“There seems no way out of the Burma problem... We've been trying very hard for the past 10 years to engage Burma but we haven’t succeeded. We are trying to continue the process, but there seems to be no change in the NLD and military stances. They are totally confronting each other and it's very hard to imagine any substantial change could be made in the future.” An Asian diplomat quoted in the Bangkok Post December 9, 1999
At the center of Burma Issues' ideology is the desire to build a long-term, people-based movement which places priority on action at the village level. For change to occur, attitudes need to change from the grassroots up. The difficulty is in stimulating and enhancing this change. Furthermore, while this is a long term goal, finding suitable courses of action in the short term can be difficult. Certainly a central component to any change needs to be based in grassroots education programmes. The Children's Education Programme is such a project. It focuses on curricular and educational change as a mechanism for shifting children's perceptions of the conflict in Burma, so that in the future they will be better equipped to find positive solutions.

The Problem
During a number of visits to the Tham Hin refugee camp near the Burma-Thai border, it was observed that few books in Karen language were available for use in the schools. What few existed were of no interest to the school children. As this problem was first observed in the Karen communities, the Karen children were the initial target group. Since then, books have been produced in Burmese and Karenni, and the success of the project has led to expansion into other languages. This lack of teaching materials is in itself remarkable. It is obviously not due to a failing or weakness of the ethnic peoples themselves. Rather these problems have come about as a consequence of the displacement of people and the ongoing ethnic conflict. The Burmese government has generally discouraged the speaking and teaching of the ethnic minority's languages, including Karen. Many Karen people describe it as a systematic assault on their culture and language. What is beyond doubt is that the displacement of people from Burma has disrupted the education of many people. While many activists talk of maintaining and preserving the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups, little money, and few materials are available to realise this goal. Whatever the reasons, the simple reality is that it has become extremely difficult for ethnic children to receive a quality education in their own language. Some NGOs have addressed the issue of adult literacy, others are engaged in providing education outside the refugee camps, often focussing on ethnic groups. But these efforts do not address the need to provide adequate new teaching materials. There had simply been nobody seeking to address this problem.

Solutions
So here was a simple problem, that seemingly had a simple answer. Design and provide books that would interest children and people to teach and speak their own languages.

In response to these problems, Burma Issues formed a strategy. The opportunity to encourage literacy among children was also seen as an opportunity to address the root causes of conflict within the country, and search for solutions which would allow all parties to live in mutual respect and dignity. The children's books seek to improve literacy, to engage children in discovering different approaches to life, and to encourage questions. Hence the stated objectives of the Children's Book Project are:

1) To provide recreational and instructional reading material,
2) To nurture children so that they may become adults who love peace, justice and their heritage.

To this end, certain criteria are used to select new books. The stories must address the fundamental issues of peace, freedom and justice. The stories must teach thinking skills and enhance the children's ability to analyze the society in which they live. The books should also foster a pride in being part of an ethnic group. In each book the children are asked to think about and discuss these values and the meaning for them. The children are encouraged to express themselves by writing and illustrating their own stories and submitting them for publication consideration. The stories can then be extended and enhanced by the teachers and parents. Rather than merely translating Thai or English books into an ethnic language, it is important to cover stories and issues which ordinary people in Burma can relate to. In short, the books should assist the children in becoming adults. Thus, stories often focus on methods of co-operation, and finding commonality, rather than difference and conflict. In a nation fractured by ethnic, religious and political hatred, the books can help to provide an alternative view of the world that may be otherwise lacking.

Work on the books is proactive in that it
also seeks to pre-empt a future need. If Burmese schools of the future wish to incorporate ethnic language curriculum into the school system, materials will be needed.

**Practical Concerns**

The project has now been underway for two years. There have been 26 books published to date, with the target of one book every two months. Each book is printed in two languages, and seven hundred copies are made of each. As stated, they now cover Karen, Burmese and Karenni languages, and plans are underway to include some Shan stories. (Clearly the objective here is to have stories that are relevant to the particular target ethnic group, not merely translate Karen books into Shan, or Karenni). The stories are for children aged between 3-12. Stories are received from many of different sources, most typically from children in the refugee camps, and from people working with Burma Issues. Naw Eh Paw the co-ordinator of the project is constantly seeking to improve the work. She freely admits that initially the books had some problems. There were many spelling mistakes as there were not enough people checking over the books, and the artwork and story lines at times were weak and failed to attract the children. But the nature of such a project is that it can respond to evaluation, rather than following rigid guidelines. Hence Naw Eh Paw has sought to improve the ‘quality control’ over the project through a more thorough edit, and using one single artist for the artwork. Another early problem of getting the books into the refugee camps, has been solved by getting the printers to ship the books directly into the camps. It is still impossible at this stage to get the books sent into Burma.

Many problems encountered in this project were inevitable. Rather than employing professional publishers, the project sought to utilise and train Burmese people. These people had little experience in producing books and had to develop the skills required. Their training has been an additional positive outcome of the project.

Despite the drawbacks, the response to the books has been overwhelmingly positive. The books have helped the children to learn to read their own languages, and they want to read more. They have found the books interesting, stimulating and informative. The books are used by teachers at schools in refugee camps. Typically the children will form groups of three around a book, and the teacher will guide them through it. After finishing the book, the teacher and students will discuss what the books is about, and what it means to them. “The teachers and children really like them, and the October book (with different stories about animals) was a real success” said one teacher from Mae La camp. Other books are distributed into libraries. As one librarian from Chiang Rai wrote: “many children now come into the library to read the books, and the parents can also read them and tell the smaller children, too young to read, what the stories are about.” A few unforeseen results have also emerged. Firstly, a number of adults have also read the books, highlighting the lack of ethnic language literacy material at all levels. Hence, the books have also been used in adult literacy programs. Illiteracy in ethnic languages among women is very high, and they will sometimes borrow the books from the schools. The books have also been used by schools internationally to help children understand the different cultures and languages in Burma and the situation in Burma in general. As a teacher who distributed a number of books thoughout France wrote: “French school teachers were interested to include (the books) in their program to awaken the children’s awareness about the Burmese realities.’ This has been a success.”

**Endnotes:**

1. Most notably the pioneering work by Paulo Freire, as outlined in Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

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**The following is a translation of one of the children's stories.**

**WE SHOULDN’T BE ARROGANT**

Once upon a time in a forest, there was a giant bull elephant who thought highly of himself. “I am the strongest in this forest, there is nobody stronger than I,” he said. He was very arrogant.

In the forest there was also a monkey who was smaller than the elephant. One day the elephant went to visit the monkey, and said, “I am the strongest in this forest. Who is as strong as I?” But the monkey didn’t agree, and the two of them went to visit the owl to settle the matter.

The owl wisely instructed them to go and get the fruit from a banyan tree on the far bank of a river. For the elephant crossing the river was not a problem, but the monkey could not do it. The elephant said, “Don’t worry about anything friend. I’ll take you across on my back.” Happily the monkey rode on the elephant’s back and together they crossed the great river.

When they reached the other side, they saw a giant banyan tree bearing a lot of fruit. But the elephant could not climb the tree. The monkey was happy and said “Friend, don’t worry about anything. There’s no problem.” They returned to the owl together and told of their experiences. Having heard the owl spoke wisely, “We shouldn’t think too highly or lowly of ourselves. If we stay in peace and unity with those around us, then we can get what we want.” From that time on the elephant was no longer arrogant.
I am from Karenni State in Burma. My village is just outside of the Karenni capital city of Loikaw. Because of government oppression, the people who live in my area have long faced problems on an everyday basis. These problems include forced labor, forced portering for soldiers at the front line, forced sale of rice paddy, forced relocation and having to pay many different kinds of fees. Even as a young student, I often worked on military farms and on railway projects as a forced laborer for my family. Many families got poorer and poorer year by year.

I fled to the revolution area in 1994 because I didn’t feel safe and my future looked hopeless. I thought that I could work to find the solution to the problems of my people there. Because of the government’s ‘Four cuts’ strategy, where people in civil war zones were relocated to government controlled villages, I fled along with many other people to Thailand and became a refugee.

After I came to Thailand I had some ideas about doing community organizing. I needed some friends to work with me. When I brought my ideas to my friends and discussed the issues they were not at all interested. I was surprised to find that they were just interested in getting money from the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) that work in the camp. Currently there are many international NGOs in the camps which seek to help people with material and other assistance. Instead of using these NGOs to support the people’s struggle for peace, my friends just work for salaries. They don’t pay attention to whether their work is effective for change or not. Most of my friends didn’t want to participate in my work, because it didn’t involve money and required hard work.

“We will get headaches and tire because we always must be working on strategies and tactics for the work,” they said. “We will face many problems and hardships.” Before I came to Thailand it would have been easy to find people to work with, but I discovered that people’s ideas have changed.

The NGOs in the refugee camps have many aims and targets; many ways of trying to help. They exist to help people who face troubles from war, natural disasters and other problems. They work in the areas of health and education as well as providing food and clothes. Some give human rights and religious training to the refugees, with some of the larger NGOs working in all these areas. But mostly, they show sympathy for the situation of the refugees. While NGOs obviously do a lot of work in the camps, they do not address the reason that the people are refugees. They are only interested in promoting their own agenda. They are often not interested in the root of the people’s problems, only in dealing with the symptoms of those problems. Consequently, they may be unaware that their attempts to help can, in fact, hurt the people’s struggle for justice and peace.

Still, some good does result from the work of NGOs. Many people gain experience in new areas and acquire knowledge about the world. They get ideas that they would not be able to get if they were still living in their own land. They can become health workers or teachers and learn more about administration. One environmental group has been able to use its exposure to international NGOs to get more information about the environmental situation around the world. Now they have some concrete examples of what happens with deforestation, and can use this information to plan for the future.

On the other hand, many international NGOs come with their own ideology – perhaps a religious belief system, or another type of western ideological agenda. Frequently, they don’t understand, or are not comfortable with the traditional ways and culture of the local people, and can hurt or change the way people work for justice. Before being exposed to NGOs, communities are more unified.

While NGOs give aid to everyone, they pay special attention to those who share their ideas. This special treatment leads to hierarchy and division within the camp, and to subtle pressure to conform to these ideas. Refugees who have the opportunity to work with NGOs receive high salaries which creates even more inequality in the camp community. The people become more focussed on receiving special treatment, aid, and high salaries from the NGOs than on their own problems. While NGOs can help people with food, education, health and information, they can also distract the people from their struggle for their future.

It is necessary for people to analyze what help is good for them and what is bad, rather than simply accepting it all. Refugees from Burma are not like people who need assistance because of natural disasters. There is a need for continued struggle towards change. Consequently, we should only be interested in NGOs that give positive help that supports future goals. We need to learn how some assistance can be negative and how to deal with it. We have always struggled to preserve our dignity as refugees. The NGOs must help support that struggle. If not, then their assistance isn’t beneficial. All the NGOs in the camps say that they are not political groups, but sometimes their assistance can either help or hurt the political struggle indirectly.

A Karenni camp resident who grew up in an area controlled by the Karenni National Progressive Party, described his experience with NGOs. He said that before he fled to Thailand his community had been like one big family. They didn’t care about hierarchy, power or money. They faced many hardships together. Now many of these people are involved with NGOs, and they have changed. They have a different vision and idea in their new work. They are now concerned with such things as position, money and ideology within the NGOs. They treat each other like strangers. He wanted to belong to a close community like before.

Many youths who finish school in the refugee camp are very interested in joining an NGO without any clear vision for their own future. They seek only to have a salaried job. Many parents say that they want their children to be clever and work in an NGO with a high salary. Those who do get work
with NGOs seldomly analyze their work. It may be beneficial or it may be a barrier to the people’s struggle for peace and justice. Being refugees, some families are allowed to apply to be resettled in third countries. Some people are very interested in the opportunity of going abroad and escaping their problems. However, only very few families are able to do this, and most people must remain in the camp. Leaving can only mean that these people will forget their people’s problems and struggle. Some NGO’s projects can create this problem. When some people or leaders escape the refugee camp to foreign countries, they can not help the people’s struggle. They flee from their people and their problems.

Other people live life in a daze in the refugee camp. They can get rice; they can get money; they can get clothing. Even if they do nothing, they can have all these things. They don’t want to do anything, and they fear going back to their homeland. Even if they could return to their homeland, their children, who were born in the camp, wouldn’t know how to survive. Sometimes they feel that don’t want to continue their struggle. They lose hope and learn to depend on the NGOs. They become afraid that if there were no NGO, they would be unable to survive.

I would like the NGOs to know that we are not just refugees, we always are struggling for a better future. The people who help us should know our background and our history. NGOs should analyze their work in regards to the people’s struggle for their rights. Sometimes good intentions can be dangerous for the people. NGOs should not take away the dignity of the people, all of their help should support their struggle.

The people cannot forget that they are always fighting for their rights. They should always move towards their target. One day we must go back to our homeland with dignity and pride. The NGOs will not be able to help us forever. If we live as a refugee in another country for a long time, we may lose our traditional ways and cultures. A relative of mine who is 5 or 6 years old and lives in a Karenni refugee camp asked his father about a cow that had wandered into the camp. He had never seen a cow in his life. It is difficult for this child to learn and understand his Karenni culture and history. Without that knowledge how can he make plans for the future. Refugees need to avoid the dangers of losing their dignity, becoming lazy, or being a ‘victim’. This is true of both people in refugee camps and those still in their homeland. If we cannot try to help ourselves, no international group can help us.

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I saw a village
It was the most beautiful in my life
Big mountains surrounded it
A little stream flowed slowly beside the village
We couldn’t see it until we were very close
Because it was hidden by green plants

Some villagers bathed in the stream
Children played by the road in the village
Dogs barked loudly at us
People looked at us curiously because we were soldiers

An old man came out from his old hut
And gave us a gourd of boiled water
Then he asked a question of us:

“When will we regain our freedom, my sons?”
“Don’t worry, we always are trying for it,” we replied

Then we left from the village with some different feelings

Later after three years,
We heard the bad news that
The Burma Army burned down the village
Which I had seen before

I miss the village so much
I want to see the villagers take a bath in the beautiful stream

But I can’t see the beautiful village and
I can’t reply to the old man who asked the question to us.

- T. R.
International political legitimacy and economic support are prime commodities for the government of any aspiring developing nation. This has been especially true for Burma's ruling military junta since they took over the reins of power more than a decade ago. Many Western nations initially withdrew their support from the ruling SLORC following the 1988 coup, and have since taken further steps to isolate the junta. Attempting to liberalize its economy in attempt to avert the economic problems that had caused the change in the government in the first place, Burma was looking for foreign investment to stabilize its economy. To survive the junta has been forced to seek support from every corner, particularly from neighboring nations—many of whom have historically been enemies.

It comes as little surprise that post 1988, isolated and in need of military support, Burma should seek assistance from China. The communist giant, which has itself existed on the fringes of the international arena, was the first country to recognize the new military government and quickly became an active trading partner. According to official government of Burma statistics, the value of goods imported from China rose from 24.42 million kyats in the 1987-88 fiscal year to 1.2 billion kyats three years later. Even accounting for the fluctuating Burmese currency, this increase vastly overshadows the 3 fold increase in imports from Singapore and a decrease in Japanese imports over the same period. At the same time, hundreds of millions of dollars in arms trade, not reported in official statistics, bound China and Burma even more closely together.

Despite the extent to which the military junta leaned on its northern neighbor in the early years, it would also be a mistake to see the Burma-China relationship as a "friendship." The Chinese, along with the Indians, were dominant economic force in Burma from before colonial times until after independence, large amounts of the property and many of the businesses and factories. Following Ne Win's coup in 1962 the government attempted to purge the country of both of these groups. Property was seized and Chinese language schools and newspapers were shut down. Now the Chinese have once again become a dominant economic force in the country, especially in the northern portions of Burma, creating resentment among the local populace. While Burma has profited from China's naval forces in China, increased unrest in northern Burma, a large trade imbalance and significant debt represent considerable threats to national security. There is even some feeling, both inside and outside the country, that Burma is losing its sovereignty to its giant neighbor.

By 1995 Burma had largely 'outgrown' its relationship with China. Risks outweighed benefits, and concern on the part of its ASEAN neighbors was increasing. In October of that year, the Thai defense minister at that time, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh raised concern about the arms build-up of "our neighboring country" on an official visit to Beijing. Upon his return he said assurances had been given that the arms sales to Burma would stop, an agreement that was never implemented. ASEAN nations also regarded rumors of a closer relationship between Burma and China's naval forces seriously, as Chinese access to the Andaman sea would also provide access to the economically important straits of Malacca. Furthermore, many ASEAN nations have had long histories with Chinese expansionism, including recent claims on the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea. So as Burma was seeking alternatives to trade with China, ASEAN was simultaneously seeking ways to diminish China's hold on Burma.

Burma's liberal use of the China card in its bid for ASEAN membership, certainly played into the decision making process. The interview in which Burmese foreign minister Ohn Gyaw confirmed his country's intentions of seeking ASEAN membership, in July of 1995, also found him affirming his counties strong ties to China. An affirmation that was all the more substantive for the fact that it immediately followed a visit by Chinese Defense Minister Chi Guotian to Rangoon. Soon after, on August 2nd, Burma acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia (TAC), the first step towards ASEAN membership. Burma needed a level of legitimacy beyond what China could offer in the face of stiffening Western opinion towards the military regime. It was assumed that ASEAN membership would bring that increased legitimacy. A year after the signing of the TAC, when Burma was granted observer status in the regional grouping, an article in the New Light of Myanmar voiced what would later prove wishful thinking. "Faced with blanket opposition from ASEAN states, [US Secretary of State] Christopher and other Western officials have backed away from earlier threats of economic and other sanctions against Myanmar," read a July, 1996 article.

No decision in a group as fractured as ASEAN is simple, and Burma's acceptance into the bloc was no exception. Members of the regional group range from highly developed Singapore to impoverished Laos; from democratic Thailand to communist Vietnam. One of the few things that the grouping has historically agreed on is the principle of "non-interference" in member's affairs, and ultimately that played a significant role in Burma's membership into the bloc. As much as China's strategic involvement in Burma may have influenced the process, the ASEAN member states had a variety of reasons for supporting Burma membership, not the least of which was trade potential. South East Asian countries accounted for a large portion of both import and export trade with Burma, with some members like Singapore actively encouraging trade as the best means of influencing political change. Additionally, a unified South East Asia had been a dream of ASEAN members since the group's inception in 1967. There was a hope that all would benefit from further consolidation of the region's economy and the common political forum would increase the stability and development of the sub-region. Proponents also hoped that ASEAN could serve as a strong front to represent the region internationally.

The risks of accepting Burma into the fold were also apparent to ASEAN members. While it was generally agreed on that Burma should be accepted into the grouping, various factions within ASEAN held differing opinions on the time frame for membership. It was obvious to regional leaders that Burma's military government, as eager as it was to gain legitimacy, was not going to allow anyone to question its domestic policy. Furthermore, there was an understanding of the risk involved if Burma didn't make the sought after changes under ASEAN's wing. With both the EU and US taking tougher
stances against Burma's military leaders, it was clear from early on that ASEAN was at risk of souring relations with some if its strongest Western allies. Even before the signing of the TAC, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans warned ASEAN not to embrace Burma too hastily and to make Burma's membership contingent on political change. ASEAN-ISIS, a network of strategic institutes that produced policy papers for the grouping, submitted a memo warning ASEAN of the potential threat that Burma's acceptance posed to its international reputation prior to the 1996 regional foreign ministers meeting. Consequently, the first steps towards Burma's membership were taken with great care on the part of ASEAN. It was made clear in the beginning that the anticipated process for acceptance of Burma into the regional grouping would take 5 years. Accordingly, the granting of observer status in ASEAN meetings was delayed almost a full year, in contrast with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam who were almost immediately given that right upon accession to the TAC. This caution was interpreted by analysts as a sign that regional leaders would set tougher standards for Burma's entry into the grouping.

Ultimately, it was Burma's own initiative that pushed the membership process ahead by more than three years from the initial timeframe. A visit by Senior General Than Shwe to Malaysia, which at that time held the ASEAN presidency, immediately followed the July 1996 meeting when Burma received observership in ASEAN. During that visit Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir made a public statement supporting Burma's full membership by the time of the bloc's 30th anniversary celebration in 1997, a full year before what normal ASEAN protocol would allow. A formal letter from Burma's Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw requesting membership under that time frame soon followed. Despite efforts on the part of Thailand and Philippines to slow down the process, Burma was admitted, with strong support from Singapore and Indonesia, under the Malaysian time table on July 23, 1997. Four months later, feeling secure under ASEAN's wing, Burma promptly closed it's border with China. With the traffic through the Muse-Ruili pass effectively cut, China-Burma trade slowed to a trickle, much to the anger of Chinese immigrants and the accumulated debt owed to China.

While condemnation of ASEAN is plentiful, too often the issue of China and the strategic concerns behind Burma's acceptance into the regional bloc are forgotten. China's relationship with Burma is one of the trickier issues affecting change in Burma. No one wants to see Burma become any closer to its neighbor to the north than it already is. It is a barrier to effective economic sanctioning for the West and a strategic risk, both for Asian nations and Burma. It is one issue that ASEAN members, human rights activists, Western governments and the military junta can all agree on. However, that is where the agreement ends. China's ear is as deaf to appeals on human rights grounds as Burma's military government. Western governments at date haven't considered the situation in Burma of enough interest to put forth much diplomatic effort on the issue. ASEAN and other Asian nations attempts to negate the Chinese influence through influence of their own. This has not been entirely successful as Burma has frequently cut ties with ASEAN compatriots when convenient. Activists have largely ignored the issue as too complex to deal with. Burma itself has yet to deal successfully with the increasing flood of Chinese immigrants and the accumulated debt owed to China.

Without examination and discussion of the larger context of ASEAN's decision to accept Burma as a member, criticism of that decision will be taken less seriously. This doesn't invalidate past criticism, but rather means that critiques of ASEAN should address the China issue as well. ASEAN's passive approach to member's "internal affairs" has allowed Burma to 'ride the fence', receiving the benefits of both relationships but without avoiding both political change and excessive Chinese influence. Burma will continue to play the different parties off each other to its own advantage unless a strong stance is taken.

NOTICE

In early February, Burma Issues' office was raided by Thai authorities and several members of the staff were taken into custody for residing illegally in Bangkok. We voluntarily closed our office for several months and just recently resumed our regular work. This issue of our newsletter, was considerably behind schedule, but almost complete at the time of the raid. As such, it is being released as is. More explanation and information on the recent experiences of Burma Issues and other organizations located in Thailand and working on the Burma situation will be forthcoming in next months updated, and redesigned version of the newsletter.

Thank you for your patience.

- The Editor
The Last Word
What Others Have to Say About Burma

“I know the dangers of AIDS but I have no choice. I must send money to my parents or they will starve....I've never done anything like this before. I couldn't find work in a factory so I contacted a mama-san.” An 18 year old girl from Burma who had been repatriated November but who returned to Thailand to work as a prostitute in the border province of Tak.

“The Japanese government as well as financial institutions want to assist [Burma], but the Americans have been pressuring them not to...The West has been pointing out that if we have political reforms, or if we do what they want, they will assist us. We don’t do what the big powers ask us to do.” State Peace and Development Council's economics advisor Brig-Gen David Abel to a group of journalists during a visit by a Japanese delegation led by former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.

Burma used to not be considered so strategically important, but it's becoming more and more so when it comes to formulating diplomatic policy....It also has significant resources and Japan doesn’t want to give up economic interests to China.” Toshiro Kudo, a researcher at the Institute of Developing Economies commenting on the recent increase in Japanese attention towards Burma.

“We regard Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a younger sister.... I have no personal animosity towards her and it is my earnest hope that she will change her totally negative and confrontational attitude against us, which is also negatively affecting the entire nation.” Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt in an interview in the December 17th issue of Asiaweek magazine.

“I don’t mind where it will be as long as I can pursue my studies peacefully,” A student in Rangoon on the cited reopening of universities in mid-December at three satellite campuses outside the capital.

“If they respected the sovereignty of their neighbor, there would not be any problem concerning illegal workers. These problems will remain as a never-ending story as long as the other country does not mend its ways.” A commentary in Burma's government-run Kyemon newspaper responding to Thailand's repatriation of Burmese immigrants.

“In fact, the border closure and repatriation mess is symptomatic of the underlying political crisis in Burma today. Were Burma a democracy, the Thai and Burmese governments could easily work out border tensions without having to resort to such hostile measures.” Analyst Win Min in The Nation newspaper November 28, 1999.

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