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OPINION

Myanmar's current
peace processes :
a new role for women?

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The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (the HD Centre) is an independent organisation dedicated to improving the prevention of, and response to, armed conflict. The HD Centre opens channels of communication and mediates between parties in conflict, facilitates dialogue, and provides support to the broader mediation and peacebuilding

community. We deploy our expertise to support local and nationally-owned processes that protect civilians and foster lasting and just peace. For more information, please visit: <http://www.hdcentre.org>

This Opinion is produced as part of the HD Centre's project, 'Women at the Peace Table - Asia Pacific', which brings together women active in peacemaking across the Asia-Pacific region to identify and employ strategies for improving the contributions of women to, and participation in, peace processes.

“hd” Opinion

Introduction¹

Myanmar has experienced one of the most complex and long lasting armed conflicts in the world. Since 1948, successive military governments have come to power under the guise of managing diverse ethnic armed groups with demands for self-determination and the granting of equal rights to ethnic nationalities. While a lack of democracy has often been seen as Myanmar's main challenge, in fact the most influential factor in the country's ethnic conflict is the militarisation of the government. On the one hand the newly elected government is pushing democratic reforms, and on the other, the emergence of a sustainable and just state of peace remains an issue of concern, especially among the general population. The inclusion of women in the peace processes in Myanmar is minimal but awareness among women in civil society of the importance of inclusion is high. This Opinion Piece will endeavor to assess the roles of women and their contributions in the current complex dynamics in Myanmar, and suggest ways in which they could be developed in the interests of a just, sustainable peace in the country.

¹ The HD Centre wishes to thank Emma Leslie, of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, and Rachel Gasser, of Swisspeace, for their expert reviews of this Opinion Piece.

Peace processes led by the military government (1989–2010)

During the period of military government (1989-2010), a series of peace negotiations were initiated by Myanmar's military intelligence and 24 individual ceasefire agreements were made with various armed and ethnic groups (see Annex 1). In April 2009, before convening the 2010 general elections and without achieving any kind of political settlement, the government steadily applied increasing pressure on all ceasefire groups to transform their forces into Border Guard Forces (BGF), a newly initiated body under the command of the state army and Myanmar's central government. The structure being proposed for the BGF was not favourable to the ethnic armed groups, thus prompting strong resistance from most of them. While stronger groups, such as the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), opposed the BGF proposal, some other smaller forces such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Association (DKBA) and the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) accepted it. They became part of the BGF, while the existing militias and some smaller armed groups remained as militias. This transition is outlined in Table 1 below as well as in Annexes 2 and 3.

Table 1: Types of armed groups who are part of state army

From ceasefire groups to Board Guard groups	9 groups (23 BGF Battalions)
From ceasefire groups or factions to militia	14 groups
Groups remaining as militia	50+ ²

The rejection of the proposal by the larger ethnic armed groups and the government's desire to impose its will, gradually increased tensions and the level of mistrust. Consequently, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a new ethnic armed group alliance, was established in February 2011. One of its key political objectives is finding political solutions

² Transnational Institute, *Burma Policy Briefing* Number 5 (Netherlands: TI, February 2011). Available at: www.tni.org/page/tni-bcn-burma-project Accessed 13 November, 2012.

collectively, rather than individually, with the new government. The perception of the ‘individual approach’ taken by the government was that it weakened the ability of the groups to negotiate as it created fragmentation and confusion among them. In contrast, the public position of the government has been that bringing all the groups together at the table may not be manageable as the desires and needs of individual groups vary. To date, the government has not officially negotiated with the UNFC.

Peace processes led by the new government (2011 – present)


On August 18, 2011 President Thein Sein issued an official invitation for peace talks (known as “Peace Call 1/11”). Two peace delegations were established to commence negotiation. These comprised of 12 men and no women.³

The two houses of parliament also established peace committees to oversee the current peace processes. The President laid out a three-step peace road map (see Table 2) and, in his annual speech at the Union Parliament on 1 March, 2012, he reiterated his plans for a peace process.⁴

³ Report on the third regular session of first Amyotha Hluttaw in *The New Light of Myanmar*, 16 February 2012.


⁴ Report, “All must try to see national race youths who brandished guns using laptops,” *The New Light of Myanmar*, 2 March 2012.

Table 2: The Government's peace road map including the three steps and the role of Parliament



The United Nationalities Federation Council has its own road map for peace. Table 3 compares the two road maps.

Table 3: Peace road maps - comparisons



Working towards reaching ceasefire agreements is a pressing issue to establish stability in the country, and critical for economic development and normalisation of international relations. While 13 out of 18 groups including the Karen National Union (KNU) and the New Mon State Party, have reached a form of agreed ceasefire (see Annex 4) there have been ongoing intense military offensives with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in the north since 9 June, 2011. Those offensives have seen increased human rights violations, gender-based violence and have displaced more than 94,667 civilians from their respective villages.⁵ The resumption of fighting has started in the area of the hydro power plant, a Chinese private investment which supplies almost 90% of the electricity it produces to China. These factors have led the KIO

⁵ 36,385 people in the government-controlled area (data from the Relief and Resettlement Department of the Kachin State Government as of 28 September, 2012) and 58,282 in the KIO-controlled areas (data from the IDP and Refugees Relief Committee of the KIO Government as of 9 September, 2012).

to believe that the government is protecting the interests of China at the expense of its own citizens.

Other groups are in ongoing discussions about ceasefire agreements (see Annex 5). However, the initial stage of the peace process is only focusing on ending the fighting between the state army (known as the Tatmadaw) and the ethnic armed groups. Substantial political discussion about self-determination and equality for ethnic groups are yet to be discussed.

On 3 May 2012, President Thein Sein announced the establishment of the newly formed Union Peace Making Central Committee consisting of 11 members with no women; and the Union Peace Making Working Committee consisting of 52 members and only two female parliamentarians. By having one peace negotiation team in the government, it makes the peace process more transparent and accountable in contrast to the prior peace.

Roles of women in Myanmar's society and peace processes

The previous peace processes, under the military regime, were led by a sole military leader and negotiations were closed to the public. There was, of course, no media access and agreements were not written down but agreed to in secret. Needless to say, the inclusion of women was not even on the agenda for the conflicting parties. It is possible women may not have even considered that they could play a role in the peace process. In contrast, the current peace process is technically open. There are public announcements of the peace talks in newspapers and on television. The media have access to the process and, in fact, 'formal' talks are televised in full to the public on state television. The media can freely report the agreements made and interview both parties involved in the particular process in post-agreement press conferences. In the current peace era, one significant feature is the inclusion of a few women from the armed groups at the peace table. Even though the participation of women is still low, this is a hopeful sign that the inclusion of women can be increased as the processes in Myanmar develop.

As a result of the authoritarian and militarised nature of all conflicting parties, challenges to the inclusion of women still exist, particularly given that there are only a few women at the decision-making level within armed groups. Nevertheless, it is notable that a few women are, in fact, in decision-making positions in three ethnic armed groups: Naw Zipporah Sein is the General Secretary of the Karen National Union; Mi Sardar is the Central Committee member of the New Mon State Party; and Maw Oo Myah (alias Naw Dae Dae Paw) is the Religious and Culture Minister of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). These women are also the lead negotiators or members of their respective negotiation teams. As the negotiation process started between the KNU and the government, Naw May Oo, a female legal expert, became a recent addition to the KNU peace negotiation team.

Traditional culture in Myanmar has a significant influence on attitudes towards women in leadership roles. It is widely recognised that women are in charge of 'home affairs'; however, women are not considered to have a role in politics or the public sphere. One chief minister, the head of the state level government and a former military general who is a member of the government's negotiation team, commented to a female ethnic leader at the end of one round of talks: "In Buddhist culture, women are not in a [political] leadership position." This is indicative of general perceptions among the majority of the public with regard to women and politics. Some women believe these views and are consequently hesitant about being in leadership positions even when they are assigned to such a position.

Some ethnic traditional norms also block women from dispute resolution processes. In the traditional dispute settlement processes of the Kachin, Karen, Chin and Mon, women are not meant to take part in political negotiation. Similarly, in the history of Burmese monarchy, women who tried to get involved in the politics were recorded as villains except the Queen Shin Saw Pu (a Mon princess), but women who were poets, artists or mothers of great kings were well respected.

As a result of being under a series of autocratic regimes, and with limited or poor educational opportunities for decades if not centuries, women are particularly inclined to submit to any kind of paternalistic behavior in decision-making involving politics or development, and men are used to accepting and expecting this. This has also led to a situation in which women in Myanmar tend not to raise concerns

themselves but let the men discuss and decide on their behalf. Even in contemporary society, many parents, even amongst the educated and urban dwellers, recommend their soon-to-be married daughters to obey their husbands. In Myanmar society 'respect' is less popular than 'obedience' which demands submission. This is true of all three of the main religious traditions in Myanmar – Buddhism, Christianity and Islam.

Another paternalistic attitude is the so-called 'know everything' attitude. Men, especially those who are in power, think they know what women need and want, and what they should do for women. Thus, they habitually set programmes and policies without consulting women. This happens within families right up to national politics. For example, the Myanmar National Committee for Women's Affairs, which was formed by the generals and led by their wives, was under the command and control of the top generals.

To a large extent, these issues explain the exclusion of women from previous peace negotiations. But with exceptions occurring more often, a slow shift may be starting in terms of including women in peace talks in different roles, rather than only as logistical support. One Karen woman involved in a recent negotiation process explained that the inclusion of women did not come automatically, but that the space for women needs to be created by women themselves and the capacity of women needs to be enhanced. General Secretary Zipporah Sein of the KNU has played a significant role in this by ensuring at least three women are a part of the negotiation team at each round of talks.

It is significant to note that observers at the peace talks have included a number of women. In the KNU talks, Kristine Gould (a military strategist from the United States) and Emma Leslie (Director of a regional NGO) were invited by the KNU, while a businesswoman from Dawei Princess company (a Myanmar oil, gas and mining company)⁶ was invited by the Government negotiation team, to be observers to the process. Unfortunately, female leaders from local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have not yet formally sat at any of the peace tables but they have also been involved 'around the peace table' as observers in a few peace processes; for example, Anna May Say Pha (a feminist

⁶ According to Karen News, the Dawei Princess Company is also known as Hein Yadana Moe – a sub-contractor on the USD 60 billion Dawei Special Economic Zone in southern Burma. It has received concessions to log in the KNU-controlled Tavoy District, Tenasserim Division. The company has strong links to the military and is headed up by business tycoon, U Ko Ko Maung, its Managing Director is Colonel U Ngwe Soe. See <http://karennews.org/2012/05/knu-questions-role-of-govts-business-linked-peace-talk-advisors.html/> Accessed 30 October, 2012.

theologian). This has given them significant roles and first hand access to the discussions at the talks. However, their role as observers is still limited – they listen, observe and give feedback after the meetings.

On the one hand, these female observers have been able to provide feedback both to the Government and the armed group, giving a kind of parallel channel for women to communicate with decision-makers on both sides. On the other hand, including women's perspectives in the negotiation agenda is currently dependent on the interests or sympathy of the men at the peace table.

In the current peace processes, women are also playing a role in influencing the regional authorities. In the Chin peace process, Chin Chin, a female CSO worker has played a crucial role as a bridge between the local authority and the Chin National Front (CNF) in the preparation for the talks. She has also functioned as a communication hub between the CNF, the Chin Peace and Tranquility Committee (CPTC) and the Chin state government to facilitate smooth logistical arrangements for each round of formal and informal talks. However, she is yet to participate in the negotiations more formally.

Significantly, some female national peacebuilders – such as Seng Raw, Susanna Hla Hla Soe, Naw Kanyaw Paw, the authors of this Opinion Piece Ja Nan and Nang Raw – have been advising the leaders of armed groups as well as some key government personnel on shaping some of the peace processes to reach a comprehensive peace agreement. Some of them have been co-coordinating and facilitating the meetings of the armed groups in order to prepare a national level peace plan. Their contributions of patience and wit as well as expert suggestions were well respected and taken. These female experts have been working with various armed groups and have gained trust as a result of their neutrality, expertise and recognised high level of education. Such – still relatively rare – cases could change the leadership's perception of the role of women in peace processes and generate a more gender-balanced view.

Women's specific peacebuilding contributions

With all the existing constraints, and in addition to what is described above, what have women substantively contributed to peacebuilding during the years of armed conflict in Myanmar? Since the early 90's, women have been extensively involved in broader peacebuilding activities in areas like livelihood creation, social services and trauma

healing which indirectly relate to the peace process; however, they did not start to be directly involved in negotiations or mediation-related activities until early 2012.

At that time, the Nyein (Shalom) Foundation conducted an opinion survey to get a snapshot of the roles of women in various peace processes and peacebuilding. The survey was conducted among 86 top-level and mid-level female leaders of CSOs from the Yangon, Bago and Ayeyawaddy Regions and the Kachin, Karen, Chin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan States, and covered their experiences from the early 90's to early 2012. Of the respondents, 35% were 20-30 years of age, 45% were 31-50 years of age, while 20% were above 51 years of age. About 50% of the respondents were from active gender-related and women's rights-focused CSOs. The rest were from other sectors such as health, livelihood creation, peacebuilding, education and religious organisations.

According to the survey, any attention to gender was almost negligible in previous peace negotiations. Only 4% of the respondents had tried to ensure women (including themselves) were included at the peace table and their efforts failed because the peace processes were very secretive and seen as a 'man-thing'. On top of that, female leaders from a limited number of CSOs were themselves not very confident of their capability. However, 40% of the respondents indicated they had tried to get access to the peace table. This illustrates the fact that women's perceptions of gender roles in peace processes, and their commitment to including women and gendered views in them, has been changing over time. Myanmar's CSO community has recognised that not having women's voices at the peace table means half of the country remains unheard.

Inside the armed groups, women also had to push themselves forward to be heard by the male-dominated leadership. The Vice-Chairperson of a women's organisation which is part of an armed group reflected: "I have demanded several times to the Central Committee that two women should be members of the Central Committee to raise women's concerns and contribute women's perspectives in critical decisions, but [this has been] constantly neglected." She continued: "Despite the fact that our demands were ignored, I did go into two or three closed door meetings, but I wasn't dragged out of the room. As a result, I could make some impact on some decisions!" Regardless of the challenges they encountered, women leaders within the armed groups have been trying to create a space to be heard and have kept expanding it.

The survey results show an increase in number of women taking the initiative and approaching armed groups as well as the regional and union governments (by sending recommendation letters, appeal letters and signed petitions) from 5% to 12%. Similarly, the number of women who have submitted public concerns to the respective armed groups or the governing authorities has risen from 6% to 29%. Surprisingly, the number of efforts—signature campaign, petitions and letters—by women to lobby public perspectives to the government and also consulting the local authorities regarding the will of the concerned armed groups has increased from 0% to 14%. All these figures show the increasing commitment and creativity of top-level and mid-level female leaders in grassroots CSOs in peace processes and this needs to be strengthened to be sustainable.

More than 60% of the survey respondents agreed collaboration with Members of Parliament is necessary and, while 50% of them think they should get involved in every step in implementing and monitoring the agreements, interestingly 90% believe their roles fit best at the preparatory stage. The survey results also show women's participation in awareness-raising activities relating to the peace negotiations has increased from 9% to 37% since the early 90's. The respondents saw a need for women's participation in the peace talks for the following reasons: no man can fully articulate women's affairs and concerns; as natural multi-taskers (for example, housekeeping, tending children and taking care of their husbands) women are more pro-change than men and, for similar reasons, women are good at micro-level thinking; women sitting at the table could relax unnecessary tensions between men; women could be more empathetic and they are more likely to implement the ideas and suggestions of various stakeholders; and, as victims of war, women have every right to have a say in these issues and decide their future.

About 71% of the respondents stated that women's perspectives and opinions on conflict and peace are different from those of men in following ways: women want durable peace while men want more power; women are more concerned about physical security issues than men; women have a greater ability to see conflict in different layers than men (women can see and feel the atrocities "from the heart with motherly eyes"); women tend to be creative in problem-solving; women are less egotistical and concerned with dignity and they are more concerned with social security issues above all else; and women solve conflicts with both heart and head. Women also have a high level of concern about issues associated with women and child war victims and the livelihoods of widows, female ex-combatants and girls. These issues generally tend to attract minimal attention from men.

It could be concluded that the change in women's (if not yet men's) perspectives on peace processes is the result of two factors. The first factor is the establishment, over the years, of women's networks such as the Women Organizations' Network (WON), Karen Women Action Group (KWAG), the Gender Equality Network (GEN) and the ethnic-based women's organisations like the Karen Women's Organization and the Shan Women's Human Rights Group. These networks have highlighted the importance of women's roles in peace processes and strengthened the collaborative effort of women in peace initiatives. These include the signature campaign, which called for a nationwide ceasefire and stopping armed hostility in Kachin State. This campaign had the support of Myanmar democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, which made the voice of the participants more powerful and enabled them to be heard. However, these networks are at an initial stage and are still weak in areas such as the timely flow of information, organisational and individual capacity, and support from media. They are also facing challenges such as fear, pessimism, minimal knowledge of international norms and practices in the area of women, peace and security, as well as a lack of advocacy, negotiation and public speaking skills.

The second factor, which may be changing women's perspectives on peace processes is the changing political environment. The international community is closely monitoring Myanmar's transition, which is forcing the peace process to be more transparent and inclusive than earlier processes.

Although the direct involvement of women has been almost nil over the last 50 years, women have been addressing the crucial issues associated with building peace. Women-led peacebuilding activities in Myanmar range from providing health services, humanitarian assistance, psycho-social support and moral support to providing maternal support and childcare to the victims of war. Until recently, women's organisations in Myanmar have been working on women's rights issues through these type of activities which respond to acute daily needs, while peace organisations have been working with the armed groups and mediators who are mostly men. The women's movement has not consciously been aligned with the peace movement, and vice versa. The first ever national level seminar in Myanmar on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) was only held in early 2012. It was jointly organised in Yangon by the WON (a network of about 30 women's organisations) and the Nyein (Shalom) Foundation, a peace foundation. As a result of the seminar, the Kachin Women's Peace Network has developed much faster than expected. In addition, the Mon Women's Organization is increasing its participation in the peace process by planning to support the female negotiator. The follow up training for

women at the peace table and around the table was held during the last week of October 2012 together with UN Women, swisspeace and Nyein (Shalom) Foundation. However, readiness to prepare a National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 is still a long way off.

Given the complexity of the 20 ongoing peace negotiations in Myanmar it is important to note that the level of women's participation differs from one ethnic group to another. Therefore, finding ways to strengthen women's networks is crucial. One route to strengthening the networks is funding. The survey respondents indicated that they got funding from international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and some embassies in Myanmar but that they are still underfunded. Sometimes they are underfunded by up to 50% and they have never reached 100% of coverage for their budgets and operations. Very few women were able to attend international and regional seminars abroad on issues relevant to peacemaking (such as CEDAW review workshops as well as workshops and training on UNSCR 1325), which greatly help to expand knowledge and networks.⁷

In terms of what the survey tells us, up till now, it would be fair to say women have made an important impact on the peace processes in Myanmar and have played numerous roles but they are yet to use all their potential capabilities.

Conclusion

Despite cultural perceptions and the male-dominated political setting which places constraints on acknowledging women's leadership, the changing political context is an open door to expand the participation of women in peace processes. One should acknowledge that the awareness-raising on gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment programmes, which has been supported by international organisations, is contributing towards women's ability to expand their participation in the public domain. In addition, the commitment to support Myanmar's peace processes and the influence from the international community encourage the leaders of all parties involved in current peace processes to reflect on the inclusion of women. Though there is some will and interest from male political leaders to include women in peace processes, it does not come automatically. The peace door is not locked for women but a strong and collective effort is still needed to open the door for women's participation in the peace processes in Myanmar.

⁷ Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1976.

General recommendations:

1. This is the right time to start gathering women's concerns and perspectives – whether they are from female combatants, women in camps for refugees and internally displaced people, or from civilian women – in order to develop an inclusive agenda for political dialogue.
2. More seminars and workshops on CEDAW as well as UNSCR 1325 and its sister resolutions should be conducted for men and women in armed groups, government and civil society.
3. Women leaders require support to equip themselves with negotiation and communication skills to prepare them for participating at the peace table, through the provision of relevant materials, training opportunities, mentoring and other forms of practical guidance.

Recommendations for donors:

1. A range of organisations who are concerned with bringing about a just peace are beginning to take new initiatives to engage in current peace processes. Support to include robust gender perspectives is critical and donors are encouraged to ensure all funding proposals include a practical component in this regard to ensure that:
 - awareness about women's rights and gender perspectives are included in peace talks and outcomes;
 - women and girls are consulted and their views communicated to decision-makers from all conflict parties;
 - networking with Members of Parliament from the Union Peace Making Working Committee established under the President occurs on these issues, and female parliamentarians are particularly supported to develop their leadership skills.
2. Support action oriented research to elucidate women's participation, perspectives and leadership in politics and peace processes to broaden understanding of the roles of women in Myanmar society.
3. Women's organisations and networks which have emerged at a local level require sustained financial and capacity support in order to become strategic actors that represent women in the peace

processes. They should be able to go beyond advocacy to become networks that strategically engage with the decision-makers.

4. Support empowerment programmes for key women who are at, and around, the table and have influence on the peace processes. Some examples of beneficial activities to support include:
 - An exposure or study visit to countries where women are actively engaged in peace processes and political processes.
 - Building skills such as negotiation, public speaking and advocacy.
 - Building knowledge of peace concepts and politics.
 - Exchanging and sharing the experiences of women involved at the peace table with other women who are in supporting roles.

Annex 1: List of ceasefire groups during the period of military government (1989 - 2010)

Nr.	Abbreviation	Name of group	Date of ceasefire
1.	MNDAA (KoKang)	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army	31.3.89
2.	MNSP (Wa)	Myanmar National Solidarity Party	9.5.89
3.	NDAA (Shan Akhar)	National Democracy Alliance Army Military Local Administration Committee	30.6.89
4.	SSA	Shan State Army	24.9.89
5.	NDA-K	New Democratic Army-Kachin	15.12.89
6.	KDA	Kachin Defence Army	11.1.91
7.	PNO	Pa-O National Organization	18.2.91
8.	PSLP	Palaung State Liberation Party	21.4.91
9.	KNG	Kayan National Guard	27.2.92
10.	KIO	Kachin Independence Organization*	24.2.94
11.	KNPLF	Kayinni Nationalities People's Liberation Front	9.5.94
12.	KNLP	Kayan New Land Party	26.7.94
13.	SNPLO	Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organization	9.10.94
14.	DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Association	1994
15.	KNPP	Kayinni National Progressive Party	21.3.95
16.	NMSP	New Mon State Party	29.6.95
17.	MTA	Mong Tai Army	5.1.96
18.	BCP(Rakhine)	Burma Communist Party (Rakhine State)	6.4.97
19.	KPF (Karen Peace Force)	Split from the Karen National Union (KNU)	24.2.97
20.	KNU Thandaung Group	Split from the Karen National Union (KNU)	8.11.97
21.	P'dol Aung San Group	Split from the Karen National Union (KNU)	17.4.98
22.	KNU No. 2 Brigade Special Region	Split from the Karen National Union (KNU)	10.1.99
23.	AA group	Arakine Army group	2.5.02
24.	KPC (Karen Peace Council)	Split from the Karen National Union (KNU)	11.2.07

** Only the KIO (No.10) was the only group which actually wrote down and signed a ceasefire agreement document.*

Annex 2: List of Border Guard Forces (BGF)

No.	Name of armed group	Status: BGF or Miitia	Date and place of agreement	Total Number of BGF Battalions by group
1.	New Democratic Army -Kachin	The BGF 1001-1003 Battalion	November, 2010 Kachin State	(3)
2.	Kayinni National People's Liberation Front	The BGF 1004-1005 Battalion	November, 2010 Kayah State	(2)
3.	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) Kokang	The BGF 1006 Battalion	November, 2010 Kokang , Shan State	(1)
4.	Lahu local people's militia	The BGF 1007 Battalion	18 May, 2010 Shan State	(1)
5.	Akha local people's militia	The BGF 1008 Battalion	18 May, 2010 Shan State	(1)
6.	Lahu local people's militia	The BGF 1009 Battalion	18 May, 2010 Shan State	(1)
7.	Wa local people's militia	The BGF 1010 Battalion	18 May, 2010 Shan State	(1)
8.	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army	The BGF 1011-1022 Battalion	18 August, 2010 Karen State	(12)
9.	Karen Peace Force (KNU No. 6 Brigade No.16 Battalion)	The BGF 1023 Battalion	18 August, 2010 Karen State	(1)

Annex 3: List of ceasefire groups which became militia during 2010 (before 2010 election)

No.	Name of Militia	Location
1.	La Sang Awng Wah Group	Gwetu/Waimaw, Kachin State
2.	Rawang Militia (Rebellion Resistance Force)	Khawnglamphu/Putao, Kachin State
3.	Kachin Defense Army (KDA)	Kawngkha/Kukai, Shan State
4.	Shan State Army (north) Brigade(3)	Loikhe/Tibaw, Shan State
5.	Shan State Army (north) Brigade(7)	Kali/kunhein, Shan State
6.	Palaung State Liberation Party	Mandung/Namtu, Shan State
7.	Pa-O National Organization	Kyautalone, Shan State
8.	Mong Tai Army	Homein, Shan State
9.	Kayan National Army (KNA) Kayan Region Development Organization	Moebye/Pekhon, Shan State
10.	Kayan New Land Party Peaceful Association	Pyin Saung, Kayah State
11.	Kayinni National Peace and Development Party (KNPDP)	Lawpyita, Kayah State
12.	Karenni National Democratic Party (KNDP)	Hweponelawng, Kayah State
13.	Karenni National Solidarity Organization	Mawchi, Kayah State
14.	Mon Peace Defence Group	Mon State

Annex 4: List of groups who have agreed ceasefires with the current Government of Myanmar

No.	Name of Group	Date of signed agreement
1.	National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) Mongla	September, 2011
2.	United Wa State Army (UWSA)	October, 2011
3.	Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) (Shan State Army-South)	December, 2011
4.	Democratic Karen Benevolent Army – Kalo Htoo Baw	December, 2011
5.	Chin National Front (CNF)	January, 2012
6.	Karen National Union (KNU)	January, 2012
7.	Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP)- Shan State Army-North	January, 2012
8.	New Mon State Party (NMSP)	February, 2012
9.	KNU/KNLA*-Peace Council	February, 2012
10.	Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)	March, 2012
11.	Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)	April, 2012
12.	National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Kaplant) NSCN(K)	9 April, 2012
13.	Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO)	25 August, 2012

* *KNLA - Karen National Liberation Army*

Annex 5: List of armed groups involved in ongoing negotiations with the current Government of Myanmar

No.	Name
1.	Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)
2.	All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF)
3.	Kokang ⁸
4.	Arakan National Council (ANC)
5.	United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)

⁸ This is the group remaining after part of the Kokang became BGF.

Authors

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