THE DUTCH IN SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY
By Wil O.
Dijk
The VOC had
three factories in seventeenth century Burma: the main office in Syriam and
subsidiaries in Ava and Pegu City. The present research adds a new dimension to
VOC as well as Burma studies seeing that till now, even Dutch historians were
quite unaware of the fact that the VOC traded successfully with Burma for
almost half a century.
=====
The vast
archives of the Dutch East Asia Company (VOC) at the ARA (Algemeen Rijksarchief
/ General State Archives) at The Hague have yielded a veritable treasure
trove of information on Dutch relations with seventeenth century Burma. This
newly unearthed material enables us to finally determine what the VOC’s Burma
trade entailed and how it fitted into the grand design of the Company’s
inter-Asian commerce, where it was not as marginal as some historians would
have it. This complete set of invaluable contemporary materials also allows us
a unique glimpse of life in seventeenth century Burma. There are no lacunae at
all in the collection of VOC documents covering the Burma years, consequently,
it has been possible to compile complete series of indispensable statistics,
such as shipping, import and export, profit and loss, wages and prices
(standard of living), as well as details on all the Indian textiles the Dutch
imported into Burma, together with their purchasing and selling prices and the
margins of profit.
The VOC’s trade with Burma
began formally on 14 May 1634, when the Vlielandt sailed from Masulipatnam to
Syriam with a cargo worth about 36.000 guilders and high hopes for profitable
trade. The Dutch established three factories: the main lodge in the port city
of Syriam, a subsidiary office in the capital, Ava, and a small establishment
in Pegu City, often referred to as 'The Little Store' (Het Winkeltje). For a
while, in the early years, the Dutch also had a place in Prome. Their Burma
establishment always remained within the jurisdiction of Pulicat, the Company's
head-office on the Choromandel Coast. The number of VOC servants stationed in
Burma barely fluctuated and generally numbered 14 in all - 3 senior merchants, 2 junior merchants, 4
assistants, and 5 sailors.
The VOC’s Burma years can be
divided into three distinct periods: 1) The Early Years (1634-1648): Years of
Indecision; 2) The Middle Years (1649-1669): Golden Years; 3) The Final Years
(1670-1680): Decline and Departure. During the first period there were repeated
suggestions, in turn by Pulicat and Batavia (the Company’s head office in the
East), to close down the Burma factories. The two seemed unable to agree so
that trade continued, albeit half-heartedly. The second period saw a great
improvement in overall conditions in Burma and Dutch trade flourished. In the
final years, a new king with little interest in foreigners or their trade
ascended Burma’s throne. But perhaps more importantly, over the preceding
decades, the character and the objectives of the VOC itself had altered
markedly, while forces beyond its control now worked to undermine the Company.
In the end, their Burma trade became a casualty of these profoundly changed
conditions.
During their time in Burma,
the Dutch had dealings with four Toungoo Kings (Thalun, Pindalè, Pye, and
Minyèkyawdin). As is the case with relations the world over, the exchange of
gifts played a key role in smoothing ruffled feathers and lubricating the
wheels of social and commercial intercourse. This has provided us with detailed
lists of many of the gifts that were exchanged between the Dutch and the Kings
as well as other Burmese dignitaries. Among Burmese return gifts were ruby
rings, betel boxes, tin, lac, chillies, elephant tusks, teak, musk and, as a
great favour, the odd elephant. On occasion, Dutch gifts could be quite exotic;
once, King Thalun was even presented with a lion and a bear. But typically,
Dutch gifts consisted chiefly of luxurious and costly textiles. Now, when
comparing the lists of gift textiles with those of commercial textiles, it is
clear that these two distinct categories of fabrics moved in vastly different
worlds. On the one hand, there were the exquisite and extremely expensive
textiles that were offered as gifts in the elite and rarefied world of palaces
and kings and then there were the cheap, coarse commercial textiles that were
traded in the dusty, down to earth world of shops and marketplaces. It is this
second category of textiles that formed the backbone of the VOC’s Burma trade.
The VOC’s main interest in
Burma was as an import market. At no time did the Dutch go there with silver or
gold to procure Burmese goods. Burma’s importance as an import market lay in
the fact that the considerable Burmese profits from the sale of Indian textiles
and red cotton yarn provided the Company’s factories in Choromandel and Bengal
with much-needed additional funds to reinvest in yet more textiles for the
Burmese and other Asian markets.
The textiles most in demand
in Burma were of an average quality, medium to coarse and low in price, such as
the plain and coarse bethilles, chelas and allegias from which the Burmese made
their cabayas and lungis. However, it was the lowliest of the textiles, like
chiavonis, tampis, cortis, coarse chintz and narrow black taffachelas and,
above all, the coarse and cheap brandams, blue boulongs and single-ply taffachelas
that sold best. As for the colourfast Indian red cotton yarn that was in such
great demand, the Burmese mixed it with indigenous yarns to weave cloth of
their own.
There was a large assortment
of Burmese export goods. Statistics indicate that the Dutch generally took what
they could get. Tin was a constant throughout as was bee’s wax and chillies
(long pepper), while lac and elephant tusks were important as well. In the
1650s, Chinese copper coins and Burmese ganza (a metal akin to bell metal) were
major exports. The Dutch turned large quantities of Chinese copper coins
flowing into Burma from Yunnan into ready money to be used as legal tender in
Batavia and Ceylon. In the final years, they also exported a great deal of
gold, much of it from China. The Dutch sold Burmese export goods in the most
profitable markets throughout the East. The VOC’s Bengal factory, always in
need of additional funds, was sent valuable Burmese cargoes (including Chinese
coins, ganza, and zinc) to generate capital. The copper extracted from Chinese
coins and ganza was in great demand in Choromandel as was gold, tin, timber and
chillies. In Japan there was a profitable market for Burmese catechu, namrack,
deerskins, buffalo hides and horns. Lac gave excellent profits in Mocha as well
as in Persia where there was also a good market for Burmese tin, elephant tusks
and cardamom, not to mention, the costliest of Burma’s fabled rubies.
Considerable quantities of Burmese elephant tusks were regularly shipped to
Surat, while in Holland there was a demand for the excellent Burmese lac. As
for Burma’s famous Martaban jars, throughout the East there was a constant
demand for these huge, glazed pots that could be used to store and transport a
myriad things, from potable water and rice to gunpowder and on occasion even
stowaways.
One of the chief problems
inherent in the VOC’s Burma trade was that, due to a lack of sufficient export
goods, the Dutch experienced difficulty in transferring their money (the
proceeds from the sale of Indian textiles and yarn) from Burma to Choromandel
and Bengal where additional funds were desperately needed. To this end, the
Dutch provided Indian ruby merchants with large loans in Burma that they were
contracted to repay within a certain period after their return to India.
Nonetheless, comparatively large amounts of capital remained tied up in Burma.
Even though the steadily accumulating sums of Company money had always been the
cause of great worry, it was not a major factor in the VOC’s decision to abandon
Burma.
Why then did the Dutch
decide to discontinue their Burma trade at that particular point in time? After
all, it had been profitable throughout. But was it still sufficiently
profitable towards the end of the seventeenth century? Here, the Eurasian
context is essential to understanding how the VOC developed and carried on its
trade with Burma. The Dutch East India Company’s overall circumstances and
policies had altered greatly since those early days when they first came to the
Bay of Bengal and established trade relations with Burma. During the 1670s and
80s, destructive forces began working against the Company from the furthest
reaches of the Eurasian continent bringing an era of great prosperity for the
VOC to an end and diminishing the relative importance of the Dutch inter-Asian
sea borne traffic. Ultimately, their Burma trade became the victim of a change
in Dutch fortunes.
While it lasted, trade with
Burma had been so lucrative that in the first half of the eighteenth century
the Dutch made several attempts to re-enter the Burmese market. By then,
however, Burma had entered a period of civil unrest. The country was in the
throes of the demise of the Toungoo Dynasty and the emergence of the Konbaung
Dynasty, not the best of times for the VOC to renew its highly profitable Burma
trade.
==============
(Mrs) Wil O. Dijk is a PhD candidate at Leiden
University in The Netherlands and is researching the Dutch East Asia Company
(VOC) in Burma in the seventeenth century.
E-mail:
Wil.Dijk@compaqnet.nl.