
(Ne Win Taisei-Ki Biruma ni Okeru Sei-Gun Kankei (1962-1988))

ネー・ウィン体制期ビルマにおける政軍関係 (1962 - 1988)

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This dissertation aims to describe the transformation of civil-military relations from 1962 to 1988 in Burma, focusing on Gen. Ne Win’s leadership and the bureaucratic development of the military (tatmadaw). The author argues that wide-ranging distribution of state posts to the relatively small-sized officer corps is the most important factor for the military regime durability in Burma. It enabled Ne Win to maintain his power for 26 years and tatmadaw to exercise powerful influence on other political actors. In order to demonstrate this point, the author examines how the formal and informal networks of the officer corps expanded to other state organizations under Ne Win’s project of party-state building. The author’s argument is largely based on primary sources of the archives in Burma and interviews with former military and party officers. The study consists of four main parts. The first part deals with the state ideology formation. Previous studies have analyzed the state ideology of Ne Win regime from the perspective of Burma nationalism. The author reexamines the conventional views by focusing on the interaction between the personal history of U Chit Hlaing, the drafter of the ideology, and the military politics in the 1950s. It demonstrates that some anti-communistic and pro-constitutional propaganda articles became the state ideology after the coup d'état on March 2nd 1962, which denied the 1947 Constitution and legitimated the political intervention by tatmadaw. The second part is an analysis of the relationship between the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and tatmadaw. Based on detailed empirical investigations into personnel
management of BSPP, the author traces the process that Ne Win attempted to build a party-state since 1962 and finally failed in 1977. It concludes that Ne Win’s state reformation resulted in a party-state manqué (=failed). The third part looks into the impact of party-state building on the civil bureaucracy. It shows that the administrative reformation in the middle of the 1970s created the basic patterns of the transfer of the military officers to the central and local administrative organizations. The author explains the weakness of bureaucrats or technocrats in Ne Win’s Burma compared with the contemporary military regimes in Thailand and Indonesia. The forth part provides an explanation to Ne Win’s leadership and tatmadaw transformation. It challenges the monolithic image of Ne Win–tatmadaw relations, and shows the detailed process of development of tatmadaw. The author argues that the control of tatmadaw was essential to Ne Win’s power maintenance and the limitation of his control over tatmadaw led to the coup d'état on September 18th 1988.

The thesis concludes that Ne Win’s leadership was characterized by the dilemmas between his strong intention for the political “revolution” (tohlanyeĩ) and his weak power base in other organizations except tatmadaw. His strong intention enabled him to embark on building a party-state. However, his project was not completed as a result of his weak power base. This attempt and failure of party-state building hindered civilian institutions from developing on one hand, and on the other hand it institutionalized tatmadaw intervention into every field of the government. Consequently, tatmadaw became the powerful political actor in Burma and created the basic mechanism for the interest coordination in accordance with the military hierarchy.