particularly Robert McNamara's) growing concern from 1969 on that the old development model excluded at least 40% of the World's population from its benefits, a concern leading to the "absolute poverty eradication" and "redistribution with growth" themes in IBRD and associated intellectual thinking, speeches, analysis and - more modestly - programming.

9. The International Labour Organization's World Employment Programme, and the conversion of those most involved in it from a wage employment to a national strategy, working poor, full productive employment focus.

10. A general revolt - especially by periphery participants but not limited to them - against intellectual overcentralism. One branch was a "revolt of the periphery" against Eurocentric intellectual paradigms and another a questioning of top down analysis which related only to central decision takers' and associated intellectuals' perceptions of reality.

11. The experience of several nations which did pursue strategies markedly unlike that of the old paradigm. China, Tanzania were central for the BHN advocates, Taiwan, South Korea for the more conservative Basic Needs, (or minimum needs) modellers. Sri Lanka has been a source of fascination but doubt for both, because its basic needs approach was largely non-participatory, curiously random intellectually, only peripherally linked to primary (as opposed to secondary fiscal and subsidy) redistribution and neither economically nor socially self-sustaining. These experiences were felt partly as expressed by the leaders and intellectuals of the actual states involved, and partly as experienced or observed by the other analysts.

Of these influences, the last - actual practice - was, and is, probably the most important intellectually, and certainly operationally. However, the UNEP-IBRD-ILO strands occasioned much of the particular analysis and writing leading to the present form of the BHN dialogue. Because national terminologies are quite diverse the debate appears more international, European and global organisation centered than it is. Tanzania, for example, has a complex ongoing dialogue on the nature and trajectory of its BHN strategy but largely in Swahili and even when in English using different terms.

Rejected Strands

Three influences, often asserted to have been critical, almost certainly have not been (whether for better or for worse). Indeed, they were positively rejected by a majority of those involved in the early stages of the dialogue:

a) the old European late colonial export model "community development" movement of the 1950s-60s, an approach seen as offending both against freedom (paternalism and Eurocentrism) and necessity (inadequate attention to the basic need of poor people to produce more);

b) the social statistics movement - including "social cost/benefit" analysis. This has been seen as usually economistic, always in danger of "black boxing" experts' value judgements as objective truth and usually ignoring
needs as perceived by workers and peasants. In fact measuring poverty in detail can often be a substitute for, or an excuse for not, acting in respect of perfectly visible needs.

c) the more austere "alternative life style", "minimum throughput", "zero growth" forms of First World Environmentalism. They are seen in the Third World as relating to totally different objective conditions and as embodying some values (e.g. austerity for its own sake) the Third World and Third World oriented participants did not share.

A tension or a rejection is an influence. In that sense the foregoing trio were influences.

IV Basic Human Needs and its Asserted Kinsmen

Before looking at variants of BHN as a strategic approach three self asserted kinsmen require mention:

1. "Minimum material needs" ("absolute poverty eradication") is an approach to limiting potential explosive pressures from the excluded; a means to satisfying conscience by technically programmed, means tested global charity; and/or a modern statement of the Ricardian-Marxian condition for maximum sustainable exploitation in the service of rapid and sustainable reproduction. One variant is Nobel Laureate Friedman's negative income tax for a guaranteed minimum income, not that practicing Friedmaniacs seem to set much store by that device.

2. Technocratic "basic needs" models, assume that the problems are largely management gaps within elite decision taking groups and lack of ability to grasp opportunities by "the poor". These may go beyond "minimum material needs" in a production/distribution sense but only on a "welfare state" basis. Politically they are naive: elite decision takers do not develop management for meeting these needs because they perceive them as opposed to their (personal and subclass) interests rather more than because they are unable to understand what is proposed. Workers and peasants lack power to enforce such a strategy on decision takers not so much for lack of consciousness to perceive that its elements can - in an altered context - serve them, but from an inability to break the repressive forces sustaining the existing context.

3. Social democratic "basic needs" models (e.g. Redistribution With Growth in its more radical moments) do begin to grapple with asset and power distribution but in a rather hesitant, incremental and individual case manner quite atypical of serious political economic paradigms or historic political economic structural transformations. This is true even of the more radical models - e.g. Bariloche - if they are conceived of as proto-plans and not only as destructive polemics against the present paradigm. Asset, institutional, income distribution, class power and state role elements are not merely not built into these models but the initial assumptions do not make clear what is assumed about them. The most rigorous reading of such models might be that of a call for "global Fabianism"
(i.e. the ultimate strategic victory over revolution to be won by a series of planned tactical defeats on specific reform measures). That is unworkable vide Sri Lanka as a national case and actual global resource transfer levels as a comment on the international "welfare system's" inadequacy.

"Not everyone who saith Lord, Lord shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven" and not everyone who says "Basic Needs, Basic Needs" supports the strategic conceptualization set out in this paper. The Roman emperors provided "bread and circuses" for the masses. Authoritarian regimes present "basic needs" programmes which seem modern variants, e.g. "football stadia and black beans", "basketball courts and rice". Basic needs defined in material terms, delivered by a bureaucracy and planned by an elite can create client groups, demobilize mass groups, create new patterns of dependence. Brazil's public services programmes are an example as, from some points of view, is South Korea's relatively equal but highly regulated and outside programmed peasant sector.

V Problems, Possibilities, Potential

Another development conceptual frame and strategic focus is needed. The old growth and modernisation paradigm is almost dead, intellectually, and its operational supporters use it in the absence of an alternative, not from conviction.

Unless one is willing to accept a technocratic development paradigm centered on efficiency defined in physical output, distribution defined by a capitalist or a socialist corporate state, organisation defined in terms of hierarchical pyramids of "expertise" and participation defined as isolated individuals implementing directives from and receiving benefits through externally controlled institutions, then a concept and strategy akin to BHN are needed. This is not to argue that BHN as presently presented or understood is adequate.

First the concepts are still somewhat vague. This does not create a case for statistical poverty mapping at global levels as a way to elaborate BHN theory. BHN if it is anything is contextual nationally and pluralist in embodiment globally. Detailed, uniform physical targets at global level would deny that reality. Further - whether intentionally or not - they drain out the conflict of interest, struggle, production relations, class and equity elements which are at the core of actual national BHN efforts whether by Chairman Mao and Premier Chao, Mwalimu Nyerere, Minister Fernandes or Minister Pereira. They do not clarify but mystify; they do not mobilize but manipulate.

Indeed the next steps in refining the general global concept, should be greater analysis of actual, partial national experiences and articulation of coherent potential scenarios for states - e.g. Sweden, Poland, Jamaica, Venezuela, Namibia - whose decision takers, workers and peasants, show some real interest in a BHN alternative. Only with that data and experience can the general theoretical framework be made more consistent, relevant and intellectually rigorous.

Second, technical feasibility conditions have not been studied carefully either in general or in the states pursuing a BHN variant. One need not endorse a
straight line growth path nor deny that participation results in mistakes as well as successes to suggest that the details of Tanzania's villageization strategy or of China's cultural revolution - at least from 1972 on - were unnecessarily wasteful and damaging in BHN terms.

It is relatively easy to demonstrate that BHN strategies can make progress toward each of the main five goals and toward all at once. Defining limits, conditions, cumulative interaction, substitution among goals is much harder. In one sense it depends on context. For example, what is possible in China with a 3,000 year tradition and an equally long, albeit often interrupted, experience of a strong central state with an efficient, merit selected, decentralized bureaucracy is not possible in a much newer nation with a weak and short public service tradition and experience (and that a very centralised one) like Tanzania. What could be done by transforming production and re-distributing existing capacity to earn income by changing production relations in a rich economy like Sweden is very different from what may be possible in a middle level of productive forces one like Namibia or a very poor one like Mozambique.

Again serious study as to what technical, policy and resource possibilities limits are in actual national contexts is the precondition for more detailed general articulation and conclusions. Importing efficiency analysis from growth models will be useful only to a limited extent and in other cases may be positively harmful. Efficiency is dependent on goals - e.g. if one agricultural technology maximizes incomes of rich peasants and marketed surplus while another maximizes poor peasant income and food consumption the real choice between them is on political, class and power values not on which shows a slightly higher rate of growth of total marketed and producer consumed output.

Third, political practicability and requirements are still very vaguely understood. Too many economists among the conceptualizers and too many international organizations seeking to take the politics out of political economy and political choice to avoid discord or conflict have achieved that. Fairly clearly a complete, violent revolution is neither necessary to embark on a BHN strategy (e.g. Tanzania), sufficient to guarantee one (e.g. Kampuchea), nor adequate to spell out the course of non-violent struggle once power has been secured (e.g. China). On the other hand, to seek to create BHN villages in a growth and modernization national economy or to create a subordinated BHN sector in parallel with a dominant capitalist one is unlikely to succeed in doing more than offering some social welfare unless there is a byproduct of increased open contrast and contradiction and of worker and peasant mobilization leading to a broader revolutionary change (whether violent or otherwise).

Study at national level has been hampered by secrecy and public relations style optimism in official work, somewhat naive initial enthusiasm by sympathetic outside observers and apolytic criticism by other outside analysts who measure only the gap between goals and present realities without serious historical or dialectical study of trends and trajectories. This has costs to analysts and, more important, to national strategy implementation. In Tanzania the caution - e.g. in the 1964-76 reduction of the proto-capitalist farmer power
base in relation to local officials and through cooperatives - used to avoid high levels of open class struggle clearly limited the ability to mobilize workers and peasants and also the speed with which resources could be redeployed toward BHN. On the other hand, in China after 1965, the levels and nature of political struggle - and especially their duration - would appear to have been not only unnecessary but counterproductive either for fulfilling the Six Guarantees or broadening the worker/peasant base. Such questions do merit serious analysis by participants and by outsiders.

Fairly clearly BHN - at least in part - is a politically viable strategy in some places at some times. Even post-Mao China has a strategy much more influenced by BHN than by orthodox Soviet growthmanship. Tanzania's Party held on to the BHN aspects of policy over the 1974-77 crisis at the known risk of national economic collapse because either it believed traditional economic salvation was as bad as collapse and/or because it perceived a retreat to inequalitarian growthmanship as political suicide. But what the conditions - both necessary and sufficient - are and how they evolve over time and economic structural change is not at all clear.

The full BHN strategy is one of struggle and not an easy unity of interests. It centres on a class and community based interpretation of human society not on an isolated individual one. To that extent it is in the Marxist and the revolutionary traditions.

On the other hand, the stress on present welfare of the excluded, exploited and oppressed and the dethronement of accumulation and growth from primacy among goals is anti-economistic in a way as challenging to Marxist as to Bourgeois economic orthodoxy. This challenge within the BHN strategy is not a romantic one - quite clear political, technical and economic thought and action are spelled out. Neither China nor Tanzania, Algeria nor Vietnam is a soft state.

Basic Human Needs is a conceptual advance toward understanding what Another Development would be and identifying the strategic tools for moving towards it. Ultimately it rests on pre-existing national experiences - in all of which politics not technical expertise, goal achievement not abstract "efficiency" is in command - and on their ability to survive, develop and be joined by others. Conceptualization can help as can identifying technical and political degrees of freedom and necessity but only in a secondary way. IF BHN is about anything it is about the needs and mobilization of workers and peasants as they perceive them, certainly not about creating a playground for technocratic model builders or a new utopia for managerial, academic or bureaucratic Platonic Guardians.
A primary objective of the Third System Project of IFDA is to "give a voice in the international discussion to those who are never heard, even if they are primarily affected by decisions taken in their names. They are the people, in the South and in the North, their organizations and the intellectuals who endeavour to listen to them". This is an important and necessary task.

It is useful to identify initially the voices that are heard in the formulation of an international development strategy. The UN system, governments, transnational corporations, leading research institutes and similar establishments, both in the North and in the South, are voices that are heard on the subject. There are also establishment figures who make their voices felt through speeches and articles and there is also an extensive literature on development processes through weekly and monthly journals, and even daily newspapers. All these voices are heard on a regular basis.

It is a given rule of the game within the UN that governments represent the people of their countries and that in the formulation and presentation of their views the governments reflect a consensus within their countries. This may be true of some governments but is certainly not true of all. The systems of government have a lot to do as to which voices are heard. In a country where some elements of participatory democracy exist, more voices may be heard than in a country with a tight military dictatorship. In this note, however, we are concerned with a more basic question.

It is the contention of this note that as a consequence of the limitations of language the large majority of people in the developing countries have not been in a position to obtain a hearing for their authentic voices from the international community. The United Nations system and the governments within that system work mainly in a few languages, the most popular being English. Though the elites living mainly in urban areas of developing countries have the facility of using an international language the vast majority of the people have no knowledge of foreign languages at all. This is apart from the fact that large numbers of people are still illiterate anyway. But illiteracy need not deny the people the oral capacity of presenting their views. The fact that vernacular languages have been ignored means that participation in any international discussion becomes limited to an elite. It then is the function of this elite to interpret the views of ordinary people, both to governments and the international community. This is a power that the elites have taken to themselves. They enjoy its exercise, informing international agencies and others concerned in the industrialized countries of their people's wants, of their aspirations and of their hopes. They are the so-called grass-roots' people.
An important dimension of self-reliant, needs-oriented and endogenous strategies of development should be to provide an opportunity for the unheard voices which now find their expression in the vernacular languages to be heard. As noted before, this should not be done through interpreters, that is, the elites who are bilingual but "think" mainly in a foreign language. It is a common experience to find some interviewers or researchers going round countries in the Third World and meeting the so-called "common man" or the "average family" and collecting their views through a local interpreter, and then providing an analysis of the supposed thoughts of ordinary people in those countries. To say the least, this is an artificial situation and the analysis can only be extremely superficial.

If the "unheard voices" are to be heard it is important to provide the opportunity for that local class of people who articulate the thoughts and aspirations of the common man to be heard. At least in some countries of the Third World there is a rich and thriving journalism and other forms of literature on issues related to international and national development strategies being put across in the vernacular languages. It is these vernacular researchers, journalists, writers, teachers, poets, politicians and others who are the real representatives of the grass-roots in these countries. What is happening today in development research is an attempt by the English-speaking (and French, etc.) urban elites to try to contact the grass-roots by contacting the "ordinary men and women" directly, using their capacity in the vernacular languages to good effect. They then become their interpreters and the distortion of the ordinary people's views take place at this point. It is the thesis here that direct access should be given to intellectuals of the Third World who use their own vernacular languages, and are, therefore, in direct touch with the people of their countries. There is no opportunity within the United Nations system and the non-governmental sector, and even within most governments, for this class of persons to express themselves on development issues.

The basic needs philosophy has a particular relevance here. A policy of basic needs is presumed to take note of the aspirations and the requirements of ordinary people, which is true in a limited sense. All human beings need a minimum of food, clothing and shelter, and of course, that need can be expressed by any concerned citizen of this world. But basic needs, if it is to be more than a uniform welfare hand-out, has to be done on the basis of extensive decentralization, taking into account the subtle differences of traditional styles of life of peoples. It is here that the vernacular language, and to coin a phrase, the "vernacular intellectuals" become important. It is they who have the natural rapport with and a genuine feel for the people. The cultural milieu of basic needs has been lost sight of, as a result of the neglect of this class of people. In fact, the promotion of vernacular languages is a basic cultural need. Particularly in the rural areas of the Third World where traditional standards of life and thought are still prevalent, the cultural and religious environment is extremely important.

What are the consequences of the neglect of the vernacular language in its proper role in the development process? It has led in the Third World to an exaggerated dominance of the elitist view of development. The discussion on development strategies tends to take place within a limited circle. External
economic relations like trade and aid obtain more than their fair share of attention. It also leads to choices based on inappropriate technologies, and a very pronounced urban bias in development. A genuine basic human need's strategy is to some extent thwarted. The economic aspects of any issue are given undue importance and the social implications of change are underestimated. There is some violence done to environmental criteria in their broadest sense. An endogenous development, and development processes not confined to the narrow field of economic growth demand that the cultural milieu and the vernacular languages be given greater significance.

Is there a way out? The United Nations would be a Tower of Babel if all the vernacular languages were permitted within its precincts broadly defined. But the UN system and the international community should not underestimate the degree of neglect of the ordinary men and women in the Third World by this process of language standardization. It is possible to improve the present situation. First, the UN system and other rich countries could provide the necessary resources to increase the level of discussion of development issues in vernacular languages. The "vernacular intellectuals" could be given an opportunity of access to development literature in their own languages and they could then be the scribes and researchers in their own regions on some of these subjects. There is a tremendous dearth of literature in the vernacular languages on development, and the UN system should make it a specific task to provide this information to some degree in the vernacular. This may also be a very useful objective for most donor countries in relation to basic needs projects. The UN should note this aspect in any reform of its public information policy.

A project identical to the Third System Project could be undertaken at one level below what has been attempted so far, and reaching the "vernacular intellectuals" and researchers directly. The project would have as a primary aim the establishment of research institutes in the Third World working exclusively in vernacular languages and opening the doors thereby for research to persons educated in the vernacular languages. The existing research institutes to some extent with their links in advanced countries and oriented towards training in advanced countries' institutes could well be described to some extent as phenomena comparable with other foreign enclave types of operations (This is not to deny a role for them and their specific tasks could be in the more sophisticated areas of research).

A truly endogenous capacity for social science research using researchers educated in the vernacular and looking at their own societies with only an indigenous experience would increase the level of participation and relevance in research. This could constitute the research component of a basic needs strategy. This type of research structure could be termed the "appropriate" social science research technology detached from the high-cost international research apparatus. It would be the national research component concentrating on problem areas of local and regional interest. In time there could be a new breed of Third World scholars whose roots would be in their vernacular soil. Probably later they will continue to think in the vernacular and write in English and French. Are there any lessons from the Japanese or Indian experience?
"Here we go round the mulberry bush...
Time is very short ...
This is the way the world ends ...
Not with a bang but with a whimper."
- T.S. Eliot

The World Bank's 1978 World Development Report is apparently the child of a marriage between Partners In Development (Pearson Report) and Redistribution With Growth. That is an odd parentage as the former was a febrile attempt to summon a last crusade for a faith whose supporters had lost conviction and the second a cautious attempt to begin ground-clearing toward identifying new ways forward.

The Report is weaker than either parent. Compared to Pearson it is a less compelling tract for our times with no central focus or cutting edge. Further, it lacks the explicit "capitalism with a human face" ideology of Pearson and weaves uneasily between sentiments Nobel Laureate Friedman would applaud and rather odd bows to types of fiscal and rural power-base changes which, if followed through, would logically lead to socialism. In contrast to RWG, there is no serious attempt to mount a sustained, comprehensive criticism of conventional wisdom on the policy or analytical levels. Nor does it, as RWG did, spotlight the falsity of dividing production from distribution, politics from economics, power from property.

The picture presented by the Report is alarming. In part this is intentional - the New International Economic Disorder is a poor setting for maintaining the inadequate (but by no means universally negligible) 1960-76 pace of development nor for altering its structure positively. In fact, because the "Basic Scenario" projections assume a 1979-85 radically more like 1960-70 than either 1975-78 or OECD projections, the true prospects on the basis of the Report's development path are much worse than its projections. That does not come across in the Report, although it did in President McNamara's 1978 Annual Meeting Address.

But the Report is even more alarming in two other ways. It apparently sets out to show that technical pragmatism by men of good will can build national, regional and global strategies with no ideological content, appealing to all reasonable men and capable of being implemented. What it demonstrates is the bankruptcy of that approach - at the worst it reads like a parody of itself. Second, its attempt to shore up bits of dead polemics and lost faith, with fragments wrenched from incomplete alternatives, is neither practically nor intellectually effective. A pastiche is not a synthesis. If this is the best that the best applied thinkers of the international development establishment (and by and large the Bank's best staff deserve that accolade) can produce, then indeed development thinking is a burnt out case wandering in a desert.
II Fragments of the Report are useful. It does identify some key problems - e.g., food production, irrigation system maintenance and water use, class (even if carefully labelled "social"!); barriers to rural structural change essential to raise output efficiency. Some sensible (if rather general) remarks appear on agendas for action - e.g. health for (albeit "by" is still seen as too radical) the people, proper locally-based and context-tied agricultural research. The policy sections on protectionism are sound (if not very original) as they relate to the industrial capitalist world and worth considering in respect of peripheral economy use of GATT. (Unfortunately the authors do not seem to note that the GATT game can now be played only by the EEC, USA and Japan - with the rest of the OECD States de facto excluded from real participation in negotiations. It is unclear how the 77 are to flock into process!). The data Annex is a genuinely valuable source of comparative country data, though its classes of country are rather odd. What Togo, Bolivia, Romania and Singapore (among the "Middle Income" class) have in common is unclear. The exclusion of Kampuchea, Laos, Vietnam, Romania, Yugoslavia from "Centrally Planned Economies" seems to be based on the interesting view (or wishful thinking?) that by joining the Bank one ceases to be socialist. (The compliment is returned - the Report explicitly does not consider development in States - e.g., China, Cuba, Mozambique, Angola - which are not Bank members.)

The whole stance of the Report is technocratic. Both politicians on the one hand and workers and peasants on the other are given occasional mention (condescending or minatory) but the Bank's faith in technocratic Platonic guardians on H Street, leading gallant warriors in a global hierarchy of bureaucracies and universities to develop the world, remains unshaken, and apparently unreflected upon as well!

This may be unfair. The extreme technicism stems in part from a successful attempt to take the politics out of political economy (indeed out of politics as well) - successful, that is, within the covers of the Report. This does lead to a picture of general harmony of interests (slightly amended when looking at industrial economy adjustment policy and when condemning vested interests seen as likely to oppose proposed policies). It also leads to incoherence. Thus at one point TNCs are sure to be a means of ensuring that technology and marketing channels stay open (p.29), but at another (pp.60-61) their licensing agreements, easy access to credit and near monopoly on research and design, seem to be the key barriers to more manufactured exports by "middle income" countries.

III In fact an implicit political economic infrastructure does exist in the Report:

1. 1945-70 should be recreated - there was some structural change then and we need more now;

2. Growth in the centre is needed for growth on the periphery and vice versa (that is not a structure seen as needing change);

3. Absolute poverty eradication is a good thing and is not inconsistent with growth unless pushed too fast, but equity and distribution issues beyond that level must be excluded from serious policy consideration because growth/development first means more inequality and then more inequality (p.33);
4. Getting the prices right (using world market price yardsticks) is the policy imperative - indeed, it is the best way to improve income distribution (pp.63-64);

5. Efficiency relates to getting prices right - apparently static deviations from perfect competition, dynamic non-linearities, political economic goals are, with one exception, minor;

6. The exception is wages which are too high everywhere (including in the First World where their rigidity lies behind protectionism - p.16) - "put the worker in his place" is a recurrent theme song albeit not in the sense of the "Internationale".

This is capitalism not with a human face but with bleary eyes and a nagging headache. (Conceivably the model in mind is South Korea.) The Report is below the standards of major past Bank studies (or Presidential Addresses) either as political economic analysis or as popularization. Who is expected to buy such shoddy merchandise is unclear - perhaps that is why the technicism is on the shop counter and the political economic skeleton in a cupboard with the door half-closed.

True, the Bank cannot undertake a definitive political economic analysis of development. It can, however, do a great deal better than the World Development Report 1978:

1. By presenting empirical data on trends and realities and summarizing them clearly and with limited interpretation;

2. By making projections of future trends on alternative stated assumptions;

3. By reverting to serious exploration of political economic issues, including equity, distribution, ownership, power and the freedoms/constraints these impose on different States;

4. And relating that exploration to questions of efficiency (which logically must be defined relative to an end) and growth (which is normally seen as a means by decision takers, whether capitalist or socialist);

5. Dropping the fallacy of universal harmony of interests (no more convincing to bankers than to bolsheviks) so that areas of real parallel interests, negotiable compromises and package deals can be identified and promoted.

The Report has flashes of each of these - the pity is that it does not follow up any. As a result its apparent chief concerns - rural production in poor countries and global halting of the present rising tide of protectionism - are presented inadequately, articulated inconsistently and incompletely, not consolidated into a programme of action which might be negotiable and workable. That is the measure of the lost opportunity - the Bank could speak to some effect on those two themes.
Leelananda de Silva

THE UN COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 'APPROACH TO A NEW TECHNOLOGY'

The Committee for Development Planning of the United Nations after its 14th Session in March 1978, has offered some "partial and preliminary" views on the International Development Strategy for the 1980s. The Committee's central role within the UN system concerning the development process and development perceptions makes it imperative that its views should at all times be subject to critical examination.*

The Committee consists of eminent social scientists representative of industrialized market economy, centrally planned economy and Third World countries. They serve the Committee in their personal capacities. However, at least as far as the Third World representatives are concerned, they are persons who in most cases are closely associated with governments at policy-making level.

A major theme of the Report of the 14th Session is the emphasis placed on the scenario of differentiation within the Third World and of "the emerging diversity (that) makes it harder to speak as if the developing countries were a homogenous collective of members whose problems all are capable of being treated in similar fashion". The Committee then goes on to identify these differentiated groups, and proposes the outlines of a strategy for each group.

"As emphasized, a sensible strategy for the 1980s must be disaggregated by country groups. Roughly, now, among developing countries, one can identify various groups according to the manner in which the countries are integrated into the world economy. By way of illustration, one could distinguish the following: oil-exporting countries, countries depending heavily on exports of other primary products, the rapidly industrializing countries and, as another separate group, the low-income developing countries - including but not limited to - the least developed. These or similar groups, while to some extent overlapping, nevertheless permit tentative approaches to a differentiated strategy".

It just happens that a differentiated strategy of this nature is being enunciated by the advanced industrialized countries and particularly within the OECD. There is, of course, an overlap of personalities dealing with the identical issues both in OECD countries and the Committee, and a link between their views could then quite easily be established. But the more important question arises for the Third World. Do they agree with the principles, the purposes and the criteria of differentiation adopted in the Report to map out a strategy for the 1980s?

A distinction must be made between such a "differentiation strategy" proposed for adoption by the advanced industrial countries, on the one hand, and the diversity of interests within the Third World which consequently demands a "negotiating package" on the basis of trade-offs. The latter is consistent with the establishment of the NIEO, while the former appears as more of an instrument of division.

* Doc. E/1978/46, sales no. E 78.II.A.8
To take the example of the Committee's prescriptions on ODA. The Committee argues that "concessional flows should in fact be concentrated on the poorest countries". Concessional flows could be defined as Official Development Assistance with a grant element of at least 84 percent, in accordance with the 1972 DAC Terms Recommendation. In 1976, DAC members' ODA which was 0.33 percent of their GNP had a grant element of 89.3 percent, which means that their aid was concessional. Now a primary objective of the IDS for DD II (and it is expected of the next one) was to achieve an ODA target of 0.7 percent. Would the Committee now specifically propose that the industrially advanced countries double their concessional assistance for the next decade from 0.33 percent to 0.7 percent, and concentrate these flows on the least developed countries, as defined by the UN, and the poor countries of South Asia and Middle Africa (these are the poorest countries in their totality according to the Committee's definition)? The Committee quite rightly is critical of the low assistance per capita to these countries already. In practical terms, the Committee's proposal would mean probably a four-fold increase in concessional assistance to these countries. But is that feasible and is it wise to deprive a large number of middle income countries with problems of acute poverty in their midst, of concessional assistance?

Even the IBRD's World Development Report is more cautious. It refers to the "large investments necessary to accelerate growth in agriculture and expand public services (which) require an increased flow of concessional capital to the low income and the poorer of the middle income countries."

The question, however, remains of the consistency of an overall target of assistance of 0.7 of ODA, with the concentration of concessional flows on the poorest countries.

It has also other implications. The Third World countries have been insistent on a link between development finance and the creation of international liquidity. Another demand has been the principle of automaticity in the transfer of resources. If it is agreed that concessional transfers should only be to the poorest, the two other policy measures would be most effectively shelved. This points to the dangers of international development strategy at least for the Third World which does not take into account some of the fundamental reforms demanded by the NIED.

The Committee might appreciate that the point of view they have expressed on concessional assistance is in accord with that of the OECD. There is nothing wrong in that, but it may be relevant to look at another UN document on this question:

"Tentative and inclusive steps towards meeting the latter problem were taken within the international designation of groups of developing countries having certain common characteristics, such as the least developed among the developing countries and the most seriously affected developing countries. Although the international evaluation of relative need that lies behind these groupings has no doubt been a useful process, the designation of these groups themselves is not without danger. The difficulty here lies not so much with the groups themselves, but with the tendency of some donors to adopt the view that because the needs of some recipients for concessional assistance are particularly urgent, the needs of
other recipients have become less urgent. This attitude, although no doubt unintended, is perhaps the inevitable result of the technique of dividing developing countries into groups rather than establishing measures and guidelines for relative need that apply uniformly to all developing countries." (UNCTAD, "International financial co-operation for development" Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat (TD/188/SUPP. 1 of 13 February 1976)).

The Committee believes that international efforts for the elimination of mass poverty should be concentrated on the problems of low per capita income countries. Developing countries with higher per capita income should be able to go further towards meeting such needs from domestic resources”. According to the Committee, the responsibility of the international community for basic needs is restricted to the poorest countries. The Committee would like to see the rapidly industrializing Third World countries have access to the world capital markets on commercial or better-than-commercial terms. Governments already heavily indebted and following the development models they do will not implement basic needs policies borrowing on commercial terms. The Committee lays excessive stress on access to commercial capital markets. It should be more aware of the implications of such a strategy in terms of IMF-type policy prescriptions.

The Committee does not believe in trickle down. It would probably agree that export expansion does not help the poorest in these Third World countries. In fact such strategies tend to aggravate their problems. Also, it should not be taken for granted that the development strategies of these countries are for all time and that they are the best. It is possible that increasing difficulties of access to capital markets would make some of these countries change direction. As the Committee itself visualises in Para 39 (e), some of these countries might decide to de-link in an "attempt to re-align the structures of their economies more towards newly perceived internal needs and priorities". That is the time they might need massive assistance. The poorest are the same everywhere. They are poor, particularly in the middle income Third World countries, primarily because their needs are not central to the political priorities of some governments. They need assistance as much as others. The political and economic components of Human Rights should both be pursued at an international level.

Another interesting proposition of the Committee is in paragraph 53 of the Report: "Among developing countries, it would be reasonable for those who have surpassed a certain level of per capita gross domestic product to be considered as being in a transitional stage. The countries in the transitional stage would be exempt from both the obligations imposed on developed countries and the privileges given to developing countries under various international agreements".

Now what are these countries? If Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, there might be no difficulty as none of them are enjoying any effective concessions and their levels of income are high. But then they are the exceptions. Jamaica and Fiji had respectively per capita income of US$ 1,070 and US$ 1,150, in 1976 (World Bank Atlas 1977). Are they to be defined "transitional" countries? And if so, are they to be eased out of the Lome Convention's preferential arrangements? The Committee shows an exaggerated concern for the GNP concept. At these low levels of income, distinctions are a bit difficult. Moreover, GNP does not say much of the income distribution aspects and if re-distributive policies are
to be encouraged within a stable political framework at these national income levels, some direct assistance to the relief of poverty may be a prerequisite. It is premature to differentiate to the degree the Committee does.

The Committee's reference to the question of commodities is engagingly intriguing. Though the importance of the issue is mentioned several times, there is not one reference to the Common Fund or the Integrated Programme of Commodities. The Commodity question is looked at essentially as a "stabilization" issue. The stress is on "the very substantial and quantifiable benefits for rich countries that may be implicit in stabilization of commodity prices and supplies (this is the sort of approach of ODC Washington and IDS Sussex when they attempt to convince the influential lobbies in their own countries on this question). Any possible gain to the Third World countries by improvements in the terms of trade is hedged with a lot of qualifications. What would the Group of 77 in Geneva think of all these personal views of some of their compatriots? Or are they their real views too back at home? Compensatory financing mechanisms to meet shortfalls in revenues are mentioned. Of course, Stabex and IMF cannot be ignored.

The Committee talks of a "growing resistance to structural adjustments" in industrialized countries. From an alternative development angle, the growing protectionism or, in other words, the partial de-linking envisaged by such policies, may not necessarily be a bad thing. It may in fact be a good thing for industrialized countries to make a start, and particularly for the United Kingdom (Cambridge School). This tendency may also be a response to the indifference for social criteria in technology choice in these countries. The Committee might look at this problem from a wider perspective than those required by the pursuit of export-oriented strategies by some Third World countries. Also, in this connexion, what would be the Committee's view on the important question of the growing trend for the internationalization of production and finance?

The report speaks of the "large majority of wage and salary earners in the affluent countries (who) continue to exert pressure for better wages and more employment and there is growing resistance against the trade liberalization measures in favour of developing countries". The Committee either overlooks some other trends or if not, it does not mention them. Advances in technology have more to do with displacement of labour than with competition from Third World countries. Unlike the World Development Report of the IBRD the Committee does not look at the export-creating effects for industrialized countries of increased imports by Third World countries. Trade unions in the West are also considering shorter working hours, not necessarily increased cash payments. One difficulty here is that one country cannot concede without the others following suit. But an international development strategy could take this into account.

Over the next two years the deliberations of the CDP are particularly important, and the Third World countries, both through the Group of 77 (and its counterpart in the IMF/IBRD) and the Non-aligned Conference should devise the necessary mechanisms for their views to be heard by this Committee.
Chakravarthi Raghavan

TCDC: TOWARDS COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE

The 14-day United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (despite negative prognostications and subsequent benign neglect by TN mass media) provided the stray silver-lining to the otherwise dark, gloomy skies of international economic relations.

The Buenos Aires Plan of Action for TCDC, modest though it is, could well prove to be the starting point of a new effort by the South to forge collective instruments to bring about the New International Economic Order.

Insofar as the international climate is concerned, the TCDC meeting took place at a time when in New York the Committee of the Whole collapsed as a negotiating body.

Though the UNDP secretariat had sought to prepare the groundwork for the TCDC conference, through regional conferences and National papers, the mountain of documentation could not paper over the differences in approach to TCDC, among the Third World countries inter se and the industrialized Third World countries.

The industrialized countries by and large took the position that TCDC was a matter for Third World countries, but at the same time showed nervousness at its possible potential in building up Third World solidarity and strength against the North in the North-South processes.

While the Third World countries had a fairly high-level representation at the conference - as many as 50 being headed by ministerial delegations - the industrialized countries had fairly low level of representation, several of them represented by second level diplomats from New York.

Some of the 77, specially Egypt, at one stage appeared keen on using the conference to set up a new body dominated by the Third World countries and with its own secretariat. Industrialized countries were opposed to this, and their international bureaucracy had gone all out much ahead of the conference to shoot down the idea, and in effect undertake the process of softening up the South for the inevitable negotiations with the North.

At the Conference itself, almost every participant spoke and behaved as if TCDC had been always in existence and had been practised by them. This posture was made ridiculous by the specialised agencies, who delivered long speeches, all of them claiming they had been practising TCDC already. The conference sharply raised the question of organisation of such conferences and the time and energy mis-spent in speeches by delegates, and even more, by the officials of specialised agencies.

Among the countries too, the talk about practising TCDC or tracing its source ranged from the claims of origins of TCDC in Babylonian civilization and in
the flow of scientific and technological knowhow from the East to Europa via Arabia (not too long ago) to the US attempt to trace TCDC to the Cento pact and its offshoot, the Ankara-Teheran-Islamabad Economic Cooperation pact.

This raised the question at one of the workshops, held along with the UN conference, whether there was any need for the conference if it was really true that everyone was already practising TCDC.

But apart from these public speeches and posturings, much of the time of the delegates at the conference, was taken up in meetings of the Group of 77, where an attempt was made to clear the air on what TCDC was and was not.

The industrialized countries, specially the western ones, and those among them who presently are getting back more than their contribution to the UNDP by way of procurement orders and technical expertise, spent much time in raising the issues of the differing "stages of development" of the Third World countries and the possibility that the more backward amongst the Third World countries might be relegated to second-best technology and be the dumping ground for goods and services of the more advanced Third World countries. The 'cascade' theory of development propounded by Argentina (its "middle-stage" of development enabling it to absorb the more sophisticated technology of the North and enabling it to pass on the older adapted technology to the "less developed" countries) and the push for bilateral relations by some others did buttress this argument.

However, one of the positive achievements of the conference, was the frank debate of these doubts and concerns, at the meeting of the Group of 77, and this did contribute to clearing the air and enabling it to see TCDC not as a vehicle for exchange of technical expertise, goods and services, important though it is, but as a new concept of collective self-reliance that went beyond a sectoral approach.

One result of this was the repeated emphasis in the document that it would be for each government to define TCDC, both conceptually and in practice, and decide, taking into consideration its views of its needs and options, the kind of help and cooperation it would seek - the traditional north-south pattern of aid and developmental efforts or the new concept.

Insofar as the negotiations with the North were concerned, these related to three main issues: the inter-governmental machinery to oversee TCDC, the kind of secretarial or servicing organisation, and the finance or resource aspect of TCDC.

While the nub of negotiations between the 77 and the industrialized countries related to these three points, there was also considerable discussion on what TCDC should be or should not be. The industrialized countries, specially the western ones appeared to be very nervous at the prospect that TCDC could really result in a certain amount of 'opting-out' by the South out of the present global system.

The international bureaucracy of the various specialised agencies were also very much in evidence, lobbying to ensure that TCDC does not result in either invasion of their sectoral fields or loss of the prerogatives and powers of their
executives and governing bodies. The view of agencies and their employees that countries and governments are there to service them rather than the other way around was very much in evidence in these lobbyings.

The proposals formulated by the 77, envisaged: (1) an inter-governmental body, open to all member states, with equal participation rights, and reporting directly to the UN General Assembly; (2) a special unit or part of the UNDP secretariat providing the servicing machinery; and (3) using and earmarking all of the global and regional I.P.Fs. of UNDP resources for TCDC and with the industrialized countries providing additional resources and untying their present aid for TCDC.

The industrialized countries, specially USA and West Germany, and also the Soviet Union, were in the beginning insisting on the UNDP governing council (with its weighted representation) acting as the parliamentary body for TCDC, or a sessional committee of the UNDP governing council or of ECOSOC, open to participation by other non-members.

Ultimately a compromise was reached under which the inter-governmental body would be set up by the UN General Assembly, open to all members of the UN development programme, with equal rights and reporting back to the General Assembly through the UNDP Governing Council and ECOSOC. The Third World countries made clear that the Governing Council or ECOSOC could comment on the report and make recommendations but not modify or bottle it up. The proposed new body has been given a fairly wide mandate to oversee TCDC in the entire UN system and review the carrying out of the Plan of Action which itself calls on the UN system to increasingly permeate its activities with TCDC.

This in effect means, that if the Third World countries utilise this forum properly, they would virtually bring the development activities of the entire UN system directly under their purview, and exercise an overview of the UN and its sprawling specialized agencies.

On the issue of financing and resources, apart from the appeals to the industrialized countries to increase their overall development assistance and unty it for TCDC, the plan of action envisages (a) earmarking by each Third World country of a percentage of its Indicative Planning Figure for TCDC, (b) using regional IP Fs of the UNDP to "the maximum possible extent" for TCDC and (c) using "a sizeable proportion" of inter-regional and global IP Fs of UNDP at the request of two or more Third World countries of different regions, to the financing of TCDC projects. Even the expertise for a Third World secretariat could come under such a move.

The total country-programme ICP figures amount to over 2000 million dollars for 1977-81, and if ten percent of this is allocated to TCDC, this gives a sizeable 200 million dollars utilizable without the intervention of the centralized bureaucracy. There is also 200 million dollars in regional IPF and about 30 million for global IP Fs.

This means that, while TCDC to get going must necessarily involve funding by the Third World countries themselves, there is enough in the UNDP kitty to oil the machine and make it go.
The nature of the inter-governmental machinery to oversee TCDC, in UNDP and the entire UN system, has sufficient potential for the Third World ultimately to ensure its viewpoint being accepted.

However, as many of the participants admitted, the plan of action and conference has only provided the framework and much depends on how the governments are going to view its potential and utilize it - whether in the direction envisaged by the Kuwait Declaration or merely as tcdc with small letters.

While the discussion and the plan of action did not produce any precise definition of what TCDC would be - the issue was left to be resolved by each country for itself to begin with and to future evolution of the idea - there was wide agreement on what it would not or should not be.

Most of the Third World countries and the Group of 77 agreed that while there could be some financing of TCDC by industrialized countries, it should be of a proportion that would preserve the decision-making power of the Third World countries. There was also a very wide consensus that while TCDC should not result in cutting North-South relations, TCDC could not mean participation by the industrialized countries in providing technical expertise or goods and services for cooperative projects of Third World countries, but at best only limited financial assistance.

The United States has proposed a 'trilateral approach' - the assistance of its experts and institutions for cooperative projects of two or more Third World countries. While the usefulness of such a role in some cases was acknowledged by the Third World countries, it was however seen merely as a continuance of existing North-South relations and not as a contribution to TCDC. It was felt that TCDC, on the other hand, should really result in creating institutions and centres of excellence within the South to enable it to analyse and solve such problems autonomously.

The Plan of Action for TCDC was at best a signpost. Whether TCDC would really become a new concept for collective self-reliance of the South, or merely turn out to be "travel costs for Third World countries", would really depend on how the idea is further developed and promoted. TCDC can become a movement towards the goal only when the Third World realises that NIEO will not be given to them or fall on them like manna from heaven, but has to be created by their own efforts.

Whether Buenos Aires was the beginning of this process, or another talkathon only the future can unfold.

(Chakravarthi Raghavan, a well known Indian journalist, is now the correspondent in Geneva of Inter Press Service. He covered the TCDC conference for IPS)
Readers will find hereafter some references to recent books or articles of interest.

1. Jacques Chonchol, Should the Village Survive?, Mazingira no. 6 (Headington Hill Hall, Oxford OX3 OBW, U.K.). Available also in French and Spanish.


3. Anil Agarwal, Drugs and the Third World, Earthscan (10 Percy Street, London W1P ODR, U.K.)

4. Anisur Rahman, Participatory Organizations of the Rural Poor, Human Futures (C-6/5 Safdarjung Development Area, New Delhi, India)


7. Rajni Kothari, Redesigning the Development Strategy, Marga Quarterly Journal (P.O. Box 601, Colombo, Sri Lanka)


9. La Información en el Nuevo Orden Internacional, ILET (Apartado 85 025, Mexico 20, D.F. Mexico)

10. Michel Schiray, Tiers Monde et monde industrialisé, documents élaborés pour le Projet Dag Hammarskjöld sur le développement et la coopération internationale. La Documentation française no. 4460-61 (31, quai Voltaire, 75340 Paris Cedex 07, France).


To remind:


Another Development, Approaches and Strategies (The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden).

(What Now is available also in Spanish from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation; Another Development is available in Spanish under the title Hacia Otro Desarrollo Enfoques y Estrategias, Siglo XXI Editores, México.)