Sustainable Solutions to the Displaced Person Situation on the Thai-Myanmar Border

ANALYSIS OF DONOR, INGO/NGO AND UN AGENCY DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO DISPLACED PERSONS FROM MYANMAR ALONG THE THAI-MYANMAR BORDER

Dares Chusri, Tarina Rubin, Ma. Esmeralda Silva, Jason D. Theede, Sunanta Wongchalee, Patcharin Chansawang

Conducted in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and funded by the European Union
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The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of UNDP or the other organizations mentioned in this report.

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<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
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<td>AUP</td>
<td>Aid to Uprooted People</td>
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<td>CAN</td>
<td>Community Agriculture and Nutrition</td>
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<td>CCSDPT</td>
<td>Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand</td>
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<td>COERR</td>
<td>Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department For International Development</td>
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<td>DPs</td>
<td>Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
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<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>KnRC</td>
<td>Karenni Refugee Committee</td>
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<td>Karen National Union</td>
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<td>KRC</td>
<td>Karen Refugee Committee</td>
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<td>KWO</td>
<td>Karen Women’s Organisation</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Protracted Refugee Situation</td>
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<td>RSD</td>
<td>Refugee Status Determination</td>
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<td>Royal Thai Government</td>
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<td>Thailand Burma Border Consortium</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>WEAVE</td>
<td>Women’s Education for Advancement and Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Zuid Oost Azie Refugee Care for the Netherlands</td>
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Executive Summary

One of six diverse studies examining durable solutions to the displaced persons (DP) situation along the Thai-Myanmar border, this study analyzes the role of donors, international organizations and non-government organizations (NGOs). It examines the rationale behind international intervention, funding policies and organizational mandates; implementation strategies and the dynamics of cooperation among stakeholders including the Royal Thai Government (RTG); as well as the operating environment and impacts of this for effective intervention. The issue of aid for the situation of DPs on the border coming from local sources is not explored under the Letter of Agreement between ARCM and UNDP. Findings will be applied to facilitate the design of an improved strategy to implement policy and to advocate for a change in policy towards sustainable and long-term solutions for the protracted displacement situation along the Thai-Myanmar border.

Qualitative and quantitative approaches are applied in this research. A field study was conducted from June 2010 to January 2011 using a combination of key informant interviews with donor and NGO staff and RTG officials, as well as focus group discussions and structured questionnaires with 444 shelter residents at three purposively selected temporary shelters: Tham Hin, Mae La and Ban Mai Nai Soi.

This protracted displacement situation of more than 25 years has its root causes in human rights violations due to internal conflict in Myanmar between ethnic minority groups and the Myanmar government which have been ongoing with no sign of peaceful, mutual agreement since 1984. This study identifies a series of issues in the interplay of various stakeholders and makes recommendations for improved cooperation as they attempt to find durable solutions to this displaced people situation.

Responsibility for DPs is not borne by a single body but shared among the RTG, donors and I/NGOs. These bodies work in differing capacities based on their own mandate, mission and policy, thus it is unsurprising to find differences in approach and practice. These differences are predominately based on stakeholders’ consideration of the current situation as an ‘emergency’ or otherwise and their resultant policy approach to serving immediate basic needs versus providing opportunities for self-reliance. These gaps sometimes hinder effective cooperation between stakeholders.

Restrictive RTG policy on DPs is premised upon temporary asylum and eventual repatriation. The focus on preventing new influxes and restriction of movement has increased DPs’ dependence on external assistance and limited opportunity for self-determination. The RTG should consider the current PRS and explore ways to adopt international law to support DPs’ self-reliance and provide suggestions or recommendations on the feasibility of project operations. The result of pre-screening pilot projects in four temporary shelters in 2009 should be disclosed soon to demonstrate public accountability. The Provincial Admissions Board (PAB) system should be reactivated as a priority to work more effectively in screening and determining DP status so that new asylum seekers can access protection and basic needs and services, including resettlement options in a timely manner.

There is also a gap in the donor–host government relationship that may affect cooperation to deliver durable solutions. There is a lack of effective communication among donor groups themselves, between donors and RTG, and donors and NGOs prohibiting
information sharing and coordination processes.

In some cases the long term provision of support with little or no progress has created a situation of donor fatigue. Donor aid policy has been gradually shifting towards ‘linking relief and development’ since 2007. The inability of donors to commit to multiyear funding and the realignment of policy from emergency aid to a developmental model yield many challenges. Some donor countries are still recovering from economic crisis and trends are revealing disaster response to be the priority of humanitarian assistance. All these factors may contribute to funding shortages and also affect food security for DPs in temporary shelters.

Most NGO program activities are also increasingly developmentally focused. Again, yearly funding prohibits long term development plans and the ability to fill specific funding gaps to provide opportunities for DP self-reliance. However, DPs are engaged in many aspects of shelter/project management. Pilot projects on vocational training and agriculture are underway in most shelters, though most are small scale and close monitoring and evaluation of these initiatives is necessary to ensure accountability and viability of expansion.

Donors should approach displacement holistically, in both the original and host countries and in both the emergency and development phases. Cross-border programs should work to support people in need internally in Myanmar and prevent the movement of new asylum seekers across the Thai-Myanmar border.

UNHCR and Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPST) have developed a 5-year strategic plan to provide direction to durable solutions for DPs. It is a selective strategy that tends to focus on local integration rather than a comprehensive package of solutions including resettlement, local integration and repatriation. Negotiation and dialogue to bring durable peace to Myanmar must be facilitated by the RTG through ASEAN and UNHCR through UNHCR exe-com and the United Nations General Assembly.

Agreement on policy direction must also be reached in relation to resettlement; whether to sustain or end the program if it is seen to create pull factors or brain-drain. If resettlement continues to be a viable and desired option, an implementation ‘action plan’ and ongoing advocacy with third countries are needed.

More channels for communication in an environment which fosters trust are necessary. UNHCR and CCSDPST should facilitate coordination, consultation and collaboration with donors and high level RTG representatives to obtain mutual agreement on development strategies for DPs, particularly the development of economic self-sufficiency which must be a common goal of all partners. Definition of strategies such as ‘local integration’ will improve understanding of the nature and extent of self-reliance and interventions. Moreover, the concepts of ‘responsibility sharing’ or ‘partnership principles’ may create a more positive working environment, in contrast to ‘burden sharing’ or ‘burden shifting’.

By drawing on themes raised by DPs and RTG, donor and I/NGO stakeholders in field research, this study provides practical and realistic recommendations for policy options to reach durable solution for DPs in temporary shelters along Thai-Myanmar border.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The current displacement of people from Myanmar to the Thai-Myanmar border began in 1984 when approximately 9,000 Karen Displaced Persons (DPs) seeking refuge in Tak province reported attacks from military government forces. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) invited the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), then working with Indochinese DPs in Thailand to provide emergency assistance to Karen DPs. It was expected that the situation would be temporary, however the DPs were unable to return to their country during the rainy season and attacks on Karen communities continued in the years that followed. This resulted in an ongoing flow of DPs into Thailand. As of December 2010, according to UNHCR there are an estimated 98,644 DPs in nine temporary shelters along the Thai-Myanmar border (TBBC, December 2010).

DPs living in the temporary shelters in Thailand are forced to subsist on external humanitarian assistance provided by NGOs and international donors. This continued reliance on external assistance has created a significant degree of aid-dependency for those living in the shelters. It has also raised the question among donors of how the current model of assistance can be made more sustainable and solutions-oriented. Alternative approaches that will provide displaced persons with greater opportunities for self-sufficiency/reliance and independence, such as increased educational and livelihood opportunities have been proposed and implemented as pilot projects. However, for the most part, these projects have yet to be scaled up to a level where they have made a significant impact.

There are at least three major actors who have an influential role in humanitarian actions toward the DPs from Myanmar along Thai-Myanmar border: the Royal Thai Government (RTG), donors and implementing organizations - International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). A number of INGOs and NGOs, including UNHCR, have been active partners with the Royal Thai Government (RTG). A number of INGOs, NGOs and members of the donor community have been active partners with the Royal Thai Government (RTG). Funding for each NGO is dependent on donor contributions. However, donor fatigue has increasingly become an issue, with some donors stating it will not be possible to continually increase support for DPs from Myanmar and others suggesting it is time to look for an ‘exit strategy’ (CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan 2207/8).

Although some donors have yet to confirm their funding intentions, the projected income for 2010 is 1,083 million baht, five percent lower than in 2009. This will result in a shortfall of 149 million baht for the year (TBBC, 2009). To respond to this challenge it is necessary to develop more comprehensive solutions by shifting from

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1 Generally INGO means non-profit, non-partisan organizations which have a main/head office abroad and a field office in Thailand. NGO refers to non-profit, non-partisan organizations which are locally based. However, in this study INGOs and NGOs refer to implementing agencies which provide services to DPs or the local community. INGO and NGO terms will be used interchangeably.
the current *care and maintenance* approach to a more *solution-oriented* approach. The comprehensive concerns of host countries and the limitations on their willingness to host DPs must also be taken into account (G. Loescher & J. Milner, 2007).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has subcontracted the Asian Research Centre for Migration (ARCM), hosted by the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University to implement the project entitled "*Sustainable solutions to the Displaced People situation along the Thai-Myanmar Border*". In close consultation with numerous UN organizations and a steering committee, the study is being carried out by six separate research teams with the goal of proposing a new approach to the Protracted DPs Situation (PRS) that has existed for 25 years along the Thai-Myanmar border. As one of the six teams, our subgroup is charged with the "*Analysis of donor, INGO/NGO and UN agency delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced people from Myanmar along the Thai-Myanmar border*". In particular, this study analyzes the role of donors, international organizations and non-government organizations, their policies and implementation of these over the years, and their relations with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and the agencies they support.

The outcome of the study is expected to serve as a basis for policy dialogue with decision makers and those in a position to influence them; to facilitate the design of an improved strategy to implement policy, to advocate for a change in policy towards sustainable and long-term solutions for the PRS along the Thai-Myanmar border - solutions that will be beneficial and agreeable both for the uprooted population as well as their host country. These groups comprise first of all the Thai government, in particular the MOI, as well as a number of line ministries whose functions and services are relevant in this context. The donor community, NGOs, international organizations and DPs committees will equally benefit from and be involved in this research. Networking consortiums such as the Thai-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) and the CCSDPT will also benefit greatly from this work.

### 1.2 Study Framework, Objectives, Research Questions

**Study Framework**

The figure below identifies the humanitarian actors working to develop sustainable, and ultimately durable solutions for DPs in the temporary shelters in Thailand.
The DPs situation in the temporary shelters in Thailand is quite unique in that the provision of humanitarian assistance is supervised by the RTG, implemented by NGOs, supported financially by donors and the UN, and motivated by the now protracted duration of encampment for the displaced. As the DPs have been living in the shelters for over two decades, the donors’ policies for supporting this model of assistance are currently being reconsidered. There is the possibility that some donors may discontinue or reduce their support for these DPs if progress towards a more sustainable and solutions-oriented model of aid is not achieved.

By undertaking an analysis of donor policies and motivations, as well as the interventions of NGOs and international organizations, this study will gather evidence that can be used to determine the extent to which current policies and strategies constitute a sustainable and solutions-oriented approach to the situation. These findings will provide the evidence base for the development of alternative policy options in the policy synthesis phase of this project.

**Goal:**

To provide an analysis of the roles, existing policies, and implementation processes behind the current rationale for intervention by donors, international organizations, NGOs and UN agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPs along the Thailand-Myanmar border through a community-based shelter management structure.
Research Objectives:

1. To analyze the current rationale behind the international intervention along the Thai-Myanmar border by different stakeholders.
2. To examine the historical role of donors, UN agencies, international and local non-government organizations providing humanitarian assistance to the DPs along the Thailand-Myanmar border.
3. To analyze the funding policies of donors, the specific mandate of each organization towards DPs, the project implementation strategies by different organizations and their cooperative strategies with the Royal Thai Government.
4. To identify the dynamics, needs and constraints of different stakeholders in engagement with the DPs.
5. To analyze the positive and negative impacts of existing intervention mechanisms, including gender related aspects.
6. To identify the limitations and constraints on effective intervention mechanisms that exist as a result of current RTG policies towards DPs.

Research Questions:

1. What is the nature and extent of current and future strategies of humanitarian aid agencies towards DPs in the temporary shelters along the Thai-Myanmar border? Are strategies the same as or different from the past? Why?
2. What are the current and future funding policy directions of donors? What strategies do stakeholders apply to work with the RTG?
3. What strategies or mechanisms will be combined or integrated to develop an intervention program for durable solutions for DPs? Do the donors, INGOs and NGOs have any plans to fund or implement the strategies further along the continuum from emergency response to sustainable development? If so, how?
4. What are the strengths, limitations and impacts of current intervention policies? What are the remaining challenges for effective intervention mechanisms?
5. What are the dynamics, needs and constraints of different stakeholders in engagement with the DPs?
6. What are the perceptions of humanitarian aid organizations regarding the DPs and their needs?

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Research Design

Qualitative and quantitative approaches are applied in this research. A combination of these methods was used in order to gain the perspective of all target audiences. The purpose of the quantitative research is to describe and explain the perceptions and needs of DPs for humanitarian aid. The purpose of qualitative research is to understand the policies, mandates and strategies defining the nature of humanitarian aid. Relevant archives and documents were reviewed, relating to the experience of other regions and that of donors, UN agencies, NGOs and host countries relating to protection and durable solutions for DPs.
1.3.2 Study Area and Study Population

Study Area

Three temporary shelters with a diversity of culture, ethnicity and population were purposively selected for this study – Tham Hin, Ban Mai Nai Soi and Mae La. Tham Hin is predominantly Karen ethnicity and forms the southernmost shelter in Thailand, located in Suan Phung District, Ratchaburi Province. It is the shelter with the most cramped living conditions. The vast majority of the population has likely limited experience with modern public transportation or other modern conveniences. Mae La Temporary Shelter is the largest shelter, located in Thasongyang district, Tak province. The area features clay earth and a stream. The majority of the population is Karen ethnicity whereas the shelter population in Ban Mai Nai Soi in Mae Hong Son province is majority Karenni. Detailed descriptions of the study areas are included in Appendix 1.

Study Population

Four main groups were recruited for this study - donor staff, international organization staff, RTG officials and DPs.

Donors

Although members of the donor group are the primary research target of this study, access to them was neither easy nor a given and it took time to schedule interviews depending on their availability and interest. The research team was persistent, sometimes sending three or four follow up emails before receiving a response from some donors. However, the majority of donors were helpful and offered suggestions or assistance in soliciting the participation of others. During the interviews themselves, the research team found all donor representatives to be friendly and willing to share information and opinions, even within the limited time available. The research team approached twelve donors for interview, of which nine participated. Of those that declined to participate, two had been declined funding for DPs from Myanmar in the shelters along the Thai-Myanmar border, while the third had expended funds for these DPs and were not available due to a heavy travel schedule during the three months of the interview period. As an observation, requesting responses through email is not easy or always appropriate for donors due to the sensitive nature of some issues. A total of twelve people representing donors participated in this study, most of them senior or high level officers directly responsible for the areas of DPs and cross border funding. Details of donor interviewees from October to December 2010 are included in Appendix 2.

Royal Thai Government (RTG)

Interviews with RTG officials were conducted in conjunction with the Study 2A team (asylum policy) so as to reduce the burden on each interviewee. The RTG study population comprised of senior, high or officer level representatives of the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Council, Office of the Prime Minister in Bangkok. District governors of the three targeted temporary shelters were also included in this study. Details of twelve RTG officials interviewed from two Ministries between June and September 2010 are included in Appendix 2.
INGOs and UN agencies

The third study population was recruited from relevant international NGOs and UN agencies from July to November 2010. The research team contacted NGOs directly to request their participation in this study, while meetings with UN agencies (UNHCR, IOM, WHO) were coordinated through the UNDP. All six NGOs contacted participated, including 16 staff in Bangkok, three Thai field staff, seven DP field workers and one network (CCSDPT). Of the four UN agencies contacted, five representatives of three agencies participated. The fourth indicated that his organization does not operate in Thailand. Details of the INGOs and UN agencies interviewees are included in Appendix 2.

Displaced Persons

The research team requested that the camp committee and leaders publicly announce information regarding this study and invite DPs from all living zones to participate. The survey respondents were recruited on the basis of certain inclusion criteria: age 18+ years old, residing in shelter at least one year, informed consent, willing and voluntary participation to answer the questionnaire and matched to reflect the gender and ethnicity balance and registration status within the shelters.

1.4 Data Collection and Tools

1.4.1 Administration and Coordination

The Asian Research Centre for Migration (ARCM) team was responsible for the policy study as well as the overall coordination of the six studies. The ARCM team led the preparation of the approach paper and coordination with the UNDP and the Project Advisory Committee; contacted MOI for permission to access temporary shelters and conduct the study; contacted international consultants for advice, feedback and consultative workshops as well as carrying out other coordinating functions.

ARCM invited representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Army Department of Border Affairs to be members of the advisory committee as the study addresses the RTG asylum policy and the role of various offices in charge of DPs affairs.

In addition, the chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and two academics from Chulalongkorn University (including Professor Vithit Muntarbhorn) joined the committee. This committee provided advice to the research teams on the direction of the study as well as on policy options. Quarterly meetings of the committee were conducted.

1.4.2 Research team

A data collection and a research team contributed to this study. The data collection team was responsible for fieldwork: the baseline survey, FGD, IDI, KII. The research team was responsible for data analysis and report writing. It should be noted that each member of the research team also participated in fieldwork and data collection. The team leader is knowledgeable in this field and has extensive experience
in working with DPs populations in temporary shelters.

1.4.3 Data Collection

The data collection tools used this study were designed in accordance with quantitative and qualitative research methods as table 1.3.

Table 1.1: Research methods and tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Target group</th>
<th>Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Survey</td>
<td>DPs in 3 selected shelters</td>
<td>Face to face interview, using structured questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Tham Hin, Mae La, Mae Hong Son)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>DPs in 3 selected shelters</td>
<td>Face to face interview, using interview guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDI</td>
<td>DPs in 3 selected shelters</td>
<td>Face to face interview, using interview guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Donor, UN agencies, INGOs</td>
<td>Face to face interview, using interview guide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Collection for Baseline Survey

This project forms one of six parts within the "Sustainable solutions to the Displaced People situation along the Thai-Myanmar Border” study. As mentioned previously, all six project subsections worked together to conduct the questionnaires so as to reduce the burden on interviewees by limiting content and time needed for each interview. Two teams were formed for field data collection. Team A comprised of the subsection studies on the labour market, social welfare, and environment. Team B comprised of RTG policy, role of donor, international organizations, NGOs and UN agencies and resettlement groups. Each questionnaire took approximately 30-40 minutes per DP interviewee; a reasonable length of time. The teams visited the shelters using different questionnaires (see Team B questionnaire in Appendix 4). A gift (canned fish or a rain-coat) was given to all respondents as a token of appreciation for their cooperation.

In order to specify the samplings size, each team applied Taro Yamane formula as followed

\[
n = \frac{N}{1 + e^2 N}
\]

Where

- \(N\) = Element of population, in this study was 145,786.
- \(e\) = Error of sampling, in this study was 5% or 0.05 proportion.
- \(n\) = sample size

\[
n = \frac{145,786}{1 + 145,786 (0.05)^2}
\]

Substitution for this formula: = 400 DPs for each team
Therefore, the two teams collected information from 800 DPs. A total sampling of 800 respondents from the three temporary shelters were randomly selected to answer the questionnaire. (See Table below for breakdown and locations). The sampling herein covered all variations in terms of gender, ethnicity, legal status within the shelter (registered, non-registered, others), resettlement intentions and status, and age group.

Table 1.2: Sampling Site by Location and Research Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporary Shelters</th>
<th>Team A</th>
<th>Team B</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tham Hin</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Mai Nai Soi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae La</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>400</strong></td>
<td><strong>400</strong></td>
<td><strong>800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Team B initially planned a total sampling of 400 respondents from the three temporary shelters, though this was inflated to an actual number of 444 respondents to prevent incomplete responses. However, it was found that all interview questionnaires could be used for data analysis. All respondents were randomly selected to answer the questionnaire (see Table 5 below for breakdown and locations). The sample covered all variations in terms of gender, ethnicity, legal status within the shelter (registered, non-registered, other), resettlement intentions and status, and age group.

Table 1.3: Sampling Site by Location of team B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporary Shelters</th>
<th>Initial plan</th>
<th>Actual number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tham Hin</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae La</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Mai Nai Soi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>400</strong></td>
<td><strong>444</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Team A and Team B consulted each other continuously during data collection. We also shared preliminary findings and discussed issues as they occurred in the field. Such close management of communications ensured that beneficiaries were not confused or overwhelmed by the visits of the research teams.

The quantitative study took the form of a baseline survey, based on three week-long research trips to interview 444 DPs between July and September 2010. The survey used a face-to-face interview structured questionnaire in three targeted temporary shelters. The baseline survey questionnaire consolidated the questions of the two other research teams (asylum policy and resettlement) in order to prevent interviewee fatigue and solicit further cooperation. The questionnaire consisted of four parts: demographic data, RTG policy, perceptions on the role of donors, IINGOs, UN, and the RTG, and finally, resettlement. The interview procedure was guided by ethical concerns (informed consent, voluntary participation and confidentiality).

**DP Respondent Characteristics**

As mentioned above, 444 DP respondents in three targeted temporary shelters were recruited in this study. Females made up 55.4% of all respondents. Mae La shelter hosts half of all respondents, with a further 25% living in both Tham Hin and Ban Mai.
Nai Soi. The majority of respondents (68%) are aged 25-59 years and 70% are married. Only half of respondents are registered as DPs. Karen (S’gaw) is the largest ethnic group (48%) among respondents. Many (41%) have lived in the shelters between 11-20 years. Half of them are Christian and 31% are Buddhist. Some 75% of respondents were literate and of these, 68% had graduated studies in Myanmar rather than within the temporary shelter. Of the literate respondents who had graduated from Myanmar, 50.7% reached middle school level. Around half (51.4%) of the respondents reported the current number of people in their household to be 5-8 persons. Only 52% of respondents are employed and 48.1% earn between 501-1,500 baht per month. In 37.4% of interviews Thai-Karen language was used. More detailed demographic results are included in Appendix 3.

Qualitative Method

Apart from the baseline survey, focus group discussions (FGD) and in-depth interviews (IDI) were also conducted according to the same interview guide with some DPs in the three targeted temporary shelters. It was planned that key informant interviews (KII) would take place from July to September 2010 with donors, UN agencies, NGOs and relevant RTG agencies.

Key informants (KI) were purposively selected based on their knowledge or experience in work related to DPs, or those who provide services to DPs, and their willingness to share their opinions, knowledge and experiences. KI comprised of the following: donor government staff, UN staff, INGOs staff, DPs who serve as INGO field workers and residents of temporary shelters. Individual interview and group interviews used a semi-structured interview guideline and structured questionnaires were used in the baseline survey to obtain the required information from temporary shelter residents. The qualitative study consumed more time than expected due to the limited availability of interviewees, taking seven months from June 2010 to January 2011.

A total of 16 FGDs were conducted with 80 DPs: 40 female and 40 male in three selected temporary shelters from July to September 2010. IDIs were also conducted with 18 DPs: 9 female and 9 male in the three targeted temporary shelters (refer to Appendix 2 for further detail).

1.5 Data Analysis

Quantitative data from the baseline survey conducted by the RTG policy team, the donor, INGO and UN agency team and the resettlement team were analyzed together using the SPSS program. Data were stratified by gender to see how various situations in the temporary shelters, such as an assessment of needs for self-sufficiency, cover both women and men adequately and equally.

Qualitative data from interviews and focus groups were analyzed by using the content analysis technique, and then integrated into the quantitative data to give more depth to understanding of the various impacts on DPs people, policy formulation processes and influencing factors, and possibilities for policy shift given the evidence revealed by the study. The baseline survey also includes policy recommendations, based
on the responses of all beneficiaries.

1.6 Ethical Considerations

The study identifies DPs as the major stakeholders. Data collected in this sample will be kept confidential and anonymous in accordance with Chulalongkorn University Ethical Guidelines for Research on Vulnerable Groups. These guidelines focus on the principles of respect for person, beneficence (minimizing harm) and justice.

The same principles are applied to other target groups, including key informants inside and outside of the holding centres, officials from the Thai government, members of NGOs, the UN and the embassies. The research team is aware of the sensitivities in the perceptions and criticism of various stakeholders on RTG asylum policy in Thailand. Researchers thus ensure that different opinions will not put informants into conflicting or dangerous situations during or after the study. ‘Informed consent’ and ‘confidentiality’ concerns have been discussed as a priority with all participants.

In terms of displaced persons’ expectations, the study did not mislead them into thinking that it can provide them with new status or a new future through the study’s findings and recommendations. The objectives and the outcomes of the study were clarified with the DPs during the data collection period.

1.7 Study limitations

There are several factors which served as obstacles throughout the various stages this study.

1. Time constraints and the study dimension agreement: ARCM, together with the six study research teams and the UNDP, committed time to seeking common agreement on the direction of this research only after the six studies had commenced work. This process took almost two months and resulted in initial uncertainty and hesitation among the team on how best to proceed. This led to a delay in the study and also affected the time available for the study process, including management. A study period of only six months was restrictive for the conduct of both quantitative and qualitative research. As such, time constraints affected the data collecting process and consequently, some important data was not captured. Considerable time was required to complete data collection in each temporary shelter and with all stakeholders. The tight schedule also limited opportunities to cross check information gathered from shelters, RTG, donors and INGO staff.

2. Limited availability of interviewees: The qualitative study consumed more time than expected due to the unavailability of interviewees and their busy schedules. It therefore took 7 months, from June 2010 to January 2011, to complete the qualitative interviews and this also affected the timeline for data analysis.

3. Cooperation from research targets: Significant components of the data collected from stakeholders (donors, INGOs and the RTG) were found to be confidential; funding figures and financial and meeting reports, for example. Although many...
stakeholders were open to sharing this confidential information with the research team, this meant it was ultimately necessary to analyze and interpret this data at a general, overview level only.

4. Confidentiality: The perforce analysis relies on data shared voluntarily by interviewees and cannot identify donors individually, in accordance with the study’s respect of confidentiality guidelines for key informants.

5. Language barriers: Most of the DP interviews were conducted in their own native language e.g. Karen, Karenni or Burmese, thus it was necessary for the research team to employ the services of an interpreter. Although the interpreters were of a very high skill level and measures were taken to overcome language barriers, some bias may have been introduced by the presence of foreigners (whether Thai or expatriate) in the temporary shelters.

6. Staff turnover: Considerable turnover among key informants and respondents inevitably results in a loss in institutional memory, making it at times difficult to gather information.

7. Sample selection: Selection of temporary shelter respondents was based on a convenience sample of who was available and may have been biased against those who are more active. This may affect the quality of the data.
Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Historical Role of Stakeholders Providing Humanitarian Assistance to the DPs

In response to the first Karen crossing the border in 1984, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) invited international non-governmental organizations (INGO) working with displaced persons\(^1\) in Thailand to provide emergency assistance to those fleeing the fighting. It was expected that the situation would be temporary, but attacks on Karen communities by the Myanmar army did not stop, resulting in continued flows of displaced persons fleeing into Thailand (Thailand Burma Border Consortium [TBBC], 2009). Over the decades, more and more displaced persons have crossed the border and the fighting has now escalated into ‘one of the longest running civil wars in modern history’ (Department for International Development [DFID], 2008).

Despite the fact that minimum basic needs are provided to displaced people in the shelters, they live in conditions of hardship. They have no access to telephones and limited access to information. With shelters heavily protected, displaced people are not allowed to go outside shelters to work and can be subject to detention or deportation by Thai authorities. They have become dependent on assistance from humanitarian aid agencies, often resulting in the loss of their sense of self-esteem and dignity, the chance to solve their own problems, to defend their rights and to become self-reliant. This also increases the likelihood of their becoming an economic and social burden for the host nation and related stakeholders, as many displaced people end up living in these shelters for many years.

Current distributions of humanitarian aid tend not to be allocated impartially, but rather are concentrated on the visible emergencies in which Western donors play a prominent military and political role. For example, between 1996 and 1999, the top five recipients of bilateral humanitarian aid were all political hotspots: Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro (the former Yugoslavia), Iraq and Israel, which together accounted for £2,725 million (Macrae et al., 2002; Macrae, Harmer, Darcy & Hofmann, 2004). In 1990-2000, official humanitarian aid flows doubled from $2.1 billion to $5.9 billion. Bilateral donations from donors, aid given by one country directly to another, accounted for over 90% of official humanitarian aid spending. This trend is continuously moving away from multilateral methods of disbursing assistance in favor of bilateral channels, a trend that is highly criticized in term of effectiveness. Multilateral aid refers only to funds that are not earmarked aid, and is channeled through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank. In public finance, an earmark is a requirement that all or a portion of a certain source of revenue, such as a particular tax, is devoted to a specific public expenditure (Earmark-finance, n.d).

\(^1\) Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees or to the 1967 protocol that classifies these displaced people as ‘illegal immigrants’. Thailand has however provided protection to this population and designated them as ‘displaced persons’. For the purposes of this document, the terms ‘Displaced persons’ and ‘temporary shelter’ will be preferred to the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘camp’, respectively. The document occasionally uses the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘temporary shelter’ when directly quoting the literature.
The balance between bilateral and multilateral channels for aid has changed over the years, with the trend now pointing towards the ‘bilateralization’ of multilateral aid. Donor countries began to use multilateral institutions in the mid-1980s to manage their own bilateral aid programs, primarily by establishing trust funds and co-financing projects. This has reduced the amount of ‘core’ resources available to multilateral institutions, increased the proportion of ‘non-core’ resources provided by donor countries for specific purposes, and led to hidden subsidies, as donors rarely pay the full administrative costs associated with the use of non-core resources (Sagasti, 2005).

All other aid, including earmarked assistance to the UN, NGOs and funds spent by governments themselves, is technically bilateral aid. Most of the funds supporting the UNHCR are earmarked, with the exception of Northern European donor countries. This places UN agencies in a difficult position, struggling between accountability and protection of universal human rights.

Humanitarian aid decision making is becoming more complex and sensitive and the framework for measuring donor performance is weak, affecting the accountability and the trust necessary for positive relations between donors and their partners (Macrae et al., 2002; Macrae, Harmer, Darcy & Hofmann, 2004). Indeed, humanitarian aid should be impartial and neutral, while humanitarian donors need to be accountable. But while there has been much talk of ‘accountability’ over the last decade, the role of official donors in the humanitarian arena has attracted little examination. There has been also little discussion as to what constitutes a good humanitarian donor. A critical analysis of humanitarian aid, though, has been put under trial to test the real effectiveness of aid and the “lack of accountability”. Indeed, the years 2004-2005 constituted a window of change in the international aid ‘architecture’, as the United Nations Special Assembly began to assess the progress of the Millennium Development Goals. In March 2005 the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was signed.

The need for humanitarian aid has increased over the last few years due to a combination of factors: a rise in the number of refugees and displaced persons due to (protracted) conflicts; a rise in the number of natural disasters attributable to climate change and the impact of the most recent economic crisis (European Commission, Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010). After several decades of housing the displaced persons from Myanmar in these ‘temporary shelters’, a different type of response and assistance is now required. Donors tend to agree that it is imperative to move from relief and providing handouts, to a more long-term and sustainable solution, which includes livelihood alternatives. This transition is particularly important because the displaced populations have become totally dependent on aid after nearly three decades. (European Commission, Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010).

2.2 Temporary Shelter-based Stakeholders and Services

Aside from the displaced persons (DPs) themselves, donors, INGOs, NGOs and UN agencies are the major stakeholders in the Thai-Myanmar displaced persons situation. The MOI is responsible for the overall governance of the shelters while the humanitarian aid agencies, most organized through the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) and joined by UNHCR, each play
a specific and collaborative role advocating and supporting basic services and humanitarian needs, to what UNHCR describes as ‘one of the most protracted refugees situations’ (United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR], 2010) (See Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: MOI & CCSDPT/UNHCR Coordination Structure (CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan 2007/8, 2007).

### Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT)

The CCSDPT was established in 1975 as a communications network for INGOs who met on a regular monthly basis to exchange information and discuss their work. CCSDPT coordinated their efforts and assisted in representing the members’ interests to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) through the MOI. There are other NGOs in the shelters who are not part of CCSDPT, though the committee acts as the main forum for NGOs to communicate and coordinate with the RTG through the MOI. Currently there
are 20 member NGOs (Table 2.1), implementing 29 projects within the CCSDPT (Table 10), who provide humanitarian services to address the needs of the population.

**Table 2.1: CCSDPT Members** (CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan 2007/8, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADRA</th>
<th>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</th>
<th>NCA</th>
<th>Norwegian Church Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMI</td>
<td>Aide Medical International</td>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Ruammit Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
<td>RTP</td>
<td>Right To Play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COERR</td>
<td>Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees</td>
<td>Sol</td>
<td>Solidarites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td>SVA</td>
<td>Shanti Volunteer Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS-ASIA</td>
<td>International Child Support – Asia</td>
<td>TOPS</td>
<td>Taipei Overseas Peace Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>TBBC</td>
<td>Thailand Burma Border Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Jesuit Refugee Service</td>
<td>WEAVE</td>
<td>Women’s Education for Advancement and Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Malteser International</td>
<td>WE/C</td>
<td>World Education/Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF-F</td>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontiere-France</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2: CCSDPT Projects in the Temporary Shelters** (CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan 2007/8, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Implementing Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Prevention Project</td>
<td>IRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of Basic protection training</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV Prevalence Survey</td>
<td>IRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting the Rule of Law in the Shelters</td>
<td>Burma Lawyer’s Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addiction Programme for Karenni Shelters</td>
<td>RF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of new Addiction Workers</td>
<td>RF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border-wide Training of Medics</td>
<td>IRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Mental Health intervention</td>
<td>ARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness raising on Mental Health disorders</td>
<td>AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Generation and Relapse Prevention</td>
<td>RF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child and Adolescent Health (Umpiem, Nu Po and BDY)</td>
<td>ARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Messenger Child Magazine</td>
<td>AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSDPT Health Information Systems Programme</td>
<td>CCSDPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Compensation for Teachers in the Shelters</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Building Construction</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of School Supplies</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials for School Buildings</td>
<td>ICS-ASIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWO Nursery Schools - MRML Shelter</td>
<td>Karen Women’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Implementing Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of School Libraries</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care and Education for Disabled Shelter Youth and Children</td>
<td>Karen Women’s Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Post-10 Education</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Support to Livelihoods Programme</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Enterprise Development</td>
<td>ARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Application of Appropriate Technology</td>
<td>UNHCR/ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen demand-driven Skills Development</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Activities inside Shelters</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Agricultural sites for Income Generation beside the Temporary Shelters</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Self-reliance of Disabled Displaced Persons</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waged Employment Service</td>
<td>UNHCR/ILO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2.2 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC)

Under the CCSDPT umbrella, TBBC works in cooperation with the RTG and in accordance with regulations of the Ministry of Interior. TBBC has the largest program mandate of all the CCSDPT member organizations and is itself a consortium of twelve stakeholders working to provide food, shelter, non-food items and capacity-building support to Myanmar displaced persons inside the shelters. Established formally in 1996, the head office is in Bangkok with field offices in Mae Sot and Mae Sariang, Mae Hong Son and Sangklaburi, with a sub-office in Chiang Mai for displacement research (TBBC, 2009).

The five core objectives of the TBBC for 2009-2013 are:
- Pursue change leading to durable solutions while ensuring a protective environment for displaced people of Burma.
- Increase self-reliance and reduce aid dependency by promoting and supporting livelihood opportunities.
- Ensure continued access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter and non-food items, prioritizing support for the most vulnerable.
- Support mutually accountable community-based management which ensures equity, diversity and gender balance.
- Develop TBBC organizational structure and resources to anticipate and respond to changes, challenges and opportunities.

TBBC’s programs are implemented through partnerships with camp committees, community-based organizations and local groups employing a community-based management system that is in line with international humanitarian best practice. Shelter residents take an active role in daily operations and provision of basic services, lead by the Community Elders Advisory Boards (CEAB), providing overall guidance and advice on internal matters, and the Refugee Committees (shelter coordination) and Camp Committees (CC) (operational body) as the primary representatives of the shelter population. These committees liaise with the MOI, UNHCR, CCSDPT and other relevant stakeholders (Loescher & Milner, 2006) Through this model they deliver
timely, quality services to the shelter populations to maximize their participation in all program matters (TBBG, 2009).

### 2.2.3 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

The UNHCR is the only global organization with a specific mandate to ensure the protection of displaced people and to find solutions to their plight. It pursues its mandate linking with a wide range of other actors like donors, governments hosting displaced populations, other UN agencies and NGOs. UNHCR is dependent on voluntary contributions from donor states, along with these states’ interests and priorities, which play a significant role in the work and evolution of the agency. UNHCR is responsible for the monitoring and protection mandates of their populations through coordination, representation to the RTG and protection of asylum seekers (Department for International Development, 2008).

UNHCR Thailand became operational in 1998 and currently has three field offices in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sot and Kanchanaburi that coordinate and act through key shelter partners.

Principally the UNHCR will (UNHCR, 2010):

- Consolidate protection activities through improvement of national screening mechanism for asylum seekers. These activities will be enhanced through advocacy and intervention with key authorities and partners.
- To continually engage in policy discussion with the RTG, donors and relevant actors aimed at finding durable solutions and increasing the protection space. In the absence of a national mechanism to process the claims of non-Myanmar asylum seekers, UNHCR will continue to register and conduct displaced person status determinations for urban asylum seekers, with the exception of those from Myanmar, for whom a shelter-based, Government-led procedure is in place.
- UNHCR will continue to engage relevant actors, including governments and donors, in discussions to support policy changes.
- The Office will also monitor the rights and wellbeing of people of concern, intervening with the national authorities on their behalf and striving to meet their basic needs, including medical care and educational support.
- UNHCR will continue its advocacy efforts aimed at sensitizing the Government to statelessness issues and will explore joint programming opportunities with other UN agencies.

### 2.3 Funding Policy and Use of Funds

Providing humanitarian aid to displaced people of Myanmar should not be seen only as emergency relief and assistance as the need for aid has persisted for years. The displaced people are now so dependent on external assistance that any sudden decision to reduce aid or stop it altogether would only exacerbate their situation. Within the temporary shelters it is clear that the risks of pulling out altogether are high enough to warrant donors’ continued involvement. Present overall levels of funding for the shelters allow for the provision of adequate levels of food, shelter, health and education, barring shocks such as the recent sharp rise in rice prices.
The rationale behind donor provision of funds is not easy to analyze or judge. Based on available information, the following section will discuss the funding policies of the European Union, United States and United Kingdom, and the use of those funds by shelter implementers.

2.3.1 International Level

The European Union (EU)

The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 27 member states. It was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 upon the foundations of the European Communities. The EU traces its origins from the European Coal and Steel Community formed among six countries in 1951 and the Treaty of Rome formed in 1957 by the same states. Since then, it has grown in size and in power through the addition of policy areas. The last amendment to the constitution of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty, came into force in 2009 by virtue of which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was elevated to legally binding status. The process of European cooperation began shortly after the Second World War in order to prevent any future war, as several European leaders became convinced that lasting peace could only be secured through economic and political integration (European Union. The History of the EU Formation, n.d).

The EU is one of the world’s biggest donors of humanitarian aid, based on the humanitarian principles of: Humanity, Impartiality, Independence and Neutrality, and promoting the respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), a set of rules which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict on civilians, humanitarian issues, human rights and refugees. The European Commission's humanitarian assistance, through the European Commission Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO), alone represents between 30-40% of the total EU humanitarian funding, reflecting the European Union's solidarity with the victims of natural and man-made disasters. ECHO is the European Commission's department for overseas humanitarian aid from the EU to developing countries (European Union, n.d).

In 2009 funding was distributed among ECHO’s partners as follows: NGOS 47%, UN agencies 39% and international organizations 14% (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010). It implements its mission by funding community humanitarian action through NGOs and international organization partners who agree to sign the Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA), such as the Red Cross family or the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) for UN agencies, mainly UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP (European Commission, 2007). ECHO assistance aims at facilitating, together with other aid instruments, the return of populations to self-sufficiency wherever and whenever possible, and to permit the phasing out of ECHO funding if conditions are favorable. In this perspective, ECHO is actively engaged in implementing a linkage strategy between relief, rehabilitation and development “LRRD”, and in developing stronger cooperation with other Commission services or donors (European Commission, 2007).

In 2001, the Commission undertook a wide-ranging internal and external consultation which is discussed in a communication entitled "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)”, also known as the ‘grey zone’, to fill the gap
that exists between relief or humanitarian aid (short-term) and development aid (long-term), with the priority of LRRD being a desire to improve the coordination of international efforts. The results of the consultative process provided a broad view of the problems involved in assisting those in need, taking account the various types of crises, other international actors and the risk of structural dependence. By focusing on the interdependence of the two policies, the Commission emphasized that better development could reduce the need for relief, that better relief could contribute to development and that the transition between the two is facilitated by rehabilitation (EUROPA, n.d).

As the international context in which humanitarian aid takes place began to change and the EU's aid was being criticized for being inefficient, mis-targeted and linked to economic objectives, the three EU institutions (European Parliament, Council and Commission) signed the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid in December 2007, recognizing the increasingly challenging environment for humanitarian response and driving forward a more efficient and coordinated approach. This consensus was followed up in 2008 by an Action Plan representing the concrete and operational translation of the numerous political commitments contained in the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (European Commission, 2007). The principle of "one instrument per policy area" established by the Commission's communication to improve the efficiency of Community action, together with the Commission's communication on the financial perspectives 2007-2013, transferred the responsibility for the management of humanitarian food aid from DG AIDCO to DG ECHO with effect from 1 January, 2007 (European Commission, 2007).

The European community is unique in clearly differentiating humanitarian aid from other forms of external assistance. ECHO is the only publicly financed department in the world solely devoted to funding the delivery of humanitarian aid. Through ECHO, the European Commission spends on average €640 million per year on humanitarian aid (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, n.d).

Since 1995 the European Commission, through ECHO, has been one of the major donors assisting more than 130,000 people living in the shelters on the Thai-Myanmar border. Since the beginning of the crisis ECHO has provided some €95 million in humanitarian aid to these displaced people (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010). All the shelters are dependent on large-scale funding by international donors. In 2010 alone, ECHO provided €8 million to help cover the basic needs of the displaced population for food aid, health assistance, clean water and sanitation in six out of the nine temporary shelters, bringing the total EU funding since 1995 to over €140 million (Eick, n.d). The funding is channeled through a number of INGOs such as ICCO, AMI and Malteser, in addition to the International Red Cross (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010).

**Assistance to Uprooted People (AUP)**

Providing support for uprooted people in post-crisis situations and fragile states is a priority for European Commission regional programming. The priority is to bridge short-term humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance by providing funds to help improve the living conditions of displaced people, and to facilitate their re-
integration into their home country or their integration elsewhere. The beneficiaries also include host communities in the resettlement areas. The aim of this program is to (1) ensure the link between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in crises involving uprooted people; (2) to find durable solutions; (3) promote Peace-Building and Reconciliation; (4) protect of uprooted people and (5) address the needs of demobilized former combatants and child soldiers (European Commission, Multi-annual Indicative Programme for Asia 2007-2010). Cooperation in this area is intended to assist refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees as well as demobilized former soldiers and other combatants, including child soldiers, to return to and settle in their country of origin or in a third country. The objective is to reintegrate them into the socioeconomic fabric of the relevant country and to provide support to local communities and resettlement areas that are hosts to such integration. A regional approach is justified because, in many cases, crises involve several countries (e.g. the Myanmar crisis covers Myanmar, Thailand and Bangladesh).

Aid to uprooted people links relief, rehabilitation and development, aiming to fill the gap between emergency relief for refugees and longer term development operations. Activities will therefore be closely coordinated with operations carried out by the Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission, ECHO, and with those carried out in the context of country programs. As crises involving uprooted people are often highly political, it will be necessary to ensure strong links with the activities carried out at bilateral level. In implementing the uprooted people program, the EC will thus try, whenever possible, to work with local partners, in order to progressively build up local partnership and development capacity. (EUROPEAN Commission Regional Programming for ASIA Strategy Document 2007-2013)

This change of funding strategy change took effect in 2007 and earmarked €112 million to be spent over the four years between 2007 and 2010. The EU-Asia Regional Strategy Paper for 2007 to 2013 continues to present support to uprooted people as a key funding area. Implementation will occur mainly through calls for proposals for each of the uprooted people crises, as well as in some cases direct agreements with certain organizations. UNHCR is likely to remain the EC’s main partner in the implementation of operations to aid uprooted people (given their mandate for the protection of refugees and displaced persons and advocacy activities).

Aid will support existing as well as new crisis profiles. There is a need to ensure the continuum of assistance in countries still greatly affected by uprooted people issues. Especially in protracted refugee situations (PRS), support will aim at promoting the search for long term solutions. Whenever possible in the prevailing political environment, the focus will be on fostering medium and long term activities aimed at the self-sufficiency and integration or reintegration of uprooted people, ensuring that an integrated and consistent approach between humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development cooperation is pursued. (EUROPEAN Commission, Multi-annual Indicative Programme for Asia 2007-2010)
The United States has been the most generous donor for decades. The U.S. government provides assistance to refugees through the Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). PRM has primary responsibility within the U.S. Government for formulating policies on population, refugees, and migration, and for administering U.S. refugee assistance and admissions programs. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration programmed over $1.7 billion in support of humanitarian activities (US Department of State. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, n.d). Its mission is to provide protection, life-sustaining relief, and durable solutions for refugees and conflict victims, working through the multilateral humanitarian system to achieve the best results for refugees and conflict victims.

The Bureau does not operate refugee camps, or otherwise give aid directly to refugees. There primary activities support the efforts of key multilateral humanitarian organizations including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In fact roughly 90% of Bureau-managed funds are allocated to international organizations (US Department of State. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, n.d). The Bureau collaborates closely with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and funds NGO programs that are coordinated with the multilateral system and help fill critical gaps (US Department of State. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 2009).

The U.S. government through the Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration programmed over $37 million in East Asia, a portion of which was used to assist refugees, returnees, and other conflict victims in Southeast Asia. Of this total, $24.2 million was contributed to the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Over $12.5 million was provided to NGOs and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for assistance to the displaced persons (US Department of State. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 2010).

NGOs that receive money from the Bureau are obligated to align with the Bureau's mission to provide protection and life-sustaining relief (such as food, water, sanitation, education and medical care) to refugees and victims of conflict (US Department of State. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, n.d).

**United Kingdom (UK)**

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government agency responsible for promoting development and reducing poverty overseas (DFID, 2007). DFID funds work with both internally displaced persons (DPs) in Myanmar and refugees in Thailand. The UK provides assistance to Myanmar in line with the EU Common Position, which states that non-humanitarian aid or development aid should be suspended, with exceptions made for: human rights, democracy, good governance, conflict prevention and building the capacity of civil society; health and education, poverty alleviation and in particular the provision of basic needs and livelihoods for the poorest and most vulnerable populations; environmental protection, and in particular programs addressing the problem of non-sustainable, excessive logging resulting in deforestation (Council of the European Union, 2006).
In 2007, DFID supported displaced people with a grant to TBBC of £1.8 million over three years, via Christian Aid. The UK contributes around the same amount again as its share of European Union (EU) funding to TBBC. Following an internal review in 2007, DFID announced that it was removing the restriction on the use of funds for assistance to displaced people, so that they can be used for either cross-border or assistance for the displaced, as need and funding dictates. Having a three-year, rather than an annual, funding agreement is seen by Christian Aid as a positive step because it adheres to Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative principles of predictable and accountable financing. Channeling DFID funding through this organization saved TBBC, a small organization with 14-15 bilateral donors, valuable time according to Christian Aid officials. No major donors fund TBBC directly; for instance, the European Commission funds through the Dutch agency ICCO and other NGO members of the consortium. Although this is the status quo, funding indirectly through a third party has proved problematic with oversight and engagement problems by DFID. To alleviate these issues the parliamentary commission believes that funding TBBC directly might improve communication and encourage stronger engagement on DFID's behalf. Facilitation of this approach was made easier as TBBC was registered as a UK charity in 2005, which would allow for a more straightforward manner in which to receive direct funding (Five DFID’s Assistance to Burmese Refugees on the Thai-Burma Border, n.d)

DFID funding to TBBC has increased annually over the past few years, from £535,000 in 2005 to £611,050 in 2006 to £672,155 in 2007. This represents about 4% of TBBC total budget.

2.3.2 National Level and Use of Funds

In 2007/8 the 20 CCSDPT member agencies and UNHCR shared their current budgetary expectations. In total CCSDPT/ UNHCR expected to raise and spend THB 2,082 million on services in 2007 (USD 59 million, EUR 45 million), plus an additional THB 237 million on resettlement processing (OPE and UNHCR, USD 7 million, EUR 5 million).

The overall planned expenditures for 2008 and 2009 were at a very similar levels to 2007, with an exception for increases in priority areas such as education and skills training/ income generation (CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan 2007/8, 2007). The table below provides an illustration from the combined CCSDPT/UNHCR statement, in their biannual TBBC report for 2009 (TBBC, 2009).
Table 2.3 Combined CCSDPT/UNHCR budget statement 2007-2009 (million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2007 THB</th>
<th>% 2007</th>
<th>2008 THB</th>
<th>% 2008</th>
<th>2009 THB</th>
<th>% 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Management</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, shelter, non-food</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Infrastructure</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, sanitation</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills training, inc gen</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Thai community support</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Thai authority support</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,032</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,892</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,942</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement processing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,269</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,128</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,256</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

- Some agencies did not separately identify administration costs and these are included in the service sectors.
- In addition to services provided direct to host communities, many local Thai villagers use health and education facilities in the camps.
- Allocations to community services, camp management, administration and Thai support are not consistent for some agencies between years.

Some 15 governments fund the services provided to displaced persons in Thailand, plus the European Union. Bilateral government grants account for 72% of the total service expenditures. UNHCR expends an additional THB 187 million of its own funds and UNICEF supports the NGOs with THB 15 million, bringing the total contribution by Governments/UN to THB 1,704 or 82% of all expenditures for 2007/8. The European Union (22%) and the United States (20%) are the largest sources of funding. Resettlement processing (OPE and UNHCR) will account for another THB 237 million in 2007, supported by USA and UNHCR funds.

Governments tend to channel their resources to particular service sectors, although there is an awareness of what others are doing, all grants are negotiated bilaterally and there is no coordination mechanism or overall funding strategy shared by governments. Whilst Governments/UN provide the vast majority of funding for displaced persons from Myanmar in Thailand, a significant amount, THB 377 million (18% of total funds), come from other sources such as individual donations, NGO own fund-raising, churches, charities and businesses in the private sector.

**Funding Specifics for UNHCR**

The Executive Committee (ExCom) of the UNHCR consists of 72 member
states meeting annually to decide the budget and projects needing funds. Countries in need of funding for refugees submit for proposals, from which the biggest donor nations decide where and who will get support according to their differing political agendas.

The agency depends almost exclusively on voluntary contributions to carry out its programs. Each year the ExCom makes its appeal in December and donors commit to fund activities. As the process is year by year, this makes multiyear planning very difficult as UNHCR cannot predict from year to year what funds it will have available. As such, engagement in areas that require multiyear commitments, such as development and rehabilitation for returning refugee populations, are very difficult (Loescher & Milner, 2006; UNHCR, 2007).

Funds come from a limited range of donors, with three quarters of the total amount coming from the United States (30%), European Commission, followed by Japan, Sweden, Spain, Germany, Denmark, United Kingdom, Norway and Netherlands. The problem is that 80% of the funds are tightly or lightly earmarked for specific countries and activities, leaving only a 20% with no restriction. Some states earmark more than others, like US, EU and Japan, while north-EU countries are more flexible (UNHCR, 2010).

The Thai operation budget has grown steadily over the past five years. The table below outlines 2010 budget allocations.

Table 2.4: 2010 UNHCR budget for Thailand (USD) (UNHCR, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIGHTS GROUPS AND OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>REFUGEE PROG. PILLAR 1</th>
<th>STATELESS PROG. PILLAR 2</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,523,091</td>
<td>240,858</td>
<td>20,763,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favorable protection environment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of statelessness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>178,755</td>
<td>178,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with partners</td>
<td>298,816</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>298,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to territory</td>
<td>49,184</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-refoulement</td>
<td>658,264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>658,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>1,006,264</td>
<td>178,755</td>
<td>1,185,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fair protection processes and documentation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration and profiling</td>
<td>566,482</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>566,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to asylum procedures</td>
<td>84,139</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair and efficient status determination</td>
<td>950,409</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>950,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification</td>
<td>26,662</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil status documentation</td>
<td>252,974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>252,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>1,880,666</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,880,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security from violence and exploitation</td>
<td>47,618</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>47,618</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community security management system</td>
<td>24,336</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
<td>842,710</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>842,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of children</td>
<td>1,354,165</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,354,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-arbitrary detention</td>
<td>99,865</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to legal remedies</td>
<td>2,358,757</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,358,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>4,727,451</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,727,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs and essential services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>38,516</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and other infrastructure</td>
<td>156,867</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>156,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic domestic and hygiene items</td>
<td>1,411,514</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,411,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary health care</td>
<td>488,808</td>
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<td>488,808</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV and AIDS</td>
<td>175,616</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>933,415</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>933,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation services</td>
<td>86,867</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services for groups with specific needs</td>
<td>663,417</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>663,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>3,955,020</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,955,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community participation and self-management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory assessment and community mobilization</td>
<td>122,272</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>122,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reliance and livelihoods</td>
<td>1,806,136</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,806,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>1,928,408</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,928,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable solutions</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Durable solutions strategy</td>
<td>291,297</td>
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<td>291,297</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntary return</td>
<td>137,477</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>137,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement</td>
<td>1,671,263</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,671,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>2,100,037</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,100,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relations</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public information</td>
<td>521,450</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>521,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>521,450</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>521,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics and operations support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply chain and logistics</td>
<td>977,275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>977,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme management, coordination and support</td>
<td>2,074,276</td>
<td>62,103</td>
<td>2,136,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>3,051,551</td>
<td>62,103</td>
<td>3,113,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and regional support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global strategic direction and management</td>
<td>139,575</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>139,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection advice and support</td>
<td>459,575</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>459,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External affairs</td>
<td>159,575</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>159,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising and resource mobilization</td>
<td>119,575</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media relations and public affairs</td>
<td>314,369</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>314,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building, skill development and knowledge management</td>
<td>159,575</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>159,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>1,352,244</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,352,244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Thai-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC)**

TBBC as part of the CCSDPT working on health, education, community services and protection, is provided around half of the total annual budget for the work in the temporary shelters, which hovers around US$30 million. Ninety three percent of TBBC funding comes from a core set of Government Donors, found in table 6 below; The European Union (European Community Humanitarian Aid Department – ECHO), Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, The Netherlands and USA. (TBBC, 2009).

### 2.4 Current Funding Commitments

The US policy statement revealed that along with their own interest in increasing aid, Great Britain, the European Community and Australia are already moving to significantly ramp up their assistance (NGO Statement on US IDP Policy, 2008). The CCSDPT has also projected but not confirmed increases from Denmark and Australia. Only three government donors, Sweden, the Netherlands and Taipei Economic & Cultural Office have so far formally committed to grant amounts for 2010, although some others (ECHO, PRM, DFID, Canada and Poland) have given strong indications (TBBC, 2009)

Most recently on March 6, 2010, the Canadian government renewed their support for displaced persons from Myanmar by stating on the Canadian International Development Agency (2010) website that:

*The renewed funding amounts to $15.9 million over five years, and builds on CIDA’s $12.4 million contribution for assistance in the region provided over the previous five years. CIDA is continuing to provide assistance in the region through Inter Pares Canada, a Canadian humanitarian organization, which supports numerous organizations, including the Thailand-Burma Border Consortium and the Mae Tao Clinic.*

### 2.5 Directions of Current Donors’ Policy and Possible Long Term Solutions/Exit Strategy

Donor fatigue has become an increasing problem due to the global financial crisis. Some have stated it will not be possible to continually increase support for displaced persons while others have suggested it is time to look for an “exit strategy”. To confront such issues and avoid compounding problems found within the temporary shelters and among the resident population, stakeholders have made positive strides at trying to address conflicts and policy gaps in the hope of finding plausible long-term solutions.

**European Union Policy**

In 2009, the concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) was refined to follow previous development in EU policies and instruments, such as
policies on fragility and security in development, the establishment of instrument for stability, and reorganization of cooperation instruments. The LRRD approach is not limited to the notion of exit strategies for humanitarian aid, particularly in situations where humanitarian and development actors are present for a long period. LRRD challenges are tackled by applying a policy mix of humanitarian, stabilization and development interventions which ensure the coherence of European interventions programmed and implemented simultaneously or successively in a country (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010).

However, one of the current main challenges facing EU’s humanitarian aid is the difficulty in linking short term humanitarian aid to long term development cooperation activities (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010). Donors, including ECHO, are supporting the CCSDPT and the UNHCR in their efforts to implement a five year Strategic Plan to find durable solutions to expand the DPs' self-reliance. Pilot projects have already started in most shelters, including vocational training, livelihood opportunities, healthcare integration, etc. In Mae La Shelter, for example, agricultural projects introducing small scale intensive farming, including fish ponds, help supplement the diets of the participating displaced families (Eick, n.d).

At the national level much has been published regarding the policy stance of the RTG towards Shelter based DPs. In 2009, CCSDPT and UNHCR coordinated in the creation of a five year Strategic Plan for coordination of all service sectors aimed at increasing self-reliance of displaced persons and, where possible, integrating services for displaced persons within the Thai system. Presented in late 2009, the RTG have provided little indication that their policy direction will change any time soon (TBBC, 2009). However, it marks a significant step forward in this process. It will provide a good basis for dialogue with the RTG on finding sustainable solutions for the displaced persons by providing them with an alternative to increase their self-reliance (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010).

In 2009, the Commission started scaling down the EU contribution to the temporary shelters in Thailand, a total of €8.75 million, just slightly lower than the 2008 figure of €9.5 million. The Commission’s strategy has been coordinated with other EU instruments and donors, and is searching for the most effective way to accompany early implementation of the five year strategic plan of the CCSDPT and UNHCR. (European Commission. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2010).

**United States**

Current indications state that US policy towards Myanmar is set to change as there is new hope within a new administration that intends to provide overall leadership on the humanitarian reform efforts of the United Nations and be a stronger advocate for discovering solutions for IDPs. The US admits to traditionally targeting the government and not the plight of the millions of people in and outside of Myanmar (NGO Statement on US IDP Policy, 2008). The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is the State Department's "functional" bureau, which focuses on a particular issue wherever it arises around the world. The PRM focus is on refugees, other migrants and victims of conflict, with the goal of protecting these people, often living in quite dangerous conditions (US State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; what to do, n.d). The mission of the Bureau is to provide protection, ease
suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring that humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into US foreign and national security policy (US State department. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; *what to do*, n.d).

In 2010 the US government’s policy objectives for displaced persons in Thailand include maintaining life-saving assistance to displaced persons from Myanmar in the official shelters; reinvigorating Thai government protection and screening for new arrivals, especially in the run-up to the 2010 elections in Myanmar and possible displacement outflows to neighboring Thailand and China and advocating for livelihood opportunities and freedom of movement in the temporary shelters. The UNHCR is focused on providing protection, thus NGOs implement all displaced person assistance activities along the Thai-Myanmar border. (US Department of State. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 2010).

**United Kingdom (UK)**

It is well documented that the displacement situation on the border has continuously been mired in policy. Although the RTG has the final say on all shelter based matters, and have made great effort over the years to ease restrictions and change contentious policy, donors continuously strive to push for shelter based policy that provides for greater freedoms and full participation of the shelter population.

Though this is a fractious issue, the UK Government indicated their desire to cooperate closely with the UNHCR to encourage the Thai authorities to take all practical steps, consistent with their resources and interests, to offer displaced persons as full a life as is possible. Donors are working with TBBC, UNHCR and the RTG to develop a medium term strategy that will address the sustainability of support to the temporary shelters. Without a strong appeal and engagement by the international community to resolve these issues, donors may risk funding the status quo (Five DFID’s Assistance to Burmese Refugees on the Thai-Burma Border, n.d).

A parliamentary commission tasked with a review of the displaced people situation recommended that DFID must undertake a strategic reassessment of the appropriate mechanism for dealing with the long term interests of displaced persons. As a clear delineation is needed between TBBC and other NGOs' work in providing food and basic services to displaced persons on the one hand, and the UNHCR, RTG and third country governments' sustainable solutions for the displacement crisis, including employment and resettlement on the other (Five DFID’s Assistance to Burmese Refugees on the Thai-Burma Border, n.d).

**National Level**

NGOs have continually been at the forefront, encouraging donor governments to increase humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering, strengthen civil society, and encourage dialogue between the international community and the Myanmar Government. Since the 2005 Plan, progress has been made in the establishment of large
scale resettlement to third countries; more protection programs were initiated; education opportunities were expanded, including Thai language education; permission was provided to expand vocational training and income generating activities, and ID cards were issued to displaced persons as a step towards providing a documentation basis for increased mobility (CCSDPT/UNHCR, 2009).

To build on the success of the 2005 plan, the CCSDPT in collaboration with UNHCR has drafted a new (2009), five-year strategic plan that will attempt to move from a relief effort to a developmental model. The Plan envisages sustainable solutions allowing for significantly expanded self-reliance of displaced persons and contributions to the Thai economy and society. The strategy, synthesized from the CCSDPT and UNHCR “Five-Year Strategic Plan Working Draft, September 22 2009”, has five sectors and two cross-cutting themes. (CCSDPT/UNHCR, 2009)

**Key Strategy Objectives by Sector and Cross-cutting Theme** (CCSDPT/UNHCR, 2009);

- **Protection** – A fair, efficient and transparent Provincial Admissions Board (PAB) system in line with relevant international standards; supportive policies for a form or legal migrant status for refugees; as well as refugees having access to the Thai judicial system.

- **Health** – Sustainable, integrated, comprehensive health services for refugees and nearby Thai populations, managed by the Royal Thai Ministry of Public Health, assisted by international and Thai NGOs, at a standard of service comparable to that provided to Thai citizens and migrant workers in Thailand.

- **Environmental Health and Infrastructure** – Sustained refugee management of camp-based environmental health and infrastructure activities and increased cooperation with local Thai communities as well as Thai NGOs and RTG line-ministries to ensure access and effective management of sites, surrounding land, forest and water resources.

- **Education** – Sustainable, integrated education services for refugees, managed by the Royal Thai Ministry of Education in cooperation with international and Thai NGOs, at the same standard as that envisioned for migrant workers in Thailand.

- **Food and Shelter** – Increased self-reliance and reduced aid-dependency, targeting assistance to the most vulnerable.

- **Livelihoods** (Cross-cutting theme) – Increased self-reliance with the creation of sustainable livelihoods for refugees and local host communities facilitated through improved direct access to resources and capital, markets and infrastructure, legitimized by supportive policy frameworks.

- **Camp Management** (Cross-cutting theme) – Broaden focus from delivery of basic services towards strengthening the governance of the communities and managing the needs of an increasingly diverse group of people through democratic processes. Pay particular attention to the needs of the most vulnerable and under-represented groups, ensuring their equitable access to services, including justice.

### 2.6 Resettlement Issues of Donors

According to the UNHCR, ‘resettlement is a vital instrument of protection and
solution for refugees, and in this situation resettlement may be the only durable solution’ (UNHCR, 2010). Resettlement offers a future for the displaced who have been in exile for more than two decades, and as such, resettlement activities should prioritize those displaced persons identified as eligible for resettlement according to UNHCR criteria (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). Though all displaced people are considered, resettlement countries, NGOs and UNHCR have highlighted eight particular types of refugees who are given priority for resettlement (Loescher & Milner, 2006):

1) Refugees with legal and physical protection problems in the country of asylum
2) Women at risk, especially female-headed households who do not benefit from traditional community support structures
3) Survivors of violence and torture
4) Medically vulnerable cases
5) Unaccompanied minors
6) Elderly refugees
7) Refugees with family members abroad
8) Refugees with no local integration prospects in their country of first asylum

A consequence of resettlement has been the depletion of skilled individuals engaged in shelter management, service provision or working with shelter based NGO activities. If not managed efficiently, the number of highly educated and more skilled residents being accepted for resettlement could affect the overall organization of the camps, not to mention the implementers who rely on their knowledge and position within the population (DFID, 2008).

The UK Commission recommended the Government take steps to ensure that resettlement of displaced persons through the Home Office’s Gateway Protection Programme does not create a sudden diminution in capacity amongst the shelter populations and leave shelters with gaps in their skilled workforce. The UK Government has been charged to advocate on this issue in coordination with other governments, particularly the USA (International Development Committee, 2007).

The British Government considers for resettlement up to 150 Myanmar displaced persons from Thailand each year under the Gateway Protection Programme. The UK’s criteria for considering cases are based on protection need rather than skill sets. They consider that all refugees with a need for protection should have equal access to the ability to apply for resettlement and are committed to providing protection to those who need it as identified by UNHCR.

Current programs are underway to work with other donors and resettlement countries to minimize the impact of the resettlement program on the skill sets in the temporary shelters through targeted training programs to replace those selected. Such initiatives should be supported and therefore a further recommendation for donors may be to work closely with the NGOs in the development and implementation of capacity building strategies (International Development Committee, 2007).

The majority of host countries require a mandatory medical check-up, including chest X-rays, and some; Canada, Australia, the United States and New Zealand ask for HIV testing prior to departure. As five years has now passed since the first displaced persons left the temporary shelters, current information however has indicated that
several host countries have begun examining such policy as the HIV and AIDS screening amongst other ‘stumbling blocks’.

Other important host policy changes have been made in the past, such as the United States issuing waivers for provisions in the Patriot and Real ID Acts for Karen National Union (KNU) and other groups fighting the Myanmar military as the current policy excluded everyone who had provided “material support” to armed groups (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009).
Chapter 3

FUNDING POLICY, PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND COOPERATION STRATEGIES WITH THE RTG

This chapter reveals the results of key informant interviews, analysed and integrated into the qualitative data. It discusses current rationale for funding through analysis of organizational philosophies, funding policies and trends. Results of the baseline survey are also included to better understand the perceptions of DPs in this regard.

3.1 Current Rationale for Funding: Working Philosophy

Donor countries, international NGOs and local NGOs involved in the Thai-Myanmar border shelters all operate under a humanitarian philosophy. These organizations are driven by their commitment to addressing the needs of displaced persons, people ‘at risk’ or the most vulnerable. The engagement of some organizations is targeted towards specific subgroups, such as extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs). As some respondents shared, as long as there are displaced persons along the Thai-Myanmar border, their organizations will continue supporting the humanitarian efforts to provide them with assistance.

Efforts in the shelters are largely driven by the perception that the situation is still an ‘emergency’. Almost all implementing organizations believe that this will continue to be an emergency situation as long as there are displaced persons crossing the border to flee persecution and violence in Myanmar, whether the influx is large-scale or not. Interestingly, one respondent indicated that it is the protracted nature of the situation that makes it a “humanitarian crisis”.

But there are also those, particularly some donors, who are slowly shifting from an emergency and humanitarian response to a more developmental perspective. This transition is strongly linked to the push for more sustainable or durable solutions on the ground.

3.2 Current Funding Policy and Trends

The long term nature of encampment (with some shelters having been in existence since 1984) has resulted in increased frustration among both donors and CCSDPT at the static nature of the current humanitarian response. Donors especially, would like to see some or even slight change towards the development of self-sufficiency among displaced persons.

Funding from donor countries is bilateral in nature. Included in this are European donor countries that are also members of the European Union. These countries direct funding bilaterally, separate to their European Commission (EC) contributions which are channeled through the ECHO/AUP mechanisms within the EU structure. A significant proportion of overall donor contributions are channeled through the Thai-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) to support their operations. Beyond this,
other NGOs receive donor funds to support projects related to health, education and capacity building. These NGOs also source funds from private foundations and organizations.

Most of the stakeholders interviewed indicated that funding has been in decline over the past three years, the impact of which has been felt particularly in the past two. This has been driven largely by effects of the global recession in donor countries. This has directly affected NGOs working with the displaced persons in Thailand by limiting their day-to-day operations and, subsequently, the projects and interventions that these organizations have the capacity to implement. But despite this trend, most respondents do not foresee any complete phase-out of funding in the immediate future. Although respondents from donor countries indicated that funding streams will continue, this remains unpredictable, subject to policy and funding decisions of home-base donor governments. The table below shows general trends in future funding, as anticipated by key informants in interview.

Table 3.1 Trends in future funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Declining</th>
<th>Steady</th>
<th>Unpredictable</th>
<th>Increasing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donor countries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In line with its shift in working philosophy to address the situation along the border, the EU is gradually transferring its focus from humanitarian relief to a more developmental approach. This is reflected in their reallocation of funds from ECHO to AUP in recent years. Funding through ECHO, emergency relief and humanitarian in nature, has declined over the past year or so. On the other hand, funds through AUP, which supports developmental cooperation, have increased and are expected to continuously increase over the coming years. This shift has been noted by other donor countries and NGOs because its impact is very significant, affecting the scale and reach of NGO operations, as well as the nature of projects and their ability to provide basic needs and services.

Interviews with donors revealed a shared sense that we are now at juncture in this protracted situation to instigate necessary change in the way shelters deliver assistance to DPs. The provision of humanitarian relief has been ongoing for more than 25 years and there is frustration that shelter populations have not diminished, despite the relative success of and the resettlement program so far. There is strong sentiment that all stakeholders – donors, INGOs and the RTG - need to better collaborate to affect change.

To improve cooperation, a more widely understood notion of ‘shared responsibility’ is necessary. To date, processes of responsibility sharing have clearly been at play, evidenced by the ongoing financial support of international organizations and donor governments to implementing agencies for emergency relief, rehabilitation and development phases over the last two decades. While the RTG has also been
involved in the displacement emergency since the beginning by providing temporary shelters, security and human resources, expenditure on protection services has not been publicly disclosed.

Although no stakeholders have articulated a desire to phase-out funds to the temporary shelters, a more clearly defined system of shared responsibility among stakeholders may help prevent this in the future. Awarding stakeholders particular jurisdictions within a coordinated response could better ensure service gaps are filled and duplications avoided.

Cross-border Aid

Apart from providing funds to shelter-based DPs, some donors also fund cross-border activities. Of those interviewed, the USA, Norway, Canada, Denmark and Britain are currently supporting cross-border aid programs to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Yangon and ethnic communities in eastern Myanmar. These funds are directed to community-based organizations (CBOs) and their own national NGOs, rather than the Myanmar government. Some donors believe that development assistance to people in need internally in Myanmar will not only provide relief but can also prevent the movement of new asylum seekers across the Thai-Myanmar border. At the same time, others give aid for purely humanitarian reasons only; the potential benefits outweighing any risks of operating inside Myanmar. The majority of funds go to health and education programs, medical and education supplies, and target childhood and maternal mortality and combating infectious diseases. The amount of funding support for IDPs inside Myanmar is actually greater than that allocated to DPs in the shelters in Thailand.

Several donors have no interest in funding cross-border programs due to a lack of adequate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Some also stressed that it is imperative their funding be impartial in accordance with their humanitarian mandate, in conflict with the opinion that that CBOs delivering cross-border services may have a political agenda.

3.3 The CCSDPT/UNHCR Strategic Framework: The Effort in Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

The effort to link relief (short term), rehabilitation and development aid (long term) (LRRD) is well underway. The efforts thus far in LRRD by implementing agencies can be seen through their initial policy advocacy towards the RTG and their work in developing the five year strategic plan.

In April 2005 CCSDPT/ UNHCR wrote a joint letter to the RTG, advocating a comprehensive policy approach which would allow displaced persons greater access to education and skills training and engage them in productive activities which would better equip them for the future, wherever that might be (TBBC, 2005). Moreover, the UNHCR/ILO led a consultancy on livelihoods in 2006/7 and a household survey on “Livelihood Vulnerability Analysis” was conducted in four shelters in 2009 (Mae La, Nu Po, Site1 and Tham Hin). Community Agriculture and Nutrition (CAN) is another
project which supports self-reliance, initiated by members of the Karenni Refugee Committee in 1999.

TBBC’s latest initiative has been to encourage the community to work together to nurture the environment and expand the green zone around the shelter by planting six selected species of bamboo around the temporary shelters as a pilot. Bamboo plantations not only provide building materials but also protect the land from soil erosion and provide nutritious bamboo shoots for consumption. The project will be expanded in 2011 – and will also include other shelters along the border (TBBC. Bamboo planting ceremony near Tham Hin).

These are just some of the examples of LRRD projects being implemented by several NGOs, including COEER, IRC, ZOA, WEAVE.

Is the Five-year Strategic Plan a Comprehensive Solution?

The UNHCR and CCSDPT have developed a five-year strategic plan as a platform for discussion among partners involved in providing protection and assistance to displaced persons along the Thai-Myanmar border by linking humanitarian assistance with development policy. The purpose of developing this five-year strategic plan was to form the basis of discussion with and active participation of the RTG. However, the question remains as to the extent to which RTG decision makers buy into the direction of the plan.

As the plan states, “There is a pressing need to develop comprehensive solutions which acknowledge that third country resettlement is an option for only a portion of the population and voluntary repatriation remains a distant possibility” (CCSDPT/UNHCR, 2009). A comprehensive plan can only be effective if all parties believe in its common interest and objectives. Moreover, a factor in the success of any comprehensive strategy is the formulation process which almost certainly requires the commitment of all relevant parties, in particular the host country. The successful implementation of durable solutions will rely on all interested parties, including the countries concerned and UNHCR, working in partnership (UNHCR, 2005 b).

Having a plan in place is an important step for stakeholders’ direction and resource allocation. The CCSDPT and UNHCR focused efforts on the development of this plan at the request of donors with the expectation of full funding to support its implementation. However, only select grants have been allocated to respond to some strategies put forward by this plan. It should be noted that the plan is too ambitious in its timeframe (five years). Development activities by nature require more time than this. Corollary to this, the current plan lacks a specified action plan or clear indicators. Specifying those agencies responsible is a critical concern, as is identifying financial support. To have a plan in place is better than none at all. But it is also critical that the strategies are actionable and can translate to policies and programs on the ground. This is where the need for a clear action plan is vital.

It could be said that this plan is a comprehensive plan for the purpose of local integration, rather than a comprehensive plan which encompasses all options for durable solutions. UNHCR defines ‘local integration’ as a process which ultimately leads to the
permanent settlement of refugees in the country where they sought asylum (UNHCR, 2005b). Likely a factor of donor interests, the focus of this strategic plan is on local integration as a solution only, while there is little or no discussion of the other two options, resettlement and repatriation. Nor is there an indication of future management directions following the initial five year period. ‘Local integration’ is a broad phrase, its meaning, purpose and extent understood differently by different stakeholders. It unclear whether the purpose of ‘local integration’ as a solution here is the means to, or the end result of, a transition from humanitarian aid to development aid.

There are three options for durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement (UNHCR 2005). A sound and truly comprehensive plan should incorporate all three durable solutions. Exclusion of repatriation and resettlement would indicate that the plan directly targets a change in policy from the host country only, leading to the apparent difficulty for the RTG to endorse the plan. This may cause the RTG to misinterpret what is intended as ‘burden-sharing’ among stakeholders to be ‘burden-shifting’ to Thailand.

It is possible that the RTG is wary of all responsibility falling to it as the host country, in line with the view that integration of DPs into local communities would not only create a huge burden for Thailand but also contradict RTG policy (based on temporary accommodation and repatriation of DPs). Moreover, the plan clearly states the need for “greater ability for refugees to move outside the camps particularly for educational and livelihood-related purposes”, despite acknowledgement of the unlikelihood of change to RTG policy on restriction of movement.

Although still in development at the time of writing, the revised strategy (no longer a plan, according to key informants) must engage the RTG in dialogue or consultation before the strategy formulation workshop stage so that no assumptions are made in relation to RTG policy. It is clear that comprehensive durable solutions demand the commitment from the highest levels of the RTG, as this is the essential factor which will facilitate the enactment of this strategy and precipitate its success. Unfortunately, it would appear that until now only medium level officers from the RTG have attended the strategic workshops.

Alignment of Funding Support for Implementation of Strategy Plan

Although the process of developing the five-year plan was based on discussion and participation amongst the RTG, donor community, UNHCR and CCSDPT to move from an emergency relief to a development model (CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan 2007/8), the funding allocation to pursue these strategies has to date been insufficient. While funding for individual NGOs is dependent on donor contributions and donor funding is unsustainable in the long run, an initial outlay for a defined period is needed for funding security during the transition period to LRRD. This will help ensure a continuum of services and change.

This process has largely been driven by a disconnect between the perceptions of the different stakeholders and, ultimately, their mandates. Table 3.2– shows the responses of the different respondents on their perceptions about the situation.
Table 3.2 -. Perceptions of INGOs, NGOs and donor respondents on whether the situation is a humanitarian crisis/emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>INGOs</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>Donor countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Still a humanitarian emergency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need a development approach</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that most of the stakeholders still perceive the situation to be a humanitarian emergency. For NGOs, this has implications for the way their organizations are set up as well as the types of projects they engage in and the expertise of the staff they employ. For donor countries, the status of the emergency is directly related to their ability to source funding as well as the types of projects they support.

3.4 NGO Strategies for Cooperation with the RTG

The cornerstone of the strategies employed by NGOs in dealing with the RTG is the need to build and maintain good interpersonal relationships with RTG counterparts at the shelter, local, district and national levels. The nature of the relationship between the organization and the RTG is largely driven by the strength of personal relationships with individual officials.

A strategy that NGOs emphasized during the course of the study was the importance of continuous engagement with the RTG. One approach they have instituted is to “learn to follow the rules first”. That is, careful adherence to the processes and guidelines set forth by the RTG in implementing its policies on the ground.

Another strategy that local implementers have adopted is to ensure the open flow of information between the organization and their counterparts at the shelter, local and district levels. Although this flow has largely been vertical, it has been helpful for the NGOs to keep the communication lines open.

These strategies have not always been easy follow, especially in light of changes to policies themselves, as well as the turnover of staff with whom NGOs work in the RTG. Essentially, a change in RTG staff means NGOs must commit new efforts to develop good relationships with officials.

However, in terms of influencing policy change, local NGOs have little influence. Most of the NGOs interviewed interacted with the RTG predominantly at the local level. For larger NGOs and donor countries, they find engaging with RTG at the national level to be difficult at best. One big challenge is the difficulty in engaging the RTG in open and meaningful dialogue on how to progress the current situation in the temporary shelters. This has been attributed to a number of factors, such as differences in culture and approach as well as the reserved response of the RTG in discussions on this issue. Another challenge cited is the slow, bureaucratic process within the RTG when it comes to gaining approval for large-scale projects. One example cited was the experience in setting up Legal Assistance Centers in the shelters. The process of obtaining approval for the pilot phase of the LAC took a significant amount of time and the roll-out phase for this project has been in the pipeline for more than a year now.
These challenges have serious implications on the ability of stakeholders to advocate and implement durable solutions in the future.

3.5 RTG policy on DPs

RTG concern with human rights is evident in the ‘National Security Policy A.D. 2007-2011’ (National Security Policy A.D. 2007-2011, n.d.) which focuses on human rights in the restoration of national reconciliation policy to promote patriotism and unity among the national population. It states, “3.4 Enhance understanding of government officials and the public to focus on human rights principles including human dignity and the protection of fundamental rights of the people who live in Thailand that will lead to a fair management to populations equally and without discrimination. So that these people can predict their future and it will lead to the prevention of negative behaviors that affect social stability”. However, in reality greater efforts are needed to translate policy to implementation, especially for the DP group. DPs have lived in Thailand ‘temporarily’ for more than 25 years, their dignity corroding as a result of their status as DPs and their self-esteem decreasing due a lack of opportunities for self-reliance, especially in terms of working opportunity. DPs further suffer from a lack of RTG strategy to promote the human dignity of DPs.

DP situations may be perceived as a threat to the security of recipient countries and their national interest. RTG policy and its restrictive access to self-reliance are interlinked with this. In the case of DPs from Myanmar, Thailand has practiced The Management Strategy for the problem of the status and rights of individuals, issued as a Cabinet Resolution on 18 January 2005 to come into effect in 2011 (The office of National Security Council, n.d.). The strategy is concerned with the management of balancing human rights principles, human security and national security and is relevant to Thailand within its obligations under international law. The RTG will only determine the status of an individual recognized by Thai law or in accordance with its obligations under binding international law. In this way it overlooks the protection of the human rights of those who do not have any such status. In relation to the DPs from Myanmar, by referring only to the ‘Displaced Persons Fleeing from Fighting’, the RTG is able to strategically restrict eligibility for anything more than temporary protection. They are considered to be:

"A group of persons for whom the government has a specific management policy which has a clear goal in terms of repatriation....DP have been officially allowed to temporarily stay inside the shelter waiting for repatriation".

It should be noted that both the national security policy and the Management Strategy for the Problem of the Status and Rights of Individuals have a similar focus on encouraging cooperation with neighboring countries and international organizations to develop the quality of life, public health, education and vocational training of people who live along both sides of the border. This serves to prevent migration and illegal migration to Thailand, for whom good relations with neighboring countries is important. It is apparent that the RTG has no development plans for DPs –its intension is for them to wait in temporary shelter until a time when repatriation is possible. Individual government officials must comply with these measures to support government policy.
Finding durable solutions for refugees is much more complex than simply providing emergency relief assistance. It is about obtaining agreement and cooperation from all relevant stakeholders. It is about recognizing the human rights of all DPs and their right to protection. It is about collective management in the provision of both technical and funding support. These are the fundamental tasks that lie ahead for donors, NGOs, RTG and DP representatives who must work and plan together to ensure the successful realisation of their common goals, objectives and activities (UNHCR, 2000). However, each of these stakeholders has a different role, responsibility and, in particular, capacity to influence the realization of durable solutions for refugees. This chapter will discuss the dynamics, needs and constraints of stakeholders in identifying appropriate durable solutions for DPs in Thailand.

4.1 The Different Roles of Stakeholders

Actors in the displaced people situation along the Thai-Myanmar border generally fall into four main groups: donors, international organisations (including NGOs), the Royal Thai Government and the displaced people themselves. Each actor has a particular role, as governed by organizational policy or regulation and based on organizational culture and working philosophy.

Donors

The principal role of donors is to allocate funds to implementing agencies, whether international agencies or NGOs. Donors provide funding in order to assist people in need or vulnerable people for humanitarian reasons. Emergency funding aims to immediately alleviate people’s suffering within a certain, short period of time. Some donor governments provide financial support solely for emergency relief programs. This means that if the approach to the situation shifts from emergency relief to development, the interest and involvement of some donors may be impacted as it no longer aligns with their funding priorities.

Donors are involved in the border shelters on the basis of good humanitarian donorship – a shared sense of responsibility and a global commitment to providing humanitarian assistance to refugees. The majority of donors direct their funds bilaterally through NGOs and INGOs who implement policies and programs in the border shelters. While many programs are NGO driven, some donors are more directive, earmarking funds for particular activities. Current policy trends reveal a divide in donor perspective: some donors are focused on continuing the humanitarian relief effort to sustain the border shelters and provide ongoing basic needs services to the displaced persons; a few are pushing strongly to shift the focus to a developmental approach which links relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) for shelter populations, while others are
seeking to quell push factors by targeting sustainable, long term development from inside Myanmar itself.

In a protracted displacement situation of 25 years, there is a strong sense among donors that the status quo is inadequate. All agree that sustainable solutions which offer opportunity for increased self-reliance are needed and that the RTG needs to be more engaged in identifying real and practicable durable solutions. Differences in opinion appear in the way donor groups prioritize projects and influence assistance efforts through their grants processes.

However, it should be noted that together, donors have paid relatively little attention to how they themselves are held accountable for the impact of their decisions. It would appear there has been minimal consideration as to what constitutes a good humanitarian donor. Establishing such agreement would be timely. Humanitarian aid flows are increasing, humanitarian decision making is becoming more complex and sensitive and the framework for measuring donor performance is so far weak, undermining accountability and development of the trust necessary for positive relations between donors and their partners (Macrae, 2002).

**International Non-government Organizations**

I/NGOs engaged in the border situation are mandated to go where there is need and deliver humanitarian assistance to refugees and vulnerable individuals. INGOs are responsible for the implementation of relief and development programs in the border shelters, supplying residents with food, shelter, health services, education and vocational training. The quality of service provision is relatively high in this particular displacement situation, with many NGOs having been involved from the outset.

As elaborated later, INGOs working on the Thai-Myanmar border are interestingly situated between the dual pressures of meeting donor funding requirements and priorities while contending with RTG policy and regulations to secure ongoing access to the shelters each year.

The roles of various stakeholders are closely interwoven and demand a collaborative effort in finding sustainable solutions to this protracted displacement situation.

**Royal Thai Government: roles and responsibilities**

The RTG has been involved in the refugee emergency from the outset by providing temporary shelters and human resources for protection services. Although the RTG has not publicly disclosed its expenditure, there are a number of agencies involved in many aspects of the DPs situation. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), through provincial and district authorities, enforces policy towards displaced persons and controls the day-to-day running of the temporary shelters in collaboration with refugee and camp committees.

The MOI is the primary civilian institution within the government responsible for the policy implementation process. It oversees the authorities working on the ground, including the Police Department (which includes Border Patrol Police), the Immigration Authority, provincial governors and district level officers. The MOI has direct security and administrative responsibilities over the shelters that are located at
least three kilometres from the border and coordinates with other responsible organizations on policy changes such as relocation of shelters. The activities of the CCSDPT and its constituent NGOs also fall under the direct authority of the MOI (Lang, 2002, p. 96). Various other government agencies, including the Royal Thai Army Paramilitary Rangers and the Border Patrol Police also assist in implementing policy and providing security. Usually a MOI local District Officer (‘Palat’) is assigned as the Camp Commander in each shelter, with Territorial Defence Volunteer Corps (‘Or Sor’) personnel providing internal security under his jurisdiction (TBBC, Camp management).

However despite these contributions, displacement issues are likely to remain low on the national agenda and Thailand's policy towards displaced persons will continue to be shaped by security concerns and bilateral considerations. The overall protection environment in Thailand is set to remain uncertain, marked by detentions and a shrinking of the asylum space for urban displaced persons and asylum seekers (UNHCR, Thailand). The policy of confinement to shelters has resulted in the slow progress of the promotion of self-reliance for the displaced (TBBC, 2010).

The international community for the last several years has been increasingly focused on skills training and educational opportunities, as well as income generation projects and employment to supplement the resettlement solution as evidenced by the CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan (CCSDPT/UNHCR, 2007). Despite this, it has proved difficult to make real progress towards self-reliance of displaced persons on the ground. This is at least in part related to discontinuity in the RTG policy process caused by multiple regime changes since the 2006 military coup. The CCSDPT/UNHCR Five-Year Strategic Plan once again focuses on shifting away from the ‘care and maintenance’ model and towards increased self-reliance of displaced persons as well as integration of services to displaced persons with the health and educational institutions of the Thai system. (CCSDPT/UNHCR, 2009)

However in contrast, the RTG policy environment to date has created a situation of almost absolute dependence of the displaced people on humanitarian assistance. Restrictive RTG policies place vast limitations on each of the durable solutions, though it should be noted that during this last five years there has been some easing of the RTG policy stance in relation to education, health and labour opportunities.

**Provincial Admissions Board (PAB): Displaced Person Status Determination**

The first formal registration of the border population was undertaken by the MOI and the UNHCR. In 1999, the Provincial Admission Board (PAB) was set up as a mechanism to determine the status of any subsequent new arrivals (TBBC, 2009). The UNHCR had a minimal role in the outcomes of the PAB decisions, given observer status and allowed to submit names of new arrivals to the provincial and local authorities. Unfortunately, the PAB was never fully functional and had unclear decision making guidelines. This is partly due to the fear that accepting the current caseload would create a pull factor for more arrivals from Myanmar (Lee and Glaister, 2005).

The decline in the willingness of states to provide asylum is a major challenge for people fleeing their countries in search of safety and for organizations attempting to
assist them (UNHCR, 2000). In this case, the absence of a PAB mechanism to screen asylum seekers means they are caught in an assistance limbo, a political vacuum and a no-man’s land of human and legal rights. Status determination for asylum is needed to prevent both human rights violations and the insecurity faced living illegally in Thailand. Moreover, a screening process will be useful for allowing services and protections to be provided to those who are really in need and to differentiate between real displaced persons who flee from persecution and those who are not. For displaced persons, this is the first step in a durable solution for the problems they face (IRC and JRS, 2005).

Displaced person status determination is a precondition for applications for resettlement. Moreover, the determination of PAB status is a guarantee against return (refoulement) to their original country, what is known as “international refugee protection” (UNHCR, 2005b). The RTG has prohibited UNHCR from registering any displaced persons from Myanmar since January 2004. On 15 September 2007, UNHCR re-opened registration for all those arriving in Thailand after this date for reasons related to the protests in Yangon. However, as with the previous batch of slipholders, the new slips offer no legal status in Thailand and do not grant any rights. Slips are only proof of their registration with UNHCR and merely represent a request to the Thai authorities not to arrest or deport the bearers.

In the last few years, international organisations, including the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), have been advocating for slipholders and non-slipholders alike to undergo national screening for displaced person status and admission into the nine official temporary shelters along the border. Recommendations have been made to the Thai Government to allow registered asylum seekers from Myanmar to stay temporarily in Thailand and for assistance to be provided to them by UN and other relief agencies. So far, advocacy efforts by UNHCR and a handful of international organizations have met with limited success (Lee and Glaister, 2005) Although the RTG has promised to establish a Provincial Admissions Board (PAB) for the purpose of determining whether asylum seekers may enter, register and reside in the border shelters, they have not yet done so (IRC and JRS, 2005).

It was not until 2009, after the long absence of the PAB screening mechanism, that a pilot pre-screening exercise for new arrivals began in four shelters. The process is being undertaken as a pilot exercise in Tham Hin, Ban Dong yang, NuPo and Site 1 shelters and is intended to determine genuine asylum seekers. The pre-screening process is monitored by UNHCR using a standard interview form and the asylum decision is made by the RTG (TBBC, 2009). The results of the 2009 RTG pre-screening exercise are still forthcoming (TBBC, 2010) at the time of writing (January 2011).

**UNHCR**

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established as of 1 January 1951 by General Assembly resolution 319/IV. Its main responsibilities are to provide international protection and to search for durable solutions to the problem of refugees and other persons of concern by assisting governments involved to facilitate voluntary repatriation, local settlement or resettlement. UNHCR operates on an annual budget cycle. The budgets of most organizations in the UN system are prepared on a biennial basis, and UNHCR should be
no exception. Biennial budgets facilitate long term planning, contribute to financial stability and produce a better match between multiyear work programs and the budgeting process. Biennial budgeting would afford the UNHCR planning and budgeting process the required flexibility to respond to emergency situations (Kuyama et al, 2004).

UNHCR’s Executive Committee is made up of host countries whose funding support the Committee cannot operate without. They also provide UNHCR with permission to operate on their territory. On the other hand, UNHCR’s role is often to challenge states either for causing refugee movements or for failing to provide adequate protection and assistance to refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2000).

UNHCR was created to uphold and oversee implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Office was designated to work with Thai authorities to reach policy agreements and to overcome technical obstacles to the implementation of this policy. Since 1979, UNHCR has been responsible for Khao-I-Dang and other ‘holding centres’ for Cambodian displaced persons in Thailand, but it had avoided seeking a role in the border shelters. At one point in late 1979, UNHCR offered to be the lead UN agency on the border, however, the terms it set — including the removal of all soldiers and weapons from the shelters and the relocation of the shelters away from the border — were considered to be unrealistic at the time. Moreover, at least some 93 international donors felt that UNHCR was not equipped to handle such a large and complex emergency. In January 1982, the newly designated United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) took over the coordination of the relief operation along the Thai–Cambodian border—but it had no explicit protection mandate and no mandate to seek durable solutions for the population in its care. Thailand’s decision not to become a signatory to the 1951 Convention, together with the distant relationship between the two actors may limit the UNHCR’s role in any bargaining process with the RTG.

**Power Relations: Interest and Influence**

Each of these actors has different spheres of influence and also different interests, particularly the donors and the RTG. The RTG controls policy and regulations on DPs, while donors have the funds to support and determine working direction for projects with DPs. The intermediary bodies here are the NGOs who provide services to DPs. NGOs must comply with the policies and regulations of the RTG in working with DPs and at the same time request funding support from donors. Thus NGOs toe a difficult line, balancing dual pressures from two dominant actors. At the same time, it seems that donors have limited capacity to pursue local integration as a dominant strategy with the RTG as Thailand is not a signatory country of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

In reality in PRS, all actors are interdependent in seeking solutions and here they have each contributed to the state of the current situation in the shelters (are all implicated in the causes of protracted nature of refugee situations). Government policy forces refugees to rely on external support. Despite this, it should be noted that donor funding for DPs did not support the model of development in the initial stages. Stakeholders may have thought that the situation would not last long enough to
necessitate this. However, waiting over seventeen years to begin to review aid, whether the catalyst be funding problems, economic crisis, or the lack of progress was of little help. NGOs as service providers have traditionally been more familiar with aid in the form of relief, as it pertains to emergency responses. Combined, these factors resulted in the continuation of relief services for over ten years and contributed to the protracted nature of the situation. This has had effects on human capability in the shelters and demonstrates how PRS are affected by policy and operational approaches of stakeholders.

As has been noted at the second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), held in Geneva in July 1984, the international community must recognize not only the needs of refugees but of their hosts, whose economic and social infrastructure must cope with the added burden of large numbers of refugees (Gorman, 1986). In the case of Thailand, it has been an asylum seeker receiving country for decades, fuelling what might be termed ‘asylum fatigue’. The RTG may view that allowing DPs to work outside the shelter is risky for a number of reasons. Protecting DPs is a major concern when these people are under the protection of UNHCR which distinguishes them from other migrant workers and has the potential to create a pull factor for new asylum seekers as well as competition with the local labour force. Providing work opportunities poses another risk in terms of the political sensitivities in the relationship with Myanmar. Security concerns related with local integration poses a major concern as well (the RTG may perceive that the local integration refers to DPs living in Thailand permanently, as nationalized Thais).

Nevertheless, these DPs are in shelters on Thai soil and the RTG has no choice but to be part of the coordinated response to finding durable solutions. All actors – donors, NGOs and the RTG would do well to attempt to better understand the influencing factors on each other and to accept their interdependence as they move forward from here.

4.2 Stakeholder Cooperation and Communication: Management Modalities

Given the numerous and varied agencies involved in funding and delivering humanitarian assistance to the displaced people along the Thai-Myanmar border, a coordinated approach is vital for effective aid programs. However, despite identifying this as a priority, donors and NGOs consistently reported a lack of effective communication practices or opportunities within and across stakeholder groups, but particularly in engaging the RTG. Appropriate mechanisms are lacking to manage the complex junction at which policy, funding direction and service delivery meet.

RTG policies and regulations govern all activities along the Thai side of the border. Implemented on Thai soil, all assistance programs must comply with national and provincial regulations. To manage this, NGOs must apply annually to the RTG for permission to enter the border shelters. NGOs submit all plans to the RTG for approval and report at regular intervals throughout the year.

NGOs interact with both national and provincial authorities but generally report an easier relationship with the latter, based on day to day contact and opportunities to develop relationships and form agreements. The CCSDPT is the representative body of
NGOs working in the border shelters and reports a relatively strong relationship with the RTG, meeting with the Ministry of Interior several times a year.

However, despite a relatively cooperative and compliant environment, NGOs often struggle to meet their mandate due to the restrictive nature of RTG policy and the limited space to advocate for change. Communication is largely one way and prescriptive and as one respondent from a NGO articulated, policy change can only be achieved through coordinated advocacy on the part of donors, international agencies and civil society groups.

NGO operations are sometimes similarly restricted by donor policy direction. Donors fund NGOs through grants processes, with some allowing NGOs to allocate resources to programs based on their determination of need. Other donors, though, restrict NGO activities by enacting their capacity to influence projects and interventions through guidelines on the specific use of funds. So while donors as funders and NGOs as implementers are in their essence assistance partners, this is the donor mechanism for managing the nature of humanitarian aid in the shelters.

There are also complexities in developing donor policies within the context of RTG policies. Donor policy must also comply with RTG regulations and this often undermines the coordinated management of humanitarian assistance along the Thai-Myanmar border. Many donors find the operating environment restrictive, with limited opportunity to engage the RTG in any discussion of policy. Donors expressed frustration at the structural complexity of RTG management of the displaced people situation, needing to engage with the National Security Council, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as provincial authorities.

While there are many factors contributing to this disconnect, including a lack of coordination amongst the donors themselves, it is clear that the operating environment in the border shelters is somewhat inadequate. A gap in communications among stakeholders is recognised across the board. While there have been some attempts to stimulate dialogue and cooperation between the major stakeholders, more responsive management mechanisms are required for all actors to be as effective as possible in providing assistance to the displaced people in this protracted situation.

4.3 Funding Shortage and Coping Strategies

Donor aid policy has been gradually shifting towards 'linking relief and development' since 2007, bringing both opportunities and challenges for humanitarian action. Despite this shift, the inability of donors to make long term commitments of financial support means LRRD remains a challenge.

Three trends impact on the availability of funds to NGOs to deliver services in the shelters: food prices, currency exchange rates and the level of donor contributions. The number of residents in the shelters has largely remained consistent in recent years.

Rising food prices and a drop in the value of major currencies in recent times mean that implementing agencies have less funding in real terms at their disposal to support shelter populations with basic needs and other relief services. In order to cope,
NGOs must be creative in service delivery – such as by adjusting the food basket from being culturally balanced to nutritionally balanced, thus replacing a portion of rice rations with Asia mix. Another cost-saving initiative has seen standardized shelter equipment rations replaced with a system of awarding materials on the basis of individual assessment of household need. Bamboo is also being grown within some shelters for internal use.

The absence of multiyear funding options for donors is a structural flaw of the funding system that supports the border shelters. This makes it extraordinarily difficult for NGOs to plan with any certainty, even in the short and medium term. At least one NGO is seeking private funding to cover gaps left by the shift of donor focus away from basic needs to development projects. Others are attempting to view the situation more holistically, identifying opportunities to provide assistance to displaced persons by incorporating them into broader migrant health or education programs supported by the RTG and other international funds.

The basic questions related to alignment of the five year strategy plan and the scale and scope of donor funding, including the operation of INGOs are as follows:

- Is the funding sufficient enough for the transition from the emergency to developmental phase?
- How can it be assured that this plan and identified strategies are comprehensive enough to lead towards supporting either one or all of the three durable solutions?
- What are the measures of success for this strategic plan?

4.4 The Impact of Stakeholder Policy and Durable Solutions for DPs

The movement from the emergency phase to development phase has been discontinuous since the beginning. Donors and INGOs need to better coordinate with and obtain real agreement from the RTG in order to develop more effective mechanisms and results. The provision of humanitarian aid to DPs inside the shelter along Thai-Myanmar border has lead to dependency after almost three decades of engagement. It is foreseeable that the promotion of self-reliance in this protracted situation may prove even more difficult than the initial emergency phase.

Since the outset, the Royal Thai Government has considered the protracted situation along its Myanmar border to be an issue of national security, rather than any refugee or humanitarian crisis. The RTG has refrained from becoming a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has thus approached the situation with a policy of containment of irregular migration. In November 2005, the RTG terminated the UNHCR screening program of new arrivals and since that time there has been no mechanism for identifying who new arrivals are, or what they are fleeing from. As a consequence, displaced persons inhabit the shelters on a ‘temporary’ basis, even though many have been there for 25 years. This has numerous implications for the pursuit of durable solutions for displaced persons, with restrictions on movement, employment and other opportunities for livelihood development, and interaction with the local community outside the shelters.
Resettlement

Since 2005, the resettlement program has seen 67,000 displaced persons depart from the shelters and settle in third countries. There is general consensus among stakeholders that the resettlement program has been successful for those who are eligible and wish to relocate. However, its viability as a durable solution has been undermined by the present lack of a PAB pre-screening process. No new arrivals have been screened or registered since 2005. The unwillingness of the RTG to pursue this mechanism prohibits the determination of DPs as eligible for resettlement. The program is thus entirely finite as a solution. At this stage, resettlement is the only solution in place which could reduce the size of the shelter population however the number of residents has remained steady due to the continuing influx of new arrivals.

Donors and NGOs are largely very supportive of the resettlement program as a durable solution but it has been emphasised that this is not a solution in isolation. In their view, resettlement can only work as part of a coordinated package of solutions.

There is some concern over whether a resettlement program is in itself a pull factor bringing new arrivals in to the shelters and one which stimulates brain drain from Myanmar. However, many donors dismissed the pull factor argument, believing that an active screening process would negate any incentive for those who are not genuinely displaced persons to seek out a place in the shelters.

Repatriation

Several donors believe repatriation to be the desire of many displaced persons themselves, and surveys found this to be conditionally true, with 58.56% of shelter residents indicating that they would wish to return if guaranteed safety in Myanmar (Table 5.20). Results of focus group discussions confirmed that DPs who wished to return to their hometown did so only with a guarantee of their safety and security. However, for those who have no personal connections (relatives) remaining inside Myanmar or have no bound obligation to return (children born inside shelters with no concept of life in Myanmar, for example), resettlement or staying in Thailand are the only options. These responses reflected the need for the cultivation of a peace process for DPs who want to return home.

Repatriation as a durable solution has not been actively discussed. While many stakeholders agree that voluntary repatriation is an ideal durable solution, it is one which remains unfeasible until the situation inside Myanmar improves dramatically and safe and dignified return can be guaranteed.

The RTG’s current policy of no interference with the Myanmar Government also means there is no forum for discussion of repatriation as an option. Despite the ‘temporary’ nature of the border shelters, the RTG accepts that not all displaced persons will be able to return to Myanmar. Its policy, however, is one that sees their ongoing presence in Thailand as an issue for Thai national security.

Local Integration
The term ‘local integration’ itself was found to be one which triggers alarm bells for stakeholders, with a variety of different interpretations among different actors. The concept of local integration is loaded with many potential ramifications for nationality, income generation and the socioeconomic fabric of local communities. But there is no clear definition of what it entails precisely. Does local integration refer to the Thai nationalization of displaced people, after which they would enjoy the same entitlements as natural-born Thais? Would it allow them freedom of movement and access to work, health and education in the communities surrounding the shelters? Or would it involve the provision of income generating opportunities within the shelters themselves? Subsequently, as a durable solution it is regarded with scepticism and uncertainty by many stakeholders, not least the RTG. The long term implications and political ramifications of this are not yet known.

Many donors and NGOs argue that the process of integration is already well underway, with education, health and agricultural projects in place. Pilot projects have already started in most shelters, targeting vocational training, livelihood opportunities and healthcare integration, though these are not yet formalized. In Mae La shelter, for example, agricultural projects introducing small scale intensive farming, including fish ponds, help supplement the diets of the participating displaced families (Eick, n.d).

Most donors and NGOs rejected the idea that self-reliance activities constitute a pull factor into the shelters, arguing that a reinstituted PAB process would negate this by screening out those not legitimately displaced persons. There is strong sentiment that any policy of integration would require the displaced persons community to be self-sustaining; they cannot be seen as a burden to local communities.

A new language around the notion of local integration must be developed to encourage the RTG and other actors to engage further with the concept, without inducing fear among Thai communities of being burdened or overrun with an influx of displaced people monopolising jobs and services. Ideas of ‘service integration’, ‘self-reliance’ or ‘co-existence’ are perhaps less confrontational to the local communities and the RTG.

Regardless of how integration is defined, at present, DPs are extremely limited in their opportunities for self-reliance. It will require a major shift in RTG policy before local integration of any kind can be considered a realistic or viable durable solution.
Chapter 5
THE IMPACTS OF EXISTING INTERVENTION MECHANISMS,
INCLUDING GENDER RELATED ASPECTS

The existing intervention mechanisms of each stakeholder, whether donor, RTG or NGO, have already had effect on the displaced people. This chapter will discuss the positive and negative impacts that have arisen from these interventions.

5.1 Existing RTG and NGOs intervention mechanisms

Although the government places strict restrictions on the number of operating NGOs and staff working inside shelters, there are some beneficial impacts of such a policy. This rigid rule allows for positive contributions to the development of DP-led shelter management of services and community-based management in collaboration with the Thai authorities who are limited in number. This strategy increases self-reliance and can reduce dependency on external management. For example, TBBC has been working in partnership with the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) and Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) since 2004, supporting shelter administration costs including stipends for camp committee members and staff involved in the delivery, storage and distribution of TBBC supplies, with capacity building effect (TBBC, 2010a).

“Each activity is allowed only a limited number of necessary staff to work on rotation inside the shelter. Food contribution, for example, permits 1-2 staff only. DPs must help each other in the process of assistance by getting advice from NGOs. NGO staff are not allowed to stay or work inside the shelter, except physicians or nurses in the case of providing emergency treatment or preventing outbreak of epidemic. But they still have to inform the camp commander first”.

Implementation Guideline for government officer and NGOs including relevant agency which related with DPs. 2009.

Another positive outcome of RTG policy is cooperation in the judicial reform process inside temporary shelters between Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and IRC to provide legal aid to vulnerable groups, especially women. DPs can access formal Thai justice through a Legal Aid Center located inside the shelter.

Although such RTG regulations produce some positive results, other policy/regulations still in force have negative impacts on the quality of life of DPs and subsequently, the image of Thailand in the eyes of the international community. Restricting access to work and movement forces DPs to rely on external support and causes the
international community to overlook the reality that Thailand has been hosting these DPs for almost three decades. Some current policies are outdated and inappropriate at present in a region where socioeconomic and environmental conditions have changed dramatically. In practice however, the RTG allows some flexibility in enforcing existing policy, permitting some NGOs to work on pilot projects related to livelihoods, for example. If the potential to roll out these pilot projects is realized through policy change, the benefits to the DPs will be substantial. It would also reflect the RTG’s commitment to responsiveness and timeliness of its policies.

It is widely acknowledged that state bureaucracy is usually slow to instigate change and the same can be said of the Provincial Admission Board (PAB) process for DP status determination. In operation since 2009, the results of pilot studies have not yet been disclosed. If the RTG could expedite this process it would help address or prevent many issues in this protracted DP situation. It could also strengthen the capacity of state officers to work effectively.

Gender programming has introduced various activities into the shelters. Those NGOs interviewed have gender policies in place, integrated into all aspects of their work in management and service areas. During field visits, it was noted that every shelter had women working side by side with men at the management level. The male shelter residents interviewed admired and respected these working women. Women know where to go to ask for help if they have any problems. There are women’s organizations such as the Karen Women Organization (KWO) and Karenni Women’s Organization (KnWO) which have a significant role in providing support and protection to women and children. It should be noted that while many organizations try to promote and protect women in various ways, it seems that men do not participate in these kinds of programs. Training programs that aim to empower women and provide protection will only be more effective if men have the opportunity to participate also, promoting understanding and avoiding resentment at female-targeted programs only. Men are also in need of strengthened capacity in this area and both sexes should work together. Focus group discussions suggested that men felt neglected in this regard, as one man complained:

“Currently, women have been more developed than men.” Male interviewee, 28 year old

“Currently men have to be aware that women have more rights. If women would like to do something such as watching a CD (movie) after meal, they can do so. If men say something and make women angry, they say that they will report to LAC. So, men do not dare to complain about anything to women, while women dare to say they want.” Male DP, 26 years.

5.2 Coordination Mechanisms between Donors, RTG and INGOs

The communications gap in the current operating environment between the RTG and donors is an ongoing source of frustration for many donors. The nature of individual donor countries’ bilateral relations with the RTG is enormously varied- from suggestion
that the RTG has devolved itself of all responsibility in the running of the shelters and no relationship exists to even speak of, to sentiments of close cooperation and belief that the RTG is a ‘neglected donor’ receiving insufficient credit for its support for the border shelters. While cooperation between NGOs and RTG officials at the provincial level is generally satisfactory, the majority of donors described a lack of open dialogue with the national government characterized by limited opportunities to meet, and even then, ad-hoc meetings with low level representation from the RTG. Attempts to host workshops have proved fruitless, and as discussed previously, the sheer number of RTG agencies involved in this protracted situation further confounds donor attempts to engage the Thai authorities.

However, within the donor group there has been a realization in recent years that their ineffectiveness in multilateral advocacy to the RTG is related to a lack of coordination amongst themselves. This could be attributed in some part to the high turnover of donor staff, often posted to Thailand for a fixed period (2-3 years). This revolving door environment has created discontinuity and hindered donors’ ability to build and maintain personal relationships with the RTG.

Many donors also identified better collaboration as a necessary precursor to approaching the RTG for policy change. A recent donor-led effort to facilitate dialogue between donors, implementing agencies and the RTG has still not provided results in terms of cooperation with the RTG but has proved successful in providing a forum for improved donor collaboration.

The relationship between the government and donors is of course governed by the terms of RTG policy and regulations on DPs, as mentioned previously. Within this however, the quality of the relationship still depends on the means and modalities of communication employed. If donors act aggressively or offensively to change RTG policy, it may be with negative consequence in which the RTG could feel coerced into accepting donor proposals which make no concessions, especially on the policy of DPs encampment. The RTG reaction is often expressed silently and can be perceived as a decision to ignore attempts at communication, to the frustration of both parties.

By contrast, the RTG relationship with NGOs is more based on compromise and coordination. If donors can better consult and listen to what the RTG puts forward this will have a positive impact in practice, perhaps enabling more pilot projects on vocational training or movement towards some kind of policy shift. Some donors demonstrate good humanitarian donorship and are collaborative rather than aggressive, as are the NGOs, through regular communication, and a concerted effort to develop a friendly understanding of the cultural limitations of the RTG. This will help to increase trust and improve working relationships.

5.3 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: Challenges and Opportunities

At present, NGOs are engaged in capacity building interventions such as candle-making and subsistence agriculture as well as training DPs in camp management, or as field and office personnel. This is makes use of the abundance of time at DPs’ disposal given
they do not work outside the shelters, and at the same time, develops their skills should an opportunity for self-reliance arise. One respondent discussed the need to continuously practice and hone the knowledge and skills that DPs possessed before entering the shelter – otherwise once a person becomes a DP, they become “invisible” and the skills that they had before will disappear.

The provision of basic services such as food, shelter, health and education is funded by donors and provided directly to DPs. A respondent noted that the level and quality of these services is better than those in other protracted DP situations. This could be attributed to the fact that providers of these services need to adhere to the strict global standards of their funders. It also shows that the service systems in these shelters run parallel to that provided by the RTG to local communities. Some NGOs and donor countries are currently working on mechanisms that would allow the provision of these services to the DPs to be channeled through the Thai system. An example is in health care, where local Thai health services would be provided to the DPs in the shelters, or as a potential alternative, where local communities could access shelter health facilities. Respondents from donor countries expressed their openness to exploring and supporting alternative avenues for policy and programmatic collaborations with the RTG, such as formulating and supporting mechanisms to enable students to study in Thai schools and universities and for DPs to be incorporated into the local health system.

But an obstacle to scaling up and rolling out small-scale interventions is the fact that the shelters are closed. An example of this is the agricultural project that one NGO is implementing in some of the shelters. At present, the project is at the subsistence level because it is constrained by economies of scale (i.e. land area available for planting). This is also dependent on the amenability of the shelter officials to making resources available to the project. The current levels of production are not enough to impact on the food requirements of the families in the shelter. Should restrictions on the shelters be eased, there is an opportunity for the project to expand and produce more, contributing substantially to the food needs in the shelter, creating opportunities to sell the produce in the local markets, or both.

In terms of policy and programmatic collaborations, the reluctance of the RTG to engage in dialogue with donor countries is another stumbling block. Respondents revealed that they have had limited opportunities for meaningful discussion with the RTG on how these collaborations could be achieved, particularly on how donor countries could assist the RTG. A corollary issue to this is burden shifting and burden sharing between the RTG and donor countries. Financial support for the shelters over the past two decades has been drawn from donors and NGOs with minimal financial input from the RTG.

An interesting point raised by one respondent focused on whose shoulders the burden should lie because up until now it has rested with the citizens of donor countries. Given the shifts in funding philosophies and shrinking funding levels, this respondent highlighted the need to consider how the RTG could take on some of the burden from donor countries. This respondent’s position showed the extent of donor frustration at this protracted displacement situation. Donors may lose interest because of a lack of solutions. Although the RTG has restricted its DP policy, it does not mean that Thailand is free of
responsibility. In fact, donors and the host country have both common and differentiated responsibilities and play an important role in humanitarian support. Cooperation is needed to support “responsibility-sharing” as a resolution for PRS. The only way that the RTG could assist in PRS is to create an environment in which DPs can be self-reliant, thus reducing external aid and increasing self-esteem and dignity of DPs.

5.4. Needs, Perceptions, Hopes and Expectations of DPs

This section reveals the results of the baseline survey conducted at Tham Hin, Ban Mai Nai Soi and Mae La temporary shelters in Ratchaburi, Mae Hog Sorn and Tak provinces, respectively. The survey questions explored the needs, perceptions, hopes and expectations of DPs as they pertained to the roles of donors, international organizations, NGOs and the RTG. As mentioned above, 444 respondents in three targeted temporary shelters were recruited in this study. In total, 55.4% (246 respondents) were female and 44.6% (198 respondents) male.

Out of 444 individuals interviewed, 7 out of 10 indicated that they were totally dependent on the aid of NGOs. Broken down by age, most of those who indicated they were totally dependent on NGO aid were aged between 24-59 years old which could be considered the economically productive age group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Totally dependent</th>
<th>Partially, for food, shelter and jobs</th>
<th>Very little, only food and shelter</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>135 (30.41)</td>
<td>40 (9.01)</td>
<td>13 (2.93)</td>
<td>9 (2.03)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>198 (44.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>183 (41.22)</td>
<td>41 (9.23)</td>
<td>16 (3.60)</td>
<td>4 (0.90)</td>
<td>2 (0.45)</td>
<td>246 (55.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group (years)</th>
<th>Totally dependent</th>
<th>Partially, for food, shelter and jobs</th>
<th>Very little, only food and shelter</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>86 (19.37)</td>
<td>26 (5.86)</td>
<td>5 (1.13)</td>
<td>8 (1.80)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>126 (28.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-59</td>
<td>221 (49.77)</td>
<td>53 (11.94)</td>
<td>22 (4.95)</td>
<td>5 (1.13)</td>
<td>2 (0.45)</td>
<td>303 (68.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 &amp; above</td>
<td>11 (2.48)</td>
<td>2 (0.45)</td>
<td>2 (0.45)</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>15 (3.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>318 (71.62)</td>
<td>81 (18.24)</td>
<td>29 (6.53)</td>
<td>13 (2.93)</td>
<td>3 (0.68)</td>
<td>444 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seven out of ten respondents indicated that they would like opportunity to be more self-reliant. Respondents within the economically productive age group (25-29 years old) would like to be more self-reliant.

Table 5.1 Aid dependency by sex and age
The results of the survey are consistent with the responses of the participants in the FGDs.

“Compared with Myanmar, here is better. But if we think about the future it is not good because we have no future. Just live life day by day without knowing the future. Each day we just cook rice to eat and have nothing to do. I wish to have job to do because I need privacy and want to help myself. No need to be burden to anyone.” Male DP, 28 years.

“Our life is like a dwarf tree. It does not grow. It is under a big tree, so it cannot grow. I have a dream. In the future, I want to be an eagle because it has completed both the wings and legs. What we want to do, we cannot do because we have no opportunity. Like a bird in a cage.” Male DP, 34 years.

When asked about what they thought about the motivations of the NGOs in their engagement, almost 44% of respondents acknowledged that NGOs provide services to them as they are people in need, while around 32% of respondents believed that NGOs act because they cannot help themselves. This reveals that most respondents are aware they have no opportunity to be self-reliant, and thus, NGOs must come to help them.

Although shelter regulations do not allow all the DPs to work or even go outside the shelters, in reality the research team found that many DPs in all the studied shelters have had some working experience outside the shelter, whether daily, periodical, seasonal or even ongoing for months or years. This is evidence that even though there are regulations in place, in reality these regulations cannot prevent the DPs from endeavoring to meet the basic life needs for themselves. It also reflects that even though the regular basic support services provided by NGOs can meet minimum essential needs, they cannot meet their wider needs. The FGD revealed that DPs need cash for their children to attend school (e.g. for lunch, sweets, stationary) and for a variety of other general needs, particularly food and cloth.

Table 5.3 Why NGOs provide services
### Why are NGOs helping you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They want to help people in need</td>
<td>86 (19.37)</td>
<td>109 (24.55)</td>
<td>195 (43.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I cannot help myself</td>
<td>65 (14.64)</td>
<td>76 (17.12)</td>
<td>141 (31.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They benefit from their services</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>2 (0.45)</td>
<td>3 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is their business</td>
<td>11 (2.48)</td>
<td>11 (2.48)</td>
<td>22 (4.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>34 (7.66)</td>
<td>46 (10.36)</td>
<td>80 (18.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>198 (44.59)</strong></td>
<td><strong>246 (55.41)</strong></td>
<td><strong>444 (100.00)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked about the timeline of NGO support, almost 55% of respondents believe they will need NGO support forever. Another 21% feel they will no longer need NGO support when the times come that they can support themselves. For those who need NGO support, they do not foresee any channels or opportunities to become self-reliant. Respondents in FGD complained that they feel they have no value if they do not work. They do not want just to sit and wait for NGOs arrive with free services.

“People outside the camp may think that DPs are lazy, in fact, some people maybe but not everyone. They may view us like dogs; that we do not do anything, just take and eat only. DPs do not want to be like that. We have no opportunity to help ourselves. We are here, we cannot go back. DPs are allowed to be here. We have to follow the rules.” Male DP, 35 years.

### When do you think you will no longer need NGOs services?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never, we need the NGOs to take care of our health and other things</td>
<td>105 (23.65)</td>
<td>138 (31.08)</td>
<td>243 (54.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only when we can access the local services</td>
<td>9 (2.03)</td>
<td>10 (2.25)</td>
<td>19 (4.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whenever we can take care of ourselves</td>
<td>41 (9.23)</td>
<td>52 (11.71)</td>
<td>93 (20.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anytime</td>
<td>5 (1.13)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>6 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>38 (8.56)</td>
<td>44 (9.91)</td>
<td>82 (18.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>198 (44.59)</strong></td>
<td><strong>246 (55.41)</strong></td>
<td><strong>444 (100.00)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to opportunities for self-reliance, 1 out of 3 respondents want to work inside or outside of the temporary shelter. Women in particular want to work inside shelter. Some of the reasons they have shared include:

“I want to work here because I can take care of my family and also do some housework”. Female DP, 30 years.

“Anywhere we can work, we want to work outside but we are afraid that our
employer will not pay us. We do not know what to do, we have not much knowledge”. Male DP, 24 years.

‘Will they allow us to go outside? We have no rights to go out, I am afraid to be arrested and sent back”. Male DP, 28 years.

Table 5.5 Opportunities for self-reliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In which way would you like to become more self-reliant?</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not interested or don’t know</td>
<td>35 (7.88)</td>
<td>66 (14.86)</td>
<td>101 (22.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to work inside or outside the Temporary Shelter</td>
<td>72 (16.22)</td>
<td>71 (15.99)</td>
<td>143 (32.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study more and/or learn a new job</td>
<td>33 (7.43)</td>
<td>39 (8.78)</td>
<td>72 (16.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want Thai documents to stay here</td>
<td>35 (7.88)</td>
<td>32 (7.21)</td>
<td>67 (15.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go back to Myanmar</td>
<td>3 (0.68)</td>
<td>4 (0.90)</td>
<td>7 (1.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to anywhere else in a safe country</td>
<td>15 (3.38)</td>
<td>24 (5.41)</td>
<td>39 (8.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 (0.68)</td>
<td>7 (1.58)</td>
<td>10 (2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>2 (0.45)</td>
<td>3 (0.68)</td>
<td>5 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>198 (44.59)</td>
<td>246 (55.41)</td>
<td>444 (100.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, 23% of the respondents are not aware of any means to be self-reliant. This is quite disturbing because it would seem that there is absolute dependence on the part of the DPs on external support.

Table 5.5 also reveals that only 7% of respondents would like to return to Myanmar, highlighting the need for better information on options for self-reliance. Another concerning point is 15% and almost 9% of DPs respondents chose to stay in Thailand or go to another place that guarantee their safety respectively. This means that they are afraid to go back to Myanmar due to fear of persecution. It serves as a reminder to people who work with them to think about who should facilitate safe conditions inside Myanmar, and how.

Even though respondents were unaware of the situation of ‘donor fatigue’, some guessed that this is the case. Only 34% of respondents expected donors to never stop funding while DPs remain in the shelters. Another 30% were aware that donors may stop supporting NGOs sometime, but believed this to be an issue for the long term when they have to help other countries. A further 12% felt that donors may stop funding soon as they have been providing funding for a long time already. This indicates that almost 425 respondents are aware that funding will one day no longer be available. The potential termination of donor funding is relevant to their previous responses regarding the need to work for self-reliance. Corollary to this are the options open to the DPs once there is no funding support available. One out of three respondents indicated that they will work towards supporting themselves (self-reliance).

Table 5.6 Ongoing donor support
A majority of the DPs rated the services of NGOs as ‘good’ or ‘fair’, education in particular. In relation to NGO food services, 63% of respondents perceived them to be good quality. A couple of women voiced concerns during FGD about the accuracy of the amount of rice rationed. One woman measured using a plastic container and found that the amount of rice was less than before, estimated around 200 grams. The other participants had no complaint about this. However, it is acknowledged that respondents are perhaps unlikely to tell interviewers the truth about their perceptions, and may have just said what they think interviewers wanted to hear or kept silent. Though these few voices raised such issues, they cannot be used to generalize or question the accuracy of rice contribution. The food distribution monitoring system is the appropriate mechanism to assess accountability here.

Education is the service that most DPs are satisfied with, with 82% reporting education services to be good. This was attributed to the RTG allowing DPs the chance to study Thai language and extend the education level to Grade 10.
Table 5.8 Perceptions about various services provided by NGOs to DPs in the shelters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Male (n=198)</th>
<th>Female (n=246)</th>
<th>Total (n=444)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>123 (27.70)</td>
<td>156 (35.14)</td>
<td>279 (62.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>38 (8.56)</td>
<td>43 (9.68)</td>
<td>81 (18.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>31 (6.98)</td>
<td>39 (8.78)</td>
<td>70 (15.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>6 (1.35)</td>
<td>8 (1.80)</td>
<td>14 (3.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shelter Items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>108 (24.32)</td>
<td>122 (27.48)</td>
<td>230 (51.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>38 (8.56)</td>
<td>41 (9.23)</td>
<td>79 (17.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>48 (10.81)</td>
<td>76 (17.12)</td>
<td>124 (27.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>4 (0.90)</td>
<td>6 (1.35)</td>
<td>10 (2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>146 (32.88)</td>
<td>181 (40.77)</td>
<td>327 (73.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>29 (6.53)</td>
<td>32 (7.21)</td>
<td>61 (13.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>17 (3.83)</td>
<td>25 (5.63)</td>
<td>42 (9.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>6 (1.35)</td>
<td>8 (1.80)</td>
<td>14 (3.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanitation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>138 (31.08)</td>
<td>171 (38.51)</td>
<td>309 (69.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>36 (8.11)</td>
<td>33 (7.43)</td>
<td>69 (15.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>20 (4.50)</td>
<td>36 (8.11)</td>
<td>56 (12.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>4 (0.90)</td>
<td>6 (1.35)</td>
<td>10 (2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>160 (36.04)</td>
<td>202 (45.50)</td>
<td>362 (81.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>14 (3.15)</td>
<td>24 (5.41)</td>
<td>38 (8.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>20 (4.50)</td>
<td>13 (2.93)</td>
<td>33 (7.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>4 (0.90)</td>
<td>7 (1.58)</td>
<td>11 (2.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vocational training</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>125 (28.15)</td>
<td>165 (37.16)</td>
<td>290 (65.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>21 (4.73)</td>
<td>24 (5.41)</td>
<td>45 (10.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>29 (6.53)</td>
<td>25 (5.63)</td>
<td>54 (12.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>23 (5.18)</td>
<td>32 (7.21)</td>
<td>55 (12.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income generating activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>81 (18.24)</td>
<td>104 (23.42)</td>
<td>185 (41.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>24 (5.41)</td>
<td>40 (9.01)</td>
<td>64 (14.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>52 (11.71)</td>
<td>53 (11.94)</td>
<td>105 (23.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>41 (9.23)</td>
<td>49 (11.04)</td>
<td>90 (20.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (n=198)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>117 (26.35)</td>
<td>138 (31.08)</td>
<td>255 (57.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>23 (5.18)</td>
<td>28 (6.31)</td>
<td>51 (11.49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But there are some services provided which a significant proportion of respondents perceive to be insufficient. Of those who complained that the food was not sufficient, many cited the reason being due to sharing with their relatives. Many asylum seekers are waiting for status determination from PAB screening and those who are not awarded status have limited access to food services, hence the need to share with their relatives. While 65% of respondents found vocational training to be good, those who disagreed with this said that the waiting periods and the small size of the pilot project leaves much to be desired. Respondents also expressed frustration at having little opportunity to use their newly-acquired skills and “if we do not use it, we will forget it” mentality. Female, 25 years.

Despite the fact that it is difficult to find any evidence of income generation inside the shelter, almost half of the respondents think that the services are good. Results highlight that this area needs strategic reconsideration to assist in the development of self-reliance among DPs. Similarly, gender training requires further public relations (PR) and strategy revision to help increase community participation in quite a new issue for DPs.

Table 5.9 Activities to prevent violence against women and children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence against women and children prevention activities</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>30 (6.76)</td>
<td>38 (8.56)</td>
<td>68 (15.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>122 (27.48)</td>
<td>165 (37.16)</td>
<td>287 (64.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>29 (6.53)</td>
<td>23 (5.18)</td>
<td>52 (11.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>17 (3.83)</td>
<td>20 (4.50)</td>
<td>37 (8.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>198 (44.59)</strong></td>
<td><strong>246 (55.41)</strong></td>
<td><strong>444 (100.00)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, activities to prevent violence against women and children prevention activities faced a similar issue to that discussed above. It is new activity for DPs and needs further PR and advocacy. At this stage 65% perceived it to be a good service.

Table 5.10 Legal assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Assistance</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ did not answer</td>
<td>24 (5.41)</td>
<td>34 (7.66)</td>
<td>58 (13.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>138 (31.08)</td>
<td>176 (39.64)</td>
<td>314 (70.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>23 (5.18)</td>
<td>19 (4.28)</td>
<td>42 (9.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>13 (2.93)</td>
<td>16 (3.60)</td>
<td>29 (6.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
<td>1 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>198 (44.59)</strong></td>
<td><strong>246 (55.41)</strong></td>
<td><strong>444 (100.00)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71% of respondents reported that the legal assistance service is good. This program is also quite new but useful and of benefit to all DPs, particular women.
Table 5.11 Negotiation with Myanmar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think that it is the responsibility of any organizations to negotiate with your original country to take you home with guaranteed security?</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>63 (14.19)</td>
<td>94 (21.17)</td>
<td>157 (35.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>126 (28.38)</td>
<td>134 (30.18)</td>
<td>260 (58.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>9 (2.03)</td>
<td>18 (4.05)</td>
<td>27 (6.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>198 (44.59)</strong></td>
<td><strong>246 (55.41)</strong></td>
<td><strong>444 (100.00)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question is related to repatriation. Only 59% of respondents believed that it is the responsibility of certain organizations to negotiate with Myanmar for the guarantee of their safe return. Another 35% thought there was no need for anyone to negotiate with Myanmar. FGDs revealed that respondents never believed in the Myanmar government and do not believe that negotiation will be successful, thus there is no point wasting time on this. This sheds light on responses to the question of where they would choose to go after the shelter. Not surprisingly, this is why they do not want to return home. They do not trust the Myanmar government, based on bad experiences, fleeing persecution and human rights abuses. Respondents indicated that at least 58.56% would return home following attainment of peace inside Myanmar. However this process requires leadership from international agencies to identify appropriate channel or mechanisms and facilitate the peace process.

Table 5.12 Responsible Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific responsible organizations for negotiations with Myanmar</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td>57 (21.92)</td>
<td>53 (20.38)</td>
<td>110 (42.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>8 (3.07)</td>
<td>10 (3.84)</td>
<td>18 (6.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Thai Government</td>
<td>19 (7.30)</td>
<td>18 (6.92)</td>
<td>37 (14.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>9 (3.46)</td>
<td>10 (3.84)</td>
<td>19 (7.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1 organizations</td>
<td>33 (12.69)</td>
<td>43 (16.53)</td>
<td>76 (29.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>126 (48.46)</strong></td>
<td><strong>134 (51.51)</strong></td>
<td><strong>260 (100.00)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who agreed that it was the responsibility of particular organizations to negotiate with Myanmar for their safe repatriation believed it to be the role of UN agencies (42.3 %), multilateral organizations (29.23%), the RTG (14.23%), NGOs (7.3% ) and ASEAN (6.92%).
Chapter 6
THE LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION MECHANISMS

This chapter will summarize the various limitations and constraints on effective intervention mechanisms for durable solutions. Results of the baseline survey have also been examined to reveal the perceptions and suggestions put forward by the displaced persons who participated from the three targeted temporary shelters.

6.1 RTG Policy

The current policy environment means that displaced persons are likely to remain low on the national agenda in Thailand. Instead RTG policy will continue to be concerned with issues of national security, the impact of the displacement situation on Thai communities, avoiding conditions which create pull factors for new asylum seekers, as well as bilateral considerations (maintaining relations with Myanmar). Moreover, policy towards displaced persons remains contingent upon the overall political environment in Thailand. As a consequence, the policy of encampment remains in place today.

While all interviewed RTG officers were sympathetic and would like to see the situation of the displaced persons improve, as one interviewee described:

“Displaced persons have social problems, mental problems, issues with alcohol use and quarrelling among teenagers etc. No matter how well we take care of them, this is not real life. Children grow and graduate; and then what will they do?”

Many government officials have compassion for DPs and most of them understand the PRS clearly but they are keenly aware of RTG policy in relation to the shelters. This makes them reluctant to say or do anything outside regulation, particularly making any promise or personal commitment.

Some authorities viewed hosting DPs as a burden to Thailand - partly due to negative perceptions associated with the hosting of DPs. However in reality, the trends in durable solutions to refugee situations have been moving noticeably away from local integration in terms of actualized solution strategies, since the policy response by host countries has often been one of restriction of movement. Within this environment there has been no significant progress towards the DPs’ economic self-reliance or access to the labour market, and opportunities for higher education remain limited. This is contradictory to the UNHCR suggestion that sustained advocacy in line with the five-year strategic plan will help achieve a gradual opening of the temporary shelters and gain the Government's permission for displaced persons to work and move about more freely (UNHCR, 2010).

It seems that RTG will not be easily persuaded to change a policy which has been in place since the influx of Indochinese displaced persons in the 1970s. Policy guidelines of
RTG have not changed since that time (Lee, and Glaister, 2005), as reaffirmed by another Thai authority in an interview - “Thai Policy toward displaced persons never changes”. Consequently, until policies of encampment are altered in a significant way, there is little possibility that dependency on humanitarian aid can be reduced in the short term (TBBC, 2010). Restriction of movement directly affects the promotion of self-reliance among displaced persons. The program report of TBBC (TBBC 2005) revealed several constraints on agriculture inside the shelter which place restrictions on household food production such as physical limitations including location, population density, limited space and seasonal water supplies.

A further constraint to the promotion of self-reliance among displaced persons is the RTG policy which states, “All NGOs must submit an annual proposal to obtain permission to operate from the MOI”. Going through the processes of applying for approval each year hampers the ability of NGOs to promote self-reliance through long-term planning and alignment with funding support.

Long and tedious administrative processes also cause delays in the implementation of projects and programs. Navigating through the many and complex processes in place results in delays and causes ambiguity in the transparency and accountability of the system. It also raises doubts about standards of work such as the PAB process, which as mentioned previously, has implemented a pilot project to pre-screen new arrivals since 2009 but not yet released the results.

Government officials must comply with the National Security Policy A.D. 2007-2011 and the Management Strategy for the problem of the status and rights of individuals A.D 2005-2011, neither of which mention working opportunities for DPs. Perhaps emerging evidence from the livelihood pilot project evaluation by NGOs and this research study by ARCM will be useful to stimulate new policy development and strategic planning by the RTG.

Although Thailand has not ratified the Refugee Convention, it has ratified a number of other core international human rights treaties in the United Nations system that can confer protection to displaced people. The first treaty, namely Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified in 1985 to guarantee that men and women are treated equally by the state. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was then put in force in 1992 to protect all children in the state without discrimination. In 1996 the Thai state ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a significant treaty for the mechanisms of the United Nations system and one of the so-called International Bills of Human Rights. It describes every fundamental norm of human rights that all should respect and protect, especially civil and political rights. Another International Bill of Human Rights, ratified by Thailand in 1999, is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), focused on monitoring the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.

Only in 2003 did Thailand accept the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which especially applies to ethnic minorities. A monitoring function of those treaties is a reporting system to which state parties are obliged
to make periodic submissions. In 2007 Thailand ratified the Convention against Torture (CAT). The Convention aims to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Signatories are legally bound by these international mechanisms to apply international laws domestically, ensuring that no such domestic laws contradict ratified international human rights laws. However, it is clear that Thailand has not yet realized the legal requirements of international standards it has ratified (Napaumporn, 2008. United Nations Human Rights. International law). Even though Thailand has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, the aforementioned conventions cover the basic human rights, including the right to work of refugees for their self-reliance.

6.2 Characteristics of Funding Policy and Intervention Mechanisms

As discussed previously, there exists a disconnect between NGO and donor perspectives on the state of ‘emergency’ in the shelters. NGOs continue to believe the situation is an emergency, thus requiring that interventions provide for basic humanitarian needs. In contrast, some donors believe the emergency has ended, given the protracted nature of the situation. The EU’s reallocation of funds from ECHO to AUP development oriented projects is prime example, but this shift is also apparent in the decision of some donors to support activities within Myanmar itself. The impact here is that these different approaches require different technical capacities and resources on the part of the NGOs. Under a humanitarian umbrella, the funding process is commonly expedited in order to address the emergency nature of the situation. But within a development framework, proposals may be subject to a competitive bidding process which takes time and often necessitates the allocation of counterpart funding from the NGO. An example of the impact of this is that even though the reallocation of funds to AUP aims to increase support for the developmental approach, the proposals of not all current implementing NGOs will be approved and may result in discontinuity of their projects, including those aimed at the promotion of self-reliance.

However, new influxes of displaced persons have arrived from time to time over the years as the conflict inside Myanmar continues, even as recently as the end of 2010. This would indicate that the emergency situation is ongoing and needs emergency funding and skilled management for the delivery of timely humanitarian aid. Funding shortages and the dynamic of emergency may create new tensions among stakeholders.

Another constraint is the year by year funding process, inconsistent with the nature of development work which demands continuous funding or funding security. Each donor provides funds in line with their interest, rather than coordinating to ensure comprehensive funding. This may leave gaps in the development process, e.g. food insecurity.

6.3 Self-reliance and Livelihood Interventions

Although a community based service delivery model is helpful in strengthening the capacity of displaced persons to be self-reliant, it requires regular monitoring to ensure
accountability, especially in even ration distribution. Several interviewees raised the issue of the accuracy of rice distribution and the quality of some non-food items during group discussions and IDI, as described below.

“We doubt that we get the right amount of rice we should get. We went home and we measured it by our barrel (which has been used for years) and we found that the level of rice has decreased. It means we did not get the full amount of rice. Did they start cutting our ration? We heard that if (NGO) have no money, they will cut our rice.” Female displaced person.

“Refugees live in difficult conditions and have nothing much to eat. We should get the full amount of rice distribution. Otherwise it is not enough for us.” Female displaced person.

“Why do we get the pen without the ink? We cannot use it.” Male displaced person.

There are still ongoing challenges for achieving food security in the shelters. Even though NGOs try to promote agricultural projects through linking vocational training projects to community based production for food safety net programs, all studied shelters are crowded and did not have enough space to do so. Moreover, the limited number of trainees that can participate in each training course cannot meet the needs of displaced persons. Agriculture training courses take many months or years to complete, thus waiting periods are long and displaced persons sometimes lose interest. Some displaced persons would like to raise chickens but have heard that this has been prohibited due to the Bird flu (H5N1) pandemic.

Some service activities still follow the old model of relief, rather than a development model. This may be related to the current transition period and the need for more time to design relevant and appropriate activities so to encourage self-reliance of displaced persons.

“NGO field workers walk to distribute Sarong ¹ to displaced persons. The question is why they do not promote displaced people to produce it by weaving it. Is it because it may be more expensive?” Thai authority.

6.4 Stakeholder Relationships, Communication and Collaboration: Consideration of Expectations

The roles of various stakeholders in this protracted situation are inextricably linked. Thus, there is an absolute need for improved communication and collaboration among stakeholders in order to collectively identify appropriate durable solutions for displaced

¹ A sarong is a traditional use for Southeast Asian, large sheet of fabric wrapped around the waist and worn as a skirt.
persons. None of the suggested solutions can be effectively or sustainably implemented without the support of all stakeholder groups, especially the RTG. Opportunities for dialogue must be created to improve understanding among actors across the board, but achievement of this first demands better awareness and sensitivity towards the cultural context of the border situation and the organizational cultures of those involved.

It would appear that donor attempts to engage the RTG have been largely unsuccessful to date, causing some to attempt to seek unilaterally to change in the nature of assistance in the shelters. Take, for example, the withdrawal and reallocation of relief funds to target specific development projects. Without effective communication, this policy transition has been perceived as impulsive, forceful and an abandonment of a commitment to supporting basic needs in the shelters. Regardless of whether this is an accurate interpretation of the policy agenda, this sort of bold approach has led to miscommunication and the alienation of certain assistance partners.

This highlights a lack of cultural sensitivity, both towards the Thai context and organizationally, considering the breadth of actors involved in delivering assistance. Overt pressure from foreign countries to direct policy down a certain path, or else, will not succeed in garnering the RTG’s support.

Instead, as many stakeholders remarked in interview, working within the Thai context requires devoting time to building relationships that support ongoing communication flows, rather than limiting interactions to one-off official business meetings. It is important to identify common ground, to work together positively on areas of shared concern before moving forward to addressing more complex issues with a diversity of opinion.

Consensus exists that mutual understanding will be better facilitated via a forum with representation from all stakeholders – donors, NGOs, INGOs and the various agencies of the RTG. So at what point to donor, NGO and RTG policy goals converge? Donors whose assistance priorities greatly differed did agree that education and health are the areas in which common ground can be forged with the RTG. Engaging the Ministries of Education and Public Health to work with the NSC and MOI could create opportunities to allow displaced children to travel safely to study in Thai schools or to better integrate health services with the local community to avoid parallel systems and the duplication of effort.

Despite current frustrations, the only way for any solutions to truly be durable is for stakeholders to communicate and cooperate. While it will not solve all differences of opinion, attention to cultural context and the application of a considered approach which does not raise the defenses of any one party will greatly improve the collaborative environment among stakeholders. Finding areas of shared concern to address in the first instance is important for incremental change, which may pave the way for further cooperation.

6.5 Resettlement, Repatriation and Local Integration: The Remaining Challenges
for Effective Intervention Mechanisms

Resettlement

Many challenges remain to ensure effective intervention mechanisms. One such challenge is the current lack of a PAB process. This has direct effect on the availability of the resettlement option for displaced persons. There is no avenue for verifying whether the people coming into the shelters are genuine asylum seekers. Since there is no means for the authorities to identify people who could be resettled in third countries, the resettlement option is unfeasible at this point.

Without a PAB process, there is also no means of controlling the influx of people into the shelters. At present, any person who crosses the border from Myanmar and joins the shelter is considered a displaced person and is, therefore, entitled to the goods and services provided within the shelters. Despite the difficult conditions in the shelters, it is still preferable to the conditions in their home country and forms a fairly significant ‘pull’ factor. Without the ability to target goods and services to those in greatest need, the NGOs working directly in the shelters are burdened with providing goods and services to everybody.

Another challenge for the resettlement option is its direction as opinion varies among actors about it should continue or end due to its potential as a pull factor.

Repatriation

Almost all of the respondents do not perceive repatriation to be a viable solution at this point in time. It will only become viable when the conditions in Myanmar improve considerably such that its citizens do not live in fear and with the threat of violence. Respondents from donor countries cite that the Myanmar problem is an ASEAN concern and suggest its neighbours should have a stronger hand in pushing Myanmar for reforms. But the current hands-off position of ASEAN means this will not happen in the near future.

Local Integration

The number of restrictions placed on the shelters effectively makes them closed shelters. This is congruent with Thai national security concerns that are at the forefront of RTG displaced person policy agenda and in line with its latent policy to limit or stop the mainstreaming of displaced persons into local Thai communities. But all respondents cite these constraints as a major stumbling block in encouraging service integration where displaced persons can access basic services such as health and education through the Thai system as well as access some opportunities to earn a living. An easing, not lifting, of some of the restrictions would go a long way in the scaling up of NGO interventions as well as provide opportunities for collaborations between donor countries and the RTG at the policy and strategic level. An avenue that could be explored is the formulation of a comprehensive migration policy. This policy would include a PAB process that would effectively screen displaced persons entering the Thai border as well as a framework for service integration.
and restrictions on the movements of the displaced persons that are screened in into the Thai workplace.
Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has provided a range of perspectives on the roles of donors, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and UN agencies in providing humanitarian assistance to the DPs in shelters along the Thailand-Myanmar border. It has achieved this by examining the rationale behind international intervention, funding policies and organizational mandates; implementation strategies and the dynamics of cooperation among stakeholders; as well as the operating environment and impacts of this for effective intervention. Findings from both secondary data analysis and field study (quantitative and qualitative study) were consolidated and summarized as below. Practical and realistic recommendations are provided for policy options to reach durable solution for DPs in temporary shelters along Thai-Myanmar border.

7.1 Conclusions

1. Root causes

Internal conflict in Myanmar between ethnic minority groups and the Myanmar government has been ongoing with no sign of peaceful, mutual agreement since 1984. The result of continuing civilian population human rights violations due to this conflict has been massive flows of ethnic minority groups leaving their homelands and fleeing persecution from the Myanmar government and seeking asylum in Thailand. These people have not only lost their land, becoming displaced, but also become stateless persons upon seeking asylum in Thailand. Temporary shelters along Thai-Myanmar border were designated their temporary home, but in reality, encampment of more than 25 years is too long to be temporary. The prolonged confinement of DPs from Myanmar in temporary shelters and the restrictions imposed on them have not only affected their socio-psychological wellbeing but have also increased their dependence on external assistance. For those who have long left their homes, the chance for a safe and dignified return home is elusive; their hometowns remain only in bitter and aggrieved memories. Those who were born in the shelters have no past and future, only current life in the shelter. All DPs inside the temporary shelters have lost the opportunity for self-determination.

2. Funding Policy: Constraints and Impacts

Donor aid policy has been gradually shifting towards ‘linking relief and development’ since 2007. The European Commission has started scaling down EU contributions to the temporary shelters in Thailand. While the lack of financial commitment from donors to support multiyear funding and the realignment from emergency aid to a developmental model yield many challenges, the opportunity for self-reliance among DPs is entirely unsupported by the RTG policy. Whether aid flows will trend upwards or downwards in the next year cannot be predicted, as most donor countries stated that their assistance contributions rely on approval from their cabinet or congress. Moreover, some donor countries are still slowly recovering from recent
economic crisis and have not committed to any increase in support. Donor fatigue is not only caused by these factors, but is mainly due to the lack of progress, and a perception of little outcome for the money injected into the shelters. As the process is annual, this makes development planning very difficult as NGOs cannot predict what funds it will have at its disposal. As such, engagement in areas that require multiyear commitments, such as development and rehabilitation for returning DPs populations, are very difficult (Loescher & Milner, 2006; UNHCR, 2007). Funding shortages may also affect food security.

3. RTG Policy: Constraints and Impacts

Together with long influxes of Indochinese DPs, Thailand has had much experience in dealing with displaced people. The RTG policy mandate has not change since the beginning, premised upon temporary asylum and repatriation for DPs, preventing new influxes and restrictions on movement. Despite this, in practice the RTG seems somewhat more flexible and acts according to each situation. Policy change may only eventuate through the alignment of multiple factors, including those that relate not only to DPs. For example, in some instances, change develops from other internal Acts which confer protection to everyone in Thailand (e.g. rights of the child on birth certificate and education). According to RTG policy, the local integration strategy is not possible. However, the most recent developments in RTG policy are changes on the rights of the child. This also means that displaced persons who are born in the shelters are eligible for birth certificates from the Thai government.

Despite the RTG providing support to DPs in term of encouraging the initiatives of development programmers (health, education and vocational training) as proposed by NGOs, much remains to be done. First, government policies remain opaque and access to information on clearly directed policies for long term solutions for DPs is difficult. This, of course, rekindles other stakeholders’ suspicion of the government's commitment. Sometimes, though not always, this lack of transparency stems from traditional Thai bureaucratic attitudes of secrecy and in sharing information or concerns about ‘burden-shifting’. Second, there is still a gap in the donor–host government relationship that may affect cooperation for durable solutions.

Although Thailand has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, the nation has already ratified many core international human rights treaties in the United Nations system: CEDAW, CRC, ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD and CAT. As a signatory, Thailand is ‘legally bound’ as the state party to apply those international laws domestically. It is obvious that Thailand has not yet fulfilled the legal requirements of those ratified international standards.

4. Role of International Organisations

Within CCSDPT practice, administrative development is already in place in camp/project management by DPs. NGOs continue to be involved in the shelters under the same mandate that has not changed since the start; their core philosophy is humanitarian action and aid for people in need or those most vulnerable. Some of them viewed that the DPs situation is still a protracted emergency because of the potential for
large numbers DPs to continue to cross the border is quite likely as long as the
instability inside Myanmar persists. This is in contrast with other organizations who
perceived the emergency situation to be over, as so much time has passed and even
though there are still some new asylum seekers arriving shelters. However, considering
the number is not massive, this can be seen more as a *protracted displaced people
situation*, rather than an emergency. However, most NGO program activities have also
gradually changed to a development model. NGOs operations are constrained by RTG
policy and funding requirements from donors. UNHCR also has to cooperate with RTG
and work under RTG policy.

5. **Pilot Projects**

Donors are supporting the CCSDPT and the UNHCR in their efforts to
implement a five-year Strategic Plan to find durable solutions to expand the DPs' self-
reliance. Pilot projects have already started in most shelters in fields such as vocational
training, livelihood opportunities and healthcare integration (Eick, n.d). Most of the
pilot projects are small scale and subsistence level implement within the shelters only.
At the time of writing this study, these pilot projects are still going on, thus, the results
of program evaluation should be the lesson learned for further expanding.

6. **Five-year Strategic Plan**

UNHCR and CCSDPT have developed a five-year strategic plan for strategic
direction to durable solutions for DPs. It is selective durable solution that tends to focus
on local integration rather than comprehensive solution. The obvious constraint is the
ambitious expectation to think that the shelters would be opened immediately. This
needs to be a phased process with systems first in place.

Surprisingly, little discussion and attention has been paid to repatriation for DPs
at both national and international level, with a corresponding lack of investment in
strengthening the process of initiative planning. Some say that it is not the time to think
about the repatriation as conflict and human rights violation situation still going on
inside Myanmar. However, if following 25years of PRS is not the time to talk about,
when is? The occasion of spontaneous peace or democratic is very rare, if without the
international cooperation. Although repatriation is not an option at the moment, it is the
obligation and collective international responsibility to pressure the Myanmar regime to
create a good/ safe environment that people can return to in Myanmar. The ongoing
phenomenon of the influx of DPs from Myanmar has formed a protracted DPs situation
which will remain forever if the root cause of the problem is ignored by all
stakeholders. How long do we have to wait for the decline of protracted internal conflict
situation inside Myanmar? Is it time for repatriation to feature on the international
agenda?

7. **Stakeholder Relationship: Communication Gaps and different Cultural
   Background of Organization**
Relationship between donors and the RTG vary from donor to donor, depending on their approach, frequency of communication, manner, cultural sensitivity and equality. A lack of effective communication between donor groups themselves, between donors and RTG, and donor and NGOs prohibit information sharing and coordination process. Even though there is donor meeting forum, not every donor participates the meeting. There is no official forum meeting between donor and RTG. Between RTG and CCSDPT, most of NGOs working at the field level will participate in annual meeting with the MOI once a year only, while they deal with local authorities on a day-to-day basis and to drive more personnel relationships.

Lack of neutral communication forum: although the donors and RTG has no direct contact with each other and there are no other forums to engage between them. There is an expectation from some donors to see the RTG’s international cooperation and funding committed to the DPs but there is none in place. RTG avoids engagement by declining invitations or sending low level representation to high level meetings. While TBBC hosts retreats with UNHCR/CCSPDT and RTG, donors are not invited. Some thus view that those existing forums are not neutral as lead by organizations with their own agenda, and this is why some people choose not to participate.

7.2 Recommendations

Stakeholders in this displaced people situation should respond to a range of areas:

1. Donors

   • *A response that covers all categories of LRRD interventions*

     In keeping with principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, donors should together ensure that adequate funding is available to respond to the full spectrum of LRRD needs in the shelters and in planning. Commitment to multiyear funding support that aligns with development plans is required. The funding patterns of donors should reflect their humanitarian action responsibilities. If this condition proves difficult to achieve due to the conflicting foreign policy interests of each government, a coordinating body should be appointed to adopt a neutral role, independent from any influential organization, to coordinate among the donor group to produce a multiyear funding plan. Within this plan, each donor can fill a specific funding gap. A Partnership Program Agreement such as this should support a Multiyear Grants Scheme for LRRD projects of up to three to five years’ duration at least. This will require a commitment from donors to providing sufficient, ongoing funding to support the period of transition from relief to development programming, designed to develop the self-reliance of DPs. The donor group should identify categories of intervention in development with concordant principles, relevant to the CCSDPST strategy and with clear objectives to guide intervention. Donors should also reach agreement on each responsibility to ensure a response to all LRRD interventions proposed by CCSDPST.

   • *A holistic and comprehensive approach*

     Donors should approach displacement holistically, in both the original and host countries and in both the emergency and development phases. Donors should recognize
DPs and internally DPs as part of the same dynamic of forced migration, while providing for different responses, vulnerabilities and needs.

2. RTG

“When you wear a robe, you become the symbol of the Dharma, just as when you put on a police officer’s uniform, you become a symbol of the law, or you sit behind a teacher’s desk you become the symbol of authority. This can be a danger, but it also gives you the opportunity to think about how to work together with people to create a code of ethics in a community.”

Thich Nhat Hanh, 2010

The Royal Thai Government should disclose clear policy direction in regard to the self-reliance or development of DPs and provide suggestions or recommendations on the feasibility of project operations. The RTG should consider the current PRS and explore ways to adopt international law (through all ratified treaties) for DPs’ development. The PAB system should be reactivated as a priority to work more effectively in screening and determining DPS status so that new asylum seekers can access protection and basic needs and services, including resettlement options in a timely manner. The result of pre-screening pilot projects in four temporary shelters should be disclosed soon to demonstrate public accountability in a project conducted since 2009.

The RTG is encouraged to be more responsive to attempts by the donor and NGO community to collaborate on issues pertaining to DPs in the temporary shelters. Providing further clarity on the roles of different RTG agencies and individuals is an important first step to better engagement and improving understanding and cooperation among the stakeholder community. Moreover, human rights concepts and principles should be promoted to the relevant authorities to apply in practice. An action plan for DP development also should be developed. This is in the spirit of the Thailand National Security Policy and the ratification by the Thailand of various associated declarations and conventions on human rights. Therefore, policy formulation of a new Management Strategy for the Problem of the Status and Rights of Individuals should identify strategies and measures for development of DPs in terms of self-reliance at least. As the host government, the RTG together with partners such as CCSDPST, UNHCR, UNDP, must be open to participation based on the evidence and scientific research which proposes viable alternatives and identifies the need for common/mutual agreement and sincere participation in strategic planning to develop the self-reliance of DPs. This participative process is significant to all partners in that they will have a constructive working forum and an opportunity to together translate policy into implementation and sustainable practice.

The RTG also should lobby ASEAN countries to establish a peace dialogue with Myanmar in order to facilitate sustainable durable solutions in the future.
3. UNHCR/CCSDPST

These bodies are prime movers to facilitate coordination, consultation and collaboration with donors and high level of RTG representatives to obtain mutual agreement on development strategies for DPs, particularly the development of economic self-sufficiency. A concrete, realistic and comprehensive plan is needed which addresses short term, medium term, and long term (5 years or longer) planning.

Regular meetings should be scheduled between key executive stakeholders (donors, National Security Council, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant government agencies) at the policy level to promote communication and a positive, collaborative working environment.

- **Comprehensive Plan**
  
  CCSDPT/UNHCR and donors need to undertake a strategic reassessment of the appropriate mechanisms for dealing with the long term interests of the RTG in DPS development, i.e. the extent and feasibility of economic self-reliance in line with funding support in place. This will also require the engagement of civil society in advocacy with the RTG, with appropriate Thai and state culture representatives in discussions to support policy changes aimed at finding durable solutions (with specific objectives, e.g. economic DPs self-reliance). CCSDPST/UNHCR, donor, and RTG should together determine the meeting agenda and provide close coordination and a transparent process, using the principles of partnership. This can work through a working group which comprised of representatives of UNHCR/CCSDPT/UNDPS and RTG. However, the extent to which these actors will work together in partnership remains a challenging question.

  
  The strategic plan needs to balance and address all three options for durable solutions. Repatriation requires international cooperation to negotiate and advocate for peace building inside Myanmar. It requires a prime mover such as UNHCR to facilitate this process. Resettlement also should be addressed in terms of the agreement on policy direction needed from all partners; whether to sustain or end the program if it is seen to create pull factors or brain-drain. If resettlement continues to be a viable and desired option, ongoing advocacy with third countries is needed.

  
  Clarification and prioritization are also required to determine the nature and extent of self-reliance and interventions. What changes are needed? What does the strategic plan seek to change – the overall situation, conditions, attitudes or behaviors? Who will instigate change – service providers, communities or individuals?

  
  An ‘action plan’ is also needed which will guide transformation of the strategic into practice. This will require mutual acceptance of the plan among actors and clear definition of key terminology, e.g. local integration. The action plan must include activities, assumptions, indicators, time frames, responsibilities and a budget. It must identify short, medium and long term plans for advocacy at the international level to realize the three durable solutions; resettlement, self-reliance and repatriation.

- **Policy Formulation**
Given that the timeframe of the actual *Thailand National Security Policy* and *Management Strategy for the Problem of the Status and Rights of Individuals* will end this year, these policies must be revised. CCSDPST, UNHCR and/or UNDP should more active in establishing a consultative forum with the office of the National Security Council and propose research results on the feasibility of DP self-reliance to the RTG.

- **Pilot Projects**

Program evaluations are needed to assess outcomes and impacts on livelihoods, including the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of projects. Results will be used as a guide for further project design, planning and expansion.

4. **UNHCR**

The peace building process inside Myanmar requires the diplomatic efforts of the international community. The challenge is how to ensure the sensitivity of national and international human rights bodies and their continued active participation in finding solutions to the protracted DPs situation. Negotiation and dialogue to bring durable peace to Myanmar must be facilitated. The issue of the repatriation of DPs to Myanmar should be addressed in the international agenda to solicit international support and collaboration in conflict resolution and easing human rights violations inside Myanmar (peace-building initiatives). UNHCR should be the lead agency involved in the peace negotiation process, as it is its experience and mandate to provide both international protection and solutions for DPs. This process needs strong leadership to engage and facilitate national, regional and international advocacy efforts, i.e. from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), ASEAN, UNHCR exe-com, and the United Nations General Assembly.

5. **All Actors**

- The results of this study suggest that trust and cooperative relationships between key actors is critical. Working with various partners demands sensitivity and a commitment to honouring the cultural integrity of those we work with. All stakeholders must be ethical in their approach to working with their partners and the DPs.

- DPs development processes are complex. Designing activities and making sound policy and funding decisions require constant engagement and need true cooperation from donors, RTG and NGOs. There is still a long way to go in making these diverse partnerships more effective and improving coordination mechanisms. A mutually acceptable resolution of the DPs issue must be a common goal of all partners. Donors and NGOs need to better coordinate with and solicit sincere cooperation from the RTG in order to achieve more effective intervention mechanisms and results.

- There is a need for a forum of donors which meets at least annually with relevant RTG agencies. More channels for regular communication among the tripartite (RTG, donors and NGOs) are needed, with sensitivity and respect for cultural orientation prioritized and interactions based on trust and optimistic views of each other. This demands increasing communication flows, improving mutual trust and establishing
mechanisms for regular meetings (not just annual) to strengthen cooperation and communication between stakeholders.

- A more positive working atmosphere will be better facilitated by adjusting the language of displacement and durable solutions to use positive, productive phrases rather than those with negative connotations.
  - Responsibility sharing rather than burden shifting or burden sharing
  - Partnership and the application of partnership principles in working together
  - A mutually accepted definition of local integration which will inform its nature and extent
  - DPs self-reliance to replace local integration where it is the objective of development interventions. In some cases, integration can be used without reference to local, e.g. ‘integration with the existing service’.
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Annexes
Annex 1

Detailed Descriptions of Study Areas

1. Tham Hin, Suan Phung District, Ratchaburi Province

Tham Hin is the southern most temporary shelter in Thailand, also the shelter with the most cramped living conditions. Tham Hin is situated about 10km from the border with Myanmar. It is 53km (1 hour) from Ratchaburi Province, 295km (4.5 hours) from Sanklaburi District, Kanchanaburi Province and 270km from Bangkok (3 hours). The shelter covers an area of 44 rai\(^1\) or 70,400 square metres. Tham Hin was formed in May 1997 following offensives by the Myanmar military in Tenasserim Division, which caused extensive displacement of civilians across the Thailand-Myanmar border. Three temporary sites were established for the displaced persons: Huay Sot and Bor Wii in Suan Phung District, Ratchaburi Province, and Phu Muang in Danmakhamtia District, Kanchanaburi Province. Agreement was reached in April 1997 to move the three sites to the current shelter location, and this was completed two months later with an initial population of 7,202. In December 2001, with the closure of the UNHCR shelter for political DPs at Maneeloy, a new zone (Zone 4) was created for the remaining residents. In March 2005, about 400 Bangkok-based Persons of Concern (PoCs) who were registered with the UNHCR were transferred to Tham Hin as part of the RTG’s policy of ensuring all asylum seekers from Myanmar were based in shelters, rather than urban areas.

The shelter has never been attacked, though Myanmar army troop movements in the area have sometimes led to increased security awareness (Tham Hin: Thailand Burma Border Consortium [TBBC], n.d). There are 2,251 households in the shelter. The shelter population totalled 7,531 persons as of November 2010 (Burmese border displaced person, 2010), 51% male and 49% female. Residents are divided into five age groups: 21-65 years (41%), 6-18 years (35%), 5 and under (16%), 18-21 years (6%) and over 65 years (2%).

The majority of the shelter population is of Karen ethnicity (95%) and divided into two religions; Christian (90%) and Buddhist (9%). Karen is the native language (94%), however for those over the age of 18, several other languages are spoken: Burmese (63%), Thai (30%) and other (2%). The majority of the people living in the

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\(^1\) Rai is a unit of area, equal to 1,600 square metres (40 m × 40 m), used for measuring land area in Thailand. Retrieved from http://www.siam-legal.com/realestate/thailand-convert-rai-square-meters.php
shelter (aged 18 years and over) have a primary level education (41%), while some completed secondary school (35%) and others were never educated (22%).

The majority of the employed shelter population are involved in fishing, farming, or other agricultural activities. Involvement in the education sector is the next most common, either as professional teachers or trainers involved in adult education within the shelter. There are also a number of skilled laborers, including tailors, interpreters, mechanics and other professional services. A large number of shelter residents also have experience in the health sector, either as medics or nurses, or as trainers or water and sanitation workers. The remainder of the employed population work as daily-hired laborers, performing various, mainly manual tasks.

The vast majority of the population has likely had exposure to television and radio but limited experience with modern public transportation or other modern conveniences. Most are aware of television, radio, and the internet; however, their actual use of such equipment may be limited. The most common technology used is radio, with many of the DPs listening to radio stations from Myanmar (UNHCR, n.d. cited in International Rescue Committee, n.d).

2. Mae La Shelter, Tak Province

Mae La shelter is located in Ban Mae Oak Hoo, Mae La sub-district, Thasongyang district. The area is mostly clay and a stream called ‘Huay Oak Hoo’ passes through most parts of the shelter. Huay Oak Hoo is also the main water source for the people in the shelter. There are three zones, A-C, inside the shelter. It is situated 8km from the border and is about 57km or 1 hour from Mae Sot District. The shelter covers an area of about 1,150 rai (Burmese border displaced person, 2010) or 1,840,000 square meters.

The shelter was originally established in 1984 following the fall of the Karen National Union (KNU) base at Mae La, a Thai village on the border with a population of 1,100. Shortly afterwards, due to security concerns, the shelter was moved to the site where Zone C currently lies. After the fall of Manerplaw in January 1995, a number of shelters were attacked in cross-border raids and the Thai authorities began to consolidate shelters to improve security. Mae La was designated as the main consolidation shelter in the area.

In April 1995, Mae La increased in size from 6,969 to 13,195 due to the closure of five shelters to the north – Mae Ta Waw, Mae Salit, Mae Plu So, Kler Kho and Kamaw Lay Kho – and the move of Huay Heng later that year. Over the following year, the shelter doubled in size again to 26,629 as those lost in the move returned to the shelter. In March 1997 some DPs were relocated here following the
closure of Huai Bone shelter (aka Don Pa Kiang) and again in February 1998 when Shoklo shelter was closed. The shelter was attacked in 1997 by DKBA troops with support from Myanmar army units. There have been no incursions since then, but a mortar shell landed in Section A5 in March 1998. Every dry season, the area becomes tense with concerns relating to shelter security – threats of armed attack and/or attempts to burn the shelter.

Mae La is considered as a centre of studies for DPs, thus the current population includes several thousand students who come to study (some from other shelters but mostly from Myanmar). They are registered only as temporary inhabitants.

The Karen State situated opposite Mae La shelter is very rural with no large settlements or infrastructure. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) maintains its 7th Brigade Headquarters nearby, and there are several Myanmar army and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army outposts in the area (the DKBA is a faction of the KNLA which split off and aligned itself with the Myanmar military in 1994) (Mae La : Thailand Burma Border Consortium [TBBC], n.d).

As of November 2010 the shelter population had reached 46,673 (Burmese border displaced person, 2010). They are divided into three groups:

1) Persons who have been accepted by the Provincial Admission Board (PAB) as people who are fleeing from fighting in Myanmar and have been registered with UNHCR. Their number totals 32,906.

2) Persons who have been rejected by PAB and should to repatriate to Myanmar as they did not flee from fighting. However, as the conflict in Myanmar has continued, they have not been able to return. This group accounts for 9,034 people.

3) Persons awaiting submission to the Board - 137 people.

The largest age group is 18-59 year olds (47%), followed by 5-17 year olds (35%) and those less than 5 years (14%). The majority are Karen (97%) (Mae La : Thailand Burma Border Consortium [TBBC], n.d).

3. Ban Mai Nai Soi shelter, Mae Hong Son province

Ban Mai Nai Soi shelter, also known as Site 1, is situated 3km from the border and 26km (45 minutes) from Mae Hong Son (Ban Mai Nai Soi: Thailand Burma Border Consortium [TBBC], n.d). The first shelter here was set up in 1989 and has been moved many times. At one stage in August 1993, the shelter was moved across the border into Myanmar but was forced back in July 1995. It was moved to its present location in
March 1996. The shelter consists of two zones divided by 1.5km of protected forest; Ban Pang Kwai and Ban Pang Tractor.

In 2002 the Thai authorities made a decision to consolidate the Karenni shelters in Mae Hong Son by closing Ban Nai Soi, formerly Site 3, located 5 km down the hill from Site 1. Consequently, all 4,421 DPs were forced to relocate by February 2003 to Site 1 with logistical and technical support provided by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The majority of DPs settled in the area of Ban Tractor. As of November 2010, there are 15,121 DPs living in the shelter (Burmese border displaced person, 2010).

The majority of the shelter population is Karenni (94%). There are many Karenni ethnic subgroups in the shelter such as Paku, Kayah and Pa-O. The largest age group are those 18-59 years (47%), followed by 5-17 year olds (33%) (Ban Mai Nai Soi: Thailand Burma Border Consortium [TBBC], n.d). Both Christians and Buddhists live together in the shelter.
## Annex 2

**Details of Interviewees**

### Details of donor interviewees

**Table 1. Interviewees: Donor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister-Counsellor</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Project Team Leader and Programme Officer (Development)</td>
<td>Canadian Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Political Section/ DFID Political Officer</td>
<td>DFID, UK Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attache (Cooperation) Good Governance and Civil Society</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Secretary, Political</td>
<td>Norwegian Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission Counsellor (Political) and Senior Programme Officer</td>
<td>Royal Danish Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political &amp; Economic Affairs</td>
<td>Royal Netherland Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Humanitarian Aid Coordinator Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Swiss Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy DPs Coordinator for SEA and Assistant DPs Coordinator for SEA</td>
<td>USA Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 12 people</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total 8 donor government 1 international donor</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Interviewees: RTG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>RTG Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 high level</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Division Office of the Permanent Secretary for Interior, MOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Deputy Director Officers 2 Senior Deputy District Chiefs (Senior Deputy Director Officer)</td>
<td>3 District governors of 3 targeted temporary shelters, Department of Provincial Administration, MOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 high level, 1 officer</td>
<td>Operations Center for Displaced Persons (OCDP), MOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 high level 4 officers</td>
<td>National Security Council, Office of the Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 12 people</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total 2 Ministries</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Descriptions of the INGOs and UN agencies interviewees

Table 3. Interviewees: INGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>INGOs, UN agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Studied shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 executive</td>
<td>ARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 executive, 1 staff</td>
<td>2 staff 3 field workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 executive, 1 staff</td>
<td>1 staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 executive</td>
<td>1 field worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 executives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 executives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 executive, 1 staff</td>
<td>3 field workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Senior officer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Program Specialists</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Senior officer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 officer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 16 people</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total 10 people</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FGD and IDI with DPs

A total of 16 FGDs were conducted with 80 DPs: 40 female and 40 male in three selected temporary shelters from July to September 2010 as outlined below.

Table 4  Focus group discussions with DPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date 2010</th>
<th>Number of group interview</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>Temporary shelter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14 Jul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 Aug</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 Sep</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDIs were conducted with 18 DPs: 9 female and 9 male in the three targeted temporary shelters as table below.

Table 5 In-depth interviews with DPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (2010)</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>Temporary shelter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14 Jul</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 Aug</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 Sep</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3

DPs Respondent Characteristics

444 DPs respondents in three targeted temporary shelters were recruited in this study. 55.4% (246 respondents) were female and 44.6% (198 respondents) male.

Figure 1 Respondents characteristics

Mae La shelter hosts half of all respondents, with a further 25% living in both Tham Hin and Ban Mai Nai Soi.

Figure 2 Resident of temporary shelter
The majority of respondents are aged 25-59 years (68%).

**Figure 3 Age group**
Almost 69% of respondents are married.

**Figure 4 Marital Status**

![Marital Status Chart]

Almost 57% of respondents are registered as DPs, while 33% are non-registered and the rest PAB.

**Figure 5 Status of Respondents**

![Status of Respondents Chart]
Karen (S’gaw) is the largest ethnic group (48%) among respondents.

Figure 6 Ethnicity
The largest group (41%) has lived in the shelters between 11-20 years.

**Figure 7 Length of Stay Inside Shelter**
56% of respondents are Christian and 31% are Buddhist.

**Figure 8 Religion**

75% of respondents were literate and of these, 68% had graduated from Myanmar rather than within the temporary shelter.

**Figure 9 Education**
Of the literate respondents who had graduated from Myanmar, 50.7% reached middle school level.
Around half (51.4%) of the respondents reported the current number of people in their household to be 5-8 persons, while 38.4% share with 1-4 persons.

**Figure 10 Household member**
Figure 11 Birth place

47.3% were born in the Karen state.

Figure 12 Income per month

52% of respondents are employed and 48.1% earn between 501-1,500 baht per month.
Figure 13 Language used in interviews

37.4% of Thai-Karen language was used during interview.
Annex 4
Key Informant Interview Questions

1. What are the current and future policy directions of your organization? What are the dynamics, needs and constraints of funding to grantees/ displaced people?

1. Please tell us about the working philosophy or objectives of your organization. When did your organization begin supporting displaced persons from Myanmar?
2. Do you feel it is still an emergency situation to support the displaced persons from Myanmar after more than 20 years? Why or why not?
3. What was your policy mandate at the beginning of the emergency? Since the beginning of your work has there been any policy mandate shift? If yes, when did this happen? What has changed and why? What are the factors that have changed? What are the strengths, limitations and impacts of those changes?
4. Do you think the current policy has worked so far? Why and Why not? What are the different impacts of the current policy in terms of gender?
5. What type of funding aid do you fund (bilateral or multilateral aid) and since when? If funding is bilateral aid, are the most of the funds earmarked assistance?
6. How much do you fund in each year? What of the trends in funding, is it static or is there change, for what reason?
7. Who are your grantees? How do you decide who should get your support? Please explain the structure and linkage with those NGOs (such as UN agencies or CCSDPT). When did this relationship begin?
8. What is your perception of the meaning “refugee aid and development approach”?
9. What is the concept of “self-reliance of refugees”? How will this concept lead to durable solutions?
10. What strategies do you employ to encourage your grantees and government authorities, to make commitments to linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)? What factors limit the progress of LRRD?
11. Is there an oversight system to verify the accountability of your grantees? If yes, how?
12. Do you have any plans which specify certain timeframes or criteria for phasing out support for these displaced people? Why and why not?

2. What strategy does your organization apply to cooperate with the Royal Thai Government (RTG)?
1. How and how often do you cooperate /work with the RTG?
2. Is the relationship with the RTG easy? Please Explain.
3. How does your organization manage and/or cope with RTG requests? On which issues does your organization and RTG easily find agreement? On which issues do you disagree?
4. What RTG policy constraints does your organization face in term of developing an intervention program for durable solutions for displaced people? Are there any positive ones?
5. Since the beginning of your work, what RTG policy/regulations have been shifted or changed? What are the factors? What are the impacts of those changes?
6. What contribution was provided by your organization to the RTG policy/regulation shift?
7. What kinds of lessons learned are useful for working effectively with the RTG?
8. What challenges have you identified in implementing with the RTG?
9. Do you think the stakeholders involved will cooperate more deeply to obtain better results in the future? Are there conflicting interests or perspectives?
Questionnaire for “Sustainable Solutions to the Displaced People Situation along the Thai-Myanmar Border”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of the temporary shelter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Tham Hin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ban Mai Nai Soi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mae La</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Language used during the interview

- 1. English-Karen
- 2. Thai-Karen
- 3. English-Burmese
- 4. Thai-Burmese
- 5. English-Karenni
- 6. Thai-Karenni
- 7. Other (specify) 

Notes
Demographic Information

1. Status of respondent
   - [ ] Registered
   - [ ] Non-Registered
   - [ ] PAB/Others

2. Sex
   - [ ] Male
   - [ ] Female

3. Age

4. Birth place
   - [ ] Karen State
   - [ ] Kayah State
   - [ ] Thanithayi/Tavoy State
   - [ ] Shan State
   - [ ] Mon State
   - [ ] Kachin State
   - [ ] Born in Temporary Shelter in Thailand
   - [ ] Other (specify)

5. Marital status
   - [ ] Single
   - [ ] Married
   - [ ] Widowed
   - [ ] Divorced/Separated
   - [ ] Other (specify)

6. Highest level of education
   - [ ] Never attended school
   - [ ] Primary school in Myanmar (Kindergarten – Standard 4)
   - [ ] Middle school in Myanmar (Standard 5-8)
   - [ ] High school in Myanmar (Standard 9-10)
   - [ ] Primary school in the temporary shelter
   - [ ] Secondary school in the temporary shelter (Standard 7-10)
   - [ ] Post-10 Course
   - [ ] College/University
   - [ ] Non-formal education
   - [ ] Vocational training
   - [ ] Other (specify)

7. Ethnicity
   - [ ] Karen (Pwo)
   - [ ] Karen (S’gaw)
   - [ ] Karenni
   - [ ] Kachin
   - [ ] Mon
   - [ ] Pa-O

Survey Questionnaires by Asian Research Center for Migration (ARCM), Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University
7. Burmese မျိုးပညာ  
8. Arakan အရှီ  
9. Shan ရွမ်း  
10. Rohingya ရာဟင်ဂ်ာ  
11. Other (specify)  
12. Unknown မသိပါ  

8. Religion စိုးပေါင်း  
1. Animist နေနိုင်ငံ  
2. Buddhist သေဘာသာ  
3. Christian ခရစ်ယာန်  
4. Muslim မူစလင်  
5. No Religion ဘာသာမရြိ  
6. Other (specify)  

9. Current or last occupation ယူဆပြီး  
1. Employed အလုပ်လုပ်သူ  
2. Self-employed ကိုယ်လျော်သူ  
3. Unemployed အလုပ်မရာ  
4. Student နိုင်ငံတကာ  

10. Length of stay in the Temporary Shelter ဝါးရိုးတွေ့ရှိသင့်ပြီး  ပိုင်းချင်း  

11. Number of current family members in household အိမ်အတွင်းရှိ  

12. If you had your preference in the future, where would you like to go after you finish your stay in the Temporary Shelter? မျိုးလေ့လာနိုင်ငံလေ့လာသင့်ပြီး  
1. Stay in Thailand ထုိင်းနိုင်သင့်ပြီး  
2. Resettlement country သို့မဟုတ်  
3. Hometown in Burma ပင်လယ်ရှည်လိုက်သင့်ပြီး  
4. Other safe area in Burma သို့မဟုတ်  

Policy Survey Questions ကူညီအခြေခံ  
13. What is your primary reason for remaining in the Temporary Shelter? မျိုးလေ့လာနိုင်ငံလေ့လာသင့်ပြီး  

14. Do you feel physically safe staying in the Temporary Shelter? မျိုးလေ့လာနိုင်ငံလေ့လာသင့်ပြီး  
1. Safe ပိုင်းချင်း  
2. Fair ကျမ်းကျခွား  
3. Unsafe မျိုးလေ့လာသင့်ပြီး
15. How would you characterize your relationship with the Thai authorities in the Temporary Shelter? (ความสัมพันธ์ของท่านกับเจ้าหน้าที่ของไทยเป็นอย่างไร)

1. □ Very good (ดีมาก) 2. □ Good (ดี) 3. □ Fair (ธรรมดา) 4. □ Poor (ไม่ดี) 5. □ Very poor (ไม่ดีมาก)

16. If you face difficulties while staying in the Temporary Shelter, whom do you turn to for help? List from first 3 priority (1=most) (ถ้าท่านมีปัญหาในสถานที่พักพิงท่านไปขอความช่วยเหลือจากใคร ถึงลำดับที่ 3 ลำดับ (1=มากที่สุด))

1. □ Temporary Shelter committee (กรรมการศูนย์ฯ) 2. □ Religious leader (ผู้นำศาสนา) 3. □ Community leader (ผู้นำชุมชน) 4. □ NGO staff (เจ้าหน้าที่องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชน) 5. □ Thai authorities (เจ้าหน้าที่ของไทย) 6. □ Other, specify (อื่นๆระบุ……………….)

17. When you have needed assistance from the Thai authorities, how have you approached them? (ถ้าท่านต้องการความช่วยเหลือจากเจ้าหน้าที่ของไทย ท่านติดต่อเจ้าหน้าที่อย่างไร)

1. □ Contacted directly (ติดต่อโดยตรง) 2. □ Through Temporary Shelter committee (ติดต่อผ่านกรรมการศูนย์ฯ) 3. □ Through NGO staff (ติดต่อผ่านเจ้าหน้าที่องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชน) 4. □ Through other community member (ติดต่อผ่านคนในชุมชน) 5. □ Did not attempt to approach them (ไม่ติดต่อ)

18. What do you think towards policies/regulation on well-being in the Temporary Shelter? (ท่านคิดว่านโยบาย/ระเบียบที่ดีในศูนย์พักพิงเป็นอย่างไร)

1. □ Good (ดี) 2. □ Fair (ธรรมดา) 3. □ Poor (ไม่ดี) 4. □ Very poor (ไม่ดีมาก)

19. What do you think towards the following policies/regulation in the Temporary Shelter? (ท่านคิดว่านโยบาย/ระเบียบที่ดีในศูนย์พักพิงด้านต่างๆต่อไปนี้เป็นอย่างไร)

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<tr>
<th>Policies/Regulation</th>
<th>1. Good (ดี)</th>
<th>2. Fair (ธรรมดา)</th>
<th>3. Poor (ไม่ดี)</th>
<th>5. No idea (ไม่มีความเห็น)</th>
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<tr>
<td>19.1 Healthcare สาธารณสุข</td>
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<td>19.2 Education การศึกษา</td>
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<td>19.3 Security control of the Temporary Shelter การควบคุมความมั่นคงปลอดภัยของศูนย์ฯ</td>
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20. What do you think towards the following policies/regulation? (ท่านมีความเห็นต่อนโยบาย/ระเบียบของรัฐบาลไทยในด้านต่างๆต่อไปนี้อย่างไร)

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<tr>
<td>20.1 Resettlement in third countries การไปตั้งถิ่นฐานในประเทศที่สาม</td>
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<td>20.2 Security control of the Temporary Shelter การควบคุมความมั่นคงปลอดภัยของสุนัข</td>
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<td>20.3 Allow working opportunity inside the temporary shelter only การอนุญาตให้ท่านทำงานได้เฉพาะในสุนัขพักพิง</td>
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<td>20.4 Integration Temporary Shelter resident to local community การผสมกลมกลืนคนในสุนัขพักพิงกับชุมชนท้องถิ่น</td>
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21. What do you think towards the RTG restriction of movement for Temporary Shelter resident? (ท่านคิดว่านโยบาย/ระเบียบของรัฐบาลไทยเกี่ยวกับการห้ามออกไปนอกสุนัขพักพิงเป็นอย่างไร)

1. [ ] Totally agree เห็นด้วยอย่างมาก 2. [ ] Agree เห็นด้วย 3. [ ] Disagree ไม่เห็นด้วย 4. [ ] Totally disagree ไม่เห็นด้วยอย่างมาก 5. [ ] No policy/regulation ไม่มีนโยบาย/ระเบียบ

22. Which policy do you want to be changed as first priority? (ท่านต้องการให้มีการเปลี่ยนแปลงนโยบาย/ระเบียบด้านใดเป็นลำดับแรก)

1. [ ] Restricted movement (การออกไปนอกสุนัขพักพิง) 2. [ ] Education (ด้านการศึกษา) 3. [ ] Employment (โอกาสในการทำงาน) 4. [ ] Resettlement (การไปตั้งถิ่นฐานในประเทศที่สาม) 5. [ ] Integration to Thai community (การผสมกลมกลืนคนในสุนัขพักพิงกับชุมชนท้องถิ่น)

23. What has been the most significant policy/regulation change during your stay in the Temporary Shelter? (ระยะเวลาที่อยู่ในสุนัขพักพิง ท่านเห็นความเปลี่ยนแปลงนโยบาย/ระเบียบของรัฐบาลไทยด้านใดมากที่สุด)

1. [ ] Educational opportunities (ด้านการศึกษา) 2. [ ] Vocational trainings (การฝึกอาชีพ) 3. [ ] Security protections (การคุ้มครองความปลอดภัย) 4. [ ] Employment opportunities (การจ้างงาน) 5. [ ] Other, specify (อื่นๆ ระบุ .................................)
III. Roles of donors, international organizations, non-government organizations and UN agencies in providing humanitarian assistance to the Displaced People บทบาทของแหล่งทุน องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนในประเทศและระหว่างประเทศ และหน่วยงานของสหประชาชาติในการให้ความช่วยเหลือด้านมนุษยธรรมแก่ผู้ลี้ภัย

24. Currently, how much do you depend on the aid of the NGOs? (ปัจจุบันนี้ท่านต้องพึ่งพาความช่วยเหลือจากเอ็นจีโอมากน้อยเท่าไร)

1. □ Totally dependent (พึ่งพิงทุกเรื่อง)
2. □ Partially, food, shelter and jobs (บางส่วน เช่นอาหาร ที่พักอาศัยและงาน)
3. □ Very little, only food and shelter (พึ่งพิงเล็กน้อย เพียงแค่อาหารและที่พักอาศัยเท่านั้น)
4. □ Don’t know/ No idea (ไม่รู้ ไม่มีความเห็น)

25. Would you like to get opportunity to become more self-reliant? (ท่านอยากมีโอกาสขับเคลื่อนเพื่อพึ่งพาตนเองได้หรือไม่)

1. □ Yes (ตอบคําถามข้อ 26 ให้ตอบทันที)
2. □ No (ข้ามไปตอบข้อ 27)
3. □ Don’t know (ข้ามไปตอบข้อ 27)

26. In which way would you like to become more self-reliant? (ท่านคิดว่าจะขับเคลื่อนเพื่อพึ่งพาตนเองโดยวิธีใด)

1. □ I want to work inside or outside the Temporary Shelter (ต้องการทํางานภายในหรือภายนอกค่าย)
2. □ I want to study more and/or learn a new job (ต้องการเรียนต่อหรือได้รับการฝึกอบรมเกี่ยวกับงาน)
3. □ I would like to get Thai documents to stay here (อยากได้รับเอกสารเพื่อพักอยู่ในประเทศไทย)
4. □ I just want to go back to my country (อยากกลับบ้าน)
5. □ I would go anywhere else in a safe country (ไปประเทศไหนก็ได้ที่ปลอดภัย)

27. What do you think about the following NGOs services? (please in the box that you choose) ท่านคิดว่าบริการขององค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนด้านต่างๆต่อไปนี้เป็นอย่างไรบ้าง (ใส่ □ ลงในช่องที่เป็นความเห็นของท่าน)

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<tr>
<td>27.1 Food อาหาร</td>
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<td>27.2 Shelter items ที่อยู่อาศัย</td>
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<td>27.3 Health (clinic) บริการด้านสุขภาพ</td>
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<td>27.4 Sanitation ด้านสุขาภิบาล</td>
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<td>27.5 Education ด้านการศึกษา</td>
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<td>27.6 Vocational training การอบรมต้านอาชญา</td>
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<td>27.7 Income generation การสร้างรายรับ (สร้างรายได้)</td>
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<td>27.8 Gender training activities กิจกรรมการฝึกอบรมด้านเพศสภาพ</td>
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<td>27.9 Violence against women and children prevention activities กิจกรรมต้านความรุนแรงต่อสตรีและเด็ก</td>
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<td>27.10 Legal assistance การให้ความช่วยเหลือด้านกฎหมาย</td>
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28. When do you think you won’t need anymore those services (as above question)?

☐ Never, we need the NGOs to take care of our health and others (everything)
☐ Only when we can access the local services
☐ whenever we can take care of ourselves
☐ Any time
☐ Don’t Know

29. Do you know why these organizations are helping you?

☐ They want to help people in need
☐ Because I can not help myself.
☐ They benefit from their services
☐ It is their business
☐ Don’t Know

30. Do you think the donors will ever stop their support to the NGOs?

☐ Never, as long as we are here
☐ Long time in the future when they want to support other country
☐ Soon, because they have helped us for too long
☐ Don’t know

31. What will you do if the donors stop sending funds for the NGOs?

☐ We want to work to support ourselves
☐ We will ask them not to stop
☐ Other organizations will come after them for helping us
☐ Repatriation with guarantee security
☐ Don’t know

32. Do you think that it should have any organizations to negotiate with your original country to take you home with security?

☐ No. (skip to answer 34)
☐ Yes. (please answer next question)

33. Please specify (can choose more than 1)

☐ UN agencies
☐ ASEAN
☐ Royal Thai Government

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IV: Resettlement Questions

34. Are you aware of the Resettlement Program? (ท่านทราบเกี่ยวกับโครงการตั้งถิ่นฐานหรือไม่?)

1. Yes ทราบ (If yes, from which source(s) ท่านทราบ จากแหล่งข้อมูลใด) 2. No ไม่ทราบ (If no, skip to Question 39)

1.1 Temporary Shelter commanders/Thai officials (ผู้ประสานงานในศูนย์พักพิง / เจ้าหน้าที่)
1.2 Friends/Relatives (เพื่อน / ญาติ)
1.3 NGOs (องค์กรเอกชน)
1.4 Informants who are knowledgeable about resettlement (คนในแคมป์ที่รู้ข้อมูล)
1.5 Others (อื่นๆ)

35. Have you ever applied to the Program? (ท่านเคยสมัครโครงการตั้งถิ่นฐานหรือไม่?)

1. Yes (ใช่) 2. No (ไม่)

If Yes, when did you apply? (ถ้าเคยสมัครเมื่อไหร่)

1. Less than 1 month (น้อยกว่า 1 เดือน)
2. 1-3 months (1-3 เดือน)
3. 4-6 months (4-6 เดือน)
4. More than 6 months (มากกว่า 6 เดือน)

If No, why? (ถ้าไม่ได้สมัคร ตอบได้มากกว่า 1 ข้อ)

For those who used to apply for resettlement, please answer 36 and 37. (สำหรับผู้ที่เคยสมัครโครงการตั้งถิ่นฐาน กรุณาตอบข้อ 36-38)

36. Did you feel you received adequate information to make an informed decision about resettlement? (ท่านคิดว่าท่านได้รับข้อมูลเพียงพอในการตัดสินใจที่จะไปตั้งถิ่นฐานหรือไม่)

1. Yes (ใช่) 2. No (ไม่ใช่) 3. Don’t know (ไม่ทราบ)

37. In case you have been accepted, have you ever withdrawn/declined to be resettled? (ในกรณีที่ท่านได้รับการตอบรับเข้าโครงการแล้ว ท่านเคยขอถอนตัว / ปฏิเสธที่จะไปตั้งถิ่นฐานหรือไม่)

1. Yes (ใช่) 2. No (ไม่)

38. What finally made you choose to apply for resettlement? (อะไรเป็นเหตุผลสําคัญที่ท่านเลือกที่จะสมัครเข้าโครงการตั้งถิ่นฐาน)

1. Hope for a better future in another country (มีความหวังที่จะมีอนาคตที่ดีกว่าในประเทศอื่น)
2. Frustration about life in the Temporary Shelter (ไม่พอใจชีวิตในศูนย์พักพิง)
3. Acceptance of inability to return to Myanmar (ไม่เห็นหนทางที่จะได้กลับไปพม่า)
4. No other better options (ไม่มีทางเลือกอื่นใดที่ดีกว่า)
5. Other, specify……………..(อื่นๆ)

39. Are you informed how frequently has the resettlement program been Temporary Shelterained in the Temporary Shelter? (ในศูนย์พักพิงมีการประกาศโครงการการรับไปตั้งถิ่นฐานย่อยมากน้อยแค่นี้)

1. □
2. □
3. □
4. □

Every day (ทุกวัน)   Every week (ทุกอาทิตย์)   Every month (ทุกเดือน)   Others..............(อื่นๆ)

40. Do you think that resettlement is the best option, at this time, for those living in the Temporary Shelter? (ท่านคิดว่าการไปตั้งถิ่นฐานเป็นทางเลือกที่ดีที่สุดหรือไม่นั้นสำหรับผู้ที่อาศัยอยู่ในศูนย์พักพิง)

1. □
2. □
3. □

Yes (ใช่)   No (ไม่ใช่)   Don’t know (ไม่ทราบ)

41. If you were to choose the resettlement country, which country would you choose? (หากท่านสามารถเลือกประเทศที่จะไปตั้งถิ่นฐานได้ ท่านจะเลือกประเทศไหน)

1. □ United States (สหรัฐอเมริกา)
2. □ Japan (ญี่ปุ่น)
3. □ Canada (คานาดา)
4. □ Australia (ออสเตรเลีย)
5. □ Norway (นอร์เวย์)
6. □ Other (please specify……………..) (อื่นๆ ระบุ……………………………)

42. Why did you choose to be settled to the mentioned country? (Select one the most significant factor) (เหตุใดท่านจึงเลือกที่จะไปตั้งถิ่นฐานในประเทศนั้น)

1. □ Many people from your community/ethnic group? (มีคนจากชุมชนเดี่ยวกัน / กลุ่มชาติพันธุ์เดียวกันอาศัยอยู่)
2. □ Education opportunity (มีโอกาสได้ศึกษาเล่าเรียน)
3. □ Generous welfare (มีสวัสดิการพร้อมทุกด้าน)
4. □ Job opportunities (มีโอกาสได้ท้างาน)
5. □ Have friends and family member in the country (มีเพื่อนและสมาชิกในครอบครัวอยู่ที่ประเทศนั้นแล้ว)
6. □ Good climate and weather (ภูมิอากาศดี)
7. □ Others (อื่นๆ)

43. From what you have heard, how do those who have been resettled generally feel about their choice? (จากข้อมูลที่ท่านได้รับทราบ ผู้ที่ได้ตัดสินใจไปตั้งถิ่นฐานแล้วโดยมากไปรู้สึกอย่างไรกับการตัดสินใจในการไปตั้งถิ่นฐาน)
44. Do you think that the resettlement program has had a positive or negative impact on the Temporary Shelter? (ท่านคิดว่าโครงการรับไปตั้งถิ่นฐานมีผลกระทบในแง่บวกหรือแง่ลบต่อศูนย์พักพิง)

1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □

Positive (น่าพอใจ) Negative (น่าทałา) Don’t know (ไม่ทราบ)

If negative please proceed to 44.1
If positive please proceed to 44.2

44.1 Please put 1 – 5 on the following negative impacts from most to least

(1-most impact to 5-least impact) โปรดเรียงลำดับผลกระทบในแง่ลบจากมากไปน้อย จำนวน 5 เรื่อง

1. □ Reduction in quality for Temporary Shelter services (ปริมาณค่าที่มีอยู่ในศูนย์พักพิงลดลง)
2. □ Less effective Temporary Shelter administration (การบริหารงานในศูนย์พักพิงจะมีประสิทธิภาพลดลง)
3. □ Loss of ethnic solidarity (สูญเสียความเป็นปึกแผ่นของชาติพันธุ์)
4. □ Negative emotional environment in the Temporary Shelter (ผลกระทบทางจิตใจและอารมณ์ในด้านลบต่อผู้ที่อยู่ในศูนย์พักพิง)
5. □ Brain drain / Loss of skilled workers (สมองไหล/การสูญเสียแรงงานที่มีทักษะ)
6. □ Separation of family members (สมาชิกในครอบครัวต้องแยกกันอยู่)

44.2 Please put 1-5 on the following positive impacts from most to least

(1-most impact to 5-least impact) โปรดเรียงลำดับผลกระทบในแง่บวกจากน้อยไปมาก จำนวน 5 เรื่อง

1. □ Reduced crowding (ลดความแออัดในศูนย์พักพิง)
2. □ Remittances from resettled persons (มีรายได้จากเงินส่งกลับของผู้ที่ไปตั้งถิ่นฐาน)
3. □ Better education or health programs (มีโอกาสได้ศึกษาหรือเข้าร่วมโครงการด้านสุขภาพ)
4. □ More livelihood opportunities in the Temporary Shelter (มีโอกาสการดํารงชีวิตที่มากกว่าการมีชีวิตในศูนย์พักพิง)
5. □ Positive emotional environment in the Temporary Shelter (ส่งผลต่อจิตใจและอารมณ์ในแง่บวกต่อผู้ที่อยู่ในศูนย์พักพิง)

Resettlement Questions for those already Accepted for Resettlement

45. Did you find the application process difficult? (ท่านพบว่าขั้นตอนการรับสมัครยากหรือไม่)

1. □ Yes (ใช่) 2. □ No (ไม่) 3. □ No opinion (ไม่มีความเห็น)

46. How long have you been waiting for resettlement beginning with the start of the application process until today? (ท่านต้องรอคอยนานเพียงใดในการสมัครเข้าโครงการตั้งถิ่นฐานนับจากวันเริ่มต้นสมัครจนถึงวันจดบัน)

1. □ Less than 1 month (น้อยกว่า 1 เดือน) 2. □ 1-3 months / เดือน 3. □ 4-6 months / เดือน
4. □ More than 6 months / เดือน

47. Do you feel adequately prepared vocationally for life in your resettlement country? (ท่านคิดว่าได้รับการเตรียมความพร้อมทางอาชีพเพื่อการดํารงชีวิตในประเทศที่ท่านไปตั้งถิ่นฐานหรือไม่)

Survey Questionnaires by Asian Research Center for Migration (ARCM), Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University
1. Yes (ใช่) 2. No (ไม่) 3. Don’t know (ไม่ทราบ)

48. Do you feel confident in your ability to communicate in language in your resettlement country? (ท่านรู้สึกมั่นใจในความสามารถในการใช้ภาษาในประเทศที่ไปตั้งถิ่นฐานหรือไม่)
1. Yes (ใช่) 2. No (ไม่) 3. Unsure (ไม่แน่ใจ)

49. Do you plan on sending remittances to relatives in the Temporary Shelters or in Myanmar? (ท่านวางแผนที่จะส่งเงินกลับไปให้ญาติในศูนย์พักพิงหรือในพม่าหรือไม่)
1. Yes (ใช่) 2. No (ไม่) 3. Unsure (ไม่แน่ใจ)

50. What is your major concern about life in your resettlement country? (ข้อใดเป็นสิ่งที่ท่านกังวลมากที่สุดในการใช้ชีวิตในประเทศที่ไปตั้งถิ่นฐาน)
1. Colder climate (อากาศที่หนาวเย็น)
2. Difficulty to adjust to the new culture / disconnection from community/culture (ความยากลำบากในการปรับตัวให้เข้ากับวัฒนธรรมใหม่ / การที่ต้องถูกตัดขาดจากชุมชน / วัฒนธรรมของตนเอง)
3. Inability to communicate (ไม่สามารถสื่อสารภาษาได้)
4. Lack of ability to find employment (ขาดความสามารถในการหางาน)
5. Safety (ความปลอดภัย)
6. Homesick (คิดถึงบ้าน)

51. What type of job would you like to do in your resettlement country? (งานประเภทใดที่ท่านต้องการท่าในประเทศที่รับไปตั้งถิ่นฐาน)
1. Agricultural (งานด้านเกษตร)
2. Manufacturing (งานอุตสาหกรรม)
3. Public/social service (งานด้านบริการสาธารณะ / สังคม)
4. Office work (งานสำนักงาน)
5. Services (Retail/restaurant) (งานบริการ ค้าปลีก / ร้านอาหาร)
6. Domestic work (Housekeeping) (ทาทำงานบ้าน)