ဗိုလ်ချင်းတပ်မှာ စစ်တန္းလ်ားသို႔ ျပန္ၿပီလား

I စိုးဖမ်းခ်က္

ဗိုလ်ချင်းက သို႔မဟုတ္ တပ္မေတာ္သည္ လြတ္လပ္ေရးအလြန္ သမိုင္း တစ္ေလွ်က္လုံးတြင္တိုင္းျပည္၌ ၿသဇာလႊမ္းေသာ အင္စတီက်ဴး႐ွင္းတစ္ခု ျဖစ္ခဲ့သည္။ ဆယ္စု ႏွစ္မ်ားခ်ီေသာ စစ္အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးအၿပီးတြင္မူ အရပ္သားတစ္ပိုင္းအစိုးရအျဖစ္သို႔ကူးေျပာင္းမႈကို စတင္ခဲ့သည္။ အစိုးရအဖြဲ႕ႏွင့္ စစ္တပ္မွမ်ဳိးဆက္သစ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားသည္ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈကို လူတကာေမွ်ာ္လင့္ထားသည္ထက္မ်ားစြာပိုမို ျမန္ဆန္စြာျဖင့္ ေ၀းေ၀းတြန္းခဲ့ၾကသည္။ သို႔ရာတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးႏွင့္ စီးပြားေရးတြင္ဆက္လက္ပတ္သက္ေနမႈႏွင့္မည့္အခ်ိန္ကာလေရာက္မွ အရပ္ဖက္အစိုးရ၏ ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္မႈေအာက္သို႔၀င္ရန္ လက္ခံမလဲ စေသာ တပ္မေတာ္၏ရည္႐ြယ္ခ်က္မ်ားႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ သံသယျဖစ္ဖြယ္အဓိကေမးခြန္းမ်ားက်န္႐ွိေနသည္။ အရာရာၾသဇာအာဏာႀကီးေသာ စစ္တပ္အျဖစ္မွ ယင္း၏အာဏာအေပၚ ဒီမိုကေရစီနည္းက်ကန္႔သတ္မႈကို လက္ခံေသာ စစ္တပ္အျဖစ္သို႔ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈသည္ ႀကီးမားေသာ စိန္ေခၚမႈတစ္ခုျဖစ္လိမ့္မည္။ တပ္မေတာ္၏ဖြဲ႕စည္းထားမႈဆိုင္ရာ ႐ႈေထာင့္အယူအဆကို ျမန္မာႏိုငံ၏ ကိုလိုနီဆန္႔က်င္ေရးလႈပ္႐ွားမႈတြင္ပါ၀င္ခဲ့ေသာက႑၊ စစ္တပ္ကို ထူေထာင္ခဲ့ေသာ ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားႏွင့္ လြတ္လပ္ေရးအလြန္အေစာပိုင္းကာလအေတြ႕အႀကံဳမ်ားက ႀကီးႀကီးမားမားလႊမ္းမိုးထားသည္။ လြတ္လပ္ေရးအလြန္ႏိုင္ငံသစ္သည္ အလယ္ပိုင္းျပည္မမွ ကြန္ျမဴနစ္ေသာင္းက်န္းမႈႏွင့္ နယ္စပ္ေတာင္တန္းေဒသမ်ားမွ တိုင္းရင္းသားမ်ားေတာ္လွန္မႈတို႔ေၾကာင့္အစိတ္စိတ္အမႊာမႊာ ျဖစ္ခဲ့ရသည္။ ပါလီမန္ဒီမိုကေရစီေခတ္ အေစာပိုင္းႏွစ္မ်ားတြင္အုပ္စုဖြဲ႕ျခင္းႏွင့္ အခ်င္းခ်င္းတိုက႔ခိုက္ ျခင္းတ႔က လႊမ္းမိုးထားခဲ့ရာ၊ ကိုယ္က်ဳိး႐ႈေထာင့္ကိုယ္က်ဳိး႐ွာႏိုင္ငံေရးသမားမ်ားေၾကာင့္ အမ်ဳိးသားအက်ဳိး စီးပြားႏွင့္ အနည္းငယ္သာသက္ဆိုင္မႈ႐ွိခဲ့သည္ဟု တပ္မေတာ္တြင္းမွအမ်ားစုက ႐ႈျမင္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။ ေနာက္ဆုံးတြင္မူ တပ္မေတာ္ထဲမွအမ်ားစုက အရပ္ဖက္ႏိုင္ငံေရးသမားမ်ားအေပၚ အယုံအၾကည္မ႐ွိေတာ့ေပ။ ယင္းအေျခအေနႏွင့္အတူ အဓိက ႏိုင္ငံေရးအေျပာင္းအလဲကာလတြင္မတည္မၿငိမ္ ျဖစ္ႏိုင္ျခင္းအေပၚ စိုးရိမ္မႈတို႔ ေပါင္းလိုက္ေသာအခါ တပ္မေတာ္သည္ အဓိကက်ေသာ လုံၿခံဳေရး
တပ်မတော်သည် ယူဆခဲ့ၾကသည္။

ဖယိုဖရဲအထူးအခြင့္အေရးမ်ားကိုပို၍ပို၍႐ွိေနဆဲျဖစ္သည္။

မီဒီယာမ်ားတြင္အထက္မွခြင့္ျပဳထူေထာင္ျခင္းတို႔သည္ဟူေသာအခ်က္ကိုလည္းျဖစ္တည္ေနေသာ္လည္းလႈပ္႐ွားမႈသည္ကုမၸဏီႀကီးမ်ား၏သည့္စစ္တပ္၏မျဖစ္ျခင္း၏ျဖေလွ်ာ့မႈမ်ားကိုျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈမ်ားကလကၡဏာ႐ွိသည္။

(ႏိုင္ငံေရး၊အေနာက္အုပ္စုႏွင့္လႊတ္ေတာ္ဆိုင္ရာကိုယ္စားျပဳမႈမွတဆင့္ၿခိမ္းေျခာက္မႈတစ္ခုအျဖစ္အေၾကာင္းရင္းတစ္ခုအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈအေပၚအစိုးရဘတ္ဂ်က္စီးပြားျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈကဲ့သို႔ေသာစြန္႔လႊတ္ရန္ရင္ဆိုင္ရသည့္အျပင္က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ယခုအခ်ိန္ထိမူတိုင္းရင္းသားေဒသမ်ားတြင္ျပန္႐ွားမႈတစ္ခုအပါအ၀င္သေဘာေပါက္လာၾကသည္။

စစ္ဖက္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားသည္အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈမ်ားႏွစ္ရပ္စလုံးတပ္မေတာ္အားၾသဇာလႊမ္းမိုးမႈကိုယူဆကာျဖစ္ၿပီးအက်ဳိးစီးပြားအေပၚအနာဂတ္အတြက္အခိ်ဳ႕ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားစိုးရိမ္ပူပန္လာမႈမီကာေသးမီကဲ့သို႔ေသာမျဖစ္ျခင္းသည္မည္သို႔ခံေနရ႐ွိထားမည္။

စိတ္ခ်မႈေပးသည့္ျဖစ္ႏိုင္ေခ်ဇာတ္ကြက္မ်ားစြာစဥ္ဆက္မျပတ္အခ်က္သည္အတြက္ဟန္ခ်က္မ်ားမွၾကည့္ေသာ့ခ်က္က်၎တိနတိုင္းျပည္ကဆိုင္ရာCrisis Group Asia Briefing N°143, 22 April 2014 Page 2

ခြင့္ႏွင့္သက္ေရာက္႐ွိေသာလည္းအာဏာေျမာက္ဆက္ဆံေရးလာခဲ့ၾကသည္။

ေယဘူယ်အားျဖင့္စိတ္ခ်မႈေပးသည့္ျဖစ္ႏိုင္ေခ်ဇာတ္ကြက္မ်ားစြာစဥ္ဆက္မျပတ္အခ်က္သည္အတြက္ဟန္ခ်က္မ်ားမွၾကည့္ေသာ့ခ်က္က်၎တိနတိုင္းျပည္ကဆိုင္ရာ
II ဗိုရိုင်းဖက်၀င်းများသည်

For a detailed account of the origins of the Tatmadaw, see Mary Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Cornell, 2003), chapter 2. For previous Crisis Group reporting on Myanmar since the present government took power, see Asia Briefings N°142, Not a Rubber Stamp: Myanmar’s Legislature in a Time of Transition, 13 December 2013; N°140, A Tentative Peace in Myanmar’s Kachin Conflict, 12 June 2013; N°136, Reform in Myanmar: One Year On, 11 April
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The Burma Independence Army was reconstituted a few months later as the Burma Defence Army, and subsequently in 1943 as the Burma National Army.

See Callahan, Making Enemies, op. cit., chapter 3.

Ibid, chapter 4.

Ibid, p. 96.

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Like many people in Myanmar, he went by one name.
တပ်ဖွဲ့များ၏ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးများကို ရေအောင် စစ်တပ်သည် စစ်အာဏာ ကို အရှေ့ချင်းခံခဲ့ၿပီး၊ ဦးချုပ်ဆိုင်ရာ အချက်အလက်များ၏ စစ်တပ်အာဏာများကို အိမ်းစားအစိုးရက ထမ်းဆောင်ခဲ့ရာ၊ စစ်တပ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုအတွက် အချချချောင်းအရာတစ်ခု ဖော်ပေးခဲ့သည်။

10 Callahan, Making Enemies, op. cit., chapter 7.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
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Owing to the junta’s frequent internal fights, its ability to control the ground has been nil. This poor military control has frustrated the army’s efforts to contain the Karen National Army (KNA) in the south of the country. The KNA has been able to operate far from the military’s reach, exploiting the lack of army control. In the north, ethnic armed groups have also, for the time being, been able to expand their activities, despite the occasional efforts of the junta to contain them. Additionally, the junta’s political position in the country is vulnerable, as the country’s national elections are due in 2020.

The junta is growing increasingly desperate as it faces a growing internal crisis. The junta’s power base is weakening, as the military and the civilian government have become increasingly polarised. Furthermore, the junta’s grip on power is being challenged by the growing influence of the ethnic armed groups, who are gaining momentum and assertiveness. The junta’s political legitimacy is also being eroded, as the country’s political landscape is rapidly changing.

In conclusion, the junta’s control over the ground is deteriorating, and its political position is under threat. The junta is facing a growing internal crisis, which is undermining its ability to govern the country. The junta’s future is uncertain, as the country’s political landscape is rapidly changing.

Since 1948 op. cit., pp. 210-214; and Maung Aung Myoe, Burma's Armed Forces Since 1948 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), chapter 2.


15 Smith, op. cit., p. 261.

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缅甸军：回归营房？
危机集团亚洲简报 N°143，2014年4月22日

(3) 

尽管军方在2014年4月22日的军事冲突中表现出了强大的力量，但随着军方在国家危机后的重新组织，他们面临着来自军方内部的压力。2018年6月，1800多名军人被重新分配到军队，而军队内部的权力结构也发生了变化。这些军人被重新分配到军队，而军队内部的权力结构也发生了变化。这些变化反映了军事内部的权力结构变化。17

17 Ibid.
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III စစ္တပ္အလို႐ွိတာကဘာလဲ

19 Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 79.

21 Ibid.

22 See Section III.C below.
Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar individuals close to the reforms and to the military elites, 2011-2014.

24 According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2010 Myanmar’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was around half that of the next poorest countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Laos and Cambodia.
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For detailed analysis, see Crisis Group Report, *The Politics of Economic Reform*, op. cit., Section IV.B.

There have been a small number of transfers from the military to the foreign ministry in recent months, and the transfer of several serving military officers to ambassadorships. A number of military officers have also been assigned as mid-level staff of the Union Election Commission. Previously such transfers to the civil service were the norm, but are now exceptional enough to be remarked on and stir some controversy. Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar think-tank analyst, and Myanmar individual with detailed knowledge of military affairs, Yangon, January 2014. See also Priscilla Clapp and Aung Din, “Myanmar’s government appoints military to the election commission”, cogitASIA (Center for Strategic and International Studies), 28 January 2014.
As provided for in the constitution, the National Defence and Security Council consists of the president, the two vice presidents, the speakers of the two legislative chambers, the commander-in-chief and his deputy, and the ministers for defence, home affairs, border affairs and foreign affairs.
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Chapter 7

(8) Relations with the Economy

For more details, see Crisis Group Report, Politics of Economic Reform, op. cit.

The Trade Council was chaired by General Maung Aye, who was the SPDC vice chairman and the army’s commander-in-chief.
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Yangon, January 2014.

30 Ibid. Also, Crisis Group interview, Myanmar individual with detailed knowledge of military affairs, Yangon, January 2014.

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34 The Karen National Union, for example, has been fighting since 1949.
35 For an early overview, see Crisis Group Report, A New Peace Initiative, op. cit.
37 New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2014, p. 1; see also “Army chief says ethnic conflicts must end for Burma’s development”, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2014.
38 Crisis Group interviews, armed group leaders, Chiang Mai, December 2013 and Yangon, October 2013; member of the government peace team, January 2014; and individual present at the peace talks, March 2014.
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For a discussion of the Tatmadaw’s earlier concerns, see Crisis Group Report, New Peace Initiative, op. cit., Section IV.E.

For a detailed discussion of the Kachin conflict and the peace parley, see Crisis Group Briefing, A Tentative Peace in Myanmar’s Kachin Conflict, op. cit.

See, for example, “Fighting dashes hopes of homecoming for displaced in Kachin”, The Irrawaddy, 20 February 2014.

See, for example, “SSA-North writes to peace team over clashes”, Myanmar Times, 7 August 2013; “Burma Army clashes with SSA-S, TNLA in Shan State”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 26 February 2014. Sporadic clashes also take place in Shan State with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, which has not yet entered into a ceasefire.
According to a spokesperson of the group, “as there was no specific demarcation, we continue to move about in the region normally, and at times we run into government army columns”, he said. “Without clear boundaries and advance notice, mobilisation can lead to ‘brief, pre-emptive clashes’”, he added. “But we have not seen large-scale fighting taking place”. Quoted in “Burma Army clashes with SSA-S, TNLA in Shan State”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 26 February 2014.

43 According to a spokesperson of the group, “as there was no specific demarcation, we continue to move about in the region normally, and at times we run into government army columns”, he said. “Without clear boundaries and advance notice, mobilisation can lead to ‘brief, pre-emptive clashes’”, he added. “But we have not seen large-scale fighting taking place”. Quoted in “Burma Army clashes with SSA-S, TNLA in Shan State”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 26 February 2014.
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47 See “Army to return 150,000 acres to original owners”, Myanmar Times, 9 February 2014.
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49 “Humanitarian crisis looms in western Burma as foreign aid workers leave”, Reuters, 1 April 2014.
50 “Commander-in-chief says armed forces responsible for ‘safeguarding constitution’ as 69th Armed Forces Day is marked with parade”, New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2014, pp. 1, 3.
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သည်ဟူေသာယူဆမႈ႐ွိသည္။
2012ခုႏွစ္ကရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္တြင္အေရးေပၚအေျခအေနေၾကညာထားစဥ္ကာလအတြင္းတည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းမႈျပန္လည္တည္ေဆာက္၍႐ိုဟင္ဂ်ာမြတ္ဆလင္ေက်း႐ြာမ်ားကိုအကာအကြယ္ေပးရာတြင္စစ္တပ္သည္ရဲတပ္ဖြဲ႕ထက္မ်ားစြာပိုမိုထိေရာက္မႈ႐ွိခဲ့ၿပီး，စစ္တပ္၏ပါ၀င္ပတ္သက္မႈသည္အျပဳသေဘာေဆာင္ေၾကာင္းအဆိုပါအသိုင္းအ၀ိုင္းမ်ားကေယဘူယ်အားျဖင့္႐ႈျမင္ၾကသည္။

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ျမန္မာႏိုငံနယ္စပ္ေဒသမ်ား႐ွိတပ္မေတာ္၏က႑မွာလည္းအေျပာင္းအလဲ႐ွိေနသည္။

အဆိုပါနယ္ေျမအမ်ားစုတြင္အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စဲထားမႈေၾကာင့္စစ္တပ္သည္ကင္းလွည့္ျခင္း，စစ္ဆင္ေရးေဆာင္႐ြက္ျခင္းတို႔မလိုအပ္သေလာက္ျဖစ္ကာ，တပ္ရင္းတပ္ဖြဲ႕မ်ားမွာစစ္တန္းလ်ားမ်ား၌သာပို၍အခ်ိန္ကုန္ၾကရသည္။

(၆) ဗိုလ်ချင်း

င်္ချင်း၀င်္ချင်းတို႔သည္တစ္ေသာမွာအေချင်္ချင်း၀င်္ချင်းနိုင်ရပ္ဖြစ်ၾကၾသားျဖစ္ပြားေနဆဲပင္ျဖစ္သည္။

52 Crisis Group interview，international analyst who had recent discussions with the authorities on the issue，Yangon，April 2014.
53 See Crisis Group Report，Storm Clouds on the Horizon，op. cit.，Section I.E.
These have included serious violations in the context of counter-insurgency operations, as well as more systemic abuses including forced labour, arbitrary detention, illegal taxation and sexual violence, among others.

For detailed discussion, see Selth, *Burma’s Armed Forces*, op. cit., Section 4.3; and Maung Aung Myoe, op. cit., chapter 2.


*New Light of Myanmar*, 16 February 2014, p. 16.
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60 A recent public opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute across Myanmar suggests that the military may not be viewed as negatively as had been supposed. It was the second most favourably viewed institution (after the media), with one third of respondents “very favourable” and more than half “favourable” – putting it ahead of the opposition, government, legislature, police, courts and political parties. “Survey of Burma public opinion”, International Republican Institute, 2014.

61 See Andrew Selth, Police Reform in Burma (Myanmar): Aims, Obstacles and Outcomes (Griffith Asia Institute, 2013) and Burma’s Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming (Griffith Asia Institute, 2013); and “Myanmar commits to child-free armed forces”, UN Press Release, 27 June 2012.

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...see crisis group report, Politics of Economic Reform, op. cit.
65 Between 2011 and 2014, Myanmar’s GDP increased by an estimated 7.5 per cent per annum, and
defence expenditure, although proportionally less, increased in real terms. See “Myanmar: Second
review under the staff-monitored program”, IMF Country Report No. 14/91, 18 February 2014.
66 See, for example, “Commander-in-chief says armed forces responsible for ‘safeguarding constitution’
as 69th Armed Forces Day is marked with parade”, New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2014, pp. 1, 3.
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ဗီတိုင်းပြည်နယ်၏ မတိုင်းဆောင်မှုများ: တမ်းချင်းမှုထက်လိုများ သိမ်းဆည်းရန်လေသည်။

စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာများကို ဆက်လက်ဖျင်စားရန် မှန်ကန်သော အခြေအနေများ ရှိပြီးလိုင်းများကို စစ်တပ်ကို စောင့်ရင်းပြုခြင်းများစွာ လျှော်စွာ ရှိပြီးလျှင် အရှေ့ပေါင်းဆင်းရေး စီရင်ခံစားမှုများ လိုအပ်သည်။

67 See “Committee to target military veto”, Myanmar Times, 24 February 2014; and “Constitution body takes military veto off the table”, Myanmar Times, 14 March 2014.
68 See “Army chief says ethnic conflicts must end for Burma’s development”, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2014; and “President marks 3rd anniversary of the government with speech: Six-decade long civil war to end soon, but armed forces will continue to be included in negotiations to solve political issues”, New Light of Myanmar, 27 March 2014, p. 1.
69 The need for sustained engagement in order to achieve clear progress in this area was underscored in the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, “Conflict, Security and Development”, particularly chapter 6.
70 “Commander-in-chief says armed forces responsible for ‘safeguarding constitution’”, op. cit., pp. 1, 3.
71 Crisis Group interviews, several of these diplomats, Yangon, January-March 2014.
72 “President marks 3rd anniversary of the government with speech”, op. cit., p. 1.
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See Section III.A above.

74 See Section III.A above.

75 Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar sources close to the military, Yangon, January 2014.
စစ္တပ္မ်ားနှင့်မဟာဗ်ဴဟာေျမာက္လက္တြဲျခင္းျဖင့္အဆင္ေျပလြယ္ကူလာမည့္တပ္မေတာ္ေခတ္မီတိုးတက္ေရးတို႔ကိုလုပ္ေဆာင္သြားမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္းတို႔ပင္ျဖစ္သည္။

တပ္မေတာ္သည္ျပည္တြင္း၌မူအထူးသျဖင့္တိုင္းရင္းသားနယ္စပ္ေဒသမ်ား၌က်ဆင္းေနသာဂုဏ္သတင္းကိုျပန္ဆယ္ရန္အတြက္လက္႐ွိျဖစ္ေပၚေနဆဲလူ႕အခြင့္အေရးခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ညွဥ္းပန္းမႈမ်ားကိုအဆုံးသတ္ကာအရပ္သားမ်ားႏွင့္ဆက္ဆံသည့္နည္းလမ္းပုံစံကိုေျပာင္းလဲပစ္ရမည္ျဖစ္ၿပီး၊ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၏လူမ်ဳိး、ဘာသာကြဲျပားစုံလင္မႈအလွကိုထင္ဟပ္ေသာႏွင့္အကာအကြယ္ေပးသည့္တာ၀န္ကိုသာထမ္းေဆာင္ေသာပေရာ္ဖက္႐ွင္နယ္ပီသသည့္တပ္မေတာ္အဖြဲ႕အစည္းတစ္ခုအျဖစ္သို႔ကိုယ္တိုင္အသြင္ေျပာင္းလဲရေပလိမ့္မည္။

ရန္ကုန္/ဘရပ္ဆယ္၊၂၂ဧၿပီ၂၀၁၄
Appendix A: Map of Myanmar
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